PATRIOTISM: WITH SOME ASPECTS ON THE STATE

BY L. A. SHATTUCK

That she, the goddess, teaches men to be
Eager with armed valor to defend
Their motherland, and ready to stand forth,
The guard and glory of their parents' years.
A tale, however beautifully wrought,
That's wide of reason by a long remove.
—Lucretius.

PATRIOTISM is the categorical imperative of the State's metaphysics. Which, being dynastically moral, one must accept in the manner usual with phenomena which are examined closely only in inverse ratio to their importance. Its supreme emotional appeal, due to being sunk deeply in a savage or barbarian psychology and perhaps even laminated beneath religious superstitions, deters one phase of criticism. Another, kept in the dark for the benefit of the common man by the State's baptismal and protecting arm, has been tampered with but seldom. Resting itself on an economic fallacy it falls into the same class with those things which Macauley had in mind when he said that if the law of gravitation had anything to do with economics there would be droves of arguments to prove its falsity. Hence, the few phases of patriotism which have been oriented into the light can be clearly seen only by a vigorous somersaulting from first principles of national philosophy.

Which, in democracies formed of undiscerning electorates, is as it should be.

A State, like its common divisor, the common man, follows biological law, viz: the survival of the fittest. Consequently in following this law every function pertaining to its national persistence must be egoistic; must be, if one is morally color-blind, positively immoral. It must educate the common man along lines that least threaten contradiction of its dogmas; nay, along lines which will even make these dogmas more inflexible; see that the common man does its work: that he engages in a productive toil, even an indif-
ferent laziness being a form of vice: that he does not animadvert on its beneficence, which is, to say the least, *lese majeste*: that, in short, all common men under its aegis be a coördinated into a composite whole: think as it thinks, hate where it hates, lay logic, labor, and life, if need be, at its service.

Thus, while political theory has it (excepting a few anomalies like Japan) that States and all their attendant machinery are for the benefit of the common man, the reverse is the fact. Due to the State's very belief in its own permanence and its knowledge of the mortality of its common men, its interests are entirely dissociable from those of common men both within its borders and those the world over. True, within its borders there are a few individuals with whom it has interests in common as I shall later point out but they are assuredly not common men. Thus while the State is more or less of an abstraction, society itself beyond the individual being a philosophical myth, this abstraction becomes fetish, hence blameless, soulless, and beyond criticism. It is an organism, disparate to any other, whose well-being evolves along a path utterly opposed to any other organism. Free, too, from that gregariousness of man which abates in some degree his natural predatory instincts, that gives a semblance of altruism to even the worst of us, the State pursues its way true to biological law. Only when it indulges in that phenomenon called "international comity" does it seem to relieve itself of its feral nature, its *anima bruta*. Yet even while the State believes in international comities in principal, submerged under the principal is the fact that it believes essentially as Tacitus did in speaking of the German barbarians: "Above sixty thousand barbarians were destroyed, not by the Roman arms, but in our sight and for our entertainment. May the nations, enemies of Rome, ever preserve this enmity to each other! We . . . have nothing left to demand of fortune, except the discord of the barbarians." As the State holds to such general tenets as this in its international relationships there is nothing strange about its intra-national in that it uses the common man, molds him to satisfy whatever are the national intentions of the moment.

And though it may be said that the efficacy of thus using the common man was high in the Middle Ages with its inter-relating systems of power, priests, castes, etc., it is still higher today with our facilities of press and propaganda. True, we are liable to overstretch the value of these due to a fallacy, e. g., our belief in psychological freedom. We fail to observe that man is apperceptive to
propaganda not alone because of any intrinsic weight in the propaganda itself but because the ideas advanced in such drop into psychological grooves which have been worn frictionless by use and wont. (In general, not scientific, ideas. The latter, once they become popular, are never questioned; if not popular are too heady, hence they are never desiderata of the common man’s mental equipment.) We see the effects of propaganda upon the common man and the way it makes him act. We do not see the causes which make him accept such propaganda as the truth. Nor do we see that each one of these causes is the effect of another cause, that cause the effect of still another, and so on until an original fact is reached.

Though it is true of course that the propaganda served up to the common man is seldom as intellectually indigestible as the foregoing still we can’t deny that even the common man’s thinking may travel in the grooves of determinism. However, waiving such arguments aside in view that man labors under the apprehension that his present acts are intelligent and not dependent upon a sequelae of original causes, we can advance the fact that nearly all propaganda appeals to the common man’s basest instincts (if the propagandist knows his business); that it preys upon him only through those things which are harmful and beneficial to him; that, briefly (to use a most appropriate slang phrase), “it hits him where his house is.” But as this all comes under the heading of what is known as “education,” it should be conspicuously posted on the credit side of the ledger, naïve bookkeeping though it is, and let it go at that.

