

The Open Court.

A WEEKLY JOURNAL

Devoted to the Work of Conciliating Religion with Science.

No. 198. (Vol. V.—16)

CHICAGO, JUNE 11, 1891.

Two Dollars per Year.
Single Copies, 5 Cts.

THE DISCOVERY OF THE SOUL.

BY PROF. F. MAX MUELLER.

PHYSICAL Religion beginning with the belief in agents behind the great phenomena of nature, reached its highest point when it had led the human mind to a belief in one Supreme Agent or God. It was supposed that this God could be implored by prayers and pleased by sacrifices. He was called the father of gods and men. Yet even in his highest conception he was no more than what Cardinal Newman defined God to be. "I mean by the Supreme Being," he wrote, "one who is simply self-dependent, and the only being who is such. I mean that he created all things out of nothing, and could destroy them as easily as he made them, and that, in consequence, he is separated from them by an abyss, and incommunicable in all his attributes." This abyss, separating God from man, remains at the end of physical religion. It constitutes its inherent weakness; but this very weakness became, in time, a source of strength, for from it sprang a yearning for better things. The despairing utterances of Job, "Man lieth down and riseth not," and of the Psalmist, "The dead cannot praise God, neither any that go down into darkness," are but the natural consequence of that abyss which had been fixed by Physical Religion between God and man, between the Infinite and the finite.

The history of religion teaches us that a belief in the Divine in Nature does not and cannot yield any satisfaction to a desire for a more intimate relation with the gods or with God, and to the irrepensible yearning for immortality. That satisfaction, so far as history allows us to see, came from a different source, from what I call Anthropological Religion, or the discovery of the Divine in man.

We cannot take the name and concept of a soul in man for granted, and proceed at once to the question how that soul came to be considered as immortal. We have to find out, first of all, how such a thing as a soul was ever spoken of and thought of. To us the two words, "body and soul," are so familiar that it seems almost childish to ask the question how man at first came to speak of body and soul. But to have framed a name for soul is by no means a small achievement, and I have no doubt that it took the labor of many generations before it could be accomplished.

We saw how long it took to frame a name for God. We also saw that man could never have framed such a name unless Nature had taken him by her hand, and made him see something beyond what he saw in the fire, in the wind, in the sun, and in the sky. The first steps were made very easy for him. He spoke of the fire that warmed him, of the wind that refreshed him, of the sun that gave him light, and of the sky that was above all things, and by thus simply speaking of what they all *did* for him, he spoke of agents behind them all, and at last of an Agent behind all the agencies of Nature. We shall find that the process which led to the discovery of the soul, and the framing of names for soul, was much the same. There was no conclave of sages, who tried to find out whether man had a soul, and what should be its name. If we follow the vestiges of language, the only true vestiges of all intellectual creations, we shall find that here also man began by naming the simplest and most palpable things, and that here, also, by simply dropping what was purely external, he found himself by slow degrees in possession of names which told him of the existence of a soul.

It is clear that in the case of the soul, as in the case of all other abstract objects, the first name and the first concept were necessarily formed from material objects. The soul, as we conceive it as an invisible, intangible, immaterial object, could never have been named, and if it could not be named, could never have been conceived. But what could be named and conceived was the blood or the heart, and, better still, the breath, the actual *spiritus* or spirit that went in and out of the mouth and the nostrils. Take whatever dictionary you like, and you will find how the words for soul, if they can be analysed at all, invariably point back to a material origin, and invariably disclose the process by which they were freed from their material fetters.

It may be asked, What has our belief in a soul to do with a belief in God? And, to judge from many works on religion, and, more particularly, on the origin of religion, it might seem indeed as if man could have a religion, could believe in gods and in one God, without believing in his own soul, without having even a name or a concept of soul. It is true that no creed enjoins a belief in a soul as it enjoins a belief

in God; and yet, what is the object, nay, what can be the meaning of our saying, "I believe in God," unless we can say at the same time, "I believe in my soul"?

The belief in a soul, however, exactly like the belief in Gods, and at last, in one God, can only be looked upon as the outcome of a long historical growth. It must be studied in the annals of language, in those ancient words which, meaning originally something quite tangible and visible, came in time to mean something semi tangible, something intangible, nay, something infinite in man. The soul is to man what God is to the universe.

When we remember what is now a fact doubted by no one, that every word in every language had originally a material meaning, we shall easily understand why that which at the dissolution of the body seemed to have departed, and which we consider the most immaterial of all things, should have been called at first by the name of something material—namely, the airy breath. This was the first step in human psychology. The next step was to use that word "breath" not only for the breath which had left the body, but likewise for all that formerly existed in the body—the feelings, the perceptions, the conceptions, and that wonderful network of feelings and thoughts which constituted the man, such as he was in life. For all this depended on the breath. The third step was equally natural, though it soon led into a wilderness of imaginations. If the breath, with all that belonged to it, had departed, then it must exist somewhere after its departure, and that somewhere, though utterly unknown and unknowable, was soon painted in all the colors that love, fear, and hope could supply. These three consecutive steps are not mere theory, they have left their footprints in language, and even in our own language these footprints are not yet altogether effaced.

