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THE PAINE-CONDORCET DECLARATION OF RIGHTS.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

A HUNDRED years ago Thomas Paine and the Marquis de Condorcet were engaged in writing a constitution for France. Each could read but not speak the other's language and the Marchioness acted as interpreter, and perhaps assisted with her ideas. It is probable that the Constitution so framed was the most thoroughly republican instrument ever framed. It has never appeared in English, but is printed in the works of Condorcet (Paris, 1805). It was offered to the French Convention in February 1793, but did not please the revolutionary "Mountain," which really desired no Constitution, but permanent revolutionism. Thus the document has attracted no study, but it well deserves the attention of those interested in political philosophy. I send you a translation of the Declaration of Rights. It impresses me as far surpassing any other instrument of that kind known in European or American history.

"The end of all union of men in society being maintenance of their natural rights, civil and political, these rights should be the basis of the social compact: their recognition and their declaration ought to precede the Constitution which secures and guarantees them."

"1. The natural rights, civil and political, of men are liberty, equality, security, property, social protection, and resistance to oppression.

"2. Liberty consists in the power to do whatever is not contrary to the rights of others; thus the natural rights of each man has no limits other than those which secure to other members of society enjoyment of the same rights.

"3. The preservation of liberty depends on the sovereignty of the law, which is the expression of the general will. Nothing unforbidden by law can be impeached, and none may be constrained to do what it does not command.

"4. Every man is free to make known his thought and his opinions.

"5. Freedom of the press, and every other means of publishing one's thoughts, cannot be prohibited, suspended, or limited.

"6. Every citizen shall be free in the exercise of his religion.

"7. Equality consists in the power of each to enjoy the same rights.

"8. The law should be equal for all whether in reward, punishment, or restraint.

"9. All citizens are admissible to all public positions, employments, and functions. Free peoples can recognise no grounds of preference except talents and virtues.

"10. Security consists in the protection accorded to society to each citizen for the preservation of his person, property, and rights.

"11. None should be sued, accused, arrested, or detained, save in cases determined by the law, and in accordance with forms prescribed by it. Every other act against a citizen is arbitrary and null.

"12. Those who solicit, promote, sign, execute or cause to be executed such arbitrary acts are culpable, and should be punished.

"13. Citizens against whom the execution of such acts is attempted have the right of resistance by force. Every citizen summoned or arrested by the authority of law, and in the forms prescribed by it, should instantly obey; he renders himself guilty by resistance.

"14. Every man being presumed innocent until declared guilty, should his arrest be judged indispensable, all rigor not necessary to secure his person should be severely repressed by law.

"15. None should be punished save in virtue of a law established and promulgated previous to the offence, and legally applied. A law that should punish offences committed before its existence would be an arbitrary Act. Retroactive effect given to any law is a crime.

"17. Law should award only penalties strictly and evidently necessary to the general security; they should be proportioned to the offence and useful to society.

"18. The right of property consists in a man's being master in the disposal, at his will, of his goods, capital, income, and industry.

"19. No kind of work, commerce, or culture can be interdicted by any one; he may make, transport, and sell every species of production.

"20. Every man may engage his services and his time ; but he cannot sell himself ; his person is not an alienable property.

"21. No one may be deprived of the least portion of his property without his consent, unless because of public necessity legally determined, exacted openly, and under condition of a just indemnity in advance.

"22. No tax shall be established except for the general utility, and to relieve public needs. All citizens have the right to coöperate, personally or by their representatives, in the establishment of public tribute.

"23. Instruction is the need of all, and society owes it equally to all its members.

"24. Public succors are a sacred debt of society, and it is for the law to determine their extent and application.

"25. The social guarantee of the rights of man rests on the national sovereignty.

"26. This sovereignty is one, indivisible, imprescriptible, and inalienable.

"27. It resides essentially in the whole people, and each citizen has an equal right to coöperate in its exercise.

"28. No partial assemblage of citizens, and no individual, may attribute to themselves sovereignty, to exercise authority and discharge any public function, without a formal delegation by the law.

"29. Social security cannot exist where the limits of public administration are not clearly determined by law, and where the responsibility of all public functionaries is not assured.

"30. All citizens are bound to coöperate in this guarantee, and to enforce the law when summoned in its name.

