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THE SAMARITAN ON 'CHANGE.

BY MONCURE D. CONWAY.

IN A London public school examination a poor little girl is reported to have got somewhat mixed up in reciting from memory the parable of the good Samaritan. "He give 'im tuppence, 'n said, watsomdever more you spendest when I come again I'll repay thee; this he said knowing that he would see 'is face no more." One may feel glad to believe that this little dame of the slums could associate such shrewd Samaritanism with "tuppence." But there appears to be a tendency in the silly Samaritanism of our time to develop a counterpart, of the self-seeking variety, which may ultimately corrupt the whole humanitarian movement. Now and then a philanthropic humbug is impaled, but that is of little advantage unless he is understood. The soul-saving wave is now succeeded by a body-saving wave. We are tolerably familiar with the frauds floated on the former. There is now serving a life-sentence, for forgery on the Bank of England, an American named Bidwell, who long pursued his frauds in Chicago and other western places, at the same time that he was followed as an eloquent revivalist. He converted small bank checks into large ones, and sinners into saints, with great success. Many a good church member to-day owes his awakening to this Rev. Mr. Bidwell, who might have been still redeeming the week's forgeries with Sabbath soul-savings, had he not deserted his mistress in London. We are now informed that crowds are following the exhortations of a convicted murderer in the West. How can common preachers compete with a miracle of grace who has killed a half dozen of his fellow creatures? But these phenomena of a dogma that despised human merits are now found chiefly on the remote frontiers of civilization, and are becoming rare even there. In the centres of culture we are prepared for the wolf in sheep's clothing, so long as he only prays and preaches about salvation in the future life.

But now a great ethical and humanitarian spirit has come upon protestant Christendom. It has floated the creeds and churches, which, if not moved by sympathy, are driven by competition for popularity to help save mankind from the actual satans of pauperism and despair going about seeking whom they may devour. Last year it was announced that even the

Salvation Army itself was to enter on a new departure, and combat these actual satans in England, instead of the fictitious devil of the dark ages. "Gen." Booth's book appeared: he made a literary reputation by it, as well as a goodly sum of money. Wealthy men said: We have misunderstood this man; he is more intelligent than we supposed, and more in earnest, as well as practical. Beside his copyrights, near half a million dollars were contributed to his scheme. But it is now charged that he did not write the book, and had not the ability to write it. A denial by his son is reported, but not as yet from himself; and only filial piety can suppose that a charge, personally substantiated by the writer of the book, can be so disproved.* "Gen." Booth implicitly admits the charge in claiming (though this too is denied) that he supplied the data. But that he knew the value of the literary repute is proved by the publication, in one of his army's papers, of the facsimile of some sentences of the book which were written by himself. Thus the charitable scheme seems to have been floated by an agent, as a new stock might be on 'Change. Had it been a purely pious stock, contemplating erection of churches, circulation of tracts, or converting the heathen, we should be prepared for it. But it is, apparently, a remarkably ignorant and vulgar orthodoxy availing itself of the humanitarian enthusiasm born of rational and secular thought, and availing itself of this surreptitiously. The contributions have all gone to a hand whose trustworthiness is shown by inscribing its name on work it did not do. Nor does the "General" appear to have been much damaged, among his pious adherents, by his imposture.

The ease with which all this was done is the sig-

* "The secret of the authorship of 'In Darkest England,'" says the London *Times*, "is now matter of common knowledge. Charitable hypothesis, combined with the fact that a facsimile of some ten lines of manuscript in Mr. Booth's handwriting has appeared in one of the Salvation journals, assigns to Mr. Booth the credit of having written at least two chapters of the book. His own explanation of the affair is that he supplied a professional writer with the materials for writing a book and that 'In Darkest England' was the result. The question whether, under these circumstances, Mr. Booth was justified in letting the book appear as if it had been written by him, is one of literary ethics, and into such a question we have no right to expect Mr. Booth to enter. 'But,' it may be said, 'the ideas which the book contains were the ideas of Mr. Booth.' There is strong reason for believing that the truth lies in the opposite direction—in fact it is believed that when the whole story comes to be known it will be found that the ideas of the substantial parts of the scheme—that is to say, of the city colony and the farm colony—had their origin in the mind of Mr. Frank Smith, and that these ideas were accepted most reluctantly by Mr. Booth."