This linguistic process which led to the formation of words for the different phases of the intellectual life of man is full of interest, and deserves a far more careful treatment than it has hitherto received, particularly at the hands of the professed psychologist. What is quite clear is that all the words of the psychological terminology, for instance the Homeric expressions "Psyche," "Ménos," "Thymos," "Phrenes," begin as names of material objects and processes, such as heart, chest, breath, and commotion, just as the names of the gods begin with the storm-wind, the fire, the sun, and the sky. At first every one of these words was capable of the widest application. But very soon there began a process of mutual friction and determination, one word being restricted idiomatically to the vital breath of the life, shared in common by man and beast, other words being assigned to the pas-

sions, the will, the memory, to knowledge, understanding, and reasoning.

We have seen that the way which led to the discovery of a soul was clearly pointed out to man, as was the way which led to the discovery of the gods. It was the breath which almost visibly left the body at the time of death that suggested the name of breath, and afterwards the thought of something breathing, living, perceiving, willing, remembering, and thinking within us. The name came first, the name of material breath. By dropping what seemed material even in this airy breath, there remained the concept of what we call the soul.

The belief in the continued existence of the soul after death, and in its liability to rewards and punishments, seem as irresistible to-day as in the days of Plato. We cannot say that a belief in rewards and punishments is universal. We look for it in vain in the Old Testament or in Homer. But when that belief has once presented itself to the human mind, it holds its own against all objections. It is possible, no doubt, to object to the purely human distinction between rewards and punishments, because, from a higher point of view, punishment itself may be called a reward. Even eternal punishment, as Charles Kingsley used to say, is but another name for eternal love, and the very fire of hell may be taken as a childish expression only for the constant purification of the soul. All this may be conceded, if only the continuity of cause and effect between this life and the next is preserved. But when we come to the next question, whether the departed, as has been fondly supposed, are able to feel, not only what concerns them, but likewise what concerns their friends on earth, we may call this a very natural deduction, a very intelligible hope, we may even admit that no evidence can be brought forward against it, but beyond that we cannot go.

Man, if left to himself, has everywhere arrived at the conviction that there is something in man or of man besides the material body. This was a lesson taught not so much by life as by death. Besides the body, besides the heart, besides the blood, there was the breath. Man was struck by that, and when the breath had left the body at death, he simply stated the fact, that the breath or the *psyche* had departed. All the speculations on the true nature of that *psyche* within, belong to the domain of Psychology.

A mere study of language would show how general, nay, how universal, is the belief in something beside the body, in some agent within, or of what in Sanskrit is called by a very general name, the *antahkarana*, the agency within. Every kind of internal agency was ascribed to that something which showed itself not only as simply breathing and living, but as feeling

and perceiving, soon also as naming, conceiving, and reasoning. In our lectures on Anthropological Religion we have had chiefly to deal with the speculations which arose from that *psyche*, as no longer *within*, but as after death *without* the body. Here also language began with the name of breath. The breath had gone, the *psyche* had departed. That *psyche*, however, was not conceived as mere breath or air, but as retaining most of those activities which had been ascribed to it during life, such as feeling, perceiving, naming, conceiving, and reasoning. So far I do not see what can be brought forward against this primitive and universal form of belief. If there was a something in man that could receive, perceive, and conceive, that something, whatever name we call it, was gone with death. But no one could think that it had been annihilated—*nunquam nihil ex aliquo*. So long, therefore, as the ancient philosophers said no more than that this something, called breath or *psyche*, had left the body and had gone somewhere else, I do not see what counter-argument could stop them. Even during life, the body alone, though it could live by itself, could not be said to see or hear or perceive by itself. The eye by itself does not see, it requires something else to receive and to perceive, and that something, though itself invisible, was as real as the invisible Infinite and the Divine behind the agents in nature, whom we call the gods of the ancient world. It became in turn the soul, the mind, the agent, the subject, till at last it was recognised as the Infinite and the Divine in man.

In our longings for the departed we often think of them as young or old, we think of them as man or woman, as father or mother, as husband or wife. Even nationality and language are supposed to remain, and we often hear expressions, "Oh, if the souls are without all this, without age, without sex, without national character, without even their native language, what will they be to us?" The answer is, they will really be the same to us as they were in this life. Unless we can bring ourselves to believe that a soul has a beginning, and that our souls sprang into being at the time of our birth, the soul within us must have existed before.

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting ;
The soul that rises with us, our life's star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar.

