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WE WANT SCIENCE AND MORE THAN SCIENCE.*

BY W. STEWART ROSS.

PREFATORY EXPLANATION BY THE EDITOR.

THE present article will be interesting to our readers as it presents a friendly criticism of some of the fundamental tenets of *The Open Court*. It is the substance of an after-dinner speech by Mr. Stewart Ross. He replied to Dr. Carus, who finished his speech with the following sentences :

“What, then, is this unknowable? If the knowable is everything that impresses us, is the unknowable that which does not impress us? Do you mean it may be knowable on some distant planet, but not here? No, that is not the Agnostic sense of the term. “As a matter of fact, I believe the Agnostic simply means that the world is wonderful. Professor Jodl of Prague, a friend of mine, says, ‘there is a difference between philosophical knowledge and scientific knowledge; scientific knowledge includes everything representable or describable; but,’ he says, ‘philosophical knowledge is something more.’ I requested a definition of philosophical knowledge, but he has not as yet given one. To my mind knowledge is knowledge, and there is none but scientific knowledge; and philosophy, being the science of science, is that which investigates the methods of science, summing up at the same time the results of the sciences in a systematic world-conception. My mind has no nook in it for the unknowable. Our knowledge is small indeed, but whatever is representable is knowable.

“The Chairman, I know, is in special disagreement with me. He has, perhaps, a stronger vein for mysticism than I; and I should like to hear him on mysticism.”†

MR. ROSS'S SPEECH.

Dr. Carus seems to take up the position that philosophy has no status apart from physical science. I agree with the Prague Professor that it has. Now, I would suggest that philosophy has made very little

progress during the last two thousand years—the Baconian system, if applied exclusively, implying a quite unphilosophical limitation—while science has made gigantic strides. I ask, then, if philosophy be dependent upon science—physical and applied science, as generally understood—where was the science when Socrates taught, and Plato elucidated, and Aristotle propounded, the philosophy which dominated Christendom for ages? Natural science, at that time, was practically unknown, though some initial steps had been taken with regard to electricity and steam-power. But philosophy then, as always, was an attempt, like that of our friend's monism, to unify the world-system and furnish a thinkable theory of being; and such attempts have been made from the very initiation of human speculation and reasoning. And I am not sure that our progress in physical science has added one jot or tittle to the grist and material for the philosophic mill.

Then with regard to theology. Theology, we are told, is “reasoned religion.” Now, I object that religion, as distinguished from ethics, cannot be reasoned. Religion, I submit, cannot be reasoned. I hold that, after reason has been pushed, as it should be, to the remotest limit and uttermost boundary to which it will extend, all your cravings and aspirations are not satisfied. And there theology has stepped in to fill the vacuum, the lacunæ, which nothing else could. Theology has been prostituted for class and imperial and pontifical interests; but no student of history can deny that it has been indispensable to mankind, because it dealt with a region which reason could not touch, but which, all the same, was indicated by man's irrepressible convictions.

Let us glance a moment at the science of which Dr. Carus speaks—science based on actual demonstration. Well, this science treats of atoms; but the Doctor will admit that what the atom is we do not know. It is not demonstrable, only hypothetical. Yet he uses the term, and has a definite idea of what he regards as the atom; and without its postulation he cannot proceed. He will speak of so many atoms combining to make a molecule of this or that, while all the time he cannot prove to demonstration the existence of the

* Reprinted from Mr. Gould's article “An Evening with Dr. Carus,” Part III, *Agnostic Journal* XXXI, No. 17, pp. 258-259.

† Quoted with slight alterations from Mr. Gould's report in *The Agnostic Journal*.

atom. Even his vaunted science itself, at its very base, is no more demonstrable than the beliefs inherent in the religious instinct.

Where science and philosophy break down we require religion. We do not, however, require a dogmatic theology. I deny that there can be such a science. I deny that an exact theological science can be propounded.* Our conception of the theos, or of infinity—our reaching to that which lies beyond the scope of science—can never be formulated and codified. Nevertheless, it may be the subject-matter of psychic aspiration and experience. Not only do spiritualists and theosophists use the term psychic science, but there are many philosophers and scientists not belonging to those schools who believe such science has a legitimate place in education and moral and intellectual development. Now, the monism of Dr. Carus would exclude this field of aspirational experience from the scope of philosophy; and, therefore, I cannot accept our friend's monism.

