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RELIGION AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION: AN EXAMINATION OF INTOLERANCE

by

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B.S., University of Tennessee at Martin, 2019

A Research Paper

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Master of Arts

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RESEARCH PAPER APPROVAL

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Tyler Campbell

A Research Paper Submitted in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Arts

in the field of Sociology

Approved by:

Dr. Rachel Bridges Whaley, Chair

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Graduate School
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
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TITLE: RELIGION AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION: AN EXAMINATION OF INTOLERANCE

MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Rachel Bridges Whaley

With the recent upsurge in challenges to the public's ability to speak in certain settings, the presence of various college curricula, and the inclusion of certain books in public libraries and schools, the contemporary political climate demonstrates a need to look at intolerance. Using the Stouffer (1955) battery of intolerance data in the General Social Survey (GSS), we examine the relationship of religious affiliation, religiosity, and political orientation with intolerance. The analyses shows that fundamentalist religious denominations exhibit intolerant attitudes more than other denominations. Likewise, the analyses indicate a positive relationship between higher religiosity and intolerance. Unexpectedly, political moderates showed a higher degree of intolerance than liberals or conservatives, indicating that scholars should continue to expand on the understanding of intolerance.

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DEDICATION

To my brother and best friend, my achievements would be hopeless without the things
I've learned from you.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Social life develops through the interconnected relationships between individuals, ideas, beliefs, behaviors, and perceptions. Like the weave of a freshly knitted scarf, the processes that shape society rely on the tensions and slack, the pushing and pulling, that serve as counterbalances to uphold the structures that support society. These compensations become established operations of people's everyday experiences through tolerance and intolerance. "Few aspects of political life so directly and immediately touch upon the daily lives of common citizens as does their tolerance toward each other" (Kuklinski, Riggie, Ottati, Schwarz, and Wyer 1991:3). While group formation and maintenance work to sustain the fabric of social interaction, attitudes to non-conforming groups can either mend the stitches or tear the seams of the current political climate.

The implications of intolerance become apparent when looking at the current socio-political climate related to the content of public speeches, college curricula, and books in school and public libraries. Evidence shows that various institutions and governing bodies have recently attempted to limit (or protect) the public's ability to share their opinions and educators' ability to teach on certain topics in various disciplines. These instances of limiting public speeches occur in places such as colleges (Kumar 2023), school board meetings (Blad 2023), and state/local government proceedings (Friedman 2023; Scott 2023).

In recent years, college teachers have experienced the pressures of intolerant attitudes from within education, from lawmakers, and from public opinion. Hollingsworth (2023) discusses how conservative lawmakers in Kansas, Texas, Florida, Louisiana, and Georgia have recently implemented policy that limit or remove tenure from institutions of higher education on

the grounds of combating the “woke” agenda. However, conservatives are not the only ones holding intolerant views of teachers. Kaufmann (2021) reports that around 25% of left-leaning teachers and graduate students in U.S. colleges suggest that they would support the firing of a colleague on the grounds of not supporting liberal policies.

Recently, schools and public libraries experienced an upsurge of attempted book restrictions. The American Library Association (2023) compiles data on the number of unique books that people attempt to censor. From the beginning of 2023 to August 2023, they indicate that 695 isolated attempts occurred to censor books and services in libraries. 1,915 library materials were contested, increasing by 20 percent from the “same reporting period” in 2022. The ALA reports that 2022 showed the most cases of book and library censorship since the group’s beginning 20 years ago. The ALA also states that “Most of the challenges were to books written by or about a person of color or a member of the LGBTQIA+ community” (American Library Association 2023). PEN America (2023) finds that 56% of banned books occur for these social groups. Growing unrest regarding the public’s ability to give speeches, teacher’s employment at colleges and universities, and the identity of authors and the content in books begs the question of how intolerance impacts our ability to extend civil liberties to individuals from opposing groups.

The notion of intolerance exists as a well-documented and examined function of social dynamics. Likewise, these observations often analyze people’s general intolerance, intolerance toward a certain group, or changes in intolerance over multiple years (Gibson 1992a; Mondak and Sanders 2013; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1979). The current socio-political climate calls for an examination of pervasive intolerant attitudes in recent years. Moreover, with the recent addition of Lehman and Sherkat’s (L&S) (2018) classification of religious affiliation into

the literature, Stouffer's (1955) battery of questions regarding tolerance requires an updated examination vis a vis the role of religion. Therefore, I examine the extent to which individuals' religious affiliation, religiosity, and political identity impact their intolerant attitudes.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

To begin with, I examine the existing literature regarding tolerance and intolerance, which develop from group boundaries and oppositional attitudes toward non-conformity. Next, I discuss religious affiliation and religiosity, describing how previous scholars conceptualize the organization and motivations of religious individuals. Finally, I differentiate between political orientation and political affiliation and discuss how political orientation provides lines of group identity and shapes how individuals define their position in the socio-political climate.

Intolerance

The theoretical definitions of tolerance and intolerance encompass a range of characterizations spanning the fields of sociology, political science, and philosophy, classifying them as a means of delineating group barriers that establish in-groups and out-groups and orient group attitudes, beliefs, and values (Ferrar 1976; Hjern, Eger, Bohman, and Connolly 2020; Mondak and Sanders 2003; Powell and Clarke 2013). Balme classifies tolerance as a “State of mind, a self-evident state of affairs, and not a contested legal concept” (2013:101) positioning tolerance as a cognitive attitude. Furthermore, Sullivan et al. define tolerance as “a willingness to ‘put up with’ those things that one rejects. Politically, it implies a willingness to permit the expression of those ideas or interests that one opposes” (1979:784). Gibson makes this conceptualization evident by explaining that Sullivan et al.’s position presupposes that “intolerance requires antipathy toward the target group” (Gibson 1992a:562). These perspectives indicate that tolerance functions as an attitude or set of beliefs that precedes action or inaction towards an oppositional out-group. Although rather apparent, the divergence between tolerance and intolerance occurs in the contrasting sentiments of approval and disapproval,

correspondingly. More specifically, tolerance refers to the allowance of civil liberties to non-conformists, whereas intolerance indicates the denial of civil liberties to non-conformists (Gibson 2006; Jackson and Hunsberger 1999; Sullivan et al. 1979). Tolerance and intolerance can be understood as opposite faces of the same coin.

When looking at the political aspects of tolerance, Mill ([1859] 2001) pioneers the stance of pure tolerance, a philosophical notion that tolerance exercised universally contributes to an improved society. Mill “regarded individuality and self-interest, properly understood, as the source of social, not just personal, progress and well-being, [and] insisted that untrammelled freedom of individual thought, inquiry, worship, and expression is the surest path to truth and social improvement” (Schuck 2002:133). On the other hand, Marcuse (1965) disputes this claim. He explains that in an idealized society where pre-existing conditions of oppression do not occur, Mill’s ideas of a universal tolerance would yield the results Mill’s put forth. However, with the structures of power and the cultural hegemonic systems that currently exist, tolerance can take on the form of repressive tolerance, where tolerance of the status quo of inequality perpetuates oppression. Hunt, Folberg, and Ryan (2021) support the claims of repressive tolerance, finding that White individuals and conservative individuals are more likely to hold more tolerant views of racist attitudes, indicating a connection between members of advantaged groups and the tolerance of an oppressive status quo.

