

The Open Court.

A WEEKLY JOURNAL

Devoted to the Work of Conciliating Religion with Science.

No. 178. (VOL. IV.—48)

CHICAGO, JANUARY 22, 1891.

Two Dollars per Year.
Single Copies, 5 Cts.

SEXUAL ETHICS.

SEXUAL ethics is the very core of all ethics. It is the most important sphere of human conduct, the tenderest, holiest, and most delicate realm of moral aspirations. When speaking of morality, we first of all think of sexual purity. So much is sexual ethics regarded as the very essence of morality! And no wonder that it is so. Consider but for a moment the importance of sexual relations! The future of our race depends upon them. The generations to come are shaped, they are created through sexual relations.

The legalized form of the sexual relation is called marriage. If marriage were not a sacrament, we ought to make it such, for it is the dearest, the most important, and most sacred of all human bonds.

The relation of parents to children is sacred indeed. It is the relation of the past to the present. Parents hand down the hallowed torch of spirit-life to the present generation; and if there is anything holier still, it certainly is the alliance between husband and wife to become parents and to devote themselves to the continuation of humanity and all the spiritual treasures of the race.

The sexual relation is a natural want produced through the necessity of self-preservation. The human soul yearns to live; it yearns to grow and to multiply. In the face of death it longs for immortality, but immortality is not granted to the individual and in order to become immortal an individual must grow beyond the limits of individuality. The natural consequence of these conditions is that immortality can spring from love only. Immortality must be gained by sacrifice, it must be taken by conquest, and there is but one power that can gain immortality. It is that power of which the Song of Songs says, "it is stronger than death." That one power is the holiness of the sexual relation, it is matrimonial love.

If we deprive sex-relation of its sanctity, it sinks down far below the most brutish acts of lowest animal life. Human sex relation in which the spiritual elements of love and an exchange of soul are lacking degrades man and more so woman; it deprives them of their sanctity and sullies the holiest emotions they are capable of—the longing for immortal life. Animal sex-relations are at least natural. Animals yield to their natural wants without any consciousness of their

importance or consequences. In the absence of thought, it is nature that acts in them. Immoral men and women, who prostitute the holiest sentiments because they imagine they find a pleasure in so doing, cease to remain natural and accustom themselves artificially to unnatural wants which weaken their bodies and poison their souls.

The apostle (in the Epistle to the Ephesians, vi. 2) speaks of the commandment "Honor thy father and mother," as being "the first commandment with promise." Reverence to parents is our willingness to receive the sacred torch of human soul-life with a grateful mind. Lack of reverence is a self-deprivation of this rich inheritance, and the highest reverence is shown not by a passive reception of merely conservative obedience, but by actively taking possession of the spiritual treasures by sifting them critically and by increasing their value. In fact, there is no passive receiving; all receiving is an active taking. Says Goethe:

"What from your father's heritage is lent,
Earn it anew to really possess it."

Greater than the promise of the fifth commandment is the blessing that accompanies sexual purity. Chastity is the condition of physical, mental, and moral health. When the Romans became acquainted with the valiant barbarians of the North, they recognized the natural holiness of the sexual relation as the source of their strength. Cæsar as well as Tacitus are fully aware of this fact and give in their historical accounts of German life with keen foresight due prominence to this most important factor in the evolution of a nation of barbarians.

The sexual instinct of man serves a most important and sacred purpose; it is the preservation of human soul-life, it is the attainment of immortality. If it is led into other channels, it decoys man into dangerous aberrations. Woe to those who find pleasure in depriving it of its sanctity! The curse that falls upon them will outlive their lives, for it will go down to their children and the children of their children.

It is not ethereal prudery that nature demands of us, not an extirpation or suppression of nature, but an elevation and purification, that the noblest features of nature's living and moving and being may be developed. A cynical attitude towards the mysteries of sexual life besmirches the soul of man with moral filth.

Chastity has regard for laws that underlie the procreation of life, and reverence for the tenderest and most wonderful of nature's secret dispensations.

A TEST OF CONDUCT.

BY F. M. HOLLAND.

In a previous article I tried to show that a practicable and accurate test, to show what is right or wrong, may be found in the conditions of social existence and progress. In other words, I hold that actions which tend to help mankind to exist and advance are morally right, that those which tend to destroy the existence of our race, or even to check its progress, are morally wrong, and that those which have no tendency either way, are neither right nor wrong. Motives, of course, are virtuous or vicious, according as they are meant to produce actions by which social progress is promoted or checked; no action which does not proceed from virtuous motives can be right; but an act which is so prompted may be morally wrong, as is the case with persecution, not to mention other conscientious errors which will soon be pointed out.

