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COMTE'S GOSPEL OF WEALTH.

BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.

IN subscribing to the opinion of Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill declared that "the clumsy method of regulating by competition the proportion of product that goes to the workman, may represent a practical necessity, but certainly does not represent a moral ideal; and that until operatives and employers accomplish the work of industry in the spirit in which soldiers accomplish that of an army, industry will never be moralised."

When these lines were written, a generation ago, such matters were looked upon by practical men as entirely out of their line, but, as Freeman says, "when statesmen who pride themselves chiefly on common sense, when newspapers which pride themselves on a certain air of dignified infallibility, make light of a question or of a movement, when they scorn it, when they snub it, when they call it sentimental, when they rule it to be beyond the range of practical politics, we know almost as certainly as we know the next eclipse of the moon, that the question will be the most practical of all questions before long."

The advocate of social reform is already in respectable company and the adherence of so practical a statesman as Mr. Gladstone must place the movement beyond the period of scorn. But it cannot be denied that the army of the well-meaning is still composed of awkward squads.

In an article entitled "Mr. Carnegie's Gospel of Wealth" the Ex-Premier points out that in our day, when the possession of land is no longer the principal form of property, the kind of wealth that chiefly grows "is what may be called irresponsible wealth; wealth little watched and checked by opinion, little brought into contact with duty." To awaken and stimulate a sense of responsibility in favor of the suffering poor, he advises the formation of a society whose members shall pledge themselves to give in charity a part of their yearly income, each one to decide for himself in advance how much that part shall be.

Among the different motives that may be relied upon to aid in this good work the devotion to others that Comte named *altruism* is mentioned, and this word recalls to us its author's own plan of social amelioration.

Unfortunately all reference to the sociological doctrines of this greatest of systematisers necessitates a preliminary disclaimer of much that will not bear the test of his own method and of most of what came after the six volumes of Positive Philosophy. We are not responsible for the "nervous crisis" and the "virtuous passion" that coincided with the initial elaboration of his second work and filled it with sentimental mysticism. History abounds in similar perturbations from Troy to Tipperary, and we can only deplore the accident that deprived us of a worthy sequel to the writings that have placed Comte among the greatest thinkers of all time.

Littré proposed as an exercise for students of history the research of what is necessary and of what is accidental in historical evolution; of what might have been different and of what could not have been different; and he suggests subjects of composition in which an accidental is suppressed and a sketch required of what would have come to pass in such an hypothesis. The accidental depending upon the intervention in social events of biological, chemical, or cosmic conditions; the necessary depending upon the nature of societies and the law of their development.

As an additional exercise some of the more tangled passages of biography or of general history might be given, and the students required to *look for the woman*.

According to Comte "the political and moral crisis that societies are now undergoing arises out of intellectual anarchy. While stability in fundamental maxims is the first condition of genuine social order, we are suffering under an utter disagreement, and until a certain number of general ideas can be acknowledged as a rallying point of social doctrine our institutions can be only provisional."

This agreement upon fundamental maxims can be brought about only by consolidating the whole of our acquired knowledge into one body of homogeneous doctrine, which will have the assent of all men of superior intelligence and thus acquire the support of an enlightened public opinion. "There can be no doubt that the legitimate complaints lodged by the masses against a system under which their general needs are too little considered, relate to a renovation of opinions and manners, and could not be satisfied by express institutions. This is especially true in re-

gard to the evils inherent in the inequality of wealth, which afford the most dangerous theme to both agitators and dreamers; for these evils derive their force much more from our intellectual and moral disorder than from the imperfections of political measures."

Having completed what Mill calls his profound and comprehensive analysis of history, and traced the progress of humanity in the past, Comte proceeded to institute an elaborate system for the reorganisation of society; as if the science of sociology had been already far advanced. Littré explains what had really been done, besides the establishment of the method, by comparing this sketch of the development of history to what would be in biology a treatise on the evolution of the individual from age to age; and, continuing the comparison, he says that in sociology there had been no treatise equivalent to a physiology.

Notwithstanding the ridiculous final result of this attempt to accomplish, by a change from the objective to the subjective method, what must be the work of succeeding generations, it is interesting to note certain points of resemblance between Comte's plan, half a century old, and the tendencies of to-day.

