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## THE CONCEPTIONS OF GOD.

AMONG the conceptions of God there are three which have been and are still the most prevalent and powerful; these three are Theism, Pantheism, and Atheism.

The Theist anthropomorphises that power which he recognises as the authority of moral conduct, and looks upon it as a stern ruler or a kind father. If evils appear as the consequence of vice, he says: These are God's visitations! And he thinks of God as teaching his creatures his will and enforcing his obedience, not by making the contrary absolutely impossible, but like a wise educator raising children in liberty, allowing them to make mistakes so as to learn by their own experience.

Theism is not wrong if we keep before us the fact that the personality of God is an allegory; and it must be granted that it is the best allegory we can discover. There is a world-order manifesting itself to those who have eyes to see and ears to hear. We have to conform to it and there is no escape from it. It is omnipresent, like all natural laws; like gravitation it is everywhere, it is bound up in all existence, being that something that encompasses all our life.

In describing this omnipresence of God, the psalmist says:

Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?

If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there.

If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea,

Even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me.

There has been made, so long as Christianity exists and even longer, a strong opposition to the idea that God is, like man, an individual being, having at different times different passions and desires. The Old Testament contains the well-known passage: "God is not a man that he should lie; neither the son of man that he should repent."

God is as little a person as are the ideas of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth; and the passages of the Bible in which God is described as wrath or repenting, or as being subject to any emotion or sentiment of a human character, have been understood since they were written, by rabbis no less than by the fathers of

the Church, in an allegorical sense, which was not only appropriate because of the strength and expressiveness of the simile, but because it was also the language of the time. To speak or think of spiritual things otherwise than in the habits of the times would be equivalent to expecting that the author of Genesis should have known Darwin's origin of the species and all the details of natural history when he described in great poetical outlines the formation of the world and the origin of man out of the dust of the earth.

The dogmatic view that God is a person and must be considered as a person became finally established as the orthodox view of the Church during the second and third century after Christ, and in this way all other views were branded as atheism. But who gave to a few narrow-minded bishops and to the theologians of a special school the right to impose this interpretation of the Bible upon all mankind? Who gave the right to Athanasius to pronounce as an œcumenical confession of faith the *Quicumque vult salvus esse*, i. e. "No one can be saved except he believe as is here prescribed." Living the truth can save alone. But the truth cannot be pronounced on the motion of a bishop by the majority decision of an ecclesiastic council. The truth must be searched for; it must be established by careful observation and critique, it must be proved.

We are willing to recognise the truth wherever we find it, even in the errors of the past; we will patiently winnow all opinions and creeds, lest we throw away the wheat together with the useless chaff. But with all that, we do not intend to compromise with superstitions sanctified by traditions. If Athanasius's view of God and other religious conceptions are to be regarded as infallible truth too sacred for criticism and required to be accepted blindly, we shall openly and squarely side with atheism and denounce the belief in God as a superstition.

Atheism is right in the face of dogma and dogmatic theism. There is no person ruling the world; all the processes of nature take place with an intrinsic necessity according to the life that is in everything that exists. The whole world is one great cosmos pervaded by unalterable law.

But was the idea of God not something more than a belief in a huge person? Is it possible that an

enormous error swayed the intellectual development of humanity for millenniums? The strength of the God idea was not its error but its truth, and its truth is contained in the fact, that in spite of the advantages which sin, malevolence, iniquity, falsehood, and disregard of the rights of others seem to bring the evil-doer, humanity still believed in the final victory of justice and the triumph of truth. And this one feature in the idea of God was predominant whenever and wherever it exercised a moral influence over the minds of men. It gave them strength in temptation, hope in affliction, and confidence in tribulation. And shall we relinquish this treasure because it was alloyed with error? Shall we drop with the personality of God all the moral truth which the idea contains?

Schiller says :

"One God exists, one holy will,  
While fickle man may waver.  
Above time and space there liveth still  
The highest idea forever."

If, then, God is no person, if God is considered as the All in All, if Nature alone is God, is not the latter view nearer the truth than theism? This view which identifies God and the world is called Pantheism, and it cannot be denied that in the face of the theistic view, pantheism is a deeper and more correct conception of God. Nevertheless, Pantheism has also its blind side, and most of its defenders are entangled in gross errors.

It is true that the idea of a personal God outside of the world and nature is not tenable; yet the idea of God and the idea of nature are not identical. God is nature in so far only as nature serves us as a regulative principle for our actions. God is the cosmos in so far only as its laws represent the ultimate authority of moral conduct. God is not the heat of the sun, not the rain that descends from the clouds; he is not the blossom of the tree, nor the ear of wheat in the field. The idea of God is a special abstraction, different from other abstractions, and it should not be confounded with them. Pantheism recognising the truth that there is no God outside of the universe, preposterously confounds God and the universe and thus leads to the confusion of a God-Nature, in which there is no wrong, no sin, no evil.

