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THE STORY OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

THE first suggestion of American Independence was made in England. In the London *Chronicle*, Oct. 25, 1774, an elaborate article appeared entitled "American Independence the Interest and Glory of Great Britain." It was reprinted in the *Pennsylvania Journal*, but there was no response. Attachment to the mother country survived the tea-riots of that year, and in March 1775 Franklin informed Lord Chatham that he had never heard an opinion looking towards independence from any American "drunk or sober." But the "massacre at Lexington," as the first collision (April 19, 1775) was called, moved the country to indignation. It was an illustration of how great a matter a little fire kindleth. A few villagers under Captain Parker (grandfather of Theodore Parker, who kept the Captain's musket on his wall) met the English troops. Parker had warned them not to fire unless fired on, but one could not restrain himself: his gun missed fire but the flash brought a volley from the Englishmen, and independence was potentially written in the blood of the seven men who were left dead in Lexington. A few days after the tidings reached Philadelphia appeared the April number of the *Pennsylvania Magazine*, edited by Thomas Paine. It contained a summary of Chatham's speech, in which he said the Crown would lose its lustre if "robbed of so principal a jewel as America." Paine adds this footnote: "The principal jewel of the Crown actually dropped out at the coronation." This little footnote was probably the nearest approach to a suggestion of independence made by any American even then. And among all the fiery meetings held throughout the colonies only one ventured to utter the word independence. From the county of Mecklenburg, North Carolina, came resolutions passed May 31 and June 10, 1775, demanding the organisation of an independent government. Congress would not allow such reasonable resolutions to be read before it, and the written records were lost. Jefferson pronounced the Mecklenburg resolutions mythical. But lately a copy of the *South Carolina Gazette* of June 13, 1775, has been discovered containing the resolutions: it is in Charleston, and I have seen a photographed copy.

The first argument for independence, from the American point of view, was from the pen of Thomas Paine. It was printed in the *Pennsylvania Journal*, Oct. 18, 1775, under the title "A Serious Thought," and over the signature "Humanus." It presents a series of charges against Great Britain, somewhat resembling those of the "Declaration," and concludes: "When I reflect on these, I hesitate not for a moment to believe that the Almighty will finally separate America from Britain,—call it Independency or what you will, if it is the cause of God and humanity it will go on." The king is especially arraigned for establishing African slavery in America, which independence will abolish. Paine's phraseology leaves little doubt that he wrote the anti-slavery passage in the Declaration which was struck out. While writing *Common Sense* which really determined the matter, Paine was suspected of being a British spy. Nor was it so absurd, for up to the "massacre of Lexington" he had been active in conciliation. He was disgusted at the prospective outbreak, and wrote to Franklin: "I thought it very hard to have the country set on fire about my ears almost the moment I got into it." *Common Sense* appeared January 10, 1776. Washington pronounced it "unanswerable" (to Joseph Reed, Jan. 31), and indeed there was not a leading patriot in the country who did not applaud. New York had instructed its congressmen not to vote for independence, but one of its delegates, Henry Wisner, sent its leading assemblymen this pamphlet, asking their answer: as they could not give any Wisner disregarded their instructions, and the State had to come round to him. At that time many ascribed the pamphlet to Franklin, who was one day reproached by a lady for the expression "royal brute of Great Britain." Franklin assured her that he was not the author, and would never have so dishonored the brute creation.

"A little thing sometimes produces a great effect," wrote Cobbett from America to Lord Grenville. "It appears to me very clear that some beastly insults offered to Mr. Paine while he was in the Excise in England was the real cause of the revolution in America." This is more epigrammatic than exact. Paine was turned out of the Excise for absenting himself from his post (Lewes) without leave. It was not fair, for he had been engaged by the Excisemen of England to

try and get a bill through Parliament raising their salaries, and had to be much in London; and no other fault was charged. There were no insults, but he was left penniless, and Franklin advised his coming to America. Here he at once got a good position, and was editing the only important magazine of the country, without any animosity to England. However, Cobbett is right when he further says that whoever may have written the "Declaration," Paine was its author. At that time Philadelphia was full of so-called "tories." Their chief nest was the University, presided over by Rev. William Smith, D. D., who, as "Cato" attacked "Common Sense." Paine replied under the name "Forrester," and President Smith was so worsted that he lost his position, and left Philadelphia for a small curacy in Maryland. Paine resided in a room opposite the chief meeting-house of the Quakers, who, under pretext of peace-principles aided the enemy. "Common Sense" insisted that they should address their testimony against war to the invaders equally with the invaded, and as they were not ready to do this their influence was destroyed. The danger to independence now lay in the approach of peace commissioners from England. Paine issued a little pamphlet entitled "Dialogue between the Ghost of General Montgomery, just arrived from the Elysian Fields, and an American Delegate." The gallant Ghost warns the Delegate that union with England is impossible, and, were it otherwise, would be a wrong to the English as well as the American people. This pamphlet was effective in strengthening waverers.

