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SPIRIT AND SOUL.*

BY WILHELM WUNDT.

THE human mind cannot collect experiences without at the same time interweaving them with its own speculation. The first result of such natural reflection is the symbolism of language. In every domain of human experience there are therefore certain ideas which science, before it enters upon its work, finds already existing, as results of that original reflective process which left behind it in the symbolism of language its abiding traces. Thus heat and light are conceptions from the domain of external experience, which immediately proceeds from sensuous perception. Modern physics classes both under the general conception of motion. But it would not be possible to attain to this end without provisionally accepting the conceptions of the common consciousness and beginning with its investigation.

In a similar way soul, spirit, reason, understanding, etc., are conceptions which existed before scientific psychology. In the fact that natural consciousness everywhere represents inner experience as a separate source of knowledge, psychology can see a sufficient witness to its authorization as a science. And in doing this, it at the same time adopts the conception *soul*, to include the entire sphere of inner experience. Soul means therefore the subject to which we assign all separate facts of inner observation as predicates. That subject itself is in the main only determined by its predicates; the relation of the latter to a common basis is intended to express nothing more than their mutual connection.

We in this way at once eliminate a meaning that common language always connects with the concept soul. To it the soul is not merely a subject in the logical sense, but a *substance*, a real essence; as whose expressions or acts the so-called psychic activities are conceived. But in this lies a metaphysical assumption to which psychology may possibly be brought at the conclusion of its work, but which it cannot possibly adopt without investigation before it enters upon its work.

That which is commonly said of the distinction of inner experience, moreover, is not true of this assumption, viz., that it is necessary in order to open

the way for investigation. The symbols which language has created for the designation of certain groups of experiences, to-day bear in themselves signs that originally they did not merely stand in a general way for separate beings or substances, but even for *personal* beings. The most indelible trace of such personification of substance is to be found in the *genus*. Reason has gradually cast off this phantastic relation of conceptual symbols. In part the personification of substances has met its end; in part also the materializing of concepts. But who, on this account, would wish to discard the use of the concepts themselves and their designations? We speak of honor, virtue, reason, without conceiving any one of these concepts translated into substance. From metaphysical substances they have become logical subjects.

Thus then we regard also the soul provisionally as merely a *logical subject* of inner experience, a procedure which is the direct result of the formation of concepts in language, freed, however, from those additions of an immature metaphysics which the natural consciousness attaches to the conceptions created by it.

A similar course must be followed in respect to those ideas which we find existing, partly for special relations of inner experience, and partly for separate domains of the same. Language first places the soul and the spirit in direct opposition to each other. But both are notions that are interchangeable, notions to which in the domain of external experience correspond the two German words *Leib* and *Körper*.* *Körper* is that object of external experience, as it appears directly to our senses, without reference to an inner existence residing therein, *Leib* is the body when it is thought of with reference to this inner existence.

Similarly, spirit means the inner being or existence when no reference whatever is made to its connection with an external existence; while on the other hand the soul, especially when it is used in contradistinction to spirit, directly presupposes its union with a bodily existence which is manifest to our senses.

While soul and spirit comprehend all of inner experience (the relation in which the terms are taken, being the only point of difference,) the so-called psy-

* To the distinctions drawn between the German *Leib* and *Körper*, English has nothing that exactly corresponds. The English word *body* stands for both the German words. If we seek to draw the distinction made above, perhaps *body* would stand for *Körper*, while *Leib* represents a living body.

* Translated from *Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie*.

chic faculties of the soul designate the separate domains of the same, as they are seen to be separated from each other in direct self-observation. In the conceptions sensibility, feeling, understanding, reason, etc., language therefore forces upon us a classification of the processes presented to our inner perception that we, confined to these expressions, can upon the whole scarcely alter. Nevertheless the accurate definition of these conceptions and their incorporation in a systematic order is strictly a matter for science.

Probably the faculties of the soul originally meant not merely different parts of the inner scope of experience, but likewise many different beings, respecting whose relation to that collective being, which we call soul or spirit, no definite idea was formed. But the materializing of these conceptions lies so far back in the distances of mythological views of nature, that no caution need here be given against the over-hasty conception of metaphysical substances.

In spite of this, *one* after-effect of the mythological conception has become transmitted *even to modern science*. It consists in this, that to the conceptions named above attaches a trace of the mythological idea of power. They are not merely regarded as class designations for definite fields of inner experience, which in fact they are, but they are often regarded as powers or forces by which the separate phenomena are produced. The understanding, for instance, is the power by which we perceive truths; memory, is the power which stores up ideas for future use, and so forth. But the irregular appearance, however, of the effects of these powers has upon the other hand raised some doubt with regard to the expression power, and thus the designation of psychical faculties has arisen. For by faculty we understand not such a power as *must* necessarily and constantly operate, but only such a one as *can* operate.

