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More than Economic? Assessing the Symbolic Power of Multilateralism in Economic Sanctions

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MORE THAN ECONOMIC? ASSESSING THE SYMBOLIC POWER OF MULTILATERALISM IN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

by

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TITLE: MORE THAN ECONOMIC? ASSESSING THE SYMBOLIC POWER OF MULTILATERALISM IN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

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This study builds on the extensive literature regarding the use of economic sanctions in international relations. In particular, this study addressing the growing question regarding the effectiveness of economic sanctions and the relative efficacy of multilateral sanctions in comparison to unilateral sanctions. Similarly, it addresses the potential differential impact of multilateralism on cases of economic sanctions sponsored primarily by small states versus cases in which great powers are the primary sponsors of the sanctions in question. Using updated data from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset, this study demonstrates the increased effectiveness of multilateral sanctions at various levels of associated costs to the target states. At every level of target costs, multilateral sanctions are shown to be more effective that unilateral sanctions. These results suggest an intangible, symbolic power component of economic sanctions, not simply an economic impact, which runs contrary to much of the existing literature on economic sanctions.

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INTRODUCTION

Economic sanctions have become increasingly prevalent in the foreign policy of states around the world, especially the United States. Hufbauer and Schott (1985) documented 103 cases of economic sanctions since World War I. More recent studies have indicated even more extensive use of economic sanctions around the world. Bapat and Morgan (2009) introduce new data that accounts for 1412 cases in which states either applied or threatened to apply economic sanctions on a single target between 1945 and 2005. Using this new data, this study will contribute to the extensive literature on economic sanctions by assessing the symbolic power added to economic sanctions by increased multilateralism. Many have considered the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions in comparison to that of unilateral sanctions. However, these assessments have largely been from a perspective of increased costs to the target state, whether it is through greater economic resources or enhanced compliance mechanisms in international institutions. None to the knowledge of the author have addressed the potential intangible power component of multilateralism. That is, none have studied how multilateralism can impact success in ways other than increased compliance and greater costs to the target state. This study is situated in this gap.

The remainder of the paper will first include an overview of the wide literature on economic sanctions, followed by theoretical arguments regarding the enhanced effect of multilateralism in sanctions sent by major world powers. Then, the theoretical argument will be tested empirically using data assembled by Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi (2013), known as the Threat & Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) 4.0 dataset. The paper will conclude following a report and discussion of test results.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

While the use of economic sanctions is disputed on moral and practical grounds, the fact remains that economic sanctions are a popular tool of foreign policy. This is likely in part due to the nature of economic sanctions as a policy that is neither too forceful nor too soft (Hufbauer and Schott, 1985). Economic sanctions provide policymakers a policy option that is short of war, but still pressures the target state to change the behavior in question.

The efficacy of economic sanctions as a policy option, however, is the subject of serious debate and has been so for decades. Many studies have addressed if, and in what cases or conditions, economic sanctions are a reliable coercive tool. Allen, for example, demonstrates that democratic target states are more likely to concede to sanctions pressure because the leaders in democratic states, "fearing public reprisal, gain little by holding out and bearing the economic burden of sanctions" (2005). Conversely, though, authoritarian leadership systems can distribute scarce resources to their vital constituencies. This insulation from "public reprisal" increases the likelihood that the target state can better absorb the political ramifications that come with resisting economic sanctions, thus decreasing the likelihood of sanction success (Allen 2005). Bapat et al (2013) support such an argument, as they demonstrate through new data that democracy in sender and target states has a positive relationship to sanction success.

The literature on economic sanctions, however, extends far beyond considerations of governmental systems. Recent literature has also included a focus on the consequences of economic sanctions outside their specified objective, which are often unintended and sometimes severe. Economic sanctions are often criticized on ethical and humanitarian grounds due to their frequent side effects. Perhaps the most salient manifestation of this criticism came following United States sanctions on Iraq before the 1991 Gulf War. Widespread criticism arose as

American sanctions were increasingly viewed as the cause of severe malnutrition in Iraqi children. Daponte and Garfield (2000) examine this relationship and conclude that sanctions were the source of dramatically increased mortality rates among Iraqi children.

Mazaheri (2010) also examines the case of sanctions in Iraq, but addresses primarily the effects of the sanctions on the domestic political circumstances. Mazaheri (2010) reveals that the sanctions did not weaken the Hussein government, but rather strengthened Hussein's hold on power. This offers insight into another line of literature that has studied the impact of economic sanctions on democratic progress and human rights in the target states. Peksen and Drury (2010) argue that economic sanctions make democratic progress more unlikely, while actively encouraging the progression of authoritarianism. Similarly, Peksen (2009) demonstrates that human rights may worsen under economic sanctions, not improve.

Others consider the unwanted consequences of economic sanctions on various economic metrics in the target state. Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2016), for example, show that economic sanctions have a positive relationship with wider poverty gaps in target states. Afesorgbor and Mahadevan (2016) similarly conclude that greater economic inequality in target states can be attributed at least in part to economic sanctions. Both assessments conclude that the efficacy of economic sanctions should be seriously reconsidered. Much of the criticism for economic sanctions asks if the desired policy change is worth the domestic civilian costs in the target states. This consideration has fueled the debate over what can be considered successful in the use of economic sanctions. If the policy objective is obtained, but millions die from starvation, are the sanctions truly successful? The existing literature has thus examined the ways in which states can effectively implement economic sanctions without severe and unintended consequences for civilian populations in target states.

These questions and criticisms have led to a broader debate over the definition of success.

Some consider success in terms of how effective the sanctions are in achieving the desired policy objective. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1985) and Pape (1997) question the effectiveness of economic sanctions, as they argue that if the case of sanctions does not achieve its stated policy objective, then those sanctions are not to be considered successful. Early and Jadoon (2016) assess the effectiveness of sanctions in terms of how the sanctions impact foreign aid flows in the target country. They argue that sanctions cannot be considered effective or successful if such sanctions result in increased foreign aid flows to the target state (Early and Jadoon 2016). Such an effect would directly interfere with and counteract the intended pressure of the sanctions themselves.

Baldwin (1999) broadens possible conceptions of sanctions success, as he considers success in various dimensions. Effectiveness in achieving the stated policy objective is just one dimension of success (Baldwin 1999). For Baldwin (1999), success of sanctions must be considered relative to the overall costs. Thus, if a set of sanctions is only partially effective in achieving its stated policy objective, yet it cost the sender state very little, this instance of sanctions may be considered more successful than an instance in which the stated policy objective was fully achieved, but the sender state suffered serious costs to achieve such a goal. Importantly, though, Baldwin (1999) addresses theoretically the difficulty in assessing success of what are often called "symbolic sanctions," which are sanctions that may have minor costs and little chance of success, but are used to send a message to the target state. Such sanctions are still an attempt to influence the behavior of a target state. Rather than dismiss symbolic sanctions as "merely symbolic," Baldwin argues that there may be some value in considering the utility of symbolic sanctions as a tool of economic statecraft. The symbolic component of economic sanctions is important to identifying and formalizing a sender state's values and foreign policy objectives. If a given set of sanctions does not achieve its stated policy objective, but it

effectively establishes and formalizes the sender state's values and policy positions, Baldwin (1999) argues that it should not be considered a total failure. He argues that, while symbolic sanctions are unlikely to have success in terms of their effectiveness toward the given policy objective, they still act as an "instrument of statecraft," and may still be considered successful if the benefits still outweigh the costs (Baldwin 1999).

