

THE OPEN COURT.

A WEEKLY JOURNAL

DEVOTED TO THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE.

No. 287. (VOL. VII.—8.)

CHICAGO, FEBRUARY 23, 1893.

Two Dollars per Year.
Single Copies, 5 Cents.

COPYRIGHT BY THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.—Reprints are permitted only on condition of giving full credit to Author and Publisher.

AUTOS-DA-FÉ.

BY DR. FELIX L. OSWALD.

MORAL philosophers have often expressed the opinion that no change in the by-laws of ethics will ever affect the stability of certain conventional maxims—not strictly compatible, in all cases, with our present conceptions of ideal justice. Among the numerous proofs demonstrating the permanence of those international compromise axioms we might mention the facts that Might has always biased the standards of Right, and that no protest against the atrocity of individual sufferings has ever been permitted to interfere with the promotion of principles supposed to involve the supreme welfare of the community.

Alexander the Great, in his sober moments, appears to have been anything but a despot, and some of his paladins were men of conspicuous clemency, and represented the most cultured cities and countries of the universe, but they all agreed on the necessity of striking terror to the heart of their Asiatic foe. The welfare of Greece seemed to demand the intimidation of her Eastern rivals, and the staff of that army of civilisation, in cold blood, ordered the crucifixion of twelve thousand prisoners of war.

The law of Lycurgus, as a rule, sacrificed both class-privileges and the claims of mercy to the principles of stern justice, but state interests suggested an exception in the case of the rebellious Helots, and the multiplication of the obnoxious race was prevented by a combination of barbarous cruelty and worse than barbarous treachery—perpetrated by men who in their dealings with other enemies often preferred death to a breach of faith.

The ecclesiastic diatribes against the despotism of the Roman Cæsars are refuted by the simple fact that for centuries an empire of 4,500,000 square miles could be kept quiet with a standing army of 95,000 men, and the *Pax Romana*, inaugurated by policy of the Emperor Augustus, will perhaps remain the nearest earthly approach to the realisation of the millennium dream. But the successors of Augustus recognised the fact that the turbulent elements of the vast metropolis could be pacified by means of liberality more easily

than by daily massacres. They also believed in the necessity of popular pastimes, and realised the wisdom of propitiating the leaders of victorious armies, and under the best as well as under the worst of the twenty-six world-kings the significance of the *ve victis* was brought home to vanquished foes and captured criminals in those orgies of bloodshed which have been called the “foulest stain on the records of the human race.”

Yet among the Roman writers who utterly failed to anticipate that verdict of posterity, there were some exemplars of Stoic ethics, and some who frequently denounced acts of *wanton* cruelty to animals and men. Cicero, who treated his slaves more kindly than our modern Cæsars their soldiers, and entrusted his fortune to the care of one of his freedmen, defends the arena-games on the ground that “compelling guilty men to fight is the best possible discipline against effeminacy that can be presented to the eyes of the multitude.” The second epistle of the prefect Symmachus, after urging the wisdom of equanimity and the renunciation of what Christian moralists would call the vanities of earth, mentions the “impious suicide” of some prisoners, which he had purchased for the purpose of making them fight at the funeral of his son, and who would have exhausted his patience under the spite of fate if he had not recalled the fortitude of the martyred Socrates. (Symmachus, “Epist.” II, 46.) Pliny, the eloquent advocate of humane reforms, extols the merit of Trajan in “discouraging amusements that enervate the souls of men,” (dancing and the comic drama, etc.,) and giving preference to those inspiring a noble contempt of wounds and even of death.” The same writer endorses the petition of the citizens of Verona, who had asked permission to establish a circus of their own, and remarks that “to refuse so general a request any longer would be cruelty rather than firmness.” (“Epist.,” VI, 34.)

Trajan, the idol of the golden age of paganism, devoted at least 200,000 men to the spectacles of the arena, (10,000 of them once on a single day,) and Titus, whose kindness of disposition had so endeared him to his subjects that the news of his death threw the inhabitants of all the Mediterranean coast-lands

into mourning—the same “World’s Delight” ruler attested, in the opinion of his biographer, his amiability of character by “jesting with the people during the combats of the gladiators.” (Suetonius, “Titus,” VIII.)

The inhumanities practiced by hundreds of mediæval abbots in the treatment of their monks reached the *ne plus ultra* of systematic cruelty—since additional afflictions would have produced a speedier death, and the tortures of heretics in many parts of southern Europe were such as to justify the belief that pity had flown from the world; yet a plurality of those same ministers of woe were undoubtedly men of humane disposition and of unselfish devotion to what they considered the best interests of the human race. Their creed had made them connect the promotion of that interest with the sacrifice of natural reason and the natural instinct of pity on the altar of faith, and in their crusade against the champions of rationalism they would have considered it a preposterous aberration of weakness to weigh the transient horrors of an auto-da-fé against the eternity of torture prepared for all whom the influence of the condemned sceptic might have caused to swerve from the path of orthodoxy.