The origin of these conceptions from the mythological idea of force or power is here directly manifest. The prototype of the operation of such a power is plainly human action. The original signification of faculty is that of an acting being. Thus even in the first formation of psychological conceptions we find the germ of that mixture of classification and explanation, which constitutes a usual defect of empirical psychology. The general remark that the psychic faculties are class-conceptions which belong to descriptive psychology relieves us from the necessity of here pointing out their meaning. In fact a theory of inner experience may be imagined in which there would be no mention of sensibility, understanding, reason, memory, and the like. For in our self-observation there are immediately only separate ideas, feelings, and tendencies. Only after these elementary phenomena of inner experience have been dissected,

therefore, can the true signification of these class conceptions be determined.

To what has been said above we may here add a few critical remarks on the interchangeable terms soul and spirit.

From the soul our language separates the spirit as a second idea of matter whose distinguishing characteristic is that it, unlike the soul, does not by its sense necessarily appear in connection with a bodily existence, but may either stand in mere external union with such a one, or be freed entirely from it.

The idea of spirit therefore is used in a double sense: first for the basis of those inner experiences which we assume to be independent of the activity of the senses, and secondly to designate such a being as can be said in general to have no corporeal existence. Psychology, of course, has to do with the conception only in its first meaning, though it is directly to be seen that this must almost of itself lead to the second, since it is not apparent why the spirit may not also exist as a wholly independent substance, if its connection with the body were only external and accidental.

Philosophical thought could not leave the relation of soul and spirit in the indefiniteness with which the common consciousness was satisfied. Are soul and spirit different essences? Is the soul a part of the spirit, or is the latter a part of the soul? We plainly notice in ancient speculative philosophy the difficulty that this question caused it. On the one side it was forced by the connection between the inner experiences to postulate some one substance as the basis for them; on the other side it was led to deem as indispensable a separation of the activities engaged in sense-representation from the more abstract intellectual activities. Thus, by the side of the grand dualism between body and spirit there exists the more limited dualism between spirit and soul; and that too without the old philosophy being able to completely do away with it—be it that it now with Plato sought to destroy the substantiality of the soul, conceiving the soul as a mingling of spirit and body; or be it that with Aristotle, by transferring to spirit the concept abstracted from soul, it put in the place of the unity of substance a form of definition that accorded with both.

Modern spiritualistic philosophy upon the whole follows more the footsteps of Plato, but has held more firmly than he to the unity of substance for spirit and soul. Thus it resulted that generally the sharp distinction between the two concepts disappeared from scientific language. If any distinction was still made, either the spirit was regarded with Wolff as the general conception in which the individual soul was contained, or spirit was confounded and identified with the general psychical faculties, it being retained

as a general designation now for the so-called higher psychical faculties, and now for the faculty of cognition. In the latter case feeling and desire were later frequently comprehended in the term mind, and therefore the whole soul is divided into spirit and mind, without understanding thereby two different substances.

Sometimes, however, between the conceptions spirit and soul a mere distinction of degree was assumed, and thus a spirit was attributed to man but only a soul to animals.

Thus this distinction has constantly lost in definiteness, while at the same time the conception of spirit has been deprived of its property of substantiality. If, therefore, we wish to impart to this conception a meaning, that does not anticipate further investigation, we can only say that spirit also denotes the subject of inner experience, but that in it an abstraction is made from the relations of this subject to any corporeal being. The soul is the subject of inner experience with the conditions that its regular connection with an external existence brings with it; the spirit is the same subject without reference to this union.

Accordingly we shall then only speak of spirit and spiritual phenomena when we lay no weight on those factors of minor experience by which the same is dependent upon sensuous existence, that is our existence that is accessible to outer experience. This definition leaves it completely undetermined whether such independence of sensibility really belongs to the spiritual or not. For we can disregard one or more aspects of a phenomenon without denying in respect to it that these aspects exist.

DO WE WANT A REVOLUTION?

BY MORRISON I. SWIFT.

It is one thing to acknowledge the signs of imminent revolution, another to determine if we shall promote it. The choice has to be made, and there is no vagueness about the nature of it. The industrial and social forces are solidly combined against independence and manliness and originality.

It is now as it was of old—a man cannot serve two masters. He must seek to ingratiate himself in the social order, and to gather from it what good things he can, becoming a bulwark against justice and general happiness, or he must be a declared and inveterate enemy of the social order, making no terms with it, opposing it day and night, hurrying on its downfall.