The standing literature on economic sanctions, however, has yet to test the coercive success of symbolic sanctions empirically. The question of whether or not largely symbolic sanctions may still be successful coercive tools of economic statecraft has gone unanswered to date. This relates closely to the frequent consideration of sanction costs to the target state. Bapat, et al (2009 & 2013) show clearly that higher costs to target states are highly correlated to sanction success in achieving its stated policy objective. They also demonstrate that multilateral sanctions are more effective than unilateral sanctions, especially when an international organization is involved in sending the sanctions. The increased success of multilateral sanctions is often attributed to the increased economic costs to the target states. A broader coalition of sender states most likely represents a larger economic force and, thus, coercive power than if any of the individual sender states were to act unilaterally. Bapat, et al (2009) argue that international organizations may increase success by enhancing cooperation and compliance, while minimizing structural obstacles. Bapat, et al (2013) demonstrate that high target costs and international organization involvement are high correlated to sanction success.

The relationship to be considered here, however, is that between symbolic sanctions and their outcomes. Symbolic sanctions, as described by Baldwin (1999), are those in which the anticipated or observed sanction costs are relatively low and, thus, that expectations for success are also relatively low. As previously mentioned, though, Baldwin (1999) argues that symbolic sanctions, or those to be used as a signal, "constitute influence attempts in precisely the same

sense that firing a shot across the bow of a ship or some other show of force is an influence attempt." Thus, influence can come from a variety of sources, of which military force and symbolic pressure are examples. This inspires the question, then, of whether symbolic pressure can be an effective tool in achieving the stated policy objectives of economic sanctions. The standing literature, and much of the criticism of economic sanctions, also offers a question about how economic sanctions may be made more effective without worsening the quality of life and severe living conditions within the target state. This paper will address these question, as well as the question of whether multilateralism exerts greater symbolic pressure, as it does economic pressure.

CHAPTER 3

HYPOTHESIS & THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

In 1990, Joseph Nye introduced to international relations academia the term "soft power," through which he accounted for the intangible ability of powerful states to attract and persuade other states to subscribe to a similar set of ideals in both foreign and domestic policy without the use of force or coercion. Nye (2017) is sure to clarify that soft power is not a normative concept. State and non-state actors who exhibit behavior far from normative may also enjoy significant soft power. Nonetheless, the concept of soft power is predicated on the idea that states may influence behavior in many ways. Hard power, such as military and economic strength, is an important component of influence, but, for many, it is no longer considered the sole source of state power. Nye (2017) argues that a combination of hard and soft power, called "smart power," is likely the most effective approach to foreign policy, thus indicating that states with significant hard power capabilities may be best positioned to influence policy from a soft power perspective, generally. One could infer, as many have demonstrated, that great powers, then, are well-positioned to influence policy and decision-making from a persuasive, ideas-based perspective because of their ability to back up their soft power influence with hard power capabilities.

Great powers and the cooperation and competition between them have played a dominant role in shaping the current international order. Competition has landscaped the dynamics of power relationships between great powers and between great powers and their less powerful neighbors. Cooperation has been the driving force behind the development of the current system of rules, norms, and institutions, through which both hard and soft power may be expressed. Major global policy coordination efforts in the years since World War II have been strongest when great powers work together.

When great powers cooperate, the pool from which resources and influence may be

drawn grows significantly. Military, economic, and ideological strength multiplies as coalitions of great powers converge. On the one hand, great power cooperation greatly increases the hard power capabilities to support the objective at hand. On the other hand, when the states who are best positioned to influence policy from a soft power perspective cooperate to achieve a given objective, one could similarly infer that such cooperation enhances the intangible power component, as well.

The ideas of soft power and normative power are well-documented, and great power behavior has been central to the development of these ideas in practice. Bapat, Morgan, and Kobayashi (2013) demonstrated that multilateralism increases the economic pressure a coalition of states can impose. If one is to recognize that such concepts as soft power and normative power exist, one could also infer that multilateralism in these areas may have a similar enhancement effect on soft and normative power projections. When more states, especially great powers, cooperate on a given policy objective, in this case economic sanctions, they pool both their hard and soft power capabilities. Pooling these resources would likely increase the chances that the coalition of states would achieve its objective. In controlling for hard power capabilities, it would still make sense that a larger pool of soft power and normative power capabilities would increase the likelihood of policy success.

Great powers possess significant hard and soft power capabilities individually. This is not to say that combining efforts would not increase their strength, but the marginal impact may be assumed to be less than that of a case in which smaller states decide to coalesce around a given policy objective and set of sanctions. Two smaller states may have more to gain from joining efforts than two great powers, as great powers may likely be able to achieve their policy objectives alone. These are, thus, the hypotheses for this analysis:

H1: The likelihood of sanction success will increase if the sanctions are sent

multilaterally.

H2: The likelihood of sanction success will increase as more great powers are involved.

H3: Multilateralism will have a greater positive impact on non-great power senders' sanctions than on great power senders' sanctions.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

This analysis uses data compiled by Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi called the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) 4.0 dataset. This dataset includes 1412 cases of either the threat or imposition of economic sanctions from 1945 to 2005. The data regarding each individual sanctions case were collected from a variety of primary and secondary sources, but primarily from *Lexis-Nexis, Facts on File*, and *Keesing's Record of Contemporary Events.*

For this analysis, not all 1412 cases will be utilized. Rather, cases in which international institutions play a central role in sending the economic sanctions will be eliminated. As demonstrated by Bapat, Morgan, and Kobayashi (2013), the involvement of international institutions in sending economic sanctions increases the likelihood that such sanctions achieve their given policy objective. However, most cases of economic sanctions since 1945 have not been carried out through an international institution. Most have been undertaken by individual state actors or a collection of state actors outside the bounds and framework of an international institution. The purpose of this study is to assess state action on economic sanctions, not that of non-state or supranational entities. Since most economic sanctions are sent outside of international institutions, assessing the value added by additional state actors is important for understanding sanction success moving forward. This change leaves 1,047 cases of economic sanctions sent by individual states or a small coalition of states.

