CRACKING THE WORLD SYSTEM: MEDIATING PUBLIC PEDAGOGIES FROM THE “WORLD REVOLUTION” OF 1848

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CRACKING THE WORLD SYSTEM: MEDIATING PUBLIC PEDAGOGIES FROM THE “WORLD REVOLUTION” OF 1848

by

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B.S., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008
M.A., University of Illinois Springfield, 2010

A Dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy

Mass Communication and Media Arts
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
In the Graduate School May 2016
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James Kepley Anderson

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial
Fullfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctorate of Philosophy
in Mass Communication and Media Arts

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Graduate School
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Approved April 4, 2016
AN ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION OF

JAMES ANDERSON, for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, in MASS COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA ARTS, presented on April 4, 2016, at Southern Illinois University Carbondale

TITLE: CRACKING THE WORLD SYSTEM: MEDIATING PUBLIC PEDAGOGIES FROM THE “WORLD REVOLUTION” OF 1848

This project adopts the framework of World Systems Analysis [WSA], formulated by global sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, to take the entire world system as the unit of analysis. Drawing on the work of Paulo Freire, the seminal theorist of critical pedagogy, this project couples WSA with the analytic lens of public pedagogy to overcome the limitations associated with the critical application of the concept of ideology and with the application of various postmodern critiques. Primary media sources are used for purposes of critical political economy, to outline the contours of economic changes and class formations from the first world revolution. A detailed descriptive history of the revolutions that swept across Europe in 1848 recovers narratives from that critical juncture. I discuss prominent public pedagogies via analysis of primary print media sources like the London Times. Focusing on hegemonic shifts in the world system around 1848, I throw light on movement-media cracks in the British Empire, while also uncovering oft-ignored resistance, insurrections and utopian experiments in the Americas. Pedagogies of conspiracy theory and Manifest Destiny legitimated US aggression against Mexico as the former took initial steps toward becoming a world system superpower. Problems and pedagogies from 1848 are also updated and examined in light of the contemporary society-media context to consider cracks in the existing system and learn from the past new possible paths out of the world system’s terminal structural crisis.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project and my successful completion of the doctoral program at Southern Illinois University Carbondale would not have been possible without my committee chair, Dr. Walter Metz. He and I both had to make it past multiple hurdles on the road to finishing this dissertation.

We tripped, spectacularly in some instances, over a few along the way. Yet we persevered.

Sometimes the process was like pulling teeth; other times it underscored how exciting and powerful it can be to write, research and learn in heterodox ways with someone who is willing to attempt to bring widely disparate ideas into a discussion. Dr. Amie Kincaid, the “Doc,” who chaired my master’s thesis committee back in 2010, has been one of the biggest supporters of my work for years, and I am thankful she could be part of the dissertation committee to help see me through this. Her insights on theory and methodology proved invaluable. Despite his theoretical precision occasionally at odds with my efforts to couple different frameworks, Dr. Jean-Pierre Reed provided a sociological perspective and constructive criticism ultimately crucial for revising this manuscript at several stages. I could not have found an outside committee member more animated and enthusiastic during the different defenses and meetings throughout the process. Dr. Dong Han constantly raised key concerns about important aspects of the project, and his observations prompted me to acknowledge and when possible to address shortcomings, omissions or inadequacies in the manuscript. Dr. Jyotsna Kapur was both my harshest critic and strongest supporter, perhaps simultaneously. Not only was I strongly influenced by some of the scholarship I was exposed to – not to mention by the dialogue – in her classroom during my PhD program coursework, but I learned a lot from her comments throughout all stages of this project.

If I later publish all or part of this manuscript, it will be thanks in large part to her. I need to thank Judith A. Downie, the Humanities and Archives Librarian & Government Documents...
Coordinator at California State University San Marcos, who provided detailed explanations of how to access electronic newspaper archives through the CSU system and how to circumvent e-form obstacles to request print copies of obscure books via inter-library loan. Staff at Morris Library on SIUC campus also deserve many thanks for maintaining microform readers and making extensive newspaper archives available on microfilm. I also want to thank several stunning scholars, journalists and writers who provided me guidance and/or encouragement while I worked on this project, namely Caroline McKusick, Jennifer Johnson, Kara Dellacioppa, Kari Lydersen and Aviva Chomsky. I would be woefully remiss not to thank my mother, Dana Anderson, for all of her support, especially as regards my scholarly pursuits. Likewise, I want to thank my sister Carrie for the same. My younger sister, Kathryn J. Anderson, gave me the inspiration and encouragement necessary to finish this project, and I remain indescribably proud of her for innumerable reasons. Good friends like Iclal Alev Degim, Kevin Taylor, Eli Kramer, Sam Meister, Alex Macias, TJ Smith, Nathan Reed, Kiran Bharthapudi, Noah Springer, Sam Robinson, Kelly Caringer, Bret Seferian and Matt Ryg also enabled me to keep going through tough times. Finally, I have to thank my fellow déclassé rabble – Phil Brewer, Nick Smaligo, Kody Smoker, Sarah Baumgarten and Cody Roach – for teaching me what militant public pedagogy means; you all are amazing friends, comrades, intellectuals and a constant inspiration.
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CHAPTER ONE: COMMUNICATING CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM

“We live so completely immersed in the present that it absorbs all our sensibilities and hence our very capacity to think of alternate social forms.” – Murray Bookchin

“The horizon of history is still open. If the remembrance of things past would become a motive power in the struggle for changing the world, the struggle would be waged for a revolution hitherto suppressed in the previous historical revolutions.” – Herbert Marcuse

“There is a crack, a crack in everything; that’s how the light gets in.” – Leonard Cohen

INTRODUCTION

The year 1848 has become synonymous with the first “world revolution” (Wallerstein, 2004; 2014a). The year of revolution is supposed to have witnessed the first full-on expression of radicalism on the stage of mainstream political theater. It arguably altered the direction and strategies of radical (anti-systemic) politics on a widescale thereafter (Wallerstein, 1990; 2014a). It is one of the first set of 365 days on a modern calendar to be equated with revolution, giving rise to works that associate the date and revolution in their titles (Price, 1988; Robertson, 1952[1971]; Rapport, 2008). In this project, I explain what made the first world revolution really revolutionary and why what happened during that year had worldwide impact. The impact of the first “world revolution” is especially important – and oft-overlooked – in media studies. With the diffusion of digital, electronic and networked media communication, it might seem odd to write a Mass Communication and Media Arts dissertation about 1848. It is imperative, however, for us to return to the critical juncture and examine its enduring educational affects if we are to understand new media in today’s context of crisis and struggle.