Pedro Rodriguez, one of the most active of the Spanish inquisitors, was so averse to the sight of human suffering that he always withdrew from the sessions of his tribunal when the judges ordered the torture of a witness, and the personal appeals of some of the condemned caused him more than one sleepless night and repeatedly made him pray for death as the only refuge from the cruel conflict between duty and inclination.

The Dominican Planedis, who signed innumerable sentences of death, was so scrupulous in the examination of evidence that he sacrificed the fortune of his family in paying expenses exceeding the available resources of the court, and at last lost his life (1235) on a journey undertaken for the purpose of examining additional witnesses. Torquemada himself was a man of charitable and even generous impulses, and his replies to the appeals of his victims often suggest the answer of the Gascon captain, whose regiment had received orders to grant no quarter: “*Demandez-moi toute chose, monsieur, mais pour la vie, pas moyen,*” said he, when a captured ensign asked to be spared in consideration of his youth.

Torquemada darkened the sunlight of Spain with the fumes of burning misbelievers, but the absolute sincerity of his religious zeal is attested by a list of the legislative amendments enacted at his advice. He diminished the emoluments of the church by abolishing the privilege of suspected heretics to waive examination and furnish coined security for his promise of sub-

mission. He extended the time of grace intervening between an ecclesiastic injunction and the institution of criminal proceedings, and he multiplied the number of indulgences granted to minors and “pagans” (Mohammedans, etc.) recently arrived from foreign parts. He was, in all his private transactions, a righteous man, and his thousands of ultra-savage and ultra-bestial cruelties were not acts of passion or malevolence, but in the strictest sense, acts of faith.

In 1869 the gardener of Capt. Elphinstone was torn to pieces in the suburbs of Lucknow by a mob of Hindu fanatics who had seen him shoot a Hanuman monkey. That mob was composed of men who treat their children and servants with infinite kindness and who would rather submit to the decimation of their crops than lift a stone against a rice-bird, but they were firmly convinced that the murder of a sacred ape would call down the vengeance of heaven, and they lost no time in averting the ruin of the community by the sacrifice of the reckless offender. Autos-da-fé, in honor of Brahmin dogmas, are not limited to the present century, for three thousand years ago the mild rulers of Hindostan enforced a law that punished with death every participant in a riot against the authority of a Brahmin. He who contradicted a priest of Brahm was punished with the loss of his tongue; a blow was avenged by the amputation of the right arm, intruders upon the privacy of a praying *Rishi* could be attacked with a club, and slain on the spot, if they refused to leave. It was the barbarity of dogmatism, the aberration of a mild-mannered, patient, and passive people, becoming cruelly active in the interest of faith.

The decadence of religious fanaticism has not obviated the possibility of such aberrations. The glare of publicity shed upon the recent fire-orgies of Judge Lynch at Paris, Texas, puts that fact in the clearest light. The perpetrators of that portentous outrage were no border-ruffians. They were, as a class, men of education, of charitable habits, of rather liberal views on questions of politics and municipal administrations. They have abolished oppressive rent-laws and seem to favor the cause of temperance. Their school-commissioners discourage Knout-methods of education. Their county rejected a proposed tramp-law, rather than involve the destitute home-seeker in the fate of the shiftless vagrant. But they emphatically believe in the expediency of self-helps in dealing with certain forms of crime which seem to defy the remedies of the law, and which are never condoned in communities where a penchant for manslaughter is included among the venial foibles of an impulsive character. The managers of the public auto-da-fé also believed in the necessity of purging their county from the reproach of judicial delays, and above all, they associated the welfare of their community and their state

with the necessity of maintaining the supremacy of the Caucasian Race—at the cost even of another civil war. The dread of political subjection to their former Helots overshadows the prospects of their country like a dark cloud, and stimulates all classes of white citizens to a passionate readiness for summary and instant coöperation in averting the impending danger. “The truth is, we dare not break the solidity of our battle-front,” said the Southern correspondent of a leading political journal, “our prosperity, our very existence, depends upon the chance of maintaining our ground against the common foe.”

If a Mexican, an Englishman, or even a notorious partisan of the Republican faction, had harangued the mob in the name of humanity, the emphasis of his remarks might have been condoned in consideration of his motive; the slightest protest on the part of the black fellow-citizens of the victim would have been answered with a volley of rifle-balls.

