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## MONISM AND MATERIALISM.

### A REJOINDER.

BY PAUL R. SHIPMAN.

DR. CARUS has replied, through one of the two mediums of publication at his command, to certain criticisms of mine, which, I regret to say, have not appeared in either of these mediums; if they had, I should be content to let his reply pass without a rejoinder. As it is, I ask permission to make one.

I said that the monism of Dr. Carus "sets duality in the atom, and runs it throughout existence"; and, in proof of this, cited his assertion that "feeling is not material," that "motion can never be transformed into feeling," that "the interconvertibility of motion and feeling is an error," that the "non-mechanical has nothing whatever to do with the mechanical," that feeling "can impart no impulse," that "the motions of all atoms are accompanied with elements of feeling," that these elements of feeling "produce in certain combinations actual feelings," and so forth, to the end of a long chapter. In reply, Dr. Carus asks, innocently: "Did I ever speak of the duality of atoms?" Not that I know of; I certainly never said he did. I simply showed that his multiform assertion of the immateriality of the elements of feeling, and of their intimate and inseparable coexistence with all atoms, means this or nothing.

Of this showing, however, Dr. Carus has taken no notice. He has not disputed my citations or endeavored to confute my arguments. He has made no further attempt to explain how two things, which he says have nothing whatever to do with each other, and consequently nothing in common, can be one. What he might do, if he tried, I will not conjecture. Perhaps, more potent than Gratiano, he might rail or rally the seal from off the bond—the words from out the printed page; but, till he does, he will pardon me for saying that, like Gratiano, he but offends his lungs to speak so loud.

Dr. Carus also asks, with like ingenuousness, if he ever declared, as I accused him of declaring, that "consciousness is immaterial and will material." He does not disown the declaration, to which my accu-

sation refers, that consciousness is immaterial, and that will is motion, but claims, it seems, that motion, as well as consciousness, is immaterial. Such being his view, how is it (will he tell us?) that motion can act on matter, and that consciousness can not—that consciousness, as he asserts, "can impart no impulse," whilst motion, as he will admit, is a living spring of impulse? Is the immaterial convertible with the material, and not with the immaterial? Or are there degrees of immateriality, and does a chasm, fathomless and spanless, divide the scale—sundering one of these degrees from the rest, as all of them are sundered from materiality? But this by the way. The question of the materiality of motion I will discuss presently in connection with the nature of properties.

It pleases Dr. Carus to imply, what he cannot seriously mean, that I hold materialism in the form imagined by some of his philosophical countrymen in the first half of this century, and he addresses himself particularly to confuting the dictum (as if it concerned me) that thought is a secretion of the brain, saying on this head, among other things, equally irrelevant, though not all equally decorous:

"Gall is a substance, but thought is not a substance. Gall is a special kind of organised matter, but thought is no matter. If it were, we might bottle it, or preserve it in tin cans. What a fine prospect to buy canned thought at the grocers!"

It is enough to say of this infirm logic, and superannuated pleasantry, not to speak of either irreverently, that thought, while not a secretion, figuratively or literally, is nevertheless the effect of the activity of organised matter; and, as every effect is consubstantial with its cause, the effect of material activity is itself material. "Nothing is immaterial, and everything is material," says the article to which Dr. Carus is replying, "that has anything to do with matter; whatever acts on matter, or is acted on by matter, is material—everything else, provided there is anything else, is immaterial." If this account of the material is true, mind unquestionably is material, and in this relation the sole remaining problem—no doubt a stupendous and superb one—is to trace the processes that emerge in consciousness. And the truth of this account results, necessarily, from the nature of causation, joined

with the principle that action and reaction are equal and opposite.

Matter can neither act nor be acted on without reaction, which includes interaction, confessedly possible between material agents only. But mental phenomena, it is now admitted, spring from the interaction of subject and object; both of which are thereby admitted to be material. From the character of knowledge, thus derived, it follows that what knows must be the same in nature as what is known; "this was some time a paradox, but now the time gives it proof." The whole superstructure of modern psychology is founded implicitly on the materiality of mind.

Furthermore, the materiality of mind is proved by the coextension of matter with reality, as guaranteed by the absolute impossibility of conceiving the negation of this proposition; out of which flows the corollary that mind is a form of matter, since nothing but the mysterious something that we call matter exists—nothing but matter in one or another of its infinite modes.

Moreover, the materiality of mind is proved inductively:—first, by the fact that consciousness is invariably and unconditionally consequent on the action of material forces; and, secondly, by the fixed correspondence of the variations in consciousness with determinate variations in material forces: each of which, if there is validity in the axioms of science, proves that consciousness is the effect of material forces, and, consequently, material, too.