1 See Bookchin (1982, p. 12).
2 See Marcuse (1977[1978], p. 73).
This is not to suggest the project comprehensively covers everything in the world that happened in 1848. No project could do that. Rather, the aim is to show how what transpired in 1848 had a rippling effect on the world system – how the ideas and practices that took root that year cracked the system, as it were, irrevocably altering its dynamics and educating the human beings comprising the system in new ways within the cracks that emerged.

The following chapter offers a brief overview of World Systems Analysis [WSA], an approach for understanding history as an evolving totality. In the second chapter I also theorize the educative effects of 1848 as forms of public pedagogy, a concept that underscores the role of human agency in history. The notion of public pedagogy helps overcome the theoretical shortcomings of the idealist/materialist dichotomy while also avoiding pitfalls of an overly subjective multiplicity of narratives (or power relations) that either underemphasize the underlying sociality in social construction or conflate changes in language with social change generally. The third chapter in this work uses the insights of WSA and the concept of public pedagogy to chart the changing political economy and its representation in print media in and around 1848, illustrating how what might have appeared as mere coincidence is really related.

The fourth chapter recovers the history of the European revolutions in relation to the larger historical resonance. In that chapter, I use newspaper articles circa 1848 to explain how nascent radicalism (e.g. anarchism, communism) functioned as public pedagogy with newfound importance. The fifth chapter extends the scope of the world revolution to Britian, which is commonly assumed not to have had a revolution that year. I show how specters of continental revolution and currents of resistance concerned the British Empire, prompting pedagogical reactions in the press and ultimately reconfigurations of power that precipitated a future decline in the nation’s system-wide influence. Similarly, I use also WSA in the fifth chapter to analyze
the Americas because of synchronous events with equal salience for evolving systemic
dynamics. I analyze the pedagogical function of media and movements across the globe to
explain how doctrines like Manifest Destiny functioned pedagogically to justify United States
aggression against Mexico and territorial expansion that would prove crucial for the US to
emerge as a hegemonic power about a century later.

My final chapter considers the implications of 1848. The hope is that a nuanced
understanding of that year as a crack in the system from whence public pedagogies emerged will
facilitate understanding of the way various public pedagogies function today in relation to the
larger world system of which they are part. The concluding chapter draws on insights from the
preceeding chapters to explore what possibilities might now be evident in the present period of
what Wallerstein (2010) terms “structural crisis” (p. 141) of the system and the capitalist world
economy that underpins it. With the prerogative of constant expansion and accumulation of
capital, occurring within repeating cycles of expansion and contraction that have moved the
system further and further from equilibrium, we have reached a point of wild fluctuation and
imminent transformation. It is in this interregnum that the exercise of human agency has
profound effects on structure in ways not possible even during revolutionary junctures like 1848.
But turning to the first world revolution and the lasting changes that emerged from it reveals the
genesis of the theories and actions (together: praxis) that exist today. I end with a call for further
re-education. I offer ideas about what education and media really mean at present and for the
future.

The study relies throughout on extensive analysis of print media published in 1848. Using
microfilm documents and later archives accessible online, I read through several weeks of issues,
and analyzed telling articles and excerpts, from the London Times, then the most widely
recognized establishment newspaper in what was then the dominant power in the world system, Great Britain. The *New York Times*, the newspaper of record in the now hegemonic power of the US, did not start printing until 1851, three years after the year of revolutions. All references to the *Times* in this study thus refer to print media in London at the time. The coverage of events in the *Times* is analyzed because it illustrates the hegemonic perspective par excellence. As an educational apparatus of concentrated power, the paper is also an institutional exemplar of the understandings of the world that support such power.

To extend the study beyond the domain of domination, I consulted the digital archives for the *Northern Star*, the newspaper of the Chartists, a social movement in Britain that is too often dismissed as having a negligible impact since England had neither a formal revolution nor system-threatening insurrection in 1848. Analysis of the Chartists’ organ not only calls flippant dismissal of the movement into question. It also demonstrates lessons to be learned from even supposedly unsuccessful movement-media during pivotal moments in the past.

In addition to secondary references to other print media circulating throughout the rest of Europe and the Americas in 1848-49 – many publications which were not printed in English, preventing their direct inclusion in this study – I culled exemplary excerpts from the digital archives of the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, a popular daily edited by American essayist and poet Walt Whitman up until 1848. The *Daily Eagle* demonstrates themes that animated the American sociocultural milieu and US war against Mexico. I also examine collected works with primary sources printed in full. This permits analysis of selected articles from Karl Marx’s organ the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, selected articles compiled about the Mexican American War and presentation of prose from abolitionists like Frederick Douglass, for example. I also unpack the speeches of political figures, those reprinted either in the aforementioned papers or found in
official transcriptions. All these texts conveyed various ideas with potentially educative affects during 1848, and they mediated the pedagogical impact of the variegated concrete (material) contestations that together comprised the year of revolution. Narrative, descriptive history drawing on primary and secondary sources throughout the major content chapters serves to put those media and public pedagogies from 1848 in context so the reader can comprehend not only the cracks in the system that emerged, but also understand certain recurring themes as forms of public pedagogy. As the following chapter will clarify, application of WSA with a detailed description of what occurred actually constructs the lens of public pedagogy we look through to examine the educational facets and enduring impacts of the critical juncture, while examination of the pedagogical reveals possible changes in consciousness and agency that cracked the system’s structures during the first “world revolution”.
CHAPTER TWO: THEORIZING THE WORLD SYSTEM AND PUBLIC PEDAGOGY

