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NEW REFORMS.

BY FREDERICK MAY HOLLAND.

VICTOR HUGO was led by sympathy with criminals to treat them as victims of society; and a recent writer in the *New Ideal* is in favor of the complete abolition of government, because, "If we had no governments, criminals would not be created." We are also told that all oppression of wives would cease, if matrimonial contracts were made so easy of dissolution, that there would, strictly speaking, be no marriage at all. Still, other enthusiasts assure us that all the woes of poverty are to be removed by doing away with individual ownership of land, or better still, with all private property, whatever.

Such reforms are advocated with the best possible intentions, and make many converts. Young and imaginative people, who find attempts to reform the tariff, the civil service, or the elections too tame and prosaic to be worth their notice, are delighted with these romantic schemes for abolishing all poverty and vice at a single blow. Nothing could be more fascinating and picturesque than these: no property, no marriage and no government reforms. No method could certainly be more radical than this of completely abolishing every institution which has dangerous tendencies. There is a sublime consistency in rejecting the plea that this or that obnoxious institution is necessary to civilization, and saying, "So much the worse for civilization! That is precisely what ought to be abolished! If property, government, and marriage are necessary to the present civilization, the sooner we can get back to an earlier, simpler and more natural state of things, the better! Let us go back to primeval innocence, and do away with all that is artificial and corrupt!"

The advantages of this method of reform are self-evident, and my present purpose is simply to apply it to fields which have hitherto been neglected.

We all know that tight lacing brings on consumption, and many other diseases; that severe colds are often caught by forgetting garments to whose protection we have been accustomed; that deadly diseases are carried about in infected apparel; and that the fashionable form of female attire hinders women from taking sufficient exercise in the open air, especially on

wet or windy days. It is true that warm clothes preserve many deformed and sickly people from dying young; but this enables them to propagate defects which would otherwise perish with them; and thus the average health of the community is reduced sadly. The Indians were able to lead a thoroughly healthy life here without anything which we should call clothing. Adam and Eve were naked and not ashamed. The first men and women had no need of doctors, for they had no tailors or milliners. What can be plainer than that clothing causes disease? In the name of health, I demand the organization of a No Clothes movement. Let us make a bold push for corporeal independence on the next Fourth of July. No consideration of decency need stand in the way; for that is merely conventional. Pride, vanity, and extravagance would be greatly checked; and there would be much less quarreling of husbands with their wives. The abundance of models would give sculpture and painting such new power as would elevate and purify all social life. Rich and poor would meet as equals, until the reduction in cost of living caused all poverty to vanish. What could be more heavenly and at the same time more natural and primitive?

And, as I look back admiringly upon that picture of health and model of all the virtues, the primitive man, who was as nobly free from clothing as from government, private property, or marriage, I delight to remember how completely he satisfied the apostolic ideal. "If any man offend not in word," says James in his epistle, "the same is a perfect man, and able also to bridle the whole body." No one has ever done this so successfully as the primitive man, the missing link. We can be sure that he never swore, nor lied, nor scolded, nor tattled, nor talked obscenely. Nothing is more certain than that he could not talk at all. Speech, like clothing, marriage, government, and private ownership, is an artificial corruption, a desertion of primeval innocence. Oh, how many vices can be escaped by starting a No Conversation reform, as holy monks have tried to do. There is no other way in which lying, swearing, scolding and all other sins of the tongue can be abolished. I will claim no more space here for setting forth my own favorite reforms, No Clothes and No Conversation; but will merely assure my readers that these

new movements are destined to triumph quite as soon and do just as much good as those for no marriage, no property and no government.

THE HIDDEN SELF.

BY ALICE BODINGTON.

THE researches of M. Ribot and M. Binet into the strange phenomena of secondary consciousness, are well known to the readers of *The Open Court*. Those of M. Janet, in the same field, are also profoundly interesting, and the conclusions he has arrived at are the results of long years of investigation. I have selected a few of his observations and experiments, and have added information from other sources which have a bearing on the same problem.

Under normal conditions we are conscious only of the impressions received by the highest cerebral hemispheres. But in healthy persons under the influence of hypnotism; in some well-known epileptic conditions; and in simple and *double hypnotism* of diseased persons, "submerged consciousnesses" reveal themselves, and become for the time the "Ego." It is probable that further researches will confirm the hypothesis that these submerged consciousnesses, these "hidden selves" are always actively at work, and take upon themselves those manifold occupations with which the highest Self concerns itself very little, after having *learned how to do them*. The acquisition of the arts of walking, reading, writing; of playing on musical instruments, and acquiring foreign languages, all demand careful attention on the part of the highest centres in their acquirement, but are capable of being carried out, when acquired, in what we have been accustomed to call an "automatic" manner. Even the art of lying safely on a bedstead is acquired, and not very quickly either.