nificant thing. Even if "General" Booth should clear himself of the grave personal charge, that he has gained fame and confidence by false pretence, it would remain that the thing can be done. A man has only to make an eloquent and fervent appeal in the name of suffering humanity for money to flow into his hands at once, inquiry coming afterwards. This is not the only sign of the approach of imposture in the guise of Samaritanism. The Tolstoi cult appears to be something of the same kind. I met with a Baroness in Europe who had long enjoyed intimacy with the Tolstoi family, and who gave me a lively account of her recent joyous sojourn in their luxurious castle. When I asked how all that was consistent with the Count's gospel, that we must sell all we have and give it to the poor, and take our place with the manual laborers, the Baroness smiled at my simplicity. I know young men in England and America who, partly by his influence, are practising something like what is preached by Tolstoi from his comfortable study in his castle. They are suffering, as I think vainly, while his undiminished income is swelled by the sale of his self-denying sermons. The inconsistency attracted attention in London, and a plea was put forward that the wealth was secured by the management of the Countess Tolstoi. We have heard that kind of thing as far back as the garden of Eden. The woman gave me and I ate. Oh, of course! But no one familiar with the position of wives anywhere, and especially in Russia, can suppose that Count Tolstoi is suffering the moral martyrdom of living in luxury because of his wife. At present the real Tolstoi gospel seems to be, "Sell all thou hast and give it to the poor, and labor beside them; but the kingdom of Christ must accommodate itself to Counts."

A similar peril besets the ethical enthusiasm. There is hardly any imposture that may not find intrenchment in the moral sentiment. There despotism survives in the lands of democracy. We see sixty millions of people content that a psalm-singing postmaster-general shall determine what books may or may not pass in the mails, providing he makes a pretext of preserving morality. The said postmaster may be pirating English encyclopædias, photographically counterfeited, at the moment he is damning books not on sale in his establishment; he has only to touch the moral nerve to paralyse that liberty of printing which is a chief corner-stone of all liberty. The teachings of Jesus, of Socrates, of others, who founded a higher morality, seemed immoral to the orthodox of their time. There can be no profound ethical culture if thinkers who grapple with great problems,—those of sex and marriage, especially,—are liable to suppression by ignorant officials, who confuse their own vulgarity with virtue.

It would appear necessary that we should comprehend the fact that every movement must have such camp-followers. No sooner does any thought or truth take hold on the popular heart than there will mingle with the honest multitude those who are after the loaves and fishes. As it was with Jesus, so has it been with the movements of Luther, of Wickliff, of Wesley. We cannot expect that the ethical and humanitarian movements will prove exceptions. It is necessary that there shall be a close and rigid criticism of those who profess to lead these new movements. They must possess and prove the courage of their opinions. They are dealing with matters of life and death to millions, they are shaping the destinies of our best-hearted youth, and must be held personally responsible for their utterances.

When Thomas Paine was grappling with the "torries" of Philadelphia, three months before the Declaration of Independence, he wrote to their leader: "To be nobly wrong is more manly than to be meanly right. Only let the error be disinterested—let it not wear the mask but the mark of principle—and 'tis pardonable. It is on this large and liberal ground that we distinguish between men and their tenets, and generously preserve our friendship for the one, while we combat with every prejudice of the other." Himself reared a Quaker, Paine's pen was sharpest on the lamb-like Friends whose peaceful texts were directed to the invader, never to the invader; he counselled resistance, then shouldered his musket and shared the deprivations and dangers of the struggle. That "Crisis," whose opening sentence, "These are the times that try men's souls," was the watchword at Trenton, was written by camp fires. The suffering soldiers were inspired by that which came from a comrade. Words may be half-battles; wedded to deeds, they are victories.

Sincerity is the soul of eloquence. I remember once, in Boston, at a meeting when the possibility of rescuing a fugitive slave from his prison was considered, Theodore Parker arose and simply said, "I am not willing to advise a risk I am unwilling to share." That was all he said, but I have remembered it, coming from that courageous man, as a mandate from the new moral Sinai. Our kid-gloved socialists are in danger of becoming successors to the clergymen who used to frighten ignorant women and children with pictures of hell, while their smiling apathy during the week proved their disbelief in any such perils. When Dr. Channing's father was returning from church with his little son, the latter terrified with the sermon he had heard, he remarked to his wife that he hoped the dinner would not be cold. "Father," said the boy, "if we are all going to hell what matters it about the dinner?" The father whistled. The Unitarian move-

ment was born anew in that little breast. Channing grew up to hold New England thought and scholarship to a moral standard. The scholar of to-day must hold the ethical and social reformer to that same standard. Paine is right. Even that man who faithfully follows an error serves men more than he who utters truth with a double tongue.

I close this little admonition with an extract from a letter received from Emerson, in reply to one written when I was nineteen, a Methodist itinerant in Maryland.