INTRODUCTION TO WORLD SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

World Systems Analysis [WSA] offers a framework for understanding history and the factors influencing the human actors within it. With WSA, social relations among people can be understood as constitutive of larger social structures subject to change over time. The logics and drives embedded within people’s relations and within the systematic arrangements of social reproduction spur that change. The structural dynamism stems from and reinforces social relations. People are in part an ensemble of those relations, and the structures they recreate are what makes a world system, the primary unit of analysis within WSA. The logics characterizing the existing world system include: 1) constant accumulation of “capital” coinciding with surplus value production and technological development, enabling endless reproduction of capital while undergirding social change; 2) unequal core-periphery relations; and 3) cycles of economic expansion (increased growth) and contraction (decreased growth), also called Kondratieff phases, with longer secular trends that push the system away from equilibrium and closer to bifurcation. Conceptions of what constitutes the world system, how long it has existed (e.g. 500 years or 5,000?) and the importance attributed to either historical continuities or qualitative ruptures differ (Amin, Arrighi, Frank, & Wallerstein, 1990; Frank & Gills, 1993[1996]; Frank, 1998; Wallerstein, 2004). Wallerstein insists on the system-changing qualitative rupture that occurred about 500 years ago when land enclosures and other mechanisms for restoring class power started to displace previously dominant feudal society in Western Europe. The slight increase in capital accumulation and the onset of European colonization of the Americas inaugurated the capitalist world economy [CWE] and the modern world-system (with a hyphen).
I use the unhyphenated “world system” for the sake of simplicity and to emphasize historical continuities as others have (Frank & Gills, 1993[1996]) within the WSA tradition.

However, Wallerstein’s (2010; 2014a) emphasis on the world revolution of 1848 and his insistence on understanding the existing world system as now in a period of “structural crisis” are worth considering in more detail. Wallerstein (2014a) contends tactical shifts after the failed revolutions of 1848 brought “radicals” closer to “bureaucrats… assuming the role of specialists who would guide transformation” (p. 160). But the contention is problematic because it assumes “radicals” comprise a monolithic bloc. More problematically, it suggests radicals all gravitated toward the bureaucratic path after 1848, which is just not the case.

Furthermore, Wallerstein’s generalization fails to account for the various pedagogies at work that could have – and most likely did – prompt changes in radical perspectives, varied as they undoubtedly were. Without investigating the particular media and movement manifestations of public pedagogies that took on newfound importance in the year of world revolution it is hard to explain how, what and why new ways of understanding and acting in the world emerged during that juncture. As this project will show, those public pedagogies profoundly affected the system still in existence today, which makes them especially crucial for thinking through present possibilities for the world in a period of structural crisis when an end to the previous arrangements appears imminent. Yet Wallerstein’s (2010) WSA framework for understanding structural crisis does not adequately theorize how and why participants are going one way or another, just as his WSA does not provide a framework for understanding the nuances that made 1848 the year of world revolution he recognizes it to have been.
INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC PEDAGOGY

To complement the WSA framework, then, the concept of public pedagogy is needed. As formative culture, public pedagogy “must be understood—while having different registers—in terms of wider configurations of economic, political, and social forces that exacerbate tensions” (Giroux, 2003, pp. 7-8). The concept refers to all sorts of extra-institutional learning and the various processes and sites of education outside of formal schooling (Sandlin, O’Malley & Burdick, 2011, p. 338). It encompasses informal education in popular culture and through media (e.g. newspaper articles), as well as the ideologies justifying interventions in the world. A public pedagogy lens acknowledges “the pedagogical function of culture in constructing identities, mobilizing desires, and shaping moral values” (Giroux, 2000, p. 349). The concept thus speaks to myriad informal modes of teaching, indoctrinating or cultivating (of intellect and affect) carried out through communications, mediated and otherwise, pervading the social environment. Organizing, direct action and revolutionary social transformations are educational processes theorized as modes of public pedagogy in this project.

While Wallerstein (2011) opts for the oft-used concept of “ideology” to refer, “first and foremost” to a “political strategy” of actors within the world system, the notion of public pedagogy introduces a different emphasis sorely needed within WSA. The tradition of historical materialism popularized ideology as a concept of critique, but it has also affirmed a dichotomy between the material and ideal, rather than other derivations of Marx’s work which emphasize the dialectical relationship between the two. I deny neither the existence nor the explanatory power of ideology. Those who dismiss the concept as a reduction of human comprehension to false consciousness miss the mark and the salience of Marxian analysis. People no doubt have and have always had constellations of conceptions that come together to form various forms of
consciousness of the world. Some of those conceptions better explain our shared (social) experience and individuals’ different places within it than others. Some of those conceptions obscure our shared experiences and obfuscate or insidiously justify relations of exploitation and domination. But ideology alone does not get at either the bodily experiences humans have in and mediated by the world, nor does it sufficiently help explain the educational process occurring within the dialectic between ideas and practical activity. The postmodern reaction – the penchant for a multiplicity of narratives, the rejection of any serious system-based explanation, the rejection of embodied human nature, and the over-emphasis on subjective or individual interpretation – over-corrects and undercuts our pedagogical, lived experience as humans mediated by the world. Such existence is always social no matter how much prevailing ideologies work to convince us otherwise, even as the material conditions underpinning those ideologies construct a suffocating social synthesis to maximize the immensity of abstracted human power over we humans who generate it. Elements of postmodern thought downplay this. The postmodern move elides the significance of our systematized and structured social and material relations even as the conceptual trends are intended to liberate by challenging meta-narratives. But changes in the narrative do not alone alter the material content of history.