Yet even if these things are true of present-day systems of propaganda it is nevertheless doubtful if they have the force commonly ascribed to them. That they have wider scope for influencing the human mind than did the systems prevailing in the Middle Ages is no doubt true but that such influence is intensified is extremely questionable. And especially is this true in a State where many racial habits and traits are at variance. The point almost commonly lost sight of by the State is that the propagandist is himself surrounded by hosts of instincts, hates, fears, and superstitions which fail to strike responsive chords in large masses of common men. And inasmuch as such masses can be moved by certain stimuli and no others, other things being equal, the State has only two courses open to it. In the one case it is possible for the State to choose as henchmen, as its propagandists and political bullies (if one would make invidious distinctions) those who cover the widest of ethnic ranges. But while it is possible for the State to do this, it is, except under
remarkable circumstances, improbable that it will for the almost obvious reason that the State itself is essentially national in its instincts, having the hates, fears, and superstitions almost common to one type of man. It but seldom sheds itself of such chrysalises even when to do so will prove to be of inestimable value to it. It reacts to the same stimuli as its common men, by rote eventually accepting its own falsehoods as truth. Whence follows the well-known principle that a State’s moral sense of justice is on a par with all but the lowest of its common men. In the other case, of course, when the State’s systems of making opinion prove unavailing, there is one final, unfailing element at its disposal: Force. Yet even force, used indiscriminately, has certain drawbacks. It may be used only according as the principles involved are minor or major to the national existence. Its constant use may be costly to the State in the matter of its international relationships. If the State inject force into its proselyting of its subject people at the wrong time or without sufficient justification, such offending State may become morally odious to other States, subject, of course, to the world’s temper at the moment. As for instance (though the case is not strictly parallel) France’s sympathy with the colonists during the American Revolution. Also as was the case during the World War. No instance is recorded that I know of in which any of opposing States reproached any allied State for using force when milder persuasions failed, though all of the opposing States involved were free enough with their reproaches for each and every State opposed to them. The thousand and one cases of flagrant injustice (not even yet all amended in the United States) later reported in the American and continental press made but few of us blink an eyelash. But this by the way. The aim of the State Jesuitically hallows the means. And whether we believe in determinism, or that propaganda have all the insidious appeal as is said, or whether it be necessary to throw force behind it to make it really effective; if none of these things have a vestige of truth to them there is little difference in the final result. For in the face of the hords of instincts and habits of thought which have been cajoled and attuned to the national interests (interests which may be called moral, or immoral, equivalents to the natural egoism of the common man) to ask the common man to adopt an ironic scepticism, to reason in a manner different from those in the schools, classes, and sub-classes to which he is accustomed is to ask for the millenium out of hand. Only a confirmed idealist would have the temerity, or an utter idiot the effrontery, to do so.
But let us push such irrelevancies aside. I stated a short time ago that the feudal lord had hardly more influence over his vassals than the modern State has over its common men. Even allowing all the foregoing argument bearing upon propaganda as making such a statement invalid there are still other considerations to be laid down, viz: First, it is almost common knowledge that the key-stone of the early State was the desire for mutual protection. But as this desire with relation to the common man in the large modern State is either non-existent or is figurative, it will have to be thrown out as being contradictory to the premise. Second, that under even the greater feudal States the common man was in a position to lose life, or goods, or both, a position which in no wise confronts him today. In but few of the great, modern States does he possess goods, and his life, under more civilized (sic!) conditions of warfare, is safer: provided of course that he be a non-combatant. Third, that if mutual protection, and not the dependence upon a plutocracy, were the motive for cohesion in the modern State, anarchy would reign in all but a few of them within a week. In this respect, the plutocrat has merely changed places with the feudal lord, the former standing in the same position to the common man today as the money lender stood to the latter upon the breaking up of the feudal system in western Europe. Fourth, and finally, the thin slap of difference existing between the position of the common man under the older regime and that of today is barely discernible to the naked eye. He occupies, if anything, rather a less enviable position in that while the vassal had a tenure of a type for which it was to his interest to aid his lord, since there was always the usufruct, the common man of today gets out of his services to the State whatever subserviency usually gets from impersonal gods. And as the State, well intrenched behind the justice of its territorial phase ("aut Caesar aut nulles," as Sir Henry Maine has it), goes on encroaching farther and farther into the domain of the common man, e. g., controls his opinions, this subserviency will keep on increasing. One can’t say to a State, an entity which depends for its very existence on human brawn and brain, that its most worth-while individuals are untrue to a type. True in a chemical experiment such organisms are considered the most interesting of phenomena, but in social chemistry men who prove untrue to type, or what the State obscurely imagines to be a type, and whose amalgamation in the herd always remains incomplete, become apostates, anarchists, subverters of all principles
of national autonomy. From Socrates down through the ages such men have always paid the penalty of freemen.

Yet who can advance arguments versus the State on this score? Since the State is composed of individuals and as it is but seldom that the individual is rhadamanthine in his sense of justice, is he any the more subject to a careful exercising of it when the unit becomes a thousand or a million fold? When the very natural propensities, and the thousand possibilities of the single mind to err are increased to infinity? Hardly. For as the individual germinates into the mass, that is, the social mass, he becomes a more powerful, a more emotional, a less mental organism, and hence he has grown the body, the nerves, and the mind of a nascent tyranny. Thus we bring back the argument to its original starting-point: That conditional upon average individual judgments on both sides being in balance a more equitable justice will be awarded by the individual than by man in the mass. The whole theory that a juridical tribunal maintains justice on a higher mental plane than does an individual I believe to be false. Since laws have been written and collated by individuals all their authoritative strength is actually vested in an individual opinion. Their strength—except from a standpoint of force—does not vest in society just because society has come to adopt them as true. For if it be conformable to fact that no opinion as handed down from the dawn of history by an individual (I except such debatable things as mathematics and the inductive sciences generally) has proved indubitably true, how much more so has this been proved of the opinions of society! And what has proved true of opinions as a whole has proved true of laws. For to assume because a consensus of opinion is that one point of law is more just or more reasonable than another is no reason for saying that such an opinion is the opinion of the mass. It simply means that the mass agrees to, or concurs with, the opinion as finally laid down by, one. For, in the last analysis, to increase the adjudicating powers, that is, numerically, merely adumbrates and does not clear the issue. The greater such powers the more highly tempered and complicated are the emotions and the more easily are the vestigial instincts of the primitive man set oscillating.

The foregoing being true of the judgments of men in the mass, to charge the State with immorality for doing away with those of its citizens who fail to accord its dogmas and its gods the degrees of sanctity to which they are no doubt entitled or because it uses the common man whenever it can is as fatuous as to believe that
biology itself is immoral. Since its dogmas have, assumptively, been bruited even in the farthest corners of the State and its gods apotheosized by its political pontiffs, ignorance of their sanctity avails one nothing in extenuation. And if one is not ignorant of the sanctity with which they are invested the very power of their sponsor is enough to make a sane man pause. Yet that stupid quality in man which is termed reticence, that gross-headed obstinacy in him whereby he goes to the torture chamber without opening his lips, has painted the whole history in lurid flame. As Nietzsche has pointed out an apology from Socrates would have saved his life. His persistence, contumacy, fanaticism, what you will, were his real executioners. As the popular opinion is ever ephemeral and as only a difference of opinion existed between him and the Greek senate that condemned him to death, he should have genuflected, smiled like a gentleman and no bigot, and apologized—as did Galileo, Roger Bacon and Voltaire—then gone on unheedingly in the way his particular gods directed him. Yet who can say that he didn’t? To say that men go to torture or to death under the impulse of a free-will is pure sophistry. Unless under the constraint of acting at the fiat of some unknown nexus of ideas, a latent, imperious urge, or a Satanic afflatus, no one short of an imbecile would do so. Nor, on the other hand, whether Socrates was so urged or not, would one expect a State, even a comparatively small city-state, to suffer a changement of opinion for the sake of one individual.

Yet the State itself is not entirely free to act always in relation to its own self-interests. Occasionally it may be bound to a narrower sphere of influence by the collective opinion of its citizens with respect to its internal policies; in its external it is not alone prescribed by the military power of neighboring States, but by the opinions of those States as well. While philosophically the individual man will be free under a theoretic anarchy, factually, however, he will never be free under anarchy since there will always be the possibility of others combining against him and thus restricting his scope of freedom. In the same manner as this is the State circumscribed with restrictions. Except under a condition of world dominion as of Rome under the Antonines, the State is always subject to chastisement by other States once it becomes too “free.” Thus its imperialistic measures are curbed sheerly by the same “moral” considerations as those which restrain a sound man from striking a cripple who offends him: there are bystanders present. Justice in such cases is usually a negative, and not a positive, reflex; the
State considers the force alone which can be brought to bear. An impending and temporarily withheld force thus restricts the State to a modified, one might say a more decent, policy of imperialism. Cases are numerous enough on this head; offers to mediate by third parties between States when, usually, the third party would lose were the two offending States to indulge in war-like enterprise. Thus the offer of Argentine, Brazil, and Chili, to mediate between the United States and Mexico in 1914; the acceptance of the latter for no other reason than to save its "moral" face at the time; the offer of A, B, and C, conditioned sheerly as a matter of self-defense: to have Mexico as an intervening cheval-de-frise between them and United States; while the United States later went into the doldrums called "watchful waiting" by which it no doubt meant that its gun was at its shoulder and it was ready to march.