"I believe what interests both you and me, and whether we know it or not, is the morals of intellect; in other words, that no man is worth his room in the world who is not commanded by a legitimate object of thought. The earth is full of frivolous people, who are bending their whole force and the force of nations on trifles, and these are baptised with every grand and holy name, remaining, of course, totally inadequate to occupy any mind; and so skeptics are made. A true soul will disdain to be moved except by what natively commands it, though it should go sad and solitary in search of its master a thousand years. The few superior persons in each community are so by their steadiness to reality and their neglect of appearances. This is the rue and euphrasy that purge the intellect and ensure insight. Its full rewards are slow but sure; and yet I think it has its rewards on the instant, inasmuch as simplicity and grandeur are always better than dapperness."

THE THIRD DIMENSION IN MONOCULAR VISION.

BY C. STANLAND WAKE.

In an article in the August number of the *Revue Philosophique*, M. Alfred Binet mentions a curious phenomenon which he refers to as "the perception of the third dimension in monocular vision." By chance one day he discovered that on looking with one eye only at a photograph the relief is much more apparent than when both eyes are used for the purpose. In the former case the foreground of the photograph appears to rise from the paper and to be located in space. When the other eye is opened the foreground recedes and the picture appears flat. On submitting it to a number of other persons, all but three or four at once recognised the relief when the picture was looked at with but one eye.

M. Binet in seeking an explanation of this phenomenon questions the correctness of the assumption that the two visual axes cease to converge when one eye is closed, from which it might be inferred that the flatness of surface apparent when both eyes are used would disappear with one eye closed. As a fact the relief is just as apparent if the second eye remains open and a screen is placed between it and the picture,

as well as when observed with both eyes while squinting. He refers to the dissimilarity of images as a second possible explanation of the appearance of relief. The photograph seems to be flat because the two retinal figures it produces do not present the degree of difference which exists when a body of three dimensions is looked at. On closing one eye this exception to the general result of the use of double vision no longer operates, and an image is obtained which is not opposed by another image too much resembling the first.

The explanation of the phenomenon proposed by M. Binet himself is, that the monocular image is due to the operation of the law, the like appeals to the like, that is, like states of consciousness attract and unite with each other. In this case the monocular image gives the impression of relief by appealing to our earlier experiences, while the addition of the second similar image destroys the effect, annihilates the appearance of relief, prevents the first image from producing all the consequences that it includes. This singular phenomenon of inhibition produced by the like on the like seems to restrict the generality of the above-mentioned law, and shows that there exists a cause of systemization of states of consciousness which is at once more general and more powerful.

M. Binet states truly that the phenomenon he describes is so apparent that it must have been previously observed. As a fact, the present writer has noticed it for many years past and thought that it must have been observed by scientific enquirers, although it was not described in any publication he had met with. As may be inferred from M. Binet's description, the effect of relief may be obtained equally with other pictures besides photographs, by looking at them with one eye closed or covered over. There is, however, a reason why the effect should be more evident with a photograph than with an ordinary picture. The image impressed on the photographic plate is formed by the light rays reflected not merely from the surface but from the sides of the object; that is, the rays are reflected not from a plane, but from a curved surface. The completed photograph, therefore, possesses within itself all the elements of relief. In the stereoscope two pictures taken from different points of view are united in one figure to give the raised effect. But the same effect is produced by looking at a single photograph through an ordinary lens, and it is due not to the lens, which merely magnifies what already exists, but to conditions existing in the photograph itself. In fact, the picture already contains in itself the elements of the third dimension which the lens merely makes patent, and which must therefore under proper conditions become patent to the eye without the lens. These conditions are obtained by closing or screening one eye, from which it is evident that the use of both eyes

interferes with the natural effect. This it can do only by preventing the elements of the third dimension existing in the photograph from revealing their presence; possibly due to the fact that the two images do not coalesce into one, but are merely superimposed, the extremely refined elements of the third dimension which exist in each image being thus obliterated.

The perception of relief on looking with one eye only at other pictures is to be traced to the same source as that which gives rise to that phenomenon in connection with photographs. This is due to what may be called *latent perspective*, and it will be found that just as far as this quality exists in engravings and other pictures will the effect of relief be produced in monocular vision. The beauty of a picture depends largely on the perspective put into it, and this depends not only on "distance," but on *chiaroscuro* or light and shade, which gives depth to the objects in the picture and therefore to the picture itself. This is not so noticeable in a small picture as in a large one, such as an ordinary oil painting, but the same rules apply to both, and the use of a monocular lens to heighten the effect of oil paintings has long been in use in picture galleries. A lens is necessary, however, only to give a magnifying effect, as the idea of relief is fully obtained by the use of a simple tube, which may be formed by the curving of the fingers and thumb of the hand.

