THE field of ethics and morals seems very chaotic to one trained in science. In spite of the fact that systems of ethics are many and varied it is a peculiar fact that the majority of people the wide world over are quite well agreed as to the good in certain acts and the bad in certain others. Moreover this agreement has existed for some centuries. This suggests at once that there are rules at work in the sphere of ethics and morals quite as surely as in that of physics, and that they are probably as true on the average, or statistically, as the rules governing the actions of atoms and molecules. It also suggests that there could be formulated a system of ethics as "true" for its specific reality as systems of physics are for their particular reality. Quite probably several such pragmatically "true" systems could be formulated, each quite useful, and dozens of quite useless fictional systems could be altogether eliminated.

In America we are especially interested in crime. We speak proudly of our crime waves and we have a crime commission to investigate them. Their existence is very real and yet our method of dealing with them is still, in many instances, very primitive. This becomes apparent in In Prison by Kate O'Hare, a book no one should read who cherishes fictions more than hypotheses dealing with reality. Oddly enough, it describes as still existing in American prisons abuses which the Webbs (in their English Prisons Under Local Government) considered atrocious in English prisons of the seventeenth century. I refer particularly to the attendants' habits of mulcting and defrauding prisoners of money and sustenance illegally. It is also still possible for a person to be convicted of some infraction of social custom—for social custom interprets law and reading the Constitution or the Bible in public may or may not be illegal, depending upon momentary social customs—and ultimately sent to prison. Here this person may actually be the victim of anti-social acts much worse than those which brought about in-
carceration and may also be compelled to break certain laws more fundamental than those whose infraction brought about imprisonment. Very curious isn't it?

For instance contract labor may be prohibited in the prisons of a certain state. That state and others may also have laws saying that all prison-made goods must be clearly labeled as such. The prisoner may, however, be so farmed out to an overall manufacturer in a distant state that he or she gets fifty cents to a dollar a month for work worth $5 a day and the profits go not to the federal government nor to the state, but to the contractor. Furthermore he or she may be compelled to sew labels into finished garments which insist they were produced at the factories of industrialists several hundred miles away; these prison products are then sold as privately manufactured, and quite illegally. Finally, the prisoner may be beaten or assaulted; he may be, and often is, exposed carelessly to infection by the most awful diseases, and he leaves the institution, willy nilly, a complete adept at all forms of criminal technic whether he has learned anything else or not.

The National Crime Commission has, in its preliminary reports, observed that such prison abuses still exist in the United States on a very considerable scale. But, if we wished, we might consider a step still earlier in the process—that of "responsibility" which is a word that covers a fiction. For we condemn and punish if the person committing an anti-social act was "responsible" for his action whereas, in reality, responsibility is itself established empirically in each case and, from a scientific standpoint, means exactly nothing. For there are only three kinds of criminals: 1. The chronically and incurably mischievous who should be intelligently restrained for the rest of their natural lives; 2. the psychic and glandular types, or those with other physiological lesions, who can be cured by medical therapy and released as entirely new characters; 3. the normals who, under great stress, make an isolated detour into crime, who should be compelled to make civil restitution and discharged in care of their "conscience," (for they have a something that gives them the very devil the rest of their lives) after it has been determined medically and psychologically that they are perfectly normal.

That in itself is all very interesting. The present fiction is that the person performed an anti-social act. He must be punished; he must make retribution to society, in order to deter others, or he must at least be reformed. The fact is that in many prisons he is mis-
treated, nothing is done to change his social habits for the better, he is exposed to infection, compelled to break other laws more fundamental than those he broke outside prison, and sent forth bitter and psychopathic. Higher prison officials are still frequently appointed as political favors; lower officials are underpaid and unintelligent; all are very often entirely untrained. We are not by innate nature maliciously savage people. Just why do we do such things as have been described? Just why do we persist in believing in fictions so manifest when facts are so easily ascertainable? I rather think we have something to learn from quite non-criminal people in their ordinary, everyday habits of conduct, and I want to adduce three examples, which may seem trivial, but which may also yield considerable information upon examination and analysis.

