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GHOSTS.

THE Norwegian poet Henrik Ibsen has written a most awe-inspiring drama under the mysterious title "Ghosts." Does this most modern author believe in spirits? Does he take us into a haunted house? Are not ghosts and haunted houses left as a survival only? O no! The ghosts of which Henrik Ibsen speaks are everywhere; they are not exceptional cases; for we ourselves are visited by the spirits of former ages; our brain is haunted by ghosts. It is full of the proclivities, the dispositions, the ideas, and the sins of our ancestors.

Mrs. Alving, the widow of a dissolute husband, and mother of a son whose life has been poisoned by his father's sin, witnesses her son's behavior in the adjoining room. It is the exact repetition of a scene in which her husband had played her son's rôle some twenty years ago. There is his ghost reappearing. In considering the weighty seriousness of the truth, that we inherit, not only the character of our ancestors, but also the curses of their sins; that all our institutions and habits are full of ideas inherited from a dead past, she says: "I am afraid of myself, because there is in me something of a ghost-like inherited tendency of which I can never free myself. . . . I almost think we are all of us ghosts. It is not only what we have inherited from father and mother that reappears in us, it is all kinds of dead old beliefs and things of that sort. These ghosts are not the living substance of our brain, but they are there nevertheless and we cannot get rid of them. When I take up a newspaper to read, it is as though I saw ghosts speaking in between the lines. There must be ghosts all over the country. They must be as thick as the sands of the sea."

It is perfectly and literally true that our soul is haunted by ghosts; nay, our entire soul consists of ghosts. Our brain is the trysting place where they meet and live; where they grow and combine, and in their combinations they propagate, they create new thoughts which according to their nature will be beneficent or baneful.

What are these ghosts? They are our experiences, the impressions of our surroundings upon the sentient living substance of our existence. They are the reactions that take place upon the impressions of our surroundings; they are our yearnings and cravings; they

are our thoughts and imaginations. They are our errors and vices, our hopes and our ideals.

Henrik Ibsen shows that the ghosts which are the inherited sins of our fathers lead unto death. What an overwhelming and horrific scene is the end of the drama, where the son asks his mother to hand him the poison in case the awful disease will pass upon him which will soften his brain and spread the eternal night of imbecility over his soul. The mother in her anxiety to calm her son's wild fancies, promises to do so: "Here is my hand upon it," she says, with a trembling voice: "I will—if it becomes necessary. But it will not become necessary. No, no! It will never become a possibility."

There is a law of the conservation of matter and energy; but there is also a law of the conservation of the stuff that ghosts are made of. The law holds good not only in the material world, but in the spiritual world also. Every vice transmits its curse; and the moment comes when the unfortunate mother has to face the fatal attack of the terrible disease.

The heroine of the drama, the innocent and wretched mother had sought help of the clergyman—the man whom she had loved. When her husband had betrayed her, had poisoned her in her youth, she fled to him in wild excitement and cried: "Here I am, take me!" But the clergyman's stern virtue had turned her away from his door, and he prevailed upon her to remain a dutiful wife to her vicious husband. She had tried to find comfort in the religious injunctions which he preached to her. She lived a life in obedience to what he represented as her duty. But now she says to him: "I began to examine your teaching in the seams. I only wished to undo a single stitch, but when I had got that undone, the whole thing came to pieces, and then I found that it was all chain-stitch sewing-machine work."

The distressed woman feels only the curse of law and order which have been invented for the salvation of mankind. Her experience leads her to trust rather in anarchy than in the threadbare superstition which our generation has in favor of the letter of the law. The sternness of virtue cannot save us, nor our blind obedience to sanctified traditions. She exclaims: "What nonsense all that is about law and order. I often think it is that which exactly causes all the mis-

eries there are in the world. I can no longer endure these bonds; I cannot! I must work my way out to freedom!"

Here lies the cure of the disease. We must work our way out to freedom. The simple method of shaking off law and order will only increase our troubles. We must learn to understand the nature of ourselves. By patient work alone can we exorcise the evil spirits that haunt our souls; and we can nourish and foster those other spirits which shower blessings upon our lives and the lives of our children. We cannot escape the natural law which, inviolate, regulates the growth of our souls; but we can accommodate ourselves to the law and the same law, that works disaster and death, will produce happiness and life.

Superabundance of life gives a power that might produce great and noble results. But when the life is stagnant as was that of Mrs. Alving's husband, a vigorous youth exuberant in strength and health, an unsatisfiable craving for pleasure takes the place of a want of activity; and instead of useful work, vicious habits are produced. The germ of many diseases is a morbid pursuit of enjoyment. Pleasure is made the aim of life, leading astray step by step into the abyss of misery and death. Not that happiness and pleasures were wrong! But it is wrong to make of them the purpose of life. Let happiness be the accompaniment of the performance of duty and happiness will follow as the shadow follows the body. If we pursue happiness, we turn our back upon the sun of life and we shall never find either satisfaction or happiness.

