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## PROFESSOR BRIGGS, AND THE HERETICS' SHEOL.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

I HAVE just listened to a lecture on "The Bible and the Reason," by the Rev. Dr. Charles A. Briggs, professor in Union Theological Seminary, and leader of the Presbyterian Church in America. It was given in the Church of the Covenant, New York, to an audience including many persons of influence. The lecture was learned, lucid, impressive; still more, it was phenomenal. The inaugural lecture for which he was indicted was but as a tentative preface to the bold and far-reaching principles affirmed in this lecture. The Doctor began by pointing out the impregnable hold of his freedom inside the Westminster Confession. He frankly admitted that the Westminster Divines in opening the door of private judgment did not imagine what explorations would ultimately result. When they condemned "blind obedience" to authority, in matters "not decided and determined by the Word of God," they could not foresee that such liberty from papal and episcopal bonds could be maintained equally against all religious bodies. There is a considerable list of things on which the "Word of God" has given no decision,—for instance, on Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Rationalism, and the salvability of Martineau. Here be wide fields and pastures new into which the presbyterian youth are henceforth to be led, unless the door of Private Judgment be closed. And who, Dr. Briggs asked, with a solemn confidence that answered his question,—who can shut that door?

As Dr. Briggs uttered his similitude of the Open Door, the arches and pillars of the church about him shaped themselves in my fancy to a semblance of a mediæval picture in my possession of Christ delivering spirits out of Sheol (for Dr. Briggs never uses the word "Hell.") In the picture Christ appears armed with what is known in iconography as the "Resurrection Cross,"—a long staff of which the cross bar is a mere ornamental symbol at the end, as it is in many "orthodox" sermons nowadays. At the touch of the end of this staff which is not cruciform a door has fallen; from the gaping mouth of a monster the souls emerge led by Adam and Eve, who are followed by a number of others long held in durance for their sins. All about are little devils,—Christ has accidentally

trod on one,—gnashing their teeth as the process of deliverance goes on. Dr. Briggs appeared engaged in similar work. Through the unbarred door of the rationalists' Sheol came a procession of the tormented freethinkers of all time, the lecturer unconsciously treading on those who damned them, declaring that "Reason is the great fountain of Divine authority." In my mediæval picture Christ grasps the hand of Adam, whom he notably resembles, and welcomes Eve just as if instead of depraving the human race she had founded in Eden an "Annex" to utilise the tree of Knowledge. So in my fanciful vision I thought Dr. Briggs particularly gracious to the most notorious heretics. He only called Martineau by name, (and Martineau is more heretical than Theodore Parker ever was,) because that great name was part of the indictment against him, but he showed his appreciation of others by allowing them to speak parts of his lecture. Not that he was conscious of this; Dr. Briggs is an original man; but when he had flung open his own mental door, and at the same time the prison of the reasoners, I noticed that some of these whispered in his ears and that he uttered thoughts familiar to the readers of their works. I recognised a touch of Parker's humor here, of Emerson's subtlety there, and of other recent forerunners gone silent. But the liberated spirit who got in most through the Presbyterian medium was no other than the despised and rejected Tom Paine!

Professor Briggs was speaking on the Centenary of Paine's first manifesto concerning Religion. It was in 1791 that "The Rights of Man" appeared, in which spiritual freedom was affirmed.

"Who then art thou, vain dust and ashes, by whatever name thou art called, whether a king, a bishop, a church, or a state, a parliament or anything else, that obtrudest thine insignificance between the soul of Man and his Maker? Mind thine own concerns. If he believes not as thou believest it is a proof that thou believest not as he believeth, and there is no earthly power can determine between you.

"With respect to what are called denominations of religion, if every one is left to judge of his own religion there is no such thing as a religion that is wrong, but if they are to judge of each other's religion there is no such thing as a religion that is right; and therefore all the world is right, or all the world is wrong. But with respect to religion itself, without respect to names, and as directing itself from the universal family of mankind to the divine object of all adoration, it is *Man bringing to his Maker the fruits of*

his heart. And though these fruits may differ from each other like the fruits of the Earth, the grateful tribute of every one is accepted."

And now, after a hundred years of experience passed while Paine was in the Heretics' Sheol, this supersacred right of free thought was reaffirmed by Professor Briggs in the same accent. He said that the religious world was now represented in three classes: those who respectively approached the divine Spirit through a church, a book, and reason. Neither of these could attain completely their own ideal so long as they exalted it by depreciating the others. These three spiritual elements were in the world; they are here to stay; by mutual respect they would all be harmoniously developed, and find that the Bible is higher than Protestantism, the Church higher than Romanism, the Reason higher than Rationalism. Then the religious demoralisation of the world would cease. And in this large tolerance Professor Briggs carefully included Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and other religions called heathen; in this also being anticipated by Paine, who pointed out the great truths discovered by the Persians, Confucians, and other religionists without church or Bible, through reason enlightened by the revelation of God in nature without and the moral sense within.