The other morning a woman burst in upon me quite radiant because her daughter had won a rifle contest in college; she was with the winning team and she also made a high record personally. The mother's enthusiasm seemed to me at first exceedingly pernicious, later only somewhat silly. My first feeling was to become indignant and sermonize—i.e. to assume the inherent inerrancy of my views, arrived at after long and devious study, and their supreme right to triumph over hers when expressed emotionally. For the shooting of guns and marksmanship have to me many connotations of value which they do not have to the superficial and quite innocently and ignorantly frivolous woman who asked me to share her enthusiasm.

The essential utility of guns is to kill. They may be used to kill birds or animals, but few of us need them for that purpose. The only widespread need we could ever have would be for the killing of human beings. This brings up the specter of war, or of police violence, and the possibility that complete familiarity with firearms will very probably develop in anyone a psychological state quite less inimical to bloodshed than that of a person like myself who never touched a firearm, if I remember correctly. In short the values evolved by long and arduous study arose in me. But there was no time to explain all of that. It would have taken me several hours even had the woman been disposed to listen. She would then have been unable to understand because she had not been accustomed to think; she took current fictions at face value. For me to become emotionally disdainful and arrogantly seek to enforce my views would have been useless. What I actually did was make some very silly remark to the effect that young women were apparently trained
in college these days to make them capable of dealing effectively with their husbands somewhat later.

A second instance: Two gentlemen sat behind me on the streetcar this morning talking of a third man whose name should, I suppose, be Chaos. They were discussing what they called "efficiency" and "system" and it became quite apparent that Chaos was one of these helter-skelter persons who had no place for anything and everything was somewhere else. They agreed on that. But they did not get much further. For within five minutes it developed that one of them, A, was himself far more precise than the other, B. When A began to tell exactly how he did things B soon began interrupting to show where this or that practice was not systematic, was not efficient, but was actually a fettering habit. The argument rapidly became passionate and it ended with A's departure from the car. Nothing at all had been accomplished except a display of bad temper.

By third instance concerns a married couple who sat across from me recently in a shoe store. The woman was buying two pairs of shoes. The man quite apparently had no objection to that. In fact I knew him quite well and I knew his wife. He was the kind of man who thought of things literary first and everything else thereafter. She was the kind of woman who would think of shoes or a dress first and might think of things intellectual secondly. Quite suddenly he remembered something and withdrew from his brief-case a magazine containing an article of his which had just appeared so illustrated as greatly to please him. Intoxicated with his interest and anxious to show the illustrations to her he burst in, at a moment the shoe salesman had turned aside, and brought the article to her attention.

The result was explosive. She became very indignant and in tones quite audible to me some ten feet away told him that he was ridiculously ignorant and rude and would never learn any manners. She was interested in shoes and interviewing a salesman whereupon he, like a child, rudely interrupted. The salesman meantime had turned to the couple and viewed the spectacle with astonishment. The husband, however, laughed, shrugged his shoulders as one would to some irritable child, put the article away and assumed a gentlemanly interest in shoes again. A moment later, entirely due to his adroit handling of the situation, the woman was quite herself and they were rather merrily discussing shoes. Here we have a
miniature study of an element which could completely disrupt a marriage except for the fact that the husband, and I happen in this instance to know both parties to the conversation very well, has his emotions so well disciplined that he does not allow them to go out on parade on matters of no particular intellectual consequence.

Reviewing these trivial instances more abstractly what do we find? First they are important because they and millions like them, are part and parcel of the reality of everyday human behavior and conduct. From such simplicities spring later complexities like war spirit, personal and group contention, social misunderstandings, broken homes, and crimes. Secondly, three needs stand forth before we can formulate a new and scientific ethical and moral system. These are: First, more pure, unindoctrinated facts; more knowledge. For had the woman in instance one known enough to realize all the implications of what her daughter was doing, to evaluate the phenomena of reality more properly, and to visualize consequences by a process of imaginative abstract thought based, however, on knowledge, she might have acted differently. The misfortune remains that a state university thoughtlessly considers it acts upon a sound psychological and intellectual principle when it inculcates marksmanship.

The second need is that for the meticulous and rigorous definition of terms. The two men who argued had no fixed definition for the words "system" and "efficiency." Probably old Chaos himself thought he was quite systematic in Walt Whitman's notoriously unsystematic way, or in the manner of literary gentlemen who can find nothing at all after prim people straighten up their studies. However, it would be possible to go fact-finding and perhaps to discover what system was best in this or that office, how much system enabled it to function more efficiently and just where superfluous system became an impediment. Facts would be needed first; then careful and precise definition of terms so that everyone interested could understand perfectly the ideas for which certain word symbols stood.

