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## DESIGN IN NATURE.

At a meeting of a scientific club lately, a discussion was held on the subject: "Is evolution directed by intelligence?" This question touches the very heart of religion and science; and we cannot shirk it if we desire to attain to any clearness and comprehensiveness of view concerning the most vital problems of human existence.

Before we can answer the question proposed, we must first ask what do we understand by intelligence. We must analyze its meaning and separate it into the elements of which it consists.

Intelligence comprises two elements: (1) We mean by intelligence design, plan, order, harmony, conformity to law, or *Gesetzmässigkeit*; and (2) when speaking of intelligence we think that there is attached to it the element of feeling or consciousness.

Feeling by itself has nothing to do with intelligence; yet consciousness has: consciousness is intelligent feeling. A single feeling, a pain or a pleasure, as long as it remains isolated cannot be called intelligent; yet it acquires a meaning as soon as it refers to one or several other feelings. For thus feelings become representations of the surrounding conditions that produce feelings. Consciousness is nothing but a co-ordination of many feelings into one harmonious state. Beings in possession of conscious intelligence we call persons.

Now we ask, Can there be design which is not connected with feeling? Can there be order or plan without a conscious being who made the plan? We say, Yes.

The crystallization of a snowflake is made with wonderful exactness, in agreement with mathematical law. Is this formation of snow-crystal manufactured with purposive will, by a personal being? A mathematician knows that the regularity of forms necessarily depends upon the laws of form, upon the same intrinsic order which is present in the multiplication table; it depends upon the arithmetical relations among the numbers.

Is a personal intelligence necessary for creating the laws that produce the harmony of arithmetical proportions? Is a personal intelligence necessary for making the angles of equilateral triangles equal? Certainly it is not.

Suppose that some substance crystallizes at a given angle. Necessarily it will form regular figures shaped according to some special plan.

Suppose again that certain cells of organized substance, plant-cells or animal-cells, perform special functions, will they not in their growth exhibit a certain plan in conformity to their nature not otherwise than a crystal? They will, or rather they must; or can we believe that the interference of personal intelligence is necessary to apply the plan to the growth of organized substance? Organization is so to say crystallization of living substance; it is growth in conformity to law.

The growth of a child takes place unconsciously, not otherwise than the growth of a flower. The consciousness developed in the former is the product, not the condition of its development; it is the product of organization. The consciousness of man is the highest kind of systematic co-ordination of feeling that we know of, and therefore we say that he is endowed with intelligence. Man is a person.

Personality is not the annihilation of the mechanical law; yet through the introduction of feeling the mechanical law that governs the changes and innumerable adaptations of a person, becomes so complex that it at first sight appears to us as an annihilation of the mechanical law.

The hypothesis of a personal intelligence is not needed to explain either the design of nature, or the plan of evolution, or the gradual development of nations and individuals, which processes are all in rigid conformity to law. At the bottom of all cosmic order lies the order of mathematics, the law that twice two is always four.

Personal interference is so little necessary to produce regularity according to some design with any exactness, that it would even make it all but impossible. If man desires the execution of some work with minute exactness, he has to invent a machine to do the work. A machine performs its work with rigid immutability. And a machine, what is it but an unfeeling and an unconscious,—a mechanical,—intelligence? Personality, what is it but the power of constantly renewed adaptation? Personality, therefore means mutability.

Suppose a book were written and not printed; sup-

pose it were produced by the conscious intelligence of a personal being, and not mechanically by a machine; could we expect the same minute exactness? Assuredly not. It would be witchery to adapt anything in close and rigid conformity to law, without machine-like unconscious intelligence.

Suppose that the planets were run by some personal being; that they were constantly watched with conscious wisdom and regulated by purposive adjustment; we could not trust our safety a moment on this planet. Mechanical regularity in minutest details is all but impossible in the work of personal intelligence.

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A machine has no feeling and possesses no conscious intelligence; yet a machine must have been invented by a conscious and premeditating intelligence. A machine proves the presence of a designing person somewhere. And the question arises: Could not the Cosmos be considered as a machine invented by a great and divine person, designed for some preconceived end?

Even though there were no objections to this rather child-like and antiquated anthropomorphism, this conception of things would be of no use towards explaining the cosmic order. A machine is not invented by an inventor as a fairy-tale is conceived by a poet. A machine can work only if it conforms to that impersonal intelligence which we call mathematical necessity. It is the latter that makes the machine useful, and it is the latter that has to be explained.

If God made the world as an inventor makes a machine, he had to obey the laws of nature and to adapt his creations to the formulas of mathematics. In that case, however, the Creator would not be the omnipotent and supreme God; there would still be an impersonal Deity above him. In that case the Creator would be no less subject to the cosmic order than we poor mortals are.

Show me by any convincing argument that the cosmic order represented in so simple a statement as "twice two is four" had to be created arbitrarily by some conscious intelligence, and I shall willingly and without hesitation return to the anthropomorphic belief in a personal God—a belief which was so dear to me in my early youth. Yet so long as the cosmic order must be recognized as uncreated and uncreatable, as omnipresent and eternal, as omnipotent and irrefragable, we must consider the worship of a personal God as pure idolatry.