In many well-known cases of epilepsy recorded in Medical Journals, the patient has carried out a long, and to all appearance, perfectly rational course of action; has lost consciousness on a quay of the Seine or in a street of New York, and has "come to himself" in a hotel far removed from the scene of his attack. He has taken his ticket, traveled by train, taken a cab, named the hotel to which he wished to be driven; paid bills when presented to him, and has behaved in every respect as a reasoning being; yet of the whole series of transactions so far as his ordinary "Ego" is concerned, he remembers nothing since he was last on the quay or in the street. Terrible crimes, most inhuman in their deadly callousness and ferocity, have been committed in this epileptic condition, yet the conscious self of the unhappy perpetrator would have shrunk with horror from such deeds.

The "nightmare" of children seems also to come within the domain of the "hidden self." The child

utters cries indicative of the utmost terror and distress; sits up in bed or wanders about the room; stares at vacancy, yet is utterly unconscious of the anxious friends who are endeavoring to soothe it. One of these crises may occur every night for a lengthened period. Yet when the sufferer is roused, he—or she—has no recollection of having dreamed anything, or of anything having been the matter.

In the phenomena of "post-hypnotic suggestion" the wonder has been how the command to execute a certain action, or to see a certain imaginary person, should always be obeyed at the exact day and hour that has been suggested. It appears from M. Janet's experiments that the "hidden self"—the inferior consciousness—is busy all the time with remembering the command, has in fact nothing else to do. In one of those curious cases of a true blister caused by hypnotic suggestion, the subject when again hypnotized said, "J'ai tout le temps pensé à votre sinapisme;" that is, the submerged self was ceaselessly occupied with the suggestion, whilst the conscious self did not remember that any such suggestion had been made.

More than a generation ago the late George Henry Lewes commented on the extraordinary fact (as it has seemed till now) that the leg is drawn up when tickled, of a patient in whom the spinal cord is injured, and who is therefore "unconscious" of the tickling. Mr. Lewes declared that there *must be consciousness* in such a case, or the limb would not be withdrawn. His theory met with little but ridicule; he was met by the answer, "There can be no consciousness, without self-consciousness." Those, like myself, who were not the least satisfied with this answer, had no hope whatever of being able to furnish any *proof* of a sub-consciousness residing in the spinal cord below the seat of injury. We had no hope of finding proofs of sub-consciousness in the complicated and purposive movements of the brainless frog. "Reflex action" might cause movements like those of a bell when the wire is pulled, but not one thought the complex movements *with a purpose*, or what would certainly have been considered as complex movements with a purpose in an uninjured frog. It has now been proved that other consciousnesses exist and are actively at work besides the dominating ego; consciousnesses which carry on reflex actions, and also *actions which have become reflex*. The highest of these consciousnesses appears capable of all but the highest functions, and can receive a fair elementary education. In *The Century* magazine for May, a well-known case is mentioned of a "young girl, quick, active, and full of life and animation, who suddenly complained one day of a severe headache, and lay down on the bed. She became unconscious, but awoke in a few moments conscious, although no longer the being she had been. She did

not know her father, mother, brothers, and sisters; the results of years of education had been annihilated. She knew no more of her native tongue than does the child just born. . . . She had to be educated over again. She lived her life, learned her lessons, until she could read and write and knew her friends once more. Suddenly the headache came again upon her, and a deep 'sleep' fell over her. She again woke up to the old being; the language acquired in infancy had returned to her; the facts learned through long years were with her; the acquaintances of old times were her friends. The acquaintances, the lessons learned, the facts and events of the second period she knew no more. So she went on until again the headache returned, the 'sleep' was again on her, and she awoke again her second self. At the very page at which her education had been interrupted in the second state it was now taken up. She recognized the friends of the second state, but knew none of the first. So through years she lived on her double life, now one person, now another; each state being connected with, or rather being a continuation of, the previous corresponding state."

This case has many parallels, in some of which there is not only one submerged ego, capable of acting when the highest ego is suppressed, but two or three or more of these inferior consciousnesses, each carrying on its separate life. M. Janet gives details of the case of a patient whom he calls Léonie 1, Léonie 2, and Léonie 3, according to the consciousness which is in action; the second self, however, rejects the name Léonie, and answers to that of Léontine; and the third self knows herself as Léonore. The true Léonie is a serious, mild, quiet peasant woman, and very timid. But Léontine is vivacious, noisy and restless, and given to irony and sharp jesting. She knows of Léonie, and says (the real Léonie has a husband and children) that the husband belongs to "the other," but the children are hers. This curious distinction is explained by the fact that she had been hypnotized for her first confinements, and had lapsed spontaneously into the hypnotic condition in the later ones.

