



# The Open Court.

A WEEKLY JOURNAL

Devoted to the Work of Conciliating Religion with Science.

No. 241. (VOL. VI.—14.)

CHICAGO, APRIL 7, 1892.

Two Dollars per Year.  
Single Copies, 5 Cents.

COPYRIGHT BY THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.—Reprints are permitted, only on condition of giving full credit to Author and Publisher.

WALT WHITMAN.

MY LITTLE WREATH OF THOUGHTS AND MEMORIES.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

THE phenomenal poet had a phenomenal funeral. I went to the poor frame house in Camden with an old college chum who happens to be an eminent railway president in Philadelphia: we took our place at the end of a long row of people in the street, working men and women, children, who to the number of four thousand filed through the house to look upon the dead poet. There he lay in the familiar gray garb, his face in such sweet and beautiful repose that I shall always be more friendly with death for having seen it. None could look upon this face without reverence. Rembrandt would have selected it from a million. The magnificent dome of head and forehead, and the glory of snowy white hair; the brow, unfurrowed; the delicate mouth, not concealed by the thin moustache, the long flowing beard; the finely cut features, the expression of perfect peace and perfect kindness: they were all a marvellous refrain to his own poem on "lonely and soothing Death," with which the funeral celebration in the woods presently opened. It is the face of an aged loving child. As I looked it was with the reflection that during an acquaintance of thirty-six years I never heard from those lips a word of irritation, or depreciation of any being. I do not believe that Buddha, of whom he appeared an avatar, was more gentle to all men, women, children, and living things. There arose in my memory many thoughts that I have heard from him, in the spirit that wrote the closing lines of his "Leaves of Grass":

"Dear friend, whoever you are, take this kiss.  
I give it especially to you—Do not forget me;  
I feel like one who has done work for the day, to retire awhile;  
I receive now again of my many translations—from my avatars ascending—  
while others doubtless await me;  
An unknown sphere, more real than I dream'd, more direct, darts awaken-  
ing rays about me—*So long!*  
Remember my words—I may again return,  
I love you—I depart from materials;  
I am as one disembodied, triumphant, dead."

There were touching responses. From all parts of the world wreaths were sent; myrtle from the grave of Key, author of the "Star Spangled Banner"; flowers

from the poets Gilder and Stedman; and some lilies from old Mrs. Davis who nursed him to the last. Portraits of his mother and father looked from the walls. Near by was the large bust of his spiritual father, Elias Hicks, founder of the Hicksite Quakers. Large histories found some connection with this little room where Walt Whitman lay. I remember hearing Carlyle talk of the "Leaves of Grass," which Emerson had sent him. He recognised something of the mysterious fire called genius, but was repelled by the democratic enthusiasm. "He seems to be saying, 'I am a big man because I live in such a big country.' I know of great men who have come from small and obscure corners of the world." Carlyle should have seen the poor little house, in poor little Mickle Street, which contented the man he supposed inflated. Whitman combined a childlike humility with a childlike delight in all applause of his works. His pleasure in such tributes was mainly that he might transfer them to America. The inspiration of the New World was to him much the same as to a Quaker the moving Spirit, to which he ascribes whatever he utters. Walt Whitman's ambition would have been more than satisfied by recognition as a rude pioneer of a race of American bards who should exalt and transfigure the facts and features of their own country. This country he could never criticise; his feeling towards America was personal; to criticise it would be to him like dwelling on the faults of his mother. The nearest thing to fault-finding I ever heard from him was when, in deprecating something said of the tendency of democracy to commonplace, he said he thought it too soon to say that; that democracy was in its infancy; and an improvement would appear when women were enfranchised.

It was a beautiful soft day when we bore Walt Whitman to his vault,—that great rough-hewn granite vault in the side of a wooded hill several miles out of Camden. There Col. Ingersoll spoke more impressively than I had before heard him speak; Dr. Binton, Dr. Bucke,—one for Philadelphia, one for England,—spoke well; and Thomas Harned, Whitman's neighbor, feelingly conveyed his old friend's farewell to his humble neighbors, and thanks for their kindnesses, as

he had been enjoined by the dying man. There were, however, comparatively few authors present,—I saw about seven. There have been several severe criticisms in the press showing animosity towards Whitman. There has been some resentment, in certain literary quarters, that the authors of England, with Lord Tennyson at their head, should have singled out this particular man for their homage. But these critics would be wiser if they studied the fact instead of resenting it. The English love Walt Whitman because he is totally un-English. This was what Emerson felt when, after reading the "Leaves of Grass," he wrote the poet: "It meets the demand I am always making of what seemed the sterile and stingy nature, as if too much handiwork, or too much lymph in the temperament, were making our western wits fat and mean," "I find it the most extraordinary piece of wit and wisdom that America has yet contributed." That was the secret: it was contributed by America.

