WAR TOPICS.—IN REPLY TO MY CRITICS.

BY THE EDITOR.

INTRODUCTION.

THREE friendly critics of mine who regret that I support the German cause in this war have more or less sharply attacked my views. They are Mr. Charles T. Gorham of the Rationalist Press Association, London, England; Mr. Paul Hyacinthe Loyson of Paris, a French poet and journalist, the author of a drama written a few years before the war in the interest of peace propaganda, son of the famous Father Hyacinthe Loyson and of Madame Loyson (a native American); and thirdly, Mr. C. Marsh Beadnell, Fleet Surgeon in the British Royal Navy.¹ I have duly published what these gentlemen had to say, but I feel quite at a loss as to how to reply, for they have not convinced me and their arguments are in my opinion obvious errors. So I feel the utter uselessness of a prolonged controversy and would prefer, if possible, to discontinue the discussion. I am sure that, even though I advance perfectly sound arguments, I should not be able to convince them of their errors. Their convictions rest mainly upon the sympathy which they cherish for their countries, France or Great Britain, and they will accept as truth only that which appeals to them. I do not doubt their honesty, but the British government has succeeded in hypnotizing them into a belief in the British side of the case, which is a bold misrepresentation of the truth.

Is it possible that we have here to deal with questions which are beyond the scope of truth and error, questions of the will? The questions, what peoples or diplomats wanted the war? who committed atrocities? who fought gallantly? who lost the field? who came out victorious? are questions of fact, and history will speak the final verdict; but the questions, who is a barbarian? who are

¹The communication of Mr. Gorham appeared in the September Open Court, and those of Messrs. Loyson and Beadnell in the October number.
Huns? who ought to win? are matters of private opinion, judgments of a purely subjective value. They are important in that our views on such topics are the very fountain-springs of action, but for a final decision as to right or wrong, they are absolutely worthless. The final decision rests on objective factors,—historical justice, ability, prudence, foresight.

The English press has made ample use of subjective arguments to slander the German cause and to further the interests of the Allies. Slander is a weapon; it is not a noble weapon, but it is sometimes very efficient, although it is apt to work as a boomerang.

I do not deny that any weapon may be allowed in warfare, and Sir Edward Grey is apparently confident that he can handle the boomerang. He has been successful with it in England. The English people believe his assertions. They are easily induced to place faith in him. They think that, with the help of France, Russia and Italy, victory and the aggrandizement of the British Empire will be achieved. Poisonous words, like asphyxiating bombs, are powerful for a time. But, also, like asphyxiating bombs, the poison of misrepresentation slowly evaporates, and the ultimate effect is nil.

At all times, and especially in time of war, there are differences of opinion which have nothing to do with truth and error, and these cannot be discussed. One person may sympathize with the Germans and another with the English. One may think that it would be best for mankind if the British Empire girdled the world, while another believes that Germany should have the same right to build a navy as England. And some of the belligerents desire a new division of the world in which their own countries will be more favorably placed. Such problems are not questions of fact, they are questions of will; and such questions are not decided by logic but by the sword.

There are many such questions. One of them, two and one-half millenniums ago, was whether the Persian Empire should spread over the whole civilized world of antiquity or whether Greece should be independent and take a new start. This was no question of right or wrong, but of the will. Persian civilization was highly developed, and Greece was an insignificant puny little nation with a mere promise of a great future.

Another question of will is the Monroe doctrine. The United States of America has no right to South America, and there is no logic in the principle that she should interfere with the course of events in Mexico, Venezuela or any other country on the continent south of us.
There are many such cases of aspiration in history. Egyptian civilization developed in parallel lines in the level land of the papyrus plant and in the hills of the South where the bee was roaming. The two would finally be united into Mizrayim, the two Egyptians. But the question which of the two would take the leadership was not a question of truth or error, nor even of right or wrong, but of aspiration.

So this war contains questions of fact as well as questions of right or wrong; but also questions of aspiration, questions of the will. In judging of the war, we must bear in mind the character of all the questions involved.

First, there was a fact—a terribly brutal fact—the assassination of the heir apparent to the Austrian throne at the hands of a Serbian conspirator. Austria demanded an investigation, at which England, Russia and France became indignant. They objected to Austria so indignantly that she naturally became suspicious. Remember that the British government had refused to send a minister to these same Serbians on account of their unscrupulous and criminal habits. Russia mobilized, and England encouraged Russia and France while it assumed a threatening attitude toward Germany. Germany stood by Austria; the Kaiser’s correspondence with the Czar and King George followed, but instead of preserving peace it heightened the tension and with ominous haste the declarations of war followed.

That a great war must come has been claimed repeatedly in England, in France and in Russia, yes even in Germany. But the predictions in Germany, e. g., by Treitschke and Bernhardi, were not exhortations to a combat, they were simply admonitions to be prepared for defense against attack. If Germany continued to grow as she had been growing since 1870 England would become her enemy, and an alliance of England with France and Russia was not only to be feared but had actually taken place in the formation of the Triple Entente. Germany herself could not gain by attacking these three countries, but England followed the policy of preventing Germany’s growth, and if Germany wished to take her proper place in the world she would find her right to existence challenged by Great Britain as well as by all her other enemies. In this sense Treitschke prophesied war and Bernhardi preached the duty of being prepared for it.

Now if my critics accept the view that Germany has grown beyond her due limits, and that she ought to be humiliated, there is a question of opinion between us, but not one of fact. Indeed I
have come to the conclusion that my critics are primarily sympathizers with the Allies; they therefore hope the Allies are right, and hence believe them to be right.

British people are partial against the Germans when they regard the natural growth of that people as aggressiveness; and my critics are not fair by adopting this same partisan standpoint. Such is my conviction, but I also realize that my critics think similarly of me. I grant that they have the same right to suspect me of being partial as I have to suspect them. Their partiality is unconscious. May not mine be unconscious too? Certainly it may, though I am fully convinced in my own mind that I have not allowed my sympathy with Germany to influence my judgment.

RIGHT ABOVE LOVE OF NATIVE COUNTRY.

On a former occasion, when a conflict threatened between Germany and the United States at the time of the clash in Manila Bay between the German Admiral Dietrich and the American Admiral Dewey, and there was danger of hostilities between the two countries, I, in common with the great majority of German-Americans, came to the conclusion that Dietrich was wrong and Dewey right. I did not side with the German cause but took the side of America, and I did so simply and solely because I believed that justice was on the American side. If I am now so easily influenced to stand by the country of my birth, why did I not then sympathize with the German cause?

Almost all German-Americans stood by America at that time, as they stand by Germany now; and if they thought that Germany was wrong they would not, nor would I, in the least hesitate to say so. There are a few German-Americans that are pro-British, but they are rare exceptions; among them are millionaires like Schwab who profit by the manufacture of munitions and have private reasons for their anti-German tendencies, easily calculable in dollars and cents.

In the present case I am sure that my sympathy with Germany against the Allies springs not from my being a native German, but is the result of a careful investigation of the causes of the war. I have come to the conclusion that the Triple Entente, and above all Great Britain, has forced this war upon Germany, and that Germany tried by all possible means to avoid war, or at least, if that were impossible, to localize it and confine it to Serbia and Austria. My critics take the opposite view. They believe that
Germany forced this war upon the Entente and is ultimately to be blamed for it.

WHY THE WAR WAS UNAVOIDABLE.

In digging deeper into the causes of the war, and considering the British propaganda for war, which found most emphatic expression in the two anonymous articles published in the London Saturday Review (republished in The Open Court for October and December, 1914), I have come to the conclusion that the English government was in a certain sense justified in entering into this conflict. It is, as I shall show below, a matter of self-preservation. It would be, as I have explained above, an issue of ambition, a question of will. England means to be the ruler of the waves, just as the United States proposes to be the protectrix of South America and would not tolerate the establishment there of European colonies. If Germany grew too quickly, so as to become a danger to England's industrial and commercial monopoly. England was justified in looking out for self-protection. She did so and established the rule of keeping a navy as strong as, or stronger than, the two second strongest navies together. But even that did not seem sufficient. Germany increased her navy, and her trade began to surpass that of Great Britain.

Germany has, in these last forty years, made such unprecedented progress that England became alarmed. And rightly so! For her very existence, commercially, was threatened.

The Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1871 gave Germany the start, but her real victory was one of industry and commerce. She has competed with England in the world market, and statistical figures show that England was being hopelessly overtaken; it was not a defeat in war but in peace! With a continuance of this process Germany was sure to crowd the commerce of Great Britain even out of her own dominions, and the world market would gradually pass into the hands of the Teutons. This change was coming about with infallible certainty and could be seen to be a thing of the near future.

England has enjoyed undisturbed possession of the world market for fully two centuries, and she regards the dominion of the seas as her divine right, her property by God's grace; so she naturally resents the appearance of a rival as an intrusion, and characterizes Germany's attitude as aggressive and threatening.

But the increase of German trade is not all! Along with the expansion of her industry and commerce Germany began to build
warships, and her navy has grown until it is now one-third as large as that of Britain.