Apart from these general principles of spiritual liberty and catholicity, the fundamental relationship between the new presbyterian apostle of Reason and the author of "The Age of Reason," was disclosed in the references made by both to Quakerism. Professor Briggs pointed out that the Westminster Divines had omitted all of the Proem of John except the first and fourteenth verses. They said nothing of "the true light which lighteth every man coming into the world." It was left to the Quakers, he said, to bear witness to this universal Light. Thomas Paine, brought up in the Quaker meeting at Thetford, described that as "the religion that approaches the nearest of all others to true Deism," and I believe it can be historically shown that Hicksite Quakerism is the monument of Thomas Paine. But Paine, discovering that the Quakers had "contracted themselves too much, by leaving the works of God out of their system," pursued his scientific studies, and also studies of the "inner light," and developed his fundamental faith. This was that the Reason was the common organ for the revelation of the divine in external nature, and of the divine in the spiritual and moral nature of man. Now compare Professor Briggs and Thomas Paine on the religious function of Reason.

DR. BRIGGS.

"The Scriptures . . . appeal throughout to the human reason. They are sealed to those who do not understand the human reason as a means of ac-

THOMAS PAINE.

"It is only by the exercise of reason that man can discover God. Take away that reason and he would be incapable of understanding anything; and in

cess to God . . . The Christian knowledge set forth in these writings, the soul possesses through the witness of the divine spirit within the forms of reason. . . . Rationalism is historically the reaffirmation of the independence of the conscience and the reason, and of immediate communion with God."

this case it would be just as inconsistent to read even the book called the Bible to a horse as to a man. . . . Though I admit the possibility of revelation, I disbelieve that the Almighty ever did communicate anything to man otherwise than by the display of himself in the works of Creation, and by that repugnance we feel in ourselves to bad actions, and disposition to do good ones."

To the largely determining influence of environment may be ascribed the difference between Professor Briggs and Paine: the man of Quaker training sees the immeasurable Light of God in the universe; the man of Presbyterian training sees there the Light of the Logos. The difference is not essential; it is the same Light, whether personified separately or not; Paine himself talks of Providence as "she." Nor is belief or disbelief in miracles material. Paine says "everything is a miracle"; Dr. Briggs believes in particular miracles; but, since both believe in the providential order of the world, the difference is not in the religious plane but in that of historical criticism. The most important difference is that one emphasises the Hebrew and Greek scriptures, the other the scriptures of science, but the Deity they derive is identical,—a just, moral, parental ruler of the Universe. Though Paine disbelieves the dogma of the deity of Jesus, whom he much admires, he assumes the humanity of God, equally with Dr. Briggs, by allying man's moral sense (as in the above parallel extract) with the revelation of God in nature. Apart from man's moral sense evil is displayed in nature equally with good. This moral sense is the Quaker's "inner light of God"; it is the neo presbyterian's Holy Spirit. There is no real difference here.

There was another striking correspondence between Professor Briggs and Paine. The Professor described a mediæval globe he had seen in which only seas and impossible monsters were visible in certain regions where now appear continents and nations. This represents fairly the small conception of the moral and religious world from which some dogmas are inherited. But meanwhile as exploration has done away with the old geography, commerce has brought us into communication with remote nations, with their religions, and the old theology must follow the mediæval geography. It is impossible for us to enjoy the science and arts of the nineteenth century and still hold on to the theology of the sixteenth or seventeenth. All this was eloquently stated by Professor Briggs. Now Paine, amid the early splendor of Newton's discoveries, spoke of the enlarged ideas consequent upon a larger knowledge of the universe. "The solitary idea of a solitary

world, rolling or at rest in the immense ocean of space. gives place to the cheerful idea of a society of worlds, so happily contrived as to administer, even by their motion, instruction to man." "What," he asks, "are we to think of a system of faith formed on the notion of only one world, into which the Almighty, quitting the care of the millions of other worlds, comes to die because a woman eats an apple?" It is a Mythology, not "true Theology," that naturally persecutes science whose progress renders it incredible. Paine also pointed out how small was the section of religious history to which Christian superstition had confined its victims, and he proposed to found "A society for inquiring into the truth or falsehood of ancient history, as far as History is connected with systems of religion ancient and modern." While the Jews were as yet an unimportant tribe, "the nations of Egypt, Chaldea, Persia, and India, were great and populous, abounding in learning and science." He had studied the cosmogonies of India and Persia in a work by the Rev. Henry Lord, dedicated to the Archbishop of Canterbury (1630), in which it is stated that, in the Persian cosmogony "the name of the first man was *Adameh*, and of the woman *Hevah*." "There is good reason to believe we have been in great error with respect to the antiquity of the Bible, as well as imposed upon by its contents."