It is easy for those who realize the iniquity and suffering on which this order exists to make their choice. They must be revolutionists because life would be dishonorable on any other terms. It were of course possible to witness silently the inhumanities of a

Depew, or Stanford, or Rockefeller, or Vanderbilt, or any little local magnate where one happened to live, but it would be dishonorable. These persons are the voluntary and satisfied agents of a system of oppression that is all the more acute and unbearable because of the intelligence of those oppressed. It is necessary to depose these monarchs of injustice and wealth; and the fact of their extraordinary power makes any concession or compromise fatal to a victory over them. To live in this decade non-committal; to let the rich go on depleting the poor while we advance our respect for them in proportion as they increase their plunder, this is scandalous and intolerable.

We want a revolution because peace is impossible when the mind awakes to the monstrous irony of wreathing those who have succeeded best in the war of selfishness and unscrupulousness, with the highest honors; we want a revolution because until some few become the implacable enemies of the present system and its managers, we are the sport of these managers—life in us is crushed while they live and thrive on us. The men called leading citizens,* live and thrive on the rest of us and crush us and make our lives hard and dull. I have no personal vindictiveness, but if these men are willing in the present hour of enlightenment to accept the colossal advantages their place in an irrational system gives them, to use these perfectly prodigious powers selfishly, as the system allows, to urge in extenuation that they are victims of the system like the rest, victims of a sorry state of human nature of which all make the most for themselves, meanwhile themselves sorry, then I am their enemy and will use what powers I have to overthrow them. The day of the suppression of ideas by vested interests is waning. We do not care for vested interests, we care to live. Vested interests no longer dazzle the imagination. We are inclined to think these important persons who own everything and make up the four hundred here and there, humbugs. We are surprised that any seek communion with them, and rather wonder that a new and select society does not spring up from which they are tabooed; a society of working-men, and scholars and farmers, honest persons, a little delivered from shams, not altogether determined to own earth, and sky and sea, and rent them. I find ownership the present gauge of respectability, but I do not respect the owners.

There is about to grow, born of revolution, a new society, whose spirit Plato invested with his genius. "I, therefore, Callicles, am persuaded by these accounts, and consider how I may exhibit my soul before the judge in a healthy condition. Wherefore disregarding the honors that most men value, and

* A series of names is here omitted. See the note on page 2591 of this number.

looking to the truth, I shall endeavor in reality to live as virtuously as I can; and, when I die, to die so. And I invite all other men, to the utmost of my power; and you, too, I in turn invite to this contest, which, I affirm, surpasses all contests here." The contest that is beautiful from age to age, the contest to live as virtuously as we can which surpasses all other contests here, is to-day one thing, is to-morrow changed; to-day it is the elaboration of material well-being for all, a new expedition of the race after happiness into the unknown, blazing the way to material equality and perfect individuality.

DO WE WANT A REVOLUTION?

IN REPLY TO MR. MORRISON I. SWIFT.

MR. MORRISON I. SWIFT is a young man and full of earnest enthusiasm for social justice and the elevation of the poor. He makes himself the attorney of the oppressed and hurls his shafts of indignation against the oppressors. To-day he appears as the prophet of a revolution, who indicts a number of rich men, "because," he says, "they make our lives hard and dull."

Their crime consists in being "willing in the present hour of enlightenment to accept the colossal advantages their place in an irrational system gives them, to use these perfectly prodigious powers selfishly." Not the slightest proof is adduced for this wholesale indictment. The indiscriminate in his collection of several well known names proves that Mr. Swift does not clearly know himself what they are guilty of. Are they arraigned for selfishness? Some of them are very active for the public good. Are they arraigned for possessing wealth? While none among them is poor, not every one of them is so extraordinarily rich as Mr. Swift seems to imagine. Nor does the plaintiff indicate what these criminals ought to do in order to escape the condemnation of selfishness. Perhaps he would repeat the demand of Christ: "Go and sell all that thou hast and give to the poor and thou shalt have treasure in heaven?"*

Plaintiff is a philanthropist and he kindly urges in extenuation that the rich are "victims of the system like the rest, victims of a sorry state of human nature." The personal indictment of these men seems to rest on the fact that they do not use their power to overthrow the social order. And this appears to Mr. Swift as the one thing that is needed. Having realized that there are iniquities and sufferings he is determined to promote revolution, because "life would be dishonorable on any other terms."

Mr. Swift undoubtedly hopes for a better system,

* The value of money is so little understood and so much misunderstood not only by the rich but also by the poor, that it will not be out of place to reproduce in this number an extract from the chapter on the uses and abuses of money in Dr. William Mathews' excellent work "Getting on in the World."

which he supposes will come after the breakdown of the present system. He may be a nationalist or an anarchist, I do not know; and it matters little. Yet it is certain that rash youth only can so wantonly, although with best and purest motives, clamor for a revolution. Putting the question to himself whether or not we must be revolutionists, Mr. Swift declares "it is easy to make his choice."