If the above explanation of the phenomenon in question is correct—and it appears to be supported by the experiments of Professor E. Mach—the appearance of relief in monocular vision and its loss on the use of double vision have a physical basis in the picture itself, and therefore it is not necessary to have recourse to the psychological law referred to by M. Binet.

THE QUESTIONS OF AGNOSTICISM.

THERE are questions that rise unasked; they obtrude upon the human mind and cannot be banished, because they lie in the nature of things. These questions so long as they remain unanswered, will cause an unrest in our soul, a spiritual thirst that can only be quenched by the spiritual waters of life—by truth and by a joyous submission to truth; they will appear as a strong and unsatisfied yearning for something that will afford help in time of need, and that shall bring light when we sit in darkness.

This dearth of peace of soul has created religion, it has created the great cosmic ideal of mankind, the idea of God as the Lord who made heaven and earth, who will be our keeper and who will preserve our soul. This dearth found expression in David's psalm:

"As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul for thee, O God.

"My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God; when shall I come and appear before God?"

"My tears have been my meat day and night, while they continually say unto me, 'Where is thy God?'"

Our world-conception has greatly changed since David's time, and together with it our religious views have been modified. But the same yearning obtains for peace and soul; because according to the nature of things the same questions rise again and again, sternly demanding to be answered.

The same anxiety as in David's psalm pervades a communication presented to me some time ago, which in accordance with the spirit of our age formulates the thirst of the soul for a satisfactory solution of the eternal problem of life in definite queries. The letter is characteristically signed "Agnostic," and reads as follows:

"Will you kindly answer the following questions? The future of religion depends, it seems to me, on the answers given.

- 1) Has the universe an ethical purpose or tendency?
- 2) Have we any reason to believe that anything corresponding to human life, feeling, or intelligence, exists now in other parts of the universe, or will come into existence again, after the destruction of the earth?
- 3) Are there any grounds for hope that pain will be diminished and pleasure increased, to any great extent, in the future of humanity?
- 4) According to the doctrine of Evolution, will not the earth and the whole solar system, in the distant future, become, once more, a mass of homogeneous vapor, destitute of life, as the term 'life' is generally understood?
- 5) If the universe is an infinite machine, which mercilessly crushes between its cogs, not only the individual, but eventually the race, must not the contemplation of the universe awaken feelings of melancholy and despair in the human heart? And are not such feelings destructive to religion and ethics?"

* * *

This is an age of eager research. Wheresoever we look, we find unanswered questions; and many people shrug their shoulders in despair, because they do not expect that these questions will ever be answered. Such people call themselves agnostics.

There are three attitudes of agnosticism. There is, first, the agnosticism of indifference. This is the position of those who do not wish to be bothered with questions which they feel incompetent to answer and which they generally care nothing about. The agnosticism of indifference is passive; it is a philosophy of indolence, which boasts of depth where because of its own littleness it has not found bottom.

The second kind of agnosticism is an agnosticism of despair. It is the agnosticism of "world-pain," and has been characterised by Heinrich Heine in the following lines:

"By the sea, by the desolate nocturnal sea,
Stands a youthful man,
His breast full of sadness, his head full of doubt.
And with bitter lips he questions the waves:

'Oh solve me the riddle of life!
The cruel, world-old riddle,

Concerning which, already many a head hath been racked.
 Heads in hieroglyphic-hats,
 Heads in turbans and in black caps,
 Periwigged heads, and a thousand other
 Poor, sweating human heads.
 Tell me, what signifies man?
 Whence does he come? whither does he go?
 Who dwells yonder above the golden stars?
 The waves murmur their eternal murmur,
 The winds blow, the clouds flow past,
 Cold and indifferent twinkle the stars,
 And—a fool awaits an answer.*

There are men of great talents who have grappled with the questions of the day, yet have failed to solve them. They feel their labors lost and their energy, spent in thought, wasted. But because a genius has failed to solve a problem, is it really absolutely insolvable? And if it is absolutely insolvable, would it not in that case be a pseudo-problem? A pseudo-problem is a question which is formulated on a misconception of facts; it is unanswerable because it is misstated. The problem of existence is unanswerable perhaps, not because the world is out of joint, but because the position of the questioner is wrongly taken.

The third kind of agnosticism is the agnosticism of science. We might call it with equal appropriateness either the agnosticism of ignorance or the agnosticism of wisdom. For it is a wise confession of ignorance. This confession is not made in general terms, that science is vanity and that all philosophy is trivial. Such general statements have no meaning, except that they place the sage and the fool upon the same level. The agnosticism of ignorance is the agnosticism of science. It is an active attitude of agnosticism. It states definitely a special ignorance of ours, and formulates it in exact terms.