All of which comes under the head of freedom. And whether it applies to the State or individual makes no difference. There is no freedom where there is no power to exercise it. For, by the same token, a freedom that is dead, that emanates from the fetid breath of a political edict is no freedom. Man is free in direct proportion only as the restraints surrounding him are few in number whether such restraints are said to be good for civilization or not. Every new law behind which the State stands in a contradiction of liberty. Even laws affirming a general liberty as are now promulgated by some few republics are a negation of liberty since the really free man does not court allowances. He is free only so far as he owes nothing and morally he feels bounden to the State when a right to which he is innately entitled is conferred upon him as an after-thought, as a further right to his consideration. To paraphrase Napoleon, not only God, but Freedom, is on the side of the strongest battalions. As to the Freedom of the State, Lord North is authority enough. "Oh! . . . miserable and undone country! not to know that right signifieth nothing without might: that the right without the power of enforcing it is nugatory and idle in the copyhold of rival States or immense bodies!"

It is organic of man, as of tropisms, that he wants to move in the line of least resistance. Let it pass that this statement may prove objectionable to Puritans. However, let us say that the individual wants to be free or wants to have the idea of being free in respect to whether, in the first case, he is exceptional to the species; or, in the second, he is common to it. The exceptional man wants the substance of freedom for the same reason in principle that makes the
wolf hunt alone rather than with the pack. Not because he doesn’t realize that such a freedom will always be unattainable: he is nearly fully aware that even in primitive times he was engulfed by the gens, house, or family, as he is aware today that the future holds out for him nothing but being engulfed by larger and larger units as time goes on. Nor is it that he is less social than the other because in the long run he is more so. He sees that the future of the race depends more or less upon a practical initiative of the individual, a reasonable amount of *laissez-faire*, just as in economics a reasonable competition will tend towards balancing costs. That he is not less brave than the common man almost goes without saying if bravery means to try new paths and have moments when habits go-by-the-board as his brother-in-kin did back in the dark ages on sunshiny days when he temporarily forgot his fear of the elements. He is willing to take a chance in any political world barely short of an absolute anarchy. Hence, while his ideal is anarchy, his practicality points out that anarchy is a *pons asinorum* as a means to happiness. But he rebels against anything else: it is his heritage to hate the feel of harness, the click of the whip along his back. Not so, however, the common man. While the proclivities of his ancestors remain with him he can’t restrain his fears. He wants something to which he may pay homage, something that will take out of his hands the initiative that he himself should exercise so that he may be left free to perform his ordinary duties of obtaining food, breeding and getting a shelter. In the past he left nearly all questions beyond these things to a god, a totem, a patriarch, a tyrant, a lord, a king. But whereas he trusted his fate to these in the past, because he attributed to them an all-powerful divinity, he has almost nothing today in which he can trust except what one may call a proxy. And proxies are not divine. Hence, when the common man sees initiative in others, he is incensed to the extent of seeing the need to limit it. He knows that though at present it may not even be remotely directed against himself, some day it may. Hence the need of whatever action he is capable to control it.

There are two ways in which the common man can do this. He can join the larger of two or more factions with which he may have interests in common or he may have recourse to the law, in either case vitiating by force the power of any real or imaginary attempts against his well-being. The very nature of the common man, his hates, his fears, his jealousies, his ever-quavering need for self-protection, are thus the nuclei of numberless laws and prohibitions.
which will restrain the initiative of all individuals whose interests are opposed to his. And especially is this so in the democratic State. It is almost an open forum where thousands of insignificant grievances may unwhirl themselves out of stupid brains: where by the simple expedient of gaining a few cackling votaries almost any imbecile can become his own Justinian, having his own pandects eventually incorporated in the statute books. Everything he fears and can't abide (either because he can't or has no desire to indulge them) lie ready at hand to add to the discordant din of the legal charivari.

This is one of the reasons that a democracy will seldom function as efficiently as an aristocracy. Whereas the laws in the latter are usually fundamental and few in number they can be rigidly enforced. those in the former are almost purely adventitious and numerous and their enforcement entails thousands of courts and depends on fortuitous factors. The aristocrat is wary of unlimited legislation for the simple reason that it will in time rebound upon himself, while the common man is constantly skipping from legal panacea to legal panacea, now distrusting legislation, now a fanatic about its powers to cure. Thus the State instead of remedying things by paternalistic laws which are supposedly to cure common men of their diseases is unconsciously impoverishing itself. For instance, the Drug and Prohibition Acts in the United States. None but the blind has failed to see how impotent the government is to enforce them. Still somehow we do manage to go lumberingly towards the millennium, whatever it will be, increasing laws, taxes, police forces, not to mention intolerance which is the primary cause for dissolution of the State as polarity within the atom is primary cause for dissolution.

The common man is, of course, satisfied with all this as indeed we all must be. The legalistic horizons to which he has so long been habituated, the innumerable "Keep Off the Grass!" signs which since the days of Hammurabi keep augmenting hour on hour and which fimbriate every highway and alley of modern life, have no terrors for him. He is satisfied not because he is interested in the State as State. He is interested in it sheerly because he believes that if the State engrafs upon itself a number of prohibitions gross enough he will be surrounded by an impenetrable armour, protecting him always, perhaps even saving him from thought. He will again have his totem. There is nothing paradoxical to him in the verity that when these prohibitions have reached a point where they
become intolerable to a large mass of men his armour will dissolve into a filament where he'll be compelled to meet his fellow man almost utterly devoid of self-reliance. Just as the State, in attempting to cure all the common man's ills by law, weakens itself, so does the common man with his supra-tendencies towards sociality, his allowing the State to preempt more and more the prerogatives which he himself should assume, weaken himself. There is a balancing point between tolerance and intolerance which should never be passed. Whenever it has been passed onto the side of the latter the common man will have no State left to protect him nor will the State have common men enough to uphold it.

As the rights of the democratic State persist only by the sufferance of the majority of its citizens, whose toes are respected, and hence who believe collectively in the sanctity of the State, it is to the majority the State looks to validate its behests. It is therefore the majority who have what are called "rights," which means in essence that what the State can't help acceding to it, the State accedes. Practically, as I have shown, there are no "rights" except those residing in force. The minority therefore have no rights. They are merely the by-products of a heterogeneous society. And as by-products they supposedly add nothing to the value of the State it may be economy to treat them negatively. Yet in this, too, I think the State errs. That is, of course, the democratic State.