Does Mr. Swift know what a revolution is? A revolution is a breakdown of society. It is not a building up, it is a tearing down. It is not evolution, but it is dissolution.

A revolution is a great public calamity which falls equally heavy on the rich and on the poor. Perhaps it falls heavier upon the poor, because as a rule they have less education and are ignorant of the course of events. The facts of the French revolution speak loud enough. Are they now forgotten? To every rich man who was guillotined hundreds of poor met with the same fate, and thousands were actually starved to death.

A revolution is like a deluge that, the dam being broken, sweeps over a valley. The deluge will drown the rich as well as the poor. It will often happen that a rich man may be drowned as well as a poor man; but after all, the rich man if he be warned in time, has better chances to escape.

Who will profit by revolutions? Not the laborer, he will be starved; not the employer of labor, he will be ruined. There is one class of men that will profit. It is the sharper; he whose business flourishes while and because all the world is covered with misfortune. There are people who undertake to fish in muddy waters. These people are the only ones that are benefited by public disturbances, calamities and revolutions.

Several months ago I discussed the eventuality of a revolution with a leading anarchist of Chicago. I do by no means agree with anarchism; nor did this anarchist agree with my views, but he most emphatically joined me in denouncing the superstition so prevalent among many would-be reformers, that revolution can bring any salvation to society. He said, "When I was young and rash, I believed in revolution and hoped for a revolution; I thought to arrive at a higher state of society by a bee line road. But since I have seen more of life, I have ceased to believe in physical force. I then believed that society could be pulled up by the roots and pitched over the fence, and a new social machine, contrary to that which is, put in its place. I now see, that society is a slow growth, and the best we can do is to remove those special privileges, empowering the few to rob the many. Evolution may at times find expression in revolution, but its necessity is always to be deplored, because all violence, bloodshed, and wars debase the higher senti-

ments of the race, and destroy the sanctity of human life; the progress which comes through peace, though slow it be, is the most certain and enduring."

There is but one way of improving the condition of the laboring classes; that is by evolution. We must enforce a better position of the workers by legal means, not with the bullet, but with the ballot. This road is slower, but it leads by and by to the desired aim.

The bee line road of revolution will not bring us nearer to a realization of our ideals. In order to reach a better state of society by the slow process of evolution, we must educate mankind up to it, we must teach them a higher morality and a respect for law.

What a terrible error it is to preach justice and recommend the overthrow not of this or that law only, but of all laws and of the whole order of society.

Society is not an artificial system that can be constructed with arbitrariness. Society is an organism and the laws of its development are similar to those of living creatures, of plants and of animals. You can promote the growth of a tree, by digging round its stem, by watering the roots and pruning the dead branches in its crown, nay, you may inoculate a tree so that indeed the thorns may be made to bear figs or grapes. But if you pull out the whole tree, you will have to begin quite anew, and it will take a long while until it has reached that state again in which it is now.

Incendiary speeches are cheap means for agitators to become popular with the uneducated among our laboring classes. Yet I hope to see the time when our laborers will hoot at the demagogue who attempts to excite them with preaching hatred and ill will.

Yet the incendiary speeches of demagogues should not be ignored by the rich. We should recommend them to the rich for a careful perusal. There is certainly something wrong in a state of society in which young men, enthusiastic for justice, openly clamor for a revolution.

We have not hesitated to publish Mr. Swift's article, not because we agree with him in the justice of a revolution, or in the advisability of preparing a revolution; on the contrary because we should consider a revolution as the greatest public calamity, the evil consequences of which cannot be all foreseen. The probability, in my mind, is that the final result of a great revolution in the United States, would be the downfall of the republic and the establishment of an empire. A revolution, so far as I can see, will bring us no liberty but serfdom.

It is a law of nature that if a nation cannot govern itself, a usurper will keep order in that nation, and every revolution in a republic is a sign that the citizens are not able in a peaceful way to administer their public affairs.

The rich therefore, should heed the cry of alarm.

They should consider that a revolution becomes an inevitable necessity as soon as the discontent of the poor in a country has reached a certain height at which their yoke appears to them unbearable.

Our society is by no means free from grievances, although they have not yet reached their fill. We should beware of the very beginning and mind all the symptoms of dissatisfaction. The greater the patience of the oppressed proves to be, the more formidable will be the outbreak of their indignation.

It is not good to build barriers between man and man; as says the prophet Jeremiah: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom; neither let the mighty man glory in his might; let not the rich man glory in his riches." And the apostle Paul writes to Timothy: "Charge them that are rich in this world, that they be not high-minded nor trust in uncertain riches."

The duties of those that have great possessions are greater than the duties of the poor. The more power a man has, the more imperative is his obligation to be just in all his dealings with his neighbors. The citizens of a republic should not attempt to make a caste of wealth; and ought to abhor all oppression of the poor. The employer must show his own independence and his sense of independence by respecting the independence of his employees. When weighing the worth of a man, let us not consider the amount of his property but the manliness and honesty of his character.