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The law of the conservation of soul-life with its blessings and its curses has not only a gloomy side, it has also a bright side, and it behooves us when considering our heir-loom of curses, to remember that they are small in comparison to the grand inheritance of blessings which have come to us from thousands of generations. What is all our activity, our doing, and achieving, our dearest ideals—what are they but the torch of life handed down from our ancestors? Gustav Freytag, the German novelist, might also have called almost all his novels "Ghosts." Especially the "Lost Manuscript" and the series of novels called "The Ancestors" are studies illustrative of the same truth. Yet while Ibsen paints the dark side only of the law of the conservation of ideas, Gustav Freytag paints the dark and the bright sides. Gustav Freytag says:

"It is well that from us men usually remains concealed, what is inheritance from the remote past, and what the independent acquisition of our own existence; since our life would become full of anxiety and misery, if we, as continuations of the people of the past, had perpetually to reckon with the blessings and curses which former times leave hanging over the problems of our own existence. But it is indeed a joyous labor, at times, by a retrospective glance into the past, to bring into fullest consciousness the fact that

many of our successes and achievements have only been made possible through the possessions that have come to us from the lives of our parents, and through that also which the previous ancestral life of our family has accomplished and produced for us."

We have to bear the evil consequences of the vices of our ancestors, but these evils can be overcome; and when they cannot be overcome, they will after all find a termination, for death is the wages of sin.

The nature of sin is its contrariness to life; its main feature is the impossibility of a continued existence. Extinction being the natural consequence of viciousness, the wages of sin are at the same time the saviour, the redeemer from the evils of sin.

If all the parents in the whole world were like Chamberlain Alving, the ruthless father of Oswald Alving, and like Mrs. Engstrand, the frivolous mother of the coquettish girl Regina, humanity would soon come to an end. It may be that none of us is entirely free from these traits; but some of us are so more or less. In some of us these traits are mixed with ennobling features, and we are striving to overcome that which we have recognised as bad. However, nature is constantly at work to prune the growing generations. Death is the wages of sin, and the bright side of this awful truth is the constant amelioration of the race.

SOCIALISM AND TRANSCENDENTALISM.

BY F. M. HOLLAND.

MORRIS, the poet, gives us in "News from Nowhere," a delightful picture of the golden future when poverty, vice, marriage, and all the other evils imposed upon man by society are to be abolished so completely, that everybody will be healthy, handsome, and fond of work. This is substantially the plan on which Brook Farm and nearly forty other communities started in this country, between 1840 and 1845, with the support of Emerson, Parker, Alcott, Hawthorne, William H. Channing, George Ripley, Margaret Fuller, Elizabeth P. Peabody, James Freeman Clarke, Hedge, Higginson, Curtis, Greeley, Dwight, James, Story, Cranch, Whittier, and Lowell. Even Thoreau took a friendly interest in socialism, and there was nothing else about which these Transcendentalists agreed so generally. The system then in vogue had been announced, as a deduction from Nature's own theory, by Fourier, whose fundamental principle was inscribed upon his tomb-stone in these words: "Instincts correspond to destiny and produce harmony." No wonder that a theory thus originated had "so much truth" in the opinion of Emerson and other Transcendentalists, who knew that communities had been founded by Pythagoras, and projected by Plato and Coleridge. Marx and Lassalle have since reached similar results by *a priori* reasoning; and such conclusions proceed most legitimately from unscientific methods of thought.

The popularity of socialistic and also anarchistic writers is largely due to the boldness with which they set aside the teachings of experience and deny the value of existing institutions. What could have been more in harmony with a philosophy which placed intuition high above experience, and thought institutions much less sacred than impulses?

How speedily experience avenged herself for this neglect was shown by the failure of more than half of the Fourierite associations before they had been in operation for two years. Brook Farm lasted longer, but ended in leaving the laborers and investors unpaid; and this was the case wherever the principles of Morris and Fourier were followed out. The members were allowed to work as they chose; and they did not often choose to work hard at what needed most to be done. This was notoriously the case at Brook Farm, where the real workers, as Emerson says, were very few; and they found themselves so much in demand, that one of them has told how it was "‘Burton’ here and ‘Burton’ there," as long as he stayed. Most of the managers had no authority and showed little ability, except in cases where they enriched themselves at the community's expense. Life proved less pleasant in many of the phalansteries than in the old-fashioned family; but the main trouble was the difficulty of making both ends meet.