Hence a third thing is needed. It is a sort of personal thing and it involves emotional discipline on the one hand and, on the other, a reluctance to interpret our own sincere private opinions, or the basic postulates which we happen to respect, as indiscriminately good for all and sundry. The woman who bought shoes had a different standard of values from that of her husband; this quite
naturally involved a different standard of conduct and a different interpretation of what constitutes bad conduct—rudeness in this case. She called her husband ignorant and rude. She was very much irritated at the time. She was in such an emotional pet that she was psychologically incapable of reasoning dispassionately or accurately. For she knew that her husband was not only highly educated—he had advanced university degrees—but he was widely known and recognized as a profound scholar, extraordinarily informed on social questions.

Now, having been irritated into a pet the woman became rude through lack of emotional discipline. Grant, for sake of argument, that her husband’s action was mildly rude: it had a powerful intellectual drive behind it; he had a subject of great human importance in mind and his offense was a minor infraction of courtesy. Hers was public, sustained, and emphatic. But worse still she rationalized her own irritation and rudeness as the just wrath of a highly cultivated lady at the boorishness of an unmanners clown. This argued that her standard was the best and the only possible standard of values; that she had a perfect right to impose it on other people because “all decent people” (and was she not their accredited representative?) behaved in accordance therewith. Her husband’s emotions were under such complete control that he neither ridiculed the onslaught nor replied in kind. He was so tactful that it disappeared without leaving a ripple and he acted thus first because he had acquaintance with a wide field of knowledge about human behavior, and secondly because he knew it would be absurd for him, in turn, to set up his personal conduct and emotional reactions as the standard of right for anyone—especially for his wife!

But, you say, this is silly. This is petty. These are mere casual individuals and insignificant incidents of no import. Admitting that they indicate some ethical confusion in the minds of individuals, there is an ethical system universally recognized as correct and people should be urged to try and live in accordance therewith. Right there I differ. I contend that the reason people are so petty, so confused, so ignorantly superficial, or so sincerely perplexed is because we have not taken the trouble to formulate any scientific system of ethics based upon the facts of reality as at present ascertainable. I admit that ethical theories of conduct must in any case be based upon a postulate. I even admit that you can base them on a varied assortment of mutually antipathetic postulates and, by
sufficiently disregarding your beliefs in fiction when you are in contact with an imperious bit of reality, live about the same "good" life in any case. But I argue that this sort of thing is itself helter-skelter and chaotic and that we owe it to ourselves to formulate a scientific system of ethics.

Consider very briefly the extant ethical systems. What postulates are assumed by various ethical systems—very, very respectable systems too—in order to build good lives thereupon? One is the existence of a god, of one sort or another, who makes demands of one sort or another. This postulate is secure and helpful so long as societies are primitive and homogenous and so long as the god is defined quite precisely by the group as a whole, and a vast majority of the group as individuals concur the rightness of the definition. In a society such as ours where god is defined so utterly differently by so many individuals or groups, this postulate is valueless. It amounts to no more than asking the god to ratify our own highest notion of what ought to be, which is a phrase-garb used to protect errant and anemic fictions from the bleak winds of reality.

We may revert to conscientious sentimentalism. We may take as our basic postulate some such sentiment as pity, sympathy, altruism, unselfishness or the pious and fervid affirmation of a fundamental principle from which practical morality certainly ought to be deduced. But what has this to do with the teeming reality which surrounds us? We may take Kant's imperative and seek so to act that things will become better by our acting so, but to refrain from acts which would make things worse if everyone committed them. But what do we mean by better and worse? We may say with him that the good will is that which acts out of respect for moral law and may therefore alone be held to be morally good, which is a charming verbal rondelet but seems somehow to lack grasp on reality. We may make all sorts of a priori rules; we may invoke hedonism or utilitarianism; we may actually postulate a principle in reverse to all that is usually considered good and moral and deduce therefrom some system, like that which rules a gang, which is singularly ethical within a restricted group.