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3 This postmodern position was perhaps most clearly displayed in the debate on human nature that took place between Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky in 1971 (Chomsky & Foucault, 2006). In the debate, Foucault rejected the notion of human nature, refuting Chomsky’s argument about its existential basis in our biological constitution and in the innate faculties endowed by our shared, embodied humanity. For a talk I gave at Purdue University critiquing the Foucaultian view and assailing the general postmodern perspective – the postmodern depreciation of embodied human nature and the relationship it might have to creating more just social arrangements – see: Anderson (2015). It is also worth recalling that for all Foucault’s genealogical problematization focusing on the body, the thesis in Foucault’s (1977[1995]) seminal work on that subject actually emphasizes the shift from punishing the body directly to bio-political control over “the soul” (p. 30) and over subjectivity (or individual, subjective internalization of incarceration and punishment). The Foucaultian critique obscures the dialectical relationship between subjectivity and objectivity – an obfuscating move common among other prominent postmodern and post-structuralist thinkers who wax explicitly a-dialectical or anti-dialectical (e.g. Deleuze & Guattari, 1987[2007]). For further critique of the Foucaultian emphasis on internalized control and its associated lack of accounting for the ongoing, perhaps intensifying applications of brute physical force in the maintenance of control, see: Parenti (1999, pp. 135-138) and Graeber (2015, pp. 31-34).
Fragmented narratives and decentered history risk becoming an ideological mirror reflecting the social fragmentation characteristic of social life increasingly defined by the atomizing and alienating influence of ubiquitous market-based commerce.

Public pedagogy recovers the dialectic. Henry Giroux is the thinker credited with popularizing public pedagogy as a concept (Sandlin, O’Malley, & Burdick, 2011). However, returning to the work of educational theorist Paulo Freire, the seminal theorist of critical pedagogy who influenced Giroux, is necessary to advance a humanist approach to both the concept and the deployment of it alongside WSA. “Human activity,” Freire (1970[2000]) explained, is “theory and practice; it is reflection and action” (p. 125) – praxis. The Freirean approach recognizes there are endowments that make us human. It stresses the sociality of ethics – and the ethical importance of using our human capacities, uniting action and reflection with dialogue, to change our reality. Freire’s (1970[2000]) emphasis on objective transformation does not “dismiss the role of subjectivity in the struggle to change structures” (p. 50).

On the contrary, one cannot conceive of objectivity without subjectivity. Neither can exist without the other, nor can they be dichotomized. The separation of objectivity from subjectivity, the denial of the latter when analyzing reality or acting upon it, is objectivism. On the other hand, the denial of objectivity in analysis or action, resulting in a subjectivism which leads to solipsistic positions, denies action itself by denying objective reality. Neither objectivism nor subjectivism, nor yet psychologism is propounded here, but rather subjectivity and objectivity in constant dialectical relationship. (p. 50).
Further, Freire (1985) implores us to “recognize the indisputable unity between subjectivity and objectivity in the act of knowing,” because reality cannot be reduced to merely “the objective datum, the concrete fact” (p. 51), as it is also characterized by our perception of it.

A Freirean pedagogy focuses on elevation of critical consciousness or conscientização, the process of conscientization – the “development of the awakening of critical awareness” (Freire, 1969[1973], p. 19), through a problem-posing dialogue. Human consciousness can “surpass the limitations of the objective configuration” (Freire, 1985, p. 93) or objective reality. The “transcendental intentionality” of human cognition makes consciousness “of what exists beyond limitations” (p. 93) possible; it is a human endowment enabling concrete transcendence beyond “limit-situations” through exercise of the innate (but socio-historically conditioned) capacity to objectify reality, pose it as a problem and project beyond it in thought and collective action.

Freirean humanism helps us understand how pedagogies historically intervened in cracks in the system. With the system in a new kind of crisis, there is a greater need to educate one’s self about ways to behave within these cracks. The history of the world is replete with cracks, filled with critical junctures when people became aware of their capacity to become agents of change. Focusing on just one big crack – the world revolution of 1848 – and how it inaugurated a new set of public pedagogies should throw light on why some of those pedagogies no longer function as they once did, in what ways some evolved and how the persistence of others illustrate parallels between the present and the critical juncture in question. That is, a WSA focused on public pedagogy will throw light on the breakdown or delegitimization of different pedagogical formations and the transmutation of others upon the onset of the structural crisis.
Focusing on public pedagogy turns our attention to another integral part of the system largely absent from WSA: media communications. “People teach each other, *mediated by the world,*” Freire (1970[2000]) taught us, “by the cognizable objects which in banking education are ‘owned’ by the teacher” (p. 80; emphasis mine). But the world is a big place with many parts comprising it. Most WSA relishes in the abstraction – and for good reason. Abstracting from immediate experience is a precondition for thinking beyond the constructed one-dimensional reality. The latter erases our struggle-filled and antagonistic past while also obscuring the possibility humans have to realize their own future destiny. In contrast, Freire (1985) advocated “the exercise of abstraction” (Freire, 1985, p. 51), taking “epistemological distance” (Freire, 1997, p. 92) from the concrete object under study to do an “epistemological encircling” and contemplate the genesis of the particular and its relations with the rest of the world. What is objectified or “admired” is then decodified⁴ or dissolved “into its constituent elements” (Freire, 1985, p. 52) to go beneath appearance level apprehension of objects to understand them as historical. This process of “admiration” (p. 52) – the “dialectical operation” (p. 53) performed and re-performed to critically apprehend an object but also to reflect or “readmire” (p. 53) the former process of admiring simultaneously – allows for interrogation of one’s previous knowledge about the world, elevating critical awareness.