Three analyses will be executed for this study. One analysis will be based on all the cases remaining after the elimination of those with international institution involvement. The second analysis will be of cases in which one of nine great world powers was the primary sender of sanctions. These nine countries represent the five permanent United Nations Security Council members—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China—and Canada,

Germany, Japan, and Italy, which represent the top four economic powers outside the P5 countries. The dataset includes observations until 2005. While these four countries may not be the four most powerful economies in 2021, they were when the data collection ended. These states were chosen for the second analysis for two reasons. The first is that most economic sanctions are sent by one or multiple of these countries. The second analysis, then, provides insight into the effectiveness of sanctions limited to those countries by which sanctions are most frequently imposed. The second reason for choosing these countries relates to an earlier point of discussion regarding great power cooperation. The second analysis focuses primarily on the relationship between great power cooperation and effective economic sanctions. Limiting the cases to great power senders in the second analysis has allowed for the isolation of these cases, so the effect of multilateralism may be considered purely among great powers. The third analysis is similar conceptually to the second analysis. With the third analysis, however, the cases are limited to those in which a non-great power is listed as the primary sender. Separating this study into three specific analyses allows for the representation of potentially differing effects of multilateralism based on the size and influence of the sender state(s).

The analyses will each employ an ordered logistic regression, using a variety of variables generated from the existing TIES dataset. Of particular importance are variables regarding the final outcome of sanctions (*success*), the degree of multilateralism represented by sender states (*multilateral, coalition*), the costs associated with the sanctions for the target state (*costs*), and the degree of major power involvement in each case of economic sanctions (*totalgreat*).

The dependent variable *success* is measured on three-value scale representing completely unsuccessful sanctions, partially successful efforts, and completely successful sanctions. It is this three-value ordinal dependent variable that required the usage of an ordered logistic regression. A value of zero is given to cases where the sender state(s) capitulated before the target state

modified its behavior, a value of one is given to cases in which the target state changed some of the targeted behavior or agreed to a negotiated settlement, and a value of two is given to cases in which the target state acquiesced completely to the sender state demands.

The primary independent variables for this analysis are *coalition, costs,* and *totalgreat.* The *coalition* variable is a three-value variable measuring the degree of multilateralism observed in each case of economic sanctions. A value of zero represents unilateral sanctions, a value of one represents multilateral sanctions without the presence of a major power, and a value of two represents multilateral sanctions with at least one major power involved.

The *costs* variable measures the anticipated or actual costs for the target state of each case of sanctions. This variable is also assigned three possible values, where a value of one represents minor target costs, a value of two represents major costs, and a value of three represents severe costs. "Minor" costs are categorized as those in which there is little to no evidence that the sanctions will negatively impact the target state's economic function. "Major" costs are those cases in which "significant macroeconomic difficulties" are likely to be present in the target country, such as inflation or unemployment increasing by more than five percent, or serious reductions in trade relationships. Instances of "severe" costs are those in which the basic functionality of a target state's economy is threatened. In these instances, the target state is likely to experience the inability to control vital resources like food, water, oil, and electricity. Severe costs also include cases in which the sanctions spur an increased mortality rate or complete economic isolation from the rest of the world.

Finally, the *totalgreat* variable measures the degree to which great powers are involved in the given set of sanctions. *Totalgreat* is a five-value variable, where a value of one indicates that only one great power is involved in the sanctions, and a value of five means that five great powers are included as sender states. This variable assessed the impact of increasing great power

involvement on the likelihood of sanction success.

This analysis used ordered logistic regression and subsequent predicted probabilities to estimate the likelihood of each possible outcome at a set level of cost, multilateralism, and great power involvement. The results are reported in the next section.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

These analyses offer interesting results, some expected and some unexpected. Each of the following reported results are statistically significant. Regarding the first analysis, in which all cases were considered, the findings are in line with both ***H1*** and ***H2.*** In assessing cases with similar target costs, multilateralism increased the likelihood of achieving a partial or fully successful outcome. Unilateral sanctions with minor target costs are only likely to achieve complete success 17.2% of the time, while multilateral sanctions are likely to achieve complete success 19.5% of the time. Including a great power in multilateral sanctions increases likely success to 22.0%. Similar results apply when target costs are major and severe. The difference between unilateral and multilateral sanctions at major target costs is 3.2%, and that gap is 3.7% at severe costs. Chances for success jump to 52.5% for multilateral sanctions with at least one great power at severe target costs. Similarly, more great power involvement increased the likelihood of success at each level of target cost. That is, five great powers participating in a set of sanctions was more likely to be successful than one great power participating, even as the target costs remained the same. One great power involved in a minor target cost sanction regime is likely to achieve full success only 18.5% of the time. This is in comparison to 27.1% of the time when five great powers are involved. This increase from unilateral to multilateral sanctions at major costs to the target is 11.5%, and 12% at severe target costs. These results are presented in Figure 1a and Figure 1b, in which the percent likelihood of each outcome is presented.

The second analysis, which is that assessing the effect of multilateralism on great-power sent sanctions only, produces similar results, but of lesser magnitude. That is, the increase in probability of success between cases where a great power is the sole sender and those in which great powers work together is only 1% in cases with minor target costs, 1.3% in cases with major

target costs, and 1.6% in cases with severe target costs. While these results still show an increased positive effect of great power coalitions, the magnitude is less than that of all cases generally. In considering the degree to which great powers participate, the results show a similar effect. An individual great power has a chance of sanction success 19.4% of the time at minor costs to the target. Five great powers working together have a 21.7% chance of success at the same level of target costs. At major costs to the target, an individual great power has a 31.3% chance of success, while five great powers have a 34.5% chance of success. These percentages are 46.5% and 50.1% at severe costs to the target. These results are presented in Figure 2a and Figure 2b.

In the third analysis, where only non-great power states are the primary sender of sanctions, the effects of multilateralism are strong. At minor costs to the target, multilateralism increases the chance of success 3.8%, and increase an additional 4.7% if a great power is included in the multilateral effort to a total chance for success of 21.1%. At major costs, non-great power states may have a 24.6% chance of success when acting alone, a 30.7% chance with a multilateral effort, and a 37.6% chance of success when the multilateral effort includes a great power. At severe costs, these percentages are 42.3%, 49.9%, and 57.6%, respectively. Thus, at least one great power participating in a smaller state's sanctions resulted in a 15.3% increase in chances for success at the same level of cost to the target. The effect of increasing great power involvement is particularly pronounced among cases in which a non-great power is the primary sender. At minor target costs, chances for success gradually increase from 14.6% to 35.6% from one great power to five. These percentages increase from 33.0% to 61.4% for major costs, and from 58.6% to 82.0% for severe costs. More great powers participating in a smaller state's set of sanctions clearly increases their chances for success. These results are presented in Figure 3a and Figure 3b.

The results also are supportive of ***H3***, that multilateralism has a larger positive impact on sanctions sent primarily by non-great power countries. Among smaller states, multilateral increases chances for success by 3.8% at minor costs, 6.1% at major costs, and 7.6% at major costs. Those percentages are even higher when a great power is involved. Among great power primary senders, however, multilateralism only increases the chances of success 0.5% at minor costs, 0.6% at major costs, and 0.8% at severe costs. While these percentages are higher when joined by multiple great powers, the added benefit of multilateralism is still substantially lower than that of small-state multilateralism.