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But this solution of the problem—is it not dreary atheism? It is not, or it is—according to our ability to receive the message of the necessity, the irrefragability of the Formal Law.

Our theologians maintain that the order of the

cosmos proves the existence of a deity. I maintain that it does more: The order of the Cosmos is itself divine. It does not prove that there is a God outside the universe who made the cosmic order; it proves the presence of a God inside.

Is the order of the Cosmos void of intelligence? It is without feeling, but surely not without plan or design. The laws of nature represent design; they are embodied design. The law of gravitation, for instance, does not act with consciousness, yet it represents order. It describes the regularity of the fall of a stone as well as of all the motions of the heavenly bodies in their wonderful order.

The immutability of the cosmic order disproves a supernatural God, but it proves an immanent God. And this God cannot be a person. He is more than a person. God is called in the Old Testament the Eternal, he is represented as immutable. Can a person be immutable? Is not personality embodied mutability, is it not adaptability to circumstances? The divine order of the Cosmos as represented in Natural Laws stands above all mutability—unchangeable, inadaptable, eternal.

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This God, the immutability of impersonal, or rather of superpersonal intelligence, is the condition of science and the basis of ethics. If natural laws were personal inventions which could be changed at the pleasure of their inventor, science would become impossible, and morality would become an illusion. What is morality but our effort to conform to the order of nature, and above all, to the laws that shape society?

This impersonal intelligence is higher than personal intelligence, as much so as the laws of a country are infinitely higher and holier than all its citizens, its princes and kings not excepted. There is a rule in monarchies that the sovereign stands above the law. Is it necessary to explain that this idea is a farce, an illusion, a felony against the sanctity of the law? Similarly, the idea of a God, fashioned according to the personality of man, is a blasphemy of the higher God, of that God who alone is God, of the Deity that passeth all understanding, *i. e.*, all conscious reasoning and personal wisdom.

The worship of a personal God is the last remnant of paganism. Our religious convictions can and will not be purified until we apprehend a glimpse of the grandeur of a higher view.

There is a superhuman Deity, whose glory the heavens declare, and the firmament showeth his handiwork. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard. The whole Cosmos is permeated by eternal and divine law, by intelligence, by design.

The whole world is a glorious revelation of its immanent God. Yet this revelation is concentrated in man's personality. He possesses, not only a conscious intelligence reflecting in his soul the divinity of the All, but also the aspiration of moral ideals inspiring him to conform to the cosmic order that rules supreme from Eternity to Eternity.

#### THE HIDDEN SELF.

BY ALICE BODINGTON,  
(CONCLUDED.)

Innumerable experiments by various psychologists appear to show that in cases of anæsthesia of one hand or of part of the body; of suggested blindness with regard to certain objects, the second self is conscious precisely where the first self is blind, deaf, or unconscious of feeling. Many curious experiments are given in "The Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research," for January, of which I will give one. The subject—not hypnotized—had a pencil put in his anæsthetic hand, hidden from his view by a screen. Many pricks were given to this hand, without the least attention being paid by the subject. The left hand, however, being gently pricked elicited an expression of pain and "What did you do that for?" "Oh to see if you were asleep," was the reply. The anæsthetic hand was then urged to write, and did write, to this curious effect, "You pricked me fourteen times with a (here followed a rude representation of a pin) and you expect me to write for you."\* M. Janet believes that the various phenomena observed in planchette writing, table rapping, etc., need neither be ascribed to imposture on the one hand, nor to the influence of spirits on the other; that the writing of the planchette, and the rappings of tables may both convey statements which cause genuine surprise to the 'conscious selves' of the experimenters, and that they really represent expressions of opinion by the 'sub-conscious selves.' Often the medium when of a *caractère sérieux*, is extremely indignant at the indiscretions and follies of the planchette writer. My character cannot change in this sudden way, says the unfortunate medium scandalized at signing himself "Pompon la Joie," an individual whose written pleasantries were more than doubtful. Or the planchette self will suddenly become tired and write, "It is time to go to sleep, go to bed," after which no more communications are to be obtained. M. Janet truly remarks that if the spirits of the dead were the real authors of the commonplace remarks, or of the nonsensical or superstitious utterances attributed to them in spiritualistic séances, "Ce serait vraiment renoncer à la vie future, s'il fallait la passer avec des individus de ce genre." Corneille, he says, through the lips of a medium makes bad verses,