Calling this test practicable does not mean that it ought to be substituted for conscience as a daily guide. When conscience bids us be generous, chaste, or honest, it is morally safer, as a rule, for us to obey promptly and disinterestedly, than for us to sit down to calculate the probability that this particular action will prove conducive or detrimental to social progress. And so, when I want to know what time it is, I usually prefer looking at my watch, to making the journey necessary to consult a clock regulated by the Cambridge Observatory. When I happen to pass such a clock, however, I am very glad to see whether my watch differs from it; and I always know which is in the wrong. So if we feel any doubt whether we ought to feed a tramp, or help wreck a liquor saloon, or resist force with force, or take a vow of celibacy, we cannot be sure that we are acting virtuously, unless we choose some guide less subject to be perverted by passion and prejudice, than conscience.

The test I propose does not justify the encouragement of mendacity by thoughtless charity, or the wanton disturbance of the public peace. It permits both nations and individuals to defend themselves; but it condemns wars of conquest, as likely not only to retard the general progress, but to curse the conquerors with retaliation from abroad and despotism at home.

Thus this test shows its accuracy by censuring nothing universally acknowledged to be virtuous, and sanctioning nothing generally considered vicious. What I claim most confidently for it, is its capacity to furnish a full code of duties. As I repeat the list already given, I will try to arrange them in the order justified

by their fitness to promote social progress. And first, should come a virtue which has been insisted upon by all rulers and teachers from the very beginning, which is still required peremptorily of all the members of society, and which has also the peculiar merit of not being liable to excess. All this is true of no virtue but justice.

The only danger about recognizing the rights of others is that of failing to do so fully. If I give my neighbor more than his due, I act unjustly towards myself or some other member of society. Whatever is just is obligatory; and whatever is not just is unjust.

In the same way, when we enlarge the definition of justice so far as to include veracity, we find not only that whatever is not true is under condemnation because it is false, but also that, when I tell my neighbor all he is entitled to hear, and nothing more, I comply fully with the requirements of social progress, as well as with those of the law of justice.

It may be noticed that I agree more closely with ancient than modern moralists, in placing justice above benevolence; but I am inclined to think that this last virtue is so liable to be carried to excess that it ought to stand lower than justice, though among other duties which are constantly obligatory on all the members of society, within the limits marked out by the conditions of social progress.

Thriftiness is so liable to be carried to excess, that it has been regarded with little favor by Christian moralists; and its cultivation ought to be kept in strict and constant subordination to that of justice. It must, however, be remembered that one of the most uniform characteristics of criminals is incapacity for success in business or even for steady work, and also that thrifty nations have been highly virtuous in all other respects, as well as very successful in making progress. The states in our own Union which have a peculiarly industrious, frugal, and enterprising population can show the largest amount of benevolence, patriotism, and scholarship, as well as the smallest taint of lawlessness, dishonesty, drunkenness, unchastity, and other gross vice. An honest and thrifty nation, family, or individual, is so much more likely than a thriftless one to be virtuous, and not vicious, that I should place thriftiness second in the scale of duties; while the danger of excess will be sufficiently guarded against by keeping justice high above it, and giving the next below to benevolence, a virtue absolutely necessary to social progress, if only to provide adequate care for young or temporarily disabled members of society.

This reason also makes the maintenance of the family tie so important, that we may give the fourth place to chastity, which has the farther advantage of greatly promoting the culture of all other good quali-

ties. This last is also true of the kindred virtue, self-control, especially when we define it as including temperance.

Having thus filled five places, we must certainly give the next one to physical culture. Utter neglect of this duty would soon make it impossible to practise any other; and it is hardly necessary to say that healthy people are generally much more thrifty, benevolent, honest, patriotic, intelligent, fond of liberty, and capable of self-control than invalids are. The care now given by civilized governments to make all the surroundings of daily life healthy, for the poor as well as the rich, ensures not only rapid progress in civilization, but steady moral improvement.

Then last come duties which are not required of all the members of society, but are highly obligatory on those men and women who are capable of performing them. Here, in order of relative importance, may be placed love of liberty, mental culture, patriotism, and philanthropy. All four are very liable to be carried to excess; and their manifestation should be carefully restricted by the claims of higher duties, especially justice.

First among these four, I put love of liberty, because lack of this virtue was the main cause of the decay of classic civilization. The capacity of vigorous rulers to promote social progress, and the liability of anarchy to check it, are so great as often to cause the establishment of despotism; but this has always been found, sooner or later, to be incompatible with further progress. The most highly advanced communities need most to have their influential members love liberty with a zeal ever on the watch against oppression.

Mental culture seems to be somewhat less important, and not so necessary as physical culture, self-control, and other qualities which must always be added in order to make it permanently useful, and which have proved extremely beneficial where it has been utterly lacking. I cannot insist too strongly on the fact that the life and strength of society lies mainly in its thrifty, honest, and healthy members. All its members ought to do their utmost to belong in this class; but all cannot be scholars, patriots, or philanthropists.