On June 7, 1775, Hon. Richard Henry Lee submitted to Congress a resolution that the colonies are and ought to be independent. A committee was appointed to propose appropriate action, and reported June 28th through Benjamin Harrison, great-grandfather of the present President. It was found that six states hesitated—New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina. Congress postponed the matter until July 1, meantime appointing a committee to draft a Declaration, another to organise a Confederation, and a third to obtain foreign aid. The committee on a Declaration (Jefferson, John Adams, Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Livingston reported on July 2. A bare majority in Congress passed the Declaration on July 4. Congress then adjourned to July 15, in order that efforts might be made to induce New York and Maryland to withdraw their restrictions on their delegates, who were personally favorable to independence. On July 15 all were free and unanimous. On the 19th Congress ordered the Declaration to be engrossed, and signed by every member. The paper had been signed on July 4 only by John Hancock, president of Congress, and the secretary Charles Thomson. The engrossed copy was

produced August 2 and signed by the members, some signatures being added later. The first to sign was Josiah Bartlett of New Hampshire, and the last Matthew Thornton of the same colony, when he took his seat November 4. In Trumbull's picture of the "signing," in the Capital, more pomp is given to the affair than accompanied it. The secretary was so little impressed that his entry that the members signed is written on the margin of the journal of Congress. Thomas Stone of Maryland, who signed, is not in Trumbull's picture, and Robert Livingston who did not sign, being absent, is put in.

The earliest draft of the Declaration, before the anti-slavery paragraphs were struck out, is in the Library of the State Department; the draft agreed to by the Committee and passed by Congress is lost; the engrossed Declaration is in Independence Hall, Philadelphia.

A complete collection of autographs of the "signers" is a fortune. There are only three in existence. One of these belongs to Dr. Thomas Addis Emmet of New York. The costliness of the autographs is in the ratio of the obscurity of the signers. One of the least distinguished signers was Thomas Lynch Jr. of South Carolina. Only three examples of his writing are known, uninteresting business notes, and for one of them Dr. Emmet paid over \$5000.

The signers of the Declaration were rich men, and all of the "gentry." The British government were probably deceived by their adopting as their spokesman, and making Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the humble exciseman Paine. The first president of Congress, Peyton Randolph, and George Washington, would pretty certainly have been knighted but for the revolution. The espousal of American independence by such men, and by the Adams family, the Livingstons, the Stones of Maryland, meant that the most loyal and conservative class had gone against the king, and that America was irrecoverably lost to him. A well-informed English Ministry would have spared themselves and us the seven years war.

Paine did not use only his pen in the revolution. When the cause had been consecrated to independence he shouldered his musket, marched to the front, did such service (at Fort Lee) that Gen. Greene took him on his staff, shared the hardships of Washington's retreat to the Delaware, and wrote by camp-fires his "Crisis" which Washington ordered to be read to his depressed soldiers. The first sentence of that "Crisis," "These are the times that try men's souls," was the watchword at Trenton, where Paine helped to capture the Hessians. He afterwards went in an open boat, under fire of the English ships, to convey an order to those besieged in Fort Mifflin, and on other occasions proved his courage. He visited France, and

brought back six million livres. But his services were forgotten when he extended his detestation of oppression and cruelty to heavenly as well as earthly despot.

ETHICS AS APPLIED TO CRIMINOLOGY.

BY DR. ARTHUR MAC DONALD.

THE relation of criminality to the other forms of pathological and abnormal humanity is one of degree. If we represent the highest degree, as crime, by A^6 , A^5 , say, would stand for insane criminality, and A^4 for alcoholism perhaps, A^3 for pauperism, A^2 for those weak forms of humanity that charity treats more especially, and A for the idea of wrong in general, particularly in its lightest forms. Thus, crime is the most exaggerated form of wrong; but these forms are all one in essence. A drop of water is as much water, as is an ocean.