and Bossuet signs sermons of which a village curé would be ashamed.\*

M. Janet had some curious experiences with regard to blisters caused by suggestion. One of his patients, Rose, had hysterical cramps of the stomach. M. Janet told her he would apply a blister to the affected part. Some hours later the effects of the imaginary blister appeared, the skin was dark red and puffed up. But strange to say the mark had as it were four corners cut off. M. Janet remarked to Rose that her blister had a strange shape. "Don't you know," was the answer, "that the corners are always cut off the 'papiers Rigolot' so that they should not hurt." Her preconceived idea of the form of the blister had thus determined the form and dimensions of the red patch. On another occasion the suggestion was made that the blister should take the form of a six-rayed star, and the red mark took precisely this form. Léonie had a suggested blister of the shape of an S on her chest. All these imaginary blisters were successful in curing the hysterical pains of the respective patients. Rose, who suffered severely from hæmorrhage, said that she had formerly been benefited by ergotine.\* M. Janet suggested that she should take a certain number of doses of this drug at stated times. Subsequently every two hours Rose went through all the forms of taking medicine from a spoon, persistently maintaining that she was doing nothing, and the most curious fact remains to be told, that the imaginary medicine cured the real disease. In numberless instances where the 'second self' is carrying out actions suggested during hypnotism, the 'first self' though wide awake is quite unconscious of these actions. Suggestions *unrecalled* are sometimes productive of embarrassing or inconvenient effects.† Some one out of mischief suggested to a patient that she should kiss the almoner of the hospital when she awoke. This suggestion was a constant source of worry to the unfortunate patient, who felt impelled to kiss the respectable almoner, yet at the same time seems to have felt the impropriety of the act. Nor could any one remove the impression. A patient N. . . who nicknamed herself Ninute, on one occasion remained refractory to everything M. Janet could suggest to her in the waking state, and to a lesser degree when hypnotized. She appeared to hear with difficulty, and to understand only with great effort.‡ "What is the matter with you?" at last said M. Janet. "I do not hear you; I am too far off." "And where are you?" "I am in Algiers, in the grand square." It was not difficult then to bring the patient back from her imaginary journey. When she considered she had returned to France, she gave a sigh of relief, and

\* My copy of the Proceedings is nowhere to be found, and I am compelled to write from memory.

\* *L'Automatisme Psychologique*, Part II, Chap. ii, iii., *Résumé historique du Spiritisme*.

began to talk as usual. "Now will you explain" said M. Janet, "what you were doing in Algiers?" "It is 'nt my fault; it was M. X., who sent me there a month ago; he forgot to bring me back; he left me there. When you spoke and told me to raise my arm, I could 'nt obey, I was too far off." This statement proved true so far that the patient had been sent to Algiers by suggestion, and the suggestion had never been recalled. The cases where the second (or one of the subordinate selves) is superior in intelligence to the conscious ego; and those where the two selves act at the same time—as with 'Léonie' and 'Léontine' seem to me inexplicable in the present state of our knowledge. But that every portion of the spinal cord and brain in ascending order should have a consciousness of its own seems only natural if the history of the individual is an epitome of the history of the race. That ontogeny is an invaluable guide to phylogeny is a fundamental axiom in biology.

It follows from this well-established fact that the spinal cord, and the various portions of the brain in ascending importance, have at different periods in the past history of the race represented each the "Ego"—such as it was. In the Acrania, (of which the Amphioxus is the sole living representative), all functions necessary for the preservation of life have been carried out by the spinal cord\* alone. In Amphioxus the upper portion of the notochord functions as a rudimentary brain, sending off nerves to a pair of rudimentary eyes, and another branch to a ciliated pit, possibly representing an olfactory organ.

From Amphioxus onwards, we find a constant increase in complexity of structure and variety of function in the spinal cord and brain. Fresh parts are literally added on, but through all the stages of progress the "ontogenetic stages find their exact parallel in the phylogenetic development of vertebrates."† In the monkey anterior parts of the brain are found which are not yet developed in the dog; in man are developed frontal portions of the cerebral hemispheres which do not exist in the monkey. My theory is, that all parts of the spinal cord and brain retain by atavism the consciousnesses, from the lowest to the highest forms, which each possessed when it functioned as the ruling nerve-centre for the time being; and that each and all of these subconsciousnesses are, in a condition of health, subordinated to the highest cerebral centres, and each and all are carrying on natural and acquired reflex actions and thus leaving the superior ego free to carry on its own special work. Not only this. It appears to me that these subordinate portions of the brain and spinal cord have all shared

\* In its primitive condition as the notochord; a stage passed through in the embryonic state by the higher vertebrates, but persisting through life in one of the lower forms.

† Wiedersheim, "Comparative Anatomy of Vertebrates."

in the development of the highest centres. The amphioxus and the brainless frog for instance, are placed under the same conditions, but the spinal cord and medulla of the brainless frog control an immense number of muscles and nerves which do not exist in the low fish; the spinal cord of the frog has been far more highly "educated" than the notochord of the fish. It is by this hypothesis that I would explain the power of articulate speech, and even of acquiring languages possessed by the subconscious centres, when the ordinary ego is to all intents and purposes, temporarily non-existent. A case came to my own knowledge of a lady who, deeply under the influence of chloroform, replied in French to a question addressed by the French governess to her husband; the governess being outside the door, and the door closed. The same lady startled the household with a violent scream, when a case full of books fell in the night; and then enquired what was the matter, who screamed, and why people had come running into her room. In both these cases whilst the dominant self was unconscious, the subconscious self was awake and equal to the occasion.