But however convinced we may be of the soul's eternal existence, we shall always remain ignorant as to how it existed. And yet we do not murmur or complain. Our soul on awakening here is not quite a stranger to itself and the souls who as our parents, our wives and husbands, our children and our friends, have greeted us at first as strangers in this life, but have become to us as if we had known them for ever,

and as if we could never lose them again. If it were to be so again in the next life, if there also we should meet at first as strangers till drawn together by the same mysterious love that has drawn us together here, why should we murmur or complain? Thousands of years ago we read of a husband telling his wife, "Verily a wife is not dear, that you may love the wife; but that you may love the soul, therefore a wife is dear." What does that mean? It means that true love consists, not in loving what is perishable, but in discovering and loving what is eternal in man or woman.

THE LOGIC OF DIFFERENTIATION.

BY HELEN A. CLARKE.

It is a question in my mind whether the present tendency of science is not to exalt beyond its proper sphere the law of differentiation. Can the most highly differentiated or specialised product of nature be proved to be, on the whole, the highest product in any but a relative sense? It seems to me that differentiation carried too far must end either in stagnation or decay. No one will deny that the differentiation which has resulted in a species of animals that can swim and live in the water makes them far superior to man in this respect, but who will dare to say that they are, on this account, a higher product of nature than man? The same is true of the differentiation which has resulted in flying. And what is the price which these highly differentiated beings have paid for their superiority in this line? Simply that they are forever cut off from all progress; their individuality is reduced to a minimum, they can fly and swim beautifully, but they can do precious little else except reproduce their kind.

When man first came upon the scene, whatever may have been the producing forces of a condition favorable to his appearance, Nature found herself face to face with a new sort of material in the rough, in which there were latent immense possibilities for intellectual and spiritual development and over which she was to wield her differentiating sway. And from her task she has never flinched until, to give a few examples, we have, here, a dancing, flirting, vain, selfish species of man, and there a toiling, moiling species; here a race of millionaires, and there, a race of paupers; here we have a genus which can write the most learned essays, and yet cannot enjoy the finest musical composition in the world; there a genus which will grow rapturous over a symphony, and call Herbert Spencer "stuff"; here a sex whose standard is morality, and there a sex whose standard is immorality. Mind protoplasm, so to speak, has been undergoing the process of differentiation into just so many birds and fishes of the mind kingdom. Now, the question is, "Is this a course of things which is going

to bring about the greatest sum of happiness to the human race?"

It is quite conceivable that if the birds and fishes of the animal kingdom had had their choice of being supreme flyers or supreme swimmers, or of foregoing this special supremacy for the sake of the greater possibilities opened out in becoming members of the human race, they would have chosen the latter. Shall we for the first time fully aroused and conscious of nature's differentiating methods do everything in our power to further her designs until we have so many species of perfected and isolated specialists that no farther general progress will be possible?—unless still another sort of un-differentiated, homogeneous being should be kind enough to make his appearance and give Nature another chance.

I do not see what good there was in our finding out this law of nature if we are only to go on consciously doing the same thing we have been unconsciously doing for millions of ages. It would be about as sensible to insist that after the discovery of the law of gravitation men should have made a point of tumbling down as often as possible in order to show their appreciation of Nature's beneficent law and aid her in carrying it out. The truth is that men are slaves to the laws of nature only so long as they remain unconscious of them. As soon as they have found them out, the laws of nature become their slaves. The destructive lightning is chained and made to do the duty which was once done by a farthing candle.

It is just here that man has such an enormous advantage over the lower animals, and if he lets nature develop him into *fishes* and *birds*, he is ignoring his own most distinctive characteristic, and one which ought to prevent his blotting out the progress of the race by overspecialisation.

I have been led to make these remarks mainly on account of the use which scientists are making of the argument of differentiation against woman. For hundreds of centuries, religion has been made to bear witness against her, and, now, just when a new day seemed to be dawning, and the pernicious results of religious superstition are being thrown off, she is to be subjected to a *material* superstition which bids fair to make her fight for independence harder than it has ever been; for science scorning the spiritual sceptres of the human past as unbecoming our fuller knowledge yet inconsistently bows in abject servitude to the material sceptres of an ante-human past. The scientific man is so much taken up with his new found ancestors, the beasts of the field, and he is so delighted with the resemblances which he perceives to exist between them and himself that he is for modeling his life on their plan, and he either ignores, or issues scientific

Bulls against any tendency he may observe to escape what he calls the fundamental laws of nature.

Nature, having divided the men off from the women, it is the duty of the human race, says the scientist, to follow her lead and emphasise this dividing as much as possible. Now, it is rather a curious fact that, although they preach the practicability of as much sub-differentiation and specialisation—provided the main line of differentiation from women is preserved—as possible among men, they declare that women must remain among themselves a highly differentiated *whole* of men-pleasing, child bearing, house-keeping beings.

Fortunately, for the women, they possess a consciousness which the poor birds and fishes of the past did not possess, and although they perceive that every opportunity is given them to become specialists in one line, they prefer the larger possibilities which open out to them in considering themselves homogeneous, and capable, like men, of further sub-differentiation.