Patriotism is much more generally obligatory at election times in this country than during the rest of the year; and there are many countries which scarcely permit its manifestation in time of peace, as well as some rulers who give it no opportunity of legitimate exercise, except in insurrection. Those of our own citizens who are constantly in charge of our national interests are under so great moral responsibility, that patriotism rises for them to a very high place in the rank of duties.

The same may be said of philanthropy for the few who are able to practice it successfully; but it must

be remembered that this requires not merely wealth, leisure, and earnestness, but also sound judgment, high business capacity, and thorough acquaintance, not only with the evils actually existing in society, but with the actual working in times past of various institutions and reforms. There are few ways in which one can do so much good as in philanthropy, or so much mischief.

Those who ignore the claims of justice, self-control, thriftiness, love of liberty, and mental culture, cannot attempt philanthropy except to its discredit and to the public injury. There is no space left to dwell on what may be done by wise and just philanthropists, especially in diminishing poverty, which has been dangerously increased by thoughtless and lavish benevolence. Highest in honor among the men and women who carry society onwards and upwards are these philanthropists.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE—THEIR INCONGRUITY.

BY R. LEWINS, M. D.

"To say I have changed my opinion, is only to say I am wiser to-day than I was yesterday."—*Pope*.

HAVING recently read, with much interest and profit, Dr. Carus's *Fundamental Problems* and *Lectures on Ethics*, I am desirous, with his sanction, and in accordance with the noble sentence which closes the preface to the latter work: "Criticisms are solicited from all who dissent from its views; wherever any one will convince me of error, he will find me ready to change my opinion and to accept the truth whatever it be,"—to offer a few but crucial objections to his in many respects harmonious world-scheme. I shall be very brief as the points at issue are quite simple and self-evident.

I base all I have to say on Positive Science, which, in our *fin de siècle* age at all events, entirely eliminates "Spiritualism" of every shade, and brings us face to face with the purest (its gainsayers term it crudest) Materialism, or Somatism. I think a very little reflection ought to convince all who have overcome prejudice and superstition to see that the interaction between an immaterial and material entity, from their incompatibility, is logically unthinkable.

Spirit or *Anima* was to the Ancients really material, being prefigured as a thin vaporous substance like the hypothetical ether of modern chemistry and physics. Plato insists that our souls are made of the same material as the fixed stars, which alone is Materialism unmasked. So that when Greek Philosophy speaks of animism, it can note something quite different from what our Religion labels "Spirit."

My position is that the union or *cirenicon* of Science and Religion is impossible. Just as that of Matter and *Anima*. And that where Religion is Science and Reason are not, and *vice versa*.

I prefer arguing the point in dispute on physiological *data*, the offspring of the century, now verging to its close, in which we live. At one fell *coup* we thus, in the simplest and most *naïve* manner, get entirely scot-free of the dual distinction between soul, which is only another word for life, like *Psyche*, and body. Dr. Carus appears to me to make too much use of the compound epithet "Soul-Life," which at best is only tautology. Define Life, as Medicine, now the science of human nature itself, does, as the sum of the organic functions, and a consistent Monism, unifying Self and the Cosmos, *i. e.* subject and object, is the self-evident result. It is the identification of Being and Thinking, only reached by a short cut as compared with the Kantian, Hegelian, or all other Metaphysics. Kant denying *Ding an sich* exactly hits the mark. Only he is not consistent with his principle. Indeed it is difficult to make out his real meaning, for *ehrlich* as, in general, he was, he still practised a certain mental reservation, as he himself during his most energetic period, confesses in a letter to Moses Mendelssohn. As Goethe says, *Gefühl ist Alles*, and *Gefühl* and *Bewusstsein*, or Consciousness, are synonymes. Till an object is subjected by entering the sphere of consciousness, it can have no rational value and is as non-existent to a sentient being after it has sown its intellectual wild oats.

And this *apodeixis* alone proves my case that there is, and can be no other "outer" world than our senses, of which Thought is a mode made for us. We are thus at once both *creator* and *creation* in the only sphere, relational or phenomenal, to which we have access. Religion haunts the Absolute sphere, and that is quite out of our lines as utterly inaccessible to human thought. The mere fact that all percepts and concepts are produced in a human mind (brain) ought to convince us that higher than humanity and ultimately Egoity, Man and the Ego cannot range. God therefore, like every "thing" (concept) else, must be a brain-made phenomenon and the only noumenon, if we care to use these now familiar terms which is non-essential, is *Ourselves*.