With tolerance being embedded in the political and cultural institutions that uphold oppressive systems, certain distinctions appear between the way tolerance negotiates a group’s relationship with the systems. This implies a distinction between political tolerance and social tolerance (Gibson 2006). Political intolerance typically involves intolerance directed at a political threat or opponent and placing limitations on their civil liberties, whereas social intolerance

denotes prejudicial attitudes directed at a specific group based on social differences and exclusion (Gibson 2006:25-27). To further distinguish between the two, political intolerance involves intolerance of social beliefs, such as being intolerant of a racist because of their views, yet social intolerance involves intolerance of a specific identity, such as being intolerant of a minority because of their race or ethnicity (Van Doorn 2014). Both political and social intolerance derive from social values, the difference lies in whether the social values are in opposition to a group's ideas or a group's more intrinsic social identity. I focus on political intolerance to assess whether the conditions of an individual's identity affect their attitudes of prohibiting the civil liberties of perceived a political opponent.

Religious Affiliation and Religiosity

Religious individuals in the U.S. distinguish themselves by ascribing to various categories that differentiate their social predispositions based on shared religious beliefs, group values, and cultural traditions (Jackson and Hunsberger 1999). This denominationalism establishes exclusionary boundaries among the group constituents, reinforcing collective identities and regulatory practices that demarcate social norms and tolerances (Miller 1996). Religious denominations offer clear lines of division between the social indicators that demonstrate group alignment. To improve upon the state of religious identification literature, Lehman and Sherkat (2018) argue that the dominant Religious Tradition (RELTRAD) framework of Steensland et al. (2000) did not provide a means of including varying ethnicities in the analysis of religious affiliation. They develop a framework for signifying religious affiliation through classifications based on group exclusivity to better include the social location and intersection of identities (Lehman and Sherkat 2018). Looking at their breakdown of denominationalization, they deduce that religious affiliation encompasses seven unique

variations, including “Episcopalians and liberal Protestants; moderate Protestants, Lutherans, and Protestants with no group; Baptists and sectarian Protestants; Catholics and Orthodox; other religions; Mormons; no religious identification” (2018:787).

Along with exclusionary beliefs and practices, religious denominations separate along lines of social and political differences. Various denominations possess beliefs that fall somewhere along a continuum between fundamentalism and liberalism regarding social issues (Iannaccone 1994; Lehman and Sherkat 2018; Miller 1996; Steensland et al. 2000; Wilcox and Jelen 1990). Looking at the groupings provided by the L&S procedure, the array of religious affiliations indicates that the denominations included in sectarian Protestant/Baptist and Mormon groups fall towards the fundamentalism side of the spectrum. Following this, the denominations within the moderate Protestants/Lutherans/non-defined Christians and Jews/other religions remain moderate between fundamentalist and liberal. Finally, liberal Protestants/Episcopalians, Catholics/Orthodox Christian, and no religious identification lie along the margin of liberalism.

Individuals who identify with the various religious identities discussed above do so in differing intensities and in differing ways. Religiosity denotes the degree to which an individual aligns with their religious affiliation, changes their attitudes and beliefs based on religious identity, and allows their religious preferences to be significant in their daily lived experiences (Campbell and Coles 1973; Cornwall, Albrecht, Cunningham, and Pitcher 1986; Finlay and Walther 2003; Jackson and Hunsberger 1999). These can be summarized into what is commonly known as the 3 B’s: belonging, behavior, and belief (Beatty and Walter 1984; Grzymala-Busse 2012; Layman 1997). With this categorization of religiosity, the social values of individual and group social dynamics become the focal point of religious analysis, where social values shape the belief, behavior, and belonging that form religious groups.

Political Orientation

Political orientation refers to an individual's location on a political spectrum (Garneau and Schwadel 2022). For the contemporary U.S. political system, the continuum typically places liberal and conservative on opposite ends, with moderate in the center. Individuals adopt and adhere to their political orientation based on socially derived boundaries imposed by the collective of similarly politically oriented individuals (Malka and Lelkes 2010). The separation between political orientations occurs based on ideological differences in beliefs, political interests, and inclinations about policy (Noel 2016). Noel distinguishes between the liberal and conservative ends of the spectrum by classifying liberals as favoring "government economic intervention to encourage equality and labor interests; policies that advantage ethnic, religious, sexual, and racial minorities and disadvantaged groups; women's rights; and a multi-lateral and often less militaristic foreign policy" and characterizing conservatives as supporting "free markets, business interests, a color-blind approach to race and ethnic issues, traditional religious and sexual norms, a foreign policy informed by American exceptionalism" (2016:168). Moderates adopt a position between these polarities. Political orientation differs from political affiliation, in that political affiliation assumes an identification with a political party (Garneau and Schwadel 2022:2). Political orientation develops as a symbolic representation of moral and group adherence, whereas political affiliation indicates association with a collection of voting individuals focused on similar policy goals. In the contemporary American political system, Democrats typically represent liberal beliefs, and Republican represent conservative beliefs; however, the political affiliation division doesn't wholly indicate clear political orientation differences (Garneau and Schwadel 2022). I concentrate on political orientation rather than political affiliation because orientation demonstrates the group-based attitudinal differences

inherent within tolerance.

CHAPTER 3

EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND

The next section provides an assessment of previous research on intolerance. I discuss the criticism and support for the validity and reliability of the GSS Stouffer's index of intolerance, as well the operationalization of preceding analyses. Likewise, I observe how researchers view the determinants of intolerance, as well as their use in measuring intolerant attitudes. I argue for the inclusion of the Lehman and Sherkat (2018) model of religious affiliation, the combining of religious belief and behavior into an indicator of religiosity, and the concept of political orientation rather than political affiliation to measure political identity.

Prior Studies of Tolerance

Previous research situates tolerance as an indication of negotiating relationships with target groups deemed as non-conformist and extending them certain civil liberties (Bobo and Licari 1989; Davis 1975; Gibson 2006, 2013; Hjerm et al. 2020; Stouffer 1955; Sullivan et al. 1979). The foundation of this empirical work comes from Stouffer's (1955) classification of tolerance. Stouffer uses an area probability sample of U.S. citizens aged 21 years and older who resided in a private household to create an index of civil liberty allowances toward individuals who did not correspond to the dominant social norms, specifically communists, suspected communists, socialists, and atheists (Davis 1975; Gibson 1992a; Stouffer 1955; Sullivan et al. 1979). These groups represented individuals to the left of the political spectrum, which consequently represent the objectionable groups during the 1950s (i.e., the height of McCarthyism and the Red Scare). The results of Stouffer's initial assessment showed that higher reported intolerance occurred in individuals within older cohorts and with less education (1955).