"31. Men united in society should have legal means of resisting oppression. In every free government the mode of resisting different acts of oppression should be regulated by the constitution.

"32. It is oppression when a law violates the natural rights, civil and political, which it should ensure. It is oppression when the law is violated by public officials in its application to individual cases. It is oppression when arbitrary acts violate the rights of citizens against the terms of the law.

"33. A people has always the right to revise, reform, and change its constitution. One generation has no right to bind future generations, and all heredity in offices is absurd and tyrannical."

BELIEF AND HAPPINESS.

BY CELIA PARKER WOOLLEY.

THE relation of happiness to belief is a subject that has occupied men's minds from earliest times, and is as inevitable as it is important. My own thoughts have been drawn to it anew by a letter lately received

from a friend, a young woman thoroughly alive to all that the busy stirring life of to-day has to offer an active aspiring mind like her own.

Like many others whom the thought of the ideal continually sways, my friend has been strongly attracted in the direction of modern theosophy, chiefly interested, I suspect, in its general claim regarding the essentially spiritual nature of the universe, and less concerned with the special phenomena by which it seeks to make good that claim. In words whose ardent sincerity impresses a less susceptible and more time-worn consciousness with a slight feeling of envy, she describes the feeling of continuous abounding content that has been hers since this spirit side of things has become a fixed mental possession with her. Life has gained in worthy impulse and meaning on all sides, and to a degree that imparts a positive physical buoyancy as well as spiritual uplift and calm. Old causes of discouragement and discontent have disappeared ; all that pertains to the merely temporal and material side of things is now reduced to its relative insignificance. Not that the sense of duty has grown less, or the feeling of personal moral accountability waned ; on the contrary my friend has for years been actively engaged in the various reformatory and educational movements belonging to a large city, besides being a busy and successful worker on her own behalf in the world of business. But while following one of the busiest and most exacting of professions she lives day after day in the thought of the eternal and the infinite.

I hesitate to use these terms, spoiled, almost, by the fulsome and sentimental use made of them in religion, where pious adoration has so long taken the place of rational belief and the worship such belief has power to inspire. They are the words, however, that define the main reality to all thoughtful minds, words also that postulate a certain kind of belief, of religious belief let us say. The conclusion then seems inevitable that they are the words which point to the only true, safe road of human happiness. I cannot but think, if this is so, that the reason lies as much in their moral as in their religious import ; at least that this former reason, if not yet fully recognised, will become more apparent as man grows in clearer understanding of himself. That noble belief of some kind constitutes the only basis of true happiness may be readily admitted, but thought on these subjects is still too obscure and tentative always to be clearly traced to its beginnings, or accurately solved as to its outcome. Admitting the merit of belief in this connection, it is not so easy to determine either its origin or its final, most important effect on men's minds. It is impossible the last should not be of a varying degree and quality, all the elements of individual temperament, disposition and training entering into the problem.

There is little doubt in my own mind that under present tendencies of thought this belief on which human happiness is so dependent is losing its distinctively religious character and becoming a kind as rightly described, ethical. We have not yet begun to surmise the true scope and significance of that term; though I am not among those who look to see it wholly replace both the idea and the terminology of religion. No doubt, however, the thought conveyed by the increasing use of this word is one of widening beauty and meaning to us all. It has won honored place for itself in the field of theological discussion, where once it was ignored entirely, and has become the word of highest worth and meaning to a large body of our ablest thinkers. Daily the ethical element in religion is receiving more and more attention from its special instructors, to say nothing of the unconscious place and influence it is coming to hold over all minds.

It is worth while inquiring, then, whether the happiness we all are seeking and seem to trace to some form of religious belief, has not a nearer cause. May not the rapidly-growing belief in our own kind, the growth of the sentiments of human justice and kindness of a true democracy, have much, perhaps most, to do with an increasing sense of happiness? Whether they have or not, that is certainly a most exalting and enticing thought which bids us seek the motive of happiness in the love and increased well-being of our kind. The noble beauty of George Eliot's hymn, "The Choir Invisible," must impress even those most strongly dissenting from its philosophy, and its power of inspiration is universally acknowledged.

As religion has profited by this infusion of the ethical motive, deepening and enriching all its thought, so it will be found has our general philosophy of life. The questions of abstract philosophy will never lose in importance and interest, but every step here taken shows that it is the *relations these questions bear to practical life*, the pressing problems of conduct, which most endears and sanctifies them to the human understanding.