Figure 3a: Effect of Multilateralism on Sanctions with Non-Great Power Primary Sender
% Chance for Complete Sanction Success
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Minor Cost
Major Cost
Severe Cost
Unilateral
Multilateral
Multilateral w/Great Power
Level of Multilateralism at Various Target Costs


Figure 3b: Effect of Additional Great Power Senders on Sanctions with Non-Great Power Primary Sender
% Chance for Complete Sanction Success
100
80
60
40
20
0
Minor Cost
Major Cost
Severe Cost
1 Great Power
2 Great Powers
3 Great Powers
4 Great Powers
5 Great Powers
Level of Great Power Involvement at Various Target Costs

CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The results presented in the previous section offer a new perspective of the intangible power of multilateralism. While the results support previous studies that show target costs to be strongly and positively associated with sanction success, this study has demonstrated that, holding target costs equal, multilateralism increases the likelihood of success universally, not just in sanctions sent by great powers or by smaller states. Multilateralism frequently increases the costs of sanctions to the target state, but these results indicate that there is an additional force at work, not just the economic costs to the target state. It is a force that indicates there is, in fact, a symbolic and intangible power of economic sanctions, and that symbolic power is enhanced when sanctions are sent multilaterally. There may be several reasons why multilateralism increases the symbolic power of economic sanctions.

The first of these reasons may apply similarly to both small and large states. It is the issue of international status, or the lack thereof, and how it may relate to both unilateral and multilateral sanctions. One goal of economic sanctions is to inflict economic damage severe enough that the target state capitulates to the sender's demands. On the other hand, sanctions have also been argued to have a stigmatizing effect on the target state's international standing and foreign policy goals. Early and Jadoon (2016) connect this stigmatization to flow of foreign aid to the target state. They argue that, if sanctions really do stigmatize target countries, foreign investors would become more wary of investing in that state. They find, however, that foreign aid flows are NOT negatively impacted if the state is the target of economic sanctions, rather that sanctions sent by the United States actually have a positive effect on foreign aid flows (Early & Jadoon 2016). This would imply, they argue, that economic sanctions do not have the stigmatizing effect that many would believe. The results of this study, though, conclude that

donor self-interest is likely the cause for why their observations revealed such puzzling results. This leaves open the question of stigmatization and how it impacts economic sanctions.

Stigmatization is one potential explanation for why multilateral sanctions are more effective that unilateral sanctions regardless of cost to the target state. The concept of stigmatization is based on the idea that heads of state and government leaders are affected by the perception of their home country on the global stage. If sanctions are applied unilaterally, it signals to the target state that the sender country is dissatisfied with the policy or decision in question. The individual sender state may have substantial hard or soft power influence in the target state, and thus the target state may capitulate. However, it is certainly possible that the individual sender state is not in such a position of power, or that the sanction sent by that state does not have that kind of strategic or intangible influence over the target. As in the study by Early and Jadoon (2016), sanctioning by the United States may actually have an opposite influence. Rather than stigmatize a country through coercive measures, such measures may actually increase the target country's standing globally. When we consider multilateral sanctions, however, the likelihood of this effect decreases. As more countries ascribe to the belief that the target state should be punished, the action is likely to be perceived as more legitimate globally. As more countries take part in sanctions, more governments around the world are likely to conclude that the action is justified. As such, greater multilateral involvement may, in turn, enhance the stigmatizing and politically isolating effect of economic sanctions. This may certainly help explain why international institutions are particularly successful in sending economic sanctions.

However, greater stigmatization is not the end result of multilateralism in sending economic sanctions. Rather, it is a channel through which other areas of the health of the target country are harmed. Sanctions, as demonstrated in the data, are used the vast majority of the time

to resolve economic disputes. International relationships extend far beyond economic issues, however. Greater stigmatization of the target states could jeopardize the target's relationship with countries around the world that view the senders' actions favorably, not just the sender state.

It may harm more than just economic relationships, though. If a target state becomes more politically isolated because of increasing multilateral pressure through sanctions, strategic partnerships may also be imperiled. The resistance of the target state despite multilateral pressure may signal to sender and other states that the target should not be trusted, is difficult to work with, or is unwilling to cooperate or compromise. Trust and cooperation are key state qualities in strategic partnerships. Thus, in resisting the sanctions, the target state may jeopardize existing and potential future partnerships. Heads of state and other government officials may likely want to avoid this scenario, and thus may capitulate to multilateral demands more quickly than they would if just one state demands change.

In a similar way, broadened stigmatization and political isolation brought on by multilateral sanctions may play a key role in the target state's standing in international organizations. The United Nations Security Council and the UN Human Rights Council non-permanent members, for example, are elected by vote of the UN General Assembly to serve in these sought-after positions. Holding a position on the UN Security Council is associated with a 59% increase in US aid and an 8% increase in UN aid (Kuziemko & Werker 2006). Not only this, but a place on the UN Security Council unarguably enhances a state's international status. A place on the UNSC may also put the state in a position to influence decisions regarding its own security situation or that of its allies.

The UN Human Rights Council may have a similar effect. Especially for countries with less-than-stellar human rights records, election to the UN Human Rights Council may serve as a

substantial status boost. It would also place the country in a decision-making capacity regarding human rights violations globally, potentially within its own borders or within those of a close ally. As mentioned, membership on these councils is elected by the UN General Assembly. States must vie with other states for an affirmative vote and, without enough support, their membership on these councils would not be possible. Greater stigmatization and political isolation, especially for smaller and less influential states, would almost certainly harm their prospects of such council memberships. This threat extends beyond just the UNSC and UNHRC, of course, but these two councils provide high-profile examples of an intangible cost of resisting multilateral sanctions and help explain why states act in response to more than just increased economic costs.

An additional impact of multilateral sanctions that may not be felt by unilateral sanctions is with regard to domestic politics in the target state. The style of government has been a common point of discussion regarding economic sanctions. Authoritarian governments are often seen as being more resistant to economic sanctions because of the ability of government leaders to shift blame and shift economic distress away from their core supporters. Democratic governments are seen as more susceptible to economic sanctions, as they must respond to public outcry or risk losing power. Both of these governmental systems, however, are likely more susceptible to multilateral sanctions than they are to unilateral sanctions, but not just because of the increased costs to their economic health. Rather, multilateral sanctions may make it more difficult for the target government to shift blame away from themselves and mislead their publics. When a single state imposes unilateral sanctions, the target government could, somewhat easily, argue that single state is unfairly targeting them, or that it is purely self-interested, or that the claims of the sender state are illegitimate. This argument remains possible with multilateral sanctions, but the case gets weaker as more sender states become involved and

more support builds around the world. It becomes harder to argue unfair treatment when a coalition of states collectively believe the target state has acted badly. Public opinion matters, whether in an authoritarian or democratic state. When enough of the public blames the sitting government for problems they are having rather than the sender of sanctions, the government leaders face much greater pressure to respond accordingly. Multilateralism could increase the likelihood of this scenario.