#### THE ETHICAL PROBLEM.

##### A REJOINDER.

BY W. M. SALTER.

Nothing but extreme pre-occupation has hindered my noticing earlier Dr. Carus's replies to my comments on his book (*The Ethical Problem*). I do not doubt his sincerity in wishing to come to an understanding, and with this desire in my own mind I offer the following remarks.

Dr. Carus says that the Ethical teachers agree that what he calls the basis of ethics is not needed. Now all that we are agreed about is that such a basis is not to be laid down as a necessary part of the Ethical movement—as something to which all members of the movement pledge themselves. But any individual in the movement can hold to such a basis, can feel the need of it and even maintain that without it there can be no rational ethics. This opinion may be held; the only requirement is that there shall be tolerance of other opinions. If one does not feel that he can belong to a society with others who think differently (whether as to the specific basis or as to the need of a basis in general) he of course leaves the society—or does not join it in the first place. For example, I myself believe that a true world-conception is of great importance, though I could not call it "a basis of ethics," as Dr. Carus does; I am in search of such a conception, and what elements of it I have already gained, those who hear me know; but I can respect others who are following different lines from my own and am glad to call them my brothers in an ethical fellowship.

Dr. Carus says that the Ethical lectures do not acknowledge the 'reason why,' presented by orthodox theology. By this 'reason why' he means the will of God. But any of us might regard whatever is right as the will of God, if he chose to. The opinion of any member to this effect we should have no right to challenge. Basing the right on the will of God is, however, another matter; and I think Dr. Carus is unjust to orthodox theology in assuming that it does so. Many are the theologians who regard God's will as identical with what is right; the few are those who regard God's will as the author of it. Can Dr. Carus instance another theologian of repute, besides Dymond, who did so? There may, of course,

be others, but I do not happen to know of them. But even so extreme an opinion we should not have the right to exclude, so long as it did not injuriously influence actual conduct.\*

Hence my own controversy with Dr. Carus will be hereafter purely in my personal capacity. It would be thoughtlessness and arrogance for me to allow all the windings, questionings, hesitations, affirmations of my own mind in a controversy like the present one to be regarded as representative of the Ethical movement. In speaking of the aim and nature of the Ethical fellowship, I do speak for the movement and am answerable to it; but in discussing questions of Ethical philosophy I speak solely for myself and am answerable to no one.

Dr. Carus says that I know no 'reason why' for my moral law (as he is pleased to term it), and that I imagine that to give a reason why "would be not to explain but to degrade morality." With all wish to be charitable, I cannot acquit Dr. Carus of a misuse of my language in this connection. A 'reason why' in the sense of an ultimate standard of right and wrong I have expressly admitted to be necessary. But after the standard has been found and, by the use of it, the right in a concrete case determined, the question is sometimes asked, why should we do the right, which is equivalent to asking why should our will be regulated by any 'ought' whatever? My answer was that we should do the right out of reverence for the right and it appears to me that Dr. Carus's language implied the same view. 'Reason why' is ambiguous; it may refer to standard and it may refer to motive. A motive is always, in one sense, a reason, but in a very different sense from that in which a standard is a reason. A motive is a feeling, a desire; a standard is an object of thought. Now there is what I call a properly moral motive—the desire to do what is right or to live in harmony with one's reason or to obey one's highest thought; these are but different expressions for the same feeling. In its fullness the moral motive is beautifully expressed by George Eliot, in her description of Dorothea (in *Middlemarch*): "She yearned toward the perfect right, that it might make a throne within her and rule her errant will." Asking for another motive beyond the moral motive practically means, what shall I gain by right action, what selfish advantage shall I have from it?—but action under such motives is not moral action at all, and appealing to such motives (i. e., furnishing such reasons) is not explaining morality, but degrading it. Hence Dr. Carus's language as to my 'mysticism' is wide of the mark. He thinks that like other enthusiasts, I regard "science and all close scrutiny with suspicion," and that "the relentless dissections of an exact analysis appear as a sacrilege." I am actually amused at these words; for it is just the absence of close scrutiny into his ideas and exact analysis of them that I thought I observed in Dr. Carus. The clear distinction of things that differ, the avoidance of vague and ambiguous language are surely the first (or at least an indispensable) step towards the scientific understanding of any subject.

This inexactness still appears in Dr. Carus's use of the term "Intuitionism." "This view," he says, "if it means anything, means that the moral command comes to us in some unaccountable way, mysteriously and directly from some sphere beyond." Not so. Intuitionism, as used by Professor Sidwick (to whom Dr. Carus refers and than whom there is no better authority) does not refer to

the source of the moral command at all, but to the immediate way in which we are supposed to know that certain things are duties. The obligation, to tell the truth, for example, is regarded by Intuitionists as a matter of direct perception, not as an inference or deduction from some other obligation. Intuitionism is not necessarily theological or supernaturalistic; and on the other hand utilitarianism even egoistic utilitarianism may be supernaturalistic, as it was in the hands of Paley. Yes, the evolutionary theory of Dr. Carus, if we give this name to the view that progress, and not happiness, is the supreme end, is just as capable of being ultimately interpreted in a theological or supernaturalistic manner; the rule, work for progress, for the development of human-soul life, may be interpreted as a Divine command as readily as any other rule. In fact, almost all the Ethical themes may be "intuitionist" in Dr. Carus's vague use of the term.