It is difficult to draw a distinct line between these different forms of wrong. This will become evident from the fact that they are dovetailed one into the other. Thus, when cross-questioning criminals, one often feels that not only are their minds weak and wavering but that they border close on insanity. The same feeling arises after an examination of confirmed paupers. Here alcoholism is one of the main causes; The individual, on account of his intemperate habits, finds difficulty in obtaining employment: and this forced idleness, gradually, from repetition, develops into a confirmed habit. Pauperism may be, in some cases, hereditary, but it is too often overlooked that the children of paupers can acquire all such habits from their parents, and so it can be carried from one generation to another, without resorting to heredity as a cause, which is too often a name to cover up our ignorance of all the early conditions. The extent to which alcoholism is involved in all forms of humanitarian pathology is well known; it is often indirectly as well as directly the cause of leading the young into crime; the intemperate father makes himself a pest in his own home; the children remain out all night through fear; this habit leads to running away for a longer time; although not thieves, the children are compelled to steal, or to beg, in order to live; and thus many become confirmed criminals or paupers, or both. The great evil about alcoholism is that it too often injures those around, who are of much more value than the alcoholic himself. It makes itself felt indirectly and directly in our hospitals, insane asylums, orphan asylums, and charitable institutions in general. However low the trade of the prostitute may be, alcohol is her greatest physical enemy.

As just indicated, some of the lesser degrees of abnormal and pathological humanity may be considered under the head of charitological. These are repre-

sented by the different kinds of benevolent institutions, such as asylums for the insane, and feeble-minded, for the inebriate: hospitals, homes for the deaf, dumb and blind: for the aged and orphans, etc., and institutions for defectives of whatever nature.

It is evident, however, that the term charitological may not only be applied to what is pathological or abnormal but also to that which is physiological or normal. Thus it can refer to institutions of quite a different order, but yet none the less charitable in nature. We refer of course to educational institutions, the majority of which are a gift to the public, and especially to those who attend them. It is obvious enough that every student is, in some measure, a charity student, from the well known fact that the tuition money in most cases pays a very small part of the expenses.

Now, no distinct line can be drawn between penal and reformatory institutions, and between reformatory and educational institutions; it is, again, a question of degree. But in saying this, it is not meant that difference in degree is of little consequence. On the contrary it is very important to distinguish between penal, reformatory and educational, for practical reasons, as in the classification of prisoners, not all of whom are criminals. In a sense, all education should be reformatory.

But it may be asked, where can a subject end. It goes without saying, that divisions are more or less arbitrary, if we are seeking reality, for things are together, and the more we look into the world, the more we find it to be an *organic mechanism of absolute relativity*. Most human beings who are abnormal or defective in any way, are much more alike, than unlike normal individuals: and hence, in the thorough study of any single individual (microcosmic mechanism), distinct lines are more for convenience. Thus the difficulties of distinguishing between health and disease, sanity and insanity, vegetable and animal, are familiar. Whatever may be said from the educational point of view about abnormal cases, is generally true, with few modifications, of the normal. Education and pedagogy are thus to be included to some extent in a comprehensive charitological system.

But although the distinct separation of one wrong from another is not easy, yet the decision as to the highest form of wrong may not be so difficult. This form consists without doubt, in the act of depriving another of his existence; no act could be more radical; the least that could be said of any one is that he does not exist. The desire for existence is the deepest instinct in nature; not only in the lower forms of nature, but anthropologically considered, this feeling manifests itself in the highest aspirations of races. In mythology, religion and theology, the great fact is ex-

istence hereafter, and in philosophy, it has gone so far as pre-existence of the soul. Perhaps the deepest experience we have of non-existence, is in the loss of an intimate friend, when we say so truly, that part of our existence has gone from us. It is death which makes existence tragic.

Now the degrees of wrong may be expressed in a general way, in terms of existence. That is, in depriving another of any of his rights, we are taking from him some of his existence; for existence is qualitative, as well as temporal; that is, it includes everything, that gives to life content.

Thus, in this sense, a man of forty may have had more existence, than another at eighty, where the former's life has been broader richer in experience and thought, and more valuable to others.

We may say in general that the existence of a person is beneficial or injurious, in that degree, in which it is beneficial or injurious to the community or humanity. This statement is based upon the truism, that the whole is more than any of its parts.

The degrees of wrong, therefore, should depend upon the degree of danger or injury (moral, intellectual, physical, or financial) which a thought, feeling, willing or action, brings to the community.

This same principle should be applied to degrees of exaggerated wrong or crime.