Léonie 3, "Léonore," knows, strange to say, of both the others. Léonie 1, she calls "a good but rather stupid woman and not me." She is serious and grave, speaks slowly, and moves little, and she despises the volatile character of Léonie 2. "How can you see anything of me in that crazy creature?" she says; "Fortunately I have nothing to do with her!"

There are terrible cases where the "Mr. Hyde," the "bête humaine" of the individual, has got altogether the upper hand; where hell—if it be a state of consciousness—has begun upon earth. Here science steps in, and with merciful hand keeps the 'bête hu-

maine'—alas! in these instances identical with what should be the highest ego,—permanently submerged. Women of bad character, of ferocious temper, and the prey of nameless vices, are by persistent hypnotism rendered useful members of society, acting as servants and hospital nurses.

The case, most interesting in its bearing on the cure of the insane, and in its exemplification of the best side of medical hypnotism, is that of a patient of M. Janet, named "Marie." She was but nineteen when she came under his care. Her condition seemed almost desperate; she had convulsive crises every month, chill, fever, delirium, attacks of terror, etc., lasting for days; with various shifting anæsthesias and contractures. After a lapse of seven months she fell into a kind of despair; and M. Janet as a last resource tried to throw her into a deeper trance,—ordinary hypnotism having no effect. He succeeded even beyond his expectations; for both her early memories and the internal memory of her crises returned in the deep somnambulism. Her periodical chill, fever, and delirium were due to a foolish immersion of herself in cold water at the age of thirteen. The chill, fever, etc., were consequences that then ensued; and now years later, the experience then stamped upon the brain was *repeating itself at regular intervals in the form of an hallucination undergone by the sub-conscious self*, and of which the primary personality only experienced the outer results. The attacks of terror were accounted for by another shocking experience. At the age of sixteen she had seen an old woman killed by falling from a height, and the sub-consciousness endured the repetition of this experience when the other crises came on. The hysterical blindness of her left eye had a similar origin; when six years old, in spite of her cries, she was forced to sleep in the same bed with another child, the left half of whose face bore a disgusting eruption. The result was an eruption on the same parts of her own face, which returned for several years before it disappeared utterly, and left behind it an anæsthesia of the skin and the blindness of the left eye.

M. Janet's object was to obliterate these hallucinations of the submerged self, which were the causes of such terrible distress. Simple commands were fruitless. M. Janet carried the poor girl back to the period of her childhood. It was easy to persuade her that she was again a child, and as a child she was led through the painful scenes of her past life, only they were given a different *dénouement*. The child with whom she had been forced to sleep was represented as no longer horrible, but as a charming little creature whom Marie caressed without fear. He also made her re-enact the scene of the cold immersion, but gave it a different result. He made her live again through

the old woman's accident, but substituted a comical issue for the old tragical end which had made so deep an impression. The sub-conscious Marie, passive and docile, adopted these new versions of the old tales, and may now be either living in monotonous contemplation of them, or they may be extinct altogether. For all morbid symptoms ceased as if by magic. "It is five months," says M. Janet, "since these experiments were performed. Marie shows no longer the slightest symptoms of hysteria. She is well, and in particular has grown quite stout. Her physical aspect has absolutely changed. Moreover, she is no longer hypnotizable."

In another case of severe hysterical vomiting, M. Janet has found it necessary to keep the patient constantly in the hypnotic state.

That the submerged consciousnesses are real consciousnesses, and not mere manifestations of reflex action, has already been abundantly proved. If anything can indicate an independent ego, it must surely be the capacity of writing a letter spontaneously. This was done by the second self of Léonie, who knows herself as 'Léontine.* Léonie had left the hospital at Havre about two months when M. Janet received a singular letter. On the first page was a short note signed with her real name "Femme B . . ." saying she had been feeling very unwell, and worse some days than others. But on the next page was a very different production. "My dear good Sir," it said, "I must tell you that Léonie truly, truly causes me great suffering, she cannot sleep; she does me a great deal of harm; I shall do for her (*je vais la démolir*) she puts me out of all patience; I am ill too, and very tired. From your devoted Léontine." When Léonie returned to Havre, M. Janet questioned her about this twin letter; she remembered the first part well, but knew nothing of Léontine's sequel. Subsequently M. Janet was able to watch the production of these sub-conscious and *spontaneously written* letters. One day Léonie was sitting calmly by a table holding in one hand a piece of knitting at which she had been working. Her face was very calm, and she was singing a peasant's song in a low voice. In the meantime the right hand was writing quickly. "I took away the paper," says M. Janet, "without her noticing it and I spoke to her. She seemed a little surprised to see me, said she had spent the day knitting, and had been singing because she thought herself alone." She had no knowledge whatever of the paper she had written. In subsequent letters the 'second self' Léontine showed both intelligence and an excellent memory; she gave an account of Léonie's childhood, and her remarks were full of good sense. Léonie had a habit of tearing up the papers that