Pope, in the fourth book of the *Dunciad*, is very severe on this lapse from Absolutism. And yet it is really his own theory in his *Essay on Man*, when he traces Heaven to the passion of pride and Hell to that of spite. I could argue this question in other ways, indeed have done so in former years *ad nauseam*. Even on transcendental grounds from the Omnipresence of Deity, which as Pantheistic practically forecloses all Personal Divinity, or form of Divine Worship. But the above argument seems all-sufficient. Regard Life as organized function and Death as its exhaustive and cessation and the immemorial fallacy of the impossible interaction of soul, or mind, on Matter is dissipated

at one blow as by a thunderbolt. Nothing ever really dies but only changes its form—and the constituents of our present bodies are as eternal as are Suns and Planets. No real distinction differentiates Time and Eternity, Space and Immensity. And both Concepts, like all others, have no other source that we can hope or fear to reach, than *Ourselves*.

It is clear from modern Chemistry that no partition separates the organic and inorganic worlds. And therefore, putting aside all the modern sciences, we reach the physiological (non-spiritual) result equally well on the *data* of Newtonian cosmology. The eschatological colophon of the Attraction of Gravity is to make matter active, not passive and inert. No foreign factor or "Spirit" is therefore needed to "*animate*" what by an inseparable *Vis Insita* is already capable of doing its own work. And Deity *inter alios omnes* is thus an illogical superfluity, must be so if Self be all in all.

Natural Religion, of which Voltaire and other sceptics of the eighteenth century were votaries seems a retrogression from the higher "revealed" ones, which were evidently the well-meant, but to us now-a-days, futile and immoral attempts of humanitarian enthusiasts like Christ and Mahomet—to supplant the cruel "God or Law of Nature" by a Being with whom, on certain terms fatal indeed to human dignity and progress a *modus vivendi* became possible.

Mr. Darwin traces all the different species of animals and plants from a few originally called into being by a Creator. But, in a letter to Sir Joseph Hooker, he subsequently retracts that rash assertion and expresses lasting regret that he had ever so far truckled (*sic*) to vulgar opinion as to have broached so unscientific a *genesis* of living beings. It conflicts entirely with the real Principles of Evolution—as does Mr. Spencer's cryptic Agnosticism of the *Unknowable*.

SCIENCE AND RELIGION.

DR. ROBERT LEWINS is one of the most original thinkers of the present day; but being original he uses a terminology of his own, and it may sometimes be difficult to understand his meaning. He characterises his view as Hylo-idealism, which appears to me similar to Monism to the extent that it has been invented for the purpose of combining the truths of idealism as well as realism.

The soul, certainly, can no longer be considered as a material being. Yet "soul" is not quite so identical with "life" as Dr. Lewins declares. We cannot think of a soul without its having life. Similarly we cannot think of matter without its being mass. Soul and life, matter and mass, are abstractions, different in kind, each of which in a certain sense covers the same sphere. The physicist may very well speak of

the mass of a certain piece of matter and the life of a certain soul. Soul is not life and nothing but life. Soul is life of a certain kind. We can speak of soul-life with the same propriety that we speak of the movement of a mechanism, though a mechanism is movement of a special kind. If life is as Dr. Lewins says, "organized function," would it be wrong to speak of the functions of an organism?

The application of Goethe's words "Gefühl ist Alles," as made by Dr. Lewins, is very ingenious, but scarcely redeemable. He says: "Till an object is subjectived by entering the sphere of consciousness, it can have no rational value, and is as non-existent to a sentient being after it has sown its intellectual wild oats." Can, for instance, bacilli so long as they do not "enter the sphere of consciousness," be regarded as non-existent to sentient beings?

Dr. Lewins understands by religion the absence of science and reason. He says: "Religion haunts the absolute sphere, and that is quite out of our lines as utterly inaccessible to human thought." Similarly philosophy was formerly supposed to haunt the realm of the absolute. The religion of the absolute has been given up just as much as the philosophy of the absolute, but philosophy and religion will not perish on account of religious and philosophical errors. Far from considering religion as antagonistic to science, we understand by religion the practical application of science; it is the regulation of life in accord with our conception of the world.

P. C.

FOREIGN TRADE AND RECIPROCITY.

AFTER discussing their dinner on the evening of December the 18th, the members of the Sunset Club discussed the "Foreign Trade and Reciprocity" question. The debate was opened by Mr. Franklin MacVeagh, with an air of taunt and triumph in his tone resulting from the treatment given the subject by the ballots in November. There was a glow of literary polish on his argument, and the sarcasm in it was not of the tomahawk quality but rather delicate and refined.

Although Mr. MacVeagh did not say "Free Trade" from the beginning to the end of his address, he might as well have done so, for he vigorously assailed the principle and doctrine of "Protection"; not merely the McKinley bill, but the whole system in its theory and practice. It was kind and courteous to advocate Free Trade in that negative way out of regard for the feelings of the Democratic party, which is rather apologetic and sensitive on that subject. It fears to be called the abolitionist of commercial slavery, as the republican party used to dread the imputation that it was the abolitionist of man and woman slavery. The Democratic party might make its mark for freedom now, if it had statesmanship equal in size to its victory.