My friend is very far right therefore when she attributes the free and happy state of mind in which she now finds herself to a renewed conviction of the reality of the unseen side of things, a freshly-clarified spiritual vision; but she does not yet realise what measure of purely human love and aspiration enter into these new beliefs; how her own warm living personality is a part of that spirituality with which she is striving to endow the universe and her own being, its most potent factor indeed, so far as the present stage of affairs goes.

But if my friend has missed the nearer in the more remote conception, I make a still greater mistake in setting one factor of human consciousness over against

another, dividing it against itself, when any true means of comprehension lies in an exactly opposite direction; that described in the word "Unity," or as *The Open Court* likes better to define it, "Monism." We cannot separate the ethical from the spiritual in our analysis of men's deeds and motives, however clearly they may seem to separate themselves in our own mental workings.

The causes of happiness are as obscurely located and as hard to define as the cause of life itself, and perhaps it is well; since opportunity is its own chief reward. The happiness and triumphs of life lie far more in the pursuits it offers to heart, hand, and head, than in any results one single struggling career can attain. Belief does bring happiness then, but along with belief in the worth of the world outside ourselves, in some divine purpose ruling it to ends of infinite beauty and wisdom, must go belief in ourselves, as fit instruments for the attainment of those ends, belief in the ethical not less than the spiritual quality of the universe.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE MORAL OUGHT.

COMMENTS UPON PROF. H. SIDGWICK'S VIEW.

THE question has been raised by ethical students, How is it that man has the idea of "ought" at all?*

The ideas "right," "moral goodness," "duty," the "ought," etc., are fundamental notions of ethics. As such they should be carefully defined; yet they are frequently used by moralists without an analysis of their meaning. Professor Sidgwick says in his article "Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies," *Mind*, No. 56, p. 480:

"Different systems give different answers to the fundamental question, 'What is right,' but not, therefore, a different meaning to the question."

Professor Sidgwick adds:

"According to me, this fundamental notion is ultimate and unanalysable: in saying which I do not mean to affirm that it belongs to the 'original constitution of the mind,' and is not the result of a process of development; that is a question of psychology—or rather psychogony with which I am not concerned: I merely mean that as I now find it in my thought, I cannot resolve it into, or explain it by, any more elementary notions. I regard it as co-ordinate with the notion expressed by the word 'is' or 'exists.' Possibly these and other fundamental notions may, in the progress of philosophy, prove capable of being arranged in some system of rational evolution; but I hold that no such system has as yet been constructed and that, therefore, the notions are now and for us ultimate."

* I owe the suggestion of writing this article to Mr. Salter. He takes the view that the "ought" is an obligation of absolute authority residing beyond facts and beyond the realm of science. Thus my attention was called to the importance of an analysis of the ought-idea itself. Whether or not the ought-idea is conceived as absolute, ultimate, and unanalysable is not a merely theoretical problem, it is of practical importance; for if we suppose that the ought is absolute, ultimate, and unanalysable, we are prevented from inquiring into its nature and come under the spell of a mysticism that debars progress and further philosophical research.

The "ought" is most certainly a fact, or to use Professor Sidgwick's words, it is "a co-ordinate with the notion expressed by the word 'is' or 'exists.'" But he who attempts to describe the meaning of the "ought" will find that it is neither unanalysable nor ultimate; on the contrary it is a complex fact of a very special kind. The expression "ought" represents a certain relation among the ideas of a living, thinking, and acting creature.

By "analysing an idea," I understand, as Professor Sidgwick expresses it, "a resolving it into more elementary notions." All our notions are descriptions of facts. Those notions which represent a complex state of things accordingly are analysable, they can be described as certain relations or certain configurations of more elementary and more simple facts. Analysing is at the same time classifying. The most elementary and most simple facts would be those qualities of phenomena which are a universal feature of reality. And it is a matter of course that something that is universal can in its turn be no further subsumed under more general views. Analysis as well as classification ends with the universal and simplest qualities of existence.

The mind of a living being consists of many impulses the origin of which is a problem that belongs (as Professor Sidgwick declares of the "ought"), to psychogony. Yet the subject is too important to be left out in ethics and if Professor Sidgwick knows of no system that can analyse such facts as the ethical impulse of "the ought," it is highly desirable to do the work.