Is there any sense in admiring the aristocratic habits which have become fashionable with so many of our wealthy families? Let us exercise, ourselves, and teach our children to exercise simplicity. Let us honor the democratic principles which so well become the citizens of a republic, and the mere idea of a revolution will become a ridiculous bugbear.

Then let us pray that come it may,—
As come it will for a' that,—
That sense and worth, o'er a' the earth,
May bear the gree, and a' that.
For a' that, and a' that,
Its coming yet for a' that,—
When oan to man the world' o'er,
Shall brothers be for a' that.

P. C.

THE USES AND ABUSES OF MONEY.*

BY WILLIAM MATTHEWS.

"Poverty is a condition which no man should accept, unless it is forced upon him as an inexorable necessity or as the alternative of dishonor. No person has a right voluntarily to place himself in a position where he will be assailed hourly by the fiercest temptations, where he will be able to preserve his uprightness only by a strength little short of angelic, and where he will be liable at any moment to become by sickness a burden to his friends. Every man, too, should make some provision for old age; for an old man in the poor-house, or begging alms, is a sorry sight, and suggests the suspicion, however ill-founded, that his life has been foolishly, if not viciously spent.

* Republished from "Getting on in the World."

"We say, therefore, that the philosophy which affects to teach us a contempt of money does not run very deep. Indeed, it ought to be clearer to philosophers than to other men that money is of high importance, and that its importance increases with every generation. So manifold are its bearings upon the lives and characters of mankind, that, as Henry Taylor observes, in his 'Notes on Life,' an insight which should search out the life of a man in his pecuniary relations would penetrate into almost every cranny of his nature. . . .

"The provident man must of necessity be a thoughtful man, living, as he does, not for the present, but for the future; and he must also practice self-denial, that virtue which is one of the chief elements in a strong and well-formed character. As with the acquisition, so with the use of money; the way in which a man spends it is often one of the surest tests of character. As Bulwer says in one of the most thoughtful essays in *Caxtoniana*,—'Money is a terrible blab; she will betray the secrets of her owner, whatever he do to gag her. His virtues will creep out in her whisper; his vices she will cry aloud at the top of her tongue.'

"As civilization advances, human life is becoming more and more significant, richer in opportunities and enjoyments. Science is multiplying with amazing rapidity the comforts and luxuries of life and the means of self-culture, and money is the necromancer by which they are placed at our disposal. Money means a tight house, the warmest clothing, the most nutritious food, the best medical attendance, books, music, pictures; a good seat in the concert or lecture room, in the cars, and even in the church; the ability to rest when weary in body or brain, and, above all, independence of thought. It is said that in England no man can afford to have an opinion who has not an income of two thousand a year; and even in this land of broad acres there are already many men who think themselves too poor to indulge in 'the luxury of a conscience.' Every step in life is conditional on 'the root of all evil.' You must pay to eat and drink, to sleep, to house and clothe yourself, and even to breathe. Every breath is a consumption of carbon, which must be paid for as inevitably as the coal in your grate. The creditor is at every man's heels, dogs him in his last moments, and hardly stops short at the graveyard gate. Not only is money thus indispensable, but the value of this representative of values was never before so great as now. With this talisman, a man can surround himself with richer means of enjoyment, secure a more varied and harmonious culture, and set in motion grander schemes of philanthropy in this last half of the nineteenth century than at any previous period in the world's history. And precisely because it means so much, because with it life is so rich in possibilities, the want of money was never before so keenly felt as now. Though the poor to-day have luxuries which a Cressus could not have commanded three centuries ago, though 'the world must be compassed that a washerwoman may have her tea,' yet never was poverty so hard to bear as to-day. . . .

"There are men born with a genius for money-making. They have the instinct of accumulation. The talent and the inclination to convert dollars into doubloons by bargains or shrewd investments, are in them just as strongly marked and uncontrollable as were the ability and the inclination of Shakespeare to produce a Hamlet and an Othello, of Raphael to paint his cartoons, Beethoven to compose his symphonies, or Morse to invent an electric telegraph. As it would have been a gross dereliction of duty, a shameful perversion of gifts, had these latter disregarded the instincts of their genius and engaged in the scramble for wealth, so would a Rothschild, an Astor, and a Peabody have sinned had they done violence to their natures, and thrown their energies into channels where they would have proved dwarfs, and not giants. . . . Academies, colleges, hospitals, museums, libraries, railroads,—none of which could have been possible without their accumulations,—are the proofs of their usefulness; and though the million-

naire too often converts his brain into a ledger and his heart into a mill-stone, yet this starvation of his spiritual nature is no more necessary in his pursuit than in that of the doctor or the lawyer. Agassiz is reported to have said, half scornfully, that he had 'no time to make money,' having given himself to science. But how could he get leisure to study the secrets of nature, if others had not made money for him? . . .