'Léontine' had written. Thereupon in one of Léonie's fits of absence of mind (distraction) she made her take the letter and hide it in a certain photographic album which contained the portrait of a M. Gibert, whom Léonie hated and dreaded. She would never therefore consciously open this album, and here 'Léontine' knew her precious papers would be safe. It must be borne in mind that these manifestations of the second self did not occur in the hypnotic state. M. Janet, to his great astonishment, found that Léonie did not know his address, nor did she know how or why she had gone to Havre; Léontine was in a hurry to return to the hospital, and had made Léonie start off without any luggage.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

THE AUTHORITY OF THE MORAL LAW.

CONSCIENCE is not so much an authority itself, as it is representative of an authority. It represents the authority of the moral law in the world, which is no less a reality than all the other natural laws. Mr. Salter in a most enthusiastic lecture on the higher law containing much that is true, asks the question:

"Whence comes the authority of this law that is within and over us?"

Mr. Salter continues:

"The ordinary answers seem to me here entirely to fail . . . the last answer as to the sources of the authority of the higher law fails as truly as the first. In fact there is no answer; there are no sources for that supreme authority."

The Israelites conceived the authority of the moral law, the power that makes for righteousness, under the allegory of a powerful ruler of nature, as a great, personal being, as a legislator who had revealed his wise orders to Moses. And through the mouth of Moses, the God of the Old Testament is said to have characterized himself in the following words:

"I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me; and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me, and keep my commandments."

That God is jealous means he is intolerant. He enforces his will and suffers no one to live who attempts permanently to resist his will.

The God of Science is just as jealous, just as intolerant as the God of the Old Testament. The laws of nature are firm, unalterable, irrefragable, and omnipotent. The will of God is described to be "steadfast forever," and his dominion over the world* is proclaimed to be eternal. It is only by obedience to the immutable laws of nature that we can live. The Psalmist says:

"Unless thy law had been my delights, I should then have perished in mine affliction." (119, 92.)

Who can doubt that nature enforces her laws rigor-

* *L'Automatisme Psychologique*, pp. 320-322.

* Daniel 6, 26.

ously, that she ruthlessly punishes him who does not regard them, but that, on the other hand, (to use the poetical phrase of the Bible,) she is "plenteous in mercy" to him who loves her, who studies her secrets and obeys her commandments? Certainly, the laws of nature are not deities, and the moral order of the world is not a person. But they are, nevertheless, objective realities just the same.

We have ceased to believe in Demeter, but we have not ceased tilling the ground. And if we ask, Who is it that taught man to till the ground? we do not hesitate to answer, "It is experience; the facts of life have taught man to sow and to harvest the fruits of the earth." The myth of Demeter is not wrong, it is simply an allegory; and the myth of a personal God having spoken to Moses out of a fiery bush contains great truths, but we must bear in mind that the truths contained in the Mosaic religion are wrapped in poetry. And science can just as much explain ethics and the moral law, and the authority of moral obligations, as it can derive the rules of agriculture from the facts of nature.

It is true as Mr. Salter says, "Science teaches us that which is, but Ethics that which ought to be." But that which ought to be, must be based upon that which is; else it will not stand.

What is the ought? The *ought* is that into which the *is* has the tendency to change. It is the *is to be*.

A Unitarian friend of mine compares in this respect ethics to obstetrics. Ethics cannot at individual pleasure create ideals of morality, all it can do is to find out the tendency of life and to assist in bringing the *is to be* to birth. The authority upon which ethics is based, he says, is not a person, but we can represent it as a person. We can symbolize its activity as if it consisted of personal actions, and that is the method by which the various religions teach ethics.

In fine, the authority according to which moral ideals must be shaped, is not subjective, but objective. It is not to be sought for in the realms of absolute principles, but must be modeled in conformity with existing facts and with the eternal laws that science abstracts from existing facts.