We need go no further than the law to discover how much at sea we really are in such matters. I perform a certain act. I happen to be seen and apprehended. I happen to be relatively poor. I am therefore brought to trial for a penitentiary offense. I am to be judged by a learned judge and a jury of my peers. In what does
this justice inheres? How is the case decided? Normally in one of
two ways, ignoring as incidental to any case at law the emotional
and fact-obfuscating antics of lawyers of sorts who seek to raise
doubts, confuse and mislead. Way number one consists in citing
precedents. The lawyers go back to look for cases like mine and
to discover what was done about such cases. Yet there never was
in the history of the world a case just like mine though the decision
is rendered in terms of that case which may have been tried a decade
or two ago under entirely different circumstances. (Remember al-
ways that under the same law reading the Constitution in public
sometimes is and sometimes is not criminal.) Actually the case
cited as precedent had nothing whatever to do with me standing
here and now before a judge for this particular offense. It is a
mere fiction to assume that it could have anything to do with my
case which cannot be subsumed under it without assuming a decision
in advance, a contingency the whole absurd process has been invoked
to avoid.

Process number two is that of deliberately making some impos-
ing fundamental postulate in resounding and impressive terms and
in asserting that my action is inimical to social stability. Thus,
the law being quite the same in each case, it may at one time be
stated by the judge that the reading of the Constitution by the
prisoner at the bar constituted an incendiary act inimical to society
and that acts inimical to society must be penalized by so many years
in the penitentiary; at another time it may be stated that the innocent
reading of the Constitution does not constitute an act inimical to
society and that anyway it is a fundamental postulate in this country
that we have freedom of speech and expression at all times—there-
fore the prisoner should be dismissed and perhaps eulogized.

Neither legal process seeks to interrogate the facts of reality, to
ascertain all the particulars relevant to this specific event and to
arrive at a dispassionately scientific judgment on the basis of those
facts. True enough this process is rendered difficult in the absence
of some well-formulated system of rational ethics. Just that is what
is needed and leading thinkers recognize this. Thus we find White-
head saying in *Process and Reality*:

"The actual entity, in a state of process during which it is not fully
definite, determines its own ultimate definiteness. This is the whole point of
moral responsibility. Such responsibility is conditioned by the limits of the
data, and by the categorial conditions of concrescence."
Whitehead is trying to write like a philosopher and it is a fiction among them that the simplest truths must be stated in the most forbidding language, but he evidently means about what I have just said above. John Dewey, who shares the fiction that confused verbiage is a great philosophic advantage, says this in writing on "Individualism, Old and New" in The New Republic for February 5, 1930 (p. 296):

Individuals will refine themselves only as their ideas and ideals are brought into harmony with the realities of the corporate age in which they act. The task of attaining this harmony is not an easy one. But it is more negative than it seems, more negative than positive. If we could inhibit the principles and standards that are merely traditional, if we could slough off the opinions that have no living relationship to the situations in which we live, the unavowed forces that now work upon us unconsciously but unremittingly would have a chance to build minds after their own pattern, and individuals would, in consequence, find themselves in possession of objects to which imagination and emotion could stably attach themselves.

Again this needs translation. For one impediment to clear thinking on the part of the masses is that its thinkers have quite universally invested belief in the fiction that fundamental truths cannot be expressed simply, perhaps for fear that being too easily understood they will not win respect. However, Dewey must mean that our ethical system should be in harmony with the reality of the age in which we now live. Shaw (in his Intelligent Woman's Guide) naturally expressed the idea much more plainly. He simply said:

The reason we are in such a mess at present is that our governments are trying to carry on with a set of beliefs that belong to bygone phases of science and extinct civilizations. Imagine going to Moses or Mahomet for a code to regulate the modern money market.

Where does this leave us? As omniscient beings, when we regard molecules, we observe that they follow certain statistical rules and we formulate a system of physics designed to explain what molecules do. But all molecules do not do what we say they do; however, enough of them follow our propositions for us to say that they are in statistical agreement with our scientific hypotheses. In the social sciences, however, we are not omniscient beings. We are rather curious, precocious molecules of a gas seeking objectively to determine the physical laws which statistically govern the gas of which we ourselves form an intimate part at the time. We try to be objective, but we remain human. If we find a statistical law which we do not happen to follow we say it is not "right" even though the vast majority of molecules do follow it. We must con-
trol our emotions and try to realize that all human molecules do not necessarily do what we do. Hence we must look to scientists, who try very hard to be objective, to study these questions and, using the same scientific method they use in physics, formulate an ethical system that has reality.