What was to be done? There was but one remedy—to check German prosperity before it was too late. And if this could be done by war only, why, war was the only thing. I believe that war was not the right way of disposing of a rival, but the leaders of English statecraft saw no other way. I believe the proper way would have been to introduce German methods into English schools and make the English people as efficient as the Germans. But let us assume that the English people had been as well educated as their German rivals, and the German progress had been due to other reasons; that there was no other remedy than a ruin of Germany's prosperity by war, I would deem a war justified.

English diplomats ought to have considered their chances of victory, and they did so. Sir Edward Grey twice explained his view before parliament, and he assured the house in unequivocal terms that the Germans could not escape defeat. Russia had an army twice as large as Germany, while that of France was not only equal in numbers to the German army but had greatly developed of late in efficiency, as was seen in the late Balkan war where the Balkan powers were officered and armed by the French, and the Turks by the Germans. The idea was quite common, even in military circles in this country, that Germany had been eclipsed by France.

There was apparently no chance for Germany to escape defeat. Sir Edward Grey said it would be but a few days and the German navy would be at the bottom of the sea or dragged into British ports. Then the German cities on the North and Baltic seas would be placed under the cannon of the British navy until the war indemnity were paid and peace restored. These arguments seemed very plausible, and the English people believed them.

England means to be the ruler of the sea; that is her Monroe doctrine. Has she not a right to look out for her future? Germany too has a right to cultivate science and industry, to develop a flourishing trade and build a navy. If two ambitions collide, there is a conflict, and this conflict must be decided by the sword. And this is actually the situation.

If England had taken this position I should not find fault with her. I should have regretted the war, I should have preferred another way of coming to terms with Germany, but I should have preserved my respect for England.

Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues in diplomacy have taken another course. They have misrepresented the Germans and have
painted them as real barbarians, as Huns and treacherous ruffians. It is a deep wrong England has committed, and the English people will regret it as soon as its gravity is understood. But there is one satisfaction which I derive from it, and it is this: The English people—I mean the people, not the government—would not have gone into this war if the Germans had not been so infamously misrepresented. The mass of the English people actually believe that the Germans are criminals, villains, traitors, scoundrels, brutal murderers, militarists—by which term is meant men who find fun in war and sport in robbery. I wish to proclaim this fact in Germany and Austria, that Sir Edward Grey deemed it necessary to make this impression on the world, and that if he had not succeeded in impressing the English people with these prejudices his policy would not have been endorsed in Parliament and the people of England would not have consented to the war.

If I am right in my conclusions, the next question to be discussed would not be who is guilty of the war but who is going to be the victor. This, in my opinion, is the real question. My critics believe that Germany will be beaten, while my belief is that it is England that will be the loser, in fact that she is inevitably doomed to defeat. From this standpoint I deem it to be wiser for England to come to an agreement with Germany before it would be too late.

It has been England's time-honored policy to preserve the balance of power on the continent, supporting the weaker nations against the stronger. In former centuries France was the strongest power, so England supported Germany against Napoleon I and profited by the downfall of the tyrant. She strengthened her dominion of the seas by the overthrow of the founder of the new world-dynasty. In the meantime Germany has grown and France has declined. Therefore it was now in order to support France and even Russia, the old enemies of England, against Germany,—not to ruin Germany entirely, but to tame her sufficiently to enable England to continue to hold the balance of power.

A defeat of Germany by the superior forces of Russia and France seemed inevitable. Sir Edward did not doubt the final result. But England is kind-hearted. She did not want to destroy Germany entirely. When the blows of the Russians and French became too hard she would step in and befriend her humiliated Teutonic cousins and use them later on once more against the French or Russians.

Is that possible? Yes, that is quite probable, for Sir Edward has suggested the idea himself. He has indicated in plain words
that if Great Britain joined Russia and France she could be of
greater service to Germany than if she remained neutral; and what
service could she offer under such circumstances than changing
sides in the moment when Germany were crushed? Moreover such
policy is exactly the traditional British plan. It is formulated in
the rule "to keep the balance of power."

England would never have found fault with Germany if she
had remained as poor and as humble as in the times of Kant and
Goethe and Schiller. But she had begun to seriously rival England,
and therefore had to be subdued, for her progress, her remarkable
development in the arts of peace, her increase in political power,
commonly characterized as her aggressiveness, had become a menace
to British supremacy, and there was no way of meeting this most
subtle of all perils, industrial rivalry, except by war. There was
no other way of stemming the advance of Germany than by ruining
her peaceful activity and breaking down the mechanism of her
national existence.

Granting that English diplomacy was justified in entering upon
this war to save her industrial and commercial supremacy, the next
question is, was the right method chosen and did the Allies take the
proper course to accomplish their purpose? We do not think so.
But one thing may be granted: Sir Edward Grey and his fellow
diplomats chose a moment which was as favorable for them as they
could possibly have selected.

Great Britain created the Triple Entente for the purpose of
isolating Germany and checking her diplomatic moves. England's
equivocal attitude toward Germany on the one hand, and her prom-
ises first to France and then to Russia on the other hand, led to
the war.

Here the alleged falsehood of Sir Edward Grey plays only an
incidental part. If England had not encouraged both France and
Russia, and if she had guaranteed to remain neutral on condition
that Germany respected the neutrality of Belgium, the war would
probably not have come to pass. The fact is, however, that it was
Sir Edward Grey's equivocation, whether deliberate misrepresenta-
tion or only an awkward and blundering attitude due to a foggy
mind, rendered the war inevitable. If Sir Edward had really and
honestly desired peace he could have preserved it; otherwise we
must assume that he was blinded by an unfortunate shortsightedness.
I believe that Sir Edward wanted war, and he wanted it for the
reason set forth in the articles in the London Saturday Review, but
he was too diplomatic not to seek for a cause.
ENGLAND'S CAUSE.

The wolf devours the lamb, not because he is hungry, but because the lamb pollutes the stream from which he drinks. There is an old rule which every disciple of Macchiavelli observes: If for some reason or other a diplomat deems it necessary to bring about a war, he looks for a cause and brings it about that the nation to be attacked furnish some ostensible pretext,—that it be compelled to commit a wrong and appear in the wrong. This was the next task for English diplomacy, and Sir Edward accomplished it to perfection. The lamb polluted the stream when Germany broke the neutrality of Belgium.

Germany was sure to break through Belgium after Sir Edward's equivocal answer, for any other course of action would have allowed England and France an easy access to the poorly protected but industrially vital part of Germany where Krupp's works are situated, and this would have meant defeat.

It is an old custom among statemen that treaties of neutrality are kept if possible, but they are not kept if they hamper important movements in a war. England has broken the neutrality of any country whenever it suited her, and she would not have hesitated to induce Belgium to join in the Triple Entente when the proper moment arrived. Even as I write, the Allies are breaking Greek neutrality against the protest of Greece, for the purpose of invading Bulgaria and assisting Serbia. If the English break neutrality England is not to be blamed; and when the neutrals remain neutral they are deserving of the severest censure; but Germany's break of Belgian neutrality was an unpardonable crime. How the English landing has been arranged in Athens beforehand with the Greek prime minister is described in a report dated from Salonica October 7, 1915. The main passage reads thus:

"On the morning of the 3. Oct., General Ian Hamilton appeared, having come aboard an English warship, which steamed right into the harbor. General Hamilton without delay proceeded to land, called upon the military and civil officials, and informed them that considerable forces would be landed at Salonica to assist the Serbians. He stated that all opposition by the Greeks would be met with summary punishment."

Please consider an additional and important point: The Belgian neutrality arranged in 1839 by England was really and unquestionably arranged in the interest of England. England regarded it
as essential that the territory on the continent opposite to the English shore should be in the hands of a weak power and should never be annexed either by France or Germany. The neutrality treaty practically made of Belgium an English territory, and so long as England's stand in the war was not unquestionably neutral, Germany had to regard Belgium as hostile territory. In the event of an English attack on Germany, England would undoubtedly find the easiest approach through Belgium.

England, as we have seen, had good reasons for beginning a war against Germany. And the opportunity was favorable; the Triple Entente consisted of the three most powerful nations of Europe, and, humanly speaking, there was little chance for Germany to come out victorious; but there are some factors which Sir Edward has overlooked, the most important of which is German efficiency and foresight. England has not one Hindenburg, not one Kluck, not one Mackensen. Kitchener always leaves the most urgent task undone at the critical moment. And now he comes to the rescue of Serbia after the Serbians have been driven out of their country. He ought to have gone to the Balkans two months sooner. It would have been wiser, at this juncture, to abandon Serbia and invade Cilicia or Asia Minor or Palestine. A German corporal could lead the English army better than Kitchener.

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Among the various friendly criticisms which have reached me, that of Dr. Beadnell, Fleet Surgeon in the British Royal Navy, was especially welcome, and I have done my best to spread the number of The Open Court containing it, in this country and in Canada, and will see to it that it circulates in Germany and Austria-Hungary as well. If I have not succeeded it is due mainly to the request of the British government in India, forwarded to the postal authorities of the United States that The Open Court is forbidden in British dependencies—a sign that the cause of Great Britain is regarded as weak.