* * *

Impulses are tendencies to pass into action. To pass into action is an incipient motion. What is motion?

Motion is change of place. Hydrogen and oxygen when brought into contact show a tendency to combine; they exhibit an incipient motion. A ball placed on a slanting surface will roll down; it is going to change its place and this state is an incipient motion. The process of chemical combination and the rolling ball are motions, but no actions; they are not deeds of rational beings.

The word "action" is used in two senses, (1) to designate the purposive deeds of rational beings; and (2) to denote a certain view of motion, which should include every kind of efficiency, not only real motions, i. e. changes of place, but also pressures where the effect of the action is to counteract another action of equal force: thus the result of $+1$ and -1 is a zero of motion, or rest. In this wider sense of the word we speak of the action of oxygen upon other elements and the action of a resting stone that exercises a pressure. Action in the narrow sense of the

word, designating the deeds of rational beings, is a very complex kind of motion. There is some additional feature in action. What is that additional feature?

Action is purposive motion. What is purpose?

Purpose is the aim of the actor.

Has the rolling ball no aim? Yes it has an aim. Motion cannot be thought without possessing a definite direction. Every gravitating body has an aim. It does not always reach its aim, but that is of no account. Every chemical atom that combines with another atom has an aim. Every piece of reality is acting somehow in a definite way. The end of the direction of its action is called the aim of its action. If there are obstacles preventing a motion reaching its aim, the motion comes to a rest. That is the end of the motion, yet not the end of the activity of the moving body. The action of the moving body (i. e. in the wider sense of the term "action") continues in the shape of pressure in the direction of the aim.

These processes are described by the physicist who uses the terms kinetic and potential energy to represent the two forms of the activity of acting things. All acting things are real. Their activity is that feature which makes them real. Activity in this sense of the term is called in German *Wirklichkeit*, and *Wirklichkeit* at the same time means "reality."

Every motion having an aim, purpose must be something more than "aim"; and indeed it is. Purpose is the conscious representation of an aim. The falling stone has an aim. If the stone were conscious of its aim, we should say, that the falling stone has a purpose.

This then is the main difference between motion and action, between aim and purpose. Action (in the narrow sense of the term) is conscious motion, and purpose is a conscious aim.

* * *

Action and motion are different, but on the other hand they possess something in common. The similarity between action and motion is their spontaneity.

The gravity of a stone acts in a certain way according to the stone's position. This gravity is a quality of the stone, it is part of its existence, it is its intrinsic and inalienable nature. There is not a force outside the stone that pushes it, there is no external so-called "cause"* that makes it fall, but the stone itself falls. The stone falls because that is its nature, and when lying on the ground it exercises a certain

* This wrong usage of the term "cause" has discredited the idea of cause, so that philosophers rose to say, there are no causes whatever. Their intentions were right; there are no causes acting as agents upon things. But this wrong usage of the term cause is no reason to discard a useful idea. Causation is transformation and the term "cause" should mean only the relatively first motion in a series of motions representing in a certain process the start of the transformation which can be arbitrarily selected, and "effect" the final state of things with which the process ends. (See *Fund. Prob.* pp. 96-104.)

pressure, because that is its nature. In certain positions this same nature, called "gravity," acts as motion, in others as pressure; but throughout it is spontaneous activity—spontaneous, because rising out of its own being, and characterising its real nature.

This same spontaneity is found throughout reality, in organic nature, and also in the conscious actions of living organisms. The spontaneity of living organisms is so immediate that men have always believed that their actions (in the absence of compulsion) are their own doing and that they are responsible for their actions. This state of things has been called freedom of will. And certainly this conception is not based upon error, it is true. Yet men noticing that actions performed without the compulsion of others are spontaneous expressions of the actor's character, forgot that this is true of all activity in nature. The light burns because it is its nature to burn. The burning is spontaneous. The oxygen combines with the fatty substances of the oil in the wick not because there is a so-called "cause" operating upon it, but because the oxygen is a reality of a definite nature and to enter under this condition into a combination with certain atoms of combustible materials is this nature of the oxygen. Its action is spontaneous just as much as a man's action is spontaneous.