These ideas of Paine, whose crudeness is that of a hundred years ago, show that he had already perceived the inadequacy of the theologic "globe" which Professor Briggs comprehends with the added light of a century. The gesture is the same. No doubt some of the Professor's champions will be scandalised by any association of him with "The Age of Reason"; but there is no escaping the fact that by opening the church door to Reason the new teacher has admitted Paine to be weighed in the balances of reason. It may be admitted that Paine misunderstood or rejected some things in the church and the Bible, but Dr. Briggs has solemnly asked whether such rejections by rationalists have not been largely due to those who have required "blind obedience to dogmas about the Bible that destroy liberty of the conscience and reason"? During all Paine's life there existed no Professor Briggs. And during all that time there was no writer who so nearly anticipated the religious principles of Professor Briggs as that leather-girdled feeder on locusts and wild honey, that voice in the desert—poor "Tom Paine."

#### THE NATURE OF THE SOUL.\*

BY T. B. WAKEMAN.

OF all the burning questions of our time is there one more far-reaching in its consequences than this, "What is the Soul of Man?" All conclusions about

\* A reply to John Fiske.

immortality, duty, religion, ethics, life—nay, everything—rest largely, if not entirely, upon the verdict of science upon this question. Therefore the lecture of Prof. John Fiske upon "Evolution" printed in the *Popular Science Monthly* (of New York) for September last, and which was originally delivered (May 31, 1891) before the Brooklyn Ethical Association has been deservedly commented upon. By reason of the discussions growing out of that lecture much has been done especially in *The Open Court* to open up and to popularise the scientific views upon this soul question. (See *The Open Court* for August 13, September 17, etc.) The following reply to that lecture, a part of that evening's discussion, is submitted as a proper continuation of the subject.

We all wish to express in words the hearty applause which closed this admirable lecture. It is one of the author's happiest descriptions of the origin and progress of the great modern rising river of human thought, which we name in the now sacred word *Evolution*.

But while thus expressing our profound acknowledgments for this grand foundation of human work and hopefulness, we must ask for the rejection of elements that may render that foundation unscientific and untrustworthy.

For two thirds of this lecture, hearty thanks! For the latter third, thanks—with leave to dissent from the Agnostic position taken as to the consciousness, mind, soul, etc. Such dissent would surely come from all phases of the Positive and Monistic Schools of thought, and it deserves earnest attention.

For the concluding part of this lecture left the impression that the lecturer was laying the foundation for a first class spiritualistic medium. He quoted some words from Goethe, which I will explain presently, but the words from that great monist which his lecture recalled to me, were his most true and impressive complaints against the spooks, which occur near the end of Faust, and which I will try to recall:

"Nun ist die Luft von solchem 'Spuk' so voll,  
Dass Niemand weiss, wie er ihn meiden soll.  
Wenn auch ein Tag uns klar verknüpf't lacht,  
In Traumgespinnst verwickelt uns die Nacht."

Now the important word here is *Spuk*, which Bayard Taylor mistranslates "Shape," in order to hit a rhyme; but the lines tell us this:

"Now fills the air so many a haunting Spook  
That no one knows how best he may escape.  
What though one Day with reason's brightness beams?  
The Night entangles us in its web of dreams."

And like to these words is the grand confession a little further on in Faust, where Goethe sums up his life, admonishes man to stand firmly on *The Knowable*, and then adds:

"Wenn Geister 'spuken,' geh' er seinen Gang."

"When Ghosts spook, let Man go straight on his way."

Now the trouble is that our distinguished lecturer instead of following this sound advice of Goethe, and getting us clearly out of the old spookdom has left the air as black as night with it. His uncorrelated "psychical" has left him to us a sublime Mercury, or Psychopomp, reintroducing the phantoms of that "Unknowable" and ghostly realm which we supposed science had left to priests, mediums, and ancient poetry. Certainly the best use that can be made of ten minutes now is to indicate, if possible, some way out of this night of the Unknowable into the clearer day of "reason's brightness."

Fortunately our lecturer has just dropped the clue to guide our way out to those other precious monistic lines from Goethe's *Sprüche*, which he and we can never quote too often:

"Willst du ins Unendliche streiten?  
Geh' nur im Endlichen nach allen Seiten."

"Into the Infinite wouldst thou stride?  
Go in the Finite only on every side."