I have done my best to let the people of Germany and Austria-Hungary become acquainted with British views as expressed by Dr. Beadnell. He will not convert the Germans, but I hope thereby to stimulate among the Germans a desire to be better understood by their enemies. I have seen repeated efforts on the continent of Europe to counteract the effect of the Song of Hate, and, in passing, I will mention the Freemasons, who emphasize that it is time to keep an eye open for conciliation, a thing which will be greatly
needed after this war. Similar voices have been raised in the periodicals of women's societies, under the guidance of Frau Hainisch of Vienna.

The Germans are bitter against England because they are fully convinced that Sir Edward Grey and his fellow ministers, together with men like Lord Curzon and Mr. Kipling, are responsible for the war. The Germans know the Kaiser's love of peace, and they know that they themselves did not want this war. It was forced on them by the Triple Entente. Hence the bitterness with which they accuse Great Britain. The Song of Hate was the natural reaction against the deeds of England as they inevitably appeared to the German people, and not only is it not half as venomous as Kipling's words nor as Lord Bryce's falsities, but it is also more artistic in form. At the same time I must state here that thinking minds in Germany are endeavoring to counteract this growing hatred. I feel sure that the German people will be ready to forget the offenses of their island cousins, though not before they have effectually beaten them back and taught them a lesson in modesty.

Possibly if the Germans see how prejudiced, how uninformed and censor-blinded the English people are as to the real state of things, their resentment will be more quickly overcome and a mutual understanding will be made easier. May be that Dr. Beadnell will be an eye-opener to the Germans. In his letter to Mr. Jourdain he says:

"Had the British done one-tenth of the deeds perpetrated by the Germans I would tear my commission into a thousand fragments and disown my country, and so, too, would every other Britisher, from the humblest Tommy to the Field Marshal, from the most recently joined cook's mate to the Admiral of the Fleet."

These are noble thoughts, but if Dr. Beadnell were in possession of all the information that has come to me he would be unable to remain longer in the British navy. I wish the marines of His Majesty's good ship Baralong were ensouled with such sentiments as Dr. Beadnell expresses.

Every word that comes from the pen of Dr. Beadnell bears the stamp of sincerity, and I feel that he actually believes that, at least in this war, English policy has been honest and that everything German—German policy, German modes of warfare, the behavior of German soldiers—has been vile and barbarous. Of course he would not believe these accusations if he knew the Germans as I know them. The alleged atrocities are so impossible that there are not a few in America as well as in Germany who charge all English
people with hopeless gullibility for accepting these patched-up stories of German barbarities, and other misrepresentations, with unhesitating credulity.

Dr. Beadnell actually believes in the English cause and seems to resent any allusion to English atrocities, be they committed in Africa or in India, even though depicted by the brush of great artists such as Verestchagin. I suppose he has not read the complaints about the conduct of English people in India, in China and in Africa, or, if so, that he has refused to believe them; otherwise he might never have entered the Royal Navy. In the *Chinese Repository* I read reports of the misbehavior of the British during the Opium War, and Mr. Norman Angell has published accounts of British atrocities in Africa which can scarcely be pure inventions.

**VERESTCHAGIN.**

My critics censure me for reproducing Verestchagin's picture, "Blown from the Cannon's Mouth," and some of them call it "a painted lie." The picture symbolizes the methods by which England holds India in subjection, and I have presented the picture because it is quite pertinent now. As a piece of art it is extraordinary and grand, but I made no comment on it in my article. I simply took the liberty of changing its title to "India Pacata."

I did not condemn the barbarous method of "pacification" represented in Verestchagin's picture, for I am not sure whether, under the circumstances, this method of punishment might not be excusable. We know the terrible insurrection that took place in India, and the wholesale massacre of English men, women and children. I am not sufficiently posted with all the circumstances to take issue either for or against the rebels, but I will here give the English the benefit of the doubt, and will grant that, in order to prevent the recurrence of such dreadful events as transpired, the government may have had to show a merciless severity to warn the unruly elements and frighten them into submission. This is the spirit of the words which Dr. Beadnell quotes from the Kaiser,—words which are unknown to me and which, if they were really spoken or written by the Kaiser, I would have preferred to see quoted in the original German.²

Civilized war presupposes that war should be carried on by soldiers, by men specially destined to fight, and recognizable as

² "The only means of preventing surprise attacks from the civil population has been to interfere with unrelenting severity and to create examples which by their frightfulness would be a warning to the whole country."
fighters,—not by civilians. If civilians wish to take part in the war they should wear uniforms or some unequivocal mark to distinguish them sharply from pacific civilians. Francs-tireurs wearing a badge on their arms, visible at a distance, may shoot into troops entering a village, and if afterwards they have to surrender they are treated as ordinary prisoners of war; but if they are civilians pure and simple, wearing no mark of distinction, they are, when caught, condemned by a court-martial and treated as common murderers, and the house in which they have hidden and from which they shot is burned to the ground. Such proceedings may be called atrocities, just as all fighting, all cannonading and all warfare is atrocious, but they are indispensable, for stern retaliation is the only effective method of teaching civilians to keep out of war.

The English warship Baralong approached a German submarine under the disguise of the American flag and sank it by an unexpected shot into the periscope. The German crew was thus at the mercy of the British marines, and I will here not repeat the barbarous treatment which the Germans received. The reports of the scene as witnessed by the American muleteers of the Nicosian are so shocking that it seems impossible; and yet how can these sworn affidavits in the several American papers be doubted? This was not a battle but murder of helpless men, some of them wounded. It was not a victory, but a prize-shooting at living targets and a criminal joy at assassination! The wounded and disabled enemy is not to be butchered, with jeers and shouts of joy, and where such deeds are practised the curse of a higher power will bring down a well-deserved doom. The Bryce reports are invented, but here, in the Baralong case, we have statements made under oath by neutral sailors who were certainly not biased against Great Britain.

English methods of warfare are not humane, not noble or heroic; they are ruthless and without consideration.

As I have said, I will not pass judgment on the English methods portrayed by Verestchagin, but that severities of this or similar nature have been practised in India, and likewise in Egypt and South Africa, is not unknown to the English people; it is a general rule that if English soldiers are severe their acts are regarded in England as merely necessary acts of justice, and the executors enjoy their bloody deeds as a joke. If German soldiers execute francs-tireurs they are accused in English reports of committing "atrocities," and the martyrs, somehow, are mostly said to be of the gentler sex, young girls and infants. I only wonder how it is that I have not yet seen the allegation that the tenderest babies are
roasted for the Kaiser, for there can be no doubt that the Germans are cannibals, and roast baby must be William's favorite dish.

In regard to the particular incidents portrayed in the Verestchagin picture, I have good reason to believe in their historicity, for I discussed the subject with the artist himself when I had the pleasure of meeting him personally in the Chicago Art Institute. He told me that everything he had painted was taken directly from observation and was a faithful portrayal of facts. When I twitted him gently on minor slips of observation, evident in certain of his pictures, as, for example, in his painting of an eagle attacking pigeous flying above him, and also of the United States flag with two stripes too many, he insisted that he had copied these things exactly as he had seen them, and asserted the same especially of the scene, "Blown from the Cannon's Mouth." Every detail, including the noble faces of the Hindu martyrs, was, according to Mr. Verestchagin's positive assertion, most accurately reproduced. But in view of the probable errors in his work, to which we have referred, could it not be that his observation was faulty in the case of the Hindu picture to which we have referred? I wonder what the mistake is in this case. Probably the uniforms. The soldiers ought to have been Prussians, and the Hindus Belgian priests or Louvain professors.

We are all human and apt to err in our observation, but it is our duty to fight for the truth as we see it. Dr. Beadnell believes in England and he must fight for England. Being a member of the Royal Navy he is even more closely bound to stand by England's cause. He must fight for England right or wrong. He would first have to resign his commission and wait for his discharge before obedience in the Royal Navy would cease to be his duty even if in his conscience he might disown his country. I consider it well for him that he trusts implicitly in the leaders of English policy; it would be a misfortune for him indeed if he no longer believed in the innocence of Sir Edward Grey.

I see a sinister motive in Sir Edward Grey's declarations. I cannot help it. Otherwise I must regard him as guilty of a most lamentable lack of judgment. Nor is my belief based upon Professor Conybeare's verdict. I had arrived at my opinion and publicly pronounced my conviction before I saw Professor Conybeare's views expressed anywhere and before his letter to The Open Court had reached me.

I will say here that I am not "the friend resident in America" whom Professor Conybeare addressed first and who had his letter
overhastily published. Professor Conybeare addressed me later on; the communication which I published and which had been written for publication is slightly different from the one that appeared in *The Fatherland*.

I will add that the "retraction" of Professor Conybeare which I received, reached me later than the earlier retraction of his earlier letter to the "friend resident in America," and I published it promptly upon receiving it. This so-called "retraction," however, the retraction sent to me, is not a retraction of his views published in *The Open Court*, nor of any statement of facts; it is merely a communication in which he expresses his regret at having been somewhat severe in his language. He grants that he ought to have been more careful in his words. Following are the main passages in his "retraction":

"I regret that I used so strong a phrase as the 'lies and hypocrisies of our public men and press.' I should have used the word rhodonmontade." . . .

"I am not sure also that I was not too severe upon Sir Edward Grey. It used to be said of him that he was a lath painted like steel, and I fear he is a weak man and given to vacillation."