During the period between 1972 and 2021, the National Opinion Research Center

(NORC) adopted Stouffer's array of questions gauging intolerant attitudes for the General Social Survey (GSS) (Davis 1975; Gibson 2006; Mondak and Sanders 2003). They expanded Stouffer's assessment to include a battery of questions that ask whether respondents believe certain target groups should be allowed to make public speeches, teach in college, and have books written by them in libraries and schools. These target groups fall along the political spectrum, either on the left with atheists, Communists, LGBTQIA+ individuals, and anti-American Islam religious leaders (included in 2008 and subsequent years) or on the right, such as racists and militarists (Davern et al. 2021; Gibson 1992a, 2021).

One of the standard procedures of Stouffer's array condenses responses to the intolerance items into an index, yet some researchers dispute the validity of this procedure. The recurring discrepancy in deciding whether to combine them into an index rests on whether the analyses examine universal intolerance or intolerance towards specific target groups. Some researchers find that the overall index fails to differentiate tolerance toward the different target groups, complicating the internal reliability of the scale (Mondak and Sanders 2003). Sullivan et al. (1979) found that the differences in measured intolerance for each group remains the linchpin of tolerance, and that combining the groups into one index undermines the theoretical basis of tolerance. Similarly, they critique the GSS measure of tolerance, claiming that the included groups, the "fixed group" model of tolerance, restrain the respondent's ability to provide sufficient data, because they may have either a positive opinion of the group or no opinion at all. Essentially, Sullivan et al. (1975) argues that tolerance and intolerance requires opposition, therefore an individual must provide data on a group they disagree with or have a negative opinion of. They introduce a new analysis of tolerance by allowing "Respondents themselves to specify the groups they most strongly oppose," generating the "content-controlled" model of

tolerance (also called “least-liked” model) (1979:785).

However, Gibson (1992a) refutes this claim, arguing that the fixed group model, specifically the Stouffer array in the GSS, provides reliable data to measure intolerance because they behave similar, independent of whether the respondent chooses their least-liked group or not. “From the point of view of an attitudinal measure, the GSS index is just as useful as the Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus index. According to this analysis, researchers in the field can use one measure just as effectively as the other” (Gibson 1992a:574). Moreover, Schwadel and Garneau (2019) use the GSS intolerance index as a standalone measure of intolerance. They support the use of the overall index as an operational measure of intolerant attitudes. Further precedent of the universal intolerance scale’s construct validity (see Babbie 2016) can be found in Froese, Bader, and Smith (2008). Their ordinary least squares regression models demonstrate that a higher degree of religiosity, measured by higher church attendance, biblical literalism, and belief in a wrathful God, and belonging to an evangelical Protestant church lowers individuals’ general tolerance.

Determinants of Intolerance

Empirical endeavors in previous studies examine the tolerance of religious and non-religious people by measuring religious affiliation and/or religiosity. Looking at religious affiliation, Sullivan et al. determines religious affiliation by using a 4-category measure of religious identity, “Protestants, Catholic, Jewish, and non-religious respondents” (1981:101). They found that non-religious individuals are more tolerant than religious individuals and that specifically, Baptists were the most intolerant denomination. Multiple scholars adopt the religious tradition (RELTRAD) model of religious affiliation. Using the RELTRAD model, Eisenstein, et al. (2017); Froese, Bader, and Smith (2008); and Schwadel and Garneau (2019) all

suggest that evangelical Protestants maintain more intolerant attitudes than mainline Protestants, black Protestants, Catholics, and non-religious individuals. The decision to use the L&S model of religious affiliation indicates a theoretical decision rather than an empirical decision. The L&S model uses a 7-category taxonomy based on religious exclusivism that provides a means of analyzing the relationships between religious affiliation and fundamentalism. These seven categories include Episcopalians/liberal Protestants, moderate Protestants/ Lutherans/Protestants with no group, Baptists/sectarian Protestants, Catholics/Orthodox Christians, other religions, Mormons, and no religious identification. From the conclusions drawn above, I expect that the most exclusionary group, Baptists/sectarian Protestants/Mormons which align most closely to evangelical Protestants both theoretically and empirically (Lehman and Sherkat 2018; Steensland et al. 2000), will exhibit more intolerant attitudes.

In addition to religious affiliation, numerous scholars examine religiosity. Karpov (2002) measures religiosity using the GSS and Poland General Social Survey (PGSS). They operationalize religiosity using religious participation, religious commitment, theocratic orientation, and religious affiliation and compare them to a modified version of Stouffer's battery of tolerance due to the differentiation between the GSS and PGSS (Karpov 2002:273-274). Karpov finds that theocratic orientations directly influence intolerance, whereas religious participation and religious commitment show indirect influences. Interestingly, religious affiliation possessed no relationship with intolerance. In general, the belief and behavior aspects of religiosity follow similar empirical methods. Regarding behavior, higher frequency of religious service attendance (Beatty and Walter 1984; Froese et al. 2008; Gibson 1992b; Wilcox and Jelen 1990), and higher frequency of prayer (Eisenstein et al. 2017; Powell and Clarke 2013) indicate a higher religiosity. With concerns to belief, importance of one's own religion to oneself

(Alston 1975) demonstrates more religiosity. Measured together, I predict that higher religiosity will demonstrate a higher level of intolerance.

Various studies examine the relationship between political identity and intolerance. Garneau and Schwadel (2022) suggest that the conceptualization of political identity varies between political orientation (e.g., liberal, moderate, and conservative) and political affiliation (e.g., Democrat, Independent, and Republican). Using the Stouffer index, they found that political orientation is a more effective correlate of different political identities and intolerance. Liberals possess significantly more tolerant ideas and attitudes when compared to conservatives, yet Democrats are not as significantly different than Republicans as liberals are from conservatives (Garneau and Schwadel 2022:12). Therefore, I argue that political orientation will provide a stronger measure of a person's political views. Similarly, Shortle Gaddie examined how Christian Nationalism impacted tolerance, looking at the relationship between religion and politics (2015). They found a strong relationship between Christian Nationalism and intolerant attitudes, demonstrating how exclusion-based group maintenance of religious collectives correlates to more intolerant views.