Men in society, I presume, may be divided into three groups: the apathetic, the idealistic, and the realistic. Politically, we call them conservatives and reactionaries, progressives and liberals, radicals, etc. The first two of these may be said to belong to the apathetics if we open the term to every one indifferent to, or opposed to, political evolution. The third, fourth, and fifth, are about evenly divided between the idealistic and realistic groups. Though it is true, of course, that no austere classification such as this can be made where individuals are involved, it is a biological truism that almost in direct proportion as the number of individuals examined become greater the more will they reflect characteristics in common. Thus when a few "apathetics" are examined many slight differences of opinion will be found among them. Where many are examined these differences will pare off by insensible gradations, the general agreement of their opinions rising predominantly above them. More, I think it will be found that the larger the group whose ideas fall into definite categories the more indifferent to those ideas will the group be. One Athanasius or one Luther has more feeling for his particu-
lar creed than ten thousand converts. Only exceptionally small groups of G. B. Shaws, Anatole Frances, H. G. Wellses, or say, Bertrand Russells and Jacques Loeb could ever be formed. Hence we may say in general that the "apathetics" will be found largely among the majority, the idealists and realists the minority. Though all trickle in and out of these two groups I think the hypothesis approaches fact. It is almost banal to point to history to show that almost everything has come from the minority, nothing from the majority. And by majority I mean, of course, those who are "for" the dominant thoughts of the community or State, the general level of its ideas and tenets, and by minority those who are against them. In the United States, for instance, the majority believes in Protestantism and industrialism: the minority does not. And while the United States as State recognizes heterodoxy in religious matters, in principle, officially it is Protestant. As witness its refusal to interfere with the persecution of Catholics by the Klu Klux Klan in the South. As I shall show in the next paragraph it is such stupidities on the part of the State which breed anarchy.

Hitherto I have shown that every State (with exceptions noted) was constrained in its acting upon other smaller States by the temporarily withheld force of other large States. When the power of any State is aggrandizing too swiftly, other States, sensing a threatening of their own autonomy, will check it by combination or counter-combination, sheering strength from the too powerful State, disposing it if the result will warrant, upon weaker States from which they have nothing to fear. It is the only check against a free imperialism and sometimes a most effective one. Within the community, however, we have no such checks. Where one faction in it is weak and the other strong the last will dominate over the first and intolerance will set in. Where neither is the strongest there will be no attempt at coercion for where their force is co-equal their one or several differences of opinion will be passive. The democracy, therefore, that maintains its various factions, its minority and majority groups, in equilibrium will most nearly approach the ideal democracy. It will be strengthened because all men will be for it. That is, as much as all men can ever be for a godhead.

Democracies ever fail to see this. They recognize creeds to the denial of everything contrary to them. They perpetually heave up prohibitions and legal restraints against natural humours which erect factions that lead the common man into mazes from which he can only extricate himself by adopting a devout nihilism.
It is true that the police and military forces of the democratic State may at all times seem omnipotent but they are not things apart. For the common man to assume that they will always be ready to protect him against all of the State's mistakes is an egregious error. They, too, are common men who take their part in the day's doings, who join their factions, and who, when these are to be put down by law, will either not bear arms against them or will take arms with them if there be the slightest chance of success. Every common man is, therefore, wherever factions exist, a potential force which may be brought to bear against the State. And factions, as I have already shown, are indirectly the children of innumerable laws.

Thus it is that the tendencies of the democratic State towards the creation of numberless prohibitions and the multiplication of intolerance is not combated by the common man. They are combated by the rare individual whose scalpel goes far beneath the surface respectabilities leaving the raw, naked stupidities exposed. It is the rare individual only who has the capabilities and the perseverance to be not alone his own surgeon but the State's. He stands in the same relationship to the State as a great critic stands to the novelist. He chastens—not because he loves the State first—but because he loves it at all. He sees in the integration of laws the gradual disintegration of his individuality and he also sees that in that integration there is a greasing of ways towards launching another mightier State which will cause still further disintegration. He would rather take present evils than those . . . etc. Call him conservative if you will, yet from the standpoint of the State with the interests of its subject people at heart, he is the only constructive influence such a State has. One Spencer is worth a thousand Cecils. England up until the early decades of the Nineteenth Century, perhaps the "freest" nation in modern history, was made so by its free-thinkers, its liberals, and radicals to whom the increasing powers of the courts were anathema. It was they who kept the legalistic restraints down to a norm compatible with a reasonable amount of individual liberty because that and that only meant the greatest sum of collective happiness. It was as these bars against the increase in laws weakened, as a few leaders of opinion became less febrile in their denunciations, that England became less and less an ideal State for the individual and therefore for every citizen in it. But while it is true that England is still far from approaching the United States in its insidious penchant for multiple law making, its committees, its governmental
bodies of this and that, it is fast riding the current which will lead it into Socialism—or worse.

I have before me a Socialist pamphlet that says: "The tendency of social evolution always was and forever will continue to be towards a state of ever-increasing restraint of the individual by society, and that this will continue till a state of existence will be attained in which the individual will be constrained by society." This passage, except for the absoluteness of "forever will continue," seems to accord with the facts. Constantly as civilization reaches farther and farther out, and as the nomadic, pastoral, and agricultural habits of men are slowly broken down, it becomes increasingly harder for him to live without its limits. His tendency is ever towards adhesion to larger and larger groups. He follows specifically Spencer's doctrine of evolution: from incoherent homogeneity to coherent heterogeneity: from individual to family, family to clan, clan to tribe, tribe to nation. And as the indispensable condition to living in these is conformity to their laws and customs, he comes up through them each in turn siphoning from him some of his individuality. He becomes in the end merely the unknown "X" in an indeterminate equation. He may have one special value or he may have a dozen. He may still retain some individuality or he may retain nothing except values common to his kind. And in a democracy, the present end of social evolution, such values are bound to be common.

So it is that if evolution (if one may call it evolution) of the State is to go on it is in some manner in which the common man will play more of a supposititious part. The signs are fairly intelligible that such evolution will be towards a stultifying democratization of values. The State slowly but surely gives way before the common man: all but him are being swallowed in its ever-widening maw. We have Utopians, Socialists, Communists, Bolsheviki, all tending to eliminate physical competition and take out of the common man's hands the initiative that has so long irked him. Socialism, Communism, and Bolshevism are all for feeding the common man assuming that thereby all individualism would be drugged into a profound coma. Yet doing this would rouse long dormant psychological possibilities in the common man which would start another type of individualism all over again. Haven't the Utopians forgotten the restlessness of man, even of the bovine type, except that he be restrained by a rigid dictatorship? Graze the common man on the vastest of meadows and he'll want any fences that surround him taken down.
that done and he'll want someone to do his grazing for him; do that and he'll reach out for things still farther fetched. If the inherent traits of common men are hardly much higher than the Neanderthal man, if a physical Utopia could be created tomorrow, he wouldn't appreciate it any more than Adam appreciated Eden, which, contrary to the orthodox doctrine of original sin, may just as well be interpreted to be a parable on man's discontent: even with the most perfect world known to man.