This collection of possible scenarios may help explain why the data demonstrate a clear advantage to multilateral sanctions regardless of economic costs to the target state. Clearly, there is an additional force at work beyond economic costs. These theories are some of those that may explain the intangible and symbolic force demonstrated by multilateralism in economic sanctions.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This study has demonstrated that multilateral sanctions are more effective that unilateral sanctions, despite imposing similar costs on the target state. This is especially true when great powers are involved in sending the economic sanctions. In fact, great power multilateral sanctions that impose only minor costs on a target state are demonstrably more effective than unilateral sanctions that impose major costs on a target state (see Figures 2b and 3b). These results may better inform our understanding of economic sanctions and multilateralism more broadly. Where multilateralism is becoming increasingly common, but also frequently scrutinized in the United States, it is important to understand that multilateralism may be a crucial tool in successfully achieving our stated policy objectives. This study has also demonstrated that economic sanctions do not have to inflict the maximum possible damage to increase their chances of success. The United States has been oft-criticized for the indiscriminate nature of its economic sanctions that have, at times, resulted in substantial suffering of vulnerable populations and severe adverse effects on the economic health of the target state. Of course, this has been the goal of economic sanctions. That is, to push the target state to a point of economic suffering where their only option is to capitulate. What this study provides, however, is a potential alternative. While increasing costs does, in fact, increase the chances of sanction success, so does coalition-building. Instead of looking to inflict the most severe consequences on the target state, efforts to build a multilateral coalition may be additionally helpful in achieving the desired change without ratcheting up the costs for the target state. It should be the goal of the United States and countries around the world to achieve their policy objectives while simultaneously limiting the cost to the quality of life in target states as much as possible. This study demonstrates the possibility of such a future.

What this study does not explore, however, is the differential impact between sanctions sent officially through an international institution and those sent by a coalition of states outside of an international institution. One may presume that an international institution may provide increased legitimacy and stigmatization power to the set of sanctions, which could, in turn, allow for sanctions of minor costs to the target state to become even more successful than those discussed in this analysis. Future analyses should consider this question. Similarly, this study considers the effect of multilateralism on all sanctions, generally. The majority of sanctions are sent because of economic disputes. Some are sent for territorial disputes, and some for military disputes. There are a whole host of behaviors that trigger targeting by economic sanctions. Future studies may also consider the differential impact of multilateralism on each triggering behavior. It would be beneficial to understand if multilateralism increases chances for success on territorial disputes, but not on economic disputes, for example. The literature on economic sanctions is vast, but there is much still to be learned. This study is contributed to that end, and encourages the continued research regarding the successful and ethical imposition of economic sanctions.

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TIES User Manual

APPENDIX

The following output tables show the effects of multilateralism on cases of economic sanctions generally, where an outcome of one represents "no success," an outcome of two represents "partial success," and an outcome of three represents "complete success.":

```
. ologit success costs coalition institution

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -872.62388
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -849.29795
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -849.22824
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -849.22822

Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs =    823
                                                LR chi2(3)    =  46.79
                                                Prob > chi2   = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -849.22822                     Pseudo R2     = 0.0268
```

success	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
costs	.6846153	.1242145	5.51	0.000	.4411593	.9280713
coalition	.1515124	.1204349	1.26	0.208	-.0845355	.3875604
institution	.2623576	.2075371	1.26	0.206	-.1444076	.6691227
/cut1	.7943114	.1718505			.4574905	1.131132
/cut2	2.255502	.1890518			1.884967	2.626036

```
. margins, at(costs=1 coalition=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                            Number of obs = 823
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 1
    coalition   = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.4895474	.0347466	14.09	0.000	.4214453	.5576496
2	.3156928	.0197075	16.02	0.000	.2770668	.3543188
3	.1947597	.0233191	8.35	0.000	.1490552	.2404643

```
. margins, at(costs=2 coalition=0 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                            Number of obs = 823
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 2
    coalition   = 0
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.3601025	.0286751	12.56	0.000	.3039003	.4163048
2	.3480176	.0179851	19.35	0.000	.3127675	.3832676
3	.2918799	.0262215	11.13	0.000	.2404867	.3432732

```
. margins, at(cost=1 coalition=0 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                            Number of obs = 823
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 1
    coalition   = 0
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.5273966	.0209726	25.15	0.000	.4862911	.568502
2	.3005134	.0163024	18.43	0.000	.2685613	.3324655
3	.17209	.0145914	11.79	0.000	.1434914	.2006887

```
. margins, at(costs=1 coalition=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                            Number of obs = 823
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 1
    coalition   = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.4518178	.0609699	7.41	0.000	.332319	.5713165
2	.3285587	.0246549	13.33	0.000	.2802359	.3768815
3	.2196235	.0429291	5.12	0.000	.1354841	.303763

```
. margins, at(costs=2 coalition=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                            Number of obs = 823
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 2
    coalition   = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.3259783	.0346513	9.41	0.000	.2580629	.3938936
2	.3498704	.01792	19.52	0.000	.3147478	.384993
3	.3241513	.0345336	9.39	0.000	.2564667	.3918359

```
. margins, at(costs=2 coalition=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 823
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(0))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(0))

At: costs       = 2
    coalition   = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.293604	.0521676	5.63	0.000	.1913573	.3958507
2	.3482101	.018619	18.70	0.000	.3117175	.3847026
3	.358186	.0575226	6.23	0.000	.2454436	.4709283

```
. margins, at(costs=3 coalition=0 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 823
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(0))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(0))

At: costs       = 3
    coalition   = 0
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.221054	.0402902	5.49	0.000	.1420867	.3000214
2	.3291898	.0235328	13.99	0.000	.2830663	.3753133
3	.4497562	.0567362	7.93	0.000	.3385552	.5609571

```
. margins, at(costs=3 coalition=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 823
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(0))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(0))

At: costs       = 3
    coalition   = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.196069	.0390164	5.03	0.000	.1195982	.2725398
2	.3164643	.0268084	11.80	0.000	.2639208	.3690078
3	.4874667	.0604006	8.07	0.000	.3690838	.6058497

```
. margins, at(costs=3 coalition=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 823
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(0))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(0))

At: costs       = 3
    coalition   = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.1732797	.0445693	3.89	0.000	.0859255	.2606339
2	.3013997	.0351652	8.57	0.000	.2324772	.3703223
3	.5253206	.0761828	6.90	0.000	.3760051	.674636

The following output tables show the effect of increasing great power involvement in cases of economic sanctions generally.