Well do I remember a day when, in the early summer of 1855, as I entered Emerson's study he handed me the "Leaves of Grass," of which I had not heard, and which was just out. Emerson said: "Americans abroad may now come home: unto us a man is born." A month later I sought Walt Whitman out, in the farthest part of Brooklyn. His father (English) had died early in the year; his mother (Dutch) I saw. She was a kindly old lady, and I thought she seemed a little frightened about her son's work. Whitman told me, as we roamed about that Sunday, that I was the first visitor whom his book had drawn. He had set it up in type himself, and gave me a copy which I now have. All of this he remembered four or five weeks ago when I visited him. His memory was bright for old times. He told me of persons he had known in Huntington, Long Island, where he was born (1819). Elias Hicks, who died in 1830, he heard preach. His tall slender figure and earnest manner made a strong impression on my childhood. Hicks resided in the neighborhood of William Cobbett, and the two, he thought, knew each other. He (Whitman) enjoyed the personal friendship of Col. John Fellows of New York. Fellows wrote several books (on Freemasonry, etc.) which are now forgotten, but his constant friendship for Thomas Paine is remembered. "Col. Fellows was a ruddy well-dressed gentleman, often seen about the courts. He told me that the pious legend of Paine's being a drunkard, and so forth, is quite false: Paine drank only as everybody else did. He said also that Paine had a very large following in New York, which increased after his death." While Whitman was talking I several times arose to leave, fearing he might suffer. But he never groaned or murmured; he bade me farewell very cordially. Although nothing of the kind was said, we both felt that we were parting for-

ever,—that is, in this life; for Whitman never had a doubt of meeting all of his friends in some conscious Nirvana.

That any one could find a trace of prurience in his pages was a thing Whitman could not conceive. Those who have censured him on this score cannot, on their side, conceive the completeness with which the popular transcendentalism of the Hicksite movement revolutionised the minds trained in its atmosphere. It was a sort of mystical naturalism to which nothing in nature—literally nothing—was common or unclean; and it was accompanied by an hereditary tendency to write with what Emerson used to call "biblical plainness." One of the most remarkable things about Walt Whitman was his spontaneous orientalism. Let me quote from my "Sacred Anthology" a few passages which I know were not translated when Whitman wrote the "Leaves of Grass." Here are sentences from the "Arthava Veda":

"I praise the world, which is continually renewed.  
May clean waters flow for our body: I wash me thoroughly and am clean.  
All the range of thee, O earth, which I look over by the help of the sun—  
may the sight of my eye lose none of it till the latest years that are to come.  
May the peaceful earth, whose fragrance is excellent, whose breasts contain  
the heavenly drink, bless me with her milk!"

Even more has Whitman the trick and accent of the Persian poets of the tenth century—who were partly Moslem and partly Zoroastrian. The following is from Faizi:

"The companion of my loneliness is my genius.  
Did I bring forth what is in my mind, could the age bear it?  
In my regulated reason I see the system of the universe, and in heaven and  
earth my motion and my rest.  
My own blood is the basis of the wine of my enthusiasms.  
Although I have buried my head in my hood, I can see both worlds; it may  
be that love has woven my garment from the threads of my contem-  
plation.  
I have become dust, but from the odor of my grave people shall know that  
man rises from such dust."

The Persian Urfi calls his own name in his poetry in the same manner as Whitman:

"Urfi has done well to stand quietly before a closed door, which no one  
would open: he did not knock at another door.  
To pine for the arrival of young spring shows narrowness of mind: hun-  
dreds of beauties are on the heap of rubbish in the backyard which  
are not met with in the rose garden."

Walt Whitman was not a reader of oriental books unless in later years; but it will be seen that he had reproduced some characteristics of those ancient literatures. The "Leaves of Grass" was certainly a sort of New York Vedas. The Western mind finds erotic elements in the warm spiritual passion of the oriental writers; they are tolerated only in the Bible. But Whitman has gone farther than the Bible lands, and sees life and nature with the eyes of an old dervish. Strange, this correspondence between the colors of the world's sunrise and sunset!

## NATURE AND MORALITY.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE ETHICAL VIEWS OF JOHN  
STUART MILL.

[CONTINUED.]

## II. THE ETHICS TAUGHT BY NATURE.

What can be the meaning of Mr. Mill's objection to basing morality upon nature, i. e. upon the entire system of things, of the universe, of which we are a part? I see only three possibilities: either it means (1) that there is no ethics at all, or (2) that ethics is imported somehow into the world from the outside, or (3) that ethics is a purely subjective invention, that it is an artificial product of man's fancy.

If nature were a chaos, if there were no constancy of law in the universe, no regularity but only the sportive arbitrariness of an irregular play of chance, no world-order but a *tohuwabohu* of general confusion, intelligent as well as moral action would be impossible, for no calculation of consequences would be reliable. Yet if there is a world-order, conformity to it will be possible. Upon the presence of law depends the intelligibility of the world; the regularity of law is the basis of rational action, of foresight, of responsibility, and of moral action.

The view that ethics are imported into the world from the outside is the theological theory of revelation. It is based upon the dualistic world-conception that the world and God are two distinct entities. The world by itself is supposed to be a chaos, but God brings order into it by penetrating the chaos. According to this view the regularity of law is not of the world but of God; it is not an intrinsic feature of existence, but it is imposed upon it by an extra-mundane Deity.