At the base of his system is the division between the spiritual and the temporal authority. During the Middle Ages the church "constituted a power that infused morality into political government." Unity of faith gave the Pope and the clergy authority over kings in the interpretation of God's will; and equally respected by all, the priest became the guide of the strong and the protector of the weak. This unity having ceased to exist, the spiritual power must fall to the representatives of the new unity and a body of philosophers is created to direct education, show all men their duty and hold them to it with the aid of public opinion. These, like all other members of the speculative class, must renounce riches and political employment and content themselves with a modest subsidy and universal consideration.

The temporal government will be in the hands of capitalists whose dignity and authority will correspond with the generality of their operations; the bankers in the first rank, then the merchants, then the manufacturers, and finally the agriculturists, with the great mass of workmen at the base. After dividing the different nations into a number of small republics, the chief authority in each is given to a triumvirate of its three principal bankers, who are to have charge of the state department, the interior department, and the treasury department. There will be no need of a secretary of war, or of a secretary of the navy, and the postmaster-general, being a man of letters, will probably represent the spiritual power as a delegate from the High Priest of Humanity, unless present signs fail.

The capitalist is regarded as a public functionary and his relations to society are similar to those approved by many socialists, but Comte proposed to accomplish by education and the force of public opinion what they would establish by political institutions. According to his plan we must discard the distinction between public and private functions. "There is a public utility in the humblest office of co-operation, no less than in the loftiest function of government. Other men would feel, if their labor were but systematised, as the private soldier feels in the discharge of his humblest duty, the dignity of public service, and the honor of a share in the action of the general economy."

He saw in the influence that belonged to men of letters and to metaphysicians in his day a partial recognition of the necessity of a separate spiritual government, and this influence has increased as metaphysics have become more and more like systematised common sense, and as the power of the press to mould opinion and control practical politics has grown with the extension of journalism.

Still there is no subsidised body of public censors in sight, and the members of the press have not yet shown a devotion to the "modesty" of their stipend and an aversion to temporal power that would indicate the speculative vocation. Regarding their appointment as ministers to foreign courts, it is in strict accordance with the system of the great positivist, who placed international relations in charge of the spiritual authority; but, of course, it is possible that President Harrison was not influenced by this fact.

Another example of the spirit of the system is seen in the endeavor of the committees of one hundred, more or less, to moralise politics. In one of our states such influence recently kept the protégé of a thief from being elected governor, and as the unsuccessful candidate has since been arrested several times for embezzlement, it is generally admitted, outside of political circles, that the interference was not unwise.

The members of the clergy that have given up perfunctory sparring with the devil and gone at him with a will by "taking the pulpit into politics" are also in accord with what Comte considered the duty of the spiritual power.

If we turn to things temporal we find greater similarity between what is and what he said ought to be in this industrial era, for capital reigns supreme. The forms of a representative government are still retained but the sovereign people are not consulted in the choice of the lobby and the lobby makes the law. But there is one marked difference between the present condition of affairs and that established by the System of Positive Politics; in the latter wealth governs directly and is responsible to public opinion, and if plutocracy is not a mere perturbation but has come to

stay, the sooner it takes on this responsibility the better. Some may say, as did a certain wealthy French financier just before the Revolution, "why innovate, are not we comfortable?" but they should profit by his later unpleasant experience.

Those of us who have not yet sufficiently outgrown our prejudices to look with equanimity on Comte's division of society into rich and poor, even if the latter are to have the wisest of care, may be pardoned for asking if there are not some immoral and abnormal influences at work to foster the present tendency. Of course, if it is found to belong to the regular order of development all we can do is to make the best of it. But even in that case we need not countenance every method of acceleration. We are not obliged, because we admit that the Indian must make way for the white man, to rejoice at the starving of squaws and papposes by a political heeler. It may be that this concentration of wealth in the hands of the few lies in the inevitable course of industrial progress, but we are not therefore bound to promote it by every form of corruption that ingenuity can devise. Whether it is so or not may be a very hard question to answer, owing to the complication of facts to be considered, but it is generally admitted that stealing is wrong and that bribery is wrong; would it not be fair to try what effect the suppression of these two in all their forms would have on this concentration? Perhaps it might not be found so necessary to abolish modest independence in the name of progress. The gospel of wealth is good but the gospel of justice is better.