Including political orientation in the examination of intolerance and religion usually follows two procedures. 1) Researchers measure political orientation as an independent variable of intolerance without the inclusion of a religion, as with Garneau and Schwadel (2022) and Sniderman, Tetlock, Glaser, Green, and Hout (1989). 2) Political orientation provides a control for the explanation of some iteration of religious affiliation and/or religiosity, as with Eisenstein, et al. (2017). In all these cases, scholars condensed the 7-item measure of political orientation into a 3-item measure, incorporating three distinct orientations, liberal, moderate, and conservative. Garneau and Schwadel found that conservatives maintain intolerant attitudes more

so than liberals (2022:12). Likewise, Eisenstein et al. (2017:408) concluded that “liberal ideology increase tolerance... but the influence is much more pronounced for mainline Protestants than for either evangelicals or Catholics.” Therefore, we can hypothesize that conservatives likely score higher on the intolerance index

In summation, intolerance demonstrates a process through which individuals’ identities, values, and group alignment shape their beliefs and attitudes of other individuals and groups. Likewise, people’s religious affiliation, religiosity, and political orientation influence their social location and identities and work to form group boundaries that establish in-group and out-group relationships. Using Stouffer’s classification of intolerance in the 2021 GSS, I examine whether and how the L&S model of religious affiliation, religiosity, and political views explain intolerance. Controlling for total family income, age, highest degree attained, sex, and race, I make 2 hypotheses. First, more religiously fundamental denominations (e.g., Baptists/sectarian Protestants/Mormons) will demonstrate higher intolerance compared to other religious affiliations. Likewise, as religiosity increases, intolerance is expected to increase. Lastly, I predict political conservatives will show more intolerance than moderates and liberals, The next section discusses the data used in the analysis, along with the operationalization of intolerance, religious affiliation, political orientation, and religiosity.

CHAPTER 4

METHODS

Research Design and Sample

Data for the analysis of intolerance come from the 2021 General Social Survey (GSS), which took place between December 2020 and May 2021 with a sample of 4,032 English and/or Spanish-speaking U.S. adults 18 years of age or older who resided in private housing when the self-administered online poll, or phone interview option, took place (Davern et al. 2021). “The GSS Cross-section survey administers a full-probability sample approach with samples created from an adapted form of the United States Postal Service (USPS) metropolitan statistical area (MSA)/county frame area” (Davern et al. 2021:4). The components of the dependent variable only come from ballots 1 and 3 of the GSS. This along with the elimination of cases with missing data results in a sample size of 1,879.

Measures

Ballots 1 and 3 of the 2021 GSS include the 18 dichotomous questions assessing intolerance, modified from Stouffer’s (1955) classification of intolerance toward target groups of non-conformists. “These questions address three fundamental civil liberties issues related to freedom of expression: making a public speech, teaching at a college or university, and having a book at a public library” (Bobo and Licari 1989:292). The questions present expressions from six target groups: “somebody who is against all churches and religion” (atheist), “a person who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior” (racist), “a self-identified Communist” (Communist), “a person who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country” (militarist), “a gay person” (LGBTQIA+), and “an Islamic religious leader who preaches hatred of the United States” (anti-American Islamic religious leader) (Davern et al.

2021:5-6). Together these items constitute a set of 18 variables that ask participants whether each target group should be allowed to speak in public, allowed to teach in college, or have their books removed from libraries (See Appendix A for a full description of questions in the Stouffer index)

In the 2021 version of the dataset, the GSS conducted a wording experiment using a subset of questions. In this subset, randomly selected participants responded to alternate versions of questions using gender-neutral phrasing contrary to androcentric language in the original set. Of the 18 variables included in the Stouffer's classification of intolerance, each included an alternate phrasing except for questions asking about atheists teaching in colleges and racists teaching in colleges. As an example, the original question regarding an atheist being allowed to give a public speech is worded as, "Should he be allowed to speak, or not?" whereas the alternate question is worded as, "Should this person be allowed to speak, or not?" (Davern et al. 2021:5). I combined the variables of the original and alternate questions to create single variables of the same expression. The original questions and the alternate forms recorded the same response options and values. The questions regarding allowing the target groups to make public speeches or teach in colleges contained two response choices which I dummy coded such that 1 = "yes, allowed to speak/teach," and 0 = "not allowed". However, the questions regarding allowing books written by target groups differed. This subset contained two response choices of "remove," coded 1, and "not remove," coded 2. The willingness to remove books written by the target groups contains the operation of intolerance. Therefore, I dummy-coded and reverse-coded these six variables, coding the intolerant response such that 1 = "remove" and 0 = "not remove". Per Bobo and Licari (1983), Ellison and Musick (1993), and Froese et al. (2008), I constructed an index by summing the 18 responses in the Stouffer battery. The resulting index ranges from 0-

18 (18 indicating most intolerant) and has a Cronbach's alpha of .884, with a mean of 5.86 and a standard deviation of 4.5 (as seen in Table 1). Just under 16% scored 0, 4.4% scored 1, 15.4% scored 2 or 3, 16.1% scored 3 or 4, 8.5% scored 5, and about 67% scored 6 or higher.

Independent variables. To measure religious affiliation, I utilize the L&S procedure of determining religious denominations. Using GSS data from 2021, I delineate religious affiliation based on participants' reported religious preference and subsequent reported denominational affiliation (see Appendix A for the phrasing of questions regarding religious preferences and denominations). Lehman and Sherkat (2018) collapse the expansive list of religious identifications based on religious exclusivism, or the belief that one's convictions are divinely inspired while others' are not, to create seven categories: Episcopalians and liberal Protestants; moderate Protestants, Lutherans, and Protestants with no group; Baptists and sectarian Protestants; Catholics and Orthodox Christians; other religions; Mormons; Religious Nones (See Lehman and Sherkat (2018) for a complete description of religious affiliation categories). Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for religious affiliation. The groupings of Mormon and Jew/Other Religion contain a sample size percentage that remains too small to run further analyses. Therefore, I collapsed Mormon with Baptist/sectarian Protestant and other religion with Episcopalians/liberal Protestant, based on shared beliefs (Iannaccone 1994; Lehman and Sherkat 2018; Steensland 2000). The resulting measure of religious affiliation separates religious individuals into 5 categories: Episcopalians, liberal Protestants, other religions; moderate Protestants, Lutherans, and Protestants with no group; Baptists, sectarian Protestants, and Mormons; Catholics and Orthodox Christians; Religious Nones. 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the 7-category measure of religious affiliation and collapsed 5-category measure of religious affiliation. I created a dummy set of all the religious affiliation categories.

This operationalization of religious affiliation allows us to determine the variation in intolerance of free expression based on fundamentalist versus liberal religious affiliation. We expect that more fundamentalist religious affiliations such as Baptists/sectarian Protestants/Mormons will score higher on the intolerance of free expression index than moderate and liberal religious identities, based on the empirical work of Sullivan et al. (1981).

The measurement of religiosity encompasses a multi-dimensional operation of intersecting attitudes and behaviors (Campbell and Coles 1973; Finlay and Walther 2003; Jackson and Hunsberger 1999). The 2021 GSS includes questions regarding how often respondents attend religious services, how often respondents pray, how important respondent's religion is to them, and to what extent respondents consider themselves a religious person. The measure for how often a respondent prays is coded 1 for "Several times a day" and 6 for "Never," importance of respondent's religion is coded 1 for "Extremely important" and coded 5 for "Not important at all," The extent to which the respondent considers themselves is coded 1 for "Very religious" and coded 4 for "Not religious at all." Therefore, I reverse-coded these so that higher values indicate greater religiosity. Table 1 indicates the descriptive statistics for the components of religiosity after reverse coding the necessary variables.