As to the distinction between Utilitarianism and Hedonism, I acknowledge that Dr. Carus has the right to make it, if etymology and not scientific usage are to determine such matters. The useful and the pleasant are certainly two distinct conceptions. Utilitarianism has always said that the useful was determined by its relation to the pleasant; but abstractly speaking, anything is useful, which serves an end, whatever that end may be. I have not called myself a Utilitarian, but I have been accustomed to say that I sympathized with Utilitarianism so far as it opposed the claim of Intuitionists to settle special duties by means of ready-made intuitions; but not in so far as it made happiness or pleasure (whether individual or general) the final end. Practically, as I think Mr. Hegeler was aware, I regard progress as a better standard than happiness. Whether it be an ultimate standard is another question, and I think it can hardly be that, since progress (if it be more than mere movement) implies some idea of a goal in the direction of which progress takes place. Utilitarianism, however, as every moral theory worthy of the name, distinguishes between moral goodness and material usefulness. Only a theory which sunk ethics to the level of mechanics would fail to do this. Bentham himself says: "Beneficence apart from benevolence is no virtue; it is not moral quality—it belongs to a stock or stone, as well as to a human being."

Failure to think out the implications of what he says seems to me to mark Dr. Carus's assertion that the stern facts of life teach us what desires should be suppressed and what wishes should rule supreme. I do not question the value of such experience as a teacher—but all on one condition, namely, that we wish to live, and more than that, that we wish others to live. Apart from such a wish, immorality is as consistent with the "stern facts of life" as morality. The fundamental problem of ethics is deeper than Dr. Carus imagines; and it is because he does not seem to me to go to the roots of things, that his ethics appear to be "something in the air." So far as I can see, it is a purely hypothetical or conditional morality that he gives us; if, for example, we wish for health, he says in substance we must regard the conditions of health—and aside from such a wish obligation has no meaning. The facts are, of course, the same whether we so wish or not; I do not question that many a "jovial companion" has been "buried in the bloom of life." The real question is, was there any obligation upon such an one to care for his life—did not he feel it or even could he be made to feel it, but did it (the obligation) *exist*?

Dr. Carus does not make a careful statement of my views as to the absoluteness of morality. I do not say that conscience is absolute. It appears to me necessary to distinguish between conscience and the moral law, just as we do between science and the facts and laws of which science takes cognizance. I fully admit the "facts of an erring conscience" to which Dr. Carus alludes. So physical science has varied and often erred in the past; but we do not therefore conclude that there have been no unvarying physical laws. Why is it not possible to allow that conscience is

\*Dr. Carus thinks that our societies should be called "Societies for Moral Culture." I have sometimes thought that I should myself prefer such a designation, simply because it sounds less technical. But Dr. Carus's distinction between morals and ethics appears to me arbitrary; no unthinking, conventional, or merely reflex action can properly be called moral. Again, Dr. Carus sees no need for our leaving the churches, in case it is duty simply that we are concerned for, since the churches also are concerned for the same thing. But is not Dr. Carus aware that almost no Christian church would receive a person to membership on the strength of a moral aim and purpose alone, that besides this, requirement is made of a confession in some theological creed?

a development and by no means infallible, and yet hold that there is an unvarying objective moral law? The real absolute of morality is in the objective principles, not in conscience or the subjective sense of them. This I have brought out in the very lecture from which Dr. Carus quotes, and which perhaps he had not time to read to the end (vide pp. 94 to 101 of *Ethical Religion*). Yet by the moral law I have in mind something quite different from a mere formulation of natural sequences (though I agree with Dr. Carus in holding them to be necessary and unvarying); I mean a commandment, a rule, an imperative—and the special moral rules are so many applications of the fundamental rule to the various special departments and situations of life. I have recently given my views on the important distinction between physical law and moral law in *The New Ideal* (Boston), June and October.

Dr. Carus recognizes the distinction between the leading principle in ethics and the philosophical view *back of* ethics. He however holds that such a leading principle must be derived from the philosophical view. This, so far as the words go, is perfectly clear and consistent. But before I can be sure of what they *mean*, I feel that I need an illustration of how the derivation takes place. It was because I thought that Dr. Carus would give us such an illustration that I took up "The Ethical Problem" with such interest. I have already recorded my disappointment; since not only did he not derive his ethics from his "monism," but he classed monism as one of the many "thought-constructions of theorizing philosophers," to which it was not wise for an ethical movement to commit itself. If then, as Dr. Carus says, "without a world-conception we can have no ethics," it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he has not given us any ethics himself. Will he not try to show in what way the principle of "truthfulness" or that of "the development of human soul-life" is to be derived from Monism—that is, in what way different from that in which it could be derived from Theism or from Materialism?