How far can our American scientists, who do delve into general and social problems, be expected to make scientific method understood to the masses and to advise its use in the solution of ethical problems? I can cite but one here. However, he is a leading scientist-sermonizer on public questions and his scientific reputation is unassailable. Of his frequent sermons I pick the one on "Alleged Sins of Science" which appeared in February, 1930, Scribners. Herein he defends science against all charges of having done evil. He is unwilling to admit, for instance, that science helped cause the Great War and helped make it horrible. Yet he has done nothing of which I am aware to formulate a system of scientific ethics which would make war anachronistic. Instead he comes out at this late date for the Golden Rule and greets with joy increased church membership. He takes a fling at loose morals and at the new art and literary forms. The gist of his attitude may be found in this sentence:

"Rather does the scientist join with the psalmist of thousands of years ago in reverently proclaiming 'the Heavens declare the glory of God and the Firmament sheweth his handiwork.' The God of Science is the spirit of rational order and of orderly development, the integrating factor in the world of atoms and of ether and of ideas and of duties and of intelligence. Materialism is surely not a sin of modern science."

This is nothing more nor less than an effort to make old bottles hold new wine and to preserve the pretended reality of what may once have been a humanly helpful hypothesis but what is now an antiquated fiction as a basic postulate for a system of ethics.

I turn from this to a statement of Prof. Albert Einstein which appeared in the New York Times during January, 1930. It was in part as follows:

"It has now become a general recognized axiom that the giant armaments of all nations are proving highly injurious to them collectively. I am even inclined to go a step further by the assertion that, under present-day conditions, any one state would incur no appreciable risk by undertaking to disarm—wholly regardless of the attitude of the other states. If such were not the case it would be quite evident that the situation of such states as are unarmed or only partially equipped for defense would be extremely difficult, dangerous, and disadvantageous—a condition which is refuted by the facts. I am con-
vinced that demonstrative references to armaments are but a weapon in the hands of the factors interested in their production or in the maintenance and development of a military system for financial or political-egotistic reasons. I am firmly of the opinion that the educational effect of a first and genuine achievement in the realm of disarmament would prove highly efficacious, because the succeeding second and third steps would then be immeasurably simpler than the initial one; this for the obvious reason that the first results of an understanding would considerably weaken the familiar argument for national security with which parliamentarians of all countries now permit themselves to be intimidated. Armaments can never be viewed as an economic asset to a state. They must ever remain the unproductive exploitation of men and material and an encroachment on the economic reserves of a state through the temporary conscription of men in the active periods of their lives—not to mention the moral impairment resulting from a preoccupation with the profession of war and the moral processes of preparing a nation for it."

Here, by contrast with the American Millikan, we find the words of a socially conscious scientist who speaks from an intimate knowledge of the facts of reality and who makes no use whatever of archaic fictions. The contrast is striking but I know no physical scientist in America capable of such a statement, though a few isolated social scientists might be cited. I know also that no one would greet with greater covered or ouvert hostility an effort to apply scientific method to the social problems of today's reality than the leaders and publications of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Their constant admonition is go easy, do not be controversial, do not be adversely critical, avoid acrimonious issues—a curiously timid and sequacious attitude indeed, and one from which we have little to hope.

This brings me to a brief concluding statement which may be inadequate but should serve to outline how a useful system of scientific ethics could be evolved. Morals or ethics should be the subject of a system of causes deliberately created as the premises of reasoning; the conclusions deduced from these premises must coincide with the rules of practical morality the recognition of which life has forced upon us, regardless of our past systems and postulates, and which constitute the reality of ethics or morals. How can we go about elaborating this system?

First the rules of the moral reality of the here and now must be clearly expressed. What are people doing and why are they doing what they do? How do psychopathic and economic factors condition their conduct? Such questions as these must be answered statistically by the collection of more facts, more instances, more
specific particulars which, in turn, will be more knowledge. Today too many social scientists follow the old technic of laying down a priori postulates and then only collecting such facts as fit into their preconceived fictions. The facts they do collect are therefore indoctrinated. Instead of this a vast number of fact-finding agencies must collect and correlate facts in some such manner as the economic bureaus of the Department of Agriculture do in order to trace price trends or to find out how hard farm women really work and what they think.