Ethical ideals that are not based on facts, are like the mirage in the desert. The mirage may be more beautiful than the oasis, but he goes astray who ventures to follow it.

THE THREE PHASES OF ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT.

There are three phases or periods in the ethical development of mankind. Like all phases of evolution they are not sharply divided; one passes over into the next gradually. Their development is nevertheless sufficiently marked to be noticeable.

The first period begins with the dawn of civilized

life and culminates in the establishment of authoritative dogmatism. The transition to the second period is marked by the breakdown of this authoritative dogmatism. The second period is the substitution of the individual conscience in the place of dogmatism. It culminates in the recognition of the sovereignty of the moral ought, and of the freedom of conscience. The transition to the third period is the result of the conflicts produced by the arbitrary nature of the various conceptions of duty.

If man's conscience is to be considered as the ultimate court of appeal we can have no objective standard of right and wrong. That which is wrong according to my conscience, may be right according to the conscience of others. How shall we decide? It is obvious that we want an objective standard of morality. Without an objective standard of morality we shall sink into moral anarchy, where the will of the individual is the sole test of what is right or wrong.

Accordingly ethics is in need of an authority to decide the conflict between two consciences or the conflict between two different commands in the conscience of one and the same man.

Must we return to the old dogmatism of the first period? We shall not; for we have outgrown mythology, and shall never return to the creeds of the old religions. But we need not think of returning to the old views, we can progress to a higher view. We have now better means than our ancestors had for recognizing the authority upon which the moral ought rests. Our knowledge of nature and of the laws of nature has grown sufficiently for us to be able to account for the necessity as well as the natural growth of morality. The authority upon which the moral commands are based can be scientifically investigated and explained no less than the other facts of nature.

The first period is represented by the Mosaic law, by Roman Christianity, and similar institutions of authoritative dogmatism. The second period is represented by certain phases and ideals of the Reformation, the overthrow of Roman authority, and the recognition of the liberty of conscience. The third period is the religion of the future, which is near at hand. It is the basing of ethics upon the firm ground of facts. It is the recognition of an authority the nature of which can be explained by science. It is the establishment of the religion of science.

This religion of science is not only the fulfilment of the old religions; it is also the realization of that ideal which has been called natural religion. If the societies for ethical culture had been founded to represent this view, they would grow like the mustard seed; the seed would soon be the greatest among herbs and become a tree so that the birds of the air would come and lodge in the branches thereof.

Mr. Salter does not approve of what he calls "setting up a standard of philosophical orthodoxy." He says:

"Dr. Carus, I am sorry to see, has not outgrown the sectarian principle of the churches, and would apparently give us another sect as 'exclusive' and 'intolerant' as any of the past, though (Gottlob) it will slay with the sword of the spirit and not with the arm of flesh."

It lies in the nature of ethics to establish an authority, and every authority is in a certain sense exclusive and intolerant. An ethical teacher, in my mind, cannot help being "exclusive" and "intolerant," if "intolerant" means the confidence that there is but one truth. Or shall any kind of ethics have the same right? Can anybody violate a law if only his conscience impels him to ignore that law? and can truth be tolerant of error? or can we have different kinds of truth which, although contradictory, among themselves may be of equal value?

The ideal of tolerance (as the word is commonly used) means that we use no other weapons in the defense of our opinion than the sword of the spirit, but it does not mean that any and every error has the same right as demonstrable truths.

It would be intolerant to make a certain belief the condition for being admitted to a religious society; but it is not intolerant for anybody, neither for societies nor for individuals, to have a definite and outspoken opinion. Nor would the leaders of the Ethical Societies commit themselves to intolerance and exclusiveness by declaring what they understand by ethics. We maintain that they cannot properly teach ethics without knowing what ethics means. In order to know what ethics means, they must define the idea of moral goodness, and they cannot define the idea of moral goodness without proposing a basis of ethics. If that is intolerant sectarianism, they have in our opinion to become intolerant sectarians. But definiteness of opinion is neither intolerance nor sectarianism, so long as an opinion remains exposed to scientific criticism, so long as in the struggle for truth its upholders slay only with the sword of the spirit and not with the arm of flesh. To have no opinion and to declare that officially the Societies for Ethical Culture do not intend to have an opinion, is not tolerance, but indefiniteness.

Conventionalism may be a sufficient *raison d'être* for formalities, ceremonies, and customs; but it is not a sufficient basis for ethics. And a reformatory movement such as the Societies for Ethical Culture aspire to inaugurate, cannot take deep root if it is planted on the stony ground of conventionalism.