These lines give no quarter to agnosticism. They are the essence of monistic positivism. They say that the infinite world is but the continuation of the knowable correlations of the finite, and that there is no conceivable way out of that unending circle of "eternal brazen laws" of cause and effect. That there is no "thing in itself, or outside itself," but that every transaction is a fact and a reality all the way and forever! There is no room for an unknowable, or a spook of any kind, and that this ghost-world simply does not exist except in the imagination of agnostic philosophers. Professor Haeckel in his letter read here to-night says that such is the verdict of evolution, and that it makes the end of the spook, that is, the "personal" God, devil, and immortality.

But our lecturer says, No. He has discovered that the motion or force-changes of correlation are not convertible into feeling, consciousness, or mind. Once Mr. Spencer said that they were, but now it seems that he was mistaken. We too, think he was mistaken. This immaterial, imponderable nature of mind is certainly if not an old yet a true story. I have always taken it as a fact certain, and have consequently disclaimed being a materialist as vigorously as Mr. Spencer in his letter read this evening. The Monists and Positivists all do the same just as they disclaim Atheism; and Professor Haeckel used the word "Monism" to get free from materialism, Atheism, Agnosticism, etc.

It does not reach them nor me to say that the mind is not a motion correlate of force or motion, e. g. that so many units of heat, etc., equal so much mind, and *vice versa*. This purely material and mechanical correlation is not feeling, but it is the fact which accounts for feeling, and of which feeling is a concom-

itant fact, or *time* correlate. People do not understand this because they have no scientific or proper classification of the sciences the making of which should be the first step in philosophy. We must remember, that in each special science the law of correlation holds, but in a way disparate and incomparable with its application in every other special science. Thus from the stars to the mind of man we have Physics as the foundation of Chemistry, which is the foundation of Biology, which is the foundation of Sociology, which is (though Mr. Spencer and many fail to see it) the real foundation of Psychology, or of man as an individual. Now, each of these scientific domains may be said to be correlates of each other in a diminishing scale, that is from Physics to Psychology, when we consider them objectively; and in the reverse or enlarging order from Psychology to Physics and Astronomy, when we consider them subjectively, i. e. looking out from the individual man towards the stars. But in each of these sciences the correlations are incomparable with those which occur in each of the others. Thus the law of "foot pounds of heat" correlates mechanically only in Physics and Chemistry, but it has vital concomitants in Biology, social in Sociology, and psychical in Psychology; which invariable correlates can only be measured or known by the methods applicable to and in those sciences, and which methods are not "foot pounds" at all.\* The attempt to apply mechanical measurements in the higher sciences of Sociology, Ethics, and Psychology, is in the highest degree absurd, and not what we are trying to do at all. Our distinguished lecturer should have left it to our President (Dr. Janes), who in sundry lectures has been trying to force it upon me in our discussions from the platform during the past winter. To him I am accustomed to reply that though all things are subject to correlation and are certainly related, yet each thing or fact is correlated according to its nature and in the domain in which it is found. I often ask him how many hours are there in a hundred miles, or how many miles does it take to make a ton, or a hogshead of molasses. Will he give up arithmetic or correlation because he cannot tell? So, because no one can answer the equally absurd questions: How many units of heat, force, motion or electricity made the Novum Organum, The French Revolution, or the Love of Dante, or the Patriotism of Washington? Because we cannot answer, shall we conclude that they were not natural, knowable correlates of this world—its matter, facts, events, history, and qualities in space and time? Or shall we go to supposing some divinity or "unknowable reality" back of them, "from which all

\* Thus, the hours are the *time* not the *MOTION* correlates of the force in the clock. The feelings are similar correlates of the forces of the nerve changes.

things flow"? This latter was the old way of explaining things, but science has dropped it as to every thing but "mind." Were it not for the enormous religious bribe for keeping it up there we would all be laughing at the absurdity. To quote Goethe once more, for when I find a quoter of Goethe it is hard to forbear :

" Ist's denn so grosses Geheimniss, was Gott  
Und der Mensch und die Welt sei?  
Nein! Doch niemand hört's gerne:  
Da bleibt es geheim."

" Is it then so great a secret, what God  
And Man and the World may be?  
No! But no one is willing to hear it.  
So a secret it remains."