Since, spite of their sex difference, men and women do possess many points of likeness, the tendency of this sub-differentiation has been to make men and women—not more different, but more alike—at least intellectually. But intellectuality is tending to spiritualise woman more and more; and, no doubt, much to the chagrin of the materially superstitious scientist, there is being developed a species of woman in which the sex instinct is reduced to a minimum, and to whom love can come only in the person of a being spiritually and intellectually *like* herself. While a lower kind of love may be founded in difference, the higher kind of love which alone endures can only be founded in fundamental likeness.

To illustrate, we may suppose the point in evolution reached where the sexes have become completely differentiated. Such a point once reached, there are but three things which could happen, either men and women must grow farther and farther apart, or they must continue to occupy the same relative position towards each other, or they must grow closer together. If nature is servilely aided in her differentiating plan, she will take men off to one pole and women off to the other and there will be no bringing them together on any but the lowest sexual plane. The men who "fly" will find the women who can hardly even "swim" most uninteresting personages and will either prey upon them or leave them alone altogether, either of which would result in the decay of the race.

If, on the other hand, nature be supposed to have assigned men and women their place permanently at the point where their difference is emphasised, rather than their likeness, there can be no real friendship nor sympathy between them. Men will have either intellectual or "fast" pursuits, women, domestic or

frivolous pursuits, and the inevitable result will be that they will have little but an ephemeral sexual attraction for each other, their lives will not harmonise and the result will be stagnation.

Should, however, men and women both wisely use the laws of differentiation, the result must be that they will grow more and more alike intellectually and spiritually and an increase of sympathy between them will be the result.

If we look about us we are led to the conclusion that so far, women alone, and, of course only some of them, have been exercising this guiding influence on differentiation. Men have either stood still at the point where the differentiation became emphasised, representing, broadly speaking, orthodox superstition, or they have enrolled themselves as slaves to nature's law and followed the direction which represents scientific superstition. In either case they are getting farther away from those women who are developing their spiritual as well as their intellectual instincts, and who will have nothing to do with men, however intelligent, who insist on the supremacy of animal instincts.

That what I have said of developing womanhood, is true, is proved on every side by the fact that many a woman is finding her companion for life in another woman, in whose love and sympathy the higher needs of her nature are fulfilled, and scientists may talk as they will about her duties to the human race, she has found out the sacredness of her duty to herself and never again will she be willing to fulfil duties to the race, unless they are raised to a plane where they will not conflict with her intellectual and moral ideals.

From the foregoing remarks it will be seen that differentiation may be used to bring about likeness as well as difference, and having become conscious of its laws, it is our duty so to use them as to bring about the highest development of the human race.

There may come a time when the work of the specialists will be accomplished; when the human intellect will be able to grasp universal knowledge, from which alone springs universal sympathy, and with that, greater happiness than the specialist ever dreamed of in his philosophy; when the musician shall be in sympathy with the scientist, and the scientist shall not scoff at the poet. In fact, a suspicion will cross my mind at times, that Nature herself is tending to produce not a heterogeneous crowd of differentiated noodles but beings who will unite, in one glorious world-embracing synthesis, the knowledge which her slaves the specialists have developed to that stage where the new order of beings can seize and ripen it in the warmth of all other knowledge. But it rests with man to decide whether he shall be that being or whether it is to be a species yet unborn.

ENGLISH REFORMERS AND AMERICAN PRISONS.

BY GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL.

THE Howard Association for the promotion of the best methods of the Treatment and Prevention of Crime and Pauperism have issued a leaflet entitled "The collegiate and hotel prisons of the United States, 1891." (Office: 5 Bishopsgate Street, London.)

We notice this tract at some length because the subject matter of it is of great importance; and because of the philanthropic services of John Howard, whose humane example is the inspiration and vitality of the useful institution which bears his name. As the life of John Howard was devoted to the abolition of crimes, the mitigation of penalties, and the reformation of criminals, it grates a little harshly upon the feelings that an association organised to carry on his work, should issue a pamphlet complaining that the treatment of criminals in the prisons of the United States is not sufficiently painful and severe. The foundation of its argument is the following statement:

"American criminality is so alarmingly increasing, that whereas in 1850, every million inhabitants of the United States only contributed 290 prisoners, the proportion had risen to 853 in 1870 and as high as 1,169 in the million in 1880. The census of 1890 appears to indicate a still further increase of criminality; there being 10,000 more 'convicts' than in 1880."

These figures are misleading, and they show us with what ingenuity statistics may be used to reveal and conceal the truth. In that one extract the words "prisoners," "criminality," and "convicts," are synonymously used; whereas, in fact, a "prisoner" may be neither criminal nor convict, a "criminal" neither convict nor prisoner, and a "convict" may be not a criminal nor in prison, for his conviction may be for the violation of some petty city ordinance involving no moral turpitude whatever. The figures are misleading also because they make no discrimination between crimes, *mala in se* and crimes which are merely *mala prohibita*. In one year 7,566 persons were imprisoned in the Chicago house of correction, and all but 190 of them were incarcerated for non-payment of fines. Yet in the statistics used by the Howard Association they all appear as "convicts."

