THE fundamentalist-modernist controversy has reopened discussion of the so-called conflict between science and religion. This conflict is largely a matter of definition. If one wants to be so stupid as to define religion in terms that are incompatible with science, there is, of course, an inevitable conflict between these fields of interest. Thus if a man insists that religion is a matter of belief in spirits or authority of the scriptures, it is, by hypothesis, opposed to science. Science has no use for spirits and dogmatic authorities would only thwart its purpose at every turn.

There is no real conflict between science and religion. Fundamentalist and modernist are unable to get on common ground because of a fundamental difference in types of mind. The one has a dogmatic and authoritative, the other scientific and reflective outlook on life. The trouble with the fundamentalist is that he has not been scientific in his attitude toward the fundamental.1 His fundamentals are not fundamental from the viewpoint of the modernist; they are ready-made, fixed and dogmatic. The modernist, in true scientific spirit, insists upon a more philosophic attitude toward his fundamentals. The problem for religion at this point, as he sees it, is that of discovering what is fundamental to religion rather than starting with the supposed fundamentals of religion and dubbing as irreligious everything which does not square with these ready-made fundamentals. The fundamentalist solves this problem by ignoring it; his fundamentals block inquiry by setting up barriers beyond which thought is not free to go. His attitude in the matter is therefore most unscientific, and it is not at all surprising that the modernist cannot go with him in accepting his fundamentals as fundamental. The two simply speak a different language. The modernist has no sympathy with the antiquated viewpoint of the fundamentalist and the fundamentalist is actually afraid of the

1 For further discussion of this point see my article on “The Role of the Fundamental,” International Journal of Ethics, Jan., 1923.
modernist’s point of view. Hence to get them together is virtually impossible, outside of re-educating the fundamentalist.

Needless to say, our interest here in religion is from the standpoint of the modernist. Our problem is that of finding the fundamentals of religion rather than starting all other problems with them. We shall show how the difference between science, philosophy and religion is primarily one of attitudes and that these attitudes are supplementary rather than conflicting.

The phenomena of religion may be approached from two main angles, the metaphysical and the psychological. Of these viewpoints, the latter is the more fruitful one for our purpose. The religious and the scientific viewpoints were once competitors as offering a rational explanation of the universe. Both have their implications concerning reality, but both have been forced to abandon their claims at this point. If it is true that science has forced religion to give up its claims of explaining the universe, it is also true that philosophy, in some measure at least, has forced science to give up its claims on this score. In fact, modern science does not pretend ultimately to explain anything; it merely endeavors to find out and accurately describe what takes place in nature. The “how” and the “what” of things are as baffling for the scientist as they are for the philosopher. Thus religion and science are on the same plane so far as metaphysics is concerned.

The difference between the metaphysical outlooks of science and religion may be well described by Doctor Höffding’s “circle of existence.” Inscribing a circle of existence, religion would trace all events to the center while science endeavors only to establish the connections between events at the periphery of the circle. Its center is God from whom all causal series flow; the periphery is merely the series. Religion is interested in the universal cause while science confines itself to specific causes. A cause that explains everything does not explain anything from the standpoint of control. Hence a universal cause does not explain anything for scientific purposes. If you are ill and wish to regain your health, it does not help you any to know that God has caused your pain. As an intelligent individual, you naturally prefer the diagnosis and treatment of a competent physician, one who knows something definite about the relations between pain, disease, food, health, etc. You would not trust your body for surgical treatment to one who simply knew that God must be causing some kind of a pain somewhere in your physical anatomy. Specific relations are essential to science.
Although religion traces all events to the center of the circle, figuratively speaking, which it calls God, it cannot demonstrate His existence. It is not necessary here to consider the historical arguments for the existence of God. Suffice it to point out that they convince those who are already convinced, and need no convincing, but fail to convince those who most need it. They have never had a reputable standing in philosophy since the time of Immanuel Kant. One of Kant's great contributions to philosophy was that he showed once and for all time that the three great historical arguments, viz., the ontological, the cosmological and the teleological proofs, prove nothing so far as the existence of God is concerned. Since that famous "infidel," Robert C. Ingersoll, "with tears of pity put out the flames of hell," atheism has been regarded as somewhat of a dead issue, but there seem to be movements for its revival at the present time. This issue, like many other historic questions, was not so much settled as it was outgrown. Or, as someone has well said: "Philosophy does not so much solve questions as it does give us insight into what kind of questions we have a right to ask." It is a commonplace observation that the little child and the "man on the street," about whom philosophers are wont to talk, can ask questions that will stump the most profound of thinkers. Ofttimes our "plain man" attributes this to ignorance on the part of the philosopher while he in turn has a tendency to pity his friend for his naivete.