If after paying the expenses of favorable legislation the industrial genius is able to amass millions he should not be too sure that all is for the best in a model world because he has used part of his surplus to endow a library. We may honor him by comparison, but perhaps the money would have done much more good if it had gone into the pockets of the operatives as fairly earned wages. There might be no library, and it is possible that the material benefit would be less, but the knowledge that an employer was paying more than he was obliged to pay would have gone further toward solving an important social problem than all the books in the world.

There are, many cheap ways of proving that this is not "practical" but the fact remains.

What is and what is not practicable in an industrial sense, must be learned by future experience, but the moral principles that relate to man's intercourse with man are the result of past experience reaching back at least as far as Adam. They are worthy of respectful consideration.

There is no easy road to social reform, but if those who desire it were to give up their petty squabbling over matters of no earthly importance and unite in ap-

plying these principles to every-day affairs there would be an immediate improvement. The best way to work for society while the more able are generalising and co-ordinating the speculations of common sense, is to look about near home and attack such evils as are condemned by all honest men irrespective of creed. This will keep us busy, and it may be said, in passing, that it is not fair for other nations to use this country as a dumping ground for social problems.

Above all let us beware of the man that has found an economic mare's nest.

A MORAL ALLEGORY.*

BY C. S. WAKE.

SOME time ago there was much discussion among the violins as to the conditions of harmony, and a meeting was convened to discuss the important subject. The debate was opened by an instrument of moderate experience, who affirmed that the strings are the seat of harmony. The breaking of the strings causes the total loss of harmony, and if a single string is the least out of tune there is a beginning of discord. When all the strings are in perfect tune then can the finest music be performed, but let one of them be dissonant, and the heaven of harmony is destroyed. Where harmony is there is music, for music and harmony are functions of the strings. But there cannot be harmony without use, and the gradual loss of tone through want of use denotes the atrophy of harmony and music.

The violin sat down amidst loud applause and was succeeded by an instrument of less age but greater note. Harmony, said he, is the denial of self in the concert of instruments, and the power of self-denial is greatest in the prime of life. Age kills music as well as harmony. We must all grow old, but we need not grow old prematurely. Premature old age is the penalty of those who depart from the laws of harmony. And what a penalty! Age does not enjoy, and does not suffer even. It has no emotion, and therefore has neither harmony nor music. Being put on the shelf or hung on the wall is the usual fate of old violins, and that is not happiness. We may apply the remark of a noted octogenarian, full of human wisdom, who, when asked whether old age is unfeeling, answered: "It has not vital energy enough to supply the waste of the more exhausting emotions." A violin who has grown old in the service of harmony must have every faculty benumbed, and drop off quietly into sleep under the benign influence of "nature's kindly anodyne." Happiness is contingent upon the faculties of vibration and resonance, and these have decayed in the old violin.

* The article by Mr. Swift in No. 185 of *The Open Court* expresses his belief, but that it expresses the truth I do not believe, and the ideas embodied in the present Allegory came into my mind.

The speaker was continuing in this strain when time was called. He was followed by an instrument of mature years who was noted for his tone of profundity. I quite approve, said he, of what the preceding speakers have uttered. At last it is proved that the physical and the harmonious are one. They have the same basis, and although we can distinguish between them by analysis, the differentiation is purely fictitious. Discordant notes are as physical as the box or the strings. They flow from the dissonance of the physical elements, and result from the breach of the laws of harmony as well as from physical causes. Rest assured, my friends, that no action which does not tend in any of its consequences to the destruction of the instrument is inharmonious. Thus all harmony and all music, the attainment of happiness and heaven, come at last to this—the perfection of the instrument.

These sentiments were greeted with tumultuous scrapings, which had not subsided when an old violin arose. His venerable appearance imposed silence, although it was evident that he was looked upon as an intruder. He began by saying that the strings are not everything. They are useless without a box or body through which their vibration can be communicated to the air and its undulations rendered sonorous and musical in tone. The strings if broken may be replaced, but any defect in the box itself is irremediable. Then indeed can it be said that the heaven of harmony is destroyed. It is not true that harmony and music are functions of the strings, they are the functions of the whole instrument, and divine is the music which issues from it when touched by a master hand. Without use there cannot be harmony, of course, but although disuse may ruin the strings, it will not affect the body of the instrument, if its material is sound and duly seasoned and varnished.