In compiling those figures no notice is taken of the multiplication of statutory offenses which is constantly going on in the United States. We have about fifty legislatures in this country and they spend the winter time in making laws prohibiting and making criminal various deeds of commission and omission which are perfectly innocent in themselves. The "criminality" deplored by the Howard Association may be obstructing the sidewalk, killing game for food instead of sport, peddling, pulling a tooth without a license, or some such heinous thing.

The Association complains that "criminals and vagrants in America are treated with a leniency which is positively cruel to the honest community." By this leniency, remarks that admirable society, "the Americans have sought to reverse the Divine ordinance that the law should be a terror to evil-doers." Only a hundred years ago, and even down to the reign of George the Fourth, platoons of malefactors were hanged every Monday morning at Tyburn corner in London, or in front of the Newgate prison; while hundreds of others were transported to the penal settlements at Botany Bay; and yet the law was not a greater terror to evil-doers then, than it was after John Howard and his disciples had forced the "Divine ordinance" of mercy into the sanguinary criminal code of England.

The Howard Association criticises our habit of pampering convicts; and with good reason, if the following statement is true:

"Thus some prisons in the United States, such as Elmira and Concord, have introduced "the collegiate system," for rendering proficiency in study a chief test of the fitness of their inmates for liberation. These and other American prisons provide their inmates with a sumptuous dietary. Thus at the California state prison of Folsom the convicts are not even obliged to work. If they choose to remain idle and lounge about in gangs they may do so; and still have every day a meat diet with coffee and vegetables. If they volunteer

to work at the quarries near the prison they are rewarded with soups, syrups, tea and cake and meat suppers. A third grade secures for them chops and steaks for breakfast as well as supper, with hot rolls and fruit, and a dinner worthy of a good hotel."

We admit that this is maudlin benevolence, and that it strains the quality of mercy to the breaking point, but we think there is a mistake as to the "menu." We half suspect also that the Howard Association circulated this tract as a sinister inducement to the criminal classes of London to emigrate, and thereby save the taxpayers of that village the expense of supporting them at Millbank or Pentonville. What is the use of passing laws to exclude European criminals from this country so long as the Howard Association persists in telling them that this is the paradise of convicts, where they may revel in luxury and idleness, besides receiving when in prison all the advantages of a "collegiate" education. Are the members of the Howard Association sufficiently aware of the awful responsibility they assume when they thus lead their English brethren into temptation? We hope that this leaflet has not been translated into foreign languages and circulated on the continent of Europe; but if it has been, we warn the criminal classes there not to be led astray by it, for if they come over here and get into an American penitentiary expecting to receive hotel fare and a collegiate course of education they will be wofully disappointed.

Some of the criticisms directed specially against the Elmira system will apply to the "reformatory" principle in every other prison in the world, and they make strong arguments in its favor; as for instance, this:

"Considering the severe competition of honest industry, it is most unfair to the ordinary American workman that these criminals at Elmira should be taught artistic and fancy trades, such as modelling and designing from nature, embossing in brass, executing portraits in copper, topography, and so forth.

Here is an admission that even "convicts" may have a genius for the higher mechanics and the esthetic arts; and if teaching them is unfair to the ordinary workman it must be because they have the ability to learn; and if when released from prison they enter into "competition" with other workmen, it must be because they are willing to earn their living by work instead of crime. This complaint bears testimony in favor of Elmira. The Howard critics appear to recognise that themselves, for they tacitly concede the claim that Elmira *does* reform, but they insinuate that this very reformation is a bad thing tempting young men to commit crime that they may be imprisoned at Elmira and converted into useful citizens. On this rather unreasonable view of it they moralise in a stately, Sir Leicester Deadlock sort of a way, and say, "The safety and welfare of the community far outweigh in importance the interests of the individual," a mouldy sentiment which for ages has been urged as an excuse for every injustice which the community may think proper to inflict upon that unlucky "individual."

It would be comical irony should the Howard Association begin a reaction towards that irrational and vindictive system of prison discipline which it was the mission of John Howard to soften and to civilise.

CURRENT TOPICS.