Of all the fields that modern psychology has invaded, none is more interesting or enlightenment than that of religion. Some of these have been subject to exploitation but in the field of religion, psychological investigations have thrown light on many of the problems that have perplexed philosophers throughout the ages. It by no means follows from this that thought has come to rest on ultimate questions, but it is safe to say that a new light and a better understanding have come through the psychological approach than had hitherto been gained by all the metaphysical speculations put together.

With the encroachments of modern science upon dogmatic theology from the beginnings of the overthrow of scholasticism to the present time, efforts to bring religion up to date have never been found wanting. These may be found in such movements as the religion of humanity as expounded by the French positivists and the religion of morality as represented by our Ethical Culture Societies. Huxley's religion of Fortitude, Spinoza's religion of Contem-
planation and the religion of the Creative Imagination as represented by Santyana and Russell are other cases in point. William James' classification of philosophers into the "tender minded" and the "tough minded" groups cuts across these various types of religion. But what is the common element, not only in these new religions, but in the old mythical religions as well? What is the greatest common denominator of religion? In answer to these questions the psychologist has found a fruitful approach through the concept of value. Wherever religious phenomena occur the value of hypothesis seems to describe most adequately the facts under investigation. Whether it be the myths and cults of primitive religions, the elaborate theology and ritual of the medieval catholic church, or the more progressive movements in religion today, religion at all points is identified with values.

Religion is interested in values while science is a method for control of values. But religion is more than an interest in values; it is a consciousness and appreciation of the highest-felt social values. If religion were to be stripped of its beliefs, its rituals, its sacraments and all the elaborate customs that have grown up around it, this consciousness and appreciation of what the group actually regards as most significant and important would be found to be the essence of religion. The ceremonies and sacraments, the cults and dogmas, the myths and superstitions that have surrounded its rites are merely attempts on the part of the group to control the values that are felt to be of supreme worth in the life of the group. The difference between modernist and fundamentalist here is not so much a difference as to ends and purposes as it is in means and methods of control. For the fundamentalist, the beliefs and superstitions of the past which have grown up about religious values, have actually become those values themselves rather than the symbols of those values. The symbol has been taken for the thing. For the modernist, who goes deeper into the meaning of his world, many of the old traditions and much of their symbolism can be discarded without destroying the values for which they have stood. But to expect the fundamentalist to see this is asking too much for to him there is no distinction between the thing and the thing as symbolized. To destroy the old symbol is to destroy the value which it represents. Because science has encroached on some of the beliefs and traditions of the old religion, it does not follow from this that it is opposed to religious values. The modernist sees in science a most powerful ally of religion as the most effective means for controlling
his values while the fundamentalist sees an irreconcilable conflict between the two because science would deprive him of outworn methods of control.

Religion is not a matter of belief; it is a matter of living. A man’s life and not his belief is his religion. Religion is a matter of belief only in so far as belief is essential to conduct. Thus if a man believes that it is right to kill, and is ready to act accordingly, such belief is an important matter; it makes a difference in his conduct. On the other hand, what difference does it make as to whether or not a man believes in the virgin birth? Does belief in this dogma make a difference in conduct either one way or the other? If so, it may be an important matter, but for the most part, it is a difference that does not make a difference, and a difference that does not make a difference is no difference at all. It is fair to state that belief in dogmas is necessary only in so far as a man needs a policeman to govern his conduct. If he needs one in order to make him behave himself, well and good, but it is hardly fair to argue from this that all people need policemen in order to make respectable citizens out of them. Just as there are those who will not respect the law under any consideration, so there are those for whom all the religious dogmas and superstitions in Christendom would have no effect in keeping within the bounds of decency. It is probably true that God has always been a much more effective policeman than man has been, but religion surely has some other service than the police function to render and perform for society.