The old violin continued, with some emotion, I deny that the power of self-restraint on which harmony depends is less in age than in middle life. To say that age kills harmony or music is a libel. Premature old age may do so, because it is due to an infringement of the laws of harmony and nature, but age itself is no penalty. It has not the passion of youth, but it is not devoid of feeling, and it has suffering and enjoyment commensurate with this feeling. Is it not happiness to rest after the turmoil of a long and busy life, spent even in promoting harmony! But that rest is not emotionless. The echoes of the past still reverberate amid the recesses of the instrument, which can live over again in memory the triumphs of former days. It is justly entitled to tranquil repose after its many years of service, but its tones are not gone, and they gain in mellowness what they may have lost in strength. But what avails even the finest qualities, the most modulated tones, unless they are received

and interpreted by a sympathetic mind! Thus the physical and the harmonious are not one in the sense intended by the former speaker. They have the same basis in nature, but they are separate expressions of it, and the mind which creates the harmony can better dispense with the instrument than the instrument with the mind. Nor can we say that no action is inharmonious which does not tend to the destruction of the instrument. If this were true, it would follow that every such action is harmonious; but how could this be if it had no relation to the instrument itself? And what is the good of a perfect instrument unless its perfection is utilised for the happiness of others! We cannot live for ourselves alone. We are members of a community and as such we have certain duties to perform to each other and to society at large. However perfect in structure and action may be the instrument, it can produce no real harmony unless in making use of its powers it seeks to benefit others. In conclusion I repeat that old age is not unfeeling or devoid of happiness, as my master Stradivari well knew. And thereupon he burst into a melody whose ravishing tones so enraptured his hearers that, on a vote being taken, he was almost unanimously declared to have carried the day.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE loss of the Utopia revives the controversy between speed and safety as qualities of a ship; and also the important question, how much human freight may an emigrant ship carry in proportion to its tonnage? It would be ironical flattery to call the steerage company packed into the Utopia by the dignified name of passengers; they were common freight, and like freight they went down to the bottom of the sea. Every year the inventive genius of man increases the speed of ships, until now the voyage across the Atlantic is a job of less than a week for a first class racer on a first class line. Unfortunately the means of safety have not grown in proportion to the increase of speed. A hundred dollars to one that there is not a passenger ship sailing between New York and Liverpool that in actual danger can lower a boat in three minutes; and the same wager that any ship in the navy can do it in ten seconds; why? Because the crew of a man of war is drilled, while the ship's tackle is always in good order. This is not the case on passenger ships where many of the crew are new men shipped merely for that voyage. Steamship companies will deny all this, and say that their crews are drilled like those of a man of war; and yet whenever an accident happens we always read the same story, "Orders were immediately given to lower the boats, but—but—but,"—and then come the melancholy reasons why; the ropes being foul, the blocks rusty, and no axes handy, the boats were of no avail.

* * *

It may be that in this particular disaster, owing to the strength of the gale, or the severity of her wounds, the Utopia could not possibly lower her boats quick enough to save her people; but had the sea been smooth as glass, without a zephyr to wrinkle its face, it would not have made any difference, the catastrophe would have been the same; not a boat would have been lowered in time, as I have good reason to know. Several years ago I was a passenger on this very same Utopia from London to New York, and the portents of bad luck hung about her even then. Just before

she swung from her moorings into the Thames, I observed a quarrel going on between one of the officers and one of the crew. They wrestled with each other across the deck, on to the gang plank, and down the gang plank to the shore. Here they were parted, the officer coming back, and the sailor staying on the land, whence he fired anathema upon the ship. He was the Dick Deadeye of the crew, and it was well to put him ashore. He had cast the horoscope of the Utopia, and his evil auguries filled the passengers with superstitious fear. Looking up at us as we were bidding friends good bye, he patronized us with sinister pity, and his green-eyed sorrow for our anticipated fate was touching in the extreme. "That ship is doomed," he said, "and I am sorry for you all. She is rated A 1 on the unlucky list; and she will never reach New York without an accident. The rats left her this morning before daylight; she is a condemned old tub and you had better come ashore." Just then the Utopia began puffing her way backwards out of the dock; and the soothsayer continued, "O, listen to that cough!" he said, "she cannot live a week, and when she sinks, remember what I said."