To reduce the number of independent variables and to more robustly measure religiosity versus individual measures of forms of religiosity, I first ran a factor analysis of religious service attendance, frequency of prayer, the importance of their religion to them, and the extent a person considers themselves a religious person to measure the strength of the common factor. The factor analysis of religiosity revealed an eigenvalue of 2.91, and the reported variance explained by the factor is 72.8%. After z-scoring the variables, I conducted a reliability analysis to identify internal consistency which showed a Cronbach's alpha of .875, demonstrating a high degree of

consistency among the items in the index. Using the z-scored items, I computed a religiosity index by taking the average of the items. Drawing on the literature (e.g., Beatty and Walter 1984; Eisenstein et al. 2017), I hypothesize that religiosity positively relates to scores on the intolerance index.

To measure political orientation, I used the question where respondents are asked to designate their position on a 7-point spectrum ranging between extremely liberal, liberal, somewhat liberal, moderate, somewhat conservative, conservative, and extremely conservative. Following precedence in the literature, I collapsed all liberals together, leave moderates alone, and collapse all conservatives together. A one-way ANOVA with post-hoc comparisons confirmed the combination of the three liberal groups and the three conservative groups. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics. I expect that conservatives will score higher on the intolerance index than liberals and moderates.

Controls. The 2021 GSS asked respondents within which income range their total family income in the last year fell. Because income is measured in an ordinal fashion and does not appear to be normally distributed, I collapsed these groups into quintiles. This enables me to compare people in groups based on income and to see if income is nonlinearly related to intolerance. The quintiles resulted in the following groupings. Quintile one is less than \$29,999, quintile two is \$30,000-\$59,999, quintile three is \$60,000-\$89,999, quintile four is \$90,000-\$129,999, and quintile five is greater than \$130,000 (see Table 1). I converted this ordinal variable into a dummy set. I predict that individuals in the total family income quintile of less than \$29,999 will score higher on the intolerance index than individuals in any other quintile (Hjerm et al. 2019).

To analyze the effect that age has on intolerance and to control for generational

differences in intolerance, I measured age using cohorts. The 2021 GSS provides data regarding individuals' age, reporting respondents' ages ranging from 18 to 89 or older. Stouffer's foundational examination of intolerance measured age generationally using cohorts (Stouffer 1955). To allow for categories that include enough cases for statistical analysis and to attend to the inclusion of young and older respondents, I collapse age into six age cohorts as follows; cohort one is 18 to 29 years old, cohort two is 30 to 39 years old, cohort three is 40 to 49 years old, cohort four is 50 to 59 years old, cohort five is 60 to 69 years old, and cohort six is 70 years and older (see Table 1). Because I use age cohorts, age becomes an ordinal variable and then I created a dummy set of all the cohorts. I expect that individuals in cohort six (i.e., the oldest group) will score higher on the intolerance scale than individuals in other cohorts (Schwadel and Garneau 2019; Stouffer 1955).

Stouffer found that individuals with less education tended to be more intolerant than individuals with more education. I control for education with a dummy set representing highest degree attained. The categories include 1) the combined categories of less than high school and high school diploma, 2) associate degree or junior college degree, 3) 4-year college degree, and 5) graduate degree. I anticipate that respondents with high school or less will demonstrate a higher score on the intolerance index compared to more educated persons (Stouffer 1955).

Sex is dummy coded such that 1 indicates men. I predict that men will be more likely to score higher on the intolerance index than men (Gibson 1992b). Race is held constant as a dummy set of White, Black, and Other Race. I anticipate that White individuals will be more likely to score higher on the intolerance scale than all other categories of racial minorities (Garneau and Schwadel 2022).

Analytic Strategy

I first examined the appropriate bivariate correlations between all independent variables and the intolerance index (see Table 3). I also examined correlations among the predictors and controls to examine risk of multicollinearity (table not provided but available upon request). None indicated a risk of multicollinearity but VIFs were examined in the OLS regression context. The VIF for those with no religion was 3.5 and ranged from 1.7 to 2.2 for the other categories of the dummy set for religious affiliation; the VIF for religiosity was 2.1. While some multicollinearity is expected within dummy sets and that religious affiliation (especially having no religion) might correlate with religiosity, I ran three models where, controlling for all else, I included both religious affiliation and religiosity, religious affiliation alone, and religiosity alone. Results suggest the small degree of multicollinearity did not impact results. To identify the reference groups for religious affiliation, political identification, total family income, cohort, highest degree attained, and race, I drew on expectations from the literature and ran one-way Anovas with post-hoc tests to find the categories that differ most from the others. I concluded that the following groups differed significantly from the rest of the categories in their respective dummy sets: Baptists, Sectarian Protestants, and Mormons; conservatives; individuals with a total family income of less than \$29,999; individuals over the age of 70; high school degree or less; White individuals. Finally, I use ordinary least squares regression to regress intolerance on religious affiliation, political identification, religiosity, total family income, age, highest degree attained, sex, and race.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

Correlations

Table 8 shows the Pearson or point-biserial (for dummy coded variables and the index) correlations between the intolerance index and religious affiliation, religiosity, total family income, age cohort, highest degree attained, sex, and race. Using one-tailed directional tests of significance, results suggest that Baptists, sectarian Protestants, and Mormons as a group score significantly higher on the index than other religious affiliations, while religious nones score lower on the index when compared to other religious affiliations. Individuals with liberal political views score lower on the index than individuals with other political views, while moderates score higher. Those in the lowest total family income quintile score higher than those in other income quintiles, while people in the highest total family income quintile score lower than all others suggesting a degree of non-linearity between income and intolerance. Individuals who have a high school diploma or less score lower on the index than individuals with more education, and individuals with graduate degrees score lower on the index than individuals with less education. Men's index scores are higher than women's. Lastly, White individuals score lower on the index than Black individuals and individuals of other races.

Intolerance Index Regression

As seen in Table 4, I regressed intolerance on religious affiliation, religiosity, political identification, total family income, age, highest degree attained, sex, and race. Model 1 explains 13.44% of the variance in intolerance. The amount of variance explained is dismally small and suggests that key predictors are missing from the model.

In support of my hypothesis, Episcopalians, liberal Protestants, Jews, and other religions

($B = -.06, p < .05$), moderate Protestants, Lutherans, and Protestants with no group ($B = -.13, p < .001$), Catholics and Orthodox Christians ($B = -.06, p < .05$), and Religious Nones ($B = -.14, p < .001$) score significantly lower on the intolerance index than Baptists, sectarian Protestants, and Mormons (see Model 1 in Table 4). As the literature predicted, a one standard deviation increase in religiosity shows a higher score on the intolerance scale ($B = .13, p < .001$). My test of multicollinearity revealed the pattern of significance and relationships remains the same. Model 2 in Table 4 shows the coefficient for religious nones increases, confirming that there was slight multicollinearity with religiosity. Contrary to expectations, political moderates ($B = .06, p < .05$) score higher on the index than political conservatives, while there is not a significant difference between liberals and conservatives.