The intolerance of the first period is an intolerance of assumed authority, but the intolerance of the religion of science—if intolerance it can be called—is

the sovereignty of demonstrable truth. Truth is one from eternity to eternity, and there is no other truth beside that one and sole and immutable truth. Truth is that Deity which suffers no equal. Like Jehovah in the Decalogue, Truth pronounces as its first commandment:

P. C.

"Thou shalt have no other gods before me."

CURRENT TOPICS.

THE venerable conundrum, "What constitutes a gentleman," was recently brought up for answer in an English court, but unfortunately, the judicial decision left the problem in its old uncertain state. It appears that a person insured in an Accident Insurance Company, having been accidentally injured, sued for his insurance money. His claim was resisted on the ground that in his application for a policy, he had called himself a "gentleman," and as this was a false description, by which the company had been deceived, the policy was void. It appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff, although out of business at the time he applied for the insurance, had formerly been in the habit of earning an honest living as a tradesman, or merchant, and therefore could never be a "gentleman" in the legal meaning of the word. The court, although intimating that "no occupation" would have been the proper description, declined to pass upon the point, because the agent of the company, when he gave the policy, knew all the circumstances, and had even suggested the description "gentleman"; therefore the company was bound by the action of its agent, and the policy was good. The plaintiff got a judgment for the amount of his claim, but his narrow escape will make him careful hereafter not to call himself a "gentleman."

On the trial of Thurtell, sixty or seventy years ago, a witness testified that he knew the prisoner was a gentleman, "because he kept a gig." This reason has never been regarded as decisive, because not accompanied by proof that he had also lived a life of idleness. I see from a criticism in *Unity* that Professor Swing in a late sermon intimated that a gentleman must have some theological belief, or forfeit the title. He asserted that the ancient epicureanism was "a culture without God, the effort of man to be a gentleman" without troubling himself about the creeds, or about questions of his origin and destiny. The language of the sentiment is doubtless the Professor's own, but it is hard to believe that the idea is not a plagiarism from Harry Sullivan, a London street Arab, who attended the ragged school patronized by Miss Tennant before she married Stanley. Describing one of her school examinations, she says, "I asked Harry Sullivan to define a *gentleman*. He replied, not without some fervor, 'Oh! a fellow who has a watch and chain, and loves Jesus.'" When properly elaborated, amplified, and diluted, Harry Sullivan's definition has an almost photographic likeness to a description fresh from the pulpit of Central Music Hall.

Admitting that theological belief is a constituent element in the composition of a gentleman, must it be orthodox according to the Christian canons, or will faith in false Gods do? This problem is not to be solved in the gloom of the cloister, but in the light of the living world. For a test, let us apply an actual example furnished by the Probate Court in London. In September, the will of Sir Munguldass Nuthoobhoy, a Hindoo millionaire, was offered for probate in that court. He was a citizen of Bombay, eminent for his private and public virtues. His life was marked by industry, philanthropy, and honesty. He had prospered in spite of his benevolence, and his estate amounted to 3,435,000 rupees. After providing liberally for his own children, as his duty was, he took thought for some other people's children, and left large sums of money to schools, hospitals, and various benevolent

institutions. All this was highly praiseworthy, and would no doubt have been placed to the credit side of his account in the books of the recording angel, but for one theological mistake; he built a temple to Siva, the God of his fathers, and he set apart 10,000 rupees "to purchase idols for the same." This very useful and benevolent man had never made "an effort to be a gentleman with a culture without God," but his God was worse than none say the Scribes and Pharisees, for it was a false God, and his worship was idolatry; therefore, according to Harry Sullivan, and other orthodox theologians, Sir Munguldass could not be a "gentleman."

Speaking of wills compels me to acknowledge that they have a weird and spiritual charm for me. I love to rove among their avenues and by-ways, to trace in their provisions the features of the dead. There is a fine character study in wills; and in their eccentricities we may learn the influence of wealth upon the souls of men. Wills are full of ethical problems; and in a legacy we may often see the palpitations of a conscience. Searching in the foliage of a recent will I found a blossom which I thought was grafted from a Bible tree, "the laborer is worthy of his hire;" and the question it suggested was, Does that apply to laborers of every kind? Does it include within its justice that large class of laborers who are uninfluential and unorganized, who do not belong to the "Knights," who have no walking delegates, and who never strike? I mean horses, oxen, dogs, and toilers of that kind. This is an ethical problem which deserves more study than it gets, and which might not have aroused my thought had it not been forced upon my notice by this curious "item" in the will of a certain Mr. Clayton. This is the blossom to which I have referred. The testator bequeaths the sum of thirty pounds a year, "for the care and maintenance of the house-dog Marcus Aurelius." This bequest is not a pension, on which Marcus Aurelius is to live in laziness, and laugh at other dogs who earn an honest living; it is left as wages, for it is provided in the will, that whenever Marcus Aurelius shall for any reason, fail to perform the duties of his office, the salary shall go to any other competent dog who may be a successful candidate for the position. At the first view, a hundred and fifty dollars a year appears to be big wages to pay a dog for house-watching, especially as he buys no clothes, and has no rent to pay; but it is not so very extravagant after all, when we remember what a policeman gets for the same work, which he performs not half so well. I think the next "revised version" will make more clear the meaning of the scripture, that the laborer is worthy of his hire.