Further, Freire’s (1970[2000]) critical pedagogy prioritized identification of the “generative theme” (p. 63). Grasping these themes can make education critical, radical and transformative. They are what “inaugurates the dialogue of education as the practice of freedom” (p. 96). The interacting complex of “generative themes,” what Freire (1970[2000]) termed the “thematic universe” and the “universe of themes,” located within the reality (and perception of

⁴ Freire (1985) explains decodification as “the process by which the knowing subject seeks to know,” by “breaking down the codified totality and putting it together again (retotalizing it)” (p. 91).
that reality) mediating human beings, can be objectified, admired and interrogated by students (pp. 96-101). A critical educator uses ethnographic work and dialogue to help unearth students’ key references and referential contexts situated within broader culture (McKenna, 2013, p. 450). The approach implies culture and the institutions sustaining it contain frequently unacknowledged educational, or pedagogical, functions. “Freire’s extensive oeuvre,” observes McKenna (2013), “argues that educators must be intimately attuned to the educational force of the entire culture and develop educational tactics and strategies to defeat domination in all its guises” (p. 450; emphasis in original). Freire’s philosophy of education elucidates the importance of analyzing what I am referring to throughout this project as public pedagogy.

The process of uncovering themes through a “gnosiological cycle of research and practice” (McKenna, 2013, p. 450), a philosophical self-reflective inquiry into consciousness and one’s own study of knowledge, can also theoretically be applied to the examination of past public pedagogies. Analyzing public pedagogies from 1848 can help us understand the historical genesis of present-day culture(s) and the relationship between public pedagogy and the political economy of the world system. To test this approach, I first examine the political economy of 1848 and what new developments finance capital inaugurated before transitioning into descriptive histories of the revolutions and heterodox resistances of ’48. To do this, I adopt the concept of public pedagogy and borrow from the Freirean approach within a WSA framework to critically reflect upon newspaper texts, manifestos and pronouncements – the historical particulars embedded with pedagogical significance that mediated people inside the system’s crack during 1848.

As stated, people are in some sense an ensemble of social relations. Marx (1845[1988]) famously referred to human essence as “the ensemble of the social relations” (p. 570). Graeber
(2006) recovered Marx’s idea to reconsider the role of capitalist production and argued capitalism does not only just produce things (commodities). It also produces social relations and people, who “are, in large measure, simply the internalized accretion of their relations with others” (p. 75). Now, to be clear, public pedagogy “refers to a powerful ensemble of ideological and institutional forces” (Giroux, 2004, p. 74). Those forces come in many forms. Print media was one powerful form in 1848. More specifically, the texts contained within newspaper articles communicated ideas to significant numbers of people. Some of those media communications justified existing power structures, or the exercise of power over others generally. Other articles educated readers about resistance. Some made it possible to learn about revolutions from the perspective of revolutionists. Many media articles featured language that could potentially elicit an affective response (e.g. invoking fear of disorder, evoking national or imperial pride, providing poetic imagery to facilitate an envisioning of a more egalitarian society).

To recapitulate, public pedagogy refers to myriad informal sites of education, the learning that occurs outside the classroom and apart from official academic institutions. The lens of public pedagogy thus enables uncovering of the processes of learning that occur through broader culture, and it throws light on the dialectical relationship between consciousness and human interventions in the world, including collective agency producing cracks in the structures of the world system. Public pedagogy differs from praxis insofar as the former can operate without an inextricable aspect of the latter: reflection. A philosophy of praxis should, though, critically reflect upon and pose as a problem the educational processes operating through unofficial sites of learning. Praxis, as theoretically-informed engagement followed by reconsideration of both the theory and the action it informs, should augment anti-systemic and subterranean public pedagogy. Admittedly, public pedagogy might appear to be an ambiguous or overly-broad
concept because it encompasses more than, say, the generation of consent. However, its explanatory power resides in the very act of conceptualizing sociocultural forces, media communications and people’s embodied relations in the world as educational. Analyzing the aforementioned as public pedagogy highlights how, perhaps why and with what possible implications various institutional productions, mediated messages, artistic expressions and (individual or collective) communicative actions all potentially educate.

As a concept and methodological tool, public pedagogy can and has been deployed in myriad ways. Henry Giroux, for instance, has used it as a cultural studies catalyst for theoretical discussion regarding how The Walt Disney Company shapes the pervasive values and popular preferences that incessantly (and insidiously) reconstruct social norms, legitimating and reproducing particular subject positions (Giroux, 1998). That methodological application prompted an explanation of Disney’s appeal to childhood innocence and the consequences of historical erasure associated with that appeal. As a methodological lens, public pedagogy provided the conceptual tool for Giroux to critique the Disney public relations machine normalizing the infantilism and commercialism the corporation’s “politics of innocence” (p. 258) reflects. Giroux (2003) later drew explicitly from Freire’s notion that human life is never totally determined and that education is always, if sometimes also inadvertently, directive in order to outline another methodology predicated upon public pedagogy. That Freirean lens, as a method and practice of critical reflection, enabled him to articulate a theory of resistance within formal education. The author formulated struggle in the classroom as a mode of public pedagogy connected to learning from social movements, from the streets and from the broader social forces interacting with those who resist or modify conventions. Connecting explicit education to the implicit learning through media and other representations of lived experience that come together
to form public pedagogy suggests examination of the quotidian education occurring subtly through everyday activities and via cultural engagement can be identified and addressed through action upon reflection. The method of examination affords action-enabling theoretical denunciation of the impediments to human flourishing otherwise maintained by both the previously unquestioned presuppositions pervading the terrain of communication and by the erstwhile unexamined structures kept intact by common sense assumptions.