Thus our Agnostic or Unknowable friends seem unable or unwilling to have this great "mystery" explained. They keep telling us that if feeling is not a space-motion-force correlate, it must be some inscrutable, indescribable kind of power, entity, or spook. But the monist says, No; it is not such at all, but simply the *fact side* of nervous changes which *as facts* are being noted by the organism. Such noting is a fact, and the continued repetition of such noting of facts is a process constantly going on and called awareness, feeling, consciousness, etc. This new Fact is simply the *time correlation* of the mechanical and chemical force correlations: for facts are only measurable in and by time, by which some of them are distinguished from others. This fact of awareness of the changes in and about the nervous system is simply *feeling time*, for time at bottom is measured only by feeling. And feeling is *our time*, i. e. the constant fact of distinguishing differences. It is *the fact* made by one change contrasted with others,—as before, after, or together with them. The comparative easiness of repeating such facts and processes give rise to memory and continuous thought-forms, which are the foundation of intellectual life, and finally of reason, and then the whole data of Psychology result. But all these facts of feeling are simply the event-side of the nerve changes, and no mystery unless we wish to make them so. If we are simply scientists, we may be Positivists or Monists, but not properly or consistently Materialists nor Atheists, nor Agnostics, nor Spiritualists, nor Spookists. If we bottom on the *fact* as Goethe says in the opening of Faust (line 880) and not on the *Word*, nor the *Thought*, nor the *Power*, but the *Fact*, (*die That*), we shall have a sure bottom to our mental and all other philosophy. The fact (*die That*) is, to us as to him, the final word; and it is not an entity or spook but the true fact-correlate of the factors which invariably precede it. This feeling, or organic time notation, under natural selection increases rapidly and soon becomes the governor of the organism—its very soul, but it is always a continuous activity, and thus *living time*. The organism notes its

own time, viz. in and as feeling, and learns to tell its time to itself, and that is consciousness—a continuous correlate time fact. The integral calculus of the minute changes of organism noted as a fact in and by itself.\*

Truth and Time only permit me to say that there never was a fifth wheel to a coach so utterly useless as this imagined "substantial" soul-entity. We have banished the spook from every other one of the sciences, now let us get it out of our own heads; that is to say, out of the science of modern psychology.

But in so doing don't for a moment suppose, but that this subjective time-process, or fact-correlation, will sustain real and true Religion, God, Christ, Immortality, and Sound Ethics, far better than the old entical illusions. How this is the result of Science, I have said in my Haeckel lecture, and need not repeat. But also remember that Professor Haeckel in his letter read to-night only refers to the nothingness of the old spook forms of a "personal God and Immortality" as wholly incompatible with Evolution. The modern monistic, scientific *realities*, which underlie and make true those fundamental words of all religion, I have just named, he would doubtless assert and defend as bravely as any one in the proper time and place.

We must learn, however, to courageously translate the old and illusory entical into the new and true time and fact conceptions of the soul. To quote Goethe once more: "There is no wisdom save in truth."

#### THE ETHICS OF STRUGGLE AND ETHICAL CULTURE.

HERACLITUS takes exception to Homer's wish that the immortal gods should abolish war; for war, he says, is the father of all things. It is understood that the word war is here used in the broader sense of struggle or contest; and certainly Heraclitus is right in holding that the world as a cosmos in its differentiated existence spatial as well as temporal (the temporal cosmos we are at present wont to call evolution) exists only through struggle. Life is a constant struggle for existence, and no force can take effect unless it be resisted; force is measured by the resistance overcome. What would force be without resistance?

Ethics being the science of right conduct, and life being in its innermost nature a constant struggle, it appears to us that the ethics of struggle are of paramount importance and it is this point in which the societies for ethical culture are decidedly lacking. They exhibit an inclination to avoid struggle and many things indicate that their lecturers look upon struggle as something wrong in itself. Their very platform pre-

\* See on this subject my lecture on Haeckel; "Fundamental Problems," and "The Soul of Man," by Dr. Paul Carus; and "The Diseases of Personality," by Th. Ribot (introduction); also "The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms," by Alfred Binet—(all published by The Open Court Publishing Co. of Chicago.)

scribes a noncommittal policy, in the hope of going along with the rest of the world without any collision. They seem to expect that their moral ideals will quietly displace the other and older ideals without being obliged to meet them in a square fight. If the leaders of the ethical societies have not by this time found out that their maxim and the ethics upon which it is based are wrong, they will have to learn the lesson still, and it is not likely that it will be spared them.

These considerations naturally suggested themselves when we read Dr. Francis Ellingwood Abbot's pamphlet "Professor Royce's Libel" and ensuing thereupon the controversy on the same subject in the *New York Nation*. We have no interest in siding with either Dr. Abbot or the Professors Royce and Adler, and we feel no ambition to figure as a judge in a case so delicate and complex as is the present one. But a few remarks concerning the paramount importance of the ethics of struggle may not be out of place. The lesson which this case teaches seems to be, that if you attempt to avoid struggle, you will the deeper implicate yourself in struggle; the struggle forced upon you will be worse than if you had faced it bravely from the beginning.