Any world in which man is to be happy will be one that comes through slow, transitional stages of growth. Even the common man will rebel at the regimentation of the current interpretation of what socialism means. His whole underlying psychology will have to be trained in new habits, new ways of thinking before any such millennium can come to pass. Ah! but then, says the Utopian, the common man will become a real part of the State, an owner: he will become blessed with a transcendental spirit of mutual aid, brotherly love, civic honor, etc. A place will be found for the halt, the maimed, the blind, the stupid; all will be the State! And I ask where, except for a very thin tincture, is there the spirit of mutual aid as would be necessary under socialism or communism? Where, except that exhibited by some very rare individuals and that voiced in stupid maudlinism, is there the brotherly love? As for civic honor, 999 times out of 1,000, if delved deeply enough into, it is found to be actuated by self-interest. No would-be socialist can be trained in these things by empty words. He can't get the spirit of them by studying economic history. Except to make him aesthetically unhappy with the present world, dangling socialism constantly before his eyes gives him nothing. He may dream that tomorrow morning he may wake up and find himself in a new world. True, dreams can only come true by first dreaming them. But dreams, as Freud has pointed out, are inhibited desires and as man has probably dreamed for millions of years, one can doubt whether the perfect Utopia will ever arrive. His desires will ever keep in front of him like the tortoise in front of Achilles. Yet Liberals of one kind or another are attempting and will probably go on attempting to make the common man suddenly into something that he is not: mayhap in time they will succeed. They have done it since the Middle Ages: from Martin Luther attempting to convert every comman man into being his own metaphysician down to Jean Jacques Rousseau and other super-democrats making every man his own politician. Yet metaphysics has now become a horror and as a politician the com-
mon man is a wanderer in a gloomy wilderness. Yet that the world will ultimately shoulder some such thing as socialism or bolshevism there is little doubt. As the whole world has a democratic bias and as such means the exfoliation of power from the hands of the few into the hands of the many (even though such power is really fictitious) some equivalent of socialism is bound in time to come. Exactly as the democratic State increasingly wades into labyrinthine mazes of government ownership pulling many common men, by the golden threads of democratic doctrine, after it, so does it increasingly give itself over to a large petty officialdom, a bureaucracy whose disposition is more and more towards socialism, creating sinecures to keep alive that sense of superiority of rank which under the most perfect of democracies is so necessary to the common man. If a vicarious egoism has glitter to him—what matter? And he gets this vicarious egoism out of being an official whether in a civil or a governmental organization. Shut off from a lack of the general qualifications necessary to a business success "on his own" in the one case and a decent respect for his own dignity and powers in the other, is it any wonder that he takes it out in a putative ownership and lords it over those whose interests are most in accord with his own? As he but seldom views things subjectively how can one blame him? If you make ethical comparisons ament whether things are to be judged foolish or wise, or good or bad, then maybe the common man is foolish. But then whatever is, is, and by playing the hobble-de-hoy mentor to him you don't make him any the wiser. And as the democratic State retains its power through his lack of wisdom one should be loathe to criticize. To appreciate this one has only to know that to give the common man a shilling different in wages or to clothe him with a purely fictitious inequality of office and he will be like a god where the difference between him and his kind will be greater than that between a peacock and some cull of the barnyard. Each will direct him next below him in rank with the pomposity of a strutting idiot.

Thus the State with its orders, stars, garters, medailles d'honneur, jobs, "Toys," as Napoleon called them, temporarily strengthens its power yet each such acquisition of power by the democratic State, where a new political sinecure is made available, is a nail in its own coffin. For each gainer there must be a loser and for each non-productive sinecurist there must be one or more productive common men and each new sinecurist makes the onus all the heavier on the remaining common men. True the common man who is proclaimed
a hero pinning a tin medal on his chest is hardly liable to detest the State nor is the common man who is fed at the public crib nor indeed is any man who is infantile over pacifiers. Since a large bureaucracy quiets a large number of common men via the reason that they are within the sanctum, are "in the know," and as even a post-office clerk is in the same macrocosmic world as a Prime Minister, his uniform, by ascription to himself at least, covers the same great virtues, the same great secrets of State. Yet while satisfying the common man's thirst for purely egocentric indulgence other common men must pay in ever-stiffening sums as time goes on.

Am I assuming that an aristocracy would be free of such absurdities? I point to history and that hackneyed line about the beggar on horseback. *Magistratus indicat virum.* True it is that all aristocracies have not been composed of Solons but the castes out of which aristocracies have sprung have nearly all sent with them daimiosian (to coin an adjective) codes of honor from which few true aristocrats have deviated. The promiscuousness of the common man, his practical inability to realize any codes of honor except those inspired by fear, the venal habits of his kind to "get it while the getting's good," his supine dependence upon surface expedients, are all against any form of self-discipline. "There is," says Mr. H. G. Wells in his "First and Last Things," a base democracy just as there is a base aristocracy, the swaggering aggressive disposition of the vulgar soul that admits neither of superior or leaders. . . . It resents rules and refinements. . . . It dreams that its leaders are its delegates. It takes refuge from all superiority, all special knowledge, in a phantom ideal, the People, the sublime and wonderful People. 'You can fool some of the people all the time and all the people some of the time, but you can't fool all the people all the time,' expresses, I think, this mystical faith, this faith in which men take refuge from the demand for order, discipline and conscious light. . . . The community is regarded as a consultative committee of profoundly wise, alert and well-informed Common Men. Since the common man is, as Gustav Le Bon has pointed out, a gregarious animal, collectively rather like sheep, emotional, hasty, and shallow, the practical outcome of political democracy in all large communities under modern conditions is to put power into the hands of rich newspaper proprietors, advertising producers and the energetic wealthy generally who are best able to flood the collective mind freely with the suggestions on which it acts." And, as de Tocqueville says: "Presque tous les peuples qui ont agi fortement sur le monde, ceux
And why not? No business can be successfully run by other principles. To speak of absolutely democratic co-operation is to speak of chaos. And so too is to speak of government from a standpoint of efficiency. Democracy is expensive, wasteful. No single man with the most extravagant of retinues could ever be as costly to the common man as modern democracy. No Heliogabalus, Nero, Commodus, Louis's with a hundred de Maintenons and Du Barrys have been. The sooner we realize that, to make government cheap and efficient, which it ever should be, that democracy is a poor way towards its attainment. Precisely as a business run on a theory of democracy with a thousand directing heads would eventually put the richest corporation in the world in the hands of the receiver so in time will the whole theory of democratic government have to be scrapped no matter to what point it eventually reaches. A policy of accumulating numerous hangers-on who add nothing to the value of the State, whose constructive value to it is inversely co-extensive to the depths they have their arms into the public treasury, eventually will drain that treasury dry, even though, like the United States, its resources for taxing the common man seem inexhaustible. No matter what theories are, facts are worth ten thousand of them that are found wanting. And from viewing history we know that no policy within the State, if we want cheap and efficient government, except that of stiffening and centralizing the powers, will work for long. No policy of indifferentism as to how many men are engaged in running the government will. Thus (without justifying anything) Germany was before the boon of democracy overtook it, an example of what a policy, which was rigorously adhered to by its political masters, could show in the way of national efficiency. True, Germany has been pointed out by social biologists as a society in a Lupine State of evolution and hence may, at this date, be an invidious comparison due to its late questionable barbarisms. Yet whether this be so or not, the fact remains that where the centralization of
power is most effected: where a few fundamental laws are most rigorously enforced; where a rigid, national credo, a political fundamentalism, is unwaveringly adhered to, there, from the nationalist's point of view, will the great State stand. Whatever odium that attaches to a hundred men who advocated the great State through the instrumentality of the mailed fist, have we not come to see that from the promontory of national truth they were right? Caesar, Machiavelli, Frederick the Great, Bismarck, Treitschke, Metternicht, William the Third, Roosevelt, not to mention less boisterous types such as Mazzini and Cavour, all go to show that a national efficiency as well as an exalted patriotism flourishes best when cultured by the hands of fanatical autocrats.