The view that ethics is a purely subjective invention, that it is human to the exclusion of the not human in nature, we may fairly assume, is Mr. Mill's view. Mr. Mill would have objected to the idea of considering his view as a special case of the revelation theory in ethics, but such it is none the less. What is the human but a product of nature. Those forces and laws which shaped man are the very same agencies which shaped the rest of the things in the universe. If the human be something so radically different from and in essence so extraordinarily superior to the whole of nature as to justify the idea that the human can create a new world-order instead of using the world order that exists by accommodating itself to it, it must contain, at least in germ, a certain something that is not of this world. Man's existence in that case must be the revelation of an extra-mundane power which thus enables him to rise above nature so as to be her superior.

Mr. Mill does not accept this view. There is no doubt about it that he regards man as the product of nature. His philosophical standpoint excludes the possibility of revelation. Accordingly, he can only mean that ethics is an artificial product of man's imagination. Man shapes his moral ideals as the musician composes a sonata or as the poet conceives a beautiful dream.

There are men who believe that ethics cannot be based upon facts, i. e. upon nature, but that it must be based upon some principle. But what is the value of a principle if it is not derived from facts? Ideals are mere dreams unless they are realisable, and to be realisable they must be shaped out of the facts of experience. Principles are rules to attain ideals. If ideals are in conflict with nature and nature's laws, what is their use? If they are not based upon a solid knowledge of facts, they are nothing but worthless vagaries of the human mind and it will be a positive waste of time to ponder over them or to give them a minute's serious thought.

There is only one kind of ideal that is useful and worthy of man's attention. It is that ideal which aims at creating a better state of things upon the ground of the eternal order of things. Ideals must be based upon the terra firma of natural law, otherwise they are mere fancies.

This world of ours in which we live is a world of law, and the irrefragibility of natural law renders intelligent action possible. Intelligent action is such as foresees and predetermines the course of events. Intelligent action consists in fixing an aim and in adapting means to this aim as an end. Intelligent action is the condition of moral action. Intelligent action becomes moral through rationalising the aim of action. Mankind in the child phase of its development obeys almost blindly its natural impulses, the general intent of which has been characterised as self-preservation. Self-preservation remains the ultimate aim of moral action. Yet with a modification, with an amplification and an increase of man's knowledge of the nature of himself, the ultimate aim of his actions must be modified.

The question arises, Can man at all preserve his self? Is not every individual doomed to die and is not self-preservation for any length of time absolutely impossible? Yes, it is impossible, if by "self" we understand this particular body consisting of a definite quantity of living matter in a special form. This particular self cannot be preserved for it is constantly changing; through slight modifications it becomes another with every minute, with every second of its life.

Yet man's self contains a something that is preserved, that is transmitted to others. What is this part of his self? Every man has received it, or a

least the greatest part of it, through heredity and education, from his ancestors. It is his organisation including the rationality of his speech, thoughts, and actions—in one word it is his soul. His fellowman, too, has inherited it and in so far as two or several men recognise the sameness of their souls, they call each other brothers. In preserving his fellowmen's souls a man preserves his own soul.

An advanced knowledge of self necessarily changes the original impulse of self-preservation into a preservation of the soul.

Man, as a particular individual being mortal, can preserve his soul only in and through others. The nature of man's being is social and his life is ephemeral. Thus self-knowledge will teach him that he is a part of a greater whole; the most important elements of his soul originate out of his intercourse with his fellow-beings; the essence of his life, of his speech, his thoughts, his aspirations and ideals, lies in his connections with them. At the same time he must learn that his particular life is only a phase in the fuller life of the soul which has come to him out of the past animating him now and sweeping onward into the dim future. Man's real self is not the materiality of which his body consists at a given moment, but his soul. The former cannot be preserved, the latter can. Any attempt at preserving the former is thwarted by nature. If we attempt to preserve anything of ourselves, we can preserve only our soul. No other choice is left.

There is one strange fact about self-preservation. This world of ours is never at rest, there is no standstill. Any attempt at preserving life exactly as it is leads to dissolution. Preservation is only possible in growth; the preservation of life must be for its further development, it must include progress.

Such is in broad outlines the injunction that nature teaches. Such is an ethics based upon the facts of life, it is the derivation of an ultimate aim of action from nature, i. e. from the nature of the being that acts and also from the nature of the world in which this being lives. When we thus base our ethics upon the facts of experience and the natural laws that have been derived therefrom; in one word, when we base our ethics upon nature, we define those actions as moral which tend to preserve and further develop the human soul.

### III. INTELLIGENT ACTION AND MORAL ACTION.

Mr. Mill says, "to make use of knowledge for guidance is a rule of prudence." But it is more; it is also a rule of ethics.