The statement of such a specified ignorance is called a problem, and although it may sometimes be extremely difficult to solve a problem, the agnosticism of science never despairs of a final solution. On the contrary, every problem is formed with the outspoken hope that in the end, it will be solved. The history of science is a continuous conquest of the hydra-like growing heads of the agnosticism of science.

* * *

There are certain questions—viz., the moral questions—the nature of which is such as to demand an immediate answer. “What are the rules of conduct? and what are the notions according to which we have to form these rules of conduct?”—are questions that are urgent. We live and act; and we cannot wait until science has settled all the problems the solution of which in this or in that way might influence our actions. We have to act as best we can. The notions in agreement with which our whole demeanor has to be regulated, are called “religious”; and it is natural that religious ideas through their extraordinary prac-

tical importance are of an extremely conservative nature. They are laid down as the most sacred possession of mankind, the holiest heirloom received from our ancestors. This conservatism is natural, but it will become dangerous if it prevents the revision of religious ideas through the best, and truest, and most earnest critique that can be furnished by science. It will become detrimental if it produces thoughtlessness, and makes a generation accept without critique whatever it has been taught to believe.

It lies in the very nature of religious problems that they must be solved again and again. Every one of us has to solve them for himself as best he can. It may be stated parenthetically that most religions are creeds; but they need not be creeds and the Religion which we advocate is the Religion of Science.

The questions proposed by Agnostic are in their nature religious questions, and we answer them very briefly as follows:

1) “Has the Universe an ethical purpose or tendency?”

If this question is to be answered by Yes or No, we should say, Yes—the universe has an ethical tendency. But it must be borne in mind that this way of putting the question is incorrect. We should ask whether the universe has any definite tendency, or whether it has no definite tendency whatever, without calling its tendency either moral or immoral. If the universe had no definite tendency it would be no universe, no unitary world, no cosmos, but a jumble of incoherent events, a chaos, a labyrinth of heterogeneous things, a confusion without rhyme or reason, without law or order. Our answer to this first question is, that the universe *has* a definite tendency, and morality means agreement with this tendency.

2) We have reasons to believe that on other planets and in other solar systems, there is something corresponding to human life, to feeling, and to intelligence. For philosophical considerations teach us, and science corroborates it, that the evolution of the human race, the feeling of animal life, and the intelligence of rational beings have developed with necessity upon earth in rigid accordance with natural laws. Is there any doubt that the same conditions in other parts of the universe will produce the same results, and similar conditions similar results? When we analyze the stars with the assistance of the spectroscope we find there the same material elements as upon the earth. Can there be any question as to our finding everywhere the same laws and the same tendency of evolution? Other races on other planets may have very different constitutions; winged animals of the air or swimming animals of the sea, bipeds or quadrupeds, mammals or insects, carnivorous or herbivorous, or any other kind of creatures might develop into think-

* Translated by Emma Lazarus.

ing beings; yet it is certain that among all rational creatures, there would be at least in all fundamental features the same logic, the same arithmetic, the same mathematics, and above all the same logic of action, viz., the same ethics.

3) There are grounds for hope that pain will be diminished in life and that the nobler and more refined pleasures will be constantly increased. But considering that pain is either the result of unsatisfied wants or due to some other disturbance in life, we must bear in mind that the creation of new wants which arises through progress, will produce new pains to the same degree as it will produce more refined and nobler pleasures.

Are we not sometimes too weak-hearted with regard to our pains? Are not the causes of our woes mostly of a trivial nature? Look at them from a higher standpoint and they appear like the baby's tears over a broken doll. And if they are not trivial, if they are not the woes of the individual, but of the aspiring race, are they not far from being merely lamentable? Are they not in such a case sublime? Are they not transfigured by their sacred purpose, and must they not appear as grand as are the struggles, the anxieties, and the sufferings of a hero in a tragedy?

Let us consider pleasure and pain not from the standpoint of sentimentality but from the higher standpoint of ethics, where the individual as such disappears, where the individual's worth is measured according to his breadth of mind, and where life is valued not according to the pleasures it affords, but according as it contains more or less of those treasures that "neither moth nor rust doth corrupt."

As to the fourth and fifth question, we should say:

This planet of ours together with our solar system may, and we have indeed reasons to believe that it will, break to pieces. Yet the conditions which produced not only our solar system, but also mankind and human civilization, will not cease to exist. They will continue to exist and will produce, in fact they are constantly producing, new worlds out of the wrecks of the old broken ones. If a man dies, we lament the loss; we weep for the friend, the brother or the father. But the loss is not so much his; it is ours. If our world breaks to pieces it will be a loss—a lamentable loss. But will it be a loss to mankind? It will be a loss in the universe, which, however, as we can fairly suppose, will be made up by other gains.