**WORLD SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF 1848 THROUGH THE LENS OF PUBLIC PEDAGOGY**

What follows is my own application of a Freirean concept of public pedagogy coupled with WSA. The major aim is to identify recurring themes throughout the critical juncture of 1848 present within newsprint articles, pamphlets, system-impacting practices and reflections from those who experienced the revolutionary situations. The uncovered themes constituting public pedagogies are interpreted in light of each other and in reference to the larger systemic forces in flux. Public pedagogy is a process. It is a process that occurs within the larger social field and within the enduring world system structures it impacts or cracks. The framework of WSA, with its emphasis on relations related to the capitalist world economy and on the relationship between that CWE and the motile inter-state system, is used here to reveal what cultural formations functioned pedagogically – and to explain how, why and with what discursive effect such non-formal education occurred – by situating media, ideologies, exercises of class power and insurrectionary organizing within the larger context of the cracking system.

Detailed descriptive history facilitates the methodological approach and exposition. The concrete and particular can be understood this way in relation to the general and systemic. Recovered narrative(s) drawing on a variety of secondary sources in dialogue with the media artifacts and other primary source documents embedded with pedagogical import are used to
explain how the cracks in the system were produced and what they actually entailed. Historical narrative is deployed as an indispensable part of the project because it is an element of the overarching method for unearthing public pedagogies that can only be rendered transparent by telling a story of what happened. More precisely, my methodology involves reconstructing stories of what transpired that coalesce into a kaleidoscopic-yet-coherent account that informs and is informed by far-reaching and changing structures of the world system clarified by the WSA also applied. Using WSA demands a methodological approach that transcends strict disciplinary boundaries. Correspondingly, the critical concept and lens of public pedagogy requires recognition of media communication and culture as complex processes irreducible to monolithic categories. Journalistic news stories, revolution-themed pamphlets, political speeches, political-economic doctrines, literary art and individual reflections regarding or in some way pertaining to the first “world revolution” are all taken as germane objects of analysis for excavating public pedagogies within the underlying unit of analysis, the world system proper.

Yet this application alone would not suffice if we have in fact entered a terminal period of structural crisis in which our actions assume added importance. I accept and argue for taking seriously Wallerstein’s (2010) thesis implying our agency is unavoidably implicated in currently cracking the bifurcation-prone system whether we want to assume the responsibility for that or not. The final chapter of this project thus applies the lessons learned from the public pedagogies of 1848 to the present by outlining the contours of the world system’s ongoing terminal phase, fleshing out parallels with the first “world revolution” and pointing out under-appreciated conditions of possibility informed by previous cracks in the system. If 1848 constituted a critical juncture of veritable world revolution, meaning what went down during that year left an indelible impact on the operations of the world system, as well as on people’s understandings of their
actions in it, then it should be understood as essential educational material for learning how to act now.

I first proceed, however, by sketching the configuration of political-economic forces underlying revolt in 1848, using analysis of media to critically assay those conditions and people’s conscious appraisal of those conditions. This exposes the material basis from which public pedagogies operated and emerged. I then recount the history of the juncture and show how print media during the first “world revolution” functioned pedagogically before eschewing a traditional conclusion in favor of that final chapter suggesting how and why lessons from the public pedagogies of 1848 might be applied today so as to consciously help determine what happens to the world when the centuries’ old system mediating it finally cracks for good.
CHAPTER THREE: CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 1848

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I examine the political-economic conditions undergirding widespread revolt in 1848. What follows is simultaneously a critique of previous political economy and prior theoretical understandings of the world revolution. With a World Systems Analysis [WSA] perspective, I aim to contribute to a better understanding of the juncture by considering the changing hegemonic tides and the new functions of finance capital creating and emerging from this crack we call the first world revolution. To understand Europe astir during 1848 requires a world systems perspective, which in turn helps clarify why 1848 was a real “world revolution,” not simply a European phenomenon. Attention to not just modes of production – and not just to the “modes of accumulation” (Gills & Frank, 1993[1996], p. 98) or to the Kondratieff cycles (Frank, 1998; Wallerstein, 2004) key to WSA – but also to public pedagogies animating 1848 illustrates the educational impetus and affects of a changing political economy. This chapter also relates political-economic developments to class formations and other social implications, with analyses of newspaper texts to illustrate systemic changes. Original archival work, particularly analyses of articles from the *London Times*, the establishment newspaper for Great Britain, the then-hegemonic power in the world system, illustrates how public pedagogy operated vis-à-vis the political economy of the world system.

CRACKING THEORIES OF HEGEMONY AND THE HEGEMONY OF RADICAL THEORIES

British philosopher and classical liberal thinker John Stuart Mill authored a multi-volume comprehensive analysis of the developing industrial capitalist system titled, *The Principles of Political Economy: with some of their applications to social philosophy*, which was first published in 1848, during the year of world revolution. Mill (1848[1880]a) made several
heterodox claims relevant for inquiry into events occurring during the year his work was initially published. Assuming a “universal point of view,” shifting the focus from local, individualized to “national and universal results,” in accord with the WSA perspective advanced here, he argued, “intellectual speculation must be looked upon as a most influential part of the productive labour of society” (pp. 68-69). “No limit,” Mill (1848[1880]a) offered, citing theoretic inquiries he claimed later led to the development of the electro-magnetic telegraph and to technical innovations in navigation, “can be set to the importance, even in a purely productive and material point of view, of mere thought” (p. 69).

As one of the last Enlightenment-influenced classical political economists, Mill grasped the power of ideas. Yet he did so with simultaneous concern for their relationship to the material world. Although his primary intent was not to think through how best to fundamentally transform existing material conditions, he nonetheless articulated what could be called “the idealistic core of dialectical materialism” (Marcuse, 1972, p. 70; emphasis in original). That is, “intellectual speculation” (Mill, 1848[1880]), p. 69), or “Imagination, as knowledge, retains the insoluble tension between idea and reality, the potential and the actual” (Marcuse, 1972, p. 70).