Whatever success has been achieved by socialistic communities is due to their having conformed so far to teachings of experience as to keep up discipline enough to compel the members to work as the rulers direct. These rulers usually serve for life, fill all vacancies among themselves and appoint subordinate officials without consulting the rest of the community, and do not even tell how much money has been earned or spent. This is substantially the plan which has been followed for nearly a hundred years by the Shakers, and also that of the Amana community which was started the same year as Brook Farm, 1842, and is, I think, still prosperous. One of the Amana overseers admitted to Mr. Nordhoff, author of "The Communist Societies of the United States," that three hired men would do as much work as five or six of the brethren; and a similar confession was made to him in a Shaker village. This deficiency is, however, made up partly by making all purchases with great care at wholesale prices, and partly by enforcing rigid economy and abstinence from luxuries. The practice of the necessary economy, diligence, and obedience has been greatly facilitated by religious zeal; and there has been at least one case in which lack of this bond made it impossible to tolerate the severity of management under which the community was actually growing rich. (See the chapter on the Wisconsin Phalanx in Noyes's "History of American Socialisms.")

It has of course been much easier for a village to keep up the strict discipline necessary for success in socialism than it would be for a great nation. Any form of communism, which might be imposed upon our people by a revolutionary minority, or even by a majority vote, would encounter millions of opponents, who would soon be joined by men who had been socialists on account of a restlessness which would make the new restraint insupportable. Still other millions of people would keep on trying, as they do now, to get a living with as little labor as possible. The discipline, necessary to make this mass of sluggishness and hostility sufficiently productive, would have to be cruelly severe. The lash would be as busy in the industrial army as it ever was on a Southern plantation; and it must be remembered that all the horrors of slavery could not make negro labor as efficient as it is now under freedom of competition. A still greater obstacle to the success of an industrial army of sixty million soldiers would be the difficulty of finding competent commanders. When we think how hard this was thirty years ago, we cannot suppose that it would be easy now. Our system of electing rulers and appointing officials has not proved such a brilliant success, that we could rely upon it for placing all our farms, factories, stores, railroads, and other industries under such able managers as not to run serious risk of national bankruptcy. The more these industries are concentrated, the greater will be the difficulty of successful management. At present, competition increases or diminishes the power of each employer of labor, according as he succeeds or fails in employing it efficiently. The man who knows best how to run a small factory makes it a great one; and thus the place is filled much more suitably than could be done by a popular election or a government appointment. Thus competition is the test of competency; and no other test has been found equal to the needs of large business interests. The nationalists have not persuaded our people that our railroads can be made less dangerous by letting the superintendents be appointed with no particular reference to qualifications, and dismissed every four years. Scientific methods of thought are now so much in honor, that socialism is not likely to regain the popularity which it enjoyed before the Fourierite bubble burst. Glorious results will be achieved by reformers who work patiently by the light of experience; but no hasty theorist is going to turn the world upside down.

WALLACE ON DARWINISM.

BY J. C. F. GRUMBINE.

It is generally acknowledged that Professor Russel Wallace discovered simultaneously with Charles Darwin the theory of evolution. In the preface of a popular book recently put forth by his publishers he mod-

estly terms his researches "Darwinism," thus yielding to the great naturalist the honor which ought equally to attach itself to his name. As a scientific work it is thorough-going and conclusive. His knowledge is immense, his style simple, his logic irresistible. As a text-book of the doctrine which it seeks not only to further popularise but to substantiate by the latest scientific discoveries, it is a brilliant compendium of Charles Darwin's two great books—"The Origin of Species" and "The Descent of Man." It is more than this. It boldly and intelligently enters a field which other celebrated naturalists refused even to touch and draws conclusions as to the ethical aspect, or fatality of the doctrine as applied to man. In fact it is a forcible accessory to the doctrine of optimism which for generations asserted itself in Christian polemics and, in a vague but certain manner, dominated Greek and Oriental philosophy. Professor Wallace admits that he has differences, that his differences in many respects clash with the minor assertions of his beloved co-worker, Charles Darwin; but he announces that his entire work tends forcibly to illustrate the overwhelming importance of natural selection over all other agencies in the production of new species. It has been urged as a palpable objection to Darwin's work, that he founded his theory on the evidence of variation in domesticated animals and cultivated plants; and from this field of inference built up the generalisation which made the doctrine of evolution a method of the universe. Professor Wallace, primarily, seeks to prove the theory by a direct reference to the variations of organisms in a state of nature and hence his labors are the more interesting and valuable because of the objections raised against Darwin's alternative. Hence, whatever defects exhibited themselves in the *modus operandi* of Charles Darwin are in this book noticeably absent and the way is paved for continued triumphs which "Darwinism" as a doctrine has already achieved.