What is the difference between a prudent action and an ethical action? A prudent action may have been performed from a selfish motive merely; an ethical action is performed from a motive broader than

self-interest, from a desire to be somehow of service to the development of humanity. Prudence is not morality; but prudence will lead to morality, for all immorality will defeat itself in the end. Thus prudence teaches us to avoid immorality.

Not every intelligent action is moral; but every moral action is intelligent; and it is an indispensable principle of morality to render all actions intelligent. Yet while all moral actions are intelligent, the intelligence or rationality of an action does not as yet make it moral.

A man may act in the right way against his inclinations from mere prudence. He may act in a certain way not because he wants to do the act, but because he knows that it is after all the best way; he thus acts against his will; he acts under a certain compulsion. His act in such a case may be called mere prudence. However as soon as the desire to act in the best way or to act as he knows that he should act, becomes part of his character, as soon as he performs the act done in the right way, because he wills it, his action is truly ethical.

All our actions—even those performed for our private interest, which are perfectly legitimate—should be guided by higher motives than by the impulse of a selfish self-preservation; all our proceedings, our omissions and our undertakings should be regulated by superindividual considerations; they should be in strict harmony with what may fitly be called the moral law.

The moral law has been taught us by our parents and teachers. We may accept their instruction simply on the ground of their authority, but we have a perfect right to ask, Why must we obey moral commands? And the answer would be: Because the natural course of events demands it. Nature defeats all egoistic intentions; and it sanctions the superindividual aspirations only—those which are commonly called moral principles.

There is no right in this world but it is the counterpart of duty. We have a right to ask why egotism should be overruled by higher principles. What is the duty that corresponds to this right? This duty is our obligation to inquire into the conditions of human life, so as to ascertain the principles by which our actions must be regulated. We must not rest satisfied with our moral sentiments; we must understand our sentiments, that we may be assured not by mystic intuition but by clear comprehension, that they are truly moral. We must be on our guard against ethical enthusiasm which is not based upon a clear comprehension of facts; for there are many noble sentiments which, as can be demonstrated by scientific investigation, are anything but morality. For instance, eleemosynary philanthropy, has been highly praised as the acme of morality; and yet, scientific investigation has stated with

irrefutable conclusiveness that it is a wrong practice. All enthusiasm that has been wasted in this direction, can be called moral only if motives alone be considered. Objectively, they are as immoral as any criminal act committed under the influence of an erring conscience.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

### ELECTING SENATORS BY THE PEOPLE

BY M. M. TRUMBULL.

A SHORT and easy lesson in American democracy is the speech made by Senator Palmer in the United States Senate on the proposition to elect senators by the direct vote of the people. Some of it is new, and some of it is not, but the speech is interesting and instructive both as history and as argument, for Senator Palmer is quite familiar with the evolution of the American constitution and the constitution of Illinois. The builder of a State, speaking to a new generation is worth hearing, and Senator Palmer was a member of the convention that made a constitution for Illinois forty-five years ago; a constitution which weakened the aristocratic apex and strengthened the democratic base of the political state. Of this he is rightly proud.

Senator Palmer, as a philosophic democrat, is jealous of a National aristocracy elected by State legislatures. He would have the Senate elected by a direct vote of the people, and he gives good reasons why, but this argument will carry thousands of his countrymen, if it does not carry him, far beyond the mild proposition to reform the Senate by a more democratic mode of electing senators. This will do for a beginning, but Senator Palmer cannot logically stop there. Having challenged one prerogative of the American peerage he must go on, and amend his amendment so as to reduce the senatorial term of office, and give States a representation in the Senate in proportion to their population. Senator Palmer says he desires to make the Senate "what it never has been; the popular branch of the American Congress." Truly a democratic purpose, but how can he accomplish it so long as a member of the Senate is elected for six years, and a member of the House of Representatives for only two years; and so long as Delaware has a representation in the Senate equal to that of Illinois?

When great abuses grew and flourished under the constitution, men interested in the wrongs done, made an idol of it, and declared that whatever it permitted became thereby sanctified. In the ecumenical councils where party creeds were canonised, it was made the Holy Scripture of politics, and its Immaculate conception became the superstition of a people. Senator Palmer is free from this idolatry, for he forcibly says, "It is not a sufficient answer to the popular dissatisfaction with the present mode of electing senators to say that it is the method provided by the constitution." Certainly not; and that bit of common sense will apply to every part of the constitution. It is nothing but a code, adopted for the service of the people, and like every other law it may be amended. This attack upon the mode of electing senators is merely a continuation of the old struggle between the Lords and the Commons which in some shape or other has been agitating the English race for more than six hundred years.

Speaking of the feeling that animated the delegates who framed the constitution, Senator Palmer says, "It is manifest that there prevailed in the convention the most profound distrust of popular elections." Yes, and the distrust was reflected in the constitution itself, for that instrument curtailed the political power of the people, and made them subject to a government which was jealously guarded in all its branches except one from their direct political interference. In the Judicial department of the National government the American people have no voice whatever; all the judges being appointed by the President. In the Executive department

they have a roundabout and qualified vote for President and Vice President; but for cabinet ministers and the other executive officers below the President they have no vote at all. As to the Legislative branch, the people have original jurisdiction by direct ballot over the House of Representatives only, the Senate being the profitable perquisite of the State legislatures.