"Especially should the business man, who is tempted to sacrifice everything to the golden calf, be cautioned against the common fallacy that happiness will increase in proportion to his gains. Dr. Johnson, indeed, once argued to the contrary. 'If six hundred pounds a year,' he said, 'procure a man more consequence, and of course more happiness, than six pounds a year, the same proportion will hold as to six thousand, and so on as far as opulence can be carried.' The facts do not sustain this theory. It may be doubted whether large possessions do not bring as many pains as pleasures. After one has enough to satisfy every reasonable want, to give free play to all his tastes in art, literature, or science, it may be questioned whether any addition to his wealth does not bring more anxiety and responsibility than enjoyment. Bacon wisely remarks that a large fortune is of no solid use to the owner, except to increase his means of giving; 'the rest is but conceit; the personal fruition in any man cannot reach to feel great riches.'

"The owner of capital really reaps the smallest portion of the advantages which flow from its possession, he being, in fact, but a kind of head bookkeeper, or chief clerk, to the business community. Though rich as Rothschild, he can neither eat, drink, nor wear more than one man's portion of the good things of life. The Astors and Stewarts, whose wealth is counted by tens of millions, are, after all, only the stewards of the nation, and, however selfish, grasping, or miserly they may be, are compelled, even when they least desire to do so, to use their accumulations for the public good. Their money making talents enable them to employ their capital, which would soon melt away in the hands of a spendthrift or bad financier, to promote the common welfare and to increase the general prosperity. The rich man in this country, who is ambitious to increase his riches, does not waste his money in luxuries or foolish schemes, but, as one has well said, he invests it in all sorts of enterprises, to the selection of which he brings enormous natural shrewdness, strengthened by the experience of a lifetime, and in every one of which it is devoted wholly to the employment of labor. 'If he puts it in unproductive real estate even, as he doubtless does sometimes, he releases some one else's money, which goes into production. If he builds houses to let, he employs labor and helps to lower rents; if he makes railroads, he employs miners, iron-founders, machinists, and helps to transport commodities; if he goes into spinning and weaving, or gardening, the result is still the same,—labor is employed, and employed with such sagacity that it is sure to return the capital and something more. If he loaded himself with diamonds, filled himself every day to the chin with French dishes and wines, and wore cloth of gold, and lived in a palace, it would be found that his salary was low. If we dismissed him, that is, took his property from him, and employed a philanthropist or editor or lyceum-lecturer to manage it in the interest of 'humanity,' the probabilities are that there would not be a cent of it left at the end of five years. It would have been put into the production of goods that nobody wanted, of roads on which nobody would travel, or stolen by knaves and wasted by visionaries.'

"These truths are well illustrated in the anecdote told some years ago of two men who were conversing about John Jacob Astor's property. Some one was asked if he would be willing to take care of all the millionaire's property—ten or fifteen millions of dollars—merely for his board and clothing. 'No!' was the indignant answer; 'do you take me for a fool?' 'Well,' rejoins the other, 'that is all Mr. Astor himself gets for taking care of it;

he's *found*, and that's all. The houses, the warehouses, the ships, the farms, which he counts by the hundreds, and is often obliged to take care of, are for the accommodation of others.' 'But then he has the income, the rents of all this large property, five or six hundred thousand dollars per annum.' 'Yes, but he can do nothing with his income but build *more* houses and warehouses and ships, or loan money on mortgages for the convenience of others. He's *found*, and you can make nothing else out of it.'

'If a rich man wishes to be healthy, says Sir William Temple, he must live like a poor one. Izaak Walton tells us that there are as many troubles on the other side of riches as on this, and that the cares which are the keys of riches hang heavily at the rich man's girdle. How many men, on reaching the pinnacle of wealth, find, as they look down upon their moneybags, that they have only purchased one set of enjoyments by the loss of another equally desirable! 'Do you remember, Bridget,' writes Charles Lamb, with a tender retrospect to his poverty, 'when you and I laughed at the play from the shilling gallery? There are no good plays to laugh at now from the boxes.' Nothing, in the abstract, seems easier than to get pleasure out of money; yet to many persons nothing is apparently more difficult. . . .