**THE CHARGE OF LOOTING.**

I wish I could discuss in detail all the arguments of my critics, explain their errors and point out the illusions which they state as established facts; but I should not have space enough and must limit myself to their most prominent arguments.

Some of the things which M. Loyson claims are absolutely unknown to me and I regard them as extremely improbable. I know German discipline. How is it possible that furniture from Belgium or France should have been stolen and removed by force to Germany or to neutral countries? I cannot disprove the statement, but it takes more to make me believe it than reference to a Danish paper.

A short time ago I found a notice in a Chicago paper, which made the same claim and proved it by the reproduction of an advertisement of a furniture-moving company in the *Cologne Gazette*, to the effect that furniture could be shipped at reasonable rates from Belgium to all parts of Germany and Austria. This advertisement had been reproduced in a Paris paper as an unequivocal proof that the Germans were systematically looting Belgium, and the Chicago paper, believing the funny argument, reproduced it, together with a facsimile of the *Cologne Gazette* advertisement.

I learn that there are now stationed in Belgium many German
civil and military officials, who, in many cases, have taken their families with them. In fact so many appointments had to be made and so great was the demand for transportation of household furniture that a furniture-moving company deemed it advisable to catch the trade. Further, since the persecution of German tradesmen and civilians, which took place in Belgium immediately before the declaration of war, German settlers in Belgium have lost all desire to remain in their new home, and hundreds of them are moving back with their families to Germany.

The advertisement in the Cologne Gazette is but a sign of the many unusual changes that have been occurring in consequence of the war. How it is possible that, with German discipline, the looting of homes and the appropriation of heavy furniture can be accomplished, I cannot understand. But the Allies and their supporters are ready to believe everything, and the more atrocious the deed the more readily it finds acceptance. Are we to infer from this that the Allies themselves would do what they accuse the Germans of having done?

MY MILITARY EXPERIENCE.

I have never been a soldier by profession. I simply served my year, as prescribed by German law, and became an officer in the reserves. I entered the army not without reluctance and prejudice, but I changed my views. The German army, with its universal military service, is an institution which has been forced upon Germany by foreign aggression. It was established solely to protect the country, not for conquest. It cannot serve the ends of aggression, for the German army is simply and solely the German people in arms. It does not consist of mercenaries, nor foreigners, nor savages. The people do not fight either for mere glory or for conquest; they fight only when necessary, for the protection of their families and their homes—pro aris et focis. The French, the Russians, the Dutch, the Belgians, the Danes, the Swiss and others have the same institution, but the methods and regulations of the German organization are better and less unfair than in that of France, let alone Russia. In France the oppressive features of militarism are harder and more unpleasant. In Germany the army is a school where young men learn discipline and become accustomed to attend to duty.

France is a republic, but she does not for that reason possess more liberty than Germany. The Kaiser is not a Czar; on the contrary he is a champion of freedom. Our president has, during
the four years for which we elect him, more power than any emperor, king or grand mogul.

THE LEIPSIC MONUMENT.

The pyramidal monument of the battle of Leipsic at Leipsic is not to my taste, but it is at least impressive and imposing; nor is it, as Mr. Loyson claims, "menacing." Its massive weight does not indicate "Teuton pride, yesterday's victory and to-morrow's triumph." Not at all! Look at the monument carefully and you will understand its meaning.

The monument was erected as a memorial to the dead who had given up their lives on those three historic battle-days. The unveiling was a memorial, and wreaths were placed on the graves of the French as well as of the Germans on the day of the centennial anniversary. This friendly spirit was at the time favorably commented upon in the French press. The stiff, forbidding figures inside are not intended to represent victors but mourners. The figures stand in a prayerful attitude of respect for the dispensation of God, and express submission to his will. The powerful warriors with bowed heads are meant to be a death-guard who keep watch over the fallen heroes, whether German or French.

The Germans are often misunderstood, and in the Leipsic monument we have but another example of this. As a triumphal monument it is certainly too gloomy, too ponderous, too serious and too lacrymose; but it is not meant to celebrate triumph; it is a cenotaph; it is the sanctuary of the souls of dead warriors, a shrine for the spirits of those who here gave up their lives that the Fatherland might be free.

If the French people understood the Germans better, they would not have deemed it necessary to undertake this war, and the Germans would not have felt the need of securing their frontiers against restless neighbors who, if beaten in this war, will but take the next opportunity to join any combination of enemies that would attack Germany. Do not the French, by their very implacability, force the Germans to demand hard conditions of peace? Have not the Germans now reasons to regret not having taken Belfort in addition to Strasburg and Metz? and would it not be positively foolish not to anticipate the repetition of a sudden renewal of hostilities as soon as Germany had difficulties in other quarters?

NEW WEAPONS.

New weapons have been introduced in this war, and the Allies make much of the fact that the Germans, in their balloon attacks,
occasionally kill women and children; but they do not read the reports of French and English raids in Germany where their own bombs have been very efficient in hitting harmless civilians, for example, schoolchildren in Freiburg, Baden.

The German attacks on English watering places are regrettable, as in fact the whole war is a sorry event; but the English bombardment of Ostend and the slaughter of Belgian civilians by English cannon is ten times more abominable than any Zeppelin attack on English towns. Have not the Belgians sacrificed themselves for England? And now that Ostend is taken by the Germans, English ships bombard the private houses and hotels of the town—not its fortifications but the homes of the people.

Asphyxiating gases were first used by the Allies, and a French chemist is credited with their invention. I remember their first announcement, with bombastic glorification, of the new weapon which was predicted quickly to dispose of the entire German army, but since the German chemists have improved its effectiveness the use of the gas has become “barbarous.”

The same may be said of the submarines, an American invention which the American President now condemns as “inhuman.” The sinking of the Lusitania was a terrible affair, but is it right to blame Germany for it? Must not the guilt be placed at the doors of those who loaded the great Atlantic liner with enormous masses of counterband cargo and explosives, and thereby exposed the lives of the passengers to the danger of attack? The passengers had been warned by Germany before they left New York, but the warnings were ridiculed and the passengers relied on the English assurance that there was no danger whatever, and that the German warning was merely an impudent bluff. It was against the laws of the country for a passenger-boat to carry explosives, but the United States government in submission to Great Britain allowed this dangerous freight to go, and thus became guilty of the terrible loss of life that resulted. The passengers were as recklessly exposed to danger as if they had been sent into the battle-lines of the belligerent armies. More lives could have been saved, too, if the life-saving arrangements had been better, but we must remember that the handling of such life-saving appliances as there were was not beyond criticism. And I have heard many a rumor that English sailors are no longer what they were in times past.

It is claimed however that the Germans should not have attacked a passenger steamer. Indeed they should not. Germany, Austria and the United States have repeatedly proposed in inter-
national conferences that all private property in time of war be considered just as sacred and secure from attack on the high seas as it is on land, but this proposal has always been rejected, and by whom? By England. It was against England's interests to allow the high seas to be free. So who is to blame for the mishaps caused by German submarines but England herself? It is to be hoped that England will soon change her views, and that in the future she will herself vote for the protection of private property on the high seas. The Germans cannot be blamed for returning tit for tat. England tries to starve Germany; the Germans try to destroy all English trade.

Do you expect the Germans to submit with saintly endurance to the tactics of their enemies, without even making an attempt to retaliate? Is it not the duty of every government to protect its soldiers in the field against the unfair and unneutral importation of war materials? I suppose you are aware that the most insidious part of the cargo of the Lusitania, the part most dangerous to the passengers, was the chemicals destined for the production of asphyxiating gases in the French trenches.

THE BARBAROUS TURKS.

I am rather surprised that M. Loyson accuses the Turks so bitterly for the reports of Armenian persecutions. If these reports are true at all, we must remember that the atrocities have always been carried on not by Turks but by Kurds, and I have come to the conclusion that we have good reason to cherish a high regard for the Turks. I have heard repeatedly that the Turks are worthy of unstinted praise and that they are the best and noblest inhabitants of the Orient.

I remember, as a child, having met a German nobleman, Baron von Keffenbrinck, who had traveled in the Orient and founded a hospital in Jerusalem. He was a true aristocrat, as one rarely sees, and a pious Christian. When he landed in Egypt a carrier took charge of his baggage and was soon lost sight of in the crowded street. The baron was in despair, for his suitcase contained important papers and valuables. He went to the German consul and inquired about the chances of recovery of his property. The consul's first question was: "What kind of a man was your carrier? How was he dressed? Was he a Kopt, or an Armenian, or a Greek, or a Turk?" And added the baron, "As soon as the consul had satisfied himself that the carrier must have been a Turk, he assured me that I would not lose my baggage. He declared most
positively that the Turks are punctiliously honest, and that a Turk would most certainly do everything in his power to find the owner of the baggage; but he added that if the man had been a Christian, either a Greek or a Kopt or an Armenian, I could be sure that I would never see my baggage again.” The baron went on to say: “The consul was right! When I reached my hotel there was the Turk. He had searched all the hotels where foreigners were wont to stay, until he found mine, where the host explained to him that a guest had arrived who had lost his baggage. And there stood the believer in the false prophet in anxiety and perspiration, while I, a Christian, felt ashamed that the reputation of the Turks was better than that of the native Christians.” And the baron confessed that again and again in his oriental travels since that time he had found this reputation of the Turks to be justified; and he wished that his oriental Christian brothers had deserved the same praise.