Notwithstanding its contemptuous distrust of the people, they have become so mystified and overawed by the Divine claims made for the Constitution that they really believe the limited rights they do enjoy come to them by the grace and condescension of that instrument. They do not think for a moment that the Constitution is inferior and subject to them, but religiously believe that they are inferior and subject to the Constitution.

Senator Palmer says, "The framers of the Constitution found but little difficulty in the application of the principle, then, as now, so important, of distributing the powers of the government to three independent departments." The reason why they found no difficulty in that matter was that having lived under the English monarchy, and being familiar with its forms, they adopted as nearly as possible what they understood, the English trinity of government, King, Lords, and Commons, merely changing the names, and making the King, and the House of Lords elective; not by the people, however, but by a carefully sifted few.

It is not easy to convince Americans that the Senate is their House of Lords, and that it was intended to be so. Senator Palmer has no doubt about it, for he quotes evidence to prove it, and says, "But it is probable that the general purpose of the convention in the organisation of the Senate and in the mode of electing Senators was expressed by Mr. Dickinson, who said he wished 'the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters; distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property, and bearing as strong a likeness to the English House of Lords as possible,' and he thought 'such characters more likely to be selected by the State Legislature than by any other mode.'" All that is very interesting, and Senator Palmer might have added that Mr. Gouverneur Morris, a delegate from New York thought that the Senators ought to be elected for life.

To prove that the Constitution is not sacred and above amendment, Senator Palmer shows that it has actually been amended fifteen times, and that the very first Congress that assembled after the adoption of the Constitution began the work of amending it by proposing to make the Bill of Rights a part of it; and on that branch of the subject he says, "It may well excite surprise that the framers of the Constitution who were familiar with the long struggle in England to secure popular rights neglected to provide in the Constitution securities for freedom in the exercise of religion, free speech, a free press, the right of the people peaceably to assemble," and so on to the end of the charter. There was nothing so very surprising in the omission, because the Convention thought that as each individual State would include the Bill of Rights in its own Constitution, it would be superfluous to put it in the National, or as it was then, the "Federal" Constitution, but as Jefferson and the radical democrats complained of its omission, the Bill of Rights was put there by amendment.

Jefferson was in Paris when the Convention was in session at Philadelphia, but he watched very anxiously from a distance the building of the Constitution. As soon as it was finished he disapproved of its conservative character; and in a letter to James Madison written on the 20th of December, 1787, after telling what he approved in it he said, "I will tell you what I do not like. First, the omission of a bill of rights providing clearly and without the aid of sophism for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, restriction of monopolies, the eternal and unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury in all matters of fact triable by the laws of the land." Jefferson thought also that the Judicial department was too fa

away from popular control, and that the Constitution in some other features bore too close a resemblance to that of the ancient monarchy.

It is historically interesting to learn from Senator Palmer that there was no opposition to a National Legislature consisting of two branches, and that it was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Dr. Franklin, who was said to be partial to a single house of legislation." This does but feeble justice to Dr. Franklin, whose opposition was not so much to two houses as it was to a House of Lords; for he saw as plainly in 1787, as Mr. Palmer does in 1892, that the Senate was to be in all its essential attributes and character another House of Lords. He was the most far-sighted statesman in the Convention, and he would not accept a House of Lords at all until it was provided that it should have no power to tax the people, and that the right of raising revenue by taxation should be the sole prerogative of the House of Representatives.

The greatness of Dr. Franklin as a statesman has never been acknowledged, but we are indebted to him for that provision of the Constitution which declares that "All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives." The courageous assertion and maintenance of that right by the Commons of England has reduced the King and the House of Lords to the position of subordinate auxiliaries in the legislation of that country; and it will be so here, as Dr. Franklin was wise enough to see.

#### INGERSOLL-BUCKLEY—1892.

BY VIROE.

O, right but rash  
Knight of the Word  
In Truth's great host,  
Be steadfast and beware:  
However you may dare,  
When two blades clash  
'Tis the sharp sword  
That suffers most.

### CORRESPONDENCE.

#### THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:

IN *The Monist* for April I noticed an article by Mr. Chas. S. Peirce, entitled "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined." In it he makes the following statement: "When I have asked thinking men what reason they had to believe that every fact in the universe is precisely determined by law, the first answer has usually been that the proposition is a presupposition or a postulate of scientific reasoning." I would have answered him differently, by saying, that the reason why I know (not believe) "that every fact in the universe is precisely determined by law," is because it is impossible to name any fact that is not determined by law, or that any occurrence was not determined by something else that occurred. This doctrine of necessity is a stone which has been rejected by nearly all philosophical builders, but it will "yet become the head of the scientific corner." While it may be philosophical as a means to an end—that end to spur mankind onward—to say that God is sovereign and man is free, or that determinism is wholly true and man is free, yet scientifically—truthfully—one or the other is false; no sound reasoning can make both statements true, for it is as much as to say that a horse hauls a load, yet the load is free—it moves of itself.