The universe is *not* "an infinite machine, which mercilessly crushes between its cogs not only the individual but eventually the race." The universe is infinite and inexhaustible life. Whatever life of organized beings, of individuals, of entire races and of entire solar systems may disappear in one part, there is a probability, practically amounting to certainty,

that in other parts new life will originate to compensate for it.

Life on its highest stage means action and action means performance of duty. Man is an ethical animal, which means that he has come to understand certain important features of the tendency prevailing in the universe. It is the performance of duty in past generations which has raised mankind to its present eminence.

The world is throughout a field of ethical aspirations. If our life ceases, if our planet breaks to pieces, the immutable laws of nature will remain the same. Humanity may be wiped out of existence, but those realities which created humanity and in consonance with which man's ethical ideals have been shaped will remain. We read in the New Testament that Heaven and earth may pass away, but the word of God abideth forever. The Religion of Science recognizes the truth of this biblical verse, although it does not accept it in the narrow interpretation of theistic theology.

CURRENT TOPICS.

KITE-FLYING is an exciting sport for boys, and sometimes when the competition is keen, the kites themselves appear to strive with intelligent emulation to "soar" above each other into the "blue empyrean" where the "celestial spaces" are. Oratorical kite-flying is equally ambitious, and just as entertaining in the proper season, which in this latitude is when the state legislature meets to elect a Senator. Rarely in Illinois has rhetoric "soared" higher than it did last week, when the kite-flyers in the legislature nominated their candidates for the national Senate. Rarely have candidates been shampooed with such foamy and aromatic suds.

* * *

There happened to be three senatorial candidates this time, and strangely enough, two of them appeared to be aspiring persons unknown to the legislature; consequently it became necessary to give a luminous and voluminous account of who they were, and whence they came, the biography of each beginning at about the age of fourteen years, when they started from home on foot, as one of the kite-flyers expressed it "for the setting sun," neither of them having perseverance enough to reach it, but both stopping in Illinois. With affected surprise as if they had never heard of them before, the attentive members learned that neither of the candidates had been in Illinois much over fifty years; that both of them had been Governors, both Major Generals, and one of them United States Senator years and years ago. The third candidate needed no biography, and so his champion just ironically remarked that "although comparatively unknown in mutual-admiration societies of this country his name was a household word among the millions." The ingratitude of republics was again manifested when the statesman and patriot whose name was "a household word among the millions" was left away down at the bottom of the poll.

* * *

There is not in the schoolbooks such a glowing tribute as the following bit of hyperbolic moonshine into which one of the proposers dragged his candidate, one of those men "who in the dark night of fraternal strife and partisan prejudice shine like the nocturnal lamp of heaven with solitary and serene lustre; obscured by the gathering clouds of partisan malice; unseen through the voluntary blindness of party interests; at times almost extinguished by political bigotry, but at length bursting through every

obstacle and reflecting a steady light upon those labyrinths of false theories of designing politicians which unrestrained must eventually lead mankind backward into slavery." Waiving the mixture of metaphor, and the slight overcrowding of adjectives, nothing could be happier in gush and gurgle than this comparison of the candidate to "nocturnal lamp of heaven." If elected, the lunar beams radiating from his countenance when at the full, will cheer and illuminate the senate.

* * *

While one kite-flyer was comparing his candidate to the moon, another was comparing the rival nominee to a dazzling constellation "a typical American whose brilliant intellectual powers are no more dimmed by time than are the stars of heaven; who stripped of every vestige of political or official raiment stands out in the clear bright sunshine of the noon day. There is none more worthy to contend with the Goliath of the democracy for the right to wear the royal senatorial wreath, than this David of republicanism." The prize for flying the highest kite was given to this particular orator, who by the way, was a colored man; and it was conceded by all the judges that such a remarkable phenomenon had not been seen for thirty years as this conspicuous candidate "stripped of every vestige of political or official raiment standing out in the noonday sun," while the comparison of such a venerable public servant to the stripling David the son of Jesse was in the highest style of biblical illustration.

* * *

The candidate of the third party was not presented for the support of the legislature on his own personal achievements, but as the enemy of "King Shylock," and the representative of the "honest, hard-handed, wealth-producing, tariff-ridden, monopoly-robbed, and usury-enslaved millions." Those compound adjectives though strong in sound, had no persuasive power, for the opponent of King Shylock received only three votes, while David got a hundred, and Goliath a hundred and one.