Examining the control variables, individuals in income quintile two ($B = -.05, p < .05$), quintile three ($B = -.10, p < .001$) quintile four ($B = -.09, p < .01$), and quintile five ($B = -.14, p < .001$) score significantly lower on intolerance when compared to individuals in quintile one. People between the ages of 60 and 69 ($B = -.06, p < .05$) score lower on the intolerance scale than people 70 years or older. People in all other age cohorts show no significant difference from people 70 years and older. Individuals with a bachelor's degree ($B = -.10, p < .001$) or a graduate degree ($B = -.11, p < .001$) score lower on the intolerance scale than those with a high school degree or less, while those with an associate or junior college degree do not differ. Men score lower than women on the intolerance index ($B = -.07, p < .01$). Black individuals ($B = .07, p < .01$) and neither Black nor White individuals ($B = .10, p < .001$) score higher on the index than White individuals.

CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The current socio-political situation indicates a growing polarization between opposing attitudes and beliefs throughout the political spectrum (Kreiss and McGregor 2023). Political opinions on both the right and the left are becoming enflamed, such as backlash to “wokeness” and cancel culture from conservatives (Scatamburlo-D'Annibale 2019) and with liberals more likely to openly oppose conservative ideology in higher education (Kaufmann 2021). The prevalence of conversations surrounding freedom of speech for the public (Blad 2023; Scott 2023), removing teachers from their positions in higher education (Hollingsworth 2023), and the censorship of books in schools and libraries (Pen America 2023), one can surmise the relevancy of examining political tolerance in contemporary times. Likewise, with the little amount of data and analysis on the current state of political tolerance, the necessity for more empirical research in this area becomes apparent.

Through my analysis of intolerance, I improve upon the literature by situating religious affiliation and religiosity as theoretical predictors of intolerance. The definition of intolerance draws upon the framework introduced by Stouffer and improved upon since its inception (Davis 1975; Ferrar 1976; Gibson 2006; Hjerm et al. 2020; Mondak and Sanders 2003; Powell and Clarke 2013; Stouffer 1955). To understand religious affiliation, I used a modified version of the L&S procedure of religious identification measurement to assess fundamentalist and exclusionary religious affiliations. Subsequently, I conceptualized religiosity as a composition of various religious beliefs and behaviors. I also argued for the use of political orientation rather than affiliation. From these assumptions, I identified various expectations of the relationship between intolerance and both religious affiliation and religiosity. Our predictions indicate that

more fundamentalist religious affiliations, higher religiosity, and conservative political identity would show more intolerance. Likewise, I expected that people with lower total family incomes, people in older age cohorts, people with advanced degrees, men, and White people would hold more intolerant views.

Major Findings

The relationship between religious affiliation and intolerance demonstrates that individuals who identify as Baptist, sectarian Protestant, and Mormon are more intolerant than other religious affiliations. These religious identities embody the characteristics of more fundamental and exclusivist religious groups (Iannaccone 1994; Lehman and Sherkat 2018; Wilcox and Jelen 1990). Through the formation of group identities, establishment of group norms, and management of group values, group ideology influences the attitudes and beliefs of the members. As predicted in our expectations and shown in our analyses, I find that people with fundamentalist religious affiliations support the limitation of civil liberties for non-conformist groups. Likewise, a directional association exists between religiosity and intolerant attitudes. This implies that the group formation inherent within religious belief creates group boundaries for the members within.

Interestingly, political moderates score higher on the intolerance scale than conservatives, which differs from my hypothesis. From this, several speculations can be drawn. First, by combining all target groups into one measure, no conclusions can be drawn regarding who liberals, moderates, or conservatives possess intolerant attitudes of (Sullivan et al 1979). However, the literature shows that liberals are more tolerant of left-leaning target groups while conservatives are more tolerant of right-leaning groups (Garneau and Schwadel 2022). By combining left and right leaning groups in the intolerance index and comparing moderates to

conservatives, moderates show that they are more likely to support the denial of civil liberties, regardless of groups' political leaning. This may indicate a political difference between pure tolerance (Mill [1859] 2001) and repressive tolerance (1965). Therefore, conservatives could be practicing repressive tolerance, in that they allow certain groups to engage in civil liberties that uphold hegemonic systems. However, moderates may wish to deny certain groups freedoms to participate in an activity that maintains an oppressive status quo.

Controlling for age, highest degree attained, sex, and race, I can see that individuals in the higher income categories score higher on the intolerance index than individuals in the lower income categories, as I predicted. Likewise, when I control for income, highest degree attained, sex, and race, our analysis supports our hypothesis that individuals with less education score higher on the intolerance index than individuals with more education. However, our analyses revealed that our predictions that older individuals will score higher on the index than younger people, men will score higher than women, and White individuals will score higher than Black individuals and other races were not supported. Notably, the results that higher age did not significantly impact intolerant views do not support the conclusions in Stouffer's original work that younger individuals report more tolerant attitudes (1955). It is possible that my cohort groupings do not resonate with current generational differences or that age is better conceived as a ratio variable; but even in the bivariate case, there was no relationship between age and intolerance. The results suggest that the relationship between age and intolerance requires a new examination of the change in intolerant views over time. The findings for race and sex may show that further explorations of their relationship are needed. However, some concerns regarding the existing data may reveal limitations.

Limitations

Several limitations arose during these analyses. To begin with, the ordinary least squares regression model only explained 13.4% of the variance in intolerance. This is extremely low. However, when compared to similar studies using the combined intolerance scale, one can place the percentage variance explained for this model in perspective of the empirical precedence. Bobo and Licari's regression models explained 32% of the variance when they regress intolerance on education, political conservatism, and psychological insecurities and control for age, race, sex, geographic region, income, urbanicity, and religious affiliation (1989). Similarly, Froese et al. (2008) found that their model explained 32.3% of the variance when regressing intolerance on church attendance, religious tradition, biblical literalism, and belief in a wrathful God, while controlling for sex, geographic region, race, education, occupational prestige, size of place, and year of study (i.e., 1991). Notably, both these studies happened before the inclusion of questions regarding Islamic religious leaders, and therefore contained a 15-point intolerance scale. I recognize that their models explained quite a bit more variance than the model presented here.

Looking at the measures discussed by Bobo and Licari (1989), I believe that scholars should control for regional differences in future studies. There is current evidence that intolerance is somewhat demarcated by region. Likewise, scholars should include a measure of biblical literalism as shown in Froese et al. (2008). However, the measure of biblical literalism was changed in the 2021 GSS, due to the allowance of an experimental volunteered response to the biblical literalism question in the online version of the survey (Davern et al. 2021:16-18). Future research should examine the impact of this change on measuring biblical literalism. Similarly, the GSS's wording experiment for the intolerance index demonstrates similar issues.

By combining the responses into one variable, I limit the variation between the masculine language and the gender-neutral language. Future research should compare whether this change causes any significant impact on the outcome by controlling for who received which question. By controlling for which respondent received which question choice, scholars could assess whether gender-neutral wording caused any significant differentiations.