* * *

Judging by the newspapers, the city of Chicago appears to be afflicted at this moment by two mischievous kinds of citizens, one that votes too little, and the other too much. The pulpit and the press ring out vehement appeals to the "better classes" urging them to vote, and thus counteract the mischievous activity of over zealous patriots from the Lakes of Killarney, and the Mediterranean sea. It is claimed that some of these invaders are too public spirited for the common good, and that they are altogether too loyal to the American ballot system. So ardent is their attachment to American institutions that they commit perjury, in order to perform, perhaps a little prematurely, the duty of ballot boxing which the "better classes" neglect. It appears that for some time past, the courts have been working over time, converting aliens into voters, intending to make citizens, when we know that for any patriotic use thousands of them never can be made citizens in the legal meaning of the word. Partly from the hopper of the naturalization mill, and partly out of other mills, came 50,000 new voters and put their names on the polling lists at the registration in October. Simultaneously appeared the United States marshal and arrested several gangs of them for committing perjury as the beginning of citizenship, and several other gangs,

the practical statesmen of the town, for suborning them to do so. Of the 50,000 no less than 25,000 have been notified by the officers of election that they are "suspects," and that their right to vote must be shown by further evidence. Meantime, a call is made on all good citizens to vote, or for ever hold their peace about bad government.

* * *

The census of 1890 has been vigorously impeached for falsehood by many cities and towns because the figures made by actual count fall below the guess work estimates. As the distance "covered" by some provincial athlete in jumping, pitching, or throwing, shrinks under the test of a tape line, so the population of a town as proclaimed by its inhabitants is liable to shrink under the test of an actual poll. Although an error here or there should not be received as evidence against its fairness, some ugly charges have been made that the census is not honest, and that it has been corrupted and falsified for partisan and political advantage. This accusation had no moral weight; it was disdainfully regarded as part of that humorous mendacity essential to a political campaign. It was neither circumstantial, nor specific, and it had no responsible authority behind it; but that is not so now; it is indorsed and guaranteed by no less a personage than the Governor of New York. In a speech made by him at Canton, Ohio, the Governor said: "The census has been manipulated for counting the republican populations up and the democratic populations down." This is either true or false; if true the census returns are a worthless complication of perjuries and frauds; if false, the slander is as wicked as the crime charged, and unless the governor can prove his accusation, the "effete monarchies" of the old world will wonder what sort of people are employed for governors in the state of New York.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SOLIPSISM AND MONISM.

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:—

"The tides of philosophic thought are setting toward unity," is the first sentence and the key-note of the able article on "Positive Idealism" in *The Open Court* of September 25. This, of course, is the key-note of your valuable journal. In the logical meaning of unity this is a logical necessity, for all truth must lie consistent with all other truth; and so the totality of all truth is a logical unity. On this there can be no question or doubt.

But I understand that the monism advocated by *The Open Court* is a more ulterior unity than this; that it is the affirmation of the essential identity of all being and the ultimate unity and harmony which are implied in its action; and that hence there follows a moral law of universal obligation, to act for the whole as parts of the whole. This monism, I think, cannot be made to square with any form of psychological idealism; for they all make all the known and knowable world of sense purely subjective, an evolution from and in the subject, though this evolution is supposed to be aided by an inconceivable something from beyond this known sense world. The monism of *The Open Court*, if I understand it, makes the known and knowable world an essential part of the total monus from which man and all inferior life are evolved and into which all known individual forms of life are redissolved. If this is so, this monism has to settle with modern psychology which is idealistic, and this psychology is now widely taking possession of common and popular thinkers. The issue here involved is fundamental, and no theory of monism can evade or ignore it; and your excellent contributor, Mr. McCrie, will here need to explain himself further as an idealist.