'Even the most specious and plausible reason for seeking riches, namely, to be above the necessity of a rigid economy, or the pressure of debt, Archbishop Whately shows to be unsound and deceptive. It is worth remarking, he observes, as a curious circumstance, and the reverse of what many would expect, that the expenses called for by a real or *imagined* necessity of those who have large incomes are greater than those of persons with slenderer means; and that, consequently, a larger proportion of what are called the rich are in embarrassed circumstances than of the poorer. This is often overlooked, because the *absolute number* of those with large incomes is so much less, that, of course, the absolute number of persons under pecuniary difficulties in the poorer classes must form a very large majority. But if you look to the proportions, it is quite the reverse. Take the number of persons of each amount of income, divided into classes from \$500 per annum up to \$500,000 per annum, and you will find the *percentage* of those who are under pecuniary difficulties *continually augmenting* as you go upwards. And when you come to sovereign States, whose revenue is reckoned by millions, you will hardly find *one* that is not deeply involved in debt; so that it would appear, the larger the income, the harder it is to live within it. In other words, the tendency to spend increases in a greater ratio than the wealth; and hence competence has been wittily defined as three hundred a year more than you possess.

'The insufficiency of mere wealth alone to confer happiness was strikingly illustrated in the life of Nathan Myers Rothschild, the great Jew banker, who died in London some years ago, 'one of the most devoted worshippers that ever laid a withered soul on the altar of Mammon.' For years he wielded the purse of the world, opening and closing it to kings and emperors as he listed; and upon certain occasions was supposed to have had more influence in Great Britain than the proudest and wealthiest of its nobles, perhaps more than the two houses of Parliament taken together. He once purchased bills of the government in a single day to the amount £4,000,000, and also the gold which he knew the government must have to pay them; and with the profits of a single loan purchased an estate which cost him £150,000. Yet, with the clearest and widest comprehension in money matters, with the most piercing insight into all possible causes affecting the money market, and with ingenuity to effect the profoundest, most subtle, and most unsuspected combinations,—an ingenuity before which all the other prodigies which have from time to time appeared sink into nothing,—he was, withal, a little soul. He exercised his talents and powers of calculation, not only for the accumulation of millions and the management of national creditors,

but also for the determination of the smallest possible pittance on which a clerk's soul could be retained in connection with his body. To part with a shilling in the way of charity cut him to the heart.

'To conclude: money is a good thing, of which every man should try to secure enough to avoid dependence upon others, either for his bread or his opinions; but it is not so good a thing that, to win it, one should crawl in the dust, stoop to a mean or dishonorable action, or give his conscience a single pang. Money-getting is unhealthy when it impoverishes the mind, or dries up the sources of the spiritual life; when it extinguishes the sense of beauty, and makes one indifferent to the wonders of nature and art; when it blunts the moral sense, and confuses the distinction between right and wrong, virtue and vice; when it stifles religious impulse, and blots all thought of God from the soul. Money-getting is unhealthy, again, when it engrosses all one's thought, leads a man to live meanly and coarsely, to do without books, pictures, music, travel, for the sake of greater gain, and causes him to find his deepest and most soul-satisfying joy, not in the culture of his heart or mind, not in doing good to himself or others, but in the adding of eagle to eagle, in the knowledge that the money in his chest is piled up higher and higher every year, that his account at the bank is constantly growing, that he is adding bonds to bonds, mortgages to mortgages, stocks to stocks, and may say to himself, 'Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years.'

'Let every one, then, who wishes to get on in the world, justly estimate the value of money. Let him neither, on the one hand, make it the only gauge and object of success, nor, on the other, affect for it a philosophic contempt which the necessities of life will compel him to unlearn. Let him neither strive for a mere living, nor (unless he has a rare genius for money-making,) for a great fortune, but gather gear, as Burns says,—

'By every wile
That's justified by honor;
Not for to hide it in a hedge,
Nor for a train attendant,
But for the glorious privilege
Of being independent.'

'A great deal has been written on the art of money-getting; but, though comparatively few become rich, there is no real secret about it. The pith of the world's wisdom on it is condensed into a few proverbs. To work hard, to improve small opportunities, to economize, to avoid debt, are the general rules in which is summed up the hoarded experience of centuries, and the most sagacious writers have added little to them.'

CORRESPONDENCE.

DO WE WANT A REVOLUTION?

To the Editor of The Open Court:—

I HEREWITH return proof of article mentioned, and have written in a concise form what my sentiments really are. Although the matter as it now stands will take up more space than the quotation you have made, I could not leave the quotation stand as you made it: (1) because I cannot see how I could have expressed myself on the ballot and law as a constructive element in the progress of society and be a consistent anarchist. (2) I do not wholly discard revolution as a means of social progress; but its necessity as I say is always to be deplored. I think after careful reflection, you will agree with me that revolution as a principle cannot unqualifiedly be condemned. Take the revolutionary nations to which you and I belong, with their plastic web, molding and remodeling their institutions to suit their ever changing exigencies, and contrast them, with some of the Oriental nations, in whom the fire of revolution has been extinguished, and notice the *fixed*

condition of their habits. Progress with them is dead and if they will ever rise to a higher life, it will be because in this age of international commingling, they are brought in contact with that iconoclastic and revolutionary element, that has at times *smashed* those institutions which hampered man in his onward and upward march.