Similar good opinions about the Turks are frequently to be found in the accounts of travelers. Madame Hyacinthe Loyson, in her book To Jerusalem through the Lands of Islam, says: “It is meet to say that we have never, in any country, met with greater courtesy and more thoughtfulness than from the Turks, nor greater charity than from the Moslem.” And in describing the Grotto in Bethlehem, with its armed Mussulman guard to prevent feuds between Christians of different sects visiting the shrine, she writes: “I do most heartily thank the Turk for keeping us from killing each other, as best he can... and withal so courteously—I may say so affectionately. In their conduct they are very often Christians; in our conduct we are often savages.”

CHICAGO POLITICS.

It would lead me too far to explain details of American, and above all of Chicago, politics; but I can assure every European that the local politics of Chicago have nothing whatsoever to do with the present war. In spite of M. Loyson’s comments to the contrary, Mr. Schweitzer, the defeated candidate for the mayoralty, was no more a pro-German than Mr. Thompson, the elected mayor, was anti-German. I took no part in the election, but I am informed that the German element in Chicago was, for the most part, in favor of Mr. Thompson, just as much as they are now against him. I am told that the former represented the Catholic element and the latter the Protestant, and yet the Catholics are said to have voted for Thompson. And when we add that Mr. Schweitzer is not of
German descent but has for some unknown reasons adopted a German name the war issue becomes still further removed from the contest.

Chicago is not the "headquarters of the Kaiser," but it stands to reason that the majority of its citizens are pro-German. In fact the great mass of the population in the central and western states is intensely so. It happened recently that in Davenport, Iowa, a pageant of nations was planned for the school-children, but the children would have appeared either as Germans, or Austrians, or Tyroleans, or Hungarians,—except for a few who were to represent neutral peoples; and there were none to dress as French, or English, or Scotch, or Italians, or Russians. The pageant would thus have reduced itself to a demonstration in favor of the two central European powers, and so the project had to be abandoned.

The most influential portion of the population of the eastern states favors Great Britain, but in the center and in the far west this country is predominantly pro-German, and in these parts the manufacture of munitions for the Allies is almost universally condemned as dishonorable. Even many Americans regard it as a blot on our national escutcheon. The few millionaires (including a small number of German-Americans, among them Mr. Schwab) who profit mostly thereby, are being censured for it in unequivocal and unflattering terms. President Wilson also comes in for his share of censure, for it had been hoped and was believed that he would not lend his sanction to the infamous traffic.

An editorial writer in the Chicago Examiner points out that Mr. Wilson's ancestry is all British. His four grandparents were all British subjects, and, reared under English traditions as he has been, we cannot be surprised at his being submissive to English politics; but it is to be regretted that in this great crisis he happens to be our president.

A prominent New York business man happened to visit me recently, and I expected him to be pro-British, but I found out gradually that all his children were pro-German, and finally he openly confessed that he himself was too. I showed him the above passage to the effect that the influential portion of the United States in the East favors Great Britain, and he said it was true; but, added he, one ought to know the conditions there in order to understand in what respect and to what extent it is true. An understanding of the situation showed that it was natural that the facts should be as they are. "One must bear in mind that the business interests of the East are largely bound up with Great Britain, and then our eastern
papers are maintained by British capital. Nevertheless a prominent eastern man said to me a few days ago: 'Do not be mistaken about the situation. The men who have much grey matter in their brain speak very little about the war, but I know what they think and secretly may say: that they take their hats off to the Germans; they believe that the Germans will win and they believe that a German victory will be the best for the world.'"

Our eastern visitor did not like to discuss the war; but as soon as he felt sure that his name would not be used he became bolder and said that in the East as well as in the West all wide-awake people know how it will end. He said directly and unequivocally: "England is going to the dogs, but what is the use of discussing the question. If I ask a man for his opinion it is because I wish to make an estimate of him. If he is pro-British I know at once he is a puddin'-head, and put him down as such. If he is pro-German I recognize that he has common sense." With a twinkle in his eye he added: "I would be greatly disappointed if I ever met a clever and straight-thinking fellow who was pro-British. I have never found one. You will always find that if a person is pro-British he is sure to be a puddin'-head. That rule is unfailing."

Our eastern visitor credited the West with a good deal of grit and independence, and this, he said, is why they are more outspokenly German. Our people in the East are more reluctant to express their views, but on the whole they come to the same conclusion as the Illinois farmer and that is unequivocally a German view. Our administration is pro-British, but I believe that the majority of the people are rather pro-German. The President attributes this sentiment to the hyphenated Americans, but he must be blind not to see that on account of his pro-British views he becomes daily more unpopular."

ENGLAND AND GERMANY.

This war will decide which nation best represents the ideal of mankind, England or Germany. It is my honest conviction that Germany ranks first, while England, and also France—not to mention Russia—lag behind. France has, to be sure, made great progress since 1871, but England has apparently gone backward, although I grant that England it still in many respects the most favored of nations.

England is at present supreme, but this war will decide whether her supremacy will endure. She owns some of the richest terri-
tories on the globe—India, South Africa, Australia, Egypt, etc. She has the largest and most powerful navy in the world and is absolute mistress of the seas. She controls the navigation of the world, for the keys to nearly all the great waterways are in her hands—Egypt with Suez and Aden, Gibraltar, and the Cape of Good Hope. The Panama Canal alone, among strategic waterways, belongs to the United States, but Great Britain can lock up even that by her West Indian stations. Great Britain glories in her dominion of the seas, which means of the world, and she is ever anxiously watchful lest her supremacy slip from her unawares. The wealth of the richest lands is controlled by her, but the exploitation of all this wealth is exclusively in the hands of the English aristocracy. Any one who studies the British Empire and its magnitude cannot help but admire the prowess and foresight with which English diplomats have built up this power, and this foresight is also in evidence in the present war.

English grit overcame Spanish dominion when Spain wanted to crush the rising English nation, and, later, England crushed Holland and deprived her of her most valuable colonies. Nelson took the Danish fleet before it could be utilized by Napoleon, and English diplomacy watched the nations on the continent, ever careful that the balance of power were preserved so that the ultimate destinies of Europe might always lie in England's hands. The scheme was well managed, and from the English point of view it has worked well.

England has always been the enemy of the most powerful state on the continent. About two centuries ago England fought with Austria against France, and in English history the victories of Prince Eugene are credited to that unworthy British nobleman, Marlborough. A century and a half ago Austria was the world power to which England was opposed. So England supported Frederick the Great of Prussia, thus to hamper the development of the Hapsburg dynasty. Then, a hundred years ago, Napoleon I founded a new great empire, and so France was the enemy to be humiliated, and the victory of the Prussians at Belle Alliance is credited to Wellington under the name of the battle of Waterloo. In the meantime Germany has risen and grown to be the greatest power on the continent, so it is Germany that is now the arch-enemy of England.

The Germans are closely related to the English. The lowlands of northern Germany are the home whence the Anglo-Saxons came before they conquered Britannia. But this is no longer thought of.
The English are not sentimental. They think only of their present advantage.

I do not blame Great Britain for her anti-German policy. Indeed Germany is more dangerous than were the Hapsburg dynasty and Napoleon's empire in their time, for she has begun to rival England in peaceful pursuits, in industry, in trade and in commerce, and Germany's progress is built up on the most solid basis, upon scientific method and a rational study of the natural conditions of civilization. England could keep in the lead if she would emulate Germany's methods, if she would devote herself in the same way to systematic work and eclipse her rival in thrift, in diligence and thoughtful application. But that would impose tasks and demand sacrifices, and the English aristocracy do not intend to work or struggle to maintain their position. Their ancestors showed pluck in overcoming the Spanish Armada and in taking possession of the world, in braving the storms of the oceans and the navies of other lands, but now the ruling classes of England regard the world as their private property, and they keep the working classes in poverty so as to control the world for their own private benefit. In Germany the laborer is considered, and the welfare of the whole is regarded above the interests of the rich. The rich and the noble are not without privileges, but merit is absolutely indispensable to gain position.

The Kaiser was boyish when he ascended the throne; he has made mistakes; he is guilty of many utterances which were unwise and, even though well meant, could easily be misinterpreted. In fact they were misinterpreted and he was misunderstood; but after all, even his enemies must grant that he is honest and courageous. He has always tried to do what was right. Duty is to him the highest command, and its call he implicitly obeys. His personal interests and selfish wishes have no weight with him when duty calls, and with him the welfare of his people comes before all other claims. He was anxious to preserve peace, for through peace he hoped to promote the welfare of Germany, and it was no fault of his that the nations of Europe were plunged into war in August of last year.

Can as much be said of any other European monarch? Scarcely of the kings of England. The kings of England are German, but the Germans are not very proud of them.

Captain Mahan of the United States Navy once wrote a book in which he showed that world-power depended upon the control of the seas, and Kaiser William II read the book. He applied the
lesson to Germany, and understood that Germany needed a navy to protect her growing commerce. This was the great and unpardonable sin in England’s eyes. It was bad enough for Germany to outdo the English iron and steel industry, but to build men-of-war that would be able to protect German merchant vessels was a threat against the English, for in England is was understood that the English navy was the only one against which these men-of-war could be used. The English navy is strong enough to police the seas, and Germany should be satisfied with this English protection of the world’s waterways.