A VERY good stroke of business was accomplished last week by a party of Turkish brigands not far from Adrianople. They wrecked a railway train, and after "holding up" the passengers in a way that would have done credit to American experts, they invited Herr Israel, the Berlin banker, with three of his friends who happened to be on the train, and also the conductor, to partake of their hospitality at their country seat in the mountains. The brigands were so delighted with the society of their German guests that they sent a message back to town saying that they really could not afford to part with them for less than ten thousand dollars apiece, or forty thousand dollars for the five, the

conductor being generously thrown into the bargain without any extra charge. They also added by way of a postscript that if the money was not paid they would cut off the heads of their guests, and send them to Berlin for nothing. The matter coming to the knowledge of Chancellor Caprivi, he immediately telegraphed an order to the German Ambassador at Constantinople to pay the money and release the captives. Although the sum demanded for the prisoners was far beyond their value, he would not higgie about the price, but pay it, and require the Turkish government to refund the money.

The prompt and businesslike action of Chancellor Caprivi, in the matter of the Turkish brigands is in admirable contrast to the methods pursued by the English authorities in a similar case that occurred in Greece. Lord Muncaster and some friends were captured by brigands in the neighborhood of Athens, and carried off into the mountains where they were held for ransom. There was so much chaffering and circumlocution by the English officials, who could not do anything without expending the constitutional quantity of red tape and sealing wax, that the prisoners were all the time in jeopardy; while the Greek government mounted its cavalry in hot haste to chase the brigands and release the captives. The slowness of the English government in the right direction, and the haste of the Greek government in the wrong direction, sealed the fate of the captives, for the brigands, impatient and alarmed, solved the whole problem by putting them to death. Perhaps this case furnished the lesson for Caprivi; but whether it did or not, his action will go far towards abolishing that international nuisance known as brigandage. When governments find that they must pay the damages caused by tolerated brigands they will probably suppress them. It will hardly do for the Grand Vizier to say to Chancellor Caprivi that owing to the peculiar constitution of the Turkish empire, the Turkish government has no criminal jurisdiction in the State of Adrianople.

In his picturesque and fascinating way Macaulay describes the scene inside the palace at Whitehall that Sunday evening when King Charles II was mortally struck with apoplexy in the midst of a gay and dissolute company. The eloquent historian says: "His palace had seldom presented a gayer or a more scandalous appearance than on the evening of Sunday the first of February, 1685. . . . The great gallery of Whitehall, an admirable relic of the magnificence of the Tudors, was crowded with revellers and gamblers. . . . A party of twenty courtiers was seated at cards round a large table on which gold was heaped in mountains." We have been accustomed to regard that royal and patrician dissipation as the quality of a profligate era which ended long ago, and yet, leaving out some of the grosser features which Macaulay mentions, the scene at Tranby Croft, where the Prince of Wales officiated as banker at a baccarat table, was in its gambling character an imitation of Whitehall. A game of cards played by friends at a private house for nominal stakes put up merely to emphasise the amusement may be harmless enough; but a game wherein one of the players wins five hundred dollars a night, as Sir William Gordon Cumming did at Tranby Croft, is covetous gambling, whether it be played by baronets, earls, and princes, or by knaves and sharpers of the baser sort. Luxury and idleness must have excitement, and gambling is one of the stimulants they crave. The man who has fallen low enough to win another man's money fairly, will soon descend low enough to win it unfairly if he can. And they say there was cheating at Tranby Croft, by a chivalrous knight, in a game where the bank was kept and the cards were dealt by the heir to the English throne.

It was rather a pleasant thing for the British democracy to see the Prince of Wales in the witness box confessing himself a

baccarat banker and a gambler; because his presence there in that capacity rubbed a little more veneering off that venerable superstition which is known as monarchy. Whatever brings that ancient institution into contempt is regarded as a gain to political civilisation; and the sordid pastimes of the prince tarnish the crown which the exemplary life of his mother made radiant. This baccarat scandal as they call it shortens the reign of royalty and caste in England. It shows to the English people of what common clay their titled aristocracy is made. It will do greater service than that, for it will lower the fence that divides cheating from gaming, and hasten the time when they will be compelled to graze in the same pasture. The difference between winning money fairly and winning it by cheating is only of degree. Neither is honest, but one is a little more dishonest than the other. The fashionable world of London affects to be greatly shocked that there should be cheating at cards by one of the Prince's own set, a baronet and lieutenant colonel of the guards, and the Prince himself in the witness box dolefully referred to the thimble-rig performance at Tranby Croft as "a sad event"; not the gambling, nor even the cheating, but the detection and exposure of the cheat. The Prince is a grandfather now, and old enough to know that every winning of money by gambling, no matter how "square" the game, is "a sad event." No man can honestly win, and take, and keep five hundred dollars of another man's money, no matter how fair may be his play according to the gambler's code.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

LAW PERMITS NO FREEDOM OF WILL.