* * *

The "Silver bill" passed the Senate under whip and spur, the whip of the "Silver States," and the spur of the Farmers Alliance; it will probably pass the House under the same persuasion. The humor of it is that the Senate, although opposed to the measure, was driven to pass it by an outside pressure too strong for the Senatorial will. It was thus with the McKinley bill, when statesmen played the comedy of speaking against it and voting for it. They probably enjoyed the eccentricity like the disolute nobleman who apologising to the king for opposing a government measure, said, "I have no principle myself, Sir; but I belong to a party that has a great deal." So with some of our statesmen; they had no faith in the bill, but they belonged to a party that had. If the salt-making states, complaining that the Atlantic ocean is too fresh, "therefore demand" the passage of a bill to re-salt it, our easy-going politicians will vote for the bill, appropriate money to buy all the salt in sight, and dump it into the sea.

* * *

The device of coin clipping is very old, probably as old as money; and it has been practised both by knavish subjects and dishonest kings. Coin clipping is a crime when done by private citizens, but statesmanship when done by governments. For centuries England suffered heavily from coin clipping, and there were two ways of doing it; the one mechanical, by chisel, file, or shaking in a bag; the other political, by act of parliament, or mandate of the king. The private citizen was hanged for clipping coins, the king never was. When the trick was done by governments, they generally got the benefit of the cheat. They were not so liberal as the American Congress, which kindly proposes to clip the silver coins one fifth, not for the benefit of the government, but for the advantage of a limited constituency, the special class who own the silver mines. To make eighty cents a dollar by act

of Congress, is to clip the value of a dollar down to eighty cents. Clipping the coin clips wages in proportion. Hume praises Queen Elizabeth because she restored the coin which had been debased by her predecessors; and yet Elizabeth herself could not resist the temptation to do a little clipping, when having the opportunity to coin some silver she made the pound of silver into sixty-two shillings, instead of sixty as the number formerly was. Although the sixty-two shillings would not buy any more goods than the sixty shillings did, they would go farther in paying debts and wages. To the full extent of coin debasement the laborer was defrauded of his hire.

* * *

A curious parallel to our scheme of making four dollars worth of silver into five silver dollars, was the Irish legislation by which the English government attempted to double the value of "Wood's halfpence." This notorious coinage was attacked by Dean Swift in his famous "Drapier's letters" and with such bitter sarcasm and invective that he made a revolutionary agitation which compelled the government to call Wood's halfpence home. It happened that there were not copper coins enough in Ireland to "satisfy the wants of trade," "to restore confidence," "to stimulate business," "to move the crops," "to lift the mortgage," and to perform the various miracles required of money, so the government proposed to issue so many hundred thousand pennies. The job of coining them was given to a patriot named Wood, a man who deserved well of his country as an active worker for the "party," and a hustler at the polls. Now, according to the price of copper "in the markets of the world," a pound of that metal could rightfully be coined into fifteen pennies, and no more, but there was a large "ring" formed around the contract and every member of the ring had to get a share of the profits. Therefore, to accommodate all hands the government issued its "fiat" that a pound of copper should be coined into thirty pennies, and it was so. Wood made thirty pennies out of a pound of copper, whereas only fifteen had ever been made before. Swift exposed the fraud in his celebrated "letters"; the ring was broken; the government drew back, compromised with Wood, and called the cheap money in. Sir Boyle Roche was laughed at when he introduced a bill into Parliament requiring that a quart bottle should hold a quart, but some day we shall see a bill in Congress requiring that every dollar shall contain a hundred cents. M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

GEORGE HENRY LEWES ON CONSCIOUSNESS.

To the Editor of The Open Court :

In your issue of Nov. 20th, Miss Alice Bodington makes a reference to the late George Henry Lewes, in which—unintentionally of course—she seriously misrepresents the view which that philosopher held on the subject of Consciousness. She says: "More than a generation ago the late George Henry Lewes commented on the extraordinary fact, that the leg is drawn up when tickled, of a patient in whom the spinal cord is injured, and who "is therefore unconscious of the tickling. Mr. Lewes declared "that there must be consciousness in such a case or the leg "would not be withdrawn." If Miss Bodington will refer to her Lewes she will discover that this is a statement which he would have strongly protested against, in fact, one of the chief aims of Mr. Lewes was to restrict the use of the word consciousness rather than to extend it. At page 143 of his Problems, Third Series, he says: "Whosoever reflects on the numerous ambiguities and misapprehensions to which the term Consciousness gives rise in "philosophical discussions will regret that the term cannot be "banished altogether. But since it cannot be banished our task "must be to attempt to give it a precise meaning." It is obvious

therefore that he would hardly be likely to use the term in the sense which Miss Bodington says he does.