We found as one explanation of Mr. Darwin's remarkable success in life, that he carefully noted every objection made to his theories, nay he was constantly hunting for such facts as would bear upon their significance most unfavorably. The average theorist and social reformer have eyes only for the things that appear to be favorable to their hobby and it happens very often that such men cherish some ideal, which appears to them very grand but is in itself untenable and nonsensical. The way to truth leads through struggle, and Darwin's success lies in the fact that he knew and obeyed the ethics of struggle.

We have repeatedly taken occasion to criticise the ethics of the ethical societies, but there has been no answer to these criticisms. Mr. Salter replied to some criticisms, but his reply was rather a personal matter, in defence of his ethical transcendentalism. The official organs of the ethical societies never attempted to answer or refute our arguments, they simply ignored our criticisms as if they did not concern them. So little are they conscious of the truth that ideals can grow only and be purified through struggle. It is an advantage to them to have a struggle offered and to enter into a competition for the search of truth.

Prof. William James of Harvard in a reply to Mr. Charles S. Peirce, the former siding with Professor Royce, the latter with Dr. Abbot, makes the following remarks:

"Now as to Mr. Peirce's talk about Prof. Royce's 'cruel purpose' of 'ruining Dr. Abbot's reputation.' When did a critic ever deny the value of a book *without* the purpose of ruining the au-

thor's reputation—his reputation, namely, for competency in that field?"

We have a great respect for Professor James's ability as a scholar and also for his personal qualities, especially his amiability and sincerity, but we must confess that we consider the above statement as radically wrong. Two men may have quite contrary opinions on a certain subject, take for instance Darwin and Agassiz, and yet both may be the highest authorities in this very subject. Is Professor Agassiz's reputation as a naturalist ruined because he was wrong in the most essential point concerning the truth of the doctrine of evolution? Even though he held the wrong view, did not his comprehensive knowledge remain, was he not, in spite of this error of his, one of the greatest naturalists of his time? If Darwin personally had written a review of Agassiz's works, would he ever have attempted to ruin his reputation in natural science, would he ever have denied that he was after all a great authority in the same field in which Darwin himself was an authority? Nay more, that if any one, he was competent to pass an opinion on the evolution theory.

It happens not unfrequently in literary controversies that the man who deservedly is the greater authority and, at the same time, possesses a wider reputation, defends a wrong cause against a weaker adversary. The fact is that a man's reputation has nothing to do with his being right or wrong in a certain question.

I do not doubt that Professor James agrees with the view I take, and so my objection is directed only against the words in which he expresses himself. These words, however, are apt to mislead and might affect, in another way than Professor James intends, the growing generation of American scholars.

It is noteworthy that the controversies among European scholars are generally distinguished not only by mutual politeness but also by a mutual and candid respect, while we Americans, I am sorry to say, are famous for rudeness in scientific discussions, because most of our combative sages try to morally kill their adversary and to ruin his scientific, sometimes even his personal, reputation. The fact is we have not as yet in this country learned the ethics of literary controversy.

But let us return to the main point of the subject of this article, viz. the ethics of struggle.

The secret of the success of the Teutonic nations, it appears to me, lies not only in their combative nature which made them strong to conquer the world, but also, and especially, in their recognition of and obedience to the ethics of struggle; and one of the first commandments of the ethics of struggle is the injunction, "Honor your adversary as yourself."

There is an episode told in the *Nibelungen saga* which characterises the ethical spirit of the combativeness of Teutonic heroes. Markgrave Rüdiger has to

meet the grim Hagen and to do him battle. Seeing, however, that his enemy's shield is hacked to pieces, he offers him his own, whereupon they proceed to fight.

It was no disgrace for the Teutonic warrior to be slain, no dishonor to be vanquished; but it was infamy worse than death to be a coward, it was a disgrace to gain a victory by dishonest means. The enemy was relentlessly combated, may be he was hated, yet it would have been a blot on one's escutcheon to treat him with meanness. It was not uncommon among these barbarians for the victor to place a laurel wreath upon the grave of his foe, whom in life he had combated with bitterest hatred.

General Trumbull tells a story, that at Vicksburg once the boys in blue and the boys in gray long lay peacefully opposite each other, the former besieging the latter. The hostile outposts had become quite familiar with each other, and had often for fun met in boyish encounters without arms romping with and chasing each other in the trenches. Similar things have happened in almost all wars. Thus the Prussians and Danes in the war 1864 sometimes indulged in a mutual snow-balling. The French and the German pickets before Metz traded in victuals, exchanging, according to their needs, bread and meat. Such friendly relations between enemies are nothing extraordinary. But to finish General Trumbull's story, one day the order was given to the boys in blue to take the fortifications of the rebels. This might have been an easy thing, because the confederates allowed the union soldiers to approach without expecting an attack. Such being the situation, the union soldiers sent word over to their enemies to be on their guard, because they had to take the rifle pits. It was neither generosity nor foolishness not to take the advantage which was offered by this occasion; it was simply a noble obedience to the ethics of struggle. The ethics of struggle which have been practised by the Teutonic nations through millenniums have perhaps become hereditary in our race.