There is no reality but it is possessed of spontaneity, nay reality is spontaneity itself; and the constancy of this spontaneity makes it that natural processes, the actions of men included, can be foreseen and predetermined; or as the scientist expresses it that all nature is governed by law—not that there were a law from the outside imposed upon the world, but that the nature of everything that exists is constant in all its changes, that accordingly it exhibits regularities which can be described in formulas called natural laws.

Natural law is no oppression of nature. Natural law is only a description of its being; and nature is free throughout. Everything in nature acts not as it must, but (to speak anthropomorphically) as it wills, i. e. according to its own being.

* * *

Man's actions are distinguished from the motions of so called inanimate nature in so far as he is conscious of his aim. The aims of so-called inanimate nature are not conscious, they cannot be called purposes. Conscious beings alone can have purposes. The problem of the origin of consciousness accordingly will also solve the problem of the origin of purpose and purposive action. We have treated the problem of the origin of consciousness at length on other occasions, which briefly recapitulated is as follows: *

Consciousness is a certain feature of our existence which is best characterised as awareness. Conscious-

ness is not objective existence, it is not matter and not motion: it is subjective existence. Consciousness is a complex state of simpler elements and these simpler elements are called feelings. The simplest feelings a man knows of are perceived as awarenesses of certain states. Feelings as they are perceived and known have a meaning, and this meaning originates by comparison with other feelings and memories of feelings. Feelings represent something, and that which they represent is called the object. A feeling organism feels itself as a body, as an objective thing among things. This body affects and is affected by other bodies and it feels differently as it is differently affected. Although other bodies like our own body belong to and are a part of objective existence, we communicate with them and cannot deal with them otherwise than by treating them as possessing subjectivity. We regard them as conscious beings like ourselves. Their feelings, their consciousness cannot be seen, but their whole attitude indicates that their feelings are analogous to ours. It is natural that feelings cannot be seen, or observed, for they are not objective states but subjective states. They are felt by the subject that is feeling. Our own feelings would appear to others who looked into our pulsating brain as motions, so it is natural that the feelings of others can appear to us likewise as motions only. Motion and feeling accordingly are the subjective and objective aspects of reality.

Every feeling is objectively considered a motion, but not *vice versa*. Not every motion is a feeling. Feelings are in their objective aspect very complex motions. Yet while we do not say that every motion is a feeling, we say that every objective existence, is at the same time a subjective existence, and this subjective existence which seems of no account in inorganic nature, is no mere blank, it is, not feeling, but potentiality of feeling; it contains the germs of psychical existence, and this leads to the inevitable conclusion that the world is throughout spiritual in its innermost nature. That which appears to a subject as objectivity is in itself subjectivity, that which appears as matter is in itself spiritual: either actual spirit or potential spirit.

We can form no idea of the subjective existence of inorganic nature, but its objective existence is grand enough to satisfy us. The subjectivity of the sun for instance may be as grand as the enormous amount of energy that carries his light through cosmic space, an extremely small part of which is intercepted by the earth where it is the main source of light and life and joy. Yet whatever be the subjectivity of inorganic nature, apparently it does not consist in representations. Representations originate only with the rise of feelings when feelings acquire certain meanings, and when subjectivity becomes representative we call it mind.

* See *The Soul of Man*, pp. 23-25

Living organisms are active beings, and with the rise of consciousness the aims of their actions become purposes.

Suppose a conscious being were possessed of one purpose only, his action would be determined by that one purpose. Yet living beings are very complex and the memory-structures of their minds will under certain circumstances naturally suggest in a rapid succession several propositions of which one only can be selected as a purpose. The conflict among these several propositions, which are called motives of action, will cause a delay, this conflict is called deliberation, which lasts until the strongest motive has overcome the resistance of the other motives.

The strongest motive at any one moment is by no means the strongest motive at other moments. Thus actions are done which afterwards would not have been done. If a man considers a former action performed through a motive that has lost its strength, he pronounces the verdict "I ought not have done it."

This "ought" is not as yet the moral ought. The moral ought is still more complex.

If a man has a certain purpose and performs an action in compliance with that purpose but fails in realising his purpose, he says, I ought to have acted otherwise in order to attain my purpose. His means to the end were inadequate. If on another occasion he follows the same motive, he says to himself, I have more carefully to consider the means to the end I have in view.