Patriotism rests on just such considerations. But as it depends on who imparts it and how harshly it is imparted no appeal to the common man's tribal instincts by a lackadaisical high-priest will do. Patriots are not born in political Laodiceas. But while he must have his civil heroes, those who engender in him a proprietary interest in the welfare of his country and make him see this interest through a wide-meshed veil of religiosity, he must as well have his military heroes: the eternal Homeric ode that lives in man's instinct to deify those who have vanquished their enemies. Who could resist the incandescent spangle and glitter of military genius of a Nelson or a Napoleon? Under whom was patriotism at its flood here in the United States? Under Wilson with his peace policy or under Roosevelt with his swash-buckling jingle and clatter of the sword? Had the latter the influence he accumulated just after the Spanish War one million men and perhaps five would have shouldered arms over night just as our optimistic sooth-sayers of patriotism said they would. That they didn't is because Roosevelt had lost power; democracies are notoriously forgetful; their heroes are those of the moment.

But while having national heroes is a consideration towards breeding patriotism, there are still deeper lying instincts which must be accounted for.

There are two: first, the herdal instinct of self-protection, the long-buried assumption from a bye-gone day that national war means the extermination of a whole race and not that, at most, of a very small sub-division of a race; second, the psychological heritage from the tribal ages that every national aggression in some way means loot. Since in the first case the common man has an inherent feeling of superiority over all those not of his own kind, which by some
turbid ethnological reasoning are supposedly differentiated by national boundary lines; and since he fears the unknown, of being amidst the beliefs and superstitions other than those to which he has been used, he assumes that his patriotism acts as a buffer against whatever the vicissitudes of life may bring him in the way of such things: that in the herd, labeled and tagged with definitive tribal names, French, English, American, etc., he will be game for any crowd heroism; that without it he will waver with uncertainty, lurk in the darkness of loose quandary.

All of these assumptions are fallacious.

Since there are no hard and fast boundary lines, either anatomical or ideological, where races begin or end, all, in the first class, imperceptibly moving downward until we have reached a common stock; and, in the second class, there are but few superstitions or rites which are absolutely indigenous to one soil, all being more or less evolved from a few general ideas, it would take but a short time for the common man to adapt himself to new national beliefs. This, of course, in the event of the nearly total extermination of a nation. Which, as I have said before, is very remote under modern conditions where no resistance is offered to an enemy nation. Conquering nations no longer enslave the conquered. And while I do not believe in the transcendental benefits that, say, Mr. Bertrand Russell, attributes to non-resistance, because militarists are seldom if ever as civilized as he, still, if all militant patriotism were to be subtracted from the vast sum which make up the inhumanities, few nations could be spiritually conquered; as, for instance, India and China have not.

I come now to the second instinct, the more iniquitous of the two; the tribal instinct for loot without which no imperialism can come into being.

If we go back to the age of the gens we find that wealth was more or less communal: that every man within it knew every other’s possession as more or less his own: that every goods inequality was more fictitious than real. This was, too, more or less the case when the gens had grown into the tribe. As the tribe was nothing more or less than a greater gens, formed for the purpose of mutual protection, all property which had belonged to the various gentes became de jure the property of the tribe and hence communal. Thus every addition to the common stock of the tribe was conducive to the welfare of the individual; and, conversely, every lessening of the common stock, or every tribute paid marauding chiefs or loss made
through inter-tribal warfare had to be paid for by the individual. As the tribal goods ebbed and flowed through the channel of the individual, it was he who had to pay in every instance. It is almost needless to say further that it was but seldom that there were additions made to the common stock except those gained through warfare. As the smaller and less war-like tribes but seldom kept a surplus of stock, it was to the tribes in the middle status, to those constantly oscillating between warfare and such domestic arts as might engage them, that the larger tribes looked to replenishing or augmenting their goods. But as the smallest tribes were most constrained to follow pursuits of a peaceful nature it was to them that all others looked to gain through warfare those things which they were too lazy to gain through industry. They were ever the prey to all and as such were eventually parcelled out as slaves when the tribute became too small to further warrant their freedom.

As it is very doubtful, however, that slaves would be held by the tribe in common, because no organization had been perfected whereby they could be made to work collectively for the group well-being, it is a natural assumption that they became the property of the dominant members of the tribe to whose lot they fell: who, usually, were chiefs, petty chiefs, etc., those who, by a prescriptive right to war-like distinction, were looked upon with no little awe by the rest of the tribe. There would, of course, be distinctions: such as the more attractive women falling to the chiefs, the less attractive women and perhaps men apportioned to lesser members, according as the prescriptive right to supremacy did not intervene. Where it did of course, there was plenty of room for club law or whatever other species of equity prevailed.

The question was: what was to be done with such property? In the nature of things the women slaves alone had value. In most cases it was found cheaper to knock the men on the head; in others it was found that he could be made to perform menial tasks; he could even, on occasion, be pressed into service as a warrior such as his older brother does without the slightest compunction. But be that as it may, the male slave’s value was more or less negative, may hap he was tolerated as a hanger-on out of a nascent, egocentric pity, a pity that has since grown, under modern government, into an indefeasible right. Eventually, however, as the tribe’s depredations grew apace, as fewer tribes were left to conquer, and as the tribal goods kept running lower and lower, it became a necessity to put such male slaves into a service whereby the community would
be benefitted. Such opening appeared in agriculture, fishing and other domestic arts. It was satisfactory to his kingship, his headship. As long as the common stock grew, war became unnecessary. His kingship had no labor to perform; he was happy. "But uneasy lies the head that wears a crown" and because at least one crowned head was uneasy, the idea of private property was born.

Ideas thrive where there is mental and physical leisure. And since the king or Old Man or whatever he was called, was, in the ancient tribe as well as in modern society, the one to whom the most leisure was allotted, he it was who first saw the idea of private property clearly once he had begun to realize the value of slaves. Just as they later had a value to the imperator under the Roman fiscus Caesaris so did they have a value to him. They were more conducive to leisure than war, hence it followed because of the increased stock, the more slaves the less war. What if he were to own all the slaves? Make a pronouncement, say, that all slaves taken henceforth in combat were to be the property of his kingship?

It might be worth while to pursue this further but as I intend to refer to it again with more definite material at hand at present it would be useless. Nevertheless, I believe it to be true that in some such manner as this slavery was the hub around which the status of property held in severalty moved to private ownership.

Yet paradoxical as it may seem to the foregoing argument, it was this very idea of private property which made the tribe more war-like than ever.