But, it may be said, should not the degree of freedom or of personal guilt, be the main basis for the punishment of the criminal? The force of this objection is evident; historically, the idea of freedom has been the basis of criminal law; it has also been sanctioned by the experience of the race; and although no claim is made of carrying it into practice without serious difficulties, in the way of strict justice, (difficulties inevitable to any system,) yet, it has not only been an invaluable service, but a necessity to humanity. This is not only true in criminal lines but this idea has been the conscious basis of our highest moral ideas.

But at the same time, it must be admitted, that the exaggeration of the idea of freedom has been one of the main causes of vengeance, which has left its traces in blood, fire, martyrdom and dungeon. And though at present, vengeance seldom takes such extreme forms, yet it is far from extinct. On moral and on biblical grounds, as far as human beings are concerned, vengeance can find little support; an example of its impracticability is the fact, that some of the best prison wardens never punish a man till some time after the offense, so that there may be no feeling on the part of either, that it is an expression of vengeance. The offender is generally reasoned with kindly, but firmly, and told that he must be punished, otherwise the good discipline of the prison could not be main-

tained; which means, that he is punished for the good of others. With few exceptions, a revengeful tone or manner towards the prisoner (same outside of prison) always does harm, for it stirs up similar feelings in the prisoner, which are often the cause of his bad behavior and crime, and need no development. Kindness with firmness, is the desirable combination. Vengeance produces vengeance.

But, taking the deterministic view of the world, the highest morality is possible. One proof is that some fatalists are rigidly moral. A psychological analysis will show that persons who are loved and esteemed, are those whose very nature is to do good,—that is, they would not, and could not see a fellow-being suffer; that is, from the necessity of their nature they were from infancy of a kind disposition. We admire the sturdy nature, who, by long struggle, has reached the moral goal; but we cannot love him always. He is not always of a kind disposition: this is not a necessity of his nature. As the expression goes, "There are very good people with whom the Lord himself could not live."

Is it not the spontaneity of a kind act that gives it its beauty? Where there is no calculating, no reasoning, no weighing in the balance, no choice? The grace of morality is in its naturalness. But to go still further: do we like a good apple more, and a bad apple less, because they are necessarily good or bad? and, if we admitted that every thought, feeling willing and acting of men were as necessary as the law of gravity, would we like honest men less and liars more? True, we might at first modify our estimation of some men, but it would be in the direction of better feeling towards all men.

But, whatever one's personal convictions may be, questions of the freedom of the will and the like must be set aside, not because they are not important, but simply because enough is not known regarding the exact conditions (psychological and physiological) under which we act and think. If we were obliged to withhold action, in the case of any criminal, for the reason that we do not know whether the will is free or not, (allowing for all misconceptions as to this whole question) the community would be wholly unprotected. If a tiger were loose in the streets, the first question would not be whether he was guilty or not. We should imprison the criminal, *first of all, because he is dangerous to the community.*

But if it be asked, how there can be responsibility without freedom, the answer is, that there is at least the feeling of responsibility in cases where there is little or no freedom; that is, there is sometimes no proportion between the feeling of responsibility and the amount of responsibility afterwards shown. The main difficulty however is, that in our present state of

knowledge, it is impossible to know, whether this very feeling of responsibility or of freedom is not itself necessarily caused, either psychologically or physiologically or both. If we admit that we are compelled to believe we are free (as some indeterminists seem to claim) we deny freedom in this very statement. Another obvious and practical ground for our ignorance as to this point, is the fact, that although for generations the best and greatest minds have not failed to give it their attention, yet, up to the present time, the question remains *sub judice*. If we carried out practically the theory of freedom, we should have to punish some of the greatest criminals the least, since from their coarse organisation and lack of moral sense, their responsibility would be very small. There is no objection to speaking of freedom in the sense that a man as an individual may be free as to his outward surroundings, as in the case of a strong character which often acts independently and freely in respect to its outward environment. But to say that *within* the man himself, within his character or personality (brain and mind) there is freedom, is going entirely beyond our knowledge, for there is little or nothing demonstrated as to the inward workings of brain or mind. A similar idea is clearly expressed by Dr. Paul Carus in his interesting book entitled "The Ethical Problem," where he makes an important distinction between "necessity" and "compulsion." This point is well taken. Dr. Carus says: "A free man, let us say an artist full of one idea, executes his work without any compulsion, he works of his own free will. His actions are determined by a motive of his own, not by a foreign pressure. Therefore, we call him free."

A scientific ethics must regard the question of freedom as an unsettled problem. Any ethics would be unethical, in taking, as one of its bases, so debatable a question.