It was Matthew Arnold who once said that “three-fourths of life consists of conduct” and to this a pragmatist has added “that the other fourth consists of something not very much different in character.” Those who would ground religion in authority as the only means for guiding conduct aright do but deceive themselves as to its effectiveness. The spirit of the age is one of revolt against unreasoned authorities, and they who think that the youth of the day will be kept in the straight and narrow path through religious authorities are but dwelling in a fool’s paradise. The revolt of the youth of the land is marked and evident as revealed by Judge Lindsey’s startling but remarkable investigations. Religious forms and authorities will work both ways, but while they may be the saving grace for one there are probably a hundred cases in which they are of little or no avail, if not actually harmful. The story is told of Jonathan Edwards, who when his daughter’s suitor approached him on the subject that was nearest his heart, could not become reconciled.
to giving his consent. The suitor was surprised and wondered why he should meet with opposition from such a kindly gentleman as Brother Jonathan. But this was just the trouble. The clergyman was too kindly: he was frank and honest. The prospective son-in-law wanted to know what was the trouble. Had his daughter not been baptized? Had she not been saved? Had she not joined the church? Had all the sacraments not been administered upon her? Oh, yes, all these had been done but her father felt compelled to be truthful and admit that "the spirit of God frequently comes into the soul of one with whom nobody can live." On the other hand, there are cases in which authority is the only thing that will work. A friend of mine once related an incident in his experience that is apropos. A young fellow once told him that if it were not for his belief in hell he most certainly would go there. My friend took the fellow and reasoned with him, showing him that there is no such thing as hell outside of that which we sometimes experience on this terrestrial planet, and, sure enough, the fellow did go there. There was a time when superstition had some utility, as Hobbes pointed out, but that time is fast going for the mass of mankind. We cannot expect to educate people and dupe them at the same time; the two attitudes conflict. Superstition and fear of authority may work in some cases of course, but such methods are futile for the normal, healthy, active and aggressive youth of today. Knowledge, insight, understanding and information are the things demanded by the youth of today, and there is no realm so sacred that it is not subject to his investigation. It is simply a question as to whether he shall be guided and directed in his experiences with life or as to whether he shall be left to his own devices. Ignorance and fear are methods that have never worked and they are methods that stand the least chance of working today that they have at any other period in history.

Religion is a matter of conduct and hence the inseparable relation between it and morality. It is a kind of life; it is living for the highest-felt social values. In as much as all values are a product of social relationships, i.e., they must occur in society, all values, to some extent, are social in character but some are more social than others. It is not only the greatest and the best, the most social of values but it is the highest-felt social values with which religion becomes identified. The values for which religion stands are those that are actually felt as most important and significant to the group. The social value of conduct or an institution is determined by the
extent to which these further group purposes and interests are determined by the group in question. At this point it is necessary to make a distinction between values which are most worth while and of the highest type in character and those which are felt as such by the group. These may coincide, provided the group purpose be a social purpose. Because an institution is felt of supreme worth by a group it by no means follows from this that such is actually the case. A striking example of this may be found in the institution of war which has always received religious significance, despite its verbal condemnation in peace time. The high tension in society produced by a state of war necessarily gives that institution a tremendous religious significance from the standpoint of values that are felt at stake in the struggle. The point here is not as to whether the values are really worth while or as to whether they are actually at stake but as to the fact that they are felt as such. Religion can no longer afford to assume an attitude of condonation toward such an institution as war. War has become an anachronism in modern society and if religion continues to sanction it, it is thereby rendered the worst form of hypocrisy. The blessings of the church upon another world war would render organized religion a mere mockery. It is to prevent the sanctioning of unworthy causes by religion that religion needs philosophy.

Because of its interest in social values, religion has a tendency to become conservative. As Lester Ward has well said: "It is the great conservative force that holds the social world in its orbit." It has always been the great conservator of human values. But religion must seek and find new values as well as conserve the old ones. In this age of rapid and strenuous living, there is little to be said for a force that is merely conservative. We are living in a changing world and religion only blocks progress and defeats its own best interests when it becomes too conservative. Why cling to empty husks after life has long since been snapped out of them by the march of progress? The appeal from providence to progress is an indicator of the new sphere for religion. Although progress is difficult to define, it is one of the outstanding characteristics of the modern world. Religion should become a more progressive force in society. It is only as it so becomes that it is vitalized. It needs to imbibe some of the spirit of the immortal Woodrow Wilson who once said that he would rather lose in a cause that he knew would

2 For further discussion of war morality, see my paper entitled, Do We Need a Moral Equivalent for War?
win some day than to win in a cause that he knew must ultimately fail. Our fundamentalist and anti-league of nations' friends may well take warning at this point.