```
. ologit success costs totalgreat institution

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -919.32325
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -886.85958
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -886.7476
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -886.74755

Ordered logistic regression                       Number of obs =    861
                                                  LR chi2(3)    =  65.15
                                                  Prob > chi2   = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -886.74755                       Pseudo R2     = 0.0354
```

success	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
costs	.7525065	.1218805	6.17	0.000	.5136252	.9913878
totalgreat	.123193	.0928671	1.33	0.185	-.0588231	.3052092
institution	.4745721	.1661665	2.86	0.004	.1488918	.8002523
/cut1	.861009	.169365			.5290597	1.192958
/cut2	2.356626	.1874009			1.989327	2.723925

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=1 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(0))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(0))

At: costs       = 1
    totalgreat  = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.4963274	.0306169	16.21	0.000	.4363195	.5563354
2	.318385	.0187431	16.99	0.000	.2816491	.3551209
3	.1852876	.0201866	9.18	0.000	.1457225	.2248526

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=2 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 1
    totalgreat  = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.4655836	.0499389	9.32	0.000	.3677053	.563462
2	.3298074	.0230381	14.32	0.000	.2846535	.3749613
3	.204609	.0336061	6.09	0.000	.1387421	.2704758

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=3 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 1
    totalgreat  = 3
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.4350991	.0707318	6.15	0.000	.2964674	.5737308
2	.3395131	.0260429	13.04	0.000	.2884699	.3905564
3	.2253878	.0507953	4.44	0.000	.1258309	.3249447

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=4 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 1
    totalgreat  = 4
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.4050975	.0910034	4.45	0.000	.2267341	.583461
2	.3472826	.0265965	13.06	0.000	.2951543	.3994109
3	.2476198	.0706739	3.50	0.000	.1091016	.3861381

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=5 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 1
    totalgreat  = 5
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.3757885	.1099298	3.42	0.001	.1603302	.5912469
2	.3529346	.024433	14.45	0.000	.3050469	.4008224
3	.2712768	.0928088	2.92	0.003	.089375	.4531787

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=1 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 2
    totalgreat  = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.3170858	.0318333	9.96	0.000	.2546937	.3794778
2	.3573726	.0176541	20.24	0.000	.3227713	.3919739
3	.3255416	.0321691	10.12	0.000	.2624914	.3885918

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=2 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 2
    totalgreat  = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.2910294	.0440192	6.61	0.000	.2047534	.3773053
2	.3558218	.0181031	19.66	0.000	.3203404	.3913033
3	.3531488	.048375	7.30	0.000	.2583357	.447962

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=3 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(0))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 2
    totalgreat  = 3
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.2662792	.0575169	4.63	0.000	.1535481	.3790103
2	.3519487	.0208306	16.90	0.000	.3111214	.3927761
3	.381772	.0690029	5.53	0.000	.2465288	.5170152

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=5 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 2
    totalgreat  = 5
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.2209792	.0808759	2.73	0.006	.0624653	.3794931
2	.3376616	.0381993	8.84	0.000	.2627922	.4125309
3	.4413592	.1152458	3.83	0.000	.2154816	.6672368

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=2 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 3
    totalgreat  = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.1620713	.0385206	4.21	0.000	.0865723	.2375704
2	.3011751	.0337946	8.91	0.000	.2349389	.3674114
3	.5367535	.0688894	7.79	0.000	.4017327	.6717743

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=4 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 2
    totalgreat  = 4
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.2429128	.0700459	3.47	0.001	.1056254	.3802001
2	.345847	.0275537	12.55	0.000	.2918426	.3998513
3	.4112402	.0916709	4.49	0.000	.2315685	.590912

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=1 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 3
    totalgreat  = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.1795052	.0354496	5.06	0.000	.1100252	.2489852
2	.3144734	.0277601	11.33	0.000	.2600646	.3688822
3	.5060214	.0584934	8.65	0.000	.3913765	.6206663

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=3 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 3
    totalgreat  = 3
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.1460293	.0432403	3.38	0.001	.0612799	.2307787
2	.2867617	.04277	6.70	0.000	.2029341	.3705893
3	.567209	.0836113	6.78	0.000	.4033339	.7310841

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=4 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 3
    totalgreat  = 4
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.1313263	.0480289	2.73	0.006	.0371913	.2254612
2	.2715088	.0535809	5.07	0.000	.1664922	.3765255
3	.5971649	.099913	5.98	0.000	.4013389	.7929908

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=5 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 861
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 3
    totalgreat  = 5
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.1178993	.0521575	2.26	0.024	.0156725	.2201261
2	.2556877	.065201	3.92	0.000	.1278961	.3834794
3	.626413	.1161291	5.39	0.000	.3988042	.8540218

The following output tables are those in which only sanctions with a non-great power primary sender were considered.

```
. ologit success costs coalition institution

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -228.97845
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -219.60736
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -219.53792
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -219.53788
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -219.53788

Ordered logistic regression                       Number of obs =    217
                                                  LR chi2(3)    =  18.88
                                                  Prob > chi2   = 0.0003
Log likelihood = -219.53788                       Pseudo R2     = 0.0412
```

success	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
costs	.8112171	.2197914	3.69	0.000	.3804338	1.242
coalition	.3075799	.1989026	1.55	0.122	-.082262	.6974218
institution	.059926	.3113676	0.19	0.847	-.5503434	.6701953
/cut1	.9426183	.33845			.2792684	1.605968
/cut2	2.744096	.3886383			1.982379	3.505813

```
. margins, at(costs=1 coalition=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 217
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 1
    coalition   = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.4560689	.0626155	7.28	0.000	.3333447	.5787931
2	.3794557	.0407562	9.31	0.000	.2995751	.4593364
3	.1644754	.0384918	4.27	0.000	.0890329	.239918

```
. margins, at(costs=1 coalition=0 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 217
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 1
    coalition   = 0
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.5328031	.0466522	11.42	0.000	.4413664	.6242398
2	.3407646	.035378	9.63	0.000	.2714249	.4101043
3	.1264323	.0260449	4.85	0.000	.0753852	.1774794

```
. margins, at(costs=1 coalition=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 217
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 1
    coalition   = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.381365	.0976807	3.90	0.000	.1899143	.5728157
2	.407437	.0446575	9.12	0.000	.3199099	.494964
3	.2111981	.070763	2.98	0.003	.0725052	.349891

```
. margins, at(costs=2 coalition=0 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 217
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 2
    coalition   = 0
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.3363024	.0510532	6.59	0.000	.2362399 .4363648
2	.4179944	.0372125	11.23	0.000	.3450593 .4909295
3	.2457032	.0441671	5.56	0.000	.1591373 .3322691

```
. margins, at(costs=2 coalition=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 217
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 2
    coalition   = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.2714267	.0541044	5.02	0.000	.165384 .3774695
2	.4215518	.0371064	11.36	0.000	.3488246 .4942791
3	.3070214	.0577157	5.32	0.000	.1939007 .4201422

```
. margins, at(costs=2 coalition=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 217
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 2
    coalition   = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.2150118	.0709114	3.03	0.002	.076028 .3539956
2	.4089742	.0440564	9.28	0.000	.3226252 .4953233
3	.376014	.0965997	3.89	0.000	.186682 .565346

```
. margins, at(costs=3 coalition=0 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 217
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 3
    coalition   = 0
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.1837667	.0611365	3.01	0.003	.0639413 .3035921
2	.393227	.0489118	8.04	0.000	.2973616 .4890924
3	.4230063	.0959652	4.41	0.000	.2349179 .6110947

```
. margins, at(costs=3 coalition=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 217
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 3
    coalition   = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.14202	.0520706	2.73	0.006	.0399635 .2440765
2	.3586961	.058593	6.12	0.000	.2438559 .4735364
3	.4992839	.1016548	4.91	0.000	.3000441 .6985237