Yet, in a sense, I am a monist. I believe in the one-ness—in the *at-one-ment*—of the universe. I believe that the world is one. But it takes very much to make a world—much which the monism of Dr. Carus would exclude. He would exclude everything which is not demonstrable in scientific propositions—everything which does not appeal to the five senses, and approve itself to the sensational school. I ask him, as a biologist, as an embryologist, whether we have *always had five senses?* Once our ancestors had them in an incipient state only. Where, then, will he put an end to the process of evolution? May not a sixth sense be at present in the stage of inception in some advanced souls? Such souls, in flights which others perhaps regard as mental aberrations, may soar beyond the bounds of physical science. Is not the region they soar to, a legitimate sphere for mankind? Has not religion, in past ages, catered to that sense? It has, indeed,

* This has reference to the following sentences in Dr. Carus's speech:

"Mr. Holyoake has been speaking on secularism, and he allowed that it was sometimes used to mean anti-theology. I think, as he does, that it should imply something more than that. The term secularism has a great advantage in being positive, while anti-theology is a mere negation. Secularism is good because it deals with life on human principles alone, and theology is bad so long as it deals with things on a supernatural basis. There is a theology, however, now growing up which has a secular character. It takes a monistic view of religion and of the world. Some of the greatest minds among theologians are joining this movement. I may mention Professor Holtzmann, of Strasbourg, the author of what I consider the best work on the New Testament, embodying the research and scholarship of several centuries. I am glad to note that he is positively secular in his views, and I find myself more in accord with a theologian than I ever expected to be. Secularism, I repeat, is not anti-theology. It is, in fact, a *higher kind of theology*. It is monistic theology, and it develops religious conceptions to a higher level.

"We have all of us, gentlemen, said many a harsh word about theology, and set up an opposition between theology and religion, arguing that religion should be accepted, but theology repudiated. To some extent this opposition is wrong. Theology, in the best sense, means reasoned religion. When I discuss, in philosophical language, with a theologian,—a philosophically trained professor of theology,—I find myself able to come to terms with him better than with a parson, i. e., an orthodox pulpiteer without a philosophical education. The philosophically trained theologian will soon confess that by God he does not mean a person."

often degraded the people rather than elevated them, owing to the ignorance, or worse, of the hierophants. But, while I admit that, I affirm that religion has had a distinct part to play in the economy of human nature. I can accept no system which will preclude the speculations of the religious instinct. Human nature is not a simple, but an exceedingly complex, factor. My friend on my right (Mr. Holyoake) has laid down an excellent code of action and ethics for it, as far as the problems of merely concrete mundanism are concerned. His doctrine is good as far as it goes; but it does not cover the whole field. Of course we cannot get above and outside what he calls "this-worldism" or "one-world-at-a-timeism"; but then this world is, in its principles and potencies, so vast that there is very much of which merely secularistic this-worldism takes no cognisance. The religionists, the pietists, are of this world, and, therefore, religion is a thing of this world; aye, and as legitimate a thing of this world as is anything else that is in it. To us, as Dr. Lewins pertinently maintains after Protagoras the Abderite, there is no world for any one of us except that which each one of us makes for himself. *Ergo*, it is vain to speak of this-worldism where no other worldism is possible; there is, as Dr. Carus justly contends, *Monism*, one world only; in spite of the evidence of phenomena as to heterogeneity, there is in reality only homogeneity, monism, one entity, one existence; and the true perception of this oneness, in spite of the able advocacy of Dr. Carus to the contrary, is likelier to yield its secret to those who search for it on what are called psychic, than to those who go in quest of it on what are called physical, lines; although, of course, in the final analysis, psychic and physical are one. It is important to know what nature *does*: to codify what it does is the special effort of my friend, Dr. Carus. To me it seems more important still to know what nature *is*, and to attempt, it may be vainly, to adumbrate a higher science that, besides embracing chemistry, biology, and geology, shall include religion, eschatology, and ontology, and found monism, not on the exclusion of anything, but on the inclusion of everything.

RELIGION, THE LOVE OF TRUTH AND THE APPLICATION OF TRUTH.

THE philosophical gathering which a few friends in England kindly convened in my honor shortly before I returned to my Western home beyond the Atlantic, was indeed a rare and unusual feast. Vigorous and fearless thinkers were present. The after-dinner speeches were lively, interesting, and instructive. Yet the most extraordinary feature of this congenial company, it seems to me, was the fact that contrary opinions were presented without producing the slightest jar. Offence was neither given nor taken, and all the

many differences of opinion blended like the seven colors of the spectrum into one harmonious conversation, such as took place in Plato's symposium, in which the different aspects of the same truth are represented by various speakers, apparently combating one another but really all working and aspiring toward one goal.