This idea of "I have to" is again an ought, but it is not as yet the moral ought.

The choice among several motives to do a thing, or among several ways of doing a thing is the condition of any ought. The idea that this or that will have to be regretted or will fail, that another thing will not have to be regretted and will succeed, leads to the formulation of rules. These rules appear to him who has the intention to obey them, as an ought.

It is natural that those motives which promise pleasure are stronger than others. Almost all the rules of ought are to protect a man against the temptation of his pleasure-promising motives.

The idea of ought in general is a very complex idea, yet the moral ought is still more complex. What is the moral ought?

Man is a social animal. Society is not merely a collection of individuals, but the individual is a product of society. An individual that is prompted by egotistic motives alone will always fail in the end; and suppose that a certain man's fate were an exception, that he succeeded by a favorable combination of circumstances, death will defeat him after all.

A man in whom the idea of his being a member of a family, of a nation, of humanity, is a live presence,

will feel bound to stand up for the common welfare with equal or even more energy than for his private interests. He is impressed with the importance that everyone in his place has to attend to the work allotted him, and he himself will be serious in the performance of what he is wont to call duty.

Duty is formulated as a norm or a prescript which is to be the highest motive for action and the intent of the moral man is to make it unbendingly strong so as to overrule all other considerations.

To sum up :

* * *

We have seen that the moral ought is not unanalysable, it is not an ultimate notion. It is a very complex mental fact which admits of analysis and a description of both its origin and its nature. The moral ought is a special kind of any ought or of any rule of action devised for the guidance of conduct. Conduct is a special case of natural processes; it is a motion plus purpose, purpose being an aim pursued with conscious intention. And aim, again, is one constituent feature of motion. There is no motion without aim. The ought grows from the realm of inorganic existence together with the unfolding of mind in animal organisms and it reaches its grandest development in the moral ideals of man.

Professor Sidgwick has sufficiently guarded his statement, saying that he merely means he cannot now resolve it into or explain it by any more elementary elements. Nevertheless it is not advisable to deal with a fundamental idea as if it were unexplainable or unanalysable and thus cast the glamor of mysticism over the whole realm of the most important and practical of sciences. There are ethical students who follow blindly the authority of such a great teacher as is Professor Sidgwick and they are too apt to forget the cautious limitation of his words preaching the mystery of the ought in its transcendent incomprehensibility.

There are always minds who love to live in the twilight of thought, who think that the unintelligible is grander than that which can be understood; and these minds seize eagerly upon every expression that throws a shadow on science, that dwarfs philosophy, and makes human knowledge appear dull and useless.

P. C.

CURRENT TOPICS.

YESTERDAY was Washington's birthday, and the celebration of it as described in the papers of this morning, was inspired by such an exuberant and thrifty patriotism as must excite the wonder of the world. At Albany the Democrats assembled in honor of the day, and tagged their platitudinous platform to the tail of Washington's coat; under the belief, not altogether vain, that some people with votes to give, will honor it as a piece of the original garment. At Detroit the Republicans adopted the same stratagem; and at St. Louis, the People's Party, or whatever the name of it is, did the same thing. Under the guise of patriotism,

each of them pressed the memory of Washington into the service of party; and all of them spent the day in coining the glorious legacy left by Washington to all his countrymen into political capital for themselves. Are there not enough days for faction outside of Washington's birthday? In Chicago the great theme was not profaned by party politics. We asked nothing of the mighty shade of Washington, except a little help in Congress for the benefit of the World's fair.

* * *

Political contradictions enough to fill the old curiosity shop were offered up yesterday at the shrine of Washington, and his festival day was principally devoted to the science of "winning elections." In the name of Washington, Senator Hill spoke to the democrats at Albany, and referring to the tariff, he said, "It is a maxim of sound policy better fitted to *win elections* than to lose them; better dividing into easy chapters the lessons of a long campaign of education, abolish whenever you can one after another, one indefensible tax at a time." The sentiment and the grammar of that "maxim" are both bad, although not any worse than those proclaimed by the republicans at Detroit, and by the People's party at St. Louis. While Mr. Hill at Albany was "improving the occasion" to declare his policy, Mr. McKinley at Detroit was covering it with ridicule, as if it were a mere motion for continuance, or some other dilatory plea; an excuse for treachery or cowardice. In rollicking banter, Mr. McKinley said, "The democratic party will not repeal the tariff in twenty-five years. They have started in to repeal it item by item, and there are two thousand five hundred items in it." And thus it was that party avarice begun the political strife of 1892 on the birthday of Washington.