```
. margins, at(costs=3 coalition=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 217
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 3
    coalition   = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.1084964	.0510194	2.13	0.033	.0085001 .2084926
2	.3159088	.0774246	4.08	0.000	.1641593 .4676582
3	.5755949	.123409	4.66	0.000	.3337177 .8174721

The following output tables show the effect of increasing great power involvement in sanctions sent primarily by a non-great power state.

```
. ologit success totalgreat costs institution

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -272.83442
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -254.78591
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -254.61499
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -254.61466
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -254.61466

Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs =    254
                                                LR chi2(3)    =  36.44
                                                Prob > chi2   = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -254.61466                     Pseudo R2     = 0.0668
```

success	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
totalgreat	.2925033	.1496287	1.95	0.051	-.0007635	.5857701
costs	1.056619	.211424	5.00	0.000	.6422355	1.471002
institution	.5357286	.2488316	2.15	0.031	.0480277	1.02343
/cut1	1.225188	.3279662			.5823866	1.86799
/cut2	3.113283	.3823593			2.363873	3.862693

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=2 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                            Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 2
    costs       = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.3973697	.0805983	4.93	0.000	.2393999	.5553394
2	.4159395	.0426435	9.75	0.000	.3323597	.4995193
3	.1866908	.0531454	3.51	0.000	.0825278	.2908538

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=4 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                            Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 4
    costs       = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.2686577	.1197637	2.24	0.025	.0339252	.5033902
2	.4395409	.0351013	12.52	0.000	.3707436	.5083381
3	.2918015	.1257415	2.32	0.020	.0453527	.5382502

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=1 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                            Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 1
    costs       = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.4690562	.0564162	8.31	0.000	.3584825	.5796298
2	.3846738	.0385061	9.99	0.000	.3092033	.4601443
3	.14627	.0320364	4.57	0.000	.0834798	.2090602

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=3 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                            Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 3
    costs       = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.329833	.1036842	3.18	0.001	.1266158	.5330503
2	.4349626	.0389239	11.17	0.000	.3586732	.5112521
3	.2352043	.0851328	2.76	0.006	.068347	.4020616

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=5 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                            Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 5
    costs       = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.2151855	.1272605	1.69	0.091	-.0342405	.4646115
2	.4291307	.0557998	7.69	0.000	.3197652	.5384962
3	.3556838	.1716896	2.07	0.038	.0191784	.6921891

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=1 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 1
    costs       = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.2349529	.0488996	4.80	0.000	.1391115 .3307942
2	.4349049	.0354707	12.26	0.000	.3653836 .5044263
3	.3301422	.0583601	5.66	0.000	.2157585 .4445259

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=2 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 2
    costs       = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.1864786	.0573061	3.25	0.001	.0741607 .2987965
2	.4158168	.044371	9.37	0.000	.3288513 .5027824
3	.3977046	.0873753	4.55	0.000	.226452 .5689571

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=3 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 3
    costs       = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.1460955	.0631394	2.31	0.021	.0223445 .2698464
2	.3845001	.0664268	5.79	0.000	.254306 .5146941
3	.4694044	.1223333	3.84	0.000	.2296355 .7091734

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=4 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 4
    costs       = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.1132402	.0646423	1.75	0.080	-.0134564 .2399369
2	.3443698	.0951053	3.62	0.000	.1579667 .5307728
3	.54239	.1558394	3.48	0.001	.2369504 .8478296

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=5 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 5
    costs       = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.0870208	.0624273	1.39	0.163	-.0353344 .209376
2	.2993789	.1222629	2.45	0.014	.0597481 .5390098
3	.6136003	.1824199	3.36	0.001	.2560639 .9711366

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=1 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 1
    costs       = 3
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.0964618	.0375986	2.57	0.010	.0227699 .1701537
2	.3171445	.0651173	4.87	0.000	.1895169 .4447721
3	.5863937	.0978793	5.99	0.000	.3945539 .7782336

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=2 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 2
    costs       = 3
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.0738039	.0349561	2.11	0.035	.0052911	.1423166
2	.2710855	.0770335	3.52	0.000	.1201027	.4220684
3	.6551106	.1090626	6.01	0.000	.4413519	.8688693

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=3 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 3
    costs       = 3
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.0561374	.0327355	1.71	0.086	-.0080229	.1202977
2	.2259596	.0884762	2.55	0.011	.0525495	.3993696
3	.717903	.1194547	6.01	0.000	.483776	.95203

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=4 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 4
    costs       = 3
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.0425057	.0300913	1.41	0.158	-.0164722	.1014836
2	.1842737	.0959158	1.92	0.055	-.0037179	.3722652
3	.7732206	.1249318	6.19	0.000	.5283588	1.018082

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=5 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 254
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 5
    costs       = 3
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.0320717	.0269985	1.19	0.235	-.0208445	.0849879
2	.1475239	.0980094	1.51	0.132	-.0445711	.3396188
3	.8204045	.1243337	6.60	0.000	.5767149	1.064094

The following output tables are those from which only sanctions with a great power primary sender were considered.

```
. ologit success costs coalition institution

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -641.38303
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -625.88008
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -625.84654
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -625.84654

Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs =    606
                                                LR chi2(3)    =  31.07
                                                Prob > chi2   = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -625.84654                     Pseudo R2     = 0.0242
```

success	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
costs	.6401661	.15307	4.18	0.000	.3401543	.9401778
coalition	.0315579	.1578368	0.20	0.842	-.2777967	.3409124
institution	.5333222	.2965914	1.80	0.072	-.0479862	1.114631
/cut1	.748477	.2045179			.3476292	1.149325
/cut2	2.10127	.2214369			1.667261	2.535278

```
. margins, at(costs=1 coalition=0 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 606
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 1
    coalition   = 0
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.5270513	.0235287	22.40	0.000	.4809359	.5731667
2	.2846501	.0185143	15.37	0.000	.2483627	.3209375
3	.1882986	.0173356	10.86	0.000	.1543214	.2222758

```
. margins, at(costs=1 coalition=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 606
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 1
    coalition   = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.5191789	.0436662	11.89	0.000	.4335946 .6047631
2	.2876517	.0232196	12.39	0.000	.2421421 .3331612
3	.1931694	.0288876	6.69	0.000	.1365508 .2497881

```
. margins, at(costs=1 coalition=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 606
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 1
    coalition   = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.5112969	.0798462	6.40	0.000	.3548012 .6677926
2	.2905675	.0335504	8.66	0.000	.2248099 .3563251
3	.1981356	.0516461	3.84	0.000	.0969111 .29936