Such imaginative or speculative projection is not just productive in the narrow economistic sense in which Mill for the most part confined it. Creative speculation is also productive in the sense of producing a vision or theory capable of informing action to alter system dynamics and realize human potentials. In addition to offering a modicum of support for the free association of workers for the transcendence of capitalism’s class divisions – a point to which I return in the next chapter, Mill thus also made an argument for understanding the implementation of those radical human endeavors as modes of pedagogy.
Like Mill’s insights, other system-changing theoretic contributions appeared in 1848, offering ideational armor for the practical dimension of anti-systemic pedagogies made operational that year. Published in London a few weeks before the 1848 February Revolution in France, “The Manifesto of the Communist Party” (The Communist Manifesto) suggested some “spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of Communism” (Marx and Engels, 1848[2010], p. 67). Class struggle, economic crises and also visions of better social relations came together in 1848 to form a rupture, a critical juncture. One standard – if also anti-establishment – interpretation, put forth by Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) in their 1848 manifesto, claimed “history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle” (p. 67). Wallerstein (2014a) echoed their premise, asserting there always have existed “historical systems in which some relatively small group exploited the others,” even as those “exploited always fought back as best they could” (p. 158).

There have also always been ways of doing and relating that do not submit to the authority of the system – that create cracks (Scott, 1990). Institutional necessities of constant capital accumulation, the “need for a constantly expanding market for its products” chasing “the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe” (Marx & Engels, 1848[2010]), p. 71), forcing that class – “as capital personified” (Marx, 1867[1977], p. 254) to “nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere” (Marx & Engels, 1848[2010], p. 71) have historically coerced people’s submission to exchange value and production for profit. This has been the system’s modus operandi since the dawn of the capitalist world economy [CWE] some 500 years ago. Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) explained this dialectically to readers of their manifesto, including those in France where a translation of the text was made available just prior to the June 1848 insurrection. With the “discovery of America” – which was a “discovery” only
for Europeans who proceeded to exterminate indigenous populations living there before them – “the rounding of the Cape,” “the colonization of America,” “the trade with the colonies” and the new markets in India, China and Africa “opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie” and provided “an impulse never before known” (p. 68) for capitalist industry. New territory facilitated capitalist expansion while capital demanded expansion, needing new labor and markets to valorize itself. Expansion promised to resolve perpetual issues regarding the need for reabsorption of surplus value (alienated labor power for profit), given greater growth with the advent of industry. Because “the condition for capital” is labor for a wage, “augmentation of capital” (p. 79) is coeval with the production of a proletariat, placed into associated work for purposes of industry, supplied with “political and general education” by the bourgeoisie who gives it “the weapons for fighting the bourgeoisie” (p. 76), producing “its own grave-diggers” (p. 79). The conflict came to a head at the dawn of the “age of capital,” which Hobsbawn (1975) positions at the 1848 juncture. For Marx and Engels, the weapons were tested in 1848 under sub-optimal conditions with counter-revolutionary results.

“The world-revolution of 1848,” Wallerstein (2014a) explained in turn, “marked a turning-point in the relations of the three ideologies—rightwing conservatism, centrist liberalism, and leftwing radicalism” (p. 159). This is supposed to have started with the February uprising in Paris. The year 1848 also featured “nationalist uprisings in much of Europe—notably in Hungary, Poland, the Italies, and the Germanies” (p. 159). The nationalist uprisings contained elements of social revolution as well. Wallerstein (2014a) goes on to assert all this unrest “forced a reconsideration of tenants of each of the three ideologies,” with reactionary reconsideration on the part of conservatives based on the observation that “the one major country in which nothing seemed to happen in 1848 was Great Britain” (p. 159). They realized Britain “discovered a mode
of containing radicalism far more effective than forceful suppression” (p. 159). British authorities “had been making constant concessions” – really “relatively minor” ones – “to the demands for social and institutional change,” seeming to “suffice to persuade the more radical forces that change was taking place” (p. 159). Further, Wallerstein (2014a) contends radicals were disappointed with the results of both “spontaneous uprisings” and with the “utopian withdrawals” (p. 159) attempted during the juncture. Radicals, Wallerstein (2014a) argues, thus replaced “spontaneity with ‘organizing’ the revolution,” with “more temporal patience as well as the creation of a bureaucratic structure” (p. 159), bringing them closer to the liberals and “radical bureaucrats now assuming the role of specialists who would guide transformation” (p. 160). The liberals for their part started using “tactics that would pull both conservatives and radicals into their orbit” (p. 160), which would help centrist liberalism reign hegemonic until the second “world revolution” of 1968.

What Marx, Engels and Wallerstein all overlook, however, has to do with the nuanced pedagogies impacted and informed by, but not irreducible to, class struggle, relations of exchange, accumulation, etc. Subterranean pedagogies of 1848, the learned and taught habits and behaviors for being in the world, reflect the material conditions of the time. They also reflect different revolutionary praxis, however. As Hodges (1960) noted, the praxis of anarchist-socialist Mikhail Bakunin, another 1848 revolutionist, differed from Marx’s praxis because of their different conceptions of the proletariat. Bakunin took pains to distinguish wage workers from salary workers, forecasting “a new type of exploitation based not on ownership of productive property and expropriation of surplus value, but upon intellectual power and bureaucratic capacity” (p. 263). He feared a salariat that would wield bureaucratic power. Hodges (1960) does not point out that Bakunin’s critique parallels the anarchist notion that criticism of exploitation is
not enough, as criticism of hierarchy or domination is also necessary. Working within the WSA and Marxian traditions, Amin (2012) echoed Bakunin’s insights in recent analysis of the present-day proletariat/bourgeois divide, arguing the latter is “now largely made up of salaried agents of abstract capital, in particular producers of knowledge useful for capital” (para. 19). The agents consume rather than produce surplus value, and they receive more remuneration than their labor time under capitalism ought to allot, enabling them to procure far more than others. “They are bourgeois and are conscious of being so” (para. 19). Albert (2004) more generally calls this the “coordinator class” of managers and well-paid intellectuals who monopolize empowering work and decision-making by virtue of capital’s institutional hierarchies and the cultural capital they accumulate. Within the CWE, the coordinator class and salaried functionaries of capital have exercised power over others within nation-states adhering to properly capitalist economics and within state-socialist societies that featured bureaucracy-producing centralized, top-down planning.