I perhaps should not omit to say that the materiality of mind, in addition to all this, is implied in the very definition of matter which Dr. Carus accepts. In "Fundamental Problems," p. 93, he defines matter as "that which affects our senses," and, in "The Soul of Man," p. 383, as "anything which can effect one or more of our senses." Affecting our senses is a process the product of which is perception, or what psychologists generally misname *sensation*, a psychical product at all events, in whose production the affection consists; so that matter, in affecting our senses, acts on mind—produces feeling—gives rise to consciousness: and, as causation is transformation, the mental effect of this action must be equally material with the action itself, reacting on matter, and setting up therewith the interaction which belongs exclusively to material things. It is an obvious suggestion that perception or sensation is merely the *sequent* of material action, instead of the effect; but, if matter does not produce sensation, so called, it does not affect our senses in the established acceptance of the phrase, for this affection consists purely in the production of sensation. An object unperceived is not considered, popularly or philosophically, as affecting our senses. An impression that stops short of the senso-

rium is not a sensory impression; so long as the "process" does not emerge in consciousness, it falls short of sensation—is physical, not psychical; and this is true of subconscious or subliminal activities and passivities of every kind. Consciousness is the essence of sensation, as of mental phenomena at large. This observation opens a field into which at present I cannot properly enter.

Having produced this argument to the man or the school, I ask briefly to make one other, more especially *ad hominem*, prefacing it with the remark of Professor Höfding, who therein but vouches for a self-evident truth, that "the conception function (in the physiological sense) implies, just as much as the conception matter or product, something presented as an object of intuition in the form of space." Dr. Carus, in one of his chapters in "The Soul of Man," talks about localising consciousness, and actually suggests that the hemispheric ganglions known as the Striped Body constitute the organ of consciousness; whereby he concedes, unequivocally, I need not say, that consciousness is not only the function of a material organ, but the product of motion, wherein the functioning of a material organ consists: whencé it follows, beyond question, not merely that motion can be transformed into consciousness, but that both are material. *Quod erat NON demonstrandum*. But this argument, and its fellow, I throw in for good measure; my intention is not to baffle criticism, but to elicit truth.

Such is my position—the citadel from which I assail the monism of Dr. Carus. This position Dr. Carus has not attacked. He has neither stormed it nor besieged it. He has not so much as summoned it to surrender. He has not come in sight of it; although the shrill note of his fifes, and the rubadub of his drums, announce that he is vigorously marching and counter-marching somewhere in the rear. I respectfully challenge him to show himself. Where does he stand? Does he accept my account of the material? Does he reject the inconceivability of the negation of a proposition\* as the ultimate test of its truth? Does he doubt that causation is transformation? Does he deny that an event on which another is invariably and unconditionally consequent is the cause of the other? Does he admit or refuse to admit the canon of induction respecting concomitant variations?

Dr. Carus would seem to have a peculiar notion of the properties of matter—a kind of dissolving notion, which passes insensibly from one notion into another, as he changes his point of view. From the point he occupied when he made this reply, he appears to re-

\*I mean a simple and legitimate proposition—one that can be framed in thought, and cannot be decomposed.

gard the properties of matter as a group of co-ordinate abstractions, of which matter itself is one among the rest. He says:

"If we speak of matter we do not mean force. If we speak of force, we do not mean matter. If we speak of form, we mean nothing but relation. If we speak of consciousness, or of feeling, or of thought, we have no reference to either matter, or force, or even form. All these terms are different abstractions of one and the same indivisible reality. . . . The thing moved is material, but the motion itself is not material."

If we speak of matter, we may with propriety mean its properties, whereby we know it, and of which, in the order of thought, force not only is the first, but comprehends the others. When we speak of matter, if we do not mean force, we can mean nothing else than matter in itself, which Dr. Carus says is a non-entity. If he speaks of matter, and does not mean force, therefore, he means nothing.

Force, motion, and the rest, are properties of matter; but that the properties of a thing partake of its nature is a corollary from the definition of properties. Besides, matter is manifested in its properties, and if these are immaterial it must be immaterial itself; so that either matter does not exist, or its properties, with their effects (to the remotest and finest issues), are material. Dr. Carus, indeed, if I understand him, holds that the properties of a thing, as they are known to us, constitute the thing; wherefore, the absurdity of holding that the properties of matter are immaterial should be especially manifest to him. But in this view of properties I do not concur.

Dr. Carus says "Every reality is material," which is saying that everything real, subjective or objective, is material, for to say that anything is real, without being a reality, is to say that it is real without the state of being real, which in turn is to say that it is real without being real. Unless Dr. Carus is prepared to accept this contradiction, he must give up the notion that there is any difference in extension between *real* and *reality*—that *real* may be applied to that of which *reality* cannot be predicated; the extension of *real*, if the tautology may be pardoned, is exactly measured by the objects to which it belongs, whereof all, by virtue solely of the quality it names, are *realities*. The proposition "Everything real is material," and the proposition "Every reality is material," are identical beyond dispute—self-evidently the self-same. Escape from this conclusion is a logical impossibility. So far, so good. But here comes the difficulty. Dr. Carus, in the reply under notice, says with some "feeling," if not "force": "To declare that force, and feeling, and consciousness, and thought, are material does not prove the boldness of freethought, it betrays an immature mind." This is intended to be rough on somebody, and it obviously is, but the somebody, I shudder

to relate, turns out to be the author of it. The killing remark puts one in mind of McFingal's gun, which,

"—————Aimed at duck or plover,  
Bore wide, and knocked the owner over."