As to the "ethical stimulus" in my own case, I have not the slightest doubt, and acknowledge it reverently, that whatever I have of it is largely due to the influences of home and of the religious faith in which I was nurtured. But that faith did not include the view that God was the author of right and wrong; and so when my theistic confidence was disturbed, the foundations of morality were not shaken. The Divine will was one with whatever was right, according to my early teaching—and such a view made it perhaps easier to do the right, just as it is often easier for a child to do some task, if the parent asks it; but duty was not made to rest on the Divine will. At bottom the faith in which I was brought up was an ethical faith (just as prophetic Judaism was an ethical faith). I mean that it was a view of the universe dominated by ethical elements. Apart from the idea of a *just, righteous and loving* God, this view would have had little ethical value and imparted little ethical stimulus. It was justice, righteousness, love that had my central reverence, that have it still.

#### IN ANSWER TO MR. SALTER.

THE basic difference between Mr. Salter's and our own position will be pointed out in the Concluding Remarks to our discussion. I refrain here from answering Mr. Salter's reply in a detailed exposition. Mr. Salter repeats his objections, and in order to be explicit we should have to repeat the arguments set forth in former articles. We shall confine ourselves to a few concise remarks on six points:

1) We not only believe that 'a basis of ethics is needed,' but also that it has to be laid down as a necessary part of any ethical movement, that is started for preaching morals. No system of morals can exist without a basis. And who will preach morals without a clear and a systematic conception of ethics?

2) Mr. Salter distinguishes between two theological conceptions the one "basing the right on the will of God", the other re-

garding "God's will as identical with what is right." The distinction appears to us irrelevant, and has no connection with our present discussion.

3) Mr. Salter accuses me of a misuse of his language where I refer to his speaking of 'the reason why' of the moral law. After a careful consideration of the case, I find that the misrepresentation of Mr. Salter's view is entirely due to a lack of clearness on his part. The passage in question runs as follows:

"In fact, Dr. Carus gives no 'reason why' in the sense of a motive beyond the moral motive; and is well aware that to do so would be not to explain but to degrade morality."

I interpreted this sentence in the light of another passage of Mr. Salter's:

"Who can give a reason for the supreme rule? Indeed, no serious man wants a reason."

Mr. Salter in his present article explains the passage under consideration in the following way:

"A 'reason why' in the sense of an ultimate standard of right and wrong I have expressly admitted to be necessary. But after the standard has been formed...the question is sometimes asked, Why should we do the right?" etc.

What Mr. Salter understands by this second Why, which rises after the first Why has been settled, he explains in this way:

"Asking for another motive beyond the moral motive practically means: What shall I gain by right action, what selfish advantage shall I have from it?"

We admit that to ask the question "What selfish advantage shall I have from ethics?" would not be to explain but to degrade morality. But we must confess that this idea never occurred to us. Thus in the passage under consideration, we had no idea that Mr. Salter could understand by 'reason why' an exclusively egoistic motive. If he meant that, he should have said so. With all due appreciation of Mr. Salter's charitableness, we do not feel the need of it, because we are confident that if there was any misuse of language, it was not made by us, and we are not to blame for it.

Aside from the question of priority in the misuse of language, the objection we have to make against Mr. Salter still holds good, in so far as Mr. Salter maintains in other passages, especially in his book, that there is no reason for the supreme rule in ethics. He actually and repeatedly declines to derive the moral ought from the facts of experience, and thus he imagines that that something from which morality grows lies outside the pale of science.

We maintain that no standard is ultimate. Every standard of right and wrong has to be derived from the facts of reality. We investigate the laws of nature, of social development, of a healthy evolution of the soul, and our standard of morality is nothing more or less than conformity to these laws.

If the question is asked of a moral teacher, "Why should we do the right," this in our mind can mean only, "Why should we obey those rules which you lay down as right?"

Mr. Salter says: "We should do the right out of reverence for the right." Of course, we must have reverence for that which we should do. That which we should do, must be regarded as the highest we can think of. What we wish to do, must not be suffered to be taken into consideration where it conflicts with that which we should do. But considering the fact that we call that which we should do "the right", the prescript "to do the right out of reverence for the right" appears from our standpoint, as tautological.

4) I do not at all deny that the Intuitionist considers conscience as "a matter of direct perception"; yet at the same time I maintain that the Intuitionist considers the moral sense, the ought, duty, conscience, or whatever it may be called, as "a fundamental notion, ultimate and unanalyzable". This is the very expression of Professor Sidgwick. Science, it is supposed, cannot analyze conscience, it cannot explain its origin, and thus its existence must remain a mystery to us. See Professor Sidgwick's latest

article on the subject, "Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies" in *Mind*, October, 1889.

5) I read Mr. Salter's article "Obligation and the Sense of Obligation" in *The New Ideal*, where he compares duty with the physical law. Mr. Salter fails to make a distinction between the objective moral law in Nature, on the one hand, which is a physical law as much as gravitation, and duty on the other hand; the latter being the subjective formulation of our obligation to conform to the moral law. Mr. Salter says:

"Duty is like gravitation in that it is objective and yet unlike it, in that it (duty) is an ideal, rule, or command, and not a necessarily acting force."