* * *

I am not weakly superstitious, and yet I confess to dread foreboding when I hear the babbling raven croaking "Nevermore." I knew then, as well as I know now, that there is no potency in curses, although there is in blessings, and yet I would rather than this envious and dismal mariner had given us a different farewell. I really did not shake him off my soul until after we had cleared the dangerous coast of England, and were well out upon the open sea. Then everything went merrily until we plunged into that eternal fog which would have turned Columbus back, had he not steered far to the southward where the fog was not. Suddenly there in the gloaming appeared the ghost of a full-rigged ship bearing down upon us with her sails all set. The refraction of the foggy atmosphere, or some other cause, magnified the spectre, and she seemed to sail upon the low, damp clouds, and not upon the sea. Surely this must be the *Flying Dutchman*, the phantom ship that sailors dread. Not so; this was a live reality, for we could hear fierce orders from the captain to his crew, as he turned his helm a port to give us way; too late, and his manœuvre brought him broadside on the Utopia, which promptly pierced his vessel to the heart, and she turned over like a whale in death, floating for a time with her keel above the waves. She was a hard working craft, earning an honest living by carrying kerosene oil, ten thousand barrels of it, from New York to Rotterdam, and she bore the classic name of Helios. With the great wide ocean free to both of them, what perverse concord was it that impelled the Helios and the Utopia to cross the Atlantic in opposite directions, on a line of travel not wider than a street? And meet each other in the fog?

* * *

Now comes the moral of my story, which indeed is all there is of interest about it. There was the crew of the Helios flung suddenly into the sea, contending with the billows and calling for help; and there was the Utopia stunned and bewildered, reeling into the fog. "Lower the boats," commanded the captain of the Utopia; and the sailors flew to the task, but it was the same old story; the knots in the ropes had rusted and stiffened so that they could not be untied; nothing would work as it ought to work, and it required minutes instead of seconds to lower a couple of boats wherewith to pick up the drowning crew. Fortunately, the barrels of oil in the hold of the Helios floated the wreck for a time, and the crew managed to climb on to the keel of the ship, as she wallowed upside down in the sea. This gave the sailors on the Utopia time to lower the boats and save the men on the wreck. Had a hole been made in the Utopia as would have been the case had she struck her foe obliquely, not a boat could have been lowered before the vessel would have sunk. That is the lesson of it,

lesson of no use to the Utopia, for she was no more competent to lower a boat when she was stabbed to death in the bay of Gibraltar than she was when she herself smote the Helios on the Great Banks of Newfoundland. Her case is not an exception, but an example. Every emigrant ship takes the like chances, and under similar circumstances their human cargoes must meet the same fate. Every ship should carry boats enough to save all her passengers, and the crew should be drilled in the methods of lowering boats, and in the practice of all other means of safety. But it would cost a little time, and time is money.

* * *

It is generally supposed that discipline and drill are only of mechanical assistance, and that they are nothing but physical agencies of great utility, but having no moral qualities of their own. This is a mistake. Discipline strengthens not only the hands, but also the hearts of men; and a crew of sailors well drilled and under discipline, is braver than a crew inexperienced and untrained. It is the same with soldiers too. Courage is one manifestation of the human soul under discipline. A well drilled company on either land or sea will face danger bravely from a sense of duty, while the very same men undrilled will retreat in panic, moved by the instinct of self-preservation. It is not so much cowardice, as want of drill, that makes a crew trample down the passengers and escape in the boats from a sinking ship. Sailors under discipline never do it.

Forty years ago the *Birkenhead* was carrying a regiment of British soldiers from one post to another. Sailing along the coast of Africa, in fair weather, and in sight of land, she struck a sunken rock and broke her back. Then the colonel ordered the troops to form on deck as if upon parade. This they did, and here is what he said, "Men, the ship is breaking up, but there are boats enough to save the women and children. Let the sailors have them for that purpose, but let no soldier leave the ranks." Not a soldier moved out of his place, while the sailors put all the women and children into the boats and started for the shore. Then the colonel took his place at the head of the regiment and he and his men went down with the ship.

The Duke of Wellington was commander of the army at the time, and when a report of the affair was made to him, he simply remarked "Good discipline! Good discipline!" It was thought that he might at least have paid a tribute to the bravery of the men, but he did not. He took the bravery for granted; he knew that without the discipline it would have been cowardice, and that the same soldiers would have trampled everybody down in crowding into the boats. He knew that it was discipline which had crowned physical strength with moral courage, and so he merely said, "Good discipline! Good discipline!" Drilling sailors at lowering boats will not only make them skilful to perform that duty, but it will also make them courageous to help the passengers into them before trying to save themselves.