This is the difficulty. That it is an awkward one Dr. Carus will probably own, though he may imagine (his imagination seems abnormal in some directions) that he can manage somehow to right himself, without retracting the admission that has wronged him. Anyhow, I resign the situation into his hands, with cheerfulness, and the best of good wishes.

Dr. Carus never wearies of repeating that *matter is an abstraction*; as if that were a common clincher. Matter is an abstraction, if, from his standpoint or one of his standpoints, we consider it as the raw stuff of material things, marking them off from immaterial things, though, even in this view, it symbolizes a reality; but if, from another and juster standpoint of his, we grant that "every reality is material," then matter is coextensive with reality—is the All—and of course is not abstracted from anything, or possessed by anything. Matter is an abstraction in the view of supernaturalism only—in that of immaterialism it does not, speaking logically, exist at all; in the view of materialism, the idea that matter is an abstraction drawn from things, or inhering in them, is the contradiction of contradictions: matter, in the materialistic view, is itself the sum total of things—absolute, infinite, transcendent.

For my part, I conceive the universe as arising from one element, whereof the mental symbol is what we call matter, and of which the thing we call force symbolises the primary attribute, whereby are evolved all the complexer elements, with their properties, and, through these, the universe as we know it, mind included: all of which, mind not excepted, is resolvable into the original element. The world is a tree of which mind is the blossom and fruit.

This is monism, as I understand it. What Dr. Carus understands as monism, it appears to me, is almost any ism under the sun, except monism. I reckon it a flat self-contradiction. It is a burlesque on monism, unless I mistake both, though a good specimen of dualism—better, if anything, than that of Zoroaster himself, for Light and Darkness may be conceived as shading into each other, and, moreover, in the Persian conception, they have immateriality in common; but the monism of Dr. Carus lacks this shadow of unity. Yet I am open to reason. If he will demonstrate that two things having nothing in common are the same thing, I will cheerfully accept the demonstration; wherever truth leads, I am ready to follow, be it into the jaws of the absurdest-looking paradox. But the demonstration has not yet come forth. Nor does it seem forthcoming.

Prof. Höffding, who agrees with Dr. Carus in asserting the inconvertibility of mind and matter, essays to unify the two by referring both to some *tertium quid*, of which he supposes that they are parallel manifestations. This unification of them, however, abandons their essential heterogeneity, for things that are homogeneous with the same thing are homogeneous with each other; and this result must attend every possible mode of real unification. The parallels cannot be made identical at either end without becoming identical throughout, when they cease to be two, and are one and the same. Dr. Carus himself reaches this result by a short turn. "The simplest conception of the case," he says, "is the monistic view, which considers the parallelism an identity,"\* subjoining: "Fechner seems to have hit the mark, when he compared feeling and motion to the inside and the outside curves of a circle." This conception is certainly simple, in one sense (which it is unnecessary to unfold), but bewilderingly intricate in another. If the two manifestations are identical, they are not different, far less so different as to have nothing in common; the only trouble, as well as I can perceive, is that their individual identity leaves the world devoid of one or the other of them, and it is not easy to see how the world can get on without both. But this curious monistic puzzle I hand over to the reader.

The whole question raised by it, as it seems to me, may be put into a nutshell. Mind and matter† are fundamentally the same or fundamentally different. If fundamentally the same, they are interconvertible; and monism is established. If fundamentally different, they are not interconvertible; but monism is exploded. Either way Dr. Carus is fundamentally wrong. If this reasoning is fallacious, in his opinion, I invite him to expose its fallacy—I seek the truth at all hazards; but he will make no head in this direction, by talking around the point, instead of to it, or splitting hypothetical hairs in the face of "unwedgeable and gnarled" facts.

Dr. Carus suggests (though the body of his reply hardly bears out the suggestion) that the difference between him and myself is "primarily a difference of reasoning rather than of opinion," adding, with engaging frankness, though scarcely with his usual lucidity, that I overlook "the fundamental rules of philosophical propædeutics, and this oversight produces, as a secondary symptom, a difference of opinion." Concerning the first part of this suggestion, I will say nothing; but, as for the latter and more learned part, if he is right in his diagnostics, and would have his prognostics indicate our agreement, I advise him, in

the immortal figure of Captain Cuttle, to overhaul his propædeutics, and, when found, make a note of. "Whereby, why not?" That important branch of his mental equipment will evidently be none the worse for a very thorough overhauling. Meantime, I rest content in my "opinion," and am not disturbed about my "philosophical propædeutics." Propædeutics, philosophical or otherwise, may be judged by the fruitage. The end crowns all.