It has been said, and it is true, that the weakness of Pantheism is its inability to explain the evil of the world. If the All is in every respect absolutely identical with God, there is no evil: if everything is a part of God, its existence whatever it be, even the existence of evil, is sanctified by being divine. There would be no wrong, but there would be no right either. The morally bad would disappear together with that which is morally good, and the whole would appear as an absolutely indifferent and meaningless play of physical forces.

Does this state of things really represent life as it

is? Are there no ideals, no aspirations? Is there no direction, no goal, no aim in the evolution of life and in the development of mankind? Surely there is good and bad, there is right and wrong, there is health and sickness, there is prosperity and ruin, evolution and dissolution, building up and breaking down; there is heaven and hell in human hearts, there is God—and the devil. The world as it is is possible only in these contraries, in these oppositions, and its life is a constant struggle between Ormuzd and Ahriman.

It is a vain dream to think of a world which is good throughout. We can as little think of light that casts no shadow as of "good" without being the resistance to "evil," or without standing in a contrast to "bad."

Christ said :

"Woe unto the world because of offences! For it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh."

The Talmud contains a legend that the rabbis had once succeeded in catching the devil and keeping him confined, when lo! the whole world came to a standstill. Everybody went to sleep and all life ceased. Suppose it were possible that a world existed without any evil, it would be a world without any opposites, it would be a world of indifferent homogeneity, without aim, without direction, without interests. If there were at all in an absolutely good world a play of forces evolution would be as good as dissolution, progress would be equivalent to retrogression, and the cosmos would be a machine which might be turned backward just as well as forward.

Could you have a thermometer which indicates the heat only and not the cold at the same time? Good and evil are relations which are deeply founded in the nature of things. These relations arise through the very complications of life. To identify God and the All, to understand by God the upward direction just as much as the downward direction of evolution, is the same mistake as to identify the concepts heat and temperature. It is true that the same degree of the thermometer may now be perceived as heat and now as cold. Heat and cold are not two things mixed in our temperature; they are one. So are good and evil. Nevertheless there is a difference in the rising and the falling of the thermometer. There is a difference of heat and cold. This difference is relative and it disappears as soon as we leave the sphere of relations and consider either a single moment in its unrelated isolation or the total whole in its absolute entirety. A single act in my life if it remained unrelated and isolated could be called neither good nor evil. There is no absolute evil; nor is there any absolute cold. An isolated act would be like a certain position of the thermometer of which we do not know whether it represents a rise or a fall. It becomes hot or cold not

until it is referred to another state of temperature. And there is no sense either in speaking of the morality or immorality of the All in its absolute totality.

That which appears to us from our standpoint as evil—and I do not deny that, considered in this relation, it is actually and undeniably evil—appears if considered in the whole as a part of the total development of universal life, as a transitional and a necessary phase only. It is a partial breakdown, but it is no absolute destruction.

The evil in the world is comparable to the negative magnitudes and quantities in arithmetic. There are no negative things in the world; but there are negative magnitudes in arithmetic. They represent a contrary direction to that which has been posited. The minus is a positive operation, but this operation is employed to reverse a plus of equal magnitude. The plus and minus operations have sense and meaning only if considered in their mutual relation. This relation being neglected we have only single operations or the results of operations, but neither positive nor negative magnitudes. If the impossibility could be thought, that there are no interconnections among the parts of the whole cosmos, we should have neither bad nor good, but only isolated actual existences.

Consider the whole world as a whole and destruction disappears as much as new creations. There are, so far as we can see, only actual existences which move onward somehow in some direction. That which appears to us as a dissolution, as a destruction, is in the motion of the whole a mere preparation for a new generation. The breakdown of a solar system must appear only as an evil, as a negative operation in comparison to the positive operation of a building up. But in the entire cosmic life it will most likely be the indispensable preliminary phase of the construction of a new world. In the entire cosmic life, there is no evil, there is the progress of formation on the one hand and there is on the other hand the dissolution of those combinations which have become unfit for a continued existence. They must be dissolved in order to be prepared for new formations; and thus their dissolution may be considered as a blessing, as much as the curses that rest upon sin, if viewed as integral parts of the whole world-order, are not inflictions; they are as much blessings as the gains that accompany noble deeds.

In this sense we may say that God is everywhere in nature, he is in evolution, he is in dissolution, he will be found in the storm; he will be found in the calm. He lives in the bliss of good aspirations and in the visitations that follow evil actions. He lives in the growth of life and in its decay. God is not the storm, he is not the calm, he is not the decay of life, he is not dissolution. He is not the bliss of virtue, nor is he the curse of sin. But he is in them all.