To the Editor of *The Open Court* :

IF I misrepresented your view by stating that when a man acts without any obstacle in his environment he is not under law, it was because you claim that at such a time a man is free; hence you palter with monism in a double sense. What the thinkers of this age are striving for is clearness of thought and logical expression. We have had confusion enough and bitter strife enough. What we want now is, that which will tend to harmonise with reason and bring "peace on earth and good will among men," but I don't see how these can obtain from your definition of monism. Because to say that you "accept determinism wholly and fully, but from the same standpoint of monism freewill must also be accepted," you make confusion instead of peace. You can, as an individual, accept that contradiction, but you cannot truthfully teach that doctrine for scientific truth; for it is equivalent to saying that two and two are four, but you must accept the doctrine also, for certain reasons, that two and three are four. What we want is clearness here. True monism does accept Determinism wholly and fully; it *must*, there is no alternative, but semi-religious monism need not. As Professor Huxley says, we must call a spade a spade.

I can distinguish between your position and the pagan doctrine of the freedom of the will and God's sovereignty, but your position is equally at variance with reason. If you postulate the freedom of the will because, in your opinion, it is best adapted to teach morals, I grant you the right, but you must remember that upon your own confession of determinism you assume an error that good may come. Artificial morality may largely depend upon teaching that untruth, but *real morality, never!*

The doctrine of scientific monism is not adapted to those who need moral instruction; it is for those who are *moral*. Under the necessity of adaptation to condition, nature had to start with the delusion of freewill. But we are now beginning to see face to face and that delusion must go along with the doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

I agree with you that "man's actions are always according to law, but I insist that his actions are caused by law—cause—and therefore are not free. There is this difference between us: You postulate freewill (after you have declared by determinism that no such thing exists) for the sake of morality, while I deny it for the sake of scientific monism, truth and consistency.

To say that nature is a slave to law, or cause is not stating a dualism of cause and reality, because cause is reality. When I say that nature cannot exist and can exist at the same time, I declare a reality and at the same time show that nature cannot do both. The causes which govern forms are a part of nature, so when I say that a man is caused to eat by reason of hunger, I state a reality, not a dualism of cause and reality. I agree again, that "the power that produced man is in him and that he is a part of it," but I insist that he is a subordinate part through and through, that comes and goes by that which is not himself. When he is, nature is one, and when he is not, nature is still one. With organisation comes will, same as sight and hearing—nature's adaptation to ends. The eye must see, the ear must hear, and the will must sense action; all these are affected by causes. The eye cannot see an object if it is not there; the ear cannot hear a sound if there is none and the will cannot will unless there is something to repel or attract it. A man's actions are not the results of himself alone; they are results of combinations of which he is always a factor, but he is never the prime factor; that honor belongs to nature, and true monism must give it that honor for all things proceed from one.

There is no dualism here. The stalk is a necessary factor for the production of corn, but it is not the prime factor because nature evolves both stalk and corn. If nature could evolve corn without a stalk it would not be governed by that law. Prof. Joseph Le Conte is mistaken when he says "in organic evolution nature operates . . . without the co-operation of the thing evolving," because the stalk is as essential for corn as good men and women are for the formation of a good environment.

Now instead of postulating an untruth for the purpose of morality, in order to cause mankind to feel their responsibility, would it not suit monism better to declare the undeniable truth which harmonises with determinism, that man in his relation to results is always a factor in the combination and therefore *must* be held responsible? Nature does not hold mankind responsible because they are free, but because, in the nature of things, it must.

JOHN MADDOCK.

ARE WE THE SLAVES OF LAW?

CLEARNESS of thought can be attained only by giving plain and unmistakable definitions. I have defined the term freewill as I use it, repeatedly; and it is not my fault if Mr. Maddock again and again speaks of a free will as a will which is not determined by law. Everything is determined by law and also all the actions of man are strictly and unequivocally determined by law. Not only the actions, but also all the wishes, desires, and tendencies to act, every hope and fear, they all arise according to strict and unalterable laws. Will is a tendency to act. If this tendency to act can freely pass into act, I call the will free. If for some reason it is prevented from passing into act, I observe that the will is under constraint, it is not free. These are my definitions, and anyone criticising my position has to bear in mind what I mean by "free."

Mr. Maddock's definition of "free" seems to be "that which is not determined by law," and of course if free means "not determined by law," there is no freedom. But then the word "free" would be a useless word and we should drop it entirely; but we should have to invent a new word for that which I understand by free. It is apparent that there is a great difference between an act which is performed without constraint and another act which

is performed by some compulsion. If a man works because a slave-driver stands behind him with a whip, his work is no moral act; but if he works without any such compulsion simply because he wills it, if he works from what I call "freewill" and what Mr. Maddock calls "he must" because the law of nature forces him to do, his act is the true expression of his will. The acts of what I call "freewill" are necessary acts; they are determined by law. But being free, they show what kind of a will is in the man; and we can accordingly judge of the character of a man only if we consider the acts which he performed when he was under no constraint, when he was free. The acts of a slave do not show his real character. All our ethical education aims at liberation. We educate our children to make them free. We teach them the nature of the moral law and as soon as they possess motive impulses in their mind to remain in harmony with the moral law, we need no longer put any restraint upon them, we need no more watch them, but can leave them to themselves, or in other words, we can give them their freedom.