We have seen that in nearly every case of the tribe's taking to war in order to replenish its stock there was never the interest of one separate individual involved. It was as the stock of the tribe ran low, as famine, perhaps, or the fear of famine, came to inculcate all its members with the desire to ward off the evils incident to these things that the collective mind was badgered into a war-like ecstacy. To seek an augmentation of their stock without a dire need would be absolutely contrary to what we know of primitive psychology. Since the tribesman lives without forethought of the morrow it may be doubted that there was ever in prehistory a tribal gloating over excess of stock. Just as long as the collective goods lasted each member was welcome; when it ran out there was nothing for the tribe to do but what it did do: engage in rapine upon neighboring tribes or starve.

From this it will be seen that there was always a collective interest at work. The individual was ever subject to checks and balances.
When his ambitions roved and settled upon considerations which could not be satisfied out of the common stock the tribe pow-wowed and a decision made whether such considerations were of sufficient community interest to vindicate the concerted effort involved. If they were not the individual could suck his thumbs in silence. Thus the individual whose desires for gain eclipsed his desires for safety would have to go it "on his own," which meant his banishment, and, unless he were adopted into a neighboring tribe, his death. Only within the tribe lay comparative safety and sustenance.

This was probably true of the individual for a long while, even after private property in slaves came into being. Since power had vested in the head of the tribe, once the community interests depended more or less on the labor of his slaves, the individual was suffered to remain in the tribe only on condition of his sacrificing his interests to the head's will. Whereas before the individual did have some chance of having his selfish extra-tribal ambitions satisfied through the community "aye!" now he had none. The head of the tribe had become not alone the leader in war-like enterprise but the arbiter of the individual's fate. Law, sagacity, dignity, and divinity were exhumed out of purely aeriform considerations and were mantled about his pontifical shoulders. Though his headship had not changed in reality, the glamour of his property, like "the lamplight streaming o'er," surrounded him with a halo of purity, verity, valour and justice. He was the fountain-head from whence all blessings flow.

And such things have tranquillizing values to those who go in for that sort of thing. Whether they be created out of the fictions of history, legends, mythology or out of the more realistic and impressionable clay deities and fanciful folk-lore of the moment but few men can withstand their lure entirely. Whether they be rare excerpts out of the annals of the State, such as carefully colored pictures of William Tells, Rolands, Cids, Bayards, Cromwells, Martels and Grants, some of whom never existed except as universal legends common to all peoples, or if they be merely canons plentifully fertilized with what passes currently as truth; if such things are coped about (to go low in the scale of royalty) a mere headship and whose sole claim to distinction is being, comparatively, a Barney Barnato for wealth, the result is the same as if he were an Aristotle, a Charles the Hammer, a Louis the 14th, a Lycurgus, and a Beau Brummel all welded into one piece. He becomes a shaman and a Holy of Holies who spills wisdom and emanates courage from
every pore. His spirit fills every quarter of the realm; he breathes a divine breath; his shadow fills every darkened forest, dell, cave. All of which is meant in no ironical spirit. Things as they were and are, were and are. To say that they had and have fictions of prior ages hanging to them is no cure. Nor is it any reason to abuse them.

However, we'll assume now that the headship was about to die. After seeing the glittering effect that wealth had upon the rest of the tribe the most natural thing for him to do would be for him to leave it to those of his posterity who could do the most with it; namely, those who had the most becoming dignity and the strongest arm. Thus to cut the tale to less than professorial prolixity, his favorite club went to his eldest male; his stone axe to his grandchild, his quartz necklace to his warrior brother, etc. Thus in some such way as this chattels personal or the theory of them came into being. Private property, in its less invidious aspects, was now in status quo.

We come now to the effect that private property had upon the individual ambitions of those members of the tribe to whom this property descended.

The headship, we'll say, had fallen to the lot of the eldest son. Now we'll further assume that such things as constituted the common stock, such as eatables, utensils, stone pots, etc., were still in the same status as heretofore. The younger brother of the headship had still the use of this common stock; he could use anything in this way that he could before but—there was something else he craved; his uncle had a quartz necklace and he had seen such a necklace on the neck of a warrior of a neighboring tribe some weeks before. It is but a short step from a craving to the desire to satisfy it. He would see his brother, the headship, and since his word was law now it might be possible to get that necklace. The headship loving, or perhaps fearing, his brother acceded; the tribe put on its war gear; and the coveted yellow pebbles slipped easily over one headless neck and fell upon the brawny chest of the brother of the headship.

But it did not end here.

The uncle of the headship had once seen in the hands of a neighboring tribesman a club just like his nephew's. He wanted it and as he was a brave warrior and had many friends among the tribe (and his nephew knew it) he got it.
Such cases were, in essence, the impelling deliriums which started the tribe out upon new crusades of extermination. What we may now term the royal family became the sole shepherd of its warlike flock; concomitantly with every augmentation of its wealth its power over it grew. But while most of this crusading spirit of the tribe was induced out of, mostly, royal considerations of gain, it needs but little probing to ascertain that the tribal common man as well had not been slack "in getting his." While royalty was engaged in getting its club or necklace there was loot for the common man. Since war-like enterprises presupposes derelictions from peacetime moralities, royalty was blind to what the common man got: the club was the thing. But always for centuries following centuries the common man got something. Thus he was, for all purposes of tribal ambition, though in a less modern sense, a patriot. His tribe now possessed a thousand axes and necklaces. His heart glowed with a sturdy and proud manliness.

We need not nurse this idea farther since for all purposes of argument we have the basis upon which the patriotism of the common man in the modern State is founded. We have seen a coercive force come into being out of pure obliquities; and we have seen that that coercive force was wealth. And since no other consideration but to protect or to obtain wealth has been the stimulus that formed the modern State, it is no far-fetched corrolary to say that wealth and wealth alone controls its policies. It is a corporation which legally never dying, has fallen heir to all the prerogatives, rights, customs and laws of the ancient tribe, which have been amended at the will of the State's masters as time or the case warranted. As being in the nature of a corporation it is controlled by and through those who hold a majority of its stock, who are, and by no consideration could be other than, its propertied class. Since minority stockholders cannot control civil corporations they cannot control the policies of the State as a corporation irrespective of whether the voting power within the State be co-equal or not. As the majority stockholders have coercive powers it is they who will control the votes where any measure is important enough to extenuate it. They can throw out subversive opinion, buy up demagogues, hire political machines, indoctrinate the common man with lies, call upon thugs, vote-breakers, political bullies. Thus where the propertied class is collectively in agreement the common man has a chance in a thousand. Disagreement among it alone adds weight to the common man's opinion. It thus follows that the greater the number of the
propertied class (in proportion to the population) the more gain will there be for the common man. In the tribe it was jealousy that distracted royalty from taking thorough cognizance of the common man during its raids; it is dissentient opinions and jealousies among the propertied classes that lightens his saddle today. "When thieves fall out honest men get their dues" may sum it up though it is an entirely unjust comparison. Thus the proprietors of the latifundia of Rome, having nothing left to squabble for when those great estates had all been taken up, went in for lex talionis and the common man came in for his own. Obversely, the power of the United States resides in its industrialists who guide the native genius in the way it is most willing to go. True, its heart is not with industrialism but its stomach is and as long as there is conflict between the two it will never be happy. This evidenced by its appalling inefficiency as a State. Yet the extravagant benefits of industrialism will probably be believed in by a majority of its people for many a long moon to come. The graph of the public opinion concerning it shows but few undulating lines upon its surface.