Our general, sociological, ethical principle (as above stated,) is, *that the idea of wrong depends upon the moral, intellectual, physical and financial danger or injury which a thought, feeling, willing or acting brings to humanity.*

But accepting this principle, the important question is just what are these thoughts, feelings, willings and actions, and by what method are they to be determined? The first part of this question, on account of the narrow and limited knowledge at present, in those lines, can be answered only very imperfectly, if at all. As to the method, that of science seems to us the only one that can eventually be satisfactory. By the application of the scientific method is meant, that all facts, especially psychological (sociological, historical, etc.,) physiological and pathological must form the basis of investigation. Psychological facts that can

be scientifically determined, as affecting humanity beneficially or not, are comparatively few in number. Physiologically, more facts can be determined as to their effect on humanity. But it is pre-eminently in the field of pathology that definite scientific results can be acquired. As to the difficulty of investigating psycho-ethical effects, it may be said that physiological psychology and psycho-physics have not as yet furnished a sufficient number of scientific facts.

By the scientific application of chemistry, clinical and experimental medicine with vivisection, to physiology, many truths of ethical importance to humanity exist. But there is much here to be desired; for example, what is said about questions of diet and ways of living in general, is scientifically far from satisfactory. The development of pathology in medicine has been without precedent. Its direct ethical value to humanity is already very great; but the outlook into the future is still greater. It is only necessary to mention the discovery of the cholera and tuberculosis germs (*a conditio sine qua non* of their own prevention.) Immunity in the case of the latter would be one of the greatest benefactions yet known to the race. Medicine can be said to be the study of the future, especially in the scientific and prophylactic sense. It is to experimental medicine that scientific ethics will look for many of its basal facts.

In emphasising the scientific method, as the most important, it is not intended to exclude others. The *a priori* method has been of inestimable value to philosophy, ethics and theology and to science itself, in the forming of hypotheses and theories, which are often necessary anticipations of truth, to be verified afterwards. The *a priori* method is related to the *a posteriori* as the sails to the ballast of a boat: the more philosophy, the better, provided there are a sufficient number of facts: otherwise there is danger of upsetting the craft.

The present office of ethics is, as far as the facts will allow, to suggest methods of conduct to follow, and ideals to hold, that will bring humanity into a more moral, physiological and normal state, enabling each individual to live more in harmony with nature's laws. Such an applied ethics must study especially the phenomena manifested in the different forms of pathological humanity, and draw its conclusions from the facts thus gathered.

But there are many scientists who look with suspicion upon the introduction of philosophical thought and methods into their field. We may call them pure scientists; that is to say, those who believe that the term scientific truth should be applied only to that form of truth which can be directly verified by facts accessible to all. Yet from this point of view, the arrangement, classification, forming of hypotheses and

theories, and drawing philosophical conclusions are not necessarily illegitimate, provided those processes are clearly distinguished from each other and rigidly separated from the facts. Perhaps the study, which more than all others, will contribute toward a scientific ethics is criminology, the subject-matter of which touches the popular mind very closely, owing in a great measure to the influence of the Press; and though this has its dangers, yet it is the duty of this as of every science, to make its principles and conclusions as clear as possible to the public, since in the end, such questions vitally concern them.

Crime can be said in a certain sense to be nature's experiment on humanity. If a nerve of a normal organism is cut, the organs in which irregularities are produced are those which the nerve controls. In this way, the office of a nerve in the normal state may be discovered. The criminal is so to speak, the severed nerve of society and the study of him is a practical way (though indirect) of studying normal men. And since the criminal is seven-eighths like other men, such a study is, in addition, a direct inquiry into normal humanity.

The relation also of criminology to society and to sociological questions is already intimate, and may in the future become closer. Just what crime is, at present, depends more upon time, location, race, country, nationality, and even the State in which one resides. But notwithstanding the extreme relativity of the idea of crime, there are some things in our present social life that are questionable. A young girl of independence, but near poverty, tries to earn her own living at three dollars a week; and if having natural desires for a few comforts and some taste for her personal appearance, she finally, through pressure, oversteps the bound, society, which permits this condition of things, immediately ostracises her. It borders on criminality, that a widow works fifteen hours a day in a room in which she lives, making trousers at ten cents a pair, out of which she and her family must live, until they gradually run down towards death, from want of sufficient nutrition, fresh air and any comfort. It is criminally questionable to leave stoves in cars, so that if the passenger is not seriously injured, but only wedged in, he will have the additional chances of burning to death. It has been a general truth, and in some cases is still, that so many persons must perish by fire, before private individuals will furnish fire escapes to protect their own patrons. It is a fact that over five thousand people are killed yearly in the United States at railroad grade crossings, most of whose lives could have been spared, had either the road or the railroad passed, either one over the other. But it is said that such improvements would involve an enormous expense; that is, practi-

cally to admit that the extra money required is of more consequence than the five thousand human lives. And yet, strange as it may seem, if a brutal murderer is to lose his life, and there is the least doubt as to his pre-meditation, a large part of the community is often aroused into moral excitement, if not indignation, while the innocently murdered railroad passenger excites little more than a murmur.