In contradistinction to Theism, Atheism, and especially to Pantheism, we call this conception of God Etheism.

God is the indestructible *sursum*, which ensouls everything that exists, which constitutes the direction of evolution and the growth of life, which is the truth in the empire of spiritual existence. It is an actuality, no less than matter and energy; and indeed like these two, which represent as it were God's reality as well as his power and omnipotence, it cannot be lost in all the changes that take place in the constant formation, dissolution, and re-formation of solar systems. It is eternal, and it is in him we live and and move and have our being.

#### THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MAGIC.

BY L. J. VANCE.

[CONTINUED.]

A writer in the *Atlantic Monthly*\* has said: "Magic had its beginning in devil-worship." Than this nothing could be more plain, but can anything be more false? There have been all sorts of guesses about the origin of magic. Pomponazzi's attempt to explain the phenomena of magic by the influence of the stars,† is no worse than the modern attempt to find the beginning of magic in devil-worship.

Here, let us follow if we can, from the beginning to the end, the magical idea that man has power over the supernatural. This brings up the main elements of savage philosophy which, as Major Powell says, "is the result of *man's struggle to know*."‡ Or, as Mr. Tylor puts it: "Man's craving to know the causes at work in each event he witnesses, the reasons why each state of things he surveys is such as it is and no other is no product of high civilisation, but a characteristic of his race down to its lowest stages."§

Bearing in mind the savage mental *status* already described, we find that the phenomena of the outside world are all explained on supernatural principles. "The Hurons," says Charlevoix, "attribute the most ordinary effects to supernatural causes." What is the savage theory of causation? Man's "first explanations," says Mr. Powell, "were based on analogies with phenomena of his own existence subjectively interpreted."

An example or two may serve to explain more clearly the difference in the philosophies of uncultured and civilised men. The Rev. Francis Newman was going on a distant journey in the wilds of Asia. The natives tied around the neck of the mule a small bag supposed to have great magical virtue. Mr. Newman thought it a good opportunity to disprove a supersti-

\* For May, 1882.

† Lecky's *Rationalism in Europe*, Vol. 1, p. 284.

‡ *Trans. Anthropol. Soc.* Vol. 11, p. 205.

§ *Primitive Culture*, 1, p. 369.

tious notion; so he cut off the bag. "But as ill-fortune would have it, the mule had not gone 30 yards up the street before she put her foot into a hole and broke her leg." Of course all the natives were confirmed in their magical faith. They said with some satisfaction: "Now you see what happens to unbelievers!" Again, the arrival of the Jesuit missionaries among the Hurons was followed by, or coincident with, certain misfortune to the tribe. The Hurons were satisfied, for instance, that Father Charlevoix's clock brought bad luck; that his weather-cock brought bad weather, and so forth.

It is easy now to see how the savage philosophy of causation is at the bottom of magic. At the outset, we find that supernatural causes are assumed to produce the most ordinary and natural effects. Can man work supernaturally? Of course he can, and that belief finds continual expression in art magic.

Once more, according to savage philosophy, *antecedence and consequence in time* stand in the relation of cause and effect. The Egyptians reasoned in that way; "for when aught prodigious occurs," says Herodotus, "they keep good watch and write down what follows; and then, if anything like the prodigy be repeated, they expect the same events to follow as before." Mr. Lang, who has worked out this portion of the subject, says: "We see the same confusion between antecedence and consequence in time on one side, and cause and effect on the other, when the Red Indians aver that birds actually bring winds and storms, or fair weather."

To recapitulate: the general principles which underlie all magical reasoning are:

I. That like affects, influences and suggests like.

II. That natural effects are the results of supernatural causes; that coincidence stands for cause.

III. That antecedence and consequence in time are the same as cause and effect. *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc.*

VI. That certain people, "not in the rôle of common mortals," are in communication with spiritual powers, which are obedient to their will.

No study of the natural history of magic would be complete without some account of the practical application of magical reasoning to the wants and demands of every-day life. For, what makes magic magical, in the ordinary sense of the word, is the putting of wild, absurd and illogical ideas into daily practice. Now, the semi-cultured man means to be extremely practical. He uses magic in song, in dance, and in medicine for definite practical purposes. His magical arts are not *pour l'art*, but because they are useful to him. If the savage wishes to shoot game, to injure an enemy, to drive away evil spirits, or to recover from a fit of sickness, he goes about to ac-

complish his purposes in what he thinks to be the most practical way. Any notion that savage magic is *not practical* will be dispelled by a study of the beliefs and practices which are always used in a low stage of culture. As an illustration, we may mention that in the Pacific Islands charms are hung up to keep thieves out of the cultivated plots; a few cocoa-nut leaves plaited in the form of a shark will cause the thief who disregards it to be eaten by a real one; two sticks set one across the other will send a pain right across his body.\*

Again, the savage verily believes that his medicine-men or Shamans can work for him practical results. He thinks, as we have seen, that human power will and can work supernaturally. On this belief, as Mr. Lang observes, "on this belief in man's power to affect events beyond the limits of natural possibility is based the whole theory of magic, the whole power of sorcerers." As a natural result of this belief, the doctor-wizard is the most practical man in the tribe. He can bring health, wealth and prosperity. When Mr. Turner was in Polynesia, he was disturbed night after night by the melancholy beating of shells, entreating the wizards to stop plaguing their victims.