The common man is, however, usually a most willing subscriber to such doctrines. Since in the tribe the headship and his various relatives took on numerous attributes of virtue, benevolence, illustriousness, heroism, dignity, etc., the difference existing between them and their counterparts of today is of little moment. The analogy existing between the putative virtue of the tribe possessing a few billion dollars or francs is surely close enough. The same considerations that made the common man a patriot within the tribe make an obedient patriot out of him today. He worships his tribal goods.

Of course, there are some differences. The axes and necklaces have become more complex in their nature and are more in harmony with contemporaneous philosophy. And since philosophy, once undeniably true to the common man, should be undeniably true to every body else, one should not heckle its advocates. Thus industry is true to the common man because it is a direct means to a closer worship of God if it is not to hold a direct communion with Him. Thus the extent of the tribal domain, having no value to the common man of an earlier day, now comes in for his proud boasting. So does the past and present glory of the State; after military victories or a diplomatic group coup d'etat patriotism receives a new impetus. So does the industrial efficiency of his State over that of foreign States: the canny ability to "put one over" on his neighbors. From every
tax upon their goods he is in some obfuscate manner to "get his." Every addition his congeneres make upon foreign territory in the way of rights, concessions, etc., is, in some queer manner, to be divided unto him and is cause for his rejoicing exactly as he rejoiced when he came in for his modicum of the spoils during tribal days. Or when, as in the medieval "scolae" he got his "fred" or "feeding" for protecting his wealthier neighbors from marauding bands.

Such things all go to make up the sum total of the national egoism. Only lately we had the spectacle in the United States of a severe agitation for a merchant marine. "American goods, carried by American bottoms, manned by American seamen," was the hardly appetizing bait thrown out to the American common man. "Keep the American flag on the High Seas" was the slogan that beset one on every side. Yet inane as it sounds in what manner the common man was to gain or that it made any difference to him whether goods were carried by American or Phoenician vessels would be beyond a horoscopist to say. Since not one per cent of the American population had any more interest under what flag goods were carried than they had in organized prostitution they might just as well been taxed upon the latter as upon the former. Except to those who liked that kind of thing because they drew down dividends or fat salaries for running the vessels nobody short of an idiot could fail to see through the blarney of the benefits which the common man was to accrue. That he is still paying for the upkeep of a merchant marine even though the Subsidy Bill did fall through is well or ill as you regard such things. As long as the common man likes the ring in his nose and likes to be lead whithersoever those who lead him like to lead him so much the worse for him. If most of us suffer with him perhaps we can the easier afford it and thus treat it as high comedy.

Further than this, no one with even an elementary knowledge of economics can fail to see what pleasures the common man takes out of a protective tariff. As the importer pays this (sic!) those interested have all the phraseology necessary at their finger tips, infant industry, protection for revenue, protection to American, French and Italian workingmen, etc. Which in the common man's obtuse thinking is not alone a gain to him but is a positive injury to foreigners and as such comes in for his risible enough commendation. Except to raise the price of domestic articles of a similar nature which is therefore a direct tax upon the common man it is nothing but part of the State's generosity to those most privileged
to be accorded favors. Yet in some manner, out and beyond even a metaphysical logic to unravel, the common man is "getting his" from the tariff which is enough to make all others keep their mouths shut.

Of course, patriotism, though eventually resting on such considerations as these, must be first quickened into life by another consideration, if it is ultimately to culminate in its real purpose—war-like enterprise. When the tribal man subjugated himself to the power of a ruler he quelled all feelings of a sense of equality beneath a becoming servility. He did not dream that the headship or his relatives breathed the same air as himself. His ego was, in other words, suppressed. Only on warring expeditions did any dormant belief in himself come out in shrieks and yells of co-equality with royalty. In peace times he was humble squatter by the family fire, lord perhaps within that circle, but not without it. Not so the common man of today. His ego is inextricably linked with that of the national egoism by perfectly invisible ganglia. So it is that it is only when he has been told that the national egoism has been wounded, the national pride humbled, the national honor insulted, he is beset with the fighting spirit of his ancestors. Much as he reveres his rich countrymen, at heart he hates them. But when their goods are threatened or when some foreigner has "skinned" them a bit in international chicanery or business deal (if it calls for strong measures of reprisal) he is told that the national honor or pride has been sullied and there is much show of diplomatic crimination and recrimination: there is a great to do about the reprehensible conduct. "National Honor Dragged in the Dust" read the headlines, and the genial and good-natured common man is dragged out upon a punitive expedition, as if national pride, once having fallen, could be placed again on its pedestal by such a method.

Montesquieu said that patriotism flourished best under democracies. If it be true that a worship of material things is most exuberant under democracies then it is no doubt true. The reason for which may be that the possessions of the few are nearly always, at least impliedly, the possessions of the many. In the modern State, it goes something like this: The goods of my nearest neighbor have always more value to me than those of one remote. Where my neighbor is poor in goods, I, comparatively as poor, am all the poorer by his not being rich. Hence when he is threatened with loss of his goods by an invasion of a public enemy I cannot see greater loss of goods than my own, which, if I am poor, are hardly worth while giving my life for. However, when my neighbor is rich in goods I
visualize wealth which I may some day attain going to an alien from whom I may never wrest a particle. So my wealthy neighbor is one whom (with the help of all my poor neighbors) I should protect. As he but holds a feoff on goods I may one day hold everything in my power should be done that he should keep his feodary right until I am able to take as much of his goods as I can get as a vested right.

Which may be pure sophistry or a reasonable theory. And if it be reasonable it is nearly impossible of cure. As long as the common man is an out-and-out materialist he will be an out-and-out patriot. The terms are, as one sees it, more or less synonymous.

True, patriotism as an appellation has the ring of an old and virtuous coin and may be for all one really knows one of the great and laudable and sacrificial virtues. Yet even here a little thought will disclose an underlying self-interest. The common man still fights for Holy Grails but less and less as time goes on.

I am not assuming, of course, that the common man does any such psychological diving as the foregoing when his patriotic emotions are awash. I simply mean that the opinions as given may be pertinent to a study of the basic psyche of patriotism. That the common man's intra- or extra-analyses of the things he is taught seldom get beyond the foetal stage because he seldom frees himself from the chains of his environment and the habits of thought which gyve him to that environment is surely well known enough. And as long as patriotism is one of those habits any such thing as outlawing war will be an impossibility. As long as the common man is actually a patriot, potentially he is in the way of being a warrior. Which, being of benefit to those who are interested enough in such virtues, is surely warrant enough for perpetuating patriotism—as long as we do not want to "revalue our values."