There is perhaps no subject upon which the public conscience is more tender than the treatment of the criminal.

Psychologically the explanation is simple; for the public have been educated gradually to feel the misfortune and sufferings of the criminal; it is also easier to realise since the thought is confined generally to one personality at a time. But if the public could all be eye witnesses to a few of our most brutal railroad accidents, the consciousness gained, might be developed into conscientiousness in the division of their sympathies. But this feeling, however paradoxical, is a sincere, though sometimes morbid expression, of unselfish humanitarianism; for the underlying impulses are of the highest ethical order, and over-cultivation is a safer error than under-cultivation. The moral climax of this feeling was reached when the Founder of Christianity was placed between two thieves.

CORRESPONDENCE.

WALT WHITMAN AS PENSIONEE.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

ONE of General Trumbull's recent paragraphs in *The Open Court* would tend to throw upon Walt Whitman the shadow of an unjust suspicion. While vaguely written, and probably not to be compassed or explicated by the general reader, it says enough and leaves enough unsaid to make it appear that Walt Whitman sometime, if not now, and in some way, by mean insinuation if not direct, appealed or appeals for or would gladly have received or receive a governmental pension. To those who know the truth of the matter—that is to say, the ignorance betrayed by the General's reproach,—the later little paragraph from Tucker, of *Liberty*, which in substance rebukes the accuser and asks if it be not more splendid to save lives, with nurses, than to destroy them, with generals, excites appreciation and gratitude.

What happens to be the record? That a pension was mentioned for Walt Whitman and that he, in his own person, in vigorous letters and through the voices of friends, protested that he did not deserve and would not take any grant of money from the government. This is authentic history, not to be scribbled away on the smart edge of a paragraph. Whitman's immediate associates, certain editors of certain newspapers, several congressmen, at least, besides sundry observers attracted at the moment, are aware of all the attending circumstances, and value the light they throw on his purposes and character.

An abstract question might be asked, viz. whether as fulfillment of justice men who sacrifice health in hospitals (with Whitman it was health of superbest majesty) are not as much entitled to governmental guarantees as men who travel the life of a forager and fighter and come home shorn of the physical gifts with which

they went. I am sure for myself that no line of logic can be drawn against a claim so clear.

Wherein is Whitman pensionee? In nothing beyond the area which comradeship yields him. Long were the years of his outlawry—long is the story of non-recognition and outrageous assault. He never complained. He cast back no retort. Keeping the path of heroic resolve—travelling with whatever soreness of foot or travail of spirit—he persevered, held his peace, continued his gospel, re-asserted his faith, accepted the human nature of foe and friend, dominated the arrogant phenomena and antagonism of the commonplace. There was need and poverty enough through mental and physical experiences following the war—paralysis. But friends came, new years brought wiser spirits nearer Whitman's solutions, his genius provoked to shame, the conceit of mere brutal criticism, and certain material helps, till then denied, arrived plentifully to his tribute and relief. Now, in these later seasons, oppressed by bodily disasters which lead him close to the doors of death, he is free of all anxiety and acknowledges the historic and efficient rally of lovers and comrades.

Is this unseemly? Somewhere Whitman himself asks, why should he shame in the gifts of friends? He gave all he had; he labored to free literature from thralldom and democracy from clogging old-time old men of seas; he went into the subtlest service of the war, where slept and played the brood of sorrow,—where it was not the mad heroism of battle but the still patient courage of suffering that commanded; he sped lance against priest-crafts and politicaldom; he compassed and displayed science, evolution, as never before in literature; he provided the lofty vistas of personality, companioning and illustrating in himself the supreme declaration of genius, that man, the natural, must dominate and make literature and life.

These are great gifts, to-day greatly accepted by some, and to-morrow to enter the blood of the race. The little a few dollars can do to pass the word of gratitude up for this is small enough. No frank sweet word in which so great a character may describe his later ills can justly or intelligently be tortured into evidence for a charge of beggary.