Additionally, the measures of political identity may need further examination. Liberals and conservatives were not significantly different from each other, unlike in Garneau and Schwadel's (2022) analysis. Despite evidence from the literature to focus on political orientation, a more nuanced measure of political identity, such as including political party identification, could improve the percentage of variance explained by the model.

Future Research

Future endeavors into tolerance should examine the presence of social tolerance along with political tolerance. The target groups discussed within ask about political non-conformists, both on the left and right of the political spectrum (Gibson 1992a, 2021). Perhaps a new dataset that asks whether certain social identities such as a racial or ethnic minority, a non-English speaking person, or an elderly person should be allowed to listen to certain music, speak a language other than English, or drive, would provide a better measure of social intolerance. Moreover, providing the respondent with the ability to choose their least-liked group in a study such as this could introduce a reexamination of Sullivan et al.'s (1979) procedure as well as Gibson's (1992a) critique.

Similarly, potential research on intolerance should include a qualitative measure of intolerant attitudes. Rather than solely on if individuals are intolerant or not, qualitative procedures, such as in-depth interviews, could reveal why people choose to have intolerant

attitudes. This would allow researchers to examine the perspectives of pure tolerance (Mill [1859] 2001) and repressive tolerance (Marcuse 1965). The importance of studying intolerance remains relevant. By expanding the empirical knowledge of intolerance, research helps to explain various ongoing political issues such as voting behavior and suppression, protests, extremist behavior, etc.

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TABLES

Table 1. Descriptives of Intolerance Index, Religious Affiliation, Religiosity, Political Orientation, and Controls (N = 1,879).

	Min-Max	Mean (SD) or %
<u>Intolerance Index</u>		
<u>7-Category Religious Affiliation:</u>	0 – 18	5.8 (4.5)
Episcopalians/Liberal Protestants	0 – 1	5.3
Moderate Protestants/ Lutherans/Christians with No Group	0 – 1	23.9
Baptists/Sectarian Protestants	0 – 1	13.7
Catholics/Orthodox Christians	0 – 1	21.6
Other Religions	0 – 1	5.4
Mormons	0 – 1	1.0
Religious Nones	0 – 1	29.2
<u>5-Category Religious Affiliation:</u>		
Episcopalians/Liberal Protestants/Other Religions	0 – 1	10.7
Moderate Protestants/ Lutherans/Christians with No Group	0 – 1	23.9
Baptists/Sectarian Protestants/Mormons (reference)	0 – 1	14.7
Catholics/Orthodox Christians	0 – 1	21.6
Religious Nones	0 – 1	29.2
<u>Religiosity:</u>		.2***
Religious Service Attendance	0 – 8	2.8 (2.7)
Frequency of Prayer	1 – 6	3.7 (2.0)
Importance of R's Religion	1 – 5	3.2 (1.4)
How Religious is R	1 – 4	2.3 (1.0)
<u>Religiosity Index:</u>	-1.2 – 1.6	-1.2 – 1.6
<u>Political Identity:</u>		
Liberal	0 – 1	36.5
Moderate	0 – 1	32.6
Conservative (Reference)	0 – 1	30.9
<u>Total Family Income Quintiles:</u>		
Q1: Less than \$29,999 (reference)	0 – 1	21.6
Q2: \$30,000-\$59,999	0 – 1	23.7
Q3: \$60,000-\$89,999	0 – 1	18.6
Q4: \$90,000-\$129,999	0 – 1	15.8
Q5: Greater than \$130,000	0 – 1	20.3
<u>Age Cohorts:</u>		
Cohort 1: 18-29	0 – 1	10.1
Cohort 2: 30-39	0 – 1	17.8
Cohort 3: 40-49	0 – 1	16.3
Cohort 4: 50-59	0 – 1	17.7
Cohort 5: 60-69	0 – 1	20.1
Cohort 6: 70+ (reference)	0 – 1	18.0
<u>Highest Degree Attained:</u>		
High School Diploma or Less (reference)	0 – 1	40.4
Associates or Junior College Degree	0 – 1	9.6
Bachelors Degree	0 – 1	28.7
Graduate Degree	0 – 1	21.2
<u>Sex:</u>		
Men	0 – 1	46.5
<u>Race:</u>		
White (reference)	0 – 1	80.5
Black	0 – 1	11.1
Other Race	0 – 1	8.4

Table 2. Religiosity Index Factor Analysis (N = 1,879).

	Component
Religious Service Attendance	.83
Frequency of Prayer	.84
Importance of Respondent's Religion	.86
How Religious is Respondent	.88
Eigenvalue	2.91
% of Variance Explained	72.82
Cronbach's Alpha	.87

Table 3. Bivariate Correlations between Intolerance and Independent/Control Variables (N = 1,879).

	Intolerance Index
<u>Religious Affiliation:</u>	
Episcopalians/Liberal Protestants/Other Religions	.01
Moderate Protestants/ Lutherans/Christians with No Group	-.02
Baptists/Sectarian Protestants/Mormons (reference)	.17***
Catholics/Orthodox Christians	.04
Religious Nones	-.16***
Religiosity	.22***
<u>Political Identity:</u>	
Liberal	-.13***
Moderate	.12***
Conservative (Reference)	-.02
<u>Total Family Income Quintiles:</u>	
Q1: Less than \$29,999 (reference)	.16***
Q2: \$30,000-\$59,999	.07**
Q3: \$60,000-\$89,999	-.03
Q4: \$90,000-\$129,999	-.06**
Q5: Greater than \$130,000	-.16***
<u>Age Cohorts:</u>	
Cohort 1: 18-29	-.01
Cohort 2: 30-39	-.02
Cohort 3: 40-49	.01
Cohort 4: 50-59	-.01
Cohort 5: 60-69	-.01
Cohort 6: 70+ (reference)	.04
<u>Highest Degree Attained:</u>	
High School Diploma or Less (reference)	.18***
Associates or Junior College Degree	.04
Bachelors Degree	-.11***
Graduate Degree	-.12***
<u>Sex:</u>	
Men	-.12***
<u>Race:</u>	
White (reference)	-.16***
Black	.14***
Other Race	.08***