Very truly,
CHICAGO, Oct. 26, 1890. GEO. A. SCHILLING.

[I take no exception to Mr. Schilling's position on the question of revolution. To state my view in two words, I should say, that *revolution* becomes necessary as soon as *evolution* has become an absolute impossibility. Yet even then, as Mr. Schilling says, revolutions must be deplored; it must be deplored that there are sometimes men in power who can effectively check all evolution and by oppressing their fellowmen wantonly produce a revolution. Not Spartacus was guilty of rebelling against the Roman Republic but the Roman people who trampled the rights of men under foot. But because the gladiators of Spartacus could only destroy not build a civilization they were in the end doomed to destruction, in spite of many glorious victories over the generals of the most warlike nation of the time.—P. C.]

BOOK REVIEWS.

ELEUSIS. A Poem. Chicago: Privately printed. 1890.

The key note to this volume of pessimistic philosophy in verse is to be found in the lines prefixed:

"Elensis mourns before the sea,
Her secret pomp of worship hid;
But, though her priest and rite be dead,
Still lives the Eternal Mystery.

Nor can the Eleusinia die:
What though the centuries wax and wane,
From each new age sounds out again
The Eternal Questioning, Whence and Why?"

The poem is not an attempt to solve the mystery of life. It is the imaginary wail of a soul, that after trying all paths, and finding only an endless maze strewn with shattered hopes, retires into itself, after vainly seeking consolation in love, sighing,

"The mind is naught, and naught the heart,
And nature lies in endless sleep."

Many beautiful thoughts are to be found scattered through the poem, which is a real work of art, but its tone is not healthy, although it does in some measure represent the ideas which are floating through the minds of many of those who, having left the old oracles and seeking a solution of the problems of life from Nature, do not ask in the right way, and therefore to them

"The Eternal Silence answers back."

Public Opinion, the eclectic weekly published in Washington and New York, offers a first prize of \$50, a second of \$30, and a third of \$20 for the best three essays on the interesting question: "The Industrial Future of the South." The essays must be limited to 3000 words, and must be received by December 15th. Full particulars may be had by addressing *Public Opinion*, Washington, D. C.

The Unitarian Missionary Mass Meeting is being held as we go to press, at Unity Church, Chicago. The opening sermon was preached by Rev. M. J. Savage, of Boston. The general topics to be discussed at this evening's sitting include "Some Missionary Agencies," by Mrs. Charles L. Moss, St. Louis; Miss Ellen M. Gould, Davenport; and Rev. Geo. A. Thayer, Cincinnati. "Church Work," by Rev. Eliza T. Wilkes, Sioux Falls; Rev. S. A. Eliot, Denver; Rev. H. D. Maxson, Menomoneie; and "The Layman's Responsibility," by Hon. J. E. McKeighan, St. Louis; Hon. Robert A. Sankey, Wichita; Prof. J. W. Cook, Illinois Normal University; and Gov. Austin Blair, Jackson, Mich.

THE INDISCRIMINATE DENUNCIATION OF THE WEALTHY.

Mr. Morrison I. Swift is favorably known to the readers of *The Open Court* by several articles pointing out the way of judicious reform in social matters. There were many plans and aspirations of his with which we could heartily sympathize. His article "Do We Want a Revolution" does not meet with our approval. But for that very reason we have thought proper to publish it together with a statement of our opinion on the same subject, and for the consequences let truth take care of herself. Before this number went to press we have deemed it advisable to suppress the string of names mentioned in Mr. Swift's article. It happens that we are personally acquainted with one of them who is very active in clearing away the misconceptions between employers and employees, capital and labor, and we asked his advice as to the propriety of letting the names stand. Here is the passage of his answer that has reference to this point:

"The use of names, indulged in by Swift and his confrères is to be deprecated. Knowing little or nothing about the financial doings or social actions of those, they thus try to focalize prejudice and hatred against; they condemn without trial. Perceiving this, many men who accumulate means, hide from public notice. They refuse to identify themselves with movements which would ameliorate if not cure the troubles of the poor and the unfortunate, while those who are sympathetic and active are assailed. The effect is undoubtedly bad all round. It is not pleasant for men like Mr. — and the others to be thus pilloried. It is not agreeable to me. I, however, should not complain if as a journalist you thought it proper to publish names and all."

There are men who have made fortunes by doubtful means. They, as a rule, remain unmolested, so long as they avoid to identify themselves with any movement for the public good. Are not many of our wealthy citizens who have the best intentions, thus frightened away from making themselves serviceable to the public good?

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