On the Rio Grande the bugbear of a Mexican revolt is sometimes paraded for oratorical purposes, but the plurality of the Saxon colonists do not believe in the reality of that danger and discourage acts of violence against the life or property of their Spanish-American neighbors. They do believe in the possibility of Negro-rule with its train of odious consequences, and the efforts of the State Government will utterly fail to secure the punishment of a participator in the horrid cruelties of an act of predominant faith.

ABSTRACTION.

I.

THE importance of understanding the process and scope of abstraction is very great, for abstraction is the very essence and nature of man's method of thought. The ability of thinking in abstracts distinguishes him from the rest of the animal world.

Abstraction is a very simple process, and yet some of the greatest philosophers have misunderstood it. He, however, who is not clear on this subject, or neglects the rules of abstraction, will never be able to attain lucidity or accuracy of thought.

The greatest difficulty for a child when he learns to walk is, not to stumble over his own feet. Similarly, the greatest difficulty with philosophers is, not to stumble over their own ideas. All our ideas are abstractions, and different abstractions represent different qualities of the objects which we meet in experience. In order to preserve clearness of thought, we must not confound the different ideas, and must not transfer a certain abstract that belongs to one set of abstractions into another quite different domain of abstractions. At the same time, we must never leave out of sight that the reality from which our abstractions are made is one inseparable unity.

The very existence of many problems proves how little the nature of abstract ideas is understood. There is, for instance, the question which has again and again been raised, whether the soul can be explained from matter or energy. The question itself is wrong, and proves that the questioner stumbles over his own ideas. We might just as well ask whether matter can be explained from energy, or energy from matter. Matter and energy are two different kinds of abstraction, and feelings, or states of consciousness, are again another kind. We cannot explain any idea by confounding it with other heterogeneous ideas. What would we say, for instance, of a man who spoke of blue or green ideas, or who attempted an explanation of mathematical problems from the law of gravitation? What should we say of a philosopher who proposes the problem whether ideas can be explained from the ink in which they are written?

Our abstracts are stored away, as it were, in different drawers and boxes. Any one who expects to solve problems that confound two sets of abstractions, has either stored his ideas improperly or searches for them in the wrong box.

* * *

If a problem is hopelessly entangled, we cannot solve it, and being led to regard the confusion of our mind as a true image of the world: we come to the conclusion that the world is incomprehensible; that is, we fall into agnosticism. But such is the confusion which generally prevails, that the man who reaches the conclusion that all things are at bottom utterly unknowable, becomes the leading philosopher of the time. Mr. Spencer actually declares in his famous work “The Data of Psychology” that “the substance of mind” (sic!) is unknowable.

Mr. Spencer searches for his explanation of mind in the wrong box.

Misunderstand the nature of abstraction and an impenetrable mist will cover all our thinking and philosophising.

Says Professor Huxley in an address on Descartes's “Discourse”:

“If I say that *impenetrability* is a property of matter, all that I can really mean is that the consciousness I call *extension* and the consciousness I call *resistance*, constantly accompany one another. Why and how they are thus related is a mystery.”

He first abstracts two qualities, viz., extension and resistance, from one and the same thing, and then wonders why they are constantly found together. By the bye, extension and resistance are not always joined unless we identify both ideas. The surrounding air is extended but does not perceptibly resist unless so closed up that it cannot escape. Extension and resistance, of course, always accompany one another if, as in physics, extension is used as a synonym of re-

sistance, if extending means exercising a pressure or resisting. Where is the mystery that fluidity is always accompanied by liquidity, that inflammability is always found together with ignitability, etc., etc.?

Professor Huxley has stored ideas which belong in the same box in different boxes.

* * *

Some philosophers forget very easily that our ideas are not reality itself, but representations of reality. They are symbols, representing certain features of reality. While our ideas of different spheres partly overlap, partly exclude each other, reality itself from which they have been abstracted, is not a "combination" of heterogeneous existences. On the contrary, we must always bear in mind that the totality of the world is an inseparable unity. All reality is one great whole and our ideas draw limits between the different provinces that are of a purely ideal nature.

Ideas, and especially abstract ideas, are symbols which serve for orientation in the world. They help us to find our bearings. Energy is not matter, and matter is not energy, but for that very reason there is no matter without energy, or energy without matter. In the same way consciousness is neither matter nor energy, but consciousness for that reason is not a thing in itself. It is not an independent existence that exists apart from matter or energy. Things in themselves, in the sense of separate and independent entities, do not exist. But philosophers are too apt to regard their abstract ideas (their noumena) as representing things in themselves. Thus time is not space, and space is not time, and neither the one nor the other is material; but therefore we are not justified in conceiving of time or space as things in themselves. In brief, all abstracts represent features of that great inseparable whole which is called reality, the world, the universe, or nature. Matter is not an inscrutable entity but a name for that quality which all material things have in common. Space and time are thought-constructions built of abstract notions representing certain relations of things. And the inside world of man, the states of his consciousness, his sensations, perceptions, and ideas, no less than all other abstracts, form one special sphere of abstraction—the domain of psychology.