The question arises, What is objective and what is subjective in duty. Mr. Salter says:

"The sense of obligation is just what appears to me to need to be clearly distinguished from the reality of obligation itself."<sup>3</sup>

This "reality of obligation itself" is an unclear idea; yet I find that it appears in Mr. Salter's book under different names again and again. So long as Mr. Salter feels satisfied with this idea, he will naturally think that the cause of all our differences lies in a failure on my part to think out, as he says, the implications of my assertion that ethics must be based on facts. Mr. Salter's "reality of obligation itself" is a something that is not found among and cannot be derived from facts.<sup>4</sup>

6) Mr. Salter again expresses his disappointment at my treatment of the Ethical Problem. He says:

"Not only did he not derive his ethics from his 'Monism' but he classed Monism as one of the many 'thought-constructions of theorizing philosophers to which it was not wise for an ethical movement to commit itself.'"<sup>5</sup>

I have purposely avoided the terms "Positivism as well as Monism" because it is not these particular "isms" we fight for, but the ideas that generally go by these names. The word Monism can help nothing. It is not from a name that we expect salvation.

It would be ridiculous to demand that our presentation of Monism or of Positivism should be adopted either by the Ethical Societies or by any one without critical examination. Accordingly we class monism among those systems that have to be examined. But we demand that certain truths be recognized which considered as philosophical principles are generally known as positivism and monism. Positive ethics I have briefly characterized as "the principle of truthfulness." Truth is agreement with facts. We must base our conduct unswervingly upon a correct conception of facts. This implies on the one hand that we should shirk no effort, trouble, or struggle to comprehend truth, and on the other hand that we should never attempt to belie either ourselves or others. The ethics of Monism urges us to heed the most important truth in the realm of facts, namely, the oneness of all-existence. The ethics of Monism teaches us to consider man as a part of the whole universe. The moral man aspires to conform to the All and to the laws of the All; he longs to be one with the power in which we live and move and have our being. In obedience to this impulse man's soul grows; it becomes more and more a microcosm within the macrocosm.

P. C.

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE DISCUSSION WITH MR. SALTER.

Making a call of late on Mr. W. M. Salter, I enjoyed with him a conversation, in which we tried to understand one another, in order to arrive, if not at an agreement, yet at a clear statement of our differences. Mr. Salter complained of my presentation of the case, that I did not make distinctions which were necessary to

\* The italics are Mr. Salter's own.

† For a further explanation see the end of the Concluding Remarks to our discussion.

‡ My answer to this objection is given in the article: "The Moral Law and Moral Rules." No. 164.

properly comprehend his position and that of the societies for Ethical Culture. He did not object to "a basis of ethics." Whereupon I said that the leaders of the Ethical Societies are perfectly right in not wanting to pledge their members to any religious or philosophical belief, yet they must themselves have a ground to stand on; they cannot preach ethics without a basis of ethics, for every ethical rule is the expression of a world-conception. By implication then, an ethical movement after all rests on a philosophical basis.

On my saying that the ethics of a spiritualist, of a materialist, of a believer in theism, of an Agnostic, of a Christian, a Jew, a Mohammedan and a Buddhist, actually differ, and that they must differ, Mr. Salter replied that "it was true, they might differ, but it was very possible that *im Grossen und Ganzen* they might agree.

We take exception to this. Even the different denominations of the same religion, for instance Protestants and Catholics, have different ethics. I do not deny that certain ethical rules are regarded as binding by all the religious teachers of the world; there is a "common conscience," (to use Prof. Adler's term,) developing in mankind, but is not this common conscience, so far as it is not a mere incidental concurrence, the expression of a common world-conception? A common world-conception (viz., a positivism or a systematized statement of the facts, founded upon scientific investigation) is preparing itself in humanity and together with it we can observe the evolution of the ethics of positivism, viz., of ethics in agreement with facts, an ethics that can be analyzed and comprehended by science.

But this kind of ethics (positive ethics) is found insufficient by Mr. Salter. He maintains that the ethical problem lies deeper than scientific inquiry can reach. "Granted that the knowledge of facts is the basis of ethics," he said, "there is a basis below this basis. In studying facts, we are influenced by a purpose; we have some end in view, and we study facts and conditions in order that we may know how we shall attain that end. The deeper question is, then, What is the true end? And the bottom obligation is to regard and seek this end, when it is once rationally determined. What are our matter-of-fact wishes is a secondary matter."

Before answering the question as to this so-called deeper obligation I would ask and answer another question. What is meant by "obligation?" Obligation is simply a statement of ours; it is the formulation of facts for special practical purposes, very appropriately put in the shape of a prescript. The obligation formulated with reference to the facts of our existence, and the conditions of our existence, is already the bottom obligation; there is not a second bottom beneath it.

In that case Mr. Salter says, "your ethical commands are hypothetical; they are conditioned by the wish to be in harmony with society; the wish to be in conformity with the conditions of nature; the wish for life."