Mr. F. J. Gould wrote an account of this noteworthy evening and we quote from it in the present number a speech which contains a few terse criticisms of the tenets upheld by *The Open Court*. It is the speech of Mr. W. Stewart Ross, the gifted editor of *The Agnostic Journal*, well known as a forcible writer under the *nom de plume* of Saladin.

One of the friends present had previously asked me the following question :

"As to Spencerian agnosticism take, as an example, the phenomena of water, its solid forms (ice, snow, hail) etc. ; its liquid forms (sea, river, rain, cloud, etc.) ; its gaseous form, invisible ; its constituent gases, hydrogen and oxygen, which are hypothetically resolvable into atoms. Does not all this impress us with the existence of a mysterious unknowable manifesting itself in the many forms. Even agnosticism would admit that the unreachable essence and its reachable manifestations are united in the ALL, but thinks that our sense of inability to grasp the idea of the primary *raison d'être* of phenomena is best expressed by speaking of the absolute. How would you meet this ?"

My answer was : I should meet it by the counter question, What do you understand by knowledge? My answer to this question will explain why from my standpoint the idea of anything unknowable cannot be admitted. Knowledge is representation ; knowledge is simply a description of facts. A phenomenon, which is appropriately represented in the sentient symbols of a mind called ideas, is said to be known. Cognition or comprehension is the unification of knowledge. We understand a phenomenon as soon as we recognise it as a special case of other phenomena with which we are familiar. Accordingly, everything that affects us somehow, can be known ; it can be represented in mental symbols. Unknowable is only that which can never affect sentient beings, neither directly nor indirectly, which can never exercise any influence upon them ; and incomprehensible is that which we have to give up all hope of harmonising with the systematised body of our experiences. I admit that facts are wonderful, but I do not call them unknowable.

I had an interesting correspondence with a friend of mine, Professor Jodl in Prague, who maintains that there are two kinds of knowledge, (1) scientific knowledge, which is a description and a unification of facts, and (2) philosophical knowledge. What the latter is, I cannot tell, Professor Jodl has not as yet defined the term and I am unable to supply a definition.

I cannot accept a duality of knowledge. There is but one knowledge and that is scientific knowledge ;

there is but one method of cognition and that is the same for both science and philosophy. The proposition of a duality of knowledge must infallibly lead to mysticism. There are two kinds of mysticism : one is the religious mysticism which finds the right ethics instinctively even before science has investigated the ethical problem ; the other is that which trusts that there is a special kind of knowledge different from scientific knowledge. The former mysticism was a forerunner of modern monism, the latter is at bottom a dualism. Monism is not antagonistic to the former, but it rejects the latter.

Mr. Ross is a mystic, and says Mr. Gould in his report :

"The concluding sentiment of Dr. Carus's address kindled the light of controversy in the eyes of Saladin, and he rose to tender briefly (for the hour was late) his friendly comments."

We have reprinted Saladin's speech, as it appears in a late number of *The Agnostic Journal*, in full, because it deserves our full attention. And having promised to give a further explanation of the subject, it would not be fair to state our reply without at the same time publishing the statement of Mr. Ross.

Saladin says :

"Dr. Carus seems to take up the position that philosophy has no status apart from physical science. I agree with the Prague Professor that it has."

While I said that there are not two, but only one kind of knowledge, I would at the same time declare that philosophy has a status apart not only from physical but also from psychological science. Philosophy is not merely as we are told by the French positivists, a hierarchy of the sciences ; philosophy has a domain of her own. Philosophy is the science of the sciences ; it investigates the methods of science ; it inquires into the objective and subjective conditions of cognition ; it states the aim and purpose of science, and gathering the rich harvest from the fields of scientists constructs out of their results a world-conception. That is not all. Having mapped out a world-conception philosophy determines man's place in nature and derives therefrom the rules of his conduct. Such is briefly sketched the field of philosophy—a large field indeed.

Saladin says that "Philosophy has made very little progress during the last two thousand years." I venture to differ. We might say with Kant of metaphysics, that it has made no progress, but not of philosophy. The progress of philosophy has been so great, and even to-day its strides are so gigantic, that it is difficult even for a philosopher by profession to keep up with it ; and the whole province is breaking up into various sub-departments of research. There are philosophers now working in one field only, say, in ethics, in the theory of cognition or in methodology.

We cannot say that natural science was unknown

to Aristotle. Aristotle was a first class naturalist. Familiarity with the results of science is less important to a philosopher than to be versed in the methods of inquiry. Yet who would deny the great influence of natural science upon Aristotle's philosophy, and must we not deplore the lack of it in the period of scholasticism?