Two suggestions which Professor Wallace makes are particularly worthy of notice, altogether because they are facts which underlie the present social order and which are inexcusably forgotten in much of the current discussion of social and religious questions. In fact they are—the one an objection to the Malthusian doctrine of population which Darwin seemed to hint at, that population tends to increase faster than subsistence; and the other, the necessary development or contingency of that part of Darwin's work, which he seemed timid of asserting, or disqualified by his own testimony in his "Autobiography" to argue—the optimism which groups and centres the phenomena of nature about the benevolence of God or what most of us mean when we say God. It is needless to say that these facts are interdependent and would associate

themselves in any thoughtful mind. It is also needless to remark that they circumscribe the problem of evil (which has always puzzled humanity) and the problem of eschatology about which sectarian Christianity has had so much wrangling. It would not be irrelevant to the general discussion to observe that I take for granted the doctrine of evolution, reaffirming Professor Wallace's revolutionary postulates.

Malthus found no greater advertiser of his cruel doctrine than Charles Darwin who, in the third chapter of his "Origin of Species" maintains that the struggle for existence is "the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdoms." Hence our own Agassiz, for he was Americanised enough to be called our own, bitterly opposed "Darwinism" chiefly if not altogether because it conflicted with his notion of a benevolent supreme being and seemed to be, to use his own language, "Malthus all over." To Malthus we are indebted for one of those high sounding formulas—the geometrical and arithmetical ratios—by which the misery of the many seem to be naturally justified, and which among a vast number of people, as J. S. Mill declares, carries far more weight than the clearest reasoning. It is to quote Mr. Mill again "an unlucky attempt to give precision to things which do not admit of it, which every person capable of reasoning must see is wholly superfluous to the argument." And yet Mr. Mill accepted the theory that population tends to increase beyond the means of subsistence. Now Professor Wallace vigorously opposes this view of the universe. He indirectly touches upon the subject in what may yet prove to be an axiom, that the tendency everywhere in nature is to give to animals "the maximum of life and the enjoyment of life with the minimum of suffering and pain." This conclusion in itself carries great weight in as much that, as an indirect argument, it can be employed very effectively against the Malthusian doctrine. For if the reverse were true, if the tendency of nature to furnish animals with the minimum of life and the enjoyment of life or the maximum of suffering and pain, a doctrine which hinting at the method of the universe, Malthus seemed to think was the fatality of all animal creation, then Professor Wallace's work is in vain. Then is God not benevolent but omnipotent and his caprice our inexplicable damnation. The fact is as Professor Wallace has shown that there are innumerable barriers erected by nature herself among her own offspring for the possession of the very thing Malthus and Darwin mournfully despair of, and that everywhere in the sudden catastrophies which befall and accompany animals in their growth and history, catastrophies in which whole species of animals are annihilated, the tendency if not the actual law of the universe is, to ameliorate

the suffering and destroy the pain of the unfortunate. What has usually been supposed to be horrible and agonising pain among the lower animals chiefly, is, in reality, nothing of the kind but is the picturesque fancies of our own pathetic nature—a fact which many of us can testify in our own experience. And along this line Professor Wallace proves conclusively that it is the fear of death as a dreaded crisis among men and a partial cause of much needless and anticipated pain which, horrifying the human mind, makes many imagine must be the *actual condition* among the animal families in the war for the survival of the fittest. And he states that as the death of animals is generally unanticipated and in nearly all cases immediate and not lingering, the fact of their terrible pain is at once preposterous conjecture if not an impossibility. Why some animals should die that others might live is a question which no one has been able to explain yet because it is so is no reason for affirming that the method is derogatory to any animal's happiness or pleasure. It is a presumption which has no foundation in reason—is built upon sophistry and is a part of that pseudo science which has found apologists in every age and among every civilised people on the globe. The fact is as Professor Wallace admits that this daily and hourly struggle, this incessant warfare, is nevertheless the very means by which much of the beauty and harmony and enjoyment in nature is produced, and also affords one of the most important elements in bringing about the origin of species. He adds weight to what some might call his speculative moralising by asserting in contradistinction to Malthus and Darwin that "while the offspring always exceed the parents in number, generally to an enormous extent, *yet the total number of living organisms in the world does not, and cannot, increase year by year.*" "Consequently," he continues, "every year, on the average, as many die as are born, plants as well as animals; and the majority die premature deaths." Of course this fact does not disprove at a single stroke what Winwood Reade writes in his "Martyrdom of Man,"* nor does it furnish any adequate explanation of this very condition he bewails but it disproves the theory of Malthus and hence destroys the lofty superstructure of sophistry which was built upon the assertion that as population tends to increase, the power of subsistence tends to decrease or to be inadequate. Hence the claim made by a rising political economist that poverty as the failure of nature to meet the requirements of an ever increasing population, is a gross

misrepresentation of nature, a caricature of the creator's beneficence, the very opposite of which being really the case, that there is plenty of provision for all the natural wants of animal creation.