#### MONISM OR MATERIALISM.

WE MUST protest from the beginning against Mr. Shipman's calling his article *Monism and Materialism* "a Rejoinder." The article is no rejoinder. Mr. Shipman criticised *The Open Court's* view of monism from the materialistic standpoint in several articles published in *Secular Thought*. We replied to his criticism in the same journal in an article entitled "The Error of Materialism." This article was reprinted in *The Open Court*, we saw another reprint of the article introduced by a few editorial remarks in *The Reform Advocate*. If Mr. Shipman's article were a rejoinder, it ought to appear in *Secular Thought*. We see no obligation to publish it, especially as we received it many months after the controversy. Yet we do not wish that any cause be insufficiently represented in *The Open Court*, nor that the cause which we plead should unduly enjoy the editorial advantages.

Mr. Shipman's present article, is a most vigorous attack couched in strong language, and displaying at the same time an almost enviable consciousness of triumphant superiority. That is the reason we have accepted it for publication,—for thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness. The present reply shall be brief in order to avoid the wearisomeness of repetition.

\* \* \*

I have said it before and I say it again that the disagreement between Mr. Shipman and myself is "primarily a difference of reasoning rather than opinion; he overlooks the fundamental rules of philosophical propædeutics and this oversight produces as a secondary symptom a difference of opinion." He declares that mind is material, to which I answer: "If mind were material. We might not only weigh it and measure it as we weigh sugar and measure cloth, but we might also bottle it and preserve it in tin cans."

In the present article Mr. Shipman comes and attempts to prove the materiality of the mind. He says:

"[Mind] is the effect of the activity of organised matter; and as every effect is consubstantial with its cause, the effect of material activity is itself material."

Could anything be a better proof than this, that there is a difference of reasoning between Mr. Shipman and myself?

I object to the maxim that the effect must be con-

\* *The Soul of Man*, p. 20.

† The word *matter* I of course use here in the popular sense—as signifying one of the forms of matter in what I conceive to be the true sense.

substantial with its cause. For instance, the hunter shoots a deer and it dies. The shooting is the cause, the deer's death the effect. Some people who cannot distinguish between the act of shooting and the ball shot, say the ball is the cause, and then argue, the cause being material, the effect must be material too. But if the effect must be consubstantial with its cause, the deer's death ought to consist of lead. It ought to be exactly the same material. But there is no sense in calling any material thing a cause, and still less in saying that cause and effect are consubstantial.

The activity of a material body is not material itself. Activity is motion and motion is change of place. He who maintains that the motion of a piece of matter is material, that the act of changing the place of a piece of matter is itself a piece of matter, is in possession of such a peculiar kind of logic that I can no longer argue with him. His logic may appear to him from his standpoint as a hyperlogic which is not bound to respect the usual rules of logic, but it is and remains radically different from mine.

Suppose we find out on the ground of physiological facts (as I have tried to do in "The Soul of Man,") that a certain part of the brain is the organ of consciousness. Does that prove the materiality of consciousness because it is granted that the brain is material? We might just as well say that the clock, viz., the instrument of measuring time, is material, and that, therefore, measuring time is material. It would further follow that time itself is material also. I should like to know whether any chemist has ever succeeded in analysing this queer piece of matter, called time!

According to Mr. Shipman, everything that exists is matter. He believes in "the coextension of matter with reality"; and he objects also to a discrimination between adjectives and nouns, between "matter" and "material," "reality" and "real." The terms "real" and "reality" are by no means coextensive, nor are the terms "matter" and "material" coextensive. I should not hesitate to say that reality is material, i. e. every concrete existence possesses a quality which affects the senses and which is called material. Reality as a whole in so far as it is or can be perceived by the senses consists of matter. Even ghosts, if there are any, would have at least pro tem to be materialised in order to appear. But reality possesses other qualities too which are not material. So for instance a dog consists of matter, he is material. But he possesses also a special form, which makes of him a poodle or a spitz. Moreover he is sentient, he has feelings. And neither the forms nor the feelings of a dog are matter.

Is it so difficult to understand that all our abstract words, such as matter, form, feeling, etc., have been abstracted from reality? Matter is not the whole of reality but a certain feature of it. What a confusion

must arise, if we call everything and anything matter! But such is the materialism of Mr. Shipman. We might with the same reason call everything spirit and on that ground call ourselves spiritualists.

Considering the fact that Mr. Shipman's reasoning follows a peculiar method of its own unintelligible according to the customary rules of logic, it is not at all strange that he is unable to understand the monistic conception which considers subjectivity and objectivity as not being the same but one.