Yes, building men-of-war, that was the sin of imperial Germany. From that time the Germans have been barbarians and Emperor William a villain and an enemy to mankind; for he has committed the arch-sin of trying to be somebody too on the ocean, and to breathe the air of the briny main. This was a symptom of aggressiveness which England could not forgive, and it had to be stopped in time.

I will not condemn the British principle of looking out for the future, and of preventing any nation from rivaling Britain, but I believe that other nations have as much right to build a navy as England, and Germany is perfectly entitled to challenge England’s claim to the dominion of the seas. This is a collision of interests which must be fought out; and the decision is by war, in fair and open fight. But I would expect that England should make her demand frankly, openly and honestly, without resorting to the tactics of slandering her enemy. I feel deeply disappointed that England should unfairly and unjustly accuse Germany of horrible atrocities and that she should misrepresent the issues of the war. Poor England! Must you malign Germany in order to rouse hostile feelings against her? Have you no better arms? Slander is not only wrong, but a symptom of weakness. The desire for slander originates from the fear that the other party will win. It is an old experience that slander is the last ditch of a lost cause.

England endeavored to preserve her dominion of the seas, and I do not condemn her for her ambition. I will not even blame her for trying to crush Germany before that country could become dangerously aggressive. But England should not undertake such an enterprise without earnest consideration of the risks and the vast possibilities involved.

It seems to me that England’s leaders have entered upon this horrible war most thoughtlessly and recklessly. Apparently they believed that the overwhelming numbers of their allies would be
sufficient to attain a quick and easy victory. And victory seemed doubly certain, for the British navy could, by a wholesale blockade, ruin German commerce and prosperity and reduce the people to starvation. All seemed very plausible to those smart diplomats, the flower of English aristocracy, who were confident that Great Britain's wealth and her power could carry on the war longer than Germany, and who boasted that when Germany was at the end of her resources the English could still shoot with silver bullets. But, after all, German steel may prove stronger than English gold.

Great is English diplomacy, very great! England has often succeeded in making other nations fight her battles; and I do not blame King Edward VII, and after his death the English prime minister, Sir Edward Grey, for building up the Triple Entente which has no other purpose than to place Germany in a vise between France and Russia. I doubt the wisdom of France and Russia in being led so easily into the meshes of British diplomacy, but I admire British diplomacy for bringing about this alliance (cleverly representing itself as a mere entente) in order to stand together against Germany and crush her before she could endanger Great Britain's dominion of the world.

France and Russia were formerly the arch-enemies of Great Britain, but they came to be regarded as hardly dangerous any longer, and certainly not so dangerous as Germany. For Germany proved dangerous as a competitor in peace and a possible enemy in war at sea. The French have little commercial talent, nor are they good sailors, while the Russian empire is too corrupt not to be tripped somehow by British gold or intrigue before Russian troops could accomplish any deeds of heroism or venture on any Asiatic conquest. Russia and France can easily be duped when the need rises, but Germany is vigorous and could not be disposed of as easily as a French president or a Muscovite grand duke.

Both countries, Russia and France, were vexed at Germany. Russia was ambitious to expand, and it was England that had prevented her from acquiring a good seaport, either at Constantinople or Port Arthur. France had met with serious losses. First she had to give up Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, and then the Suez Canal to England. She was also unable to maintain her hold on Central Africa, a compensation which her colonial hero, Major Marchant, had gained by his expedition to Fashoda.

Russia had been on friendly terms with Germany, but Germany did not mean to abandon Austria to the Pan-Slavic tendencies of Russian policy, and Russia saw that Germany would not support
her in a policy hostile to Austria. So Russia came to the conclusion that Germany was not the right ally for her plans. Austria has a mixed population. The main elements are Germans, Hungarians, Bohemians, Slavs, Ruthenians and Italians. If Austria broke to pieces its eastern portion would fall to Russia, and Germany would be dangerously surrounded by a formidable Slavic empire. So it was absolutely necessary for Germany to preserve Austria and protect her against the Pan-Slavic intrigues which had become more and more dangerous through conspiracies which had their seat in Servia and were fostered by Russia.

The leaning of Germany toward Austria cooled Russia's friendship and induced her to close an alliance with France, and when England, forgetful of her former hostility toward France and Russia, offered France her friendship, France felt flattered, and in the hope of some day regaining Alsace-Lorraine through England's assistance, she gladly acceded to the proposed entente.

M. Leghuit, Belgian minister at Paris, in the papers discovered in the Brussels archives expresses grave doubts as to the advisability of France's allowing herself to be so easily induced to join the Triple Entente, for, says he, "France will probably have to pay dearly for England's friendship.... It is obvious that France is fighting at her own risk for an English cause, not vice versa. England is not fighting for France, France must make greater sacrifices, must fight harder, and even in case of victory will gain less."

Here again we have an instance of British policy. The English fight their wars with the troops of other nations and, as some wit has said, England will fight bravely to the last Frenchman. When Sir Edward Grey began to fear that the French might see through the secret of the English game, he secured Britain's position by an agreement of the Entente powers against a separate peace. So now the French and the Russians are pledged to fight to the last, until England too agrees to make peace.

The Triple Entente is a clever trick, and it was further improved when Sir Edward Grey succeeded, through the silver-tongued art of English diplomacy, in luring Italy into it, and thus increasing it into a Quadruple Entente. Perhaps something good will come from Italy's attack upon Austria. On the one hand the Austrian provinces offered to Italy for the sake of preserving peace will remain Austrian, and on the other hand Rome may again be surrendered to the pope, and the head of the Roman Catholic church would again be a temporal sovereign, an independent prince equal in royal dignity to kings and emperors.
English policy is clever, very clever, but the whole plan is more astute than wise, for there is a streak of viciousness in it which takes undue advantage of Germany's isolation. Such tricks have often been resorted to, and we will not condemn them too severely. Macchiavellian viciousness is common in diplomacy. But there is another pathetic feature of it that will go down into history, and that is its incalculable stupidity. If such a trick does not succeed, it discredits the party that tries it.

The armies of Russia and France, combined, are about three times as great numerically as that of Germany, so that Germany might be assumed to have little chance of resisting her enemies even if supported by the Austrian troops. The Austrian army lacks unity. It is made up of excellent units, but its regiments speak different languages—German, Hungarian, Polish, Czechish, Italian, Slavonic, Ruthenian, etc., etc., and so the organization of the whole is quite unsatisfactory. There are as many nationalities in Austria as there are in the United States, but there is no obligatory common speech which all must understand. In addition there are petty rivalries and jealousies between the different nationalities, whereby a harmonious cooperation is made difficult.

It is obvious that Germany, even with her ally, Austria-Hungary, must contend against great odds in her struggle against France and Russia. But she also has advantages, of which superior intelligence is not the least important.

It is true that the French have made great progress in military efficiency. They have introduced reforms in their army, increased the time of service, and also reconstructed their army, not to speak of the excellent new institution of a large squadron of air-ships. The progress of French militarism was positively proved in the Balkan wars, for the French had instructed and equipped the Balkan states while the Turkish army had been trained by Germans. Turkey was badly beaten, and the French regarded the success of the Balkan victors as an evidence of a significant change in favor of France. Since that time it became customary to ridicule the goose-step of the German parade; German training was characterized as antiquated, and French arms were considered more than a match for the Krupp guns.

We will not deny that the French have made great progress in their military institutions, but the Germans have not stood still. There is this difference: the French crowed about their accomplishments, while the Germans kept the invention of their heavy mortars absolutely secret. The friends of France prophesied that in a new
war Germany would be beaten; they had good reasons based on first-hand information.

So it was quite natural that Sir Edward Grey should have unbounded confidence in both France and Russia, the resources of the latter being practically inexhaustible; and he also believed in the efficacy of the English blockade; so naturally he would not doubt the success of his plans. But he will gradually find out that he has overestimated the strength of England and her allies, and under-estimated the power, efficiency and serious spirit of Germany. After all, quality decides, not quantity. Remember that Hindenburg opposed two Russian armies, three times as strong in all as the forces under his command, and lured them into the district of the Masurian lakes where he beat them thoroughly in a seven-days' battle and took more prisoners than his own army numbered in fighting men. Intelligence is more important than numbers, and the final outcome does not depend upon bragging.

Those who believe in the cause of the Allies will not believe me, but I am fully convinced that Germany cannot be conquered.

Each of the Allies began the war trusting in the support of the others, but now they are breaking down successively, one after the other, each disappointed that its allies are proving so inefficient. It seems to me that they deserve their fate.

I am not a blind admirer of Germany. I am a native German and owe the basis of my education to the German schools and German universities. But I felt dissatisfied with the narrowness of German institutions, and when my liberal views gave offense to my superiors I resigned my position as instructor in science in the corps of cadets at Dresden and left the country for the United States of America, with which country I had, since my childhood, felt a deep sympathy—a sentiment in the time of my youth quite common all over Germany.