It was the opinion of Mr. MacVeagh that the protective system in the United States was near its end, because the argument for it was exhausted, its promises having failed when put to the test of actual experiment. "When all is promising failure," said the speaker, "Mr. Blaine re-appears. He proposes his lively plan of reciprocity to widen protection's market and to rehabilitate the perishing superstition of the farmer and the moral unconsciousness of those good citizens who have been supportin

for partisan purposes." It is difficult to believe Mr. Blaine serious, because he remembers very well how the English protectionists when their argument was exhausted, endeavored to stop the break in the Protection levee, by anointing the flood with a little Wizard oil called "Reciprocity." It failed, according to the law of makeshift politics; it was laughed at as a trick, and it vanished in derision.

Mr. MacVeagh's word-picture of "Reciprocity" was an effective piece of work, graphic in its details and easily understood. He said: "Reciprocity sounds well and is proposed with a certain theatrical effect; but it is illogical, not very moral, and exceedingly oppressive in intent; utterly superficial and hopelessly impossible in plan; and as an answer to the heightening aspirations of this expanding nation petty beyond measure." There is a sting in the last phrase which wounds our national pride. When we think of the immense resources of this nation, the inventive and mechanical industry of its people, and their commercial ambition, the very proposition to restrain their energies by the device of "Reciprocity" gives an air of littleness and pedlarism to our statesmanship "petty beyond measure."

It has always appeared to me that the turning of captured cannon upon a retreating enemy, and puring their own grape and canister into their own backs was the very cruelty of sarcasm although permitted by the laws of war. Grim as the argument is, Mr. MacVeagh adopted it, when after contrasting the "Protection" doctrine with its "Reciprocity" contradiction, he said, "When therefore we quit our isolation or admit the necessity of free trade with other nations, even if they scarcely count, we admit the impossibility of our protective system, and give up whatever made it an intellectual proposition." The protectionist cannon surrendered by Mr. Blaine, is used by Mr. MacVeagh to fire upon the protectionists retreating to the refuge of reciprocity. It is harsh, but it is war.

The opposition to Mr. MacVeagh was led by Mr. Ransom W. Dunham, formerly a member of Congress, and well qualified to speak on the "protection" side. He said that he did not agree with Mr. MacVeagh that Protection was in trouble, "but," he said, "Protection run mad has received a severe criticism from the American people." This admission at the very start that the McKinley bill was protection run mad, rather weakened the rest of Mr. Dunham's argument, because it appeared to many of his hearers, that if the doctrine of protection is founded on moral and economic science, Mr. McKinley was not mad but perfectly consistent in trying to extend as far as possible, its beneficent operation. It is not chivalrous to reproach Mr. McKinley because his bill was condemned by the voters at the polls. If "protection" is right, McKinley is right; elections decide nothing as to principles, although they may settle measures, and sometimes men.

"The principle of protection," said Mr. Dunham, "is this, that it is better for this country to take care of itself and its own people than to take care of other countries and other people." If so, why does he censure Mr. McKinley for his enthusiastic application of the principle? Is it possible to take too much care of this country and its people? The power of elections to reverse opinions is controlling over certain minds. The advocates of a truth may be so badly beaten at an election as to renounce it, but their desertion of it will not change it into a lie, and in the end it will be victorious.

In 1846 the English protectionists, feeling that their cause was lost, asked for an appeal to the people. They said, "if the verdict of a general election is against us, we will acknowledge the free trade principle and submit," and Mr. Cobden instantly answered thus: "Then you have no faith in your doctrine; if you had, you would not submit to one defeat or many." Nor would Mr. Dunham, if he had faith in his doctrine, allow an election to make

him sceptical, nor cause him to stigmatise the McKinley bill as "Protection run mad." If the theory and principle of protection were not condemned in the recent election, there was neither victory nor defeat for either side.

Mr. Dunham believed in "the greatest good for the greatest number." This is a very popular sentiment, but one of the most plausible and dangerous counterfeits that ever passed current among any people. Its political meaning has ever been "the smallest good to the smallest number," and it is perpetually on duty as an excuse for the oppression of the weak. It is the standing apology for a thousand mistakes and a thousand wrongs. It has no place in political ethics, for there never can be in a just political or social system any "smallest number" outside the principle of "the greatest good." The Bill of Rights in the American Constitution is a denial of the doctrine and a protest against it. The vital principle of every law that has any moral purpose in it is "the greatest good for each and all."