* * *

"A plague on both your houses," exclaimed the People's convention at St. Louis, also in the name of Washington; and with no better taste than the others, the third party threw in its little contribution to the discords of the day. Said the tautological Mr. Polk, the President of the convention, "We want relief, we demand that we have relief, we will have relief, and I repeat, we must have relief, if we have to wipe out the two old parties from the face of the earth." This threat of wiping out the two old parties ought to have general approval; and on any other day than Washington's birthday I rather think it would be a beneficial thing, but considering that the "two old parties" include within them about nineteen twentieths of all the people, it will not be an easy task for Mr. Polk to wipe them out, although Mr. Ignatius Donnelly offered to perform a still more difficult feat. He agreed to "wipe the Mason and Dixon line out of the geography, and the color line out of politics." Mr. Donnelly would also undertake for a very small wager to wipe out the ecliptic, and pull up the North pole.

* * *

Chicago honored the day by patriotic exercises at the public schools, by appropriate services in the churches, by civic banquets of great magnificence, by generous hospitality to senators and representatives from Washington, and by a great meeting at the Auditorium addressed by Gen. Stewart Woodford, of New York, a very eloquent orator. From the life, character, and work of Washington, General Woodford drew a beautiful moral, wherein he showed that it was the duty of Congress to make a liberal appropriation for the World's Fair. "We want no unseemly, wasteful, and barbaric extravagance," he said, "and we will tolerate no pitiful, niggardly, and miserly meanness." This, from a citizen of New York was very magnanimous; and the same feeling was manifested by the guests from other states, who, in the figurative language of one of the reporters, were "sojourning within the gates."

Generous as was the before dinner oratory of General Woodford, it was parsimonious economy when compared with the after dinner eloquence of the clubs, a gushing artesian well whose bountiful flow actually persuaded the people of Chicago that we were too modest in asking Congress for only five million dollars, when we might have had fifty millions. Mr. Doan, a member from Ohio, said that he had "heard a congressman *say just after dinner* that he was willing to vote a hundred million dollars to Chicago." Judging from the "Menu," which by the way, was published in the papers, I should think that any member of Congress who would not vote that way, after enjoying such an aristocratic and indigestible free lunch would show himself ungrateful, especially when the millions came not out of his own pocket. Merely reading the "Menu" was equal to an ordinary meal; and a stimulant strong as a common drink was the suggestion artfully scattered through the bill of fare, about Old London Dock Sherry, Pommery Sec, Cognac, Liqueurs, and Siberian Punch, to say nothing of Chateau La Rose, and Chateau Yquem, which I think are wines of rare and precious vintage; although for anything I know to the contrary they may be the French names for turnips and potatoes, but I think they are Baronial brands of wine; nectar that has been ripening in the cellars of old castles these hundreds and hundreds of years. The Siberian Punch was poetry in bottles. What inspiration it would give to a Tennyson or a Browning, when a couple of glasses of it could make a newspaper man talk thus, "And so supper waned and champagne flowed. The immaculate china was soiled, the flowers withered as eyes grew brighter, and the time came as it always comes, when desire was satisfied, and when the things that were good became vanity. And only the curling, evanescent blue cloud of the Havanna did not pale upon animal satiety."

* * *

Intoxicated by the "evanescent blue cloud of the Havanna," as by voluptuous incense, Mr. Enloe, a member of Congress, I think from Tennessee, showed his political sagacity and his knowledge of the world by giving to his hosts this most valuable bit of counsel, "I advise you," said he, "to get the appropriations committee to come out here and see what you are doing. They are a lot of men whose brains need enlarging." Mr. Enloe had seen how the dinner and the Siberian Punch had enlarged the brains of his colleagues at the feast, and he thought that if the committees on appropriations could be Chicago's guests for a couple of days their brains might be enlarged in the same way. Mr. Enloe's advice ought to be acted on at once, because one member of the appropriations committee is worth ten of the other kind; and the recipe which Mr. Enloe found so effectual, will be just as good for the appropriations committees if we can only get them here. Of its power to enlarge the brain, I had convincing evidence this morning, when a member of Congress who was at the banquet, was bidding good bye to a friend. "I do not like your Chicago drinks," he said; and when his companion asked him why, he replied thus, "Well, I had some of them at the banquet last night; and this morning, when I tried to scratch the top of my head, I had to reach up about four feet to get there, my brains were so enlarged."