Certainly, the ethical rules are in this sense conditioned; for all we can say about the ethical ought is to state the facts as they are: the man who does not care for being a useful member of society, or who does not care for his physical, mental and moral health, who does not care for going to the wall and whose actions are expressions of this indifference, he will do harm to his fellow-beings and he will be doomed to perdition. His soul so far as it is possible will be blotted out, and his life will become a curse to humanity. These are the facts and the moral ought is a statement of such and kindred facts for pastoral purposes, or as a help for self-education.

Here, it appears, lies the ultimate divergency between Mr. Salter's view and our view. Mr. Salter finds, or believes he finds, an obligation of absolute authority beyond facts and beyond the realm of science. We cannot see that an obligation outside of the province of positive facts, the obligation of an absolute authority has any meaning.

This ethical view will naturally appear to him who holds it, deeper than positivism and broader than monism. To the monist however it must appear dualistic, to the positivist metaphysical, to the man of natural science, supernatural. The former standpoint recognizes a profundity where the latter finds a vagary.

P. C.

## MUNERA PULVERIS.

BY JEFFERSON B. FLETCHER.

LUXURY lives and love lies dead,  
Pleasure is king and beauty fled,  
Fled with the souls of ideals slain,  
Slain by Cain and the sons of Cain.  
For a pitiful pittance of shoddy show  
The world's grown gray, and the world must grow.  
O young men! O maidens! O children of pride!  
From *you* beauty fled, for *you* love hath died:  
Oh! breathe on his frozen lips one kiss,  
And the beautiful god will awake I wis,  
And beauty come back from the dead world to this.

## BOOK REVIEWS.

RACES AND PEOPLES: Lectures on the Science of Ethnography. By *Daniel G. Brinton*, A. M., M. D., etc. New York: N. D. C. Hodges. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Co. 1890.

This well got-up volume, which is the outcome of a series of lectures delivered by the author as professor of Ethnology at the Academy of Natural Sciences, Philadelphia, was reviewed in *The Monist* of October last. Although some of its chief conclusions will not recommend themselves to the majority of anthropologists, it presents an array of facts which are not to be found collected elsewhere in so small a compass. The last chapter treats of *Ethnographic Problems* and *The Destiny of Races*. Dr. Brinton concludes that while all other races are either dying out or are stationary. "The great white race is gradually extending its empire over all continents and to the most distant islands." He is strongly opposed to what is known as miscegenation, but he believes that "when bigotry ceases on both sides, and free-marriage restores the Aryo Semitic stock to its original unity, we may look for a race of nobler capacities than any now existing." Ω

A GRATEFUL SPIRIT AND OTHER SERMONS. By *James Vila Blake*. Chicago: 1890. Charles H. Kerr & Co.

It is not surprising that Mr. Blake was requested to publish these sermons. They contain many suggestive thoughts and pious reflections, clothed in language which makes them more readable than the ordinary run of sermons. Much liberality of mind is observable throughout and it is pleasing to meet with a Christian minister who can say, as does Mr. Blake, that he has found "great delight, mental and moral glow, spiritual inspiration," in reading the Scriptures of other religions besides the Hebrew and the Christian, finding in them the same moral and religious truths. Some of the sermons, such as "At Peace with Things," "Faithfulness," and "Old Age," contain much that may be of service in aiding the development of high moral culture. Ω

REMINISCENCES. By *Lucy N. Coleman*. Buffalo, N. Y.: 1891. H. L. Green.

The story of a life spent in the interests of truth and freedom, and particularly in support of the anti-slavery agitation and in furtherance of the abolition of "Woman's Wrongs," as expressed by Mrs. Coleman. The *Reminiscences* are full of curious experiences, not the least of which was the interview of the authoress with President Lincoln, who avowed that he was not an Abolitionist, and would not free the slaves if he could save the Union in any

other way: "He believed in the white race, not in the colored, and did not want them put on an equality." The book contains excellent portraits of Mrs. Coleman and of her friend Mrs. Amy Post, a short notice of whose active life concludes the volume. Ω

## NOTES.

We understand that the Brooklyn Ethical Association has recently elected a number of Corresponding Members, resident in different parts of this country, in England, France, and India. The Association wishes to receive information, written or printed, upon any of the following topics connected with its work: (1) As to the location, organization, and work of other societies, clubs, or classes with objects similar to its own; (2) Information, bearing upon the doctrine of Evolution, of its physical, biological, psychical, philosophical, or ethical aspects; (3) Information bearing upon the scientific study of Ethics; (4) Information concerning practical methods in applied Ethics—involving the questions of practical beneficence, public and private charities, the moral training of the young, the elevation of the ignorant and degraded, reforms in penal institutions, hospitals, etc., the relations of capital and labor, the legal status and education of women, social and governmental reforms, etc., etc.; (5) Information bearing upon the scientific study of Sociology, including the science and philosophy of Economics; (6) Information bearing upon the scientific study of Comparative Religion; (7) Information as to the best methods of spreading and inculcating scientific and evolutionary doctrines as affecting ethical, religious, and sociological problems, and especially as affecting the practical daily life of women.

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