II.

The words *abstract* and *abstraction* are derived from the Late Latin *abstractum* and *abstractio*, the latter being the act of abstracting, the former the product of abstraction. The old Romans did not use the words *abstractio* and *abstractum* in a philosophical sense. These ideas are a product of the great nominalistic controversy and appear first in the twelfth century. Abstraction was originally used in contrast to "subtraction." Abstraction was the consideration of form

apart from matter, and subtraction the consideration of the essence without heeding its form.*

Modern usage has dropped the scholastic distinction between "abstract" and "subtract" entirely, and places the abstract in opposition either to the "concrete" or to the "intuitional," i. e. the direct perception of objects.

Abstraction means "to single out, to separate and hold in thought."

For instance: when observing the whiteness of snow, we concentrate our attention upon the quality of whiteness to the neglect of all the rest. Attention, accordingly, is the condition of abstraction. Special wants produce special interests; special interests produce a special attention, and a special attention singles out and keeps in mind that which is wanted.

Abstraction is first a concentration of attention, which involves a neglect of everything else, then a mental separation of the part or quality upon which the attention is concentrated, and finally the establishment of a relative independence of the product of abstraction. This completes the function of abstraction, and as this can be done only by naming, abstract thought is identical with rational thought, which is the characteristic feature of the thought of speaking beings.

This is the reason why abstract thought is upon earth the exclusive prerogative of man; and why brutes are incapable of abstract thought. The process of naming is the mechanism of abstraction, for names establish a mental independence of the objects named.

As soon as the color of the snow has been denoted, the word denoting snowish color or whiteness becomes applicable as a thought-symbol to the same quality wherever it is found.

* * *

The verb, "to abstract," is used, according to Drobisch, either in a logical or psychological sense; in the former we abstract certain qualities *of* a given complex, in the latter we abstract our attention *from* certain objects. (See Mansel, "Prolegomena Logica," 3d ed., p. 30.) Hamilton regards the former usage as improper. Says Hamilton:

"I noticed the improper use of the term abstraction by many philosophers, in applying it to that on which the attention is converged. This we may indeed be said to prescind, but not to abstract. Thus, let A, B, C be three qualities of an object. We prescind A, in *abstracting from* B and C, but we cannot without impropriety say that we abstract A."

In agreement with Hamilton, Sully remarks:

"Abstraction means etymologically the active withdrawal of attention from one thing in order to fix it on another thing."

The Century Dictionary adds to this quotation:

"This is all founded on a false notion of the origin of the term."

* See *Century Dictionary*, s. v. abstract,

The old quarrels between Nominalists and Realists, important though they were, are forgotten. The distinction between "abstract" and "subtract" has lost its meaning. Hamilton and Sully's usages have not been accepted outside some narrow circles of English scholars; and the most natural and common usage of the verb "to abstract," it seems to us, is in the sense "to form abstracts," or "to make an abstraction." We abstract a certain quality of a certain thing, (say whiteness,) and treat it in our thought as if it were a thing itself.

* * *

Intuition, in the proper sense of the term, furnishes the immediate data of our sense-impressions. Intuition is the German *Anschauung*, an exact analogous term to which does not exist in English. We have coined the word "atsight," to supply this defect. Like *Anschauung* it denotes that which we look at, or the present object of our sight.* Although an innovation, this word seems to be the most appropriate substitute for *Anschauung*.

The terms "*Anschauung*," "intuition," "atsight," originally denote the contents of the most important kind of sense-perceptions, those of sight; but they have been extended to mean the perceptions of all senses.

Man's thought, i. e., the properly human mind-operations, consists in an analysis and reconstruction of his *Anschauungen*, intuitions, or atsights, i. e., of the data given him in his sense-impressions. With the assistance of language, man separates and recombines certain features of his atsights; he constructs ideas, which enable him to find out in the events of nature the determining factors and to make them, on a large scale, subservient to his wants.

Man's ideas, and most so his general ideas or generalisations, in so far as they are represented by names, are products of abstract thought. The idea "horse" is not the actual and concrete reality of the sight of an individual horse, but a generalisation; it is a name representing to every English-speaking man the composite image of all horses, or pictures of horses seen, and including, in addition, all the knowledge he has of horses. The general idea of a horse thus stands in contrast to real horses; it is not the horse itself, but a thought-symbol signifying horse in general.

Abstract thought is decried as pale, colorless, shadowy, and unreal. True enough, in a certain sense, for abstract thought is not intuition, it is not *Anschauung*, and therefore it cannot possess the vivid glow of sensuous activity, the reality, individuality, directness, and immediateness of the objects presented to our

senses. Yet, in another sense, abstract ideas are by no means unreal.