We say, and in this we are in agreement with many prominent thinkers and psychologists of modern times, viz. with Fechner, Clifford, Wundt, Lewes, Ribot, Höfding, Lloyd Morgan, and others, that a feeling is not a motion and a motion is not a feeling; they are different and not interconvertible. Yet a certain feeling and a certain motion (viz. certain nervous actions of the brain) are one, being the subjective and objective aspects of one and the same reality.

Mr. Shipman is unable to see that such a view is monistic; he declares that I "set duality in the atom." I wish Mr. Shipman would leave the atom alone and speak of atoms only when we discuss chemical questions. As to the duality, I do not see why a curve should be called dual because it is said to be concave on the one side and convex on the other side. No mathematician will consider concavity and convexity as identical, nor will he, by making this distinction, have "to set duality" in the curve itself. The curve itself remains one although it possess two sides that are quite different from one another.

If after these explanations Mr. Shipman and myself cannot come to an understanding, I feel satisfied that at least each of us has had a chance of setting forth his view clearly. Our readers are the umpires, who according to their taste may choose between materialism and monism—or if they please, form some other Ism of their own. P. C.

#### THE SUNSET CLUB ON THE WAY TO UPLIFT THE MASSES.

BY M. M. TRUMBULL.

It was ladies night at the Sunset Club on the 4th of February, and accordingly the attendance was very large, five hundred and seventy men and women being present at the banquet in the big dining hall of the Grand Pacific Hotel. Miss Frances Willard presided, and the topic was, "How would you uplift the masses?" The most effective speeches were made by women, spiritually and mentally strong, absurdly forbidden by law to take any political part in the work of social uplifting, which never can be completed without their political aid.

Mrs. J. M. Flower opened the debate, and in a very womanly way began to uplift the masses by giving them a good washing in the first place, then some food, and then some clothes. Her social trinity appeared to be soap, flour, and cloth, the triune elements of good and happy life. Dirt, rags, and hunger were the dangerous microbes corrupting our social constitution and filling the body politic with disease. Expressed in Mrs. Flower's own lan-

guage, "Spirituality is incompatible with a craving stomach, and the best mind can be stunted by insufficient bodily nourishment." Therefore she "would begin the work of uplifting the masses by improving physical conditions, and especially the conditions of child life." She would uplift the masses by making law and justice synonymous; she would enforce the laws against trusts; and against child labor. She would improve the habitations of the poor, equalise taxation, establish public baths, and multiply the schools.

For charity in the form of almsgiving Mrs. Flower had only censure. She declared that almsgiving "acts detrimentally on both giver and receiver by quieting the conscience of the one, and by supplying the physical needs of the other at the expense of his independence and self-respect." Instead of alms, Mrs. Flower would give justice. This doctrine, for which I hold myself in some degree responsible, contains a grain of truth and a shipload of error. I am now convinced that it is unsound and at least misleading. Several years ago, in a moment of enthusiastic passion, I said in the "Wheelbarrow" papers that the toilers "ask not charity, but justice"; and ever since I said it the echo of it has been coming back to me in sentiments like those uttered by Mrs. Flower at the Sunset Club. Placing those two sublime virtues in antithesis was a mistake; I ought to have demanded for them "charity and justice."

I wish I could stop the spiritual degeneration which the sentiment is making, because if it continues we shall see the time when the poor will get neither charity nor justice. If less charity made more justice, the position taken by Mrs. Flower would be invincible; but the very opposite is true. A study of her own acquaintances will convince her that the men and women most conspicuous for charity are the most inclined to justice. While we are waiting for justice let us go on with the charity, with discriminate charity, I mean, for God loveth a cheerful giver. "It is in the scriptures, Trim!"

While some of Mrs. Flower's projects of reform were generous wishes and aspirations merely, and while she relied a little too securely on the coercive power of governments, the majority of her plans were within the scope of social effort and practical statesmanship. Indeed it would be well if our professional statesmen understood our political needs as intelligently as Mrs. Flower does. Of course there is a suggestion of Utopia in those impossible courts "where politics will not rule, and where law and justice will be synonymous and within the reach of all"; but there was practical politics in her demand that the burdens of government be more fairly distributed; and there was good morals in the contempt she threw upon that system which "taxes the poor man earning his scanty living with his cheap horse and cart, as much on his slim equipment as his rich neighbor on his five thousand dollar turnout." Mrs. Flower did well to ridicule that. To fine a man for earning his living with a horse and cart is a travesty and caricature of government.

Dr. E. G. Hirsch was the next speaker, and with rare felicity of expression he showed how strong the temptation was to prescribe some favorite and infallible panacea, education, statutes, charity, temperance, or something else. "With one medicine," said Dr. Hirsch, "the disease cannot be reached. To lift up the masses it is necessary before all to unmass them." He then showed wherein lay the hope and chance of doing it.