The scientist, the scholar, the moral teacher, it appears, can learn some moral lessons still from our soldiers. Shall there be an ethics of actual warfare while no ethics is needed in the battles of science? Shall the ethics of the sword and the cannon be nobler than the ethics of the spiritual struggle? Our ethical theorists and reformers refuse too much to learn from actual life; they are too apt to judge the conduct of the men of action according to self-made principles or general maxims, while they should study the history of great men, they should investigate the facts of the conditions of social growth in order to state the natural laws of ethics and then derive their moral principles from such natural laws, instead of

relying upon their own opinion of goodness, right, and justice. Ethics is neither something to be paraded in a show as an ornament of life, nor is it something mystical, of unknown origin and unknown purposes, it is extremely practical and must therefore be applicable to real life and to the struggle that prevails in life.

Ethics like all the other sciences is to be based upon the facts of life and has again to be applied to the facts of life. But life being a struggle for existence, we should first of all try to understand the ethics of struggle.

The ethics of struggle are of paramount importance in life, and the ethics of literary controversy are of paramount importance in the field of science and in the scientific inquiry into truth. Practical morality is impossible without a clear conception of and a strict obedience to the ethics of struggle. P. C.

#### CURRENT TOPICS.

THE National Swine Breeders Association has never been suspected of superabundant piety, although it is a strictly orthodox communion, and rigidly Sabbatarian. At their convention recently held in Chicago, the National Swine Breeders resolved in favor of closing the World's Fair on Sundays, in order that the nation "may be spared the strain of a conspicuous and flagrant act of disobedience to God." In the code from which that bit of theology is taken, the eating of pork is also condemned as "a flagrant act of disobedience to God"; now if the law against eating pork, and the law against breaking the Sabbath be enforced with strict impartiality, what will become of the National Swine Breeders Association?

\* \* \*

Once upon a time, a minister of the gospel in San Francisco was preaching the funeral sermon of a boy member of his congregation; and after praising the bright and shining virtues of the deceased, he said: "Mourning friends, I can hardly realise this bereavement; it has come so sudden and unexpected. It was only last Tuesday that I saw this blessed bud of promise, out on Sacramento Street, a-heaving rocks at a Chinaman." I was reminded of this, when reading in this morning's paper that a girl 14 years old was locked up at the Des Plaines Street station on a charge of malicious mischief. "It is claimed," says the paper, "that she playfully tried to snowball a Chinaman, but her aim was bad, and the missile broke a pane of glass at 57 South Halsted Street." Her crime was missing the Chinaman, and hitting a window. Had she missed the window, and hit the Chinaman, all would have been well. Pelting the Chinaman was "playfully" done, but her bad aim converted the sport into "malicious mischief." It is announced that a convention of all religions will assemble in Chicago in 1893, and surely such a conference is needed here, when a girl 14 years old can be degraded by imprisonment in a convict cell, for accidentally breaking a pane of glass at 57 South Halsted Street.

"Alas, for the rarity, of Christian charity,  
Under the sun."

\* \* \*

The opening of Congress is our great national show, where law-makers play to galleries filled with applauding crowds. As youths enchanted worship actresses by offering bouquets, so lobbyists, friends, and flatterers offer homage in flowers to senators and representatives, a silly reverence that lowers the dignity of Congress, and makes those "potent, grave, and reverend Signiors" look frivolous. Those love tokens, and compliments are private

favors which ought to be bestowed in private. When flaunted in public they become theatrical, invidious, and suggestive of anything but serious duty. "At this opening," say the papers, and their description of it makes me think of the opening of a millinery store,— "At this opening, the flowers came in cartloads, and some of the devices were so enormous that they could not be got through the door of the house. Mr. McAleer of Pennsylvania was the main recipient. He got two chairs 'life size,' a floral harp seven feet high, the head of a huge floral gavel, which looked more like a beer keg than a gavel, and innumerable baskets of flowers." As the flummery grew around him, the mental calibre of the honorable member shrunk, and at last the floral nonsense made a statesman look like a fool. As a citizen of Chicago, interested in its glory, I rejoice that "the three democrats from Chicago were remembered by huge baskets of red roses," but a cloud of sorrow steals across the paper as I read that "Col. 'Ab.' Taylor sat flowerless and disconsolate in the back row." Not altogether disconsolate, I hope, for it must be a consolation to Col. Taylor that there is a strong belief growing up in the very highest quarters, that the "flowerless" members are the only men of sense in congress, and that they themselves have sent out the command, "No flowers."