But, as you stated in *The Open Court*, No. 238, monism is a starting point for a new departure, and if we are to take a *new* departure we must not take it from a cape bearing the antithetical name of yes and no. If we do, we will still be at sea without any

compass, star, or guide. Evolution is monistic in character, and by its principle, and from its lofty and invulnerable cape, we must take our departure; for its latitude and longitude are now well known; no sophistical reasoning can change them; evolution cannot exceed involution; hence Mr. Peirce's argument does not remain unrefuted. The doctrine of necessity is not based on chance, as he seems to suppose, but upon well ordered law and intelligence. If evolution is to begin, there must be power to begin it; and if it is to go on every change in its onworking must be "precisely determined by law"; the thing evolving cannot get beyond the power of the evolver; it is always subject to involution and the power of evolution, whether plant, rock, animal, or man. I respectfully beg to differ from that school of evolutionists which teaches that evolution comes by acquirement, because, on the contrary, acquirement comes by evolution—there cannot be evolution without involution, and involution is as "precisely determined by law" as evolution in accretions for either brain or brawn. I respectfully request any reader of *The Open Court* to name any fact that is not "precisely determined by law." I have not found one yet. JOHN MADDOCK.

[Mr. Maddock alludes in his remarks to the controversy he had in our columns, but he is not free from misrepresenting his antagonist when speaking of the car load as being free.

We do not at all agree with Mr. Peirce, but we think that it is the most formidable attack upon the doctrine of necessity that was ever made and believe that Mr. Peirce's article will be a profitable reading to those who do not agree with him. An editorial article in reply to Mr. Peirce will appear in the next number of *The Monist*.—ED.]

#### BOOK REVIEWS.

WHAT IS REALITY? An Inquiry as to the Reasonableness of Natural Religion, and the Naturalness of Revealed Religion. By Francis Hove Johnson. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin, & Company. 1891.

The object of this work is to develop the idea that reality is the agreement of our thought with that which is external to our thought, and by inference to establish the existence in the universe of a self-conscious *ego* as the source of creation. Before considering the arguments adduced in support of this inference let us see whether the definition given of reality is justifiable, and if so to what it leads. The author refers in the first place to the fact that any apparently external object may be an illusion, the proof of which is the absence of certain qualities which we supposed to be present. A thing is real only "when it is capable of fulfilling the promises it makes to us." Hence, although we have no direct knowledge of the *whole* nature of things, we may say that what we call things are groups of events, that is of sensations, since every sensation is an event. But the sensation of external objects is the effect they produce upon us and thus we know them in their qualities. It is of course assumed on the one hand that an external world exists, and on the other hand that the subjective world is equally real. There may be illusions of the internal world, just as of the external world, but both alike have their rise in realities. The starting point of subjective reality is our personal identity, the *ego*, which is "an ultimate datum of consciousness." This datum is the outcome of experience, and our belief in the continuity of the *ego* is referrible to memory, which, by the registration of the reactions of the *ego*, is the abiding certificate of its continuity and identity. So far our author's reasoning is correct, and it must be affirmed that, notwithstanding the ever changing conditions of consciousness, there is an element or substratum on which all subjective reality depends.

What has gone before forms the ground-work for the following propositions: (1) I exist. (2) There exists in time and space a

world external to myself. (3) I can produce changes in myself and in that external world. (4) Changes take place in me and in that world of which I am not the author. These propositions taken literally cannot be objected to, but it will be asked at the outset what is the personality that exists and acts? The answer to this question requires a definition of the *ego*, to illustrate the nature of which the author refers to the development of organic forms from the simple cell and the unity in multiplicity which marks every step. This unity is represented in the human being by the intelligent, self-conscious, self-asserting *ego*, but we are told that there is no room for it in the organism, which is a multiplicity of cells. Hence, the mystery of the unity of being is not solved, although to the author it is the soul. It is surprising that so much mystery is made of the unity of being, seeing that it naturally follows from the fact that "every animal, man included, is at the outset a single nucleated cell." This cell at first constitutes the whole organism, and therefore has a unity as perfect as that of the grown man, whose organism is only that of the primitive cell, which throughout all its multiplications and transformation retains its pristine unity. The unity of being is thus the organism itself, which is the seat of life and sensibility, although self-consciousness is relegated to the higher nerve-centres. Here we have the real basis of subjective reality, and the ultimate datum of consciousness, that in which our personal identity consists, is the organism itself.

We may now consider the reasoning by which the author seeks to establish the existence in the universe of a self-conscious *ego* as the source of creation. While admitting that we cannot know anything as it is in itself, which means only that we cannot attain to a perfect knowledge of things "in the unity of all their relations," the author maintains that it is not necessary to grasp all the relations of a thing in order to know its essential being. Moreover, knowledge is not confined to relations, since the knowledge of self which accompanies the awareness of a relation existing between myself and something else is over and above a knowledge of the relation. The self-conscious soul is in fact a thing-in-itself, known directly as a peculiar and vital element of all experiences. This thing-in-itself is known to us as the unity of being, as intelligence, and as cause, and by analogy we may assume the existence in the universe of a self-conscious being who stands in the same relation to the world as the *ego* does to the physical organism.