Whitman is loved by as devoted groups as ever blessed the way of martyrdom. These men and women are his for their best worth. Officialdom, whether civil or military, has intrinsically nothing either to give or to withhold.

HORACE L. TRAUBEL.

NURSE AND SOLDIER.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:

MR. TRAUBEL'S criticism is well made, a little acrimonious perhaps, but not more so than my supposed offense deserved, an offense which I think has been exaggerated by the imagination of Mr. Traubel, excited by zeal in defense of a friend.

According to Mr. Traubel, Walt Whitman is not on the pension rolls, and never has been there. This, if true, and I suppose it is true, gives Mr. Traubel an apparent advantage over me in this discussion, but the advantage is weaker than it might be because he admits that "a pension was mentioned for Walt Whitman," but that Mr. Whitman protested against it. The newspaper account was that a pension had been granted; and I never saw that statement contradicted until now.

Reading the offending paragraph again I do not care to modify it. Mr. Whitman's letter to the *Review of Reviews*, in which he said "I am totally paralysed from the old secession war time overtrain," so much resembled what the claim agents call "supplementary proof" to support a pension, that I might be justified in so regarding it. Whether that is so or not, the letter was another contribution to that huge mountain of egotistical cant which makes all our ailments, from consumption to corns and bunions, the result of patriotic sacrifices rendered by us in "the old secession war time."

Mr. Traubel says: "An abstract question might be asked, viz. whether as fulfillment of justice men who sacrifice health in hospitals (with Whitman it was health of superbest majesty) are not as much entitled to governmental guarantees as men who travel the life of a forager and fighter?" I do not see the use of going into the abstract here; but if "governmental guarantees" is the "Whitmanic" phrase for pensions, I do not care to act as referee, especially as we are not debating whether a male nurse of "superbest majesty" or a soldier is most worthy of "governmental guarantees." I do not believe that either of them ought to have a pension. I believe that pensioning is one of the most corrupt and corrupting of governmental usurpations; but if compelled to decide between the male nurse and the soldier, I should say give it to the soldier. If the question were between the soldier and the female nurse, I might vote the other way.

So far as the praise of the male nurse reproaches me for having been a soldier instead of a nurse, I will bear it with such penitential humility as I can. In the excitement of the great struggle for liberty I did not notice it, but I begin to see how wretched it was for me to "travel the life of a forager and fighter," when I might have been a hospital nurse; in which latter case I should not only have received the approbation of Mr. Traubel, but also I should have escaped a couple of bullets which unceremoniously knocked me out. Still, should the dispute have to be fought out again, I should probably act as I did before; for looking back at the conflict in the calm and quiet of old age, I am rather gratified than otherwise that I fought for the preservation of the American republic and the overthrow of slavery.

In reply to the "forager" sarcasm, let me say that male nurses could do more "foraging" among hospital stores, than the most rapacious of Sherman's bummers ever did among the plantations of Georgia. Whenever I am at the point of death, as I very often am, I renew the instructions which I gave to my family twenty years ago, "Tell the reporters when they come to write me up, to be kind enough to say that I did not die from disease contracted in the army."

His fervent adulation of Whitman is creditable to Mr. Traubel for it shows the goodness and softness of his nature. I have no desire to dispute the great services of Walt Whitman, outside the hospital, as eloquently set forth by Mr. Traubel. I do not doubt that he kept that rhetorically well worn path of "heroic resolve," that he "continued his gospel," that he "brought wiser spirits nearer Whitmanic solutions," that he "provided the lofty vistas of personality," and that he "dominated the arrogant phenomena and antagonism of the commonplace." These tributes are of the "abstract." They are outside the question, but they look very much as if the scheme to pension Mr. Whitman was not yet abandoned.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

NOTES.

James Sully has contributed to *The Monist* an elaborate essay on the "Psychology of Conception," which is the leading article of the July number. Moncure D. Conway follows with a discussion of the "Right of Evolution," throwing much light on the development of American institutions and explaining the laws of the growth of institutions. It appears that we Americans are much more conservative than we usually imagine ourselves to be. An extraordinary interest attaches to the contribution from the pen of one of the unfortunate eight anarchists, Michael Schwab, who after a careful study of Professor Lombroso's article on the "Physiognomy of the Anarchists," calls attention to several points in which the eminent Italian psychologist must have been mistaken. Michael Schwab's remarks are to the point and deserve the attention of the scholar, the psychologist and physiognomist for mere theoretical reasons. Yet they command the additional interest not only of American citizens, but also of every one who sympathises with

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enthusiasts and reformers. Enthusiasts and reformers also make mistakes; Michael Schwab is not blind to that fact and his article is a contribution to the psychology of their aspirations. Next in line we have a controversy between Professor Höffding of Copenhagen and the editor, the former defending the principle that welfare or the greatest possible happiness constitutes the criterion of ethics, the latter maintaining that the criterion of ethics must not be sought in the subjective element of feeling pleasures or pains, but in the objective elements of facts. The ethical criterion must be sought in the expanse and growth of the human soul, pleasures and pains being incidental features only in the realisation of this process.