The atsights of our sense-experience are the basis of all abstract ideas. The atsights are the real facts, our abstract ideas, however, are artifices invented for the purpose of better dealing with facts; they are reality-describing symbols and well-designed mental tools.

III.

The main mistake of former philosophers has been the habit of regarding abstracts as independent real entities, or essences. The pagans represented beauty as a goddess and worshipped it, and Plato thought that ideas were beings that possess an independent existence outside and above the sphere of reality, of that reality which is faced by us and depicted in our sensations.

It is customary at present, as the pendulum swings from the one extreme to the other, to regard abstract ideas in contradiction to the old view as mere fictions and nonentities. One error is naturally followed by the opposite error. But abstracts are not mere fictions, they are symbols *representing features of real existence*, and as such they cannot be overestimated, for they form the properly human in man, they create his dignity and give him the power he possesses.

Even our systems of mathematics, arithmetic, and other sciences of pure thought are not mere fictions or arbitrary inventions, but constructions made of elements representing actual features of reality, of pure forms and of the relations of pure forms. To be sure, they are fictions in a certain sense; they are inventions, but they are not mere fictions and not arbitrary inventions. To operate with pure forms, as if pure forms as such existed, is a fiction. But exactly in the same way it is a fiction to speak of whiteness as if whiteness in itself existed. The processes of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, involution, evolution, the usage of logarithms are inventions, but they are as little arbitrary inventions as, for instance, the method of naming things. All these inventions (like other useful inventions) have been called forth by special wants; most of them have been eagerly searched for, and they serve certain practical purposes.

* * *

Abstract thoughts are comparable to bills or checks in the money market. Bills and checks are not real values themselves, but being orders to pay out a certain amount, they represent real values, thus serving to facilitate and economise the exchange of goods. In the same way the realities of life are the data of experience as they appear in our *Anschauung*; abstract ideas, however, are derived from and have reference to these basic facts of our existence. If the values of our abstract ideas are not ultimately founded upon the

* See the article "What Does *Anschauung* Mean?" in *The Monist*, Vol. II, No. 4, p. 527.

reality of the given facts of experience, they are like bills or drafts for the payment of which there is no money in the bank.

It is comparatively easy to palm off counterfeit abstracts at their nominal value upon ignorant or uncritical people who know not the difference; for the poor fellows who have thus been cheated are likely to die before they discover the fraud.

Most people being uncritical, we need not wonder that the philosophical world is flooded with abstracts that possess no merit beyond being high-sounding words. There are plenty of philosophical wild-cat banks flourishing and booming, and this is quite natural, for our average public are no better than the savages of darkest Africa with whom glass pearls pass for money, the same as if they were genuine pearls.

* * *

The term "abstract" is confined to such products of thought-operations as "whiteness, goodness, virtue, courage," etc.; but it is sometimes also employed to denote generalisations such as "star," meaning any kind of a star, or "triangle," meaning any kind of a triangle. The fact is that generalisations can be made only by the method of abstraction. The term "abstract" is not used, however, to denote sensations. Sensations are the materials which by abstraction are analysed into their elements, for sensations are that which is given in our intuition, i. e. our *Anschauung*, and abstracts are contrasted to the intuitional.

This is very well, and we do not blame this usage of the word; but we wish to point out that even sensations are in their way a kind of abstraction. Our sense-organs perform the function of abstracting certain features of the objects impressing us. Thus the eye abstracts only certain ether-vibrations called light, and transforms them into vision, the ear abstracts only air-vibrations and transforms them into sounds, the muscular sense abstracts resistance and transforms it into the notion of corporeality, the skin abstracts temperature and transforms it into sensations of heat and cold. The tongue and the nose actually abstract and bodily absorb certain particles, and transform the awareness of this process into taste and smell.

Thus it is evident that abstraction is a function of fundamental application in the domain of psychic life, and the method of abstraction is, properly considered, not limited to that sphere which, according to the generally accepted terminology, is called the domain of abstraction.

P. C.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE Chicago Board of Education is making vigorous efforts to limit the scope of education in the public schools, under the pretense of abolishing what they classically call "fads." This war upon certain kinds of learning is itself a mischievous "fad." Its capital stock consists largely of nicknames, and the reformers who

are conducting the campaign of non-education think that any study in the school is quite sufficiently condemned when they choose to stigmatise it as a "fad." In the scornful vernacular of those critics modelling in clay is "mud pie making," and the satire is applauded by a generation of fools. One of the most useful employments for children is the making of mud pies, and clay modelling is merely an advance from that to experimental and solid lessons that make abstract learning easier. The Board of Education met last night, and a committee appointed at a previous meeting brought in a report recommending that the following "fads" be abolished, namely, clay modelling, German, physical culture, drawing, sewing, and singing. The report was referred to the committee of the whole which will meet February 23d. There are some Boards of Education that make me nervous whenever they handle educational questions. They make me feel just as I would if Jack Hicks who used to fiddle "hoe downs" for us on the frontier, should with profane fingers attempt to play the overture from Semiramide on Ole Bull's violin. His brother Joe used to rattle on the tambourine what passed with us for a Beethoven symphony, and he played it quite as intelligently as the Chicago Board of Education plays on "fads."