The greatest values are personal in character: hence the tendency of God to become personal. Thus He is good; He is righteous; He is merciful; He is just; He is benevolent; He is perfect, omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent. Why? Because these are the characteristics in human relations that we either most like to find or should like to find. In either case, we value them most, but for those of us who perhaps are of a more "tough-minded" nature, wisdom, power and presence will be sufficient as over against perfection, not only in these but in the moral attributes of the infinite God as well. "Tender-minded" folk will doubtless require the infinite God of the older theology but a finite God who possesses both the metaphysical and the moral attributes of the perfect God in relative degree, may be all that we have a right to expect. He needs our help much more than did the God of the old theology. But whichever He may be, both His metaphysical and His moral attributes may be accounted for by the value hypothesis. They are the finer and the nobler traits of human nature. Raise human values to a superior degree and you get divinity. That man is made in the image of God is only half the story: God is also made in the image of man. The power of God is like the power of an ideal. We make our own ideals but they turn around and make us. "Tell me the kind of god a man worships and I will tell you what he is" is true, but the reference is to his activities, his interests and his pursuits rather than to his mere beliefs and pretensions. Obviously the form is a dynamic and vital factor in the life of an individual whereas the latter is of no particular power in the molding of character. God is the social ideal.

Here someone may object to this "subjective religion" on the grounds that our God is merely psychological. What of His existence? This raises the question as to the relation between value and reality: a most interesting and perfectly legitimate question, but one that would take us somewhat beyond the limits of our present discussion. In passing, it might be well to point out, however, that the answer will depend somewhat on our conception of reality. Much confusion in the matter has doubtless been due to the tendency to think of reality in merely physical terms. God is a social reality. May not social realities be as real as physical existents? The tendency to think of reality in physical rather than social terms is prob-
ably due to the priority of development of the physical as compared with the social sciences. So far as metaphysics is concerned, however, physical existents have about as ghostly an appearance as social realities after the philosopher gets through with them. If anything, the latter seem to have the more respectable standing in the court of reality.

The old anthropomorphic conception of God as a ruler seated on his heavenly throne wearing a golden crown and wielding a golden sceptre is essentially autocratic in character and arose in the days when men believed in the subject-ruler relationship between the individual and the state. It is here interesting to note that although Christianity has always denounced materialism, it was unable to eliminate the element of gold, either from the picture of its heaven or the picture of its god, due to the fact that men do actually desire gold. Lack of "the root of all evil" has probably been responsible for as much evil in the world as has the possession of the root in super-abundance. The Christian religion still carries vestiges of its tribal and feudal origin in such terms as "The Master" and "The Lord." These were class distinctions that were recognized in the social order of the times and, like ruler, were attributed to the religious symbolism which reflected the social and political conceptions of the day. God should no longer be thought of as a ruler but rather as a companion and helper. He helps man to help himself. A more democratic conception of God is much more fitting for present-day religion. Such a conception might very appropriately regard Him as a fit candidate for President of the League of Nations and Chief Justice of the World Court.

Religion personifies; science depersonalizes. If you want to understand yourself you must treat yourself as a thing. Science says it thinks. It views nature as impersonal and man as a part of nature. Science naturalizes man and religion humanizes nature. Both processes are necessary. The difference between science, philosophy and religion is one of attitudes. If human nature were a simple affair we should not have these different viewpoints. Religion is an active, appreciative attitude toward value; philosophy is a critical, reflective attitude toward value; science is non-valuational in its character. Philosophy applies a scientific method to value and thus becomes the meeting place of science and religion.

These are supplementary rather than conflicting attitudes. It is only by viewing them as such that harmony, proportion and perspective may be kept in life. If left to themselves without proper edu-
cation, they will have a tendency to pull apart just as will the intellectual, the emotional and the volitional aspects of self without such education. Just as it is quite possible for an individual to become unbalanced regarding these phases of the development of his personality, so is it perfectly possible for these dominant attitudes toward life as reflected in philosophy, science and religion to receive a disproportionate development in any given state of society. Indeed, the demands of an age of specialization such as the modern industrial world calls for, not only make such a development more dangerous than it has been at any other period in the history of civilization, but make imperative the preservation of balance in these attitudes if life and society are to continue and endure. An individual may be able to blunder his way through life with a lop-sided development of his personality, but the recent great war has taught us, or rather should have taught us, that it is no longer possible for civilization to endure with a corresponding lop-sided development of its philosophic, its scientific and its religious interests. Society must preserve a balance in these fields of interest if it is to protect itself against its own ultimate annihilation. This is the message of the greatest tragedy in history.