Previous to coming to the United States I lived for some time in Belgium, in Paris, and in England, but I found none of these countries as free and progressive as Germany. Germany has its faults, but the faults of other countries are not less, and my respect for Germany has increased with my knowledge of the shortcomings of other peoples. I have a great admiration for the English, but when I compare them with the Germans, I must give the preference to the latter. The English are more self-sufficient, and as a rule quite naively ignorant. The average German is better trained, more serious, gives better attention to his duty, is more thoughtful and less rude than the average Englishman, and if we compare the high-
est achievements of representative men in the various countries we shall probably find that Germany leads mankind in almost every science and art.

Germans are by nature cosmopolitan; they love other nationalities; and I must grant that they show a special preference for the French. Why? I am not sure that I know, but I believe the main reason consists in the fact that the French have some very desirable qualities which the Germans lack. The French possess a rare grace and lightness of temperament which renders, for example, the French author elegant in style and clear in diction. The German, in his tendency to thoroughness, is apt to be ponderous and heavy. He has many superior traits, but he recognizes ungrudgingly the fine qualities of the French character. In the past the Germans have been inclined to regard the French as hereditary enemies. They were enemies in the times of Louis XIV, of Napoleon I, and again of Napoleon III; but real hatred hardly any longer exists. Senator Beveridge has recently traveled in Europe in order to study the situation in the various countries, and he characterizes the attitude of the Germans toward their enemies thus:

"The German people feel and believe that they have been wronged. The German people say that they did not want this war, nor any war. They are convinced that they are the victims of a monstrous plot, hatched in a foreign country, to destroy modern Germany.....

"The German people believe that England is the arch-enemy who, in the final analysis, brought this catastrophe upon them. Man, woman and child lay their misfortunes at England's door. In their German way they have brooded over the wrong which they regard England as responsible for, until their feeling has become that of hatred. This feeling is growing stronger and deeper all the time."

In regard to the German attitude toward France and Russia, Senator Beveridge says:

"Although France has caused Germany her heaviest losses, and although Germany has dealt France her heaviest blows, yet from the western to the eastern battle fronts, from Hamburg to Munich, not one unkind word was heard of the French. The expressions were almost friendly—certainly sympathetic and without patronage.

"The feeling of the German people is that the French ought not to be in the war, and would not be, except for the Russian alliance
and their enormous investments in Russia; and even more, except for the machinations of England.

"The consensus of German opinion is that the French have no logical place in the conflict. The Germans declare that France would not have been attacked except for the certainty that France would have attacked Germany to help France's ally, Russia, as France's alliance with Russia bound France to do. But, fundamentally, the Germans think no real ground of conflict exists between Germany and France. Except for diplomatic alliances and intrigues, the Germans are sure France would not be in this war.

"Strangely enough, there is no great animosity against the Russians. Most of this has been overcome by the German people's resentment toward England. The Germans say that the millions of Russian soldiers do not know what they are fighting for, but only do what they are told to do; and that in this instance Russia's grand dukes have done the telling. Here again to the German mind, England once more appears as the master manipulator. Russia, they say, would not have acted if she had not been sure of England's support. As to the Russian mushik, who is the Russian common soldier, the Germans have pity for and sympathy with him. Poor devil! they say, 'he has no chance and never did have any chance; cannot read or write, and is not allowed to learn,' and so forth and so on."

Our author writes as follows regarding the German attitude toward the American people:

"'It is tragic,' said a German scholar, 'how the English control your opinion through your press. During the Russo-Japanese war England told you to hate Russia, and you hated Russia. Now she tells you to love Russia, and you love Russia. When will America awake from being the international Trilby under the influence of the international Svengali?'

"As to the stories of German 'atrocities'—the Germans at first simply did not think that we could believe them; they at first did not conceive it to be possible that we could credit the tales about German 'barbarism.' Still, there was no animosity.

"This latter feeling has begun to show itself only in the last month or two (February, 1915). This is chiefly due to our sale of food and munitions of war to Germany's enemies, especially powder and guns. It is the firm belief of the German people that the war would now be over if we had not done this. They are sure that it would be over in a very short time if we would stop doing it. And they cannot see why we should do it—it benefits no American,
say the Germans, except the American producer of war material.

"'American shells are killing our sons,' say German parents; 'American ammunition is desolating German homes; Germany's enemies are fighting with American weapons.' Such is the comment and such the feeling among the German people.

"For many weeks it has been common talk among private soldiers as well as officers, on both the western and eastern battle lines, that it is American powder hurling the enemy's bullets.

"This has spread throughout Germany until now (February, 1915), there is a genuine feeling of resentment. The sentiment is growing that we are, for practical purposes, the ally of England, or rather, the tool of England. How deeply rooted this will become it is, of course, impossible to say.

"But it always should be taken into account when trying to gauge German feeling that the Germans firmly believe that they are fighting for their very lives. Whether one agrees with them or not is of no consequence whatever in sounding the heart of the German people; but to understand them it is necessary always to remember that, to them, this war is a question of life or death."

This description of the situation is corroborated by many other observers, and I endorse their views. I also believe that the Germans are not mistaken in their judgment. The English planned the war with vicious astuteness. The moment could not have been better chosen, and all possible factors were cunningly combined, but England in her vanity has overestimated her own powers and the extent of her resources. I have come to the conclusion that Sir Edward was lured on to his fate by a hope, like Croesus of old haunted by the Delphic oracle:

"If you cross the Halys river
You will destroy a great empire."

The oracle proved true then as it is proving true now; but the English Croesus destroys his own empire. Diplomats often misinterpret Apollo's meaning. History repeats itself.

What condemns England is not her lack of strength, or her misfortune in allying herself with inefficient peoples. There would be no harm done to England if the Russian Empire broke down, or if the French were unable to resist the Germans. The English would finally be forced to do the fighting themselves. They should not have begun a war in the hope that others would fight it out for England; but they relied on others, on the French, the Russians, the Italians, the Japanese, from the start, when they ought to have
taken an independent stand. They misrepresented the real reasons for the war. They calumniated the Germans and maligne their deeds and their character most inexcusably; they believed that by thus misrepresenting their foes the good-will of the world could be gained; as if thereby battles could be won and history written! Such methods succeed once or twice, but not always, and there are indications that they will break down now.

M. Loyson accepts the stories of German atrocities as infallible truth. The Bryce report lies before me, but it is obviously a collection of assertions made with the definite purpose of a partisan condemnation. The statements contained in it, coming as they do from anonymous witnesses, have no weight, for they have not been and cannot be checked by a cross-examination held by a representative of the German side. They are absolutely worthless except as a propaganda for a dubious cause.

Any one who has read the German reports of the treacherous attacks of the civilian population of Belgium on the German troops, will see these Belgian and English accounts of German atrocities in a different light. In view of the obvious onesidedness of the British-Belgian statements, I naturally feel suspicious on perusing them, and am inclined to think that even if the witnesses are telling the truth it is but a partial version of the truth, and hence I regard these reports as extremely untrustworthy. I sympathize with the Belgians for their patriotism, but were they not obviously misguided and were not some of their deeds horribly treacherous and atrocious.

English papers have published pictures of Belgian civilians taking an active part in the war. There lies before me a reproduction of an elegant piece of art, apparently photographed from a painting for the English paper in which it appears. It shows a well-dressed lady, gun in hand, before a slit in the door, and by her side three children. The inscription reads, "Firing on a Party of Uhlans." While here the heroism of civilians in taking part in the war is praised, in the anti-German reports of German atrocities this same contention is denied, and the claim is made that the inhabitants did not give any cause for complaint.

I have read German accounts of the entrance of the Germans into Louvain, and their experiences in Belgium, also others, written by impartial American reporters, and these versions are all very different from that of the Bryce commission.

Mr. James O'Donnell Bennett's answer to Sir Conan Doyle shows the facts of the German attack on the cathedral of Reims and the origin of the fire in the library at Louvain in a different light
from that in which these same incidents have been represented by
the enemies of Germany. I wish those who put faith in the Bryce
report would read Mr. Bennett's and Mr. McCutcheon's articles on
the war in Belgium. They would be convinced that the Germans
have done nothing discreditable and that the stories of atrocities
are obvious distortions and misrepresentations which cannot be
maintained before a just, honest and impartial tribunal.

Further, I do not see how it is possible to deny the fact that
before the war British ammunition was deposited in Maubeuge,
the French fortress near the Belgian frontier, and does not that
alone prove the conspiracy between France, England and Belgium?
Is that not a plain explanation of the meaning of the "conversa-
tions" discovered in Brussels? Is not the British ammunition of
Maubeuge now in German hands, as well as the Brussels archives,
including the communications of the Belgian ambassadors, details
of which have already been published? Can the hostile intention
of Belgium against Germany be gainsaid, and was not the English
attitude on the eve of the war most obviously equivocal? I for
one find it difficult to understand how the advocates of the Allies
can accept all the statements emanating from that side with un-
questioning credulity, while the German side is not allowed the
slightest or most superficial consideration.

Stories of German atrocities have been mostly invented, and
whatever grain of truth there may be in them is inflated and pub-
lished broadcast over all the world, while the Russian atrocities in
East Prussia are not even mentioned, and the reports of English
atrocities in Ireland, Africa and India are denounced as lies.