* * *

The public interest at this time seems to be almost equally divided between statesmen and prizefighters, the advantage, if there is any, being on the side of the prizefighters. The following important piece of information appears in the telegraphic dispatches of this morning, and is dated New York, February 13. "Austrian Billy Murphy was about town to-day for the first time since his recent fight with Griffin. Outside of a broken nose and a couple of scars he is looking pretty well." By a queer psychological coincidence the very same consolation—in finer language of course—was offered by Col. Turner, the orator of the occasion, to his fellow members of the Marquette Club in Chicago at the Lincoln banquet held on that identical February 13, when he introduced the Republican party for the admiration of the company. Translated into ordinary prose, his remarks were these: "Outside of a broken nose and a couple of scars the Republican party is looking pretty well." Col. Turner is described in the papers as the "famed post-prandial speaker"; and allowing the usual discount on "post-prandial" talk, it must be admitted that his oration was more eloquently inconsistent than is usual even in speeches of the after dinner kind. He condemned the Republican party for attempting to give the colored man political rights, or as he called it "black supremacy." In addition to that, he said, "the Republican party is in defeat for clinging to dead issues," also "through lack of statesmanship"; likewise for "lack of ability in leadership"; and because "in the Republican Senate money has superseded brains." Supplementing these reasons, were "pension laws which offer a bribe for coöperative perjury," together with other bad legislation which caused the orator to regret that the new leaders of the Republican party were not "in the grave" instead of the old ones. After talking like Dick Deadeye until all the wine turned sour, Col. Turner made a "post-prandial" contradiction of himself by proclaiming that the hope of the country lay in "the garnered intelligence and stalwart courage of the Republican party." He meant, of course, the Republican party as it will be when all its present leaders are "in the grave."

* * *

Although I may never know what the Monroe doctrine is, I am very sure that it is a piece of national property; and as a proud citizen I like to see it bring a high price whenever it is offered for sale in a foreign market; a price corresponding to the size and dignity of this nation. With patriotic pleasure I learn that the Panama Canal syndicate was compelled to pay several million dollars for the Monroe doctrine, but no more than it was worth, because, without it the syndicate could not have swindled anybody,

not even the French people. This is clear from the testimony given yesterday by Mr. Seligman before the investigating committee appointed by Congress, and Mr. Seligman was the man who negotiated the purchase of the profitable doctrine. He admitted that the effort to obtain subscriptions in Paris for the Panama Canal had failed "because of the apprehension in France that the United States was hostile and would put in force the Monroe doctrine." Any man with a genius for "business" must admire the American statesmanship that created the "apprehension," without which the Monroe doctrine would have brought nothing in the market. It soon became evident to De Lesseps and his colleagues that before the French people would make subscriptions to the Panama scheme, the Monroe doctrine must be bought and paid for, so the "American Committee" was formed by the Seligmans "to protect the interest of the canal and secure the neutrality of the United States in relation to it." It was important that some great American should be at the head of the committee, so they baited the trap for General Grant, but although the cheese on the hook was tempting he would not nibble. Seligman offered him \$25,000 a year *for life*, but the offer was rejected, and Grant escaped from an enterprise that would have steeped his name in scandal. The chairmanship with a salary of \$25,000 a year was then given to Mr. Richard W. Thompson, a member of the cabinet. The result of it all was the ruin of thousands of innocent French people whose confidence having been gained by those proceedings threw their money into the canal. In spite of the ruin wrought, Mr. Seligman gave his testimony with a cynical gaiety that reminds us of the complacent equanimity of Mr. Jay Gould.