The application of his principle to the tariff was for Mr. Dunham, a suicidal *reductio ad absurdum*. As a reason for taking the tariff off sugar, Mr. Dunham said: "Not over twenty-five to fifty thousand people in this country are interested in its production, while sixty-three millions want it free." Very well! Now, less than ten thousand people in the United States are interested in the production of soap, while sixty-three millions want it free. The moment that Mr. Dunham denies to soap the benefit of his doctrine, his argument for free sugar becomes absurd. It is better to lay a tax on sweetness than on cleanliness.

Continuing, Mr. Dunham said: "I do not believe that it is necessary to make the tariff so high that the manufacturer shall profit unreasonably, but I would have it high enough that he may be able to pay a liberal amount of his profits to his laboring men and be well rewarded for the use of his capital." Here again he seems to be illogical in censuring the McKinley bill, for if the tariff raises wages, why not raise the tariff to its highest capacity? And when shall we behold the miraculous tariff that will not only enable the employer to pay high wages, but also compel him to do it? Was there ever a Congress yet omnipotent enough to make such a tariff as that?

Finally Mr. Dunham gave the tariff a bad character by affirming that the trouble with it is that "too many men want the tariff made for their particular benefit." This is equal to saying that the tariff is a premium upon rapacity and avarice, and is probably a deduction from Mr. Dunham's own experience in Congress. While there did he ever see a man lobbying for a tariff to benefit the people at large? Or for a tariff on any other product than his own? Mr. Dunham's complaint amounts to an accusation that the tariff is unpatriotic in its work and spirit, a device for diverting public taxes into private pockets, regardless of the nation's needs. No wonder that he does not want it very high.

In the course of the debate one member of the club proclaimed to the astonished congregation that he was "a protectionist on principle," a phenomenon impossible under the sun. No man will buy in the dearest market and sell in the cheapest on principle. No man will buy dear goods in preference to cheap ones if he can help it, even to encourage home industry. Every year, thousands of American protectionists go to Europe, but amongst them all there is not one protectionist on principle. Not one of them lays in a stock of dear clothing before he starts in order to protect American labor, as he would certainly do if he were a protectionist on principle. Not one of them about to return home postpones the purchase of coats for himself and gowns for his wife, because he is a protectionist on principle, and therefore prefers to pay more for them in the United States.

A childish outcry against one of the greatest American politicians was made a couple of years ago because on his return from Europe he brought with him several trunks filled with "pauper

made goods," purchased in Paris and London. "Why," said a critic, "did he do that, if he was such an ardent protectionist?" And the convincing answer was, "Because he is not a fool."

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE IMPERSONAL GOD.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*.—

I HAVE long noticed with pleasure that your columns are hospitably opened to the expression of views which are different from your own.

Will you permit me to set down some thoughts that occur to me in reading your article "Design in Nature," in *The Open Court* of Dec. 4th?

Your argument against the personality of the Deity assumes that this personality necessarily implies mutability. You conceive of a machine as the only power by which any work can be done with absolutely mechanical exactness. A machine, you say, "is an unfeeling and an unconscious—a mechanical—intelligence, Personality—what is it but the power of constantly renewed adaptation?" It is "embodied mutability."

Waiving the question how a machine can in any sense be an intelligence, I would merely ask here: Cannot we conceive of a Divine Personality absolutely above and free from anything like the mutability of human personality?

According to your view, here, and in your 'Fundamental Problems,' the cosmic order is God. Why not supplement this conception with that of an infinitely perfect Divine Personality?

You argue very justly against the folly and blasphemy of ascribing to the Deity the imperfect personality of man. But why object to the conception of a supreme and all-including Intelligence and Beneficence, (and therefore necessarily personal,) pervading the Universe—not *subject* to the cosmic order, as you imagine, but one with it, as soul with body? You speak of such a power conceived of as acting *arbitrarily*—and use the word *interference*. Are these terms quite fair in representing the attitude of the more enlightened and progressive adherents to the Personality idea?

Is there anything superstitious, 'Pagan,' or childishly anthropomorphic in such a conception, if cleansed from the mud of Genesis, and the later Christian mythologies?

I must confess that your idea of a cosmic order without a pervading Intelligence of the highest conceivable nature, directing and controlling all, is one that satisfies neither my intellectual nor my religious demands.

It is almost impossible for me to conceive of law, order, harmony, progress in the Universe, without an all-pervading soul in it. We used to say 'God is Spirit. The Universe is not God, but the manifestation of God to man.' Now, God and the Universe seem to represent the same idea.

You yourself say, God "is more than a person", "superpersonal", "superhuman"; and admit that "the whole cosmos is permeated by eternal and divine law, by intelligence, by design." But it is difficult for me to imagine how your cosmic order can get on of itself, without—well, yes, *conscious* Intelligence—if that is necessary to complete Personality—back of it. Your conception gives us, as it seems to me, a soulless universe.