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ one-tailed tests

Table 4. Regression of Intolerance Index on Independent and Control Variables.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	β	β	B
<u>Religious Affiliation:</u>			
Episcopalians/Liberal	-.06*	-.08**	
Protestants/Other Religions			
Moderate Protestants/			
Lutherans/Christians with No Group	-.13***	-.14***	
Baptists/Sectarian Protestants/Mormons			
(reference)	---	---	
Catholics/Orthodox Christians	-.06*	-.09**	
Religious Nones	-.14***	-.23***	
Religiosity	.13***		.17***
<u>Political Identity:</u>			
Liberal	.00	-.03	-.01
Moderate	.06**	.04	.06*
Conservative (reference)	---	---	---
<u>Total Family Income Quintiles:</u>			
Q1: Less than \$29,999 (reference)	---	---	---
Q2: \$30,000-\$59,999	-.05*	-.05*	-.05*
Q3: \$60,000-\$89,999	-.10***	-.10***	-.10***
Q4: \$90,000-\$129,999	-.09**	-.10***	-.09**
Q5: Greater than \$130,000	-.14***	-.16***	-.14***
<u>Age Cohorts:</u>			
Cohort 1: 18-29	-.03	-.04	-.03
Cohort 2: 30-39	-.03	-.04	-.03
Cohort 3: 40-49	-.02	-.02	-.02
Cohort 4: 50-59	-.04	-.05*	-.04
Cohort 5: 60-69	-.06*	-.06*	-.05
Cohort 6: 70+ (reference)	---	---	---
<u>Highest Degree Attained:</u>			
High School Diploma or Less			
(reference)	---	---	---
Associates or Junior College Degree	-.02	-.02	-.02
Bachelors Degree	-.10***	-.10***	-.11***
Graduate Degree	-.11***	-.10***	-.12***
<u>Sex:</u>			
Men	-.07***	-.09***	-.07**
<u>Race:</u>			
White (reference)	---	---	---
Black	.07**	.08***	.08**
Other Race	.10***	.10***	.10***
R ²	.134	.126	.125

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ one-tailed tests

APPENDIX

GSS Questions from Davern et al. (2021)

- Allow atheists to publicly speak in communities: There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion . . . If such a person wanted to make a speech in your (city/town/community) against churches and religion, should he be allowed to speak, or not?

- Allow atheists to publicly speak in communities (GENDER-NEUTRAL VARIATION): (There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion...) If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community against churches and religion, should this person be allowed to speak, or not?

- Allow atheists to teach in colleges: (There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion...) Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not?

- Remove books written by atheists from public libraries: (There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion...) If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote against churches and religion should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?

- Remove books written by atheists from public libraries (GENDER-NEUTRAL VARIATION): (There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion...) If some people in your community suggested that a book this person wrote against churches and religion should

be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?

- Allow racists to publicly speak in communities: Or consider a person who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community claiming that Blacks are inferior, should he be allowed to speak, or not?

- Allow racists to publicly speak in communities (GENDER-NEUTRAL VARIATION): Or consider a person who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior... If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community claiming that Blacks are inferior, should this person be allowed to speak, or not?

- Allow racists to teach in colleges: (Or consider a person who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior...) Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not?

- Remove books written by racists from public libraries: (Or consider a person who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior...) If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote which said Blacks are inferior should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?

- Remove books written by racists from public libraries (GENDER-NEUTRAL VARIATION): (Or consider a person who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior...) If some people in your community suggested that a book this person wrote which said Blacks are inferior should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?

- Allow Communists to publicly speak in communities: Now, we would like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?

- Allow Communists to teach in colleges (GENDER-NEUTRAL VARIATION): Now, we

would like to ask you some questions about a self-identified Communist. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should this person be allowed to speak, or not?

- Allow Communists to publicly speak in communities: (Now, we would like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist...) Suppose he is teaching in a college. Should he be fired, or not?

- Allow Communists to teach in colleges (GENDER-NEUTRAL VARIATION): (Now, we would like to ask you some questions about a self-identified Communist...) Suppose this person is teaching in a college. Should this person be fired, or not?

- Remove books written by Communists from public libraries: (Now, we would like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist...) Suppose he wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests that the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

- Remove books written by Communists from public libraries (GENDER-NEUTRAL VARIATION): (Now, we would like to ask you some questions about a self-identified Communist...) Suppose this person wrote a book which is in your public library. Somebody in your community suggests that the book should be removed from the library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

- Allow militarists to publicly speak in communities: Consider a person who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community, should he be allowed to speak, or not?

- Allow militarists to publicly speak in communities (GENDER-NEUTRAL VARIATION): Consider a person who advocates doing away with elections and letting the

military run the country. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community, should this person be allowed to speak, or not?

- Allow militarists to teach in colleges: (Consider a person who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country...) Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not?

- Remove books written by militarists from public libraries: Suppose he wrote a book advocating doing away with elections and letting the military run the country. Somebody in your community suggests that the book be removed from the public library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

- Remove books written by militarists from public libraries (GENDER-NEUTRAL VARIATION): Suppose this person wrote a book advocating doing away with elections and letting the military run the country. Somebody in your community suggests that the book be removed from the public library. Would you favor removing it, or not?

- Allow LGBTQIA+ persons to publicly speak in communities: And what about a man who admits that he is homosexual... Suppose this admitted homosexual wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?

- Allow LGBTQIA+ persons to publicly speak in communities (GENDER-NEUTRAL VARIATION): And what about a gay person? Suppose this gay person wanted to make a speech in your community. Should this person be allowed to speak, or not?

- Allow LGBTQIA+ persons to teach in colleges: Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not?

- Remove books written by LGBTQIA+ persons from public libraries: (And what about a man who admits that he is homosexual...) If some people in your community suggested that a

book he wrote in favor of homosexuality should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?

- Remove books written by LGBTQIA+ persons from public libraries (GENDER-NEUTRAL VARIATION): If somebody in your community suggests that a book the gay person wrote in favor of homosexuality should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing it, or not?

- Allow anti-American Muslim leaders to publicly speak in communities: Now consider a Muslim clergyman who preaches hatred of the United States. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community preaching hatred of the United States, should he be allowed to speak, or not?

- Allow anti-American Muslim leaders to publicly speak in communities (GENDER-NEUTRAL VARIATION): Now consider a Islamic religious leader who preaches hatred of the United States. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community preaching hatred of the United States, should this person be allowed to speak, or not?

- Allow anti-American Muslim leaders to teach in colleges: Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not?

- Remove books written by anti-American Muslim leaders from public libraries: (Now consider a Muslim clergyman who preaches hatred of the United States...) If some people in your community suggested that a book he wrote which preaches hatred of the United States should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?

- Remove books written by anti-American Muslim leaders from public libraries (GENDER-NEUTRAL VARIATION): (Now consider a Islamic religious leader who preaches hatred of the United States...) If some people in your community suggested that a book this

person wrote which preaches hatred of the United States should be taken out of your public library, would you favor removing this book, or not?

- Religious affiliation: What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?

- Denomination: (IF PROTESTANT) What specific denomination is that, if any?

- Other denomination: (IF PROTESTANT) What specific denomination is that, if any?

- Frequency of religious service attendance: How often do you attend religious services?

- Frequency of religious activity: How often do you take part in the activities and organizations of a church or place of worship other than attending services?

- Frequency of prayer: About how often do you pray?

- Religious person: To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person? Are you very religious, moderately religious, slightly religious, or not religious at all?

- Religious importance: How important is religion in your life – very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?

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Research Paper Title:
Religion and Political Orientation: An Examination of Intolerance

Major Professor: Dr. Rachel Whaley