M. M. TRUMBULL

CARLYLE.

BY ELLIS THURTELL.

MASSIVE, sky-towering, rugged as rude rock
That shirts some coast of thy leal stalwart land;
Formed to invite, and to repel the shock
Of thine own ages, head, and heart, and hand:
Giant of world, where springs of thought, close coiled,
Are found by master-minds mechanic place,
Carlyle, whose force hath been so strangely foiled
Through lack, or lapse of Charity's sweet grace.
Strong storm-scarred soul, though unpossessed by strength
Sprung panoplied from head of sympathy,
Thee must we hail, throughout our island length,
Preacher profound in sad prose harmony.

Peasant, yet preacher—prophet wast thou born,
 Grim Jeremiah of our century,
 Hadst thou not felt our Christian faith outworn,
 Thou hadst been swathed in cramping clerisy.

Still, none the less, a pulpit-voice was thine,
 Thundering athwart a boisterous sea of sin,
 Invoking human vengeance and divine,
 On flattering shows without, foul cores within.

Virtue and wisdom didst thou sometimes brand,
 Fury and folly didst thou sometimes crown ;
 Sightless to grandeur in thy native land,
 Heroes shrank from thee frozen at thy frown.

True Titanolater of noble mould,
 Something of manhood's mercy didst thou miss ;
 The marble heart, the steel-clad arm of old
 Gleamed God-like from another age than this.

Men must be herded with an iron goad,
 Dropped from Olympus into hero band ;
 Relentless will must point them out the road,
 Resistless force slay stragglers from the band.

Cursed be Man's softening of the rule of God,
 Or demi-God, or priest-annointed king ;
 Cursed be poor fools who scorn to kiss the rod
 Upraised to urge under a heavenly wing.

Such thy despotic and despairing creed,
 The gloomy birth of gall-embedded brain ;
 Angels and fiends of early epoch's need,
 Though dead to thee, for us must live again.

They shall not. Yet shall thy majestic law
 Of ethic empire thrill the sceptic soul.
 Touched by an impulse that, divine no more,
 Shall grander grow as generations roll.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE PROBLEM OF THE FREEDOM OF WILL.

To the Editor of The Open Court :—

As one deeply perplexed concerning the question of freewill, I have taken peculiar interest in the controversy between yourself and Mr. Maddock. But, after all, are you not like the knights of old that disputed about the color of the shield ?

Mr. Maddock represents man's relations to the universe by the hands of a clock, while you suggest the regulator. The latter is no better; because the counter action stops in the works, but we have a piece of mechanism that does represent man's relations to the universe, and also shows us both sides of the shield in a strong clear light.

When a boy I worked in a woolen factory wherein were employed various machines—looms, breakers, condensers, etc. Frequently one of the breakers would be stopped and immediately the various parts of the other machines would begin to move with greater speed. The engineer would go to the engine, turn a little wheel and the machinery would soon slow up to its former gait. Presently the breaker would be started again and the other machines would move too slow. Again the engineer would hasten to the engine, turn the wheel a little, and the proper movement would quickly be attained. Later the owners of the factory had a governor attached to the engine, and here we may ask what is our engine in its present form? Is it a creation or simply a product of evolution? If man, the immediate antecedent cause, is himself a result of evolution there seems no other alternative but to admit that our engine is likewise a product of evolution.