```
. margins, at(costs=2 coalition=0 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 606
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 2
    coalition   = 0
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.3700843	.0352412	10.50	0.000	.3010128 .4391559
2	.324351	.0204956	15.83	0.000	.2841805 .3645216
3	.3055646	.0325673	9.38	0.000	.241734 .3693953

```
. margins, at(costs=2 coalition=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 606
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 2
    coalition   = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.3627581	.0462437	7.84	0.000	.2721222 .4533941
2	.32494	.0205831	15.79	0.000	.2845979 .3652822
3	.3123018	.0432339	7.22	0.000	.227565 .3970387

```
. margins, at(costs=2 coalition=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 606
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 2
    coalition   = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.3554951	.0749499	4.74	0.000	.208596 .5023943
2	.3253856	.0207371	15.69	0.000	.2847417 .3660294
3	.3191193	.0711797	4.48	0.000	.1796097 .4586289

```
. margins, at(costs=3 coalition=0 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 606
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 3
    coalition   = 0
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf. interval]
_predict					
1	.2364899	.0522248	4.53	0.000	.1341311 .3388486
2	.3085804	.0266735	11.57	0.000	.2563013 .3608595
3	.4549297	.0706199	6.44	0.000	.3165173 .5933422

```
. margins, at(costs=3 coalition=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 606
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 3
    coalition   = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.2308391	.0550986	4.19	0.000	.1228479	.3388304
2	.3063953	.0283981	10.79	0.000	.250736	.3620545
3	.4627656	.076042	6.09	0.000	.313726	.6118052

```
. margins, at(costs=3 coalition=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 606
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: costs       = 3
    coalition   = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.2252836	.0695433	3.24	0.001	.0889812	.361586
2	.3040965	.0345276	8.81	0.000	.2364237	.3717693
3	.4706199	.0983455	4.79	0.000	.2778663	.6633735

The following output tables show the effect of increasing great power cooperation in cases of sanctions in which a great power is the primary sender.

```
. ologit success totalgreat costs institution

Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -642.81056
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -626.67878
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -626.64347
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -626.64346

Ordered logistic regression                     Number of obs =    607
                                                LR chi2(3)    =  32.33
                                                Prob > chi2   = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -626.64346                     Pseudo R2     = 0.0252
```

success	Coefficient	Std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
totalgreat	.0355572	.1299233	0.27	0.784	-.2190877	.2902022
costs	.6421165	.1545953	4.15	0.000	.3391152	.9451177
institution	.5487304	.2684117	2.04	0.041	.022653	1.074808
/cut1	.7505886	.2060112			.3468142	1.154363
/cut2	2.101763	.2227822			1.665118	2.538408

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=1 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 1
    costs       = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.5182207	.0398084	13.02	0.000	.4401976	.5962437
2	.2877581	.0221877	12.97	0.000	.2442709	.3312452
3	.1940213	.0266995	7.27	0.000	.1416912	.2463513

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=2 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 2
    costs       = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.5093383	.0688061	7.40	0.000	.3744809	.6441958
2	.2910195	.0299653	9.71	0.000	.2322886	.3497505
3	.1996422	.0450014	4.44	0.000	.1114411	.2878432

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=3 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 3
    costs       = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.5004501	.0999812	5.01	0.000	.3044906	.6964096
2	.2941655	.0387067	7.60	0.000	.2183017	.3700293
3	.2053844	.0659398	3.11	0.002	.0761448	.334624

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=4 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 4
    costs       = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.4915616	.1317385	3.73	0.000	.2333589	.7497643
2	.2971902	.0472474	6.29	0.000	.2045869	.3897934
3	.2112482	.0883154	2.39	0.017	.0381531	.3843433

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=5 costs=1 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 5
    costs       = 1
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.4826784	.1636435	2.95	0.003	.161943	.8034139
2	.3000879	.0551369	5.44	0.000	.1920216	.4081542
3	.2172337	.1118134	1.94	0.052	-.0019166	.4363839

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=1 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 1
    costs       = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.3614211	.0419255	8.62	0.000	.2792487	.4435935
2	.3246841	.0205081	15.83	0.000	.2844889	.3648793
3	.3138948	.0394038	7.97	0.000	.2366648	.3911248

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=2 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 2
    costs       = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.3532557	.0633104	5.58	0.000	.2291697	.4773418
2	.3251415	.0205673	15.81	0.000	.2848303	.3654527
3	.3216028	.060563	5.31	0.000	.2029014	.4403041

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=3 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 3
    costs       = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.3451751	.0887986	3.89	0.000	.171133	.5192172
2	.3254158	.0204983	15.88	0.000	.2852399	.3655916
3	.3294091	.0867986	3.80	0.000	.159287	.4995312

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=4 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 4
    costs       = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.337183	.1151906	2.93	0.003	.1114136	.5629523
2	.3255062	.0204061	15.95	0.000	.285511	.3655015
3	.3373108	.1151783	2.93	0.003	.1115655	.5630561

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=5 costs=2 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 5
    costs       = 2
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.3292828	.1415416	2.33	0.020	.0518664	.6066993
2	.3254128	.0206617	15.75	0.000	.2849167	.3659089
3	.3453044	.1448183	2.38	0.017	.0614657	.629143

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=1 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 1
    costs       = 3
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.2294679	.0525625	4.37	0.000	.1264473	.3324885
2	.3054394	.0278334	10.97	0.000	.250887	.3599918
3	.4650927	.0727867	6.39	0.000	.3224334	.6077521

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=2 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 2
    costs       = 3
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.2232415	.0614496	3.63	0.000	.1028026	.3436804
2	.3028097	.0320561	9.45	0.000	.2399809	.3656386
3	.4739488	.0872954	5.43	0.000	.302853	.6450446

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=3 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 3
    costs       = 3
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.2171364	.0753611	2.88	0.004	.0694313	.3648416
2	.3000423	.0392321	7.65	0.000	.2231489	.3769357
3	.4828212	.1097981	4.40	0.000	.267621	.6980215

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=4 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 4
    costs       = 3
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.2111529	.0914252	2.31	0.021	.0319628	.3903431
2	.2971425	.0486793	6.10	0.000	.2017329	.3925521
3	.4917045	.1364038	3.60	0.000	.224358	.759051

```
. margins, at(totalgreat=5 costs=3 institution=0)

Adjusted predictions                                  Number of obs = 607
Model VCE: OIM

1._predict: Pr(success==0), predict(pr outcome(0))
2._predict: Pr(success==1), predict(pr outcome(1))
3._predict: Pr(success==2), predict(pr outcome(2))

At: totalgreat  = 5
    costs       = 3
    institution = 0
```

	Delta-method				
	Margin	std. err.	z	P>|z|	[95% conf.	interval]
_predict						
1	.2052911	.1081887	1.90	0.058	-.0067549	.4173371
2	.2941158	.0598218	4.92	0.000	.1768672	.4113644
3	.5005931	.1651008	3.03	0.002	.1770014	.8241847

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Research Paper Title:

More than Economic? Assessing the Symbolic Power of Multilateralism in Economic Sanctions

Major Professor: Stephen C. Shulman