According to Dr. Hirsch, before we can uplift the masses we must restore to man his individuality. The massing of men was due to the invention of machinery and the introduction of steam, whereby "men who had to earn their living by the work of their hands were deprived of all individuality." House industries gave way to the factory system which "reduced men and women to the level of mere hands." Following out this train of thought, Dr. Hirsch said, "the factory makes it essential that all wage

workers shall live in the neighborhood of the great industrial establishments." The result of this is the tenement abomination, where privacy and healthy development are alike impossible. The value of privacy and room to grow was illustrated by this fine comparison, "As the body requires a certain minimum of cubic feet of fresh air, so the soul, using this term to cover all the functions of man's moral nature, needs at least some space which cannot be invaded by any other person."

It seemed like a poetical dream, but the hope of Dr. Hirsch lay in the development of electricity as a mechanical power, whereby home industries may be restored, and men again become whole persons instead of bits of a machine. There was so much glow of human feeling in his words, that ideal as his prophecy appeared to be, it was impossible not to wish that it might be fulfilled. He said, "The age of steam is passing away. Electricity is the force of the future. It is my conviction that it offers the possibility of reviving the old house industries, allowing room for individuality, and allowing the workers to live comfortably, not in the crowded hovels of the city, but in the laughing homes of healthy suburbs." Eloquent and animated as Dr. Hirsch was, the realisation of his hope is too far distant, even if possible at all. Something must be done to uplift the masses now.

Mr. George A. Schilling followed Dr. Hirsch, and promptly made a claim that the question itself conceded that the masses were down, and that they might be lifted up by human agencies. If the masses are oppressed, he said, there must be something that oppresses them. He averred that merely social and private remedies such as charity, prohibition, and similar expedients were inadequate; and he contended that the problem was one of justice in the realm of economics. He would uplift the masses by setting them free, and he contended that they were under a form of slavery by duress of hunger, cold, the fear of the future, and the love for wife and children which compelled them to sell themselves in the labor market for whatever they would bring. It was not the chattel slavery of old, but it was a form of moral slavery which ought to be abolished.

Mr. Schilling's argument had the merit of specific statement, and his remedies were three, the abolition of land monopoly, of money monopoly, and the monopoly of patents. Legalised privilege concrete in those monopolies was responsible for what Mr. Schilling called "the exploitation of labor." He would abolish all land laws, and make occupancy and use the sole title to land, thus "restoring to the masses those natural opportunities and resources upon which their energies may be employed." There is a high purpose in all that, but I fear the scheme is impossible, at least in this geological epoch. It is doubtless true that land monopoly is a grievance that ought to be abated; it may be also true that natural resources, the inheritance of all the people, are locked up from the masses by the privileged few, whereby the productive power of nature is abridged, and agriculture oppressed with heavy burdens, but I fear the scheme of Mr. Schilling would abolish agriculture altogether. Men will not cultivate land unless they can read their title clear to a certain quantity of it described by metes and bounds. Title by use and occupancy alone is too precarious to justify a man in ploughing land or planting it; in fencing it, or building a barn on it. Security of title is the foundation of agriculture; and agriculture is the support of every other industry. The other social remedies proposed by Mr. Schilling, the Mutual Bank, and the Abolition of the Patent Monopoly, I will refer to at some future time.

Miss Addams of Hull House came next; and the appearance of this young lady created a sensation that will not soon be forgotten by the Sunset Club. Hull House, now famous because of Miss Addams, is conspicuous over there in Darkest Chicago, a mansion owned by that lady, where for the past five years the masses have been actually uplifted through her unostentatious work, and largely

at her own expense. Not many of those present had ever seen Miss Addams, but evidently all had heard of her, for as soon as her name was announced, and she rose to speak, the audience recognised at once that the greatest woman in Chicago stood before them, and the applause was a magnificent and spontaneous tribute of respect. It could not be suppressed, but broke out again and again. It lasted for several minutes, to the embarrassing surprise of Miss Addams, which almost broke her down, but the cheering was a testimonial unmistakable that her good deeds had found her out.

The address of Miss Addams was of wonderful strength and quality. It was democracy set to music, and the religion of social equality inspired every word. The description of Hull House as a social force was condensed and very clear; Miss Addams said: "The Social Settlement of which Hull House claims to be a modest example is an attempt to know the 'masses' as one neighbor knows another neighbor. The residents of such Settlement live among the masses as nearly as possible without a sense of difference. They claim to have added the social function to democracy."

The purpose expressed in that sentiment appears to me to be the most morally scientific solution of the social problem that has yet appeared. It reminds me of the democracy of Robert Burns, wherein the principle of social equality forms its most essential part. The poor, having political rights without social equality, "meet in a saloon," says Miss Addams, "their only host a bartender, and a local demagogue forms their political opinions." Nor, according to Miss Addams, is this equality necessary for the elevation of the poor only, but also for that "fast growing number of so-called 'favored' young people who have no recognised outlet for their active faculties." This somewhat startling doctrine Miss Addams made beautifully clear.