We have already referred to the importance attached by the author to the "unity in multiplicity" which exists in the organism, where the *ego* dominates a hierarchy of beings. The *ego* as *immanent* is not conscious of the separate individuality of the cells which are its subjects. It knows them directly only in organised groups, but as *transcendent* it knows them and ministers to them in the same way as Jehovah is represented as having dealt in primitive times with Israel. These ideas are by analogy applied to God, the thought of whom as immanent has, "all through the Christian ages . . . lived alongside the thought of a God who is transcendent," as in the symbolism of the human person immanency and transcendency are united in a living and abiding reality. The fact that man knows himself as intelligently causative justifies us in postulating intelligent cause in the orderly adaptations of nature, but it is not necessary to refer all creation *directly* to the supreme mind. The adaptations of which nature is full may be regarded as the cumulative product of innumerable inferior minds, without excluding the divine agency from any point, and without limiting the knowledge of God, "whose consciousness is coextensive with the universe of which He is the centre."

This very ingenious analogy is well worked out and is supported by reference to various facts bearing on the theory of evolution. But there are many difficulties in the way of its being accepted. Thus it is admitted that the microcosm does not accredit

the idea of origination out of nothing, and as that which always existed is supposed to be modified by inferior intelligences, what room is there for a supreme intelligence? Moreover, as the universe is governed by certain principles of activity which are evidently inseparable from it, may we not regard nature as the result of the orderly operation of those principles without calling in the aid of intelligence at all? The chief difficulty those who regard nature as the outcome of intelligence have to contend with, is to show that the universe as a whole is conscious. This is in fact the central point of the author's argument, and, notwithstanding the acuteness of his criticism of the philosophy of the unconscious, he does not succeed in establishing it. Nor is it supported by the analogy between the universe and the human *ego*. This, as we have seen, is in reality the organism itself, the elements of which are essential not only to its unity but to its very existence, and which is sensitive throughout, and not merely at the chief nerve centre. In the lowest organisms there is no trace even of any nerve structure, which is the result of a process of evolution. All that analogy justifies us in assuming therefore is that the universe as a whole is organic, and that it possesses a degree of sensitiveness which resembles as little the sensitiveness of the amoeba as the latter resembles the feeling of the human organism; while its elements stand towards the universe in the same relation as do the elements of the body towards the complete organism.

We have dwelt so long on the fundamental thesis of the work before us, that we can say little with reference to "the naturalness of revelation." The author takes the view, which has now in the light of evolution become orthodox, that although revelation is superhuman it is in accord with the order of nature. By revelation the author means "the direct assistance and enlightenment of a human mind by a mind infinitely greater than its own,—a mind with which it is organically connected." Without such revelation there could be no formation of new germinal ideas. Such a view, however, is equivalent to asserting that revelation is only a phase of evolution. This is going further than the author would allow, but it is the truth. What is called revelation is a reflection from the human mind itself, and it is the necessary accompaniment of man's progress towards natural enlightenment, which includes the evolution of conscience as well as the development of the idea of God.

Able as this work is in many respects we are compelled for the reasons stated to reject its main conclusions. We agree, however, with the author that "the premises of religion are as real as any part of man's knowledge," although we must take exception to the explanation he gives of those premises. Ω

THE ONLY GOOD THING IN ALL THE WORLDS. By Prof. J. B. Turner. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co 1891.

The present book is not cast in the form of thought in which we should have put it. The author has not availed himself of the modern Bible-criticism presented us by the theological scholars of Europe, as we should expect of a man who criticises the religious dogmas of Christianity and comes to the conclusion that they little agree with Christ's preachings. But the more interesting is the book in other respects. It is the product of an American pioneer scholar, for he was one of the very first professors of the growing west who came and settled here when the red man had not yet retreated from the old home of the Illinois and most of the country was still virgin soil. He is a representative western thinker, showing all the strength and earnestness of our first settlers. Those who are interested in knowing the latest verdict of European scholars upon religious subjects will be disappointed in reading his book, but those who wish to know what impressions the doctrines of the Christian churches made upon an original but to a certain degree lonely thinker, upon a deeply religious and

truth loving man, will be richly repaid by a perusal of Professor Turner's book.