Once more, the savage is a firm believer in the power of songs and incantations. He uses this kind of magic to drive evil spirits away, just as David drove the evil demon from Saul by his song and harp playing. The belief in the magical power of songs and incantations is found all over the world. It is a prominent feature in all magic, whether ancient or modern. Many of these magical songs are preserved in ritual; many survive in *märchen* or household tales.

In addition to these forms of magic, we find among savages the belief in the power of charms, and in a kind of "luck." Sticks and stones are no longer worshipped, but they are endowed with certain magical properties, chiefly in the way of charms. But why is any stick or stone lucky? That is not always easy to say. Somehow particular objects are believed to bring success, and, to the mind of the semi-cultured man, that is enough to make them "lucky." Just as the Indian hunter wears the claws of the grizzly bear that he may be endowed with its courage and ferocity, so he carries a bit of stone, perhaps, "for luck." As, even in our own day, there are people who carry a bent nail, a potato, a button, and so forth, "just for luck," you know.

Thus, there are three forms of magic which specially call for our attention. They are (1) the magic of the Shaman, (2) the magic of songs and incantations and (3) the magic of charms and of luck.

1. To understand the magic of the Shaman it is necessary to show how he comes by his miraculous

\* Tyler, "Early History," p. 130.

powers. It has now to be shown what claims the Shaman has to be considered as a magician. Let us see how he goes to work. A good example is given by Mr. Dall.\* He thus describes the methods in vogue among the Alaskans: "When the young aspirant for the position of medicine-man goes out into the woods, after fasting for a considerable period, in order that his to be familiar spirit may seek him, and that he may become possessed of the power to communicate with supernatural beings, if successful, he meets with a river otter, which is a supernatural animal." He kills the otter, and "takes out the tongue, after which he is able to understand the language of all inanimate objects, of birds, animals and all other living creatures. He preserves the otter's tongue with the utmost care in a little bag around his neck."

It is a "far cry" from Alaska to Australia, but the methods by which the medicine-man gains his magic is pretty much the same the world over. In Australia, according to Mr. Howitt, "the manner in which a man became a Bira-ark (wizard) was generally believed to be that being found alone in the forest by the Mrarts (ghosts), they took him up with them, and taught him."†

The belief that the magician of the tribe can communicate with the spirits is universal among savages. Thus, Mr. Brough Smyth mentions a case in which the wizard lying on his stomach spoke to the deceased, and the other sitting by his side received the message which the dead man told.‡

Now, the arts of the magician would be in vain unless he possessed power over the spirits with which he claims to be in communication. The savage really believes that the wizard of the tribe has this supernatural power. Thus, in an Ojibwa pictograph given by Schoolcraft, *power* corresponds with the sign for medicine-man or doctor. Garrick Mallery in his valuable study of gesture language gives the sign for medicine-man as follows: "Passing the extended and separated index and second fingers of the right hand upward from the forehead, spirally," indicates superior knowledge.§ He also gives another sign thus: "The hand passed upward before the forehead with the index finger loosely extended with the sign for *sky*," means knowledge of superior matters—spiritual power.

Here let us distinguish between the magician proper and the medicine-man. The line has been drawn by Mr. Schoolcraft. He says: "The Meda is a magician. He is the professor of the arts of the Grand Medicine Dance. He makes use of various articles which are supposed to have the power of cur-

ing the sick. . . . He is, however, professedly a magician. The power imparted to his medicines and charms is ascribed to necromancy. . . . The only use he makes of medicine is one wholly connected with the doctrine of magic. He is a seer, a soothsayer, a fortune-teller, a diviner and a prophet."\*

Here, again, we come to the medicine practice of the savage. As we have seen, disease is attributed to evil spirits; the question being, not, How did the man die, but Who killed him? Now, the remedies of the savage are wholly magical. It is the business of the medicine-man to drive out the evil spirit; in other words, to practice his magical art. This is a feature of magic which calls for some illustration.

An excellent summary of the attributes of the Mojave doctor-wizard is given by Capt. John G. Bourke of the U. S. Army: "Mojave doctors are born, not trained. Their gifts are supernatural, not acquired. They can talk to the spirits before they have left their mother's womb. There are spirit doctors who are clairvoyants and exorcists; they talk to spirits. There are snake doctors who cure snake bites; sometimes by suction, sometimes by rubbing something on the wound, but generally by singing."†

Our idea of the medical practice of people in a low stage of culture is confirmed by Mr. James Morney's account of Cherokee theory and practice of medicine.‡ Thus, "plants are selected from some connection between their appearance and the symptoms of the disease." Here we find again the "like to like" theory; that you can cure a man by applying a plant of the color of the symptoms, etc. Among the Cherokees, biliousness is treated "with a decoction of several plants also called *Da lani*, from the color of the root, flower or bark." So, too, in treating for a snake bite, the doctor rubs his finger around the spot from left to right, "because the snake always coils from right to left."

Mr. Mooney proceeds: "The Cherokee doctor works to drive out a ghost or devil." Again, "every doctor is a priest, and every application is a religious act accompanied by a prayer. In these prayers the doctor first endeavors to show his contempt for the disease spirit by belittling it as much as possible, so as to convey the impression that he is not afraid of it."

Now observe how the Cherokee doctor goes to work to cure the patient. "Sometimes the medicine is blown from the mouth of the doctor upon the body of the patient, according to certain rules. . . . In every instance a prayer or sacred *song* accompanies the application."

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

\* Rept. Bur. Ethn., 1881-2, pp. 111-112.

† Journ. Anth. Inst., vol. 13, p. 185.

‡ Aborigines of Australia, 1, p. 107.

§ First Ad. Rept. Bureau Ethn., p. 330.

\* Indian Tribes of U. S., edited by Drake, Vol. I. p. 73.

† Journal of Am. F. L., vol. 2, p. 172.

‡ Journ. Am. F. L., vol. 3, p. 47.

## THE TRAGEDY AT NEW ORLEANS.

BY M. M. TRUMBULL.

THE chief topic of the time is the controversy between the United States and Italy. The cause of the dispute is the tragedy at New Orleans, and the difficulties of it grow out of the unsettled state of international politics and law. How far was Italy as a nation injured by the action of the mob at New Orleans; and what legal power has the United States to grant redress, either by punishing the actors in the drama, or by making compensation in money to the families of the victims? As to the character of the killing, after admitting all the provocation claimed for it, there still remains upon the heart and mind the painful feeling that it was an act of sanguinary vengeance intensified by race prejudice, an Apache execution, irrational and barbarous. The victory of eleven hundred armed men over eleven men unarmed and in prison is an achievement not great in chivalry. If Italy has any standing in an international court at all, the evidence and the argument are largely on her side, but the right of that country to interfere for the victims of the riot may fairly be disputed, since they had in reality ceased to be citizens of Italy.

What standing has Italy in the court? It is claimed that four of the men slain in prison were Italian subjects, having never assumed the obligations nor sought the protection of naturalization in America. This raises the question, how far a man may claim the protection of two governments while acknowledging service to neither. Those four men had renounced their allegiance to Italy by the substantial act of abandoning that country to become permanent residents of the United States. They could claim American protection for their property and their persons; but when required to serve on a jury, or in the army, or the militia, or to vote, or to perform any other duty belonging to citizenship, they instantly became exempt, and under the protection of Italy. In the same way, if required by the Italian government to render any duties to Italy, they could laugh at the demand, and place themselves under the protection of the United States.

Thousands of men of all sorts of nationalities choose to live in the United States claiming the protection of two countries without owning responsibility to either. Those four men who are the subjects of this international controversy were as much outside the political pale of Italy as if they had been born in Louisiana, or as the other seven who had formally taken the oath of allegiance to the United States. The treaty stipulations by which it is agreed that Americans shall be protected in Italy, and Italians in America, apply only to those who are in good faith foreigners, transitory persons having a temporary residence either for business purposes or pleasure; it has no application to permanent residents, whether they call themselves aliens, denizens, or citizens. Voluntarily those four men had withdrawn themselves from the guardianship of Italy, and that country might very properly have treated them as no longer a part of the Italian people. The United States might also take the same ground and insist upon it that by their own action they had renounced Italy and had become a part of the American people, but unfortunately the United States is on record against that principle.

Whether the position just assumed is correct or not, the United States is estopped from taking it. We have pressed the immunity and impunity of American citizenship to unreasonable extremes, and we have been more ostentatious than any other nation in wrapping our flag around criminals in foreign countries, under the plea, sometimes true and sometimes not, that at some previous period they had become naturalized American citizens. Only a few years ago a member of a Dublin "*Mafia*" who had been appointed to murder an informer, having deliberately and effectually performed the work, was tried for the crime, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged. There was no doubt about his guilt, yet the

government of the United States, on the unsupported claim that he had taken out his first papers, requested the government of Great Britain to arrest the sentence against the murderer. Not only that, but Congress passed a resolution asking a respite for the criminal, that matters might be shown which would entitle him to a new trial. Out of respect for the American government a respite was granted, but nothing was shown, or could be shown in favor of a new trial and the man was finally hanged. This is only one specimen of our interference with the laws against offenders in foreign countries under the pretense that the criminals were nominally citizens of the United States.

When Italy, out of regard for the safety of Italians in America, and in vindication of her own dignity, appeals to the treaty for atonement, we are compelled to plead that the security for our citizens which we have exacted from other nations we are not able to give to their citizens in return; that literally we are a nation without sovereign powers in our own territory, and that the question of retribution belongs exclusively to the State of Louisiana a State which politically Italy does not know, a State which is forbidden by the American constitution to have any political relations with Italy, either by treaty, or in any other way. We are very impatient because the Italian government does not seem to understand this curious anomaly; but let us imagine eleven Americans in Genoa, accused of crime, tried by an Italian jury and acquitted, immediately put to death in prison by the "leading citizens" of the town; would we not regard with surprise and scorn a plea of the Italian king that by the constitution of United Italy the national government had no criminal jurisdiction in Genoa. We should very promptly say that Italy could not plead its own constitution as an acquittal of its obligations to other nations.

It is hardly necessary to say that the plea of justification offered in this case would be demurred out of any international court in Christendom as not binding upon Italy. The charge that the murdered Italians were themselves the murderers of Hennessy was answered by the verdict of the jury, and in this controversy that verdict is conclusive on the *side of Italy*; that the jury was bribed and all the rest of it, is mere assertion without any legal evidence to support it; and even if all the excuses be admitted, the fact remains that the victims were Italians, confined in an American prison, and that they were illegally put to death by a mob, with at least the passive sanction of the mayor and other magistrates of New Orleans. As to the complaint that the Italian government has been rash and hasty in recalling the Italian ambassador from Washington, let us imagine again the case of eleven Americans illegally put to death in Genoa, and how long would it take us to withdraw our minister from Italy?

As to menaces, we heed them not; the United States is war-proof; but a nation too powerful to fear war ought to be too magnanimous to desire it. The tone of the Jingo press is not a true echo from the conscience of our people, although it might lead foreigners to suspect that we aspire to be the swaggering cowboy among the nations. Our very invincibility ought to make us just and kindly considerate, yet some of our papers appear to be edited by Captain Bobadil, they are so full of challenge and conceit. Especially sensitive in our own intercourse with foreign countries we sometimes forget that other people have national spirit and some patriotic feeling. Several years ago one of our most intensely American journalists, in an article criticising the conduct of our ambassadors to foreign courts, asked this question, "Is the United States a gentleman?" a very pertinent sarcasm, for the rules of good behavior apply to nations as to men. We may rudely defy the opinion of the outside world, but we cannot hide from our inner consciousness that the unfortunate affair at New Orleans has lowered us in our own esteem.

There ought to be magnanimity on both sides. The Italian government should consider the vast foreign population perma-

nently residing in the United States, and how impossible and unreasonable it would be to hold the government of this country answerable to all the nations of the earth respectively for whatever injuries may be inflicted here upon their former subjects. A very slight change of circumstances would reverse the position of the parties to this cause, making the United States plaintiff, and Italy defendant. Suppose, for instance, the men slain at New Orleans had gone back to their native land a couple of years ago, to live there for the rest of their lives, and suppose them claiming to be American citizens, appealing to the United States to redress wrongs done them in Italy, we might at this very moment be demanding reparation from Italy on their account, as Italy is demanding it from us. Such are the anomalies that result from straining beyond its legitimate province the privilege acquired by naturalization.

#### SOME REVIEWS OF "THE SOUL OF MAN."

WHILE glancing over some of the reviews of "The Soul of Man," I was astonished to find the book characterised as representing materialism, or mechanical positivism, or mechanical monism. It is strange how people can read into a book the ideas which they expect to find. Sometimes the things which reviewers sum up as the contents of the book are just the contrary of what the book contains.

A critic in *The Week* of Toronto, Canada, speaks of monistic positivism, but how much is he mistaken in what it means! The following extracts show how little acquainted he is with the ideas set forth in "The Soul of Man":

"By monistic positivism is meant a philosophy which postulates 'The All.'"

Positivism is a philosophy which knows of no postulates, but takes the positive facts of experience as its data.

"... It is positive because there is no reality, no selective activity, mind, but the law of 'The All' is mechanical."

When did I ever declare "mind" to be no reality? There is no selective faculty in the sense of "hypermolecular impulses," but there is mind, and mind is a reality.

When did I ever declare that the law of "the All" is mechanical? I maintained that all motions are mechanical, but feeling is not mechanical. The supposed interconvertibility of feeling and motion has been expressly declared to be an error.

"The 'All' is discovered mainly that it may be worshipped."

We have never proposed to worship the All.

"The book before us tells us how far the Monistic Positivists have now got. They have some information of the nervous system—principally cuts taken from authorities... whom they call the fathers of Monistic Positivism."

Does the critic of *The Week* think that Monistic Positivism is a sect? What a queer notion to call our great physiologists the fathers of Monistic Positivism!

*The Independent* says:

"So far as the book has any consistent standpoint it is that of mechanical monism."

In a similar strain *The Christian Union* pronounces its verdict. It says:

"Dr. Carus is convinced that anatomy and physiology are the only proper pathways of knowledge to the nature of the soul. This is in outline what we understand to be his philosophy of things. There are entities or centres of energy which may be named atoms. These tend to cohere, and when they have collected they become an organism. The organisms also tend to congregate, and when they have succeeded, the result is a body. The energy is manifested double, whether in the simpler atom or the germ. It works outwards in its relations to others, and inward to preservation of self. When the congregation of entities or germs is complete, this outward working centralises, and is manifested as life, and, in its highest condition, soul."

"The real question is whether his physiological psychology is true. It cannot be dismissed easily as blank materialism of the pantheistic school... Nevertheless, a question or two may be asked. What brings together, first of

all, these entities? Why do they tend to congregate, and how do we know anything of the matter? Is not this whole theory, therefore, built upon an unproved hypothesis? How do we know that life is only a mode of energy?—for surely this is implied in the monistic theory."

Is this muddle of words supposed to be a summary of my views? My first idea was that my representation of the subject must have been lacking in clearness, although my critic adds:

"Dr. Carus's book possesses the merit of clearness and frankness; though we utterly differ from his fundamental hypothesis."

I am much obliged for this praise, but I fear, it has been allotted too rashly. My critic says, "Dr. Carus is convinced that anatomy and physiology are the only proper pathways of knowledge to the nature of the soul," whereas I maintain, that although anatomy and physiology are indispensable, they are not by any means exclusively sufficient for a proper study of the human soul.

I have to add that I nowhere spoke of "entities" nor of "centres of energy." I did not say that "life is only a mode of energy." I said that "the energy which living beings expend in their activity, in their motions, their passions, and in their thoughts, is the same energy that we meet with everywhere, and which is produced in animal bodies in a more complicated way, yet in a similar manner as work is done by machines." In other words, life is a mode of energy *in so far only* as the motions of living organisms are considered. Thought is no energy, feeling is no energy; but when man thinks and when he feels, energy is expended.

My first thought was that I had not made my views clear enough, when I met with another view in *The Reform Advocate*, which, I am informed, comes from the pen of the editor, Dr. Hirsch. My view is summed up in the following words:

"Aaatomy and physiology alone do not suffice to give the key to the riddles of life and the universe. The *gritige Band* of which Goethe speaks is not found along the lines of dissection. . . . Dr. Carus is a monist. His philosophy is positive. But not the crude positivism of Comte and his blind followers, much rather the loftier, because in the true sense of the term, more ideal positivism of Noiré would have his qualified assent. . . . The concluding chapters of the book are those which interested us most, and for which we are extremely thankful to the Doctor. Two classes of men might with good results study these. The unyielding orthodox and the equally dogmatic atheist. Their dogmatism is well exposed. That God and immortality are not concepts which deserve merely a pitying scornful smile, or an impatient shrug of the shoulder, the altogether too loud agnostic of younger years might well study in this book. His teacher is a man of the greatest liberality of views, free from the trammels of theological prejudices. . . . It is refreshing to find one who speaks clearly on these things after the haze of would be enlightened twaddle. His discussion of the relation and the difference of Nature and God is to our mind one of the most suggestive of the volume. And what has pleased us most is the emphasis with which he picks the presumption of basing ethics on happiness or any other foundation save that of an eternal outlook. . . . His religion of the future has in very truth all the essentials of the faith which alone can win the assent and devotion of the thinker."

Am I mistaken if I suspect both my critics, the reviewer of *The Week* and the reviewer of the *Christian Union* to be clergymen? It seems to me most difficult to a certain class of pious believers to understand and to state with objective impartiality the views of others. The critic of *The Week* says:

"The avowed purpose of Monistic Positivists is to build up a religion on monistic positivism. . . . A science which has repudiated in turn the dogmatic of the scholastics and the "natural religion" of Auguste Comte is now too independent to show much patience toward this new form of irreligious seduction."

Is it so difficult for a theologian to give to science what belongs to science? It is sometimes notable how little theologians care and how little they try to understand scientific methods of investigation. Their lack of scientific insight is plainly shown when they denounce physiological psychology as materialism because they consider it a denial of the spiritual element of the soul. Dr. Hirsch is also a theologian, but he appears almost as an exception. There are very few who recognise with him that science can have her full due without the slightest detraction from true religion.

## A JAPANESE SWORD.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

I was the spirit of Japan,  
I, the ennobler, I, the sword;  
Of all her islands I was lord  
And with me power to bless or ban.

I made the boor a gentleman;  
I taught the striving mass accord  
In gentle ways; for my reward  
They kept me bright as honor can.

New days are come, old days are dead,  
And warriors now no more rely  
On valiant steel but worthless lead.

My servant once, the Samurai,  
Now wields the yardstick in my stead,  
For it is mightier than I.

## A REPLY.

BY MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).

What meaneth this despondent mind?  
And when shall idle wishing cease?  
We cannot leave the world behind,  
But conquering it we may find peace.

Perchance if hence one could depart,  
Soon might he yearn to come again;  
O show the world a gentle heart,  
Whose joy lies in assuaging pain!

Irrevocably fades the leaf,  
And strength of youth shall pass away;  
There are abysses dark to grief—  
Alas! the deepest hell are they!

We see them; over them we go,  
Not halting in the eager race;  
And happiness lies close to woe,  
And grief and mirth with life keep pace.

The moon is sailing o'er the sky,  
Now shining full, now lost to sight;  
So, too, this changeful life doth fly,  
Evanshing in clouds of night.

—Platen.

## BOOK REVIEWS.

KATECHISMUS DER HANDLESE-KUNST. Bearbeitet von *Gustav Gessmann*. Mit 19 Tafeln. Berlin: Verlag von Karl Siegismund.

The author of this interesting little pamphlet has compiled from several sources the data of Chiromantic belief, and explains them in concise outlines with the assistance of many instructive plates. Chirosophy, or the science of reading the character and fate of a person in the formation and lines of his hands, is a quaint study, and we do not deny that there is some truth in it. We may for instance distinguish a farmer, a tailor, a scholar, or a blacksmith simply by looking at their hands, but we cannot go so far as Mr. Gessmann goes, who considers Chiromancy as a regular science, which has the same rights as for instance "Meteorology, which upon the foundation of known facts and according to certain rules of experience prophecies the probability of rain, snow, storm, etc." Let alone other things, Chiromancy is an amusing pastime, and those who wish to know something about the heart line, the head line, the lines of life, of health, of the sun, the characteristics of artistic, psychical, square, and spade-like hands, or other details of this branch of occult knowledge will find this little pamphlet very useful.

KPS.

RELIGION OF MAN AND ETHICS OF SCIENCE. By *Hudson Tuttle*  
New York: M. L. Holbrook & Co.

This book does not represent our views, its author belongs to that class of thinkers who are generally called spiritualists. We find, nevertheless, many ideas which meet with our hearty sympathy and approval. This is true mainly of the ethical truths. The present book is intended to set forth the Religion of Man in opposition to the Religion of the Gods, the former being conceived of as the religion of the future, the latter as the religion of the past. Mr. Hudson Tuttle says:

"The Religion of the Gods comes from without, as a foreign system, to be received by the servile devotee; the Religion of Man originates from within, and is a normal growth of humanity."

"The field is new; broad as the universe; profound as the depths of space; as high as heaven."

The question What is Religion? is answered on p. 63 as "Devotion to the right, consecration to duty, unshrinking self-sacrifice."

KPS.

## NOTES.

Lieut. Col. M. von Egidy whose pamphlet "Ernst Gedanken," was the subject of a few comments in a former number of *The Open Court*, is continuing his missionary work of religious reformation and has sent us a number of tracts of the same tendency as the pamphlet mentioned.

We have received from Dr. William J. Harris, United States Commissioner of Education, a brochure of seventy-seven pages, (with portrait frontispiece) entitled "Thoughts on Educational Psychology." The reflections of Dr. Harris will be read with interest by all. Dr. Harris also sends us a pamphlet on "The Right of Property and the Ownership of Land."

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P. O. DRAWER F.

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## CONTENTS OF NO. 190.

THE CONCEPTIONS OF GOD.....	2771
THE NATURAL HISTORY OF MAGIC. (Continued.)	
L. J. VANCE.....	2773
THE TRAGEDY AT NEW ORLEANS. GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL.....	2776
SOME REVIEWS OF "THE SOUL OF MAN." EDITOR.	2777
POETRY.	
A Japanese Sword. LOUIS BELROSE, JR.....	2778
A Reply. MARY MORGAN (GOWAN LEA).....	2778
BOOK REVIEWS.....	2778
NOTES.....	2778