* * *

Commenting, in *The Open Court*, some weeks ago on the fantastic substitutes for law and equity doled out by the courts of Illinois, I advised all disputants before becoming litigants to put the whole subject of controversy into a poker game and gamble for it. Or, easier yet, flip a penny and settle the difference by the appeal of "heads or tails." I showed that by the laws of chance alone the verdict of the copper would be right six times out of twelve, which is more than can be said of the judgments of our courts; and besides, expense, vexation, anxiety, time, and a large quantity of profanity would be saved. Although I gave that advice in serious good faith, some persons erroneously thought I spoke in irony or jest. It is, therefore, with some pride and satisfaction that I see my plan surely, although slowly, penetrating that very dense thicket of confusion, which is called the "public mind"; and even the press is giving some approbation to my scheme. In *The Chicago Herald* of this morning I find the following indorsement: "Out of nineteen cases considered by the appellate court of this district, in which opinions were rendered on Tuesday, thirteen were reversed and remanded. The fact is significant of the quality of law and justice dispensed—or dispensed with—in our local courts. In view of such a state of affairs, it would be far cheaper for litigants to 'flip a penny' in order to reach a decision of the questions at issue, and the chances are far greater that by such a course they would reach a legal and equitable adjustment of the difficulties than by appealing to the courts." Thirteen from nineteen, and six remains, so that of all the causes decided by the "jurists" in our trial courts, a little more than two-thirds of them are reversed by the "jurists" in the Appellate Court; and when those lucky six go up to the Supreme Court, the most of them will be reversed and remanded by the "jurists" there. And rarely the right comes uppermost, and seldom is justice done.

* * *

We are indebted to the Associated Press dispatches of this morning for a revelation of clerical crime peculiar in its enormity, the delinquent being the Rev. E. P. Gardner, pastor of the Con-

gregational Church of Marion, Mass., "at which Mr. and Mrs. Cleveland worshipped while they were residents of Marion." Religion can hardly be sufficiently grateful to such eminent people for their patronage, and as a loyal snob I wriggle with joy to know that the President of my country not only attended the Congregational Church at Marion, Mass., but also that he "worshipped" there. The crimes and misdemeanors of the preacher would not have been so trying as they are to the nerves of cringing sycophants if we had not known that he was pastor of the very church where Mr. and Mrs. Cleveland formerly "worshipped." I think the champion psychologist will be the man who can pick out the "worshippers" from any congregation; and I doubt that any mortal man will ever be able to do it, because the genuine worshippers may not be among those who preach, or pray, or sing. Only the angel appointed for that purpose can perform the feat, and some of us who think that we are prominent worshippers may be surprised at the "great day" to find that he has passed us by. Nothing but the awful fact that Mr. and Mrs. Cleveland once worshipped in the Congregational Church at Marion could magnify the trivial doings of the pastor into crimes worth printing in a newspaper. Had not Mr. and Mrs. Cleveland once worshipped in the church, the accusations against the pastor would not have been thought worth laying before the people. What else could have made it a high misdemeanor that Mr. Gardner "had promised to call on a sister and had not kept his word"? That he "had made false statements about a coal scuttle"? That he "had contradicted himself in regard to the day of his birth"? and "last and finally,"—I quote from the indictment,—and "last and finally," plagiarising "ten sermons on Bunyan's 'Pilgrim's Progress,' and palming them off as his own." The church "where Mr. and Mrs. Cleveland worshipped" seems to have been rather punctilious and exacting, making it very hard for Brother Gardner to tell which way he ought to go. If he had kept his promise to call on a sister, he would probably have been tried for that. In fact, I believe this is the only case to be found in the records of ecclesiastical jurisprudence where a pastor has been tried for *not* calling on the sisters. So, in the case of the ten sermons; while I think that any man hardened enough to preach ten sermons on Bunyan's "Pilgrim's Progress" deserves punishment, yet I think he has a right to plead in extenuation of his fault that he did not write them. Here is another case where plagiarism deserves praise.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

BOOK REVIEWS.

GOETHE'S FAUST. Edited by *Calvin Thomas*, Professor of Germanic Languages and Literature in the University of Michigan. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co. 1892.

"In undertaking this edition of 'Faust,'" says Professor Thomas, "I was chiefly actuated by a desire to promote the study of the poem as a whole." To effect this end, in every aspect from which Goethe's masterpiece might be viewed, the editor conceived that the publication of the revised text of the poem, with suitable notes, would be the best method, and one much preferable to the publication of a commentary. The present volume contains the text of the first part of the poem, and it is promised that the second will soon follow. The text is preceded by an introduction of eighty-two pages, in which the editor discusses the importance and literary status of the poem, the data of the Faust legends, the preparatory experiences of Goethe, the history of the execution of the poem, and gives short sketches of the principal characters. It is an exact reprint of the Weimar edition; the notes occupy one hundred and four pages, the appendices fifteen pages. In dealing with the vast literature which has grown up in the criticism of the Faust poem, Professor Thomas's aim has been "to be useful, rather than to seem acute or learned." It has been his rule to

avoid controversy and the rehearsal and discussion of conflicting views. He has formed his opinions independently, from an examination of the original data, and corrected and revised them by comparison with the views of the commentators. Then he has presented in the notes the results of his judgment, without argument. Everything has been done to attain the utmost brevity consistent with the satisfactory treatment of the real difficulties that a student is likely to encounter. Everything that has not been needed for scientific illustrations has been excluded. "According to my conceptions," he says, "the one great purpose of an editor's notes to a classic should be to help the reader to enter more than he otherwise might into the thought and feeling of the author." No philological lore has been admitted that does not illustrate the author's peculiarities of diction and give the author's exact linguistic point of view. Yet the editor has, confessedly, "wrought as a philologist and a lover of definiteness." The aim sought is the *understanding* of the poem, and this could not be attained without some attention to philological details. He has not imparted into the poem any philosophical views of his own, but has treated his subject from an entirely objective standpoint.