You say, "a mathematician knows that the regularity of forms necessarily *depends upon* the laws of form." I should rather say, "is in conformity to, or in harmony with the laws of form."

You say, "at the bottom of all cosmic order lies the order of mathematics—the law that twice two is four." But at the bottom of this—what?

You say, "If God made the world as an inventor makes a machine, he had to obey the laws of Nature and adapt his crea-

tions to the formulas of mathematics. In that case, however, the Creator would not be the Omnipotent and Supreme God: there would still be an impersonal Deity above him. In that case the Creator would be no less subject to the cosmic order than we poor mortals are."

The idea of making the world as an inventor makes a machine, ought only to be ascribed to a very crude state of thought among men; and I don't think you would state it as the thought of any very intelligent opponent.

Cannot we rationally conceive of a Divine Personality, not arbitrarily interfering, but immanent, and in perfect accord with the laws of the universe? Why clothe the soul of the All with imagery borrowed from our imperfections? You say, "This impersonal intelligence is higher than personal intelligence, as much so as the laws of a country are infinitely higher and holier than all its citizens." The laws may be higher and holier than the citizens of a particular period; but are they higher and holier than their originators? or than the collective wisdom of the legislators from whom they emanated?

If so, then why should it be irrational to conceive of an infinite supreme source of wisdom back of the order of nature—not interfering in any miraculous way that may not be explained by science—but immanent and in perfect accord with all—not working by "renewed adaptation," but with a supreme intelligence such as no machine could in the remotest degree imitate?

As for Anthropomorphism, is it possible to escape from a certain tinge of it in our highest conceptions of Deity? We should not be human otherwise. We do all our thinking by symbols, by imagery. The soul of man and the universe are so related by these wonderful correspondencies between material and spiritual things, that it cannot be otherwise.

But is it not as rational to conceive of personal Deity as of an unconscious universal law and order that exists of itself, or which is in itself both cosmic Soul and Body?

It seems to me that both our intellectual and our religious wants are left unsatisfied by leaving us with the conception that the universe runs itself, rather than in harmony with an infinite Personality, pervading it through and through with a diviner life.

So far from believing with you, that "the worship of a personal God is the last remnant of Paganism," it seems to me that it is so deeply founded on the needs of our human nature, and on a universal common sense instinct, that it will never die out of our creeds, although it will become more and more refined, pure and intelligent with the advancement of the rate in knowledge and religion.

Hoping that these suggestions may find an assenting voice with some of the readers of your valuable and interesting journal,

I am very sincerely yours,

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

CHRISTOPHER P. CRANCH.

IN REPLY TO DR. EDWARD BERDOE.

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

THE false witness borne against me by Dr. Edward Berdoe, consisted in a *suppressio veri*. He had no right to say that I had defended "the atrocities of vivisection" without the qualification that I advocated its restriction to a comparatively few eminent men whom parliamentary investigation had shown (as I believed) above suspicion of cruelty. Dr. Berdoe's offence would be made a shade darker by his present letter, did it not suggest allowance to be made for constitutional inexactness. For, in reasserting that I demanded "the repeal of the English Act which places certain formal restrictions on Vivisection," Dr. Berdoe adduces a witness that refutes him. The little travesty of my discourse quoted from the *Zoöphilist*,—sarcastic and hostile as it is,—represents me as saying, "Repeat this vexatious legislation against knowledge, and

then extend to all animals the protection you afford those required by science." Here then, when writing his original letter in your columns (Nov. 13, 1890), my accuser had evidence before him that I desired protection for the animals required by science, and not the repeal of that protection; and that I wished to extend that protection farther than (so far as I am aware) the anti-vivisectionists had advocated,—even to the foxes, hinds, and other victims of the English gentry. There was also a *suggestio falsi* in Dr. Berdoe's use in quotation-marks, which might naturally be connected with me, of the phrase "the exploded superstition known as Christianity." My forty years acquaintance with freethinkers does not suggest one who could have written such nonsense. Dr. Berdoe has no right, I repeat, in controversy with a public teacher, especially one whose teachings he has attended and is considering, to insinuate between quotation-marks things he might be supposed to have heard from that teacher. And the case is worse when, as it now appears, the apparent quotation is Dr. Berdoe's own invention. Let me also protest against Dr. Berdoe's saying "he charges the Bible and Christianity with neglecting to uphold the rights of animals." I should as soon think of charging them with not upholding Dr. Koch's lymph. There is no question of "charges." The Bible and Christianity could not, as I have argued, recognise the "rights of animals," because they did not share the oriental belief in transmigration, which is the fable of evolution.