Into educational matters also, Miss Addams would put social as well as political democracy, and this is the style of education obtained at Hull House. How many hundreds of years it has taken to find out what some of us would not have discovered for hundreds of years to come had it not been shown to us by Miss Addams, that, "people who have been allowed to remain undeveloped, and whose faculties are inert and sterile, cannot take their learning heavily. It has to be diffused in a social atmosphere. Information held in solution in a medium of fellowship and good will can be assimilated by the dullest." There is enough genial warmth in that sort of talk to thaw out a good deal of our natural stupidity, and make learning easier to get.

I would gladly quote a little more from the speech of Miss Addams, but Lady Henry Somerset spoke well too, and with admirable grace and elegance. Her speech was magnetic with human sympathy, and very much in the strain made so attractive by Miss Addams. Lady Henry Somerset is President of the Women's Christian Temperance Union of Great Britain, and in addition to the duties of that office, she performs a work very much like that performed at Hull House. Familiar with the palaces of Belgravia and the slums of Whitechapel there was much valuable instruction in what Lady Somerset said. Her comparison between the social phenomena of England, and those of the United States was valuable. It was kindly said, but there was a solemn warning to Americans in this parallel: "Your problems here, it seems to me, are simpler in some measure, because your evils cannot surely have taken such deep root in your social system; but superficially speaking, I should say that you are meeting to-day exactly the same spectres with which we are grappling in the old world."

Like Miss Addams, Lady Somerset proclaimed the elevating tendency of social democracy upon the masses and the classes too. She expressed the sentiment in a picturesque and vivid way, saying, "There is deep rooted in the minds of men and women a sense that what we have to give is not all that we think it is. We

want to bring before them little by little the feeling that they must raise themselves. The moment we attempt to put our hand down or to lift it up, I believe all effort is useless. We need to hold out the level palm and say, 'Greeting to you my brother and my sister.' And only that which comes in this spirit, whether we deal with the great problems or whether it is in our social relations, will tell for good when we seek, as we call it, to uplift the masses."

There were other speeches and good ones too, that I should like to review, but my comments are already too long.

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## CORRESPONDENCE.

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### THE ETHICAL SOCIETIES AND THE CRITERION OF ETHICS.

*To the Editor of The Open Court:*

YOUR recent criticism\* of the ethical culturists seems to me to be very praiseworthy, opportune, and pertinent. It is about time that this sailing of the sea without a compass or chart which is claimed to be the scientific method of ethical culture societies were pointed out as *unscientific* and by no means consistent with the modern spirit of criticism and the rationalising efforts to get at and maintain the possible criterion for conduct or the basis for and the existence of the ethical formula. If we are to be guided by ethical culturists what surety have we that our work, teaching, conduct, is right? If there is or can be no common unit of truth among men built on the conception of the reality and existence of truth itself—truth which as law predestinates not only the human will but determines the rationale and method of conduct, then what ground for positive ethics or authority for right and wrong conduct have we? Will our ethical co-workers say none at all! If so, how do they know this? Will they please oblige us by explaining their reasons for this agnosticism? On the general assumption by them that there is a method in the universe—that the universe is this method, perhaps; why then could not it be formulated, if truth can at all be arrived at, even if the masses should not see it. Is truth to wait before man formulates it, if he can, until humanity is *ready* to see and accept it? It strikes any fair mind that our ethical culturists, are not sure of their ethics or the authority for the same or they would not be so modest and timid about seeking with the rest of us for the only possible criterion for truth, and be so arbitrary and absurd in their belief that because they refuse to be scientific, the other thinkers who differ with them are like the foolish ostrich who knew it all. J. C. F. GRUMBINE.

### BOOK REVIEWS.

LINGUISTIC ESSAYS. By *Carl Abel*. London: Trübner & Co.

This volume of essays is intended as a contribution towards rendering philology a comparative conceptology of nations, with which object a systematic attempt is made "to realise the psychological significance of the dictionary, and to connect dictionary and grammar by conceptual ties." The meaning of words is explained in groups, each conveying a complete view of a particular notion, and the ordinary mode of discussing grammatical subjects by parts of speech, is supplemented by a classification of inflections and their syntactical combinations according to what they express. The larger part of the work treats of language as the embodiment of a nation's general views of men and things, and the author has brought together some very acute observations on this topic. For example, in the essay on "Language as the Expression of National Modes of Thought," he compares the ideas conveyed by the German word *Freund* and the French word *ami*, tracing the difference between them to the different ideas entertained by the peoples who speak those languages in relation to friendship. In France so slight is the pathos bound up with this

\*No. 234.

sentiment, that not only people habitually address each other by the term *ami* in the trivial intercourse of everyday life, but mere acquaintances call each other *amis*. On the other hand, "the German scarcely ever says to his friend, *Mein Freund*. The word denotes too sacred a bond to be lightly used. Only in earnest or excited moments are Germans moved by this lofty name to confess, confirm, or appeal to their intimate relation to each other." Thus the difference in the meaning of the two terms is significant of the difference in the character of the peoples to whom they belong. To this may be added that the German word has preserved a memory of the time when among many peoples, as it still is with some of the Slavs, the bond of friendship was considered the most sacred of all ties.