\* \* \*

Notwithstanding the premature band playing, and the clarion crowing over the anticipated victory, it now turns out that Mr. Springer was not elected Speaker, although he made a good showing, and came within a hundred votes or so of getting the nomination. What is more surprising still, the invincible battle cry, "The North West," which was "emblazoned on his banner" had no inspiration in it; and the prize, as if in banter and fun, perversely went in the opposite direction as far as it could go, and actually fell to a man from the "South East." I shall never again believe in the false prophets at Washington, who assured me that Mr. Springer's election was a certainty, because he was not only working all night, and Sundays, but also had a faithful band of political kidnappers on his staff, who from an ambuscade at the railroad station sprung upon incoming congressmen, seized their gripsacks, and steered them away from where they wanted to go, up to the Springer headquarters, where they were tortured in a sort of "sweat-box" until they promised to vote for the candidate from the "North-West." Those deceitful soothsayers now try to apologise for misleading me by the worthless information that "Although the Illinois candidate did not win, he did the next best thing. He commanded the situation at the climax." Considering the extravagant pretensions made, I think that last word must be a misprint for "Anti-climax," for it seems to me that the man who commands the situation at the climax of it ought to win. The comfort, such as it is, reminds me of the boast of Stephen A. Douglas, that although not elected president himself, he held Mr. Lincoln's hat at his inauguration.

\* \* \*

A noteworthy affair was the banquet of the Presbyterian Social Union at the Palmer House last Tuesday evening; not because of what the papers called its "rich menu," whatever that is,— something extremely good to eat, I think, for I often see it mentioned,—but for the feast of reason furnished after the "menu" in the address read by the Rev. Dr. Parkhurst of New York. His theme was the need of more heart and less brain in religion, and especially in the Presbyterian church. The very fine comparisons used in the address gave proof that much labor had been used in its preparation, and there was in it a very interesting mixture of Psychology, Theology, and Physiology; while even Geology was drawn upon for one of the best illustrations made. Dr. Parkhurst easily showed that brain, although a physiological fact, was heretical, or at least unscriptural; for he said: "The word brain does not occur in the scriptures, while heart is a word that the Bible is full of." This is true and the moral intended to be drawn from

it was that therefore brain is not needed in any scriptural church. According to Dr. Parkhurst, the soul of man dwells in the heart, and not in the brain; and in the heart is established the basis of morals; or, to state it in his own words, "You can never put morality in a better place than that in which the Bible puts it; that is in the outcome of the holy enthusiasm." This was the thought that inspired Ignatius Loyola, John Wesley, and the spiritual evangelists of all time; and it leads logically enough to this mistake of Dr. Parkhurst, "The moving energy in the world's history to-day, is not a philosophy but a cross, and the consummating act by which Christ fitted the church for its work, was not the founding of a college, but the baptism of the church with the Holy Ghost, and with fire." The evidence of Dr. Parkhurst's mistake is the following contradiction of himself, "A great deal of the part that passion used to play in Christianity, has now come to be played by sheer thought, cool, bloodless ratiocination." This concession puts his argument in danger, for it is the testimony of Dr. Parkhurst himself, that holy reason and philosophy, not holy enthusiasm and the cross constitute "the moving energy in the world's history to-day." The extinct volcanoes and the Dead Seas represent the creeds.

\* \* \*

In his remarkable address, Dr. Parkhurst made good anti-theoretical use of the opposites heat and cold, as ideal qualities respectively of heart and brain; the former, warm, passionate, impulsive, and religious; the latter, cool, reflective, analytical, and sceptical. Dr. Parkhurst wants his religion hot from the heart, not cool from the brain. He said: "Geology tells us that the world began hot; so every thought that has had a history began as a passion." The comparison is rhetorically good, but rather perilous for Dr. Parkhurst, because Theology tells us that the world began cold, or just as it is now. For a long time Geology and Theology have quarrelled about the origin of the world, and if Dr. Parkhurst takes the side of Geology in the controversy, his heresy is probably due to "the founding of a college." Dr. Parkhurst draws a curious indictment against the Presbyterian church, and accuses it of having too much brain; a charge that many people think is without any foundation. On a fair and impartial trial the church would very likely get a verdict of not guilty. "The Presbyterian church is brainy," says Dr. Parkhurst, "and one of the best things that could happen to the church would be to have fifty per cent. of its brain taken out, and made over into heart." I believe that is another mistake. It is true that the Presbyterian church with its doctrine of wholesale punishments needs more heart, but let it not be at the expense of the brain, for it is the brain that improves the heart.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

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