By the bye, philosophy is in my opinion not dependent upon natural science. I should rather say the reverse. Natural science is dependent upon philosophy; for philosophy discusses the fundamental problems of scientific inquiry; philosophy manufactures the implements of scientific inquiry. But philosophy prospers only when in closest contact with science. What manufacturer would dream of making certain implements if they were not in demand! Thus while philosophy quickens science and *vice versa*, science quickens philosophy. Philosophy and the sciences form one great interacting organism.

Socrates was the founder of ethics; he neglected all other branches of philosophy and limited himself to inquiries into the rules of conduct. Socrates is a great man as a character and moral teacher. He lived and died as he preached, so that he can justly be compared with Confucius, Buddha, and even to Jesus of Nazareth. But aside from his ethics we should hardly, for his other philosophical achievements, range him so high.

Now we approach the main point. Saladin says:

"Where science and philosophy break down, we require religion."

Here I must respectfully differ. Yet I must state at once that I do by no means underrate the strength of Saladin's proposition. I have been on the other side of the fence also, and in attacking his position, I am attacking a former self of mine. Desirous to let the reader judge for himself, I quote two mottoes of *The Agnostic Journal* which prove that there are very great authorities cherishing the same view.

Says Max Müller:

"There is in man a third faculty, which I call simply the faculty of apprehending the Infinite, not only in religion, but in all things; a power independent of sense and reason, a power in a certain sense contradicted by sense and reason, and yet a very real power, which has held its own from the beginning of the world, neither sense nor reason being able to overcome it, while it alone is able to overcome both reason and sense."

More valuable still are the following words because coming from the pen of a prominent scientist; Professor Tyndall says:

"Man can no more now, than in the days of Job, by searching find out what this power is whose garments are seen in the visible universe."

That All-existence of which we are parts is indeed a wondrous power. Its immensity is no less overwhelming than the marvels which we encounter when

laboriously entering into the realms of the infinitely small. Wherever we touch it, existence is great; wherever we inquire into the laws of being, we find portentous wonders, which are certainly no less wonderful for the fact that they are intelligible. On the contrary, the intelligibility of the world is its most striking feature, which is even more stupendous when we learn to understand that intelligibility is a strikingly simple fact, which cannot be otherwise than it is, and the problem of the universality of law is the same as the problem why one plus one will always make two.

But all this granted, we cannot contradict ourselves, and say this all-existence which is so wonderful because it is intelligible, is at the same time so unintelligibly mysterious that we know nothing about it, and cannot know anything about it. Prof. Tyndall says, "Its garments only are seen." Without discussing the propriety or impropriety of the allegory, which introduces an unjustifiable duality of garment and of the person clothed in the garment, we should say that this garment indeed must be a close fitting jersey; and if it were not, if God were so radically out of contact with the world, that no inference were allowable from the creation to the creator, our reality would be the garment and not the unapproachable God so loosely vested in it. If we are not and can never come in contact with God, his existence would to us be tantamount to non-existence. There are some savage tribes taking this view. They say: "We know that God exists, but he is too big for us; he is too great to mind us; he is far away above the skies and would not hear our prayer." God in my opinion is the reality that surrounds us and of which our very being consists. We are in constant contact with him, for it is He in whom we live and move and have our being. Thus it is not true that man can no more now than in the days of Job, by searching find out what this power is "of which we are parts." We do find out more about God by searching, and we do know more about him than did the great author of this grandest of poems, the book of Job.

The world is grand and wonderful, but whatever exists manifests its existence; it acts and reacts upon other existences. It affects them and forms a factor in the interacting totality of the whole. In its action it is describable and cognisable. Even the infinite is a conception which is as plain or even plainer than anything finite. Ask a mathematician whether man possesses besides sense and reason a third faculty, "the faculty of apprehending the infinite." The mathematician will inform you that reason is quite sufficient to understand the nature of the infinite; and that if such a third faculty existed its reality should be doubted if indeed it were in a certain sense contradicted by sense and reason. If reason were contradicted by

sense, or sense by reason, in what a sorry plight would science be? If Max Müller's statement had to be accepted, agnosticism would indeed be justified to stop philosophical and scientific and also religious progress by the sad cry "Ignorabimus!"

I recollect that Mr. Ross said in his speech something to the effect that he would be the last to cripple reason or to limit its range. I cannot find the sentence in Mr. Gould's report. Is my recollection mistaken, or was the sentence dropped because it appears contradictory to the passage in which Mr. Ross speaks of "the region which reason cannot touch"? I was eagerly looking for the sentence concerning the unlimited range of reason, not because it appeared to me contradictory to the other sentence concerning the region which reason cannot touch, but because both sentences might satisfactorily interpret the one the other. For a satisfactory interpretation—satisfactory to me from the standpoint I take—of the view defended by Mr. Ross and endorsed by the quotations from Max Müller and Tyndall is possible. I should not budge from the proposition that everything real is describable and cognisable; but am willing to make a concession which might be deemed satisfactory to at least some partisans of mysticism.