When we ascend from such considerations up into the greater thought of an optimism which such facts employ, an interpretation of the universe from the standpoint of benevolence will not seem impertinent. The great conflict in which nations of men and species of animals were actors, has been the means of developing a higher plane and multiplying opportunities for life's enjoyment. The truth is very much as Professor Wallace has stated, that all the slow growths of our race struggling toward a higher life, all the agony of martyrs, all the groans of victims, all the evil and misery and undeserved suffering of the ages, all the struggles for freedom, all the efforts toward justice, all the aspirations for virtue and the wellbeing of humanity, in fact the whole purpose, the only *raison d'être* of the world, with all its complexities of physical structures, with its grand geological progress, the slow evolution of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, is the development of the human spirit in direction of its perfect and perpetual happiness. Professor Wallace has no suggestions to offer on the reconstruction of the universe, although he recognises his utter inability to explain away the fact that pain and pleasure are not one and the same thing—a conclusion to which many philosophers, chiefly Hegelians, give their support. For viewing any and all sensations in man as conditioning some immediate or future beneficent object, Professor Wallace was but carrying out the *a priori* assumption of God's benevolence to its legitimate end when he stated that beings thus trained and strengthened by their surroundings, are surely destined for a higher and more permanent existence than the one in which they now live, and we may confidently believe, he concludes, with our greatest living poet:

"That life is not as idle ore,
But iron dug from central gloom,
And heated hot with burning fears,
And dipped in baths of hissing tears,
And batter'd with the shocks of doom
To shape and use."

There can be no philosophy of life more sound and rational than that one, which being designated "Optimism," traces in the method of the universe, the benevolence of God, and dares to affirm that all things work together for good—that love and the issue of the universe is correlative and at one—that our pleasures are proportioned to the planes upon which we live—that our wills are ours we know not how perhaps, but they are ours to make them what God intended they should be. Into this obscure realm of thinking, where many intellectual giants have become lost, where many millions of earth's children have

*"Pain, grief, disease and death, are these the inventions of a loving God? That no animal shall rise to excellence except by being fatal to the life of others, is this the law of a kind Creator? It is useless to say that pain has its benevolence, that massacre has its mercy. Why is it so ordained that had should be the raw material of good? Pain is not the less pain because it is conducive to development. Here is blood upon the hand still and all the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten it."

buried their hopes in despair and where religion has proven in many instances to be but a will-o'-the-wisp to tempt man to leap from the edge of a sword into a fool's paradise, Shakespeare flashes a light when he says :

"There is nothing good or bad,
But thinking makes it so."

The whole scheme of life—whatever may be the issue—is a fatality approved if not ordained for the wellbeing and eternal happiness of mankind. And it is a matter of small importance whether we stand weeping in utter despair at the order of the universe, or whether like a famous Athenian philosopher we laugh at the follies of man ; for by taking thought we cannot add one cubit to our stature nor change the universe one iota, and we act and shall continue to act, whether through wisdom, sophistry, or prompted by our mechanism, forever in the direction of perfect happiness. For this end Professor Wallace seems to believe our life is destined. And judging by the efforts which many are making to-day to develop paradise among us, we are on the high way to a joy in which many instead of a few will find satisfaction, and by which "Darwinism" truly shall see its final earthly triumph.

ETHICS IN OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

The Voice of New York has published a symposium on the question "Should ethics be taught in our Public Schools? If so, How?" The answers given are mostly affirmative, yet they vary greatly concerning the method of teaching ethics. The answers follow here in concise extracts.

Mr. Amos M. Kellog, editor of *The School Journal* says, "A school that does not teach ethics or morality is to be avoided." A moral act is defined as "a fitting act. It fits the case we are in that we reverence our maker," etc. "Happiness and joy come to those who do the fitting thing."

The editor of *The Open Court* demands that all instruction should be education, and the purpose of all education is to teach man right conduct. Special lessons in morality might be helpful, but since nothing is so apt to become tiresome as moralising, especially gifted teachers would be required. Morality being applied religion, a difficulty in teaching ethics naturally rises wherever people have different religions. The introduction of ethics in our public schools will accordingly lead to a neglect of the properly sectarian element of religious doctrines and gradually produce a common and universal religion. This will be the Religion of Science.

Dr. R. B. Westbrook, the President of the American Secular Union advocates the teaching of secular morality in our state schools. "There is in every child," he says, "a natural sense of oughtness, of duty ; to do right because it is right and because it is most conducive to happiness. To avoid wrong because it is wrong and is sure to result in misery ; this constitutes natural morality—that is secular morality ; and there is no other."

John Bacon, D. D., Ex-President of the Wisconsin State University, recognises the need of teaching ethics. Concerning the how to teach it, he emphasises the spirit in which the daily duties are performed and the healthy tone of the school sustained. Moral teaching should be "constant but never obtrusive." The teachers must freely use "the spiritual convictions." It is a folly for the

teacher to neglect the religious impressions, and it is still greater folly to require him to pass them by.

Professor Felix Adler, of the Society for Ethical Culture, expresses his unwillingness to join in the discussion, because "the time has not yet come for the public agitation of this matter." The right text-books must first be written and if ethical teaching is prematurely introduced into the public schools, it will become a source of danger. Sects will try to introduce their sectarian religious teachings, or it may also be used by crude radicals to introduce radical ideas under the cover of moral teaching. The kind of moral instruction given in the public schools should be strictly and absolutely neutral with regard to all questions of metaphysics and theology. Prof. Adler advises us to proceed with great caution in agitating this matter.

The Rev. Charles G. Ames, of Boston, says: "The ethical element enters synthetically as oxygen into the air we breathe. To administer it separately has not been found to agree with the constitutional craving of children who hate preachiness." The moral sentiments require gracious, tender handling, and are touched most powerfully (1) by a loving personality, (2) by the atmosphere and sunshine of good example, (3) by the continuous discipline of active duty.

Mr. Austin Bierbower of Chicago, Ill., the author of a text-book on ethics, says: "It is not necessary to teach religion in the public schools even if religion be necessary for moral training. . . . While religion presents a basis for morality, and offers some additional motives, these can be taught in connection with the teaching of religion (in the church and Sunday school) and need not be presented in the teaching of ethics any more than the metaphysical basis need be taught, or any more than the religious bearings of geology need be taught in teaching that science."

Mr. T. B. Wakeman desires that "we should have a secular system of education, just as we have a secular system of government. . . . But it is said that a general agreement cannot be obtained as to the means of such education. Let us try and see it!"

Mr. B. O. Flower, the editor of *The Arena*, says: "The great fundamental principle of morals can be developed independent of any dogmatic or theological speculations. . . . To most effectually teach ethics in schools it seems to me that we should have a systematic course of training in which the cardinal virtues should be impressed on the plastic mind of the child. . . . Next we could have ethics laid down in text-books and illustrated by striking incidents in history and biography." Music and hygiene should also form a part of the ethical education.

Josiah Strong, D. D., Secretary of the Evangelical Alliance, demands that Church and State be kept entirely separate, but that we must distinguish between church and religion. Ethical instruction in the public schools, he says, "cannot even be avoided. . . . Ought ethical instruction to include religion? I answer no, not for the sake of religion ; and yes, for the sake of morals. . . . Religion alone affords adequate motives to the practice of moral precepts"—these motives being "the existence of God, the immortality of man, and man's accountability."

The Rt. Rev. Thomas Preston, a Catholic prelate, says that "morality and religion cannot be properly separated. . . . ethics must be taught and with it the principles of religion. . . . But ethics cannot be taught in the public schools without offending many citizens who support these schools. . . . They must be stripped of every reference to ethics or moral principles, and society must look out for itself as to the observance of its own laws."

Mrs. Abby Morton Diaz shows a strong antipathy to text-books. "Text-books?" she says. "Printed lessons in morals? By no means!"

J. W. Bashford, D. D., President of Ohio Wesleyan College, says: "Ethics rest upon a scientific basis and scholars have as much right to be taught this as any other science. . . . We ac-

cept Daniel Webster's authority that the state has not abandoned all moral functions. . . . It is not inconsistent for the teachers of the state to recognise the existence of God." As to ethics, he adds, "I prefer it to be taught only incidentally and in a fragmentary manner."

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Does not this symposium prove that we cannot teach ethics without coming in conflict with some religious views? Indeed we cannot teach ethics without teaching religion—religion being the basis of morality.

By religion we do not understand a system of church doctrines, not the sectarianism of special revelations. Religion is cosmical in its character. We may briefly define religion as our aspiration to live in accord with truth. There is but one religion, viz. that of truth. There are not several contradictory truths, there is but one truth, and we have to search for truth, to inquire into it, to reason it out with all the means at our disposal, in a word we have to find it just as we have to discover natural laws.

The attempt to teach ethics—so-called pure ethics—without finding out the facts upon which ethical rules of conduct are grounded, without having first discovered the natural laws of ethics, will be of little use. It would be like teaching descriptive geometry to pupils who have no idea of geometry itself, its definitions, its theorems, and its methods. On the other hand it will be found to be impossible to teach ethics and leave religious doctrines alone. Ethics is not based upon theological speculations, it is not based upon dogmatical religion. But for that very reason rational ethics must come into conflict with the irrational ethics of an erroneous religiosity. There are enthusiasts who believe that ethics can be taught without coming in conflict with religion (viz. dogmatic religion). They are as much mistaken as would be an advocate of republicanism in a country where there are several royal and imperial pretenders to the throne, trusting that the republic can be introduced without coming in conflict with the assumptions of the pretenders. Religion has no sense unless it be a guide through life, a regulation of conduct, a basis of ethics. The Rt. Rev. Thomas Preston is fully consistent when he declares that morality and religion cannot be properly separated and ethics cannot be taught in the public schools without offending many citizens who support those schools.

Let us not disguise the truth and let us plainly understand the consequences of this proposition. Ethics based upon the facts of life, natural ethics, or ethics as a science (whatever you may be pleased to call the ideal of humanitarian morality) will introduce a new religion, or rather it will purify and reform the old views. It will destroy their errors, their superstitions, their paganism, yet it will bring out more clearly than ever the purely religious kernel of the old religions, it will widen the sects into truly cosmical congregations, not pretending to be catholic, but being catholic, in the original sense of the word.

What will decide the final outcome of this problem that now agitates so powerfully the public mind? The answer is very simple. The question will be decided by a survival of the fittest. If ethics can be taught only through the instrumentalities of church doctrines, the old dogmatic religions will survive. If ethics can best be taught without inquiring into the why of ethics, without basing it (assisted by either science or religion) upon any foundation, pure ethics will survive. But if it is possible to base ethics upon the data of experience so as to derive the rules of conduct from the facts of reality, we shall see in the near future the rise of the religion of science. If the religion of science is possible, (not a religion according to the views of Auguste Comte which is artificial and an imitation of Romanism, but a simple religion of truth,) if it be possible to transform and to reform any old religion so as to become a religion of science whose highest doctrine is to find the truth and to be guided by the truth alone, there is no

doubt that this religion of truth will conquer in the end. It will prove in the long run the strongest, it will come out victorious in the struggle with its competitors and it will be the fittest to survive.

P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SENSIBILITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

It is one of the strangest inconsistencies of our age, permeated as it is with philosophic tendencies, that notwithstanding the extraordinary confusion which arises whenever Metaphysical, Psychological or Philosophical questions are discussed,—owing to the extreme ambiguities of language,—there has as yet never been any persistent attempt to remedy the evil. I say no persistent attempt, because although one very vigorous effort has been made it has unfortunately never been seconded. Why it should be so, it is hard to say. It is true that metaphysicians with a strong theological bias, (I prefer the term theological to dualistic, because it more clearly indicates the real animus which induces certain writers to do their best to perpetuate the confusion,) would find their occupation gone if the nomenclature of philosophy were made as precise as that of science.

The one effort to secure greater precision in the use of terms was made by George Henry Lewes; indeed it was an aim he never ceased to have in view in all his philosophical writings. Many before him had complained of the ambiguities of language,—even among those who profited by the confusion,—but by no one has the resulting mischief been so clearly pointed out, and by no one beside him has such an effort been made to remove it.

Lewes says, "Physical Basis of Mind," p. 322, of the principal psychological terms, for example: "They are employed by different writers, and are understood by different readers, in widely different senses; they denote and connote meanings of various significance. All physicists mean the same thing when they speak of weight, mass, momentum, electricity, heat, etc. All chemists mean the same thing when they speak of affinity, decomposition, oxygen, carbonic acid, etc. All physiologists mean the same thing when they speak of muscle, nerve, nutrition, secretion, etc., but scarcely any two psychologists mean precisely the same thing when they speak of sensation, feeling, thought, volition, consciousness, etc., and these differences of connotation and denotation lead to endless misunderstandings." In another place he admits that "language was formed long before psychology began to interpret mental processes; we have accepted the terms in use, all that we can do is to point out their ambiguities."

There cannot be any doubt that one of the most, if not the most ambiguous of these terms is the term Consciousness. So all pervading is the mischief resulting from the different senses in which this word is employed that I am induced to quote once more Lewes's condemnation of it. He says ("Problems," Vol. iii, p. 143): "Whoever reflects on the numerous ambiguities and misapprehensions to which this term gives rise will regret that it cannot be banished altogether, but since it cannot be banished, our task must be to attempt to give it precise meanings. Generally the term is synonymous with feeling, i. e. sentience; only in this sense may we define psychology to be the science of the facts of consciousness." Now it is in this sense that Lewes believes it would be wise not to employ the term at all, although he adds (p. 152): "Having thus endeavored to explain why it is desirable not to make the term conscious states and sentient states equivalent, . . . let me now add that it will be difficult if not impossible to avoid the occasional use of the term consciousness as the equivalent of sentience owing to the language of philosophers and ordinary writers having so thoroughly identified them."

Mrs. Alice Bodington (*The Open Court*, No. 184) is so far right then in thinking it would have been better to replace both sensibility and consciousness by the Anglo-Saxon word "feeling," though even here we should not altogether escape analogous ambiguities. Sentience (as the subjective aspect of sensibility) would, I think, be better still, and then—as Mrs. Bodington will, I think, perceive—she would be absolutely correct in declining to "see any break throughout the animal kingdom." "Consciousness (sentience) is found from the protozoön to the human infant; and as the brain (nervous mechanism) of the infant matures, gradually expands in the highest cerebral centres into self-consciousness (into the full light of consciousness)."

Mrs. Bodington "cannot conceive of sensibility without consciousness." This obviously depends upon whether consciousness is used in the wider or more restricted, special sense. That the "limb" below the seat of injury in the spine exhibits sentience is obvious, but that it should exhibit consciousness is impossible since it is severed from the organ of consciousness as completely as if amputated.

I have to thank Mrs. Bodington for her extremely courteous reply to my criticism, which I assure her was not penned with the view of inflicting any "vexation"; nor are the further remarks I would beg to offer upon one or two points in her present letter. Mrs. Bodington defines "sensibility as the function of the peripheral sensory nerves which convey impressions made by the outer world to the mysterious energy we know as consciousness." Will Mrs. B. pardon me if I ask her to reflect for awhile on this use of the word "energy" as a synonym for consciousness? I would also ask her to consider whether it is really desirable to "restore to its old dominion" the idea of "a simple supreme ego" as an "entity." I put the queries with all respect, and with a good deal of confidence, because Mrs. Bodington herself displays so well the true scientific spirit when she says that "it is not what one would like to be true, but what is in point of fact the truth."

J. HARRISON ELLIS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

DRAMATIC SKETCHES AND POEMS. By *Louis J. Block*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. 1891.

This is a very pretty book, finely printed and elegantly bound. Its contents are of unequal merit. As verses they are well enough, but some of them will hardly rank as "Poems." They are lame in the feet; having too many, or too few. Prose versified remains prose, even when the metre is even and the cadence true. The tone of these verses is good, although their time, is often bad. They soar aloft at the beginning, but seem unable to stay long upon the wing, and drop like a wounded bird. For instance, in the verses to "Success":

"He has failed, you say:
From the rise to the set of day
His name is not heard:
He has abandoned his lofty schemes
He is lost in idle dreams,
The event has not occurred,
His star is not seen in the sky
There is nothing left him save to die."

Now, if the beginning of that were accepted as good poetry, the sixth line would convert it into feeble prose, "The event has not occurred." "Wild wind of the North," ends better than it begins, and most of it is of a higher quality than much that passes for poetry in these days. The same praise may be given to some other pieces in the book; but what shall be said of this, the conclusion of "Resurgence"?

"Take thou the day and the hour; what though the sun is hidden, what though the clouds are weaving their gray and gloomy engirdment for the pale welkin, what though the air is solemn and

heavy, life, and time, and labor remain thee, and, in the spring-time, swift memorial gleams of the sweet-voiced times which return not, clouds in flocks o'ertravelling the deep blue concave, blossoms, birds, and winds, in whose hearts reposes the measureless sunshine."

All that is prose; its incoherency in places does not convert it into poetry, neither does the breaking of it into blank verse. Some of the pieces give promise that the author will do better by and by.

M. M. T.

NOTES.

Rev. J. C. F. Grumbine proposes in the present number his optimistic views concerning evolution as well as the Deity that shaping the ends of our destinies produces evolution. He bases his belief upon the authority of Professor Wallace and his trust in the benevolence of God—which latter, however, is the assumption to be proved. Mr. Grumbine's philosophy "dares to affirm that all things work together for good" and by good is apparently understood "happiness." This view is a modernised Deism which we are fully convinced is untenable, in its crudest form of the eighteenth century as well as its more refined form of the nineteenth century. The idea of a benevolent Deity (whatever that term may mean, either a personal God or the factors of evolution in nature) stands in a palpable contradiction to the facts of all experience—if benevolent means that God cares for the sufferings of his creatures and wills their happiness so as to procure as many pleasures for them as possible. God, or nature, or the factors of evolution take care that there is no stagnation in life, in history and in evolution in general. Far from being benevolent, the Deity of the world is stern to cruelty. We have more fully expressed our view on the subject in a former article of ours, "The Rise of Consciousness," pp. 363-369 of *The Soul of Man*.

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