To try to make it clear in what sense Mr. Lewes did believe the word should be employed, it is necessary to consider the particular fallacy he was endeavoring to controvert, which was, "that the Brain and the Brain only is the seat of Sensibility," and that consequently the action of the rest of the Cerebro Spinal Axis was purely Reflex, Physical and Mechanical. Those who can call to mind the somewhat acrimonious controversies concerning Animal Automatism which took place some years ago, will remember that Lewes's polemic was directed against that theory. He also was among the earliest to declare the importance, and indeed the absolute necessity of combining the study of Physiology with that of Psychology, one of his doctrines being that Mind after all is but a special Mode of Life.

In 1859 Lewes enunciated his famous biological law, which has not yet obtained universal recognition. In reference to the Nervous Mechanism he maintained that "Identity of tissue implies identity of property, and identity of organic connection implies identity of function," and it is in reference to this "law" that Lewes himself stated "it was so little understood that it for the most part met with denial or silent neglect."

The bearing of this law on the problem of consciousness is easily seen; the central tissue throughout the whole Cerebro Spinal Axis is identical in structure, hence it is identical in property, this property being Sensibility, but says Lewes, "to admit that all nerve centres have a common property, and that their functional relations depend on their anatomical relations, is to sweep away a mass of theoretic interpretations which from long familiarity have acquired almost axiomatic force."

"Dr. Hunter's patient on being asked if he felt any pain when the prick caused his leg to kick, answered, 'No, but you see my leg does,' and Lewes adds, Now, when a man has a diseased cord, the seat of injury causes a division of the whole group of centres into two independent groups, his nervous mechanism is cut in halves. How then can any cerebral control be obeyed by his legs, how can any impression on his legs be felt by his cerebrum?"

"It is true," he says further on, "that the man himself when interrogated declares that he feels nothing; the cerebral segment has attached to it, organs of speech, and expressive features by which its sensations can be communicated to others; whereas the spinal segment has no such means of communicating its sensations; but those which it has it employs." . . . "The question we have to decide therefore is, not whether a patient with an injured spine can feel impressions on, or convey voluntary impulses to limbs below the seat of injury—for as respects the nervous mechanism these limbs are separated from him no less than if actual amputation had taken place—the question is, whether these separated limbs have any sensibility? And the answer seems to me unequivocally affirmative. I assert therefore that if there is ample evidence to show that the spinal centres have sensibility when separated from the cerebral centres, such evidence can in no sense be weakened by the fact that a man with an injured spine is unconscious of impressions made below the seat of injury; such a fact follows necessarily from the establishment of two centres."

Now while Lewes affirmed the existence of sensibility in the lower half of the injured spine, he was strongly opposed to the assumption "that this sensibility is the equivalent of consciousness." He says: "The manifest advantage of thus restricting the term conscious state to the activity which is salient and discriminated is, that it extricates us from many contradictions and confusions."

I think Miss Bodington will perceive that whatever may be said to be proved concerning the existence of "other conscious-

nesses beside the "dominant Ego." Mr. Lewes can hardly be appropriated as an authority in favor of any "Hidden Self." In fact by her endeavor to increase the number of consciousnesses she is really endeavoring to increase and perpetuate a source of ambiguity and confusion which Lewes was desirous to banish or restrict

J. HARRISON ELLIS.

BOOK NOTICES.

"Marriage and Parentage, and the Sanitary and Physiological Laws for the Production of Children of Finer Health and Greater Ability" (M. L. Holbrook & Co., New York, 1888), recently received, is apparently a sensibly written book, containing much practical and salutary advice. The author's name is not given.

"The Auroraphone," by Cyrus Cole, (Chas. H. Kerr & Co., Chicago,) is a romance in which telegraphic communication is established with the planet Saturn by means of a Jules-Vernes-instrument called the Auroraphone. A medium is thus afforded for the expression of ideas with regard to which it is difficult to say whether they are meant to be taken in a Saturnian sense or a terrestrial one. The philosophical ideas imparted certainly do possess the characteristics of Saturninity. However, the incidents of the novel are necessarily of interest and form a good setting for the presentation of opinion.

We have received the first number of *The Bacteriological World*, (formerly noticed,) which has for a frontispiece portraits of the well-renowned bacteriologists Prof. Robert Koch and Dr. Louis Pasteur. Editor Dr. Paul Paquin of Missouri State University gives the first part of his "Lessons on Bacteriology." Two thousand copies of the first issue have been reserved for distribution to subscribers and others during the months of January and February. (T. J. Turner, Mexico, Mo.)

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