How does science describe? It reduces the unknown to terms of the known. Thus the whole universe is interpreted by our own existence; and the elementary quality of our own existence is feeling. Our senses paint the world in the glowing life of sensations, while reason constructs from these data a world-picture.

Mr. Ross mistakes my position when he says that I "would exclude . . . everything which does not appeal to the five senses and approve itself to the sensational school." Mathematics is a science from which all sense elements have been excluded, and logical arguments appeal to reason, not to the five senses. Unwilling to exclude the formal sciences I do not regard *The Open Court* philosophy as belonging to the sensational school. The sensational school being unable to explain causation from sensational data alone was the very philosophy which naturally developed into agnosticism and mysticism, for Hume, Mill, and Spencer belong together. Reason is a mystery to the sensationist.

What is reason? Is reason a mysterious faculty? Reason, like the world-order, is most wonderful, but it is not mysterious. On the contrary, it is that which solves the mysteries of the world. The world-order is due to the omnipresence of form and to the universality of the laws of form. Reason, however, is the image of the form of existence; reason is formal thought. Logic, arithmetic, mathematics, are formal sciences. Logic is the science of the formal laws of

thinking, and reason is that faculty which performs logical, arithmetical, mathematical and other operations upon the basis of the laws of form. Reason, accordingly, is as little mysterious as light is dark. Wherever light penetrates, darkness ceases, and wherever reason analyses nature, the mysteries of existence vanish.

We have five senses, and Saladin justly claims that in former periods of evolution we had less, and that in the future we might have more. We might acquire an electric sense, or some organ to become aware of natural phenomena the very existence of which is still hidden to us. I do not venture to contradict, but it appears to me that it would matter but little so long as our reason would remain the same. Yet, although I grant that man might become in possession of more than five or six senses, I maintain that he cannot acquire another kind of reason. There are different kinds of sense, but there is but one reason. Reason traces the form of the universe, and with the help of the laws of form, the world is described not in the subjective elements of feelings but in the objective elements of measurable relations. In this way reason frees us from the fetters of sense and becomes, as it were, the organ of constructing objectivity.

What are the elements of which reason constructs its world-picture? That quality which is common to all sensations is feeling or awareness. Are feelings perhaps mysterious, or incomprehensible, or unknowable? No they are not; for they are exactly that which is best known. Our feelings are the data of knowledge; and all knowledge is based upon them. But while our feelings are not unknown or unknowable, they are to the cognising subject ultimate. Being the terms in which we describe, we can describe one only by comparing it with another, and have always to fall back upon them as that which is immediately given in experience. In this sense the realm of feeling forms a department which reason does not touch. Reason handles the different feelings, the sensations of smell, of taste, of touch, of sight, and of hearing; but it does not make them. It uses them as building-stones, but it does not create them. Reason need not create them, for they are the given element of experience, but without them reason could never construct a world-conception. Pure reason can raise lofty structures of pure forms, systems of mathematical, algebraical, or logical symbols. But these systems are emptier than air-castles. They are evacuate forms without substance. The data of sentiency only can fill them with reality and give color to their pale forms.

If by religion is to be understood the unspecified yearning that animates the soul, I grant that reason cannot produce it. Physics teaches us that a mutual attraction resides in all particles of mass that consti-

tute the sum total of matter in the universe, and an introspection into the life of our self reveals to us that our feelings in an analogous way aspire to something: our soul consists of yearnings. How often are we mistaken in our desires, hopes, and longings! As soon as we reach that which we thought we were eagerly seeking, we feel disappointed, for we find out that we desired something better, greater, and nobler.

The ultimate aim in which all feelings may be represented to find satisfaction, may be sought in infinity it may be called God or Theos, it may be characterised as an illusion or an ideal, that much is certain that the elements of our soul, the feelings out of which the human mind grows, are yearnings. Reason does not create these yearnings; they are facts; they are the data of our soul-life.

There is a truth in Saladin's position which I do not wish to deny, and there is a truth too in the sentences quoted from Max Müller and from Tyndall; but I should express it differently. I should say: The religious sentiment is now the same as it was in the days of Job; we feel attracted by a power that, mystically speaking, loves us with an everlasting love and therefore with loving kindness is drawing us. The yearning of our soul, which is unlimited, unfathomable, infinite, is a power "independent of sense and reason," and "neither sense nor reason are able to overcome it, while it alone is able to overcome both reason and sense." For this yearning is the master, sense and reason are his servants. Sense and reason stand in the service of the will. They are his torch bearers and illumine his path.

Monism, as it is upheld in *The Open Court*, does not exclude the sacred promptings of the religious instinct; on the contrary, it includes them; nay, more so, *The Open Court* is the work of these promptings. The founder of *The Open Court*, in spite of all the accusations of narrow-minded bigots who call him a pagan and an infidel, because he carries the torch of reason into the dark chambers of religious dogmatism, is of a deeply religious nature.

The religion of *The Open Court*, however, (mine no less than Mr. Hegeler's,) does not originate in the breakdown of science and philosophy, but it permeates and is permeated by science and philosophy. The more science we have, the purer, the grander, the truer will be our religion. If science and philosophy should break down, our religion would break down with them. Science and philosophy are inseparable from religion, and religion could not exist without them.

In conclusion of my reply to Mr. Ross, I repeat what I said in London at the banquet table: My agnostic friends may agree with *The Open Court's* monism more than might at first seem probable, if we could come to a closer understanding of our fundamental

terms." The gist of Saladin's speech expresses the sentiment: We want more than science, we want religion. And this finds a ready echo in my heart. Science alone cannot save; we must have religion. But we demand that religion should be in agreement with science. Science is the search for truth, and religion is the love of truth and the application of truth. We want more than science; we want the application of science, we want more than a cold statement of facts; truth alone is not enough; we want feeling also; we want the religious sentiment, the love of truth, the enthusiasm of right, of duty, of the ideal.

P. C.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE problem of an extra session is not yet solved, although all the newspapers in the country have been guessing at it ever since the election; and if an incident far away from the main subject may be in order by way of illustration, I will mention it. About fifteen years ago, a Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with whom I had some official relations, died; and a friend, who was himself an officer of high rank in the Bureau, spoke thus of the misfortune to me: "This is a great loss; Tom was the only man in the Department who knew anything about the business, and *he* didn't." It seems that Mr. Cleveland is the only man in the country who knows whether there will be an extra session or not, and *he* doesn't know. To clear this mystery, the *New York Herald* put the following question to every member of the new Congress, "Are you in favor of an extra session or not?" Seventy-two members answered, Yes; seventy-eight said, No; and twenty-eight were like the accommodating jurymen, ready to go on either side. One hundred and sixty-eight made no answer; and a large majority of these, contrary to the old maxim that silence gives consent, must be counted in the negative. Unfortunately, the *Herald* went for information to the wrong place; and the testimony it offers is worthless either as a sign of public opinion or as a declaration of the President's duty. The *Herald* says to three hundred and fifty-six hired men, "Your wages will go on for nine months whether you work or play; now, which would you rather do?" Although the answers are not all that they ought to be, they offer gratifying evidence that political honesty is increasing in this land, for no less than seventy-two of the hired men declare themselves willing to work for the wages they receive. Seventy-two out of a total of three hundred and fifty-six is very encouraging. The witnesses offered by the *Herald* are parties interested in the verdict; and these at common law were not permitted to testify. It is true that the old rule has been modified in England; and in most of the American states the testimony of interested parties is now accepted; but it is always under the shadow of legal suspicion, and therefore weak. It is to the advantage of members that an extra session shall not be, and they will prevent it if they can.

* * *

If the *New York Herald* had expanded its political catechism, and had asked those members who are opposed to an extra session, whether or not they are in favor of drawing pay for their idle time, the answer would have been unanimously in the affirmative. With patriotic punctuality they will begin drawing pay on the 4th of March, at 12 o'clock, sharp; but they will not meet for business until the following December, and then only just in time to adjourn over for the holidays. When they reassemble they will adopt stringent rules for limiting debate, so as to save the precious public time. For the first nine months of the term they will do nothing; but for the last nine hours of it they will work with dangerous velocity; and at the very end, they will steal nine minutes from the future by the perilous trick, always theatrically done, of putting

back the hands of the congressional clock. In those moribund hours, the most important legislation of the term is done; and it is done without either deliberation or dignity; yet the men who are so conscientiously delirious at the end, will publicly declare that they ought not to do anything at all for nine months at the beginning. Members of congress draw two year's pay for one year's work, and they insist upon having a holiday half the time even if they have to steal it. Already opposing partisans are throwing upon one another the "responsibility" for a possible special session of Congress, as if a meeting of the people's elected representatives were a calamity. When members of congress declare that they ought not to be allowed to meet for nine months after their term of office begins, and not until thirteen months after their election, they throw suspicion upon themselves, and proclaim that the prospect of their coming together in legislative session is a menace to the republic. What honest objection can there ever be to a meeting of the chosen representatives of the people? Is a meeting of delegates charged with a direct message from the people to be regarded as dangerous to the commonwealth? If so, let us abolish the republic, and like the fools of Israel advertise for a king. The people at the late election decided, not for a change of masters, but for a change of servants, and the right to be put into immediate possession of their own.

* * *

Whenever a free people, or a people nominally free, become jealous of the republican element in their political constitution, it is a sign that the legislature is corrupt, or else that the people themselves are not in robust moral health. When they get into that sickly mood, they are sure to call for help upon the royal and imperial powers latent in their organic law. They appeal to the chief magistrate for protection against themselves and their own representatives. We, the people of the United States, appear to be in that morbid condition at this time. We are praying for despotic rule, and clinging to a hope that somehow or other Mr. Cleveland will magnanimously save us from the House of Representatives, the only republican element in the government; the only part of it that is directly appointed by general ballot, and made immediately responsible to the people. Feeling that we are not politically well, we dose ourselves with quack physic, and experiment in a shiftless way with every magic drug that promises relief. For instance, here is a scheme of imperial coercion recommended to Mr. Cleveland by a man of national reputation as a lawyer, a political economist, and a social reformer, Mr. Thomas G. Shearman of New York. I present it on the authority of the *News Record*, which gives the story "for what it is worth," a suspicious apology which implies that it is not worth very much, and that Mr. Shearman may be innocent after all; but here is the story: "Mr. Shearman's recommendation as reported is that almost immediately after Mr. Cleveland's inauguration he shall summon Congress in special session and shall give the members of his party to understand that no appointments whatever will be made by him until a tariff bill shall have passed both houses." This plan of punishing legislative disobedience to the royal will has one transcendent merit, it is a scheme of ingenious torture, the most effectual that could possibly be devised; but unfortunately, it is prohibited by the constitution in that section which declares that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted, Surely nothing could be more tantalising and cruel than to withhold from victorious Democrats the offices they have won by the sweat of their honest brows. If Mr. Cleveland will flourish that whip over the Democrats in Congress and give it a few snaps after the manner of the ring master in the circus, they will surrender unconditionally, and allow him to dictate the laws.

* * *

Lord Beaconsfield said on one occasion that history is a record of political action and reaction; and in this he was very nearly

right. At the close of the eighteenth century, theoretical democracy had reached its highest development in the United States of America; but at the close of the nineteenth century, we behold a strong reaction here against the spirit of democracy and the substance too. The recommendation of Mr. Shearman, if he ever made it, that the President use the offices to influence Congress, means a reaction toward the system that aided Walpole to govern England: a judicious distribution of offices and patronage among the members of parliament in both houses. Walpole employed those means, not because he was himself corrupt, but because he lived in a licentious age; and because the men he wanted were for sale. He is charged with saying, "Every man has his price," and although he probably never said it, the testimony of history shows that he might have said it when he was prime minister without much exaggeration. Mr. Shearman's advice to the President, if adopted, would carry us backward even to the rear of Walpole's administration; to the time of James, and Charles, and Elizabeth, when the sovereign used to reprimand the House of Commons as a schoolmaster lectures disobedient boys. Nor is the plan of Mr. Shearman the only sign of a reaction in this country toward kingship and arbitrary power. Other men are advocating a like principle for a reason antagonistic to that which animates Mr. Shearman. He wants the President to coerce Congress in behalf of tariff reform; while the others, fearful of reform, advise the President not to convene the legislature except upon condition that the Democrats promise to do nothing but appoint the committees, vote the supplies, and then go home. Either way is an assault upon the independence of Congress, the superior authority, and the people's part of the government. Any such kingly interference is an encroachment upon liberty, and a usurpation. "The United States of America in Congress assembled," is a phrase not meant for sonorous rhetoric; it expresses the law, and it excludes the President from the domain of legislation, excepting that he has a qualified and limited veto. Relatively, the prerogatives of the President ought to be decreased, while those of Congress ought to be enlarged, especially the powers of the House of Representatives. In the language of a parliamentary resolution memorable in English history, "The power of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished."