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE.

To the Editor of *The Open Court* :—

I wish to call attention to one or two statements made by J. C. F. Grumbine in his last article in *The Open Court* on "The Present Religious Revolution."

He says, "The right path (meaning the path of action) is right because it is the path of least resistance, and affords man the greatest possible and the highest quality of enjoyment." "The

wrong path is wrong because it is the path of greatest resistance and affords man the least possible and poorest quality of enjoyment." I cannot agree with him in these statements. There is truth in the statement that "man must be born anew." Man is in a constant state of development. He is born with tendencies and aptitudes founded on all his past in lower conditions. These tendencies and aptitudes are both good and bad and both mark alike the paths of least resistance. Constant action will in the lower conditions form paths of least resistance; these paths are carried to a higher condition where they are the natural paths of least resistance also, but where action along them would bring evil consequences. Action along the paths of least resistance does not always "afford the greatest possible and highest quality of enjoyment," nor does action along the paths of greatest resistance "afford the least possible and poorest quality of enjoyment," on the contrary it may and does often afford just the reverse.

The paths of least and greatest resistance cannot be the determining principles of action. There is a constant changing of the paths of least and greatest resistance. Our knowledge of the universe and our relation to it is constantly changing and increasing. As we develop and society grows and develops new relations are necessitated and there must be corresponding change of action regardless of the paths of least and greatest resistance.

Minneapolis, Minn.

LEROY BERRIER.

THE EFFICIENCY OF WOMEN IN FINE WORK.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:—

A WATCHMAKER friend of mine surprised me with the information that there were no women watchmakers. I told him that the delicate manipulations required in watchmaking, it would seem to me, could be best performed by women, but he said that they were very efficient in such fine work as in the manufacture of the single parts, but when it came to the assembling of the pieces and the minute adjustment and general horological judgment, they had proven themselves incapable.

I think it would be well to ventilate the subject and ascertain whether my friend is mistaken or not.

Yours sincerely,

S. V. CLEVENGER.

BOOK REVIEWS.

NATURAL RELIGION. By the Rev. *Theo. W. Haven*, Ph. D. New York: Twentieth Century Publishing Company. 1892.

This little book is a collection of fifteen sermons which are broad as well as religious. The reader will look in vain for the author's creed, and we are at a loss where to place the reverend Doctor who must send his articles to *The Twentieth Century* to find a publisher. We note the following subjects from the table of contents: "Normal Living is Religion," "The Religion of Health," "The Religion of Mind," "God and Man." Dr. Haven quotes Christ's word "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." He concludes the article:

"Walk in the light of your eyes, with ears open, of your native sense, your judgment and your reason, of pure and spotless emotion, and beneath the brightly burning stars of your moral sense, and thou shalt behold God."

Other chapters treat of: "Conscience," "Duty," "Heart," "Character," etc. In the article "The Moral Sense God-Given," the author does not appear to be clear as to the meaning and origin of conscience, and in the article "Intimations of Immortality" he tells us too little about immortality. He pictures man's want of a continuance of life, when love kisses the lips of death, but he stops short when the reader expects to hear the author's own opinion on immortality.

The appearance of the book is a good sign of the times. There are not many reverend gentlemen like Dr. Haven. KPC.

SHAKESPEARE AND JOAN OF ARC.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

"STRUMPET"? Oh, Shakespeare, was your heart so blind?
What fair ideal is there, all your own,
That casts no shadow by the light of Joan?
Her love prevailed beyond the strength of mind.

A simple woodland flower, pensive, kind
And fearful till she heard the time make moan
And that great pity on the realm and throne
Grew lily royal over king and hind.

Proud vengeance this on her who turned to sheep
The wolves of Crecy and of Agincourt!
Was faith in France triumphant infamous?

Or did you cast the groundlings bait so cheap?
How well might honest gain of such a sort
Play minion to the gold of Pandarus.

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