Bakunin’s nuanced analysis of exploitation accounting for intellectual-institutional command led to a different theory of historical materialism informing different strategies and tactics. Thus Wallerstein’s (2014a) assertion that tactical shifts after the failed revolutions of 1848 brought “radicals” closer to “bureaucrats now assuming the role of specialists who would guide transformation” (p. 160) poses two main problems. First, “radicals” are not and have not historically acted as a monolithic bloc. In the same vein, it is worth noting that one is only radical in relation to what is dominant. When what is dominant is determined dominating or dehumanizing, then a radical view would posit the dominant agenda as illegitimate.\(^5\) Regardless

\(^5\) Freire (1970[2000]) distinguished radicalization from dogmatic, fanatic and mythicizing sectarianism, arguing the former involves both questioning but also “increased commitment to the position one has chosen, and thus ever greater engagement in the effort to transform concrete, objective reality” (p. 37). “The radical,” Freire (1970[2000])
of the inappropriate extremist connotations associated with “radicals,” Wallerstein’s (2014a) assertion glosses over important differences – not just those between Marx and Bakunin, but between the various public pedagogies of anarchism, socialism and communism (not to mention the incredible variations of praxis that fell under each of those banners) circa 1848 and after. Second, not all “radicals” advocated bureaucratic methods or favored select specialists dictating to others the best course for social transformation, as Bakunin’s criticism confirms.

It is equally important to think through the changes (or cracks) in concentrations of power within the system. Relations of hegemony within the WS affected and were affected by the revolutionary changes of 1848. But hegemony has different meanings in different contexts. It is often understood, following the work of Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci, as a cultural phenomenon comprising in part the seeming “‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production” (Gramsci, 1917[1971], p. 12). Hegemonic “cultures of consent” are constantly re-generated, maintained, resisted and contested (Downing & Brooten, 2007). Within WSA, hegemony refers to the preponderant exercise of one state or entity’s power over the entire interstate system – the process of one power “credibly and continuously” demonstrating “its ‘leadership’ by shaping systemic structures, and having its systemic policies almost always accepted not merely by weaker states but by other strong ones as well” (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1996[1998], p. 3). From

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continued, “committed to human liberation, does not become the prisoner of a ‘circle of certiancy’ within which reality is also imprisoned. On the contrary, the more radical the person is, the more fully he or she enters into reality so that, knowing it better, he or she can better transform it. This individual is not afraid to confront, to listen, to see the world unveiled. This person is not afraid to meet the people or to enter into dialogue with them. This person does not consider himself or herself the proprietor of history or of all people, or the liberator of the oppressed; but he or she does commit himself or herself, within history, to fight at their side” (p. 39).
another WSA perspective, hegemony refers to “a hierarchical structure of the accumulation of surplus among political entities, and their constituent classes, mediated by force” (Gills & Frank, 1993[1996], p. 100). Hegemony of one power in the world system is rare. For analyzing system-changing “hegemonic transitions,” Gills (1993[1996]) appreciates the explanatory power of an “emerging Gramscian perspective on international hegemony” because it turns attention “not only the military and productive capabilities of states as the motors of hegemonic transition, but also, and perhaps most importantly,” the Gramscian conception enjoins us “to examine how class coalitions are constructed and how ideology and culture are employed both to construct and to legitimate a hegemonic order” (p. 119). Exercising hegemony in the Gramscian sense, meaning generating consent through cultural formations, is undoubtedly a requirement for a nation-state to wield hegemonic power in the world system sense. Deploying the concept of public pedagogy, however, shifts the focus from how consent is generated to the educational implications of culture and cultural materials like media form and newspaper article content.

One key hegemonic consideration must be the British Empire. World systems scholars have recognized the United Kingdom’s hegemonic position in 1848. Wallerstein (1983) puts the “maximal bounding” (p. 102) point of UK (British) hegemony between 1815, after the fall of Napoleon when Britain gained the international advantage over France, and 1873 when “Great Britain began to decline” (p. 107). In contrast, this chapter argues Britain’s hegemonic decline started during the critical juncture of 1848. Recall how hegemony within the world system is always “self-liquidating” (Wallerstein, 2014a, p. 162). A hegemon in the inter-state system, the key actor in the WS proper and protector of the private property regime required by capital, must “on occasion exercise its military power to maintain order” (Wallerstein, 2010, p. 134). Expanded militarism comes at a cost, often shouldered by the majority of the hegemon’s
domestic population while the attempted domination abroad is “usually less effective than expected, and this strengthens those who wish to resist in the future” (p. 135). Further, the core-periphery relations within the system are not static. The dynamism of capital demanding greater profits – together with hierarchies embedded in the state and its related alienated, autonomous power exerted partly apart from capital and also over the humans who construct it – compels hegemons (and all states vying for international power) to expand their terrain of control. This also comes at the cost of loss of economic affluence at home or at the expense of losing the consent of the domestic population (a breakdown of hegemony in the Gramscian sense).

Analysis of machinations of British hegemony around 1848 will illustrate the initiation of its early self-liquidating process, which was concurrent with events in the Americas crucial to laying the foundation for the US hegemony to come almost a century later.

CONDITIONS OF CRISIS, CLASS FORMATION AND MOVEMENT CYCLES CIRCA 1848

“Underlying the broad range of the revