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RELIGIOUS TRUTH.

BY JOHN BURROUGHS.

WHEN hard pressed, theological writers often take refuge in the statement that there is some kind of evidence that is superior to scientific evidence in matters that pertain to objects of sense and experience. Thus Dr. Temple in his Brampton lectures on the relations between Religion and Science, says in behalf of miracles; that if the student of science is to admit a breach in the uniformity of nature, "it can only be by stepping outside of his science for the time and conceiving the possibility that there is some other truth beside scientific truth, and some other kind of evidence beside scientific evidence." Unless he does this he is in a groove, and is like "the student who when he first saw a locomotive engine looked persevering for the horses that impelled it, because he had never known, and consequently could not imagine any other mode of producing such motion." But if the student did persevere he surely found the horses at last, that is, a real tangible force that propelled the engine, and one that worked according to uniform law. For my part I confess I cannot conceive of any evidence that can be brought in support of miracles that shall not be in its nature scientific, that is, addressed to our rational faculties. What is this other evidence to which Dr. Temple alludes? He would probably say it is the evidence that a higher will interferes and sets aside or reverses the ordinary processes of nature; but do we not want evidence that a higher will does so interfere, and must not this evidence be scientific? that is adequate to convince the mind? We can admit a breach in the uniformity of nature only upon the same *kind* of evidence as that which leads us to deny the breach, that is evidence that appeals to reason and experience. It must be tangible, objective evidence, and not a theory or a groundless postulate. What proves the interference of this higher will? The miracle. But what proves the miracle? The theory of the higher will.

If there are other truths than scientific truths, and other grounds of certitude than those apprehended by the reason, they are not such as are available when natural law is on trial.

But are there such other truths? are not all truths strictly speaking scientific truths? If the matter is not capable of verification, are we justified in calling it true, no matter what our private opinion or conviction on the subject may be? If we ask of a thing, or a measure, or a course of conduct, is it good or bad, right or wrong, we appeal to the moral sense; if we ask of a thing is it beautiful? we appeal to the æsthetic sense. If we ask of a statement or alleged occurrence, is it true? we appeal to the intellectual sense, to the reason and judgment. And there is no other court but this that can settle the truth or falsity of a proposition. There is no other court but this that has to do with the *truth* of things.

Our religious instincts and impulses do not have to do with the truth or falsity of a thing; they are just as keen and active in the presence of false gods as in the presence of true; our æsthetic perceptions or attractions do not have to do with the truth or falsity of things, but only with their beauty. A fable pleases more than a history. The conscience is no guide in detecting truth from falsehood, but in detecting right from wrong—in separating what is good from what is bad, and it may be trained or warped so as to mistake one for the other. What the conscience of one man approves that of another may disapprove. It is our reason and knowing faculties alone that have to do with the truth of things, and the verdict of these faculties can never change or be reversed like those of the taste or the conscience. There can be no fashion in science.

A theory, or a proposition, or an alleged fact may be morally sound and good, while yet it is not logically sound and good. A sentiment is true as sentiment but not true as science. There is no moral objection to Æsop's fables, but if put forth as sound natural history, there would be objections to them. The New Testament records, which more and more people in our day find difficulty in accepting as history, are for the most part, morally and spiritually, beautiful and elevating, and to certain natures this is enough. But the man of science asks are they true, not as poetry or fable, but as history? That feeling or mental disposition that responds to fables and allegories is as genuine

as that which enables us to detect truth from falsehood, only it cannot take its place: it belongs to a different sphere. There is something in us that delights in fables and in heroic deeds; that rises superior to times and circumstances, and makes the devotion of martyrs and the triumphs of the Davids over the Goliahs, tonic and refreshing. There are books and poems, that ventilate and tone up a man's whole nature. We are by no means summed up by our knowing faculties. Truth of fact and truth of sentiment make up life, and about in the proportion of the bone and the fleshy tissue in our systems. We may say there is relative truth and absolute truth. All scientific truth if it be truth is absolute; it is verifiable and must hold good at all times and places. A man's opinion of a matter, that is, his inference from observed facts, is true from his conditions and point of view; it is the outcome of his relations, capacity, and antecedents; it is modified by his temperament, his culture, his health, his sympathies, his race, his environment and many other things. If strictly speaking there are religious truths, truths that in no wise depend upon your view, or my view of the case, they are verifiable. What are these truths? That man has a soul of which his body is the tenement, that the soul survives the dissolution of the body, that there is a heaven and a hell, that there is a personal God, that Jesus did not belong to the human race, etc.—these are not truths because they are not verifiable. They are hopes, faiths, beliefs, aspirations; they are true to some men and not to others; the grounds upon which they are held true count much with one man, and count little with another. We speak of the sublime truths of the sermon on the mount; noble and sublime sentiments they are, but not truths; they afford consolation to the religious spirit, but not satisfaction to our truth discerning faculties, and were not meant to. Religious truths, therefore, I should say are relative truths, and any attempt to make them fixed and absolute as the creed-mongers have tried to do, must end in failure. Truth in all subjective matters, is not a fixed quantity; it is something that must be ever newly grown like organic nature herself. A recent theological writer says that when men accustomed to the demonstrative evidence of science "enter a province where moral evidence rather than demonstration prevails, they are not unnaturally inclined to suppose that nothing in it is settled, nothing ascertained," and very reasonably I think. Nothing can be *settled* except upon demonstrative evidence; you may think it settled and wake up next day to find that the floods of new inquiry have come and set it all afloat again. Moral evidence can settle nothing permanently; it may produce conviction in men's minds to-day, which some new thought or new spirit will chafe under to-

morrow. The moral evidences of Christianity—its wonderful growth from such obscure beginnings, the noble lives it has inspired, its power for good in the world, etc., have great weight, but they do not settle the questions that vex us. Other religions have grown in the same way, and been the inspiration of heroic lives and the bond of national prosperity. It will not do to say, as is so often said, that the European nations owe all to Christianity; what Christianity owes to the quality and spirit of the European races remains to be determined. Why did it not transform the Eastern peoples as well? Science has done more for the development of Western civilisation in one hundred years, than Christianity did in eighteen hundred. Again, why has science not done as much for the oriental nations? There we are; to dogmatise in these matters is dangerous business. The factor of race, the factor of environment, climate, geology, rivers, mountain chains, variety of coast line, etc., all enter into the problem.

The writer I have already quoted says, "Too high demands cannot be made on theology as to the legitimacy and scientific accuracy of its methods." The scientific method is the same whether in the hands of the man of science or the theologian. It is simply proving all things and holding fast that which is true.

When Dr. Abbott treats Christianity as an evolution, does he not thereby abandon the claim that it is a revelation? It cannot be both. If it is an evolution, if it came logically and naturally out of what went before, if it was a growth, a development of the religious conscience of man, then it takes its place in the course of historical events, and the man of science may accept it. In that case what becomes of the claim that it was a revelation, something that had no relation to what went before, something interjected into the course of mundane history from without, an interpolation, a miraculous ray of light from out the heavens? Science knows evolution, but it can make nothing of revelation. Pilot's old question, What is truth? is never out of date.

Ask what is the truth in mathematics, and the answer is easy: two and two make four; a straight line is the shortest distance between two points; the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, etc. Ask what is the truth in science, and the answer comes as promptly, though here the field is as yet only fairly entered upon; ask what is the truth in politics, and here we are bound to say all men are liars; the truth is whatever you can convince yourself is true. Ask what is the truth in political economy, in ethics, in metaphysics, and lastly in religion, and the answers are as various as the minds of men. It is certain that it is not a fixed quantity, that it is relative and changes as the wants and conditions of men change. We can-

not close our minds upon the truth in these spheres and say "I have it" any more than we can close our hands upon the light and say "I have it." The good and the bad, the beautiful and the ugly are relative terms; no fast and hard lines can here be drawn, all is plastic, fluctuating, growing. But science draws fast and hard lines and can alone formulate definite truths. A friend and correspondent of Coleridge writing for the benefit of his children said that through the influence of that philosopher he had been able to arrive at settled and definite conclusions upon all matters to which he attached value or interest. And then he adds with great wisdom "When I say that I have arrived at settled conclusions, you will not for a moment believe that my opinions can or *ought* to be received by others of a totally different experience, as *truths* for their minds; still less that matters which depend upon individual experience and temperament can be permanent truths for all time." What a lesson for us all. Every man builds or tries to build himself a house of truth of some sort, to shelter him from the great void, but how foolish to expect us all to build alike or go to the same quarry for our material; or that our house could serve for our children for all coming time. How long it will serve depends upon how large, how well, how conveniently it is built.

Into the formation of our minds and into the conduct of our lives there enter truths, opinions, and sentiments. Four fifths of our lives are probably made up of sentiment, that is feeling, aspiration, attraction, repulsion, etc.; a sentiment may be relatively true or false, it may arise from a narrow view or a broad view, but it is equally potent whether true or false. Demonstrable truth enters into our lives, scarcely more than the mineral elements enter into our bodies, but our lives could not go on for a moment without them.

Religion is a sentiment, one of the most powerful and absorbing that the human spirit knows, but that it is or can be in any way related to science, or can partake of the certitudes of science, is one of the mistakes that have cost the world untold suffering.

THE MYSTERIOUS BEETLE.

MR. PEEPER lives in Gotham. Being a learned man and master of the microscope, he is employed as an expert in the law courts, where his services are very valuable, especially in criminal cases. For, besides other things, he is able to tell, with certainty, the nature of stains: he easily distinguishes the blood of man from the blood of pigeons or other creatures. In spite of his great learning, or because of it, he has one fault; he considers nothing settled until it has been examined under the microscope; and whatever does not admit

of a microscopic inspection he regards as lying beyond the ken of science.

Mr. Peeper's neighbor is Professor Sage, a teacher in the High School. The Professor's hobby is logic, and he is so astute that he can split hairs of thought and make the finest distinctions in the philosophical meanings of words. But, like his friend, he considers nothing true unless it be demonstrated with rigid formalism according to some syllogistic figure. He is able to stretch nearly everything upon some of the Procrustean beds of logical deduction or induction, and that which he cannot reduce to this treatment is regarded by him as unknowable.

They admire each other and agree very much in their scientific and philosophical views, although they differ in their methods of investigation. The difference of their methods seemed to increase their friendship, for each, as a rule, submitted willingly, although sometimes not without a slight mental reservation, to the authority of the other, whenever the subject lay in the province of his special field.

"There is a new fangled philosophy," said the Professor one day to his friend. "Its maxims are formulated in two Isms. It calls itself Positivism, because it takes the facts of experience to start with; and Monism, because a systematic arrangement of facts is looked upon as the aim of cognition: Thus knowledge is regarded as a description of facts, and philosophy becomes a unitary world-conception. What do you think of this view?"

"All philosophies," said Mr. Peeper, "are in my opinion idle, and their study a waste of time."

"All philosophies?" asked the Professor sharply.

"Yes, all," he repeated,—adding slowly and in a considerate mood, "except agnosticism."

"Ah! I should say so!" rejoined the logician with unconcealed satisfaction.

"Well," continued the microscopist, "did you not tell me yourself: the gist of agnosticism is the idea that the world-problem is an inscrutable, an absolutely incomprehensible mystery? Ergo, all philosophies, all world-schemes, except that one which denies the possibility of any world-scheme, must be failures from the beginning."

Mr. Peeper always evaded controversies with his friend, for he knew that he could not hold his own in argument against him. Agreeing upon the whole with him on the question of agnosticism, he kept, nevertheless, detailed explanations of his own view for himself; for he felt that his explanations might show divergencies which he did not care to discuss; they might reveal such a radical difference of opinion that the harmony of their souls might be destroyed. Mr. Peeper did not believe in philosophising at all. He thought by himself, "Theories and world-schemes

cannot be placed under the microscope; they are mere fancies. Thus they must be regarded as outside the realm of science. Accordingly, they are not fit objects for scientific investigation."

Mr. Peeper was much more of an agnostic than his friend the logician, for he doubted even the absolute reliability of the syllogism, and believed that man knows nothing beyond what is revealed to him through the microscope. He was not even sure of the agnostic doctrine that the world-mystery is utterly incomprehensible. Thus he resembled the old philosopher Pyrrho who was so consistent in his scepticism that he doubted his own doubt.

"Positivism," said the logician, "is not only crude, but also illogical. To start with facts, what a proposition! What can we do with facts unless we have theories concerning them or at least methods of how to deal with them? We cannot do anything with facts without having principles. We must first have principles. Positivism derives principles and everything from facts, without considering that in doing so it presupposes certain principles. The problem is whence do the principles come? And, then, positivism assumes facts without proving them! Facts are exactly the mystery of the world. For instance, now I look at you, I see you, I have a sensation of sight. This sensation is a fact. So far, all right, but the positivists forget that facts cannot be proved. Facts must be proved. How can anybody prove that I have a sensation? Here lies the problem. That is a mystery, and the mystery will remain unsolved forever."

"You are right," said Mr. Peeper. "The whole world consists of facts, and, supposing we know everything that science can discover, we should have to confess that all facts are equally mysterious." He paused for a few moments. Then, he continued, "Even this general statement is mysterious. For 'mysterious' is a relative term. The mysterious presupposes the comprehensible. Light and shade, obscurity and clearness go together. There are no shades in impenetrable darkness, and if the existence of all facts is absolutely mysterious, there would after all be no mystery in the existence of facts."

* * *

One day the microscopist called at the close of the school for the Professor to take a stroll with him through the park before going home. He found his friend surrounded by a number of boys, all of them absorbed in a deep problem. The Professor of natural science had fallen ill, and Professor Sage had taken his place pro tem. Professor Sage tried to conceal the fact, but the boys knew that he was not very familiar with natural science, and so they enjoyed puzzling him with questions. One of them had produced a

queer bug, it was no dragon fly, no spider, no bumble-bee, yet it resembled each of these insects.

The Professor appeared to be greatly puzzled when his friend entered. Mr. Peeper noticed at once the perplexing situation and when the Professor showed him the strange creature, Mr. Peeper took out of his pocket a capsule which he generally carried about him, put the bug in the capsule, and cut off all further discussion by the promise that he would investigate it under the microscope.

In the park they met the gardener of the conservatories. They showed him the rare specimen, and asked him whether he knew what it was.

"Yes," said the gardener with assurance, and the Professor was delighted at the prospect of receiving information. "Yes," said the gardener "that is a bug."

The Professor was disappointed. "My dear friend," said he, "you do not see the depth of the problem. We know very well that the creature is a bug; but of what kind, what family, what species?" He turned away sadly, thinking, "This man pretends to know something, and he knows nothing. How much more arrogant is the conceit that we can know something where the wisest minds must confess that we know nothing. It takes all the wisdom of the ages to understand that at bottom all knowledge is impossible."

When the two friends arrived at Mr. Peeper's home, he placed the unknown bug under the microscope. "Strange," he said. "The wings are those of a dragon fly. His head looks like a grasshopper's head. His hind body reminds one of the bumble-bee. I fear this creature is a very mysterious being. I wonder how it can exist at all? Its existence is illogical and self-contradictory."

"But it is a fact," said the Professor. "There it is."

"Yes, it is a fact. There it is," replied Mr. Peeper musingly. "There it lies before us in its undeniable presence. But, after all, what does that amount to?" he added, with a sarcastic twinkle in his eye. "A fact is only a fact. Facts cannot be proved. They are all equally mysterious. It seems to me that the whole world, being an incomprehensible mystery, is like this bug. The whole world is mysterious. It is, for aught I know, as illogical and unintelligible as this little bug."

Mr. Peeper enjoyed, for the first time in his life, a superiority in discussing a subject with his friend. The Professor, who was so confident when engaged in a dispute on logical topics, was at sea in natural science. Mr. Peeper was much better informed in entomology than Professor Sage.

"Well," said the Professor, hesitatingly, "what shall I tell the boys to-morrow when they ask for the name of this mysterious beetle?"

"That bug is a rare specimen," said Mr. Peeper, "and indeed, excellently made by the creator who shaped him. But this wondrous world in which we live is faulty, why should not a bug have his faults too. Just look through the microscope and you will see the mucilage with which these heterogeneous parts are pasted together. If the boys ask you to-morrow what kind of a creature it is, tell them it is 'a humbug,'—and that is the reason why it is so mysterious."

P. C.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE GOD-IDEA.

BY C. STANILAND WAKE.

M. LE COMTE GOBLET D'ALVIELLA has published in Paris at Felix Alcan's (Bruxelles, at Th. Falk's; Chicago, at Ackermann and Eyller's) a work entitled "L'Idée de Dieu d'après l'Anthropologie et l'Histoire."

The brilliant author of this exhaustive treatise of the God-idea was studying the question of the development of the later forms of religion from ideas current among peoples in lower stages of culture, to form a supplement to his work on contemporary religious evolution among the English, the Americans, and the Hindus, when he was asked by the trustees of the *Hibbert Foundation* to give one of their annual series of lectures. This invitation was accepted, and M. d'Alviella determined to take for his subject the historical evolution of the God-idea. To give effect to such a scheme, however, it was necessary to give a much wider meaning to the term history than it usually has, and to bring within its scope much that is regarded as strictly prehistoric. This was absolutely necessary if the lecturer's idea was to be carried out, and as there can be no evolution without continuity, it is requisite to go back to the very beginnings of human culture to show the origin of the God-idea, which runs as a thread throughout the whole course of religious development.

By religion M. d'Alviella understands the mode in which man realises his relations with superhuman and mysterious powers on which he thinks himself dependent. This definition leaves open the question whether the end of religion is real or a mere shadow. The author thinks it is real, and that the word God contains the imperishable conception of "a Superhuman Power who, realising himself according to law, is revealed to man in the voice of conscience and in the spectacle of the universe." This is the truth which persists when, "after having stripped the Deity of his original superfetations and of his parasitic accretions, after having removed from him, as so many borrowed garments, his anthropomorphic attributes and his moral limitations, after, finally, having restored his nature to unity and his action to harmony, we find ourselves in presence of the impenetrable veil which will always conceal it from us in its essence and in its grandeur, but which arrests the passage neither of the manifestations of its power nor of the revelations of its law, nor perhaps the mysterious radiation of an attractive force answering to our terms of sympathy and love."

There are three delusions, says M. d'Alviella, under which the conception of a superhuman power has been gradually arrived at: (1) The abusive extension of personality, (2) the confusion of coincidence with causality, and (3) the assimilation of dreaming with reality.

The abusive extension of personality is supposed to have been due to the fact that the savage, like the animal, regards all movement as the sign of life. Hence man came to personify everything that appears to move, and, by extension, everything that seemed to exercise on his destiny an influence implying the exercise of an active will. It is doubtful, however, whether this goes far enough,

and it is probable that, as the author at one time thought, man at first regarded as animated "everything which affects his senses with an individuality sufficiently pronounced to awaken in his mind a distinct image." The primitive notion of the transmigration of souls, as preserved in popular Buddhism is consistent with that view, as is also the fact that the Australian aborigines divide all things in nature into two categories which appear to answer to male and female. To the savage, man is the standard for nature, and everything therefore is animated like himself.

As to the confusion between coincidence and causality, there can be no doubt that this delusion has had great influence over the uncultured mind. As the author shows, objects are accidentally associated with events, of which they are inconsistently supposed to be the cause, and thus they attain a personification, if this had not been previously ascribed to them. The influence of dreams during sleep is as great as that of the waking imagination. His experiences during these two conditions are to the savage equally real, a fact which must effect greatly his ideas in relation to duplication of personality and its continuance after death. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose, as the author does, that the *latter* had its origin in dreams. These might supply the conditions of a future state of existence, but not the idea of it. If the savage ascribes life to inanimate objects, why should he not conceive of his own life continuing, notwithstanding the apparent cessation of motion? Originally man could have no idea of death, but would, as M. d'Alviella himself says, at first confound it with sleep, fainting, and catalepsy. The connection between the belief in a future existence and the worship of ancestors is evident, but in its developed form the ancestral cult is undoubtedly of comparatively late origin. The author thinks that it was developed on parallel lines with the worship of natural objects, and it is quite possible that the fear of the spirits with which man's imagination filled nature, and the dread of the spirits of the dead may have originated together. It is, indeed, far from improbable that originally they were one and the same, and that the spirits with which the human mind peopled nature were those of departed generations of men, although this would probably never be actually recognised, and they would finally come to be clearly distinguished.

The earliest prayers and the earliest rites were offered to the principal objects of nature regarded as "quasi human personalities." The former were for the obtaining of blessings, but the latter would be rather for the working of evils. Sacrifice appears to have combined both these notions, and the author seems to think the primitive idea on which it was based was that of reciprocity. Generosity in offerings requires generosity in return, and a similar notion gives rise to peace offerings and expiatory sacrifices. Sorcery is based on the opinion that supernatural powers can be influenced by incantations, and that spirits sometimes injuriously affect human beings, as in sickness. Magical processes and divination have a similar origin. M. d'Alviella asks whether conjuration preceded propitiation, and he replies that probably they have coexisted since the time that man first felt the necessity of putting himself in communication with the personified forces of nature. It is more probable, however, that propitiation in its simplest form, as intended to avert evil, preceded conjuration, as the fear of spirits must have preceded the thought of making use of them.

The subject of *polydemonism*, under which term is comprised spiritism, fetishism and idolatry, is well treated. The author states that in the veneration of natural objects, worship is addressed to the personality with which they are invested. Moreover, this personality is conceived under the form of a double separable from its envelope, by analogy with the human personality. Thus the distinction of body and soul is coextensive with the whole range of personified nature, a fact which has perhaps even a more

important bearing on the subsequent developments of religious belief than the author ascribes to it. He points out the intimate connection of spiritism with fetishism, which supposes that a spirit can dwell outside of a body, and he shows that an idol is merely a perfected form of the fetish, and not a symbol as it is often asserted. Idolatry thus constitutes a progress, a development from a simpler cult, and it elf exhibits various stages of progress.

We are told that polytheism, although based on polydemonism, is the result of a process of differentiation among superhuman powers. Those that were supposed to concern themselves the least with the affairs of men fell into the background, and preponderance was thus given to four categories of demons, those which were thought to control the principal natural phenomena, tribal spirits, the souls of the illustrious dead, and the powers which represented social collectivities. This differentiation was attended with the establishment of a hierarchy which implied the subordination of the spirits to the gods, and which naturally imitated the hierarchy established among earthly powers. M. d'Alviella after tracing the existence of such divine societies among various peoples, remarks that "it is interesting to show that everywhere there was a consciousness of the spontaneous parallelism established between the celestial kingdom and the terrestrial state. But by an optical illusion, it was the human society which seemed the imitation of the divine state." We have here, however, only another illustration of the truth, that man has ever been prone to see in the reflections from his own mind external realities and, we may add, often to invest them with supernatural attributes.

In the passage from polytheism to monism there has generally been the development of a form of dualism. There has always existed in the mind of the savage a distinction between good and evil spirits, and the author sees in mythology, by which he understands "the transformation of natural phenomena or of abstract events into personal adventures which are ascribed to superhuman beings," a means by which could be formed the idea that the gods were actively concerned in the well-being of humanity. He speaks of this as the regulative mission of divinity, the object of which was to establish order in nature, and thus organise one of the conditions essential to the preservation of mankind. The gods thus came to represent the beneficent power of nature who are opposed in their mission by the hostile superhuman powers. This dualism becomes the more marked as religious development proceeds, but the final triumph of order is always recognised. This belief led to the formation in the human mind of the idea of law, of a cosmical order based on the regularity of natural phenomena. It resulted, moreover, in the restriction of the domain left to divine arbitrariness. The personifications of natural order were placed above the ancient gods, who finally gave place to a supreme author and sustainer of cosmical order.

M. d'Alviella points out that the conflict for order in nature was accompanied by a contest for moral order. This may seem to be opposed to the immorality of the actions ascribed to the gods in the ancient myths, but this is explained, and we think properly, by the fact that at the beginning of religious evolution morality has no place in the conception of the gods; "ethics and religion are absolutely independent of each other." But a conception of moral order is gradually formed on the plan of the cosmical order; that which agrees with this order is good and what is in opposition to it is evil. Thus, says the author, "is everywhere established a sort of assimilation between the forces which represent, on the one side, light, life, order, truth and justice; on the other side, darkness, death, disorder, untruth and unrighteousness. The drama which, until then, confines itself to nature extends to the conscience, and man is more than ever sensible of the duty to cooperate with the gods who fight for the good of the world." The connection of these ideas with that of a future life of retribution

or recompense, for evil done or suffered in the present through violation of the divine order, is evident; as is the relation between the "moralisation of the divine type" and the improvement in the moral conduct of man, who comes to be governed by the ideas of duty and love ascribed to the deity.

The author appears to have lost sight of one important feature. In polydemonism the distinction between the soul and the body is always preserved. In the later dualism this distinction is not lost sight of, but it takes on another aspect. In its cosmology the soul becomes spirit and the body, matter, and in the antagonism between light and darkness, we have the conflict between spirit and matter as the latest phase of dualism, which profoundly affected the monotheistic religions, including Christianity itself.

Monolatry was founded, as M. d'Alviella states, on the belief in the superiority of the national God, and the more a nation was able to extend its authority the more its supreme deity approached the position of universal sovereignty. To this was added the idea of the Deity being a father, as well as the ruler, of his people.

We cannot follow the author further in his description of the transformations undergone by the God-idea, under the influence of metaphysical speculation, until it becomes the "eternal energy from which all things proceed," and "the power that makes for righteousness"; two well-known formulæ which he thinks furnish "the point of contact between the philosophy of evolution and the religious school of positivism, by allowing these two systems to complete each other without abandoning their respective principles."

Let us see, in conclusion, what are M. d'Alviella's ideas as to the future of religion. He says that three motives which have from the first constituted the principal factors of religion are fear, admiration, and sympathy. Of these motives the first two tended to be absorbed in the third, which gave rise to a sentiment of fraternity, engendered by communion in God, and a disinterested desire to participate in the divine work of human regeneration. This evolution of the religious sentiment, which was accompanied by changes in the inferior elements of worship, such as prayer, sacrifice, symbolism, the priesthood, led to the belief that the service of humanity is the best mode of serving the Deity.

But if so, he asks, may not religious worship disappear?

In considering this question, the author refers to the ethical movement, whose founders have "sought to establish the bond of their communion on the sole identity of humanitarian and progressive aspirations," but which he thinks will fail to satisfy the aspirations of man towards the infinite and the absolute, through not appealing to the resources of the combinations of art which enter into worship to symbolise the æsthetic side of the ideal.

CURRENT TOPICS.

On the 11th of July the President of the United States made a few remarks before the National Educational Association, assembled at Saratoga. Of course, any public address made by a President who happens to be a candidate, will be open to suspicion as an electioneering plea; but whatever may be the campaign motive of it, the speech delivered at Saratoga was admirable in taste, quality, and diction. Also, it abounded in good sense. The President said, "It is quite as appropriate, I think, that the President of the United States should review the teachers of the land as that he should review its army or its militia." This was a novel view of it, and a good one, but the chief merit of it lay in its dignity. The President was careful to describe his office by its lawful name, and himself by his constitutional title. He called himself the President of the United States, like a man proud of his civic rank. He was no cheap, diluted, 'umble "chief executive," but the President of the United States. Let us hope that the vulgar, disrespectful, weak, and illegitimate equivocation, "chief executive" will now be banished from American speech. I have been trying

for years to abolish it, but with poor success, because the fear of honest words has made us cowardly in speech, and we prefer to use ambiguous phrase instead of single words that have no double meaning. If we must say "chief executive" let us add the word "magistrate" and thus rescue the phrase from the bondage of literary slang. Even then, we shall not fully describe the President, for while he is the chief executive magistrate, he is also more than that; he has a veto on legislation, and he has other prerogatives not belonging to the executive department of the government. Now that the President has himself set the example will our people, and especially our newspapers, follow it and outlaw the "chief executive"?