* * *

I would much sooner have kept out of the discussion of this
war, but it would have been cowardice on my part to pander to the
majority and keep silent while I possessed a definite and most pos-
tive conviction that the German side is right and that the war has
been engineered by England. I have deemed it my duty to investi-
gate the cause and the nature of this war, and I deem it my duty
now to discuss the question openly and without fear.

I have been reproached by some of my pro-British friends that
I have given the German side more space than the British side, and
in reply I will say that I have not suppressed any pro-British critic
of mine; If I have not deemed it necessary to represent the pro-
British cause more completely I have avoided wasting space on a
subject which fills our dailies ad nauseam and needs no repetition.
If there is anything that can be said in favor of the Allies or against the Germans which has not been reiterated in our daily press, I shall for the sake of truth be glad to receive it, read it, consider it, publish it and state my opinion on it publicly. I have been searching for facts that will excuse the war or exonerate the Triple Entente of a tricky, false and stupid policy, but so far I have not been able to condemn Germany's actions, as is done so frequently, so maliciously, so unfairly, and unjustly.

A WARNING FOR OUR COUNTRY.

This war also involves grave questions for us, the citizens of the United States. The sad experience of Germany proves that we too might in some future time be attacked and therefore ought to imitate German institutions and introduce universal and compulsory military service, perhaps in the form in which it exists in Switzerland. We ought, every one of us, to be willing and ready, when the necessity arises, to shoulder the gun and fight in the defense of our country.

This world is a world of struggle, and the day may come when we too shall be represented as Huns and barbarians. We have been misrepresented before but we have forgotten. When we are attacked again, shall we then be as patriotic and brave as the Germans are now? Shall we be willing to die for our country, our honor and our independence as our ancestors did in the past? Will our women be as brave as German mothers are to-day? I fear we have to learn the seriousness of courage from the Germans.

GERMAN MOTHERS.

A German mother was asked by her American cousin how she fared in this war, and what had become of her children. She answered: "God be thanked, they are all healthy and strong to serve our fatherland in the field. One son is fighting in Poland, another is in Flanders, and the latest news is favorable. But my third son fell in the first battle in Alsace." Here her lips quivered. "He was the sunshine of my life, but he died for a great cause; he died that we may live, that Germany may be saved. My daughter is a nurse with the Red Cross." And what if all your sons fall?" asked the American. To this the German mother replied: "It would crush me to death. I would not care to survive them. But I would thank God that he gave them to me and that I could offer them to my country. It gives me strength to know that they have done their duty. I know that they are brave and will not shrink. If they die
they will not have lived in vain, and they would be blessed in dying for a great, noble and heroic purpose."

This is not the opinion of one mother. It is the thought that moves the hearts of nearly all of them. What few are selfish enough to feel differently will scarcely dare to utter their sentiments; they feel small and conscience-stricken and ashamed.

I know that the Germans are not guilty of this war, and I know that the calumnies of the German atrocities are untruths. The Germans would gladly have kept peace if possible. They do not wish to conquer the French or the Russians. They were ready to fight, not because they love to fight but because their past history has taught them that only courageous nations can maintain themselves in this world. The Germans are ensouled by a spirit of great courage, of honesty, of seriousness. They know that all life is transient, but the ideals of life are eternal. We all must die, but the aims which we aspire for live after us. I do not hesitate to say that the Germans are at present the greatest nation on earth, and part of their greatness shows itself in the quiet firmness with which they bear the slander that is so unjustly and maliciously heaped upon them by their enemies.

*   *   *

I wish now to speak to my French friends in particular. I wish to tell them most emphatically that the Germans do not hate France. On the contrary they like the French, but they cannot and will not, for sheer friendship, give up Alsace-Lorraine to them. The French should bear in mind that the German claim to Alsace-Lorraine is just. The Alsatians are Germans, and most of them have become and will remain good Germans. Alsace is a German country, and France had no right to it in the first place. It is wrong for the French to feel hurt about its loss. Why did they take it at all, and, having lost it in 1871, why should they want to take it again? They stole it once; is that a justification for stealing it again? Alsace is German in blood and language. Let it remain German.

I have lived in Alsace and I know whereof I speak. The Alsatians are Germans and share all their virtues and their faults. There are, however, some amusing exceptions, or would-be exceptions, to the prevalent German nationality in Alsace, for example, the painter Hansi who, by his Francomania, made a reputation for himself; and the case of a local politician who was anti-German, probably because he bore the French name Schneegans!

But I have more to say to my friends in France. If you love France do not continue this war which you are waging in the
interest of England. England will not give you any thanks for your alliance, except words such as Kipling uttered. Germany would have been a better confederate for you than England. Germany would have allowed you to keep the Suez Canal and would not have checked your advance in Africa at Fashoda; and she would have protected you against England. But your political leaders have been shortsighted. They made it impossible for Germany to support French interests, for it was only too apparent that the French would use the first opportunity to turn against Germany. Germany's implication in any war meant likewise France's participation, and on the side of Germany's enemies whoever they might be. Why? Because the French have become monomaniacs on the subject of Alsace-Lorraine.

If France and Germany would cooperate, their friendship would be mutually beneficial. The French would profit by coming into close touch with Germany, and Germany too would be benefited, appreciating as she does those typically French qualities which she lacks. Their national characters are complementary. When M. Pegu fell, bravely fighting in the air, German aviators dropped a laurel wreath over his home, with a message of condolence, and also praise for his patriotic courage. The Germans do not calumniate their enemies.

I do not expect that the French will listen to my advice; but the time will come when they will understand what a horrible mistake they have made in fighting the battles of England in the vain and mistaken hope of regaining Alsace-Lorraine.

One conspicuous feature in this war is the unfair representation of the German cause by the Allies, and this ought to be recognized by the critical minds among their own partisans. This misrepresentation has been accomplished mainly through a systematic propaganda by English writers, and men like Kipling have disgraced their names thereby. The French accept such misrepresentations as gospel truth, and you too, my kind critics, believe those falsehoods. It seems impossible however, that the men who are responsible for them do not know that they are not true. It is for this reason that in certain circles in the United States "Allies" has been spelled "All-Lies."

The method of introducing misrepresentation into a war is sinister but very human; it is the psychological feature of warfare, and the Germans' strong love of truth has its weak points. They are lacking in diplomacy. Nevertheless in the long run the blunt truth is stronger than smart fabrications and the venom of errors
begotten by them. Both the English people and the French are suffering because of such mistakes, and they will have to pay dearly for them. The present war is the fruit of this policy, and it is difficult to tell what will be the end of it all. I fear that the war will have to be fought to the bitter end, to the detriment of all concerned. But two things are certain: (1) that the Allies will not be able to crush Germany, and (2) France and Russia will suffer most. England will probably suffer least, but she will not escape unpunished. It is to be expected that England will lose her financial supremacy and probably also her dominion over the sea.

The Germans have shortcomings. I am not one who is pro-German whether or not their cause is just. But I am pro-German in the present war because, after a careful investigation, I have reached the firm conviction that justice is on the German side; for the Entente was founded for the purpose of crushing Germany, and Germany had no choice but to break through Belgium and violate Belgian neutrality so as to forestall an attack by her enemies in the rear of her armies. The Serbian complication with Austria was a cheap pretext, and Sir Edward Grey made cunning use of it to fan the flames of war fever, although it was as foul as the protection of assassins can be. The Kaiser, in his love for peace, wrote personal letters to the Czar and King George, but in vain. The Czar himself may have preferred peace, but the grand dukes and the war party around him insisted on war and he had to submit. Finally, the die was cast when England promised to join and thus make up for Russian inefficiency and lack of naval equipment. England's equivocal attitude and lack of frankness toward Germany, even when Germany offered to respect Belgian neutrality, was also clear proof that she was about to enter the fray. From that moment Germany knew that war was unavoidable and that there was no other alternative than the path through Belgium.

But Germany did not advice Austria to yield in the Serbian question! No, she did not. To advice Austria to humiliate herself was not Germany's duty, as my critics claim, nor would it have done any good. It would not have served to preserve the peace. To submit the Serbian dispute to a conference of the very powers who made up the Entente—the enemies of Germany and Austria—was certainly not acceptable.

It is no sin of Germany's that the Allies have proved to be mistaken in their calculations, and that she was better prepared; these are signs of her greatness and superiority, her courage, her efficiency and her virtue. I trust that Germany will finally triumph
over her enemies, and I see in her victory the victory of everything that is noble and liberal and progressive, for she represents the cause of mankind better than any of her adversaries. I expect that this present ordeal, brought upon her by the hatred, envy and intrigues of her neighbors, will purify her of her shortcomings and her several faults, as it has already purified her social relations, her patriotism, and all her ambitions and aspirations to a most remarkable degree. The noble attitude of all German classes, and not least among them of the Social Democrats, of the German youths that go to the front with great courage; of German mothers when offering the lives of those dear to them on the altar of the fatherland; the serious spirit that ensouls the Kaiser, the German princes and all citizens down to the humblest patriot, are sufficient evidence that the Germans are not Huns, nor barbarians, nor brutal savages; they are the noblest exponents of humanity and the chosen people of that portion of the human race from whom we look for a greater and nobler and better future to be born.