This is probably one of the greatest problems, if not the greatest problem, that confronts the world at the present time. The difficulty is not due to the fact that we do not have plenty of religion, plenty of science and plenty of philosophy. We are supplied with these in abundance, enough so at least to make this old world of ours quite a different place in which to live, and yet, behold the sorry spectacle of the human drama that is still ours to witness! Until the recent developments of modern science, man’s ferocity at its best was somewhat harmless as his methods of destruction were unable to keep pace with his ferocity; but the situation is reversed today. Methods and implements of destruction have grown way beyond the resources and capacities of human nature for development of ferocity and hatred. Consequently it is necessary actually to whip nations into warfare at the present time. Even the whipping cannot fan the passions of men into a state of ferocity and hatred at all comparable with the destructiveness of the machines and devices they wield. Thus it is we find ourselves the victim of an institution because science, philosophv and religion are not free to perform their true functions and render their respective services to a needy mankind. A faculty psychology has always been more or less of a myth but a faculty world is a stern reality, and it is one
of the most serious problems for education at the present time.

We pride ourselves on our freedom and tolerance and yet social science is today in practically the same position as physical science in the days of Galileo and Copernicus, so far as its applications are concerned. With our knowledge of social science now extant we could make tremendous strides toward the solution of our social, political and economic problems, but we are not free to apply it. The corps of expert scientists that President Wilson had at work on the new peace was simply scrapped in the interests of "practical" politics. The result has been this period of exhaustion that we naively call "peace." It is true that we no longer give our heretics the rack and the thumb-screw or the stake as in the days of the renaissance; we have a much more cordial method of treatment. We simply quietly and politely deprive them of an opportunity to make a decent and respectable living. With the application of the physical sciences to industrial processes and the world of human relations still ruled by passion, prejudice and superstition, humanity today is facing the abyss of destruction.

Never has religion been in such a position to realize its values as it is at the present time. It has had to resort to other worldliness and project its values into another realm in the past, so hopeless was the condition of the world for their realization and so impotent was it in coping with its problems. But science has changed this outlook for religion if she will but co-operate with it. Religion needs science in order to actualize its values. Through science the ideal may be made the real. Science needs philosophy in order properly to direct its interests. Science is cold; it seeks neither the good nor the bad of its phenomena. It merely inquires as to how nature behaves but nature itself is neutral regarding value so far as science is concerned. The methods of science are as effective for pestilence and disease as they are for life and health, and without philosophy to guide this spirit of investigation, science will only enslave man rather than set him free as is its true mission. Religion needs philosophy to analyze its values; without such analysis it has a tendency to degenerate; it is apt to become all heat and no light. Philosophy gives light to religion and thus directs its energies into worthy and constructive enterprises. Philosophy needs religion in order to accomplish its purposes. Religion furnishes the necessary motor power for getting results in the world of action. It is the human dynamo, but like an automobile, it needs direction. Religion without science is impotent while science without religion is cold; science
without philosophy is brutal while philosophy without science is empty; philosophy without religion is sterile while religion without philosophy is blind.

Although modern society presents many more classes than are here represented by science, philosophy and religion, these attitudes are inter-penetrative and cut across various classes as they represent three dominant attitudes toward life. Men possess these attitudes in varying degrees and the work of the world necessitates a division of labor based on individual differences. We may find an interesting parallel in Plato's Republic in which justice consists of each individual doing that for which he is best fitted. Our philosopher is still our guide although Plato's dream of the days when philosophers should be kings has by no means been realized. Our warrior class has been succeeded by the man of action in the new crusader as the champion and protector of religious values. But he is a man of peace rather than a man of war, while our husbandmen have given way to the modern scientist who holds in his possession the secrets of nature and can make nature do his bidding. The analogy will hold still further for surely if ever the philosopher needed wisdom he needs it today and if ever the man of religion needed courage he needs it today. But it must be a new courage; it must be a civic rather than a military courage. The world is rich in military courage but it is sadly lacking in civic courage. Perhaps we might exchange the virtue of temperance for the patience of the scientist, but our picture is not complete until we emphasize, as Plato did, the fact that each must possess justice, for it is justice, alone, that can preserve the proper balance and harmony in society. Justice in the individual was a harmony of the virtues and so justice in society is a harmony of interests.