The President, in his address to the teachers, had something sensible to say about practical education, and especially the education of young children. He said: "There is a just mean between a system of intellectual competition which destroys the body, and a system of physical training that eliminates the mind. Perhaps the stress is applied too early upon our little ones." There is, as they say in the President's own State, a "heap" of sense in that; but where is the "just mean," and how shall we discover it? The President spoke of two little girls whom he heard in conversation outside the school house near his own home. One of them said, "I had an awful dream last night." The other said, "What was it?" and the dreamer answered, "Oh, I dreamt that I did not pass." There is a touch of nature there that appeals to every father and to every mother; and the lesson of it applies to most of us. It is not a month gone since I heard something similar to that. In the street where I live, in the very same house in fact, if you want to be critically exact, a little girl just eight years old, came home from school on the last day of the term in a state of great excitement, and shouted to an old man, thus, "Oh, Grandpa! Grandpa! News! News! Great news I have for you!" "What is it?" said the old man. "I passed!" replied the child. It may be said that the exultation was too great a strain on the nervous system of the child, especially as it was a reaction from the anxiety of many days. Perhaps so; but what are we to do? Our children must go to school; and while the nervous forces ought not to be weakened or wasted, they ought to be kept healthy by exercise, and by the stimulus of ambition. Perhaps it would be well to abolish all general and periodic examinations for promotion in the schools, so that the advancement of one child might not be the public humiliation of another.

That the mental discipline acquired at the schools tends to refine mere physical bravery into moral heroism is very likely true, and the President appeared to be of that opinion, for he referred in proof of it to a battle scene which came under his own observation. He said, "I recall a battle scene. The line was advancing against an entrenched enemy; from behind strong parapets eight double-shotted guns belched forth their missiles of death into the advancing line; there was a pause that threatened instant retreat, when a stripling soldier, a mother's boy, stepped to the front and with cap in hand cheered the line on to victory." This was a splendid achievement which ought to have put the name of that "stripling soldier" high up on the "scroll of fame"; but in a tantalizing way, as is the habit of some story tellers, the President, although he was there at the time, and saw the chivalrous charge, provokingly neglects to tell us the name of the "stripling soldier," or the name of that battle which he won. Will the President kindly finish the story, and tell us what the generals, and the colonels, and the captains were about while the "stripling soldier" was leading his troops against the strong parapets defended by double-shotted guns? Were they preparing to retreat, or had they already gone? The President himself, I am happy to say, had not yet left, because he was present somewhere handy, and saw

the "stripling soldier" lead the charge. And, merely for the rectification of history, nothing more, will the President give us the name of the general who got credit for the victory won by that "mother's boy"?

Lord Chief Justice Norbury who flourished in Ireland nearly a hundred years ago, was called "the hanging judge" because of his great efficiency in sending men to the scaffold. One day, having sentenced a man to death, he ended with the usual benediction, "May the Lord have mercy on your soul"; to which the prisoner answered, "Small thanks to your lordship for that same; I never knew any man to thrive after *your* prayers." Sinister blessings are unlucky; as, for instance, those bestowed upon the President of the United States by Mr. Andrew Carnegie of Cluny Castle, Scotland. "The American people know a good thing when they get it. Heartiest congratulations; you deserve this triumph." Better for the President, if instead of this crooked compliment he had heard the grim and ghastly raven croaking, Nevermore. The flatteries given by Carnegie, and accepted by the President, are stained by the blood of workmen slain on the battle field of labor. The spirit shown by the workmen of Homestead, in resisting the Pinkerton invaders, will make their fight heroic in history like the fight on Bunker Hill. In mimicry of George the Third, Mr. Carnegie, at a safe distance, hires from the Grand Duke of Hesse, Pinkerton mercenary legions to subjugate the aspiring laborers at Homestead. As we think of this grim parody the lines of Ferdinand Freiligrath ring in our ears like bells:

"The bullet in the marble breast, the gash upon the brow,
You raised us on the bloody planks with wild and wrathful howl!
High in the air you lifted us, that every writhing of pain
Might be an endless curse to him at whose word we were slain!
That he might see us in the gloom, or in the daylight's shine,
Whether he turns his Bible's leaf, or quaffs his foaming wine!"

It has come to this at last that any man made of money, and out of jail, no matter how coarse his moral fibre, nor how impudent his flunkey spirit, may patronise the President of the United States with complimentary slang. He may even anoint the American people with flatteries fawning and insincere, receiving thanks and gifts for his cajoleries. With a cunning leer in his eye, showing that he is making fun of the American people, a canny Scot, gold-plated by the taxation of Americans, prints a book full of rant and fustian in praise of a "triumphant democracy" which gives millions of dollars to him, and a few baubles to his men. The offering of this cheap incense is offensive enough, but it is humiliating to see the proud American spirit stoop to receive the counterfeit adulation of a mere speculator in American bounties, a guest of this free land whose life and daily actions prove that he is morally and mentally incompetent even to understand the genius, intent, and promise of American democracy. What will the world think of us for allowing ourselves to be wheedled by a pretender whose only claim to notice is that he chinks when he walks upon the ground! It is arrogance, vulgar and intolerable, that such a man by grace of money alone, should presume to countenance and befriend the President of the United States. The familiarity drags the President down to the lower plane occupied by his patron; and it is natural to imagine a reciprocity of compliments between them. Does the President think that the American people knew a good thing when they got Mr. Carnegie? And will he send him heartiest congratulations for his triumph at Homestead? And will the President further tell him that he deserved this triumph? It is worth a good deal of money over there in Europe to a returned emigrant that he is on terms of intimate friendship with the President of the United States; and when a crafty fellow can ostentatiously present a keg of Scotch whiskey