Now I imagine yourself and Mr. Maddock looking at this engine in action. An increase of speed is noticed, and you see the governor raise its arms slightly and the speed is checked before any harm is done. A little later the action is too slow: the governor, like a thing of intelligence, promptly lowers its arms, and all moves on as before. You see in this governor a something which as a fact reacts on the source of its own power to act, itself being promptly reacted on, to the regulation of its own action, and so far exercises freedom, "the lesser overcomes the greater," the creature modifies the creator. But you also see how the piston-rod by moving slower gives the motive to the governor that determines its motion, and so gives us determinism. Mr. Maddock sees that the governor is not at liberty to raise its arms when the piston moves slowly, but on the contrary must of necessity lower them, and seen from this side we have necessity. Mr. Maddock seems to contend that to regard the governor as a free agent it must raise its arms even when the movement becomes slower which is contrary to law, while you apparently go to the opposite extreme and contend that if it were of necessity that the governor lowered its arms they would have fallen even if the motion had been accelerated, equally contrary to law. Nature certainly reveals no such freedom as Mr. Maddock would dispose of, but it is a fact that there has been evolved a something that reacts on the prime factor of its action in a way to secure a determining principle in its own conduct. Thus looking at the engine with its attachment we see determinism which for all practical ethical purposes is equivalent to freewill—it secures the harmony sought. Nor is there that absolute necessity which you would dispose of, but carrying our view to the machinery connected with the engine we see that the action of the governor could not have been otherwise than it was. Thus the broader view gives us that fatalistic conception that everything is just as it is and could not have been otherwise. The more limited and keener view that you seem to take of the matter constrains you to regard the office of the engineer, in turning the little wheel, as actually transferred to the governor so that it henceforth acts independent of his governing and determining power, and works of itself to secure the regularity desired,—acts "from a will determined by its own nature and not by a foreign compulsion" exercised by the engineer. But the wider view of Mr. Maddock, though it fails to recognise the reactive influence of the governor, discovers that the office of the engineer has been combined with that of the man who starts and stops the breaker, and that the action of the governor, indirectly, is still determined by foreign compulsion.

CYRUS COLE.

Garden City, Kansas.

To the Editor of The Open Court :—

In your "Ethical Problem" you remark: "Before we commence building let us have a plan." I will add, and a foundation to rest upon, free from contradiction. I have no other motive in my persistence on this question than the one above named. In your definition of determinism I fail to see a foundation free from contradiction. It is no clearer to my mind than Calvinism. As determinism teaches that the will is not free you cannot logically say that it is. If all actions are determined by law they cannot be the result of freedom. A happy union is not the result of freedom; it is the outcome of law—law which produces harmony. Let me illustrate: If you present the north pole of a magnet to the south pole of another magnet you will have a perfect union, because there is attraction in both poles. This union is of law, not of freedom. Free the metal from the law of attraction and the union ceases. The metal *must* obey the law which conditions it; it has no freedom in the matter. So with man and wife: If they are conditioned to love there will be a union of hearts; and they *will* to love because they are conditioned by law like the two magnets; therefore their wills are subject to the law which conditions

them and are not free. Under the circumstances they *must* will that way; they are bound by the law of their conditions, and cannot loose themselves. Freedom would be to have power to will a union of north pole to north pole, which is impossible. You do not reason from induction; you reason from the organism not from the cause of its conditions. You say, "the union is free because the act of uniting results from a freewill, from a will determined by its own nature; and you stop reasoning here when you ought to go on to the inductive point, and say, and its own, or specific nature is conditioned by natural law and its condition is the cause of its willing. The lion wills to eat lamb because it is conditioned by nature to eat lamb. If it was conditioned like a lamb it would will to eat grass. Will therefore is governed by law and is not free. Here is determinism without contradiction and here is the firm foundation to build upon; we must give due credit to the architect as well as to the building. Freedom is not implied in necessity but harmony is. If freedom were the potent factor the magnet could roam around the compass at will, but as law is the potent factor it is bound to point to the north owing to the conditions of organism and environment. Results will not be the same no matter how we act, and we *will act* in accordance with laws of organism and environment, sometimes harmoniously and sometimes inharmoniously to ourselves, but never with freedom from law. Monism is not yea and nay; in it is yea. No logic can touch scientific monism. It seems to me that your difficulty is in trying to hold on to religion. Monism must be free from confusion. Monism must be established and rock-seated, free from contradiction and to do that the argument must come from science, not from religion.

JOHN MADDOCK.

EDITORIAL COMMENT ON THE PRECEDING LETTERS.

I HAVE to correct a wrong notion of Mr. Maddock's concerning my definition of freedom. Freedom of will (as I understand and define it) does not mean that a man has the power to will the contrary of that which he, according to his character, actually does will. Such a freedom does not exist. Freedom of will, if the term has any sense at all, means the power of a man to act in accordance with his will, i. e. agreeably to his character.