MONCURE D. CONWAY.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE SEPTONATE AND THE CENTRALIZATION OF THE TONAL SYSTEM. A new view of the Fundamental Relations of tones and a simplification of the theory and practice of music with an introduction on a higher education in Music. By *Julius Klausner*. Milwaukee, 1890.

This is the work of an earnest and enthusiastic artist, who among his colleagues is distinguished by a philosophical turn of mind, as well as a comprehensiveness and clearness in dealing with the intricate problems of music. New principles in the theory of music are generally considered with suspicion; but the novelty in Mr. Klausner's work consists chiefly in a simplification and a clarification of the old views. Thus, for instance, by his peculiar method of viewing the seven principal tones of the scale and their intermediate tones, he gets rid of the minor key; and he wages a war against such expressions as "inversions and changed chords." "Tones," Mr. Klausner says, "are distinct, they cannot be modified, they do not move; intervals are distinct, chords are distinct." Thus the novelty does not revolutionize music, it is not a new theory, but a new method of presenting the musical relations, and this new method is based on the maxim that "the key is the basis of all music; the musical relations of tones are key relations; key harmony is the harmonic basis of key relations, hence of all music."

It is impossible for us to enter into the details of Mr. Klausner's views either to defend or criticize them. If the book is destined to have a lasting influence, this will depend upon its reception in musical circles. So far, it appears, the reception of the book in professional journals of music has been favorable, as might be expected of a musician who as a teacher and artist ranks so high as the author of this book. We have only to add that the introduction of the book, being a chapter on "a higher education in music," contains many excellent suggestions, not only concerning its desirability but also its practicability.

NOTES.

WE cannot approve of the methods and the taste displayed by the Editor of *Lucifer* in the advocacy of his peculiar views on the emancipation of woman from the bonds imposed upon her by the marriage laws of society; for we do not believe that the evils he denounces are prevalent. We regret, however, that he should

have been imprisoned in the penitentiary, especially as he is of a very advanced age. If our courts wish to advance a cause by making martyrs, they might select some object better fitted for the purpose. The sentence we regard as unwise, excessive, and unjust.

We have received from M. L. Holbrook & Co., of New York, a volume (222 pages) of verses by EMMA ROOD TUTTLE, of which some are set to music. The poems are inscribed to "the faithful doers of little things which form so large a part of happy and perfect lives;" a portrait of the authoress is prefixed to the book.

We have received from the Freidenker Publishing Co., of Milwaukee, two almanacs, compiled in the German language, for the year 1891. They are called respectively the "Freidenker-Almanach" and the "Amerikanischer Turner-Kalender." They contain the usual statistical information and very much instructive and entertaining reading-matter.

From Samuel C. W. Byington & Co., (New York, 234 Fourth Ave.,) we have (1) a pamphlet entitled "The Philosophy of Evil," and (2) a book, of 359 pages, entitled "Selections from the Poets, with Responses,"—both by Mr. CALEB S. WEEKS. The latter work consists of notes, comments, and replies in verse to certain poems of Pope, Thomson, Cowper, and others, in which Mr. Weeks has embodied in the metrical form of the originals the corrections that modern science and thought have supplied touching the sentiments and ideas set forth by the authors responded to; the originals appear on the even-numbered pages of the book and the "Responses" thereto on the opposite pages. Mr. Weeks shows himself to be an able versifier and exercises good judgment in some of his discriminations of pure sentiment from fact. Many of the performances, however, can hardly be termed "Responses," as for instance the paraphrase of the "Bridge of Sighs," the reference of which has, so to say, been generalised, and an improved meaning hardly given to it. μικρ.

FUNK & WAGNALLS of New York, 18 and 20 Astor Place, and 44 Fleet Street, London, England, have in preparation a new dictionary, the title of which will be "The Standard Dictionary of the English Language." To judge from the prospectus and specimen pages of advanced sheets, the work planned promises to be excellent. It is especially praiseworthy that the editors have taken the trouble of locating the verifying quotations, so as to give in each instance not only the name of the author who uses the word, but also the page of the book where the quotation is found. This is indeed a Herculean task and not at all redundant; it will prove very useful to the public at large and especially to the student who is anxious to know the authority and the special circumstances under which this or that meaning has been moulded. In the pronunciation of words the scientific alphabet as adopted by the American Philological Association has been employed; a plan which will be more welcome to scholars than to the general public. It is announced that the new dictionary will contain 50,000 more vocabulary words than are to be found in any other single volume dictionary in England or America, and care has been taken in the admission of new words. No new word is admitted to a vocabulary place unless it has been passed upon by competent authority. The men in charge of this department are Julius H. Seelye of Amherst College, Edward S. Sheldon of Harvard University, Edward Everett Hale, Charles A. Dana, and Howard Crosby. The make-up of the pages, the style of print, and the illustrations remind one of the Century dictionary.

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