We can only say that Professor Thomas has very well accomplished the task which he has set himself, and that the book will be a very useful one, both for the general reader and the classroom student.

μκρκ.

NOTES.

Mr. Moncure D Conway kindly sends for our inspection a letter of Madame Renan, incidentally saying, "It is, I fear, too complimentary to me for publication." We hope we commit no indiscretion in publishing Madame Renan's letter, for the objection made by our esteemed contributor does not appear sufficient. Mr. Conway's address, given at South Place Chapel, London, on Ernest Renan, appeared in the last number of *The Monist*, January, 1893. This is the letter:

"Le 3 Février 1893.

Cher Monsieur Moncure Conway,

J'ai reçu "The Monist" et je veux vous dire combien j'ai été touchée du discours que vous avez prononcé à South Place Chapel. Je le lis et le relis avec émotion, car personne n'a mieux compris que vous les idées philosophiques et religieuses de mon mari bien-aimé. Vous avez compris aussi son grand cœur, sa bonté. La seule consolation que je puisse éprouver est d'entendre parler de celui que je pleure comme vous en avez parlé. Je vous remercie donc encore et vous prie de me rappeler au bon souvenir de Madame Conway et de votre fille.

Veillez agréer nos sentiments affectueux et dévoués.

Cornélie Renan."

MOSES.

BY ARTHUR A. D. BAYLDON.

True man is he, who doth all joys eschew,
 All doubts, hopes, fears, griefs, promptings—everything
 That cajoles conscience, of his mind sole king,
 Whose barricades no furious thoughts burst through.
 He subdues minds who can his own subdue
 By trampling Passion down, whose senses cling
 To Truth and all its duties, combating
 Hell's fiends at every point, who sleuth-hounds, too,
 Each separate passion with unsleeping eyes,
 Lest in one evil hour he trip and fall.
 O Moses, Prophet! thou wert surely wise,
 Yet thy great virtues could not keep in thrall
 Thy scornful pride—hush! they immortalise
 The statue gone from Sinai's pedestal.

THE MONIST.

A QUARTERLY MAGAZINE

OF

PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND SOCIOLOGY.

CONTENTS OF VOL. III, NO. 2, (JANUARY, 1893.):

THE DOCTRINE OF AUTA. By PROF. C. LLOYD MORGAN.

EVOLUTIONARY LOVE. By CHARLES S. PEIRCE.

RENAN: A Discourse Given at South Place Chapel, London. By MONCURE D. CONWAY.

INTUITION AND REASON. By CHRISTINE LADD FRANKLIN.

CRUELTY AND PITY IN WOMAN. By GUILLAUME FERRERO.

PANPSYCHISM AND PANBIOTISM. EDITOR.

LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.

1) France—LUCIEN ARRÉAT.

2) Germany—CHRISTIAN UFER.

CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

PERIODICALS.

SINGLE NUMBERS, FIFTY CENTS.

TERMS OF SUBSCRIPTION: \$2.00 a year, post-paid, to any part of the United States, Canada, and Mexico; to foreign countries in the Postal Union, \$2.25; single numbers, 60 cents.

THE OPEN COURT.

NIXON BUILDING, 175 LA SALLE ST.,

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, Post Office Drawer F.

E. C. HEGELER, PUBLISHER.

DR. PAUL CARUS, EDITOR.

TERMS THROUGHOUT THE POSTAL UNION:

\$2.00 PER YEAR.

\$1.00 FOR SIX MONTHS.

N. B. Binding Cases for single yearly volumes of THE OPEN COURT will be supplied on order. Price, 75 cents each.

CONTENTS OF NO. 287.

AUTOS-DA-FÉ. DR. FELIX L. OSWALD..... 3567

ABSTRACTION. EDITOR..... 3569

CURRENT TOPICS: Fads in the Public Schools. The

Causes of Republican Defeat. The Sale of the Monroe

Doctrine. Law and Justice Dispeased With. Who Are

"Worshippers"? GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL..... 3572

BOOK REVIEWS..... 3573

NOTES..... 3574

POETRY.

MOSES. ARTHUR A. D. BAYLDON..... 3574