Now Mr. Maddock might ask me why I use the word freedom for a state which according to his usage of terms is slavery. He imagines that I do it, because "it is best adapted to teach morals." That is not my motive. My motive is that I trust it is the truest expression of things as they actually are. Man's actions are not "caused by laws" as Mr. Maddock says; man is not "a slave" of laws. Man's actions are caused by "causes"; and causes which affect a man's will are called motives. If a hungry man finds bread, he will if he is without constraint naturally and necessarily eat it. Hunger is the main motive of his act of eating and this hunger is at the time a part of himself. Hunger means a want of food, and a want of food implies the desire to eat. The desire to eat is at the time his will. If this will is not restrained (if it is free), it will pass into act. Would it be proper to say that this will is the slave of his desire to eat? This will is the man's desire to eat. Accordingly there is no sense in saying that it is the slave of itself.

But Mr. Maddock says, man is the slave of laws and he also says that nature is the slave of laws. To say that man's will is the slave of his motives is a meaningless tautology, for every free man may be called his own slave. But to say that man is the slave of laws (viz. the psychological laws of action) and that nature is the slave of natural laws, is a palpable dualism. Natural laws are only formulas describing the uniformities of nature. Hungry men desire to eat is a statement of fact, or rather of many facts which belong together. If I call this statement a law I must not think of it as some legal authority which is outside of the stomachs of hungry men compelling them to have a desire for food. The actual facts are the hungry men and all hungry men desire to eat. This uniformity is formulated in a general statement, and the general statement is called a natural law. It is positively erroneous and shows a trace of dualism to consider the law of gravitation as the power that forces the stone to fall. Gravity makes the stone fall, and gravity is a certain quality of the stone, it is (so far as the fall is concerned) the stone itself. The stone certainly falls according to a certain law, its fall is determined by law or in other words there is a uniformity in all falls of stones which can be described in a definite formula. But there is no sense in saying that the stones, when falling, are slaves of that formula. Nor is there any reason to speak of men whose freedom of action is not curtailed as slaves of the psychological laws by which the uniformities of human action are described.

If I have taken up this subject again and again, it is because I believe with Mr. Maddock that we must strive for clearness of thought, and I respect Mr. Maddock's pertinacity although I regret that he does not understand what I mean by free will.

P. C.

NOTES.

The Century for June contains an illustrated article "Women at an English University," (Newham College, Cambridge) by Eleanor Field.

National Zeitung is the name of a new German publication which makes its weekly appearance in Chicago. It is most ably edited by Joseph Brucker and discusses the live, political, economical, religious, and literary questions of the day. The first five numbers which we have seen are very promising and we do not doubt that the success of the journal is ensured.

Professor Max Müller tells us in his article "The Discovery of the Soul," how man came to believe in a soul. He explains to us the historical growth of the soul-idea which was taught us mainly by death. Death proved that besides the natural body there must be something else in man, his life, his soul, something spiritual which leaves the body with the last breath. This something was conceived as an agent within and was accordingly called in Sanscrit *antahkarana* (the agency within). This conception of the soul as the agency within has been of great service in the evolution of our psychological ideas, but it has also been a source of many errors. Even to-day it is not uncommon to represent the soul as a certain something which is a distinct entity moving about in the body. This soul-entity is either supposed to consist of a special ethereal substance or (according to Herbart and his school) it is said to be an immaterial point, an atom forming a centre of energy and causing all the phenomena of soul life by interaction with the material brain-cells. Prof. Max Müller is no dualist, but most representatives of the idea that the soul is an agency within, are dualists. The errors that so naturally originate from the idea that the soul is an agency within the body, have led to an abandonment of the term and gave way to what may briefly be called the psychology of positivism. We have stated our view of the subject at length in a series of former articles and in "The Soul of Man," and need not go into further details here.

THE OPEN COURT.

PUBLISHED EVERY THURSDAY BY

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.

TERMS THROUGHOUT THE POSTAL UNION:
 \$2.00 PER YEAR. \$1.00 FOR SIX MONTHS.
 AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND TASMANIA, \$2.50 PER YEAR.

All communications should be addressed to

THE OPEN COURT,
 (Nixon Building, 175 La Salle Street,)

P. O. DRAWER F. CHICAGO, ILL.

CONTENTS OF NO. 198.

THE DISCOVERY OF THE SOUL. PROF. F. MAX
 MUELLER..... 2835

THE LOGIC OF DIFFERENTIATION. HELEN A.
 CLARKE..... 2837

ENGLISH REFORMERS AND AMERICAN PRISONS.
 GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL..... 2839

CURRENT TOPICS. Brigandage and Ransom. Gaming
 and Cheating. GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL..... 2840

CORRESPONDENCE.

Law Permits no Freedom of Will. JOHN MADDOCK....

Are we the Slaves of Law? EDITOR..... 2841

NOTES..... 2842