to the President, and have it accepted, his importance rises thirty degrees in the social thermometer; because the people in the old country think that any man who would dare to take such a liberty must be on terms of the most intimate friendship and association with the President. It is due to the dignity of his own countrymen that the President of the United States be careful how he gives dignity to merely opulent men. M. M. TRUMBULL.

both in this country and in Europe; where ethnologists have ceased to claim a position of superiority owing to their having been the first in the field. Ω.

NOTES.

When Mr. John Burroughs in his article on "Religious Truth" in this number of *The Open Court* says: "Religion is a sentiment, one of the most powerful and absorbing that the human spirit knows, but that it is or can be in any way related to science, or can partake of the certitudes of science, is one of the mistakes that have cost the world untold suffering," he uses the word "religion" partly in the sense of creed, and means, as we judge from the tendencies of his article, that the formulations and doctrines of religious creed are not, in virtue of being religious, for that reason scientific and absolute truths. In so far as they spring from sentiment they may not be truths and may not partake of the certitudes of science, but in so far as the religions of the earth have all builded alike and have all gone to the same quarry for their material, to the quarry of facts, their creations are truths and will stand the test of scientific examination. Both religion and ethics have an objective aspect as well as the subjective aspect to which Mr. Burroughs refers, and this objective aspect is certainly a domain of scientific investigation. Whether *individuals* agree with the results of scientific criticism in this domain, is of as little consequence as whether they agree with the doctrine of the rotation of the earth on its axis.

BOOK REVIEWS.

GOD'S IMAGE IN MAN. By *Henry Wood*. Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1892.

The author of this work, whose recent articles in the *Arena* Magazine attracted considerable attention and have been incorporated in the book, claims for his studies that they are glimpses through the vision of the intuitive faculty, that is, "interpretations of the inner consciousness, rather than an intellectual or argumentative effort." The objection to books of this kind is that the teachings of intuition, so-called, can have no authority unless they are confirmed by reason. While therefore we can sympathise with the author when he says that he has no purpose other than the plain unfoldment of truth and the delineation of living realities, we cannot accept his statement that "the cultivated human intuition has something of that exactness and perfection of which instinct on the lower planes of life is a prophecy." In fact instinct as we know it is the expression of past experience, and although the value of experience depends on its being a representation of the laws of nature, these can become known only through the exercise of reason. Reason, therefore, and not intuition is the real source of our recognition of truth. This view excludes all modes of revelation but the operations of nature itself; and except so far as what the author refers to as "Direct Revelation," "Biblical Revelation," and "Revelation through the Son," can receive a natural interpretation, that is, can be indorsed by reason, it must be rejected. The following sentence sets forth concisely Mr. Wood's views: "If we would listen intently we might hear the divine voice within assuring us that God is our life; that spirit is the only substantial entity, and that love is the only law." All turns here on the meaning to be given to the term "spirit," and we can well believe that most of those who agree with the author, that "nature is God translated into vitalised color, form, and beauty," that is, nature as known to us, would be able to accept the views set forth in the above sentence if they were allowed to define "spirit" in their own way. The book contains much that is good, but its supernatural element vitiates most of its contents. Evolution may be a revelation, but a great deal of allegory will be required to bring the teachings of bible history into consonance with it. Ω.

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ANTHROPOLOGY AS A SCIENCE AND AS A BRANCH OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION. By *Daniel G. Brinton*. Philadelphia: 1892.

By this pamphlet the well-known American Anthropologist, Dr. Brinton, makes an appeal to institutions for higher education in this country, for the establishment of chairs of anthropology in their faculties of philosophy. A simple professorship, with courses of lectures, would not be sufficient, however, to carry out what the author proposes, and he states, in fact, that the rightful claims of the science he advocates will be recognised only "when it is organised as a department by itself, with a competent corps of professors and docents, with well-appointed laboratories and museums, and with fellowships for deserving students." This is an extensive scheme, but in this way only can so important a science as that of anthropology, with its four sub-divisions of somatology, ethnology, ethnography, and archæology, be properly cultivated. The arrangement of subjects thus made by Dr. Brinton is a good one, and it will, we think, recommend itself to anthropologists

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