The last article is an essay on "Thought and Language" by Prof. F. Max Müller. It is the substance of a lecture delivered before the Philosophical Society of Glasgow on January 21, 1891. Prof. F. Max Müller criticises Herbert Spencer as well as Mr. G. J. Romanes. Without entering into the details of the controversy we may state here that we cannot agree with Prof. Max Müller in one important point. He speaks of "the immense presumption that there has been no interruption in the developmental process in the course of psychological history" of which Professor Romanes is guilty. The editors of *The Monist* are certainly guilty of the same "presumption," and we believe that all evolutionists who have discarded the idea of special-creation acts will have to adopt the same view which is more than a mere presumption.

The literary correspondence from France is a review of the ethical text-books which are shown to be a decided step backward. The old Christian catechisms were more humanitarian and cosmopolitan; the new French text-books for civic and moral instruction take a narrow national view which under the disguise of patriotism dwarfs the minds of the children. Christian Ufer reviews the science of pedagogics in Germany.

The book reviews are of special interest. John Dewey's "Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics" and John S. Mackenzie's "Introduction to Social Philosophy" are discussed. Among the foreign books we note August Forel's "Der Hypnotismus" which lately appeared in the second edition; Carneri's "Der Mensch"; Paul du Bois-Reymond's "Grundlagen der Erkenntniss," a deeply philosophical book of an agnostic character. Dr. Krause's book "Tuisko-Land" is an important contribution to anthropological science in a popular form. It is mainly a comparative mythology the results of which would corroborate the European origin of the Aryas. C. Dillmann's book "Die Mathematik die Fackelträgerin einer neuen Zeit" is a justification of the plan to make mathematics the cornerstone of a scientific education, the author being the principal of a Mathematical Highschool at Stuttgart. The contemporary periodicals of a philosophical and ethical character, of America, England, France, Germany, and Russia, are reviewed so as to give of almost all their articles a concise synopsis.

Whatever Moncure D. Conway writes is to the point; he wields a vigorous pen and is fascinating as well as instructive. The following letter which pays a beautiful and honorable tribute to his abilities as an author, will be interesting to his many admirers:

Canterbury Freethought Association,
Christchurch, New Zealand.

Mr. Moncure D. Conway,

Dear Sir:

The members of the above association having read your articles in *The Open Court*, at their last meeting held in the Freethought Hall in this city, unanimously passed the following resolution:

"That the Canterbury Freethought Association wish to place on record their heartfelt thanks to Moncure D. Conway, for the

"tribute of respect he has paid to our late revered leader—Charles "Bradlaugh."

I may state Mr. R. Thompson of Milner & Thompson of this city made an effort to get the article referred to, reprinted in the leading liberal (!) paper here, and succeeded by paying for every word as an advertisement.

Herewith I forward copies of both papers. I am, dear sir,

Very Sincerely Yours,

Francis J. Quinn, Secretary, C. F. A.

A circular to the Friends of Russian Freedom signed by a great number of most prominent names, among them Kennan, Whittier, Lowell, Julia Ward Howe, Phillip Brooks, William Lloyd Garrison, etc., appeals to the American public for aid by all moral and legal means to obtain for Russia political freedom and self-government. There is no one who will not heartily sympathise with the aim of the society founded to this noble purpose, although we may doubt whether their efforts will be of any avail. The Society of the American Friends for Russian Freedom has been formed after the model of an English society of the same kind the organ of which is *Free Russia*. The circular declares:

"We do not intend to approve and we are not asked to approve, to support, or countenance the extreme and violent section of the Russian opposition. What we wish to do is to tell all liberty-loving Russians that many Americans are in deep and warm sympathy with their aspirations, that they will watch with eager attention every new effort of theirs, will hail with enthusiasm their victory, and will mourn for their sufferings in case of defeat."

Those who wish to join this society and receive also *Free Russia* (published monthly) should send their names and post-office addresses, with the membership fee of One Dollar, to Francis J. Garrison, Treasurer, 4 Park Street, Boston, Mass.

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