Dr. Abel's second essay is entitled "The Conception of Love in Some Ancient and Modern Languages," and it contains much curious matter relating to this interesting subject. The languages compared are Hebrew, Latin, English, and Russian, and in summarising the results the author states that the strength of the Hebrew is shown in the recognition of the love of God to man, the love of man to God, and the common love of men to one another; Latin is distinguished by accentuating obligatory love, inspired by attachment to family, tribe, and country; in English there is "a noble and intelligent development of the concept in all its various aspects"; while Russian has in addition a word peculiar to itself for the different varieties of active love. The religious temperament of the Russians is shown by the fact that their language alone of those compared has a word, *blagost*, which expresses "the love of God to man, universal, all-embracing love."

We must pass over the elaborate study of the eleven English words of command, and succeeding essays, until we come to that which treats on the Origin of Language, which is the subject of most general importance. The author's views as to the origin of language are the result of a study of ancient Egyptian, which possesses certain remarkable features distinctive of really primitive speech. In the more ancient hieroglyphic period Egyptian was largely a language of homonyms, one sound or a combination of sounds being used to denote a variety of things. Moreover, there was the opposite practice of expressing one idea by any one of many sounds or combinations of sounds. Such a language when written would appear to be unintelligible, and it would be so largely, if it were not that, with the exception of certain well understood grammatical abstracts, every word in an inscription is accompanied by a supplementary picture. Dr. Abel draws the inference that gesture and facial expression must have occupied in the spoken tongue the place which elucidatory drawings had in the written language. He says "but half understood as such, primitive speech required to be supplemented by and interpreted by the intelligible motion of the body, the signal given by the head, hand, or leg, the impression conveyed by nod, shrug, wink, glance, or leer." The study made within the last few years of gesture language confirms the truth of these remarks. Probably hieroglyphics were originally intended to be pictorial illustrations of gesture language itself, in which case they would be only indirectly representative of the written words. An advanced stage is marked by the appearance of words definite in meaning and distinct in sound, in place of the numerous homonyms and synonyms, a change which was attended by a corresponding development of the sense of hearing, and the power of definite speech. Similar linguistic phenomena are observable in a close examination of the Aryan and Semitic families of languages. The use of numerous words for the same object, and the application of the same word to different ideas opposes the hypothesis "that speech began as an outburst of uniform inspiration, or that the distinct linguistic sense which to-day connects sound and meaning, had any original existence." What happened, says Dr. Abel, was "the gradual development within rationally confined boundaries of the faculty of appropriating distinct sounds

for distinct concepts." Nevertheless this would seem only to throw the difficulty further back unless, as is very improbable, sounds were used almost haphazard to denote many different objects or ideas. Possibly ancient Egypt was populated by a conglomeration of tribes each of which contributed to the common language, which would require gesture to make it properly understood. Hieroglyphics would thus occupy the same position as the Chinese written characters, which are read by various peoples whose spoken languages are totally different from one another.

But ancient Egyptian had other remarkable features, among them the inversion either of sound or of sense, or of both. The author's Coptic Researches contain ninety pages of such inversions and the explanation he gives of them appears reasonable. As to the case of inversion of meaning he shows that it must have been intentional, and that it was due to the primitive practice of thinking by thesis and antithesis, in order to facilitate the comprehension of either of the opposed conceptions. Arabic furnishes many examples of this polar change of meaning, which we would suggest is probably connected with the fact that thought itself is in many cases antithetic. The explanation of inversions of sound is different. Egyptian roots are almost always capable of development by repetition of the initial consonant at the beginning or end of the word, or by the repetition of the terminal consonant at the end. When the initial consonant is repeated at the end, a slightly emphasised pronunciation will produce a complete inversion of the root, added to itself, and the idea expressed by the reduplicated whole will come to be likewise expressed by each of its constituent parts. Dr. Abel accounts for such inversions as "simply instances of the full play given to the speech-making faculty in the first glorious flush of its exuberant spring." He gives various examples of them in the Indo-European tongues, and it is known that they are frequent in languages of a more primitive type. We cannot do more than mention the essay on "Coptic Intensification," which is one of the most valuable studies in a work every part of which is deserving of careful perusal. Ω.

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### CONTENTS OF NO. 235.

MONISM AND MATERIALISM. (A Rejoinder). PAUL R. SHIPMAN.....	3151
MONISM OR MATERIALISM. EDITOR.....	3154
THE SUNSET CLUB ON THE WAY TO UPLIFT THE MASSES. M. M. TRUMBULL.....	3155
CORRESPONDENCE.	
Ethical Societies and the Criterion of Ethics. J. C. F. GRUMBINE.....	3157
BOOK REVIEWS.....	3157