As an idealist Mr. McCrie says truly: "The ego is not the bodily organism alone. The true, the only ego—is the subject

self projected so as to include the objective." This extension of the ego as conscious subject cannot be limited in any direction—if all phenomena are subjective states or conscious moods of the ego. Then I, the conscious ego or subject am wherever there is a phenomenon—nay I comprise that phenomenon in every case. It is I and I am it. It is I in that said mood. I thus constitute the entire known and knowable universe, and all its known and knowable forces, for these cannot be directly known or conceived except as they are known or conceived as phenomenal, at least in their manifestation, and it is only their manifestation which is directly known. There is nothing known from which this universe can be evolved—except myself, conscious subject. This I know; and according to this theory I know it as comprising the universe; and all the known evolutions and involutions of the universe are known only as the variations of my own mind or unitary power of conscious life. Thus I am the ALL. I know nothing unconscious, and no other consciousness than my own or myself.

These phenomena are not abstractions, and my conscious self is not an abstraction. If psychological idealism be true there is no room for any other monism than solipsism—unless it be a very different monism from that of *The Open Court*, and attained by a far less simple and direct process, as it seems to me. On these points I should be pleased to hear from Dr. Carus as well as Mr. McCrie.

Yours Inquiringly,
WM. J. GILL.

[Since I read Mr. McCrie's article in No. 167 of *The Open Court*, and Miss Naden's essays,* I am under the impression that the differences between Solipsism and the Monism of *The Open Court* are mainly verbal. It may be that I misinterpret Dr. Lewins, the founder of Solipsism, for the problems are so very subtle that we have to ascertain the exact meaning of every concept which we introduce in our reasoning and it is not a mere phrase when Prof. Clifford says:

"The question is one in which it is peculiarly difficult to make out precisely what another man means, and even what one means oneself."

Mr. McCrie, the philosophic thinker of the Orkney Islands, is an intimate friend of Dr. Lewins. He as well as Miss Naden can be considered as faithful representatives of Solipsism.

Now I find that Dr. Lewins and his adherents use an entirely different terminology than we do. There is, for instance, a tree seen. That part of the process (viz., of the tree being seen) which (as science informs us) consists of certain nervous disturbances in the brain accompanied with a special kind of consciousness is commonly called "a sensation," and that part from which the rays of light proceed is called "an object." Dr. Lewins appears to include in the term sensation the objective thing that causes the sensation. He calls object that something which is projected by our senses to a place outside our body.

There are in the domain of objects motions sensorily perceived to take place and there are other motions (viz., those in the brain) which (although not always directly perceived) are for certain scientific reasons assumed to take place. Some motions (viz., some of those taking place in the brain) are not mere motions, they possess in addition a certain something called feeling.

There are accordingly objects and subjective representations of objects forming analogues of the objects. We will call the former the domain of objectivity, the latter the domain of subjectivity. The difficulty that presents itself is to draw a line of demarcation between subjectivity and objectivity.

The objective process of motion does not cease when passing into the spectator's eye. The motions that take place within the brain, are according to our usage of terms objective processes just as much as all other motions, and I prefer to confine the domain

of subjectivity to the feeling alone. Yet I am aware of the fact that neither subjectivity nor objectivity exist by themselves; they are abstract conceptions which are arrived at by a most complicated process of thinking. They have been abstracted from Reality which is one inseparable whole.

Philosophy and the sciences are at work to describe the whole of reality, the domain of objectivity as well as that of subjectivity in their interconnection,* and it is at once apparent that this description can be made in different terms. Two descriptions made in different terms may be equally correct. They may apparently contradict one another, and yet their actual meaning may be one and the same.

I will call attention here to Mr. McCrie's proposition that man's ego is not limited to his body; the objects belong to it; and certainly man's body and the objects around him are one inseparable whole. His lungs as they are cannot exist one millionth part of a second without the surrounding air and the pressure of the atmosphere. Exactly so his brain and the ideas that are registered in his brain exist, as they are only on account of the surrounding world. The surrounding world in this sense is an actual part of man's existence.

Dr. Lewins and Mr. McCrie emphasize this truth in their terminology. All the critical remarks which Dr. Lewins has made on the views presented in *The Open Court* seem (in my mind) to arise from the difference of terminology. He calls "ego" that which we call "the All," and thus it is quite natural for him to say, the ego alone is God.

I cannot agree with Dr. Lewins in the acceptability of his terms, but that is another question.

My opinion that the most flagrant discrepancies are merely verbal, that they ultimately rest upon a difference of terms, has found a corroboration in my private correspondence with Dr. Lewins.—ED.]

* This subject has been discussed in my article "The Origin of Mind," published in *The Monist*, No. 1.

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* "Induction and Deduction and other Essays," by Constance C. W. Naden.