This done, and it will take quite a while before it is scientifically worth while to do anything else, the production of axioms and definitions will follow. Broad statements—laws which form hypotheses—must be formulated and each word in them must be clearly defined. Their entire meaning must also be precise and their axioms simply expressed. From these premises propositions must then be derived. Had we had them in hand, for instance, in 1917 it would have been quite possible for social scientists to have predicted with fair accuracy just what would happen in the United States after the passage of the Volstead Act. Had it been possible to present these facts to the public in simple, non-hysterical terms, an intelligent vote might have been taken upon an abstraction which, in turn, might have saved us from may crimes and other devious necessities we had, instead, wastefully to learn from reality.

The propositions deduced from the premises must coincide with the empirical moral rules of reality. If the system leads us to deduce that all parents will instinctively treat their children kindly any juvenile court official can tell us how unreal and fictional our system must be, for so many parents are deliberately very cruel to their own children. We must make sure of such coincidences and keep them as perfect as possible. Then at last we shall be in a position to develop an entire theory by deducing from the initial propositions, as in geometry, all of the theorems those propositions logically entail. These theorems must again be compared with the facts of reality, as we go along. As long as facts and theorems are compatible we are on the right track; when the contrary is true we must modify or replace our ethical system of causes, for it has then become a pure fiction and can no longer have wide practical utility.

This process would still leave quite a number of systems of ethics in existence from which to choose, each seeming logically valid to about the same extent as the others. Dozens of systems
would, however, fortunately be eliminated at once and need occupy us no more. They could be taught historically but not as valid in present reality. Finally, that ethical system should be adopted which was based on the smallest number of theorems and those most consistently connected with the existing body of science as a whole. This system would, like the present system of physics, explain the phenomena of reality and would also be a time and labor saving device by predicting future realities for us in various postulated terms.

Reverting now to my original three "trivial" cases—what would this mean? 1. It would necessitate getting more facts and broadening knowledge, because human beings are so constructed that they automatically act differently when in possession of a large number of facts than when in possession of very few, or of errors. 2. It would necessitate the clear and concise definition of word-symbols, axioms and propositions, so that like chemists when engaged in their profession, we should all everywhere know what a person was talking about when he said system, or good, or efficiency. 3. It would necessitate sufficient discipline of the emotions to enable us to refrain from interpreting our personal opinions as true for all men, and to reason logically and dispassionately about the facts of reality which confront us.

To accentuate our present ignorance I may cite an example that appeared in the paper on the day I wrote this. We all know that a great many people regard the high-priced workers in the building trades as unethical gougers who overcharge and underwork. This is a very common opinion and one often expressed without any tangible evidence being cited. Actually it is a fiction. If the twenty thousand skilled building mechanics of the District of Columbia average two hundred days work a year apiece they may consider themselves fortunate. It is improbable then that their average income will be equal to the monetary expenditure expert economists declare to be necessary for the adequate support of a family of five. Their work is seasonal and they have to charge whatever they can get when they work in order to tide them over periods of ill-timed idleness. At the moment six thousand of them happen to be out of work and the unions are endeavoring to write the five-day week into every agreement made with employers in order to distribute the quantity of work about more evenly among the workers and during the year. Here we have a situation in reality and certain labor
unions have endeavored to meet it in the only way they know how in view of the limited number of facts available to them.

Actually the building industry is one of many industries and is closely related thereto. We need a specific number of new buildings annually and we need a specific number of mechanics to construct them. We also need so much coal, so many pianos, so many loaves of bread and so many fountain pens. However, nobody knows how many of any of these things the country needs—what the relative importance of various industries is, or exactly what number of workmen should be engaged in each. Perhaps we have too many building mechanics as things are. Who knows? Perhaps their effort to get a five-day week is socially, economically, and ethically expedient. Who knows? We have no code to guide us in such matters because we lack a system of economics related to present-day reality quite as surely as we lack a system of ethics. Therefore many of us regard as maliciously unethical a group of workmen who are trying in the only way they know how to solve a pressing economic problem. The method is imperfect because they do not know all the facts, and no fact-finding agency has taken the trouble to ascertain them and construct a rational system related to reality. So we go ahead blindly and whether labor is "right" or "wrong" in its action we cannot tell. Evidences of this self-same muddle-headedness may be discerned in every branch of the social sciences,—economics, politics, group conduct or ethics, and the only way we can get anywhere is by accumulating more knowledge, adopting definite terms and axioms, and dispassionately building objective logical systems statistically true to the reality of our time.