That religion is powerless to realize an ideal social order without the instrumentality of science is well illustrated by its failure to abolish the institution of war from the earth. For nearly two thousand years the gospel of The Prince of Peace has been preached throughout the civilized world, and yet, in the second decade of the twentieth century, the church of Christ found itself as helpless as a new-born babe to prevent that hell that was turned loose upon the world in August, 1914. Peace is not an impossible goal for humanity; it is more than a beautiful dream; it is a value that may become an actuality. It can be realized, provided we are willing to assume a scientific attitude toward it. Like every value in human experience, it has its price and this price is the reconstruction of ideas
that represent recognized values, values which, although they may not be recognized in the world of thought, are tacitly implied in the world of action. We cannot continue to think in one world and act in another and expect to get peace.

Another excellent illustration may be found in home life in connection with the value of love. Surely this is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, value that life affords. Yet without knowledge and insight into many of the subtleties of the marriage relation, the matrimony! ship may be destined for the rock-bound coast of unhappiness, despite the best of motives and intentions. This is but one instance in home relations but many might be cited. Health, birth control and food supply are other cases in point.

It is no more reasonable to suppose that all men are religious than it is to assume that they are all philosophers. It is probably true that men do not vary in their capacity for the appreciation of value quite to the extent that they do in their intellectual attainments, and yet there are those in whom this capacity approaches closely to the zero mark, if it does not actually reach it, just as there are those in whom the same condition obtains in the realm of the intellect. Some people are more religious than others because they possess a greater capacity for responding deeply to the nobler and richer interests of life. We are religious to the extent that we respond to the highest and best things in life. Since religion's prime interest is that of finding and conserving the most social of values, it is only natural that it should become interested in ultimate questions. It is at this point that its interests are closely related to the metaphysical aspects of philosophy. To restrict it to this capacity for enjoyment of another realm, as Burns does, would seem to render it too esoteric in character.

The introduction of a philosophic element into religion brings with it, relative, as over against absolute standards in ethics and a practical, as over against the absolute absolute of the old religion. These in turn call for problematic attitudes and it is questionable as to whether the same enthusiasm can be gained for "practical absolutes" and "hypothetical imperatives" that has hitherto been gained for the "absolute absolutes" and "categorical imperatives" of the past. Some of the old religious enthusiasm will doubtless be lost. This is all too true, but what religion may lose in heat it will gain in light so that the loss has its compensating value. Perhaps only

the combustible and inflammable heat may be lost in the transaction, and if so, who would want to revive it? However this may be, there is little to be said for a religion that does not square with life and life is but one problem after another. The late Professor Foster happily and expressively put it when he said that "Life is a matter of problemizing, reproblemizing and depproblemizing." Philosophy's contribution to religion at this point may well prove a blessing in disguise.

It may help religion to forget its petty theological controversies and its narrow sectarian disputes and see with Ingersoll his vision of The Cooperative State and ally itself with science for the making of this vision a reality:

"I see a world where thrones have crumbled and where kings are dust. The aristocracy of idleness has perished from the earth.

"I see a world without a slave. Man at last is free. Nature's forces have by science been enslaved. Lightning and light, wind and wave, frost and flame and all the secret subtle powers of earth and air are the tireless toilers for the human race.

"I see a world at peace adorned with every form of art, with music's myriad voices thrilled while lips are rich with words of love and truth—a world in which no exile sighs, no prisoner mourns: a world on which the gibbet's shadow does not fall; a world where labor reaps its full reward; where work and worth go hand in hand: where the poor girl in trying to win bread with the needle—the needle, that has been called 'the asp for the breast of the poor'—is not driven to the desperate choice of crime or death, or suicide or shame.

"I see a world without the beggars' outstretched palm, the miser's heartless, stony stare, the piteous wail of want, the vivid lips of lies, the cruel eyes of scorn.

"I see a race without disease of flesh or brain—shapely and fair, the married harmony of form and function—and, as I look, life lengthens, joy deepens, love canopies the earth; and over all in the great dome, shines the eternal star of human hope."

It may not be a moral universe such as we should like to have it, but it is for most part at least, a universe that is capable of sustaining a moral order if we will but co-operate with it, even though such co-operation may require of us "the massing of interests against a reluctant cosmos." It is for the philosopher to see this, the scientist to show the way and the religionist to bring it about. "In union there is strength." The fundamentalist, who apparently
is more interested in where man came from than where the world is going, would have us believe that religious faith consists of believing things that are hard to believe, propositions that are an insult to our intelligence, while the modernist sees in religious faith the untold and unrealized possibilities of the universe for humankind. Science takes for its axiom the conservation of energy; religion takes for its axiom the conservation of value. Neither can prove its axiom. To believe that somehow or somewhere the values for which we live, the interests for which we strive and the ideals for which we struggle may be realized and conserved is all that religious faith requires of us.