Professor Turner is a faithful christian; believing in Christ he yet opposes with great vigor, often with vehement impatience many most cherished dogmas of orthodox Christianity; and his arguments are often well put. We quote his view of inspiration from p. 70-71:

"Bayard Taylor, on his return from Arabia, some years ago, told me he found in those Idumean mountains, near where the author of the book of Job is supposed to have lived, a tribe of Arabian people who still retained all the old primitive modes and habits of life, of speech, thought and action which they inherited from their old Abrahamic fathers, particularly with regard to their modes of speech. They still thoroughly believed in the Old Testament doctrine of inspiration, as defined by Job, and as is expressed in some of our older creeds; viz. that God Himself directly, spiritually inspired them to know, think, believe and do all the good and true things that they ever do believe, know, think or do, and they did not express this in any abstract proposition, but in their hourly life and conduct, and habits of speech, as did their fathers before them. Instead of saying, 'I believe, I think, this that and the other,' they would say, 'God has told me this, that and the other; God met me this morning, or yesterday, or in some day past, and said so-and-so to me, or He appeared to me in such-and-such a place, and under such-and-such conditions, and told me or commanded me to do this or that.' And this personified and dramatised mode of speech meant no more to them, and seemed no more strange to them than ours does to us, when we say, 'I sincerely believe or think this, that or the other.' For they were in the habit of using it daily about all sorts of affairs and interests of any importance to them.

"There may be a question as to which of the two modes of speech, theirs or ours, is most profoundly philosophical and religious, but there can be no question that either party is bound to accept the thoughts of the other, whether expressed abstractly or dramatically, without a further examination, nor do they hold it so. For each man still insists on revising what God has said to his neighbors, by what God has said to himself, as Christ rightly did in the case of Moses and of all the old Jews; and it has now turned out to us as clear as daylight that He was always philosophically in the right whenever they were philosophically in the wrong, and their methods of dramatising their speech makes not the slightest difference with its weight and importance, and any pretended monopoly of the inspiration of the world is worse than a pretended monopoly of its wealth."

So far so good. We take the same view of inspiration. But Professor Turner applies the principle in a peculiar way. While modern bible criticism has proved that Matthew and John are rather late productions of the early Christian literature, certainly later than Mark, Professor Turner makes them the cornerstone of his "Christ word." He says p. 72-73:

"The only books in the Bible or now in the world, 'according to scripture,' that even pretend to have any authority from Christ himself are the two simple narratives of Matthew and John, neither of which pretends to any other inspiration than the simple fact that they had seen and heard the Lord, the sole, true revealer of God, the Father of all, and of His kingdom of the heavens, and Himself the sole *kurios*, curator, caretaker, leader, and teacher of all His children here on earth, their elder brother, the only true and full-born Son of Man; and, therefore, a true Son of God."

It is the ethics of Christianity which inspire Professor Turner and he accepts the fourth gospel apparently because Christian ethics have found in it their purest and grandest expression,

The book with all its rather ferocious denunciations of dog-

mas and creeds and with all its other shortcomings deserves our attention as a typically American book characterising the aspirations of liberal religious thought in a period of the history of our country that is fast disappearing now. P. C.

#### NOTES.

The publication is announced for the present month of a new "newspaper" called *Thought News*. The aim of *Thought News* is to supply the want of a magazine "which shall not go beyond fact, which shall report thought rather than dress it up in the garments of the past, which, instead of dwelling at length upon the merely individual processes that accompany the facts, shall set forth the facts themselves; which shall note new contributions to thought, whether by book or magazine, from the standpoint of the news in them, and not from that of patron or censor. The immediate responsibility for the conduct of the magazine will lie in the hands of Prof. John Dewey, of Ann Arbor, Mich. Its cost will be \$1.50 per volume (12 numbers); it will appear irregularly, as often as the material warrants, but at least once a month. We wish the project all success.

We are informed that Helen Gardener is about to publish a new work, entitled "Pushed by Unseen Hands."

MR. C. S. PEIRCE has resumed his lessons by correspondence in the Art of Reasoning, taught in progressive exercises. A special course in logic has been prepared for correspondents interested in philosophy. Terms, \$30 for twenty-four lessons. Address: Mr. C. S. Peirce, "Avisbe," Milford, Pa.

## THE OPEN COURT.

PUBLISHED EVERY THURSDAY BY

### THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.

EDWARD C. HEGELER, PRES.

Dr. PAUL CARUS, EDITOR.

TERMS THROUGHOUT THE POSTAL UNION:  
\$2.00 PER YEAR. \$1.00 FOR SIX MONTHS.

N. B. Binding Cases for single yearly volumes of THE OPEN COURT will be supplied on order. Price 75 cents each.

All communications should be addressed to

### THE OPEN COURT,

(Nixon Building, 175 La Salle Street.)

P. O. DRAWER F.

CHICAGO, ILL.

#### CONTENTS OF NO. 241.

WALT WHITMAN. My Little Wreath of Thoughts and Memories. MONCURE D. CONWAY.....	3199
NATURE AND MORALITY. An Examination of the Ethical Views of John Stuart Mill (continued). EDITOR.....	3201
ELECTING SENATORS BY THE PEOPLE. M. M. TRUMBULL.....	3203
POETRY.	
Ingersoll-Buckley-1892. VIRGIL.....	3204
CORRESPONDENCE.	
The Doctrine of Necessity. (With editorial note.) JOHN MADDOCK.....	3204
BOOK REVIEWS.....	3204
NOTES.....	3206