* * *

By reading a late number of that very interesting and superior paper, the *Newcastle Weekly Chronicle*, I learn that a new holy day has been consecrated in England and put into the sacred calendar of hard labor. The curious but expressive name of it is "Museum Sunday," and it seems to be the Sunday nearest to the sixth day of November in each year; "for it was on that day a year ago," says the *Chronicle*, "that the Sunday Society secured its object in London—the opening of museums, art galleries, and libraries to the public on Sundays." The explanation is bewildering until we get accustomed to it, because the Sunday Society in America is devoted to the work of shutting up museums, art galleries, libraries, and all such depraved and idle places on the blessed Sabbath day. Statues, pictures, books, specimen wonders in geology, or zoology, and the triumphs of ingenious mechanism are all well enough on Mondays or on Tuesdays, for then their influence is educational and moral, but on Sundays it is demoralising and profane. On Sundays an art gallery must be made a cloister or a tomb. "Seventy-two museums, art galleries, and libraries," we are told, "are now opened on the Sabbath in different parts of England; and before the next anniversary comes round the number will doubtless be increased." This is a great achievement; and we are informed also that, "For some time past the Sunday opening of these places of culture and recreation has engaged the attention of social agitators." I cannot help asking, where were the men of "culture" all this time? Why was the work of opening "places of culture" on Sundays left to "social agitators," who seem to be the persecuted

pioneers of every improvement in the social state? Straggling along as usual among the camp followers, come the clergy, to patronise Museum Sunday now, for we are told that "the movement finds many sympathisers among pulpit lights, favorable references being made to the new anniversary last Sunday by the Rev. Canon Shuttleworth, the Rev. H. R. Haweis, and Mr. Moncure D. Conway." Very well; we ought to be grateful for this little contribution; here are two divines out of hundreds, and although Mr. Conway is a very brilliant light in literature and in social science, he has not been a "pulpit light" in the orthodox meaning of the phrase for many years. I am grateful even for their late support; but where were those "pulpit lights" when they were needed in the fog? Where were they when men through a haze of ignorance saw the sun only as a big red ball in the sky? What apology have they to offer me for depriving me of the Sunday education that I might have had, but which they hindered me from getting because their light was darkness? Not until I went back to my native land as a foreigner and a stranger did I have an opportunity to visit the British Museum or the National Gallery, because when I was a youth in England, these and all similar "places of culture" were closed on Sunday, and I could not visit them on any other day. The same spirit that shut up them closes the World's Fair too, against the working men. Meantime, I send my greeting across the sea to Saint Museum's day.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

COSMOTHEOS.

BY CHARLES A. LANE.

Who treads the earth, and deemeth Matter base,
Kens not the kindredship of mysteries,
Nor openeth the spirit, vision-wise,
Behind the sense, to watch the Wonder's ways
That slips from clay to soul, with subtle grace,
Through all the scale of mutabilities,
A very god for marvel to the eyes,
Normal in change, inscrutable of face.

Lo, every touch that feelth Force refuse
The formless infinite beyond saith: God!
And dull the ear that doth the echo lose,
Where, 'neath the feet, God soundeth in the sod:
Not Ymer slain; but Life that aye unfurls
In dreams whose substance is the mazy worlds.

BOOK REVIEWS.

INQUIRENDO ISLAND. By *Hudor Genone*. Third Edition. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company.

THE LAST TENET IMPOSED UPON THE KHAN OF TOMATHOZ. By *Hudor Genone*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company.

The first novel, "Inquirendo Island," presents to the readers many valuable ideas in the shape of an allegory pleasantly told. Mr. Hudor Genone is known to our readers by several thoughtful contributions, and we recommend the present volume as being in the same style. It caricatures the dogmatism of church-life, but it suggests at the same time the religious truth that lies hidden in the symbols of ceremonies and rituals.

The second novel by the same author will prove more interesting still. The burlesque pencil sketches which illustrate the various comical situations adorn the book and are no small incitation to read the story.

WITHIN ROYAL PALACES. Scenes Behind the Thrones. By *Marquise de Fontenoy*. Philadelphia and St. Louis: Hubbard Publishing Co.

An interesting book, full of information concerning the royal families of Europe. The editor Mr. Fletcher Johnson, an Ameri-

can journalist of repute, has enjoyed the personal acquaintance of the authoress for many years. The Marquise de Fontenoy appears to be well fitted to the task she has undertaken, not only because she belongs by birth and marriage to the aristocratic coteries and is admitted to court, but also because she has a talent of telling well what she knows. She places before us the occupants of the thrones and those that stand nearest them, so that we can conceive a clear idea of their characters, their speech, their faces, their habits, their virtues, and their shortcomings. The book is richly illustrated and tastily bound.

NOTES.

The Open Court Publishing Co., will publish in a few days, for the Christmas market, a tastily bound booklet by the editor under the title "Truth in Fiction, Twelve Tales with a Moral." Some of the tales are entirely new, while others have already appeared in *The Open Court*, among which we mention "The Gardener of Galilee," "Capital and Labor," "After the Distribution of the Type."

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