Mr. Maddock is mistaken when he says: "Determinism teaches that the will is not free." Determinism teaches that willing is determined by law. What is law? Law is a formula describing facts of a special kind. There are not two things, law and will, the one dominating, ruling, or governing the other. There is but one thing, will, or rather all the many different acts of willing. The facts of reality alone are real, and the laws of nature are mere abstractions describing the regularity of these facts so far as we have been able to trace it. Nature is not the slave of law. Nature acts in a certain and definite way; and the way in which nature acts is called law. That is all. I cannot see any slavery in the action of the magnet; as if magnetism were one thing, the master, the ruler, and the magnet the other thing, the slave, the subject, the suppressed. The idea of "freeing the metal from the law of attraction" has no sense in my conception of nature, for the law of attraction is a part of its nature; it has not been imposed upon it as a fetter from the outside; the disposition of being attracted by a magnet is quality of it; it is part of its self.

What is will? Will is a state of mind tending to action. If such a state of mind exists in a person, we say he wills this or that. Now, if there is no hindrance for the will to pass into action, the will is free; if however the will is prevented from passing into action, it is restricted, it is not free. If a person is compelled to do an act, which he would not do unless compelled to do it, the action does not result from his own state of mind, it is not an expression of his own, of his free will. But if a person commits an act be-

cause in his mind there is a tendency to perform that act, he is free, which means he can let his own will pass into act.

The will of a man, accordingly, if considered as a faculty and not as a single state of mind, is a mere abstraction. There is no will in a man that wills now this and now that. There are innumerable states of mind tending to action, and in speaking of these tendencies in general we form the generalisation "will." These innumerable tendencies often naturally come in conflict the one with the other. Animals, children, savages, or uneducated people are apt to let any state of mind that dominates the present moment pass into act, rashly, and in that case it will easily happen that the act will afterwards be regretted. Thus another state of mind is produced in which a tendency prevails to make, if it were possible, the act or its consequences undone. In this case the liberty of one tendency has unduly overruled other, and perhaps more important, tendencies; the others have been overruled, their right remained unrespected. The means to prevent regret is to check every tendency to action as soon as it rises, until it has after a comparison with all the other tendencies been approved of by a general consensus of all. The determination of a man and the actual performance of placing this check upon the tendencies to action that 'live in his soul, is called self-control.

Self-control is the beginning of moral action in so far as it suppresses those tendencies that should, according to a careful deliberation, not be carried into effect, and allows only those to pass into act which have been approved of by a general consensus of the strongest inclination of the soul.

Moral motives are such as are fit to survive. Immoral motives are such as are contrary to the laws of existence, to life, or to social conditions; they will ruin either the individual or the race, or both.

Freedom will lead to the gradual extinction of immoral motives and it will strengthen moral motives. We may doubt whether a certain act is moral or immoral, because in many single instances a moral individual may suffer on account of its very morality; but not in the long run. Morally acting individuals may be sacrificed by the thousands and millions, the moral ideals will nevertheless be the only ones fit to survive.

If Mr. Maddock cannot accept the term "freewill" in this sense, I suggest to use the term a man's *own* will.

* * *

I am glad to notice that Professor Clifford took exactly the same view of freewill that I do. He says in his essay "Cosmic Emotion" "The peculiarity of living matter is that it is capable of combining together molecular motions which are invisible, into molar motions which can be seen. It therefore appears to have the property of moving spontaneously without help from anything else. . . . Its changes of shape due to aggregation of molecular motion, may fairly be called *action from within*, because the energy of the motion is supplied by the substance itself and not by any external thing. . . . As, therefore, the immediate origin of my action is in myself, I really am free in the only useful sense of the word."

BOOK REVIEWS.

ALMOST PERSUADED. By *Will N. Harben*. New York: Minerva Publishing Co.

The idea of this novel of 316 pages is to illustrate and establish the truth of natural ethics as opposed to the dogmatic and inconsistent systems of religious sects. Stanley, the hero, is cast away on an island at an early age of his life; there, living in solitude and in intimate contact with nature, he acquired the foundation of a sound and natural sense which led him in his after life (after he was rescued and educated) to refute by criticism and to disprove by practice the accepted notions of truth and conduct in the conventional Christianity of the day.

The novel is a "novel of tendency," in the sense in which we now have so many. We do not think that the execution is equal to the conception; and the main emphasis is placed at times on unessential points; and although there are a number of animated passages in the book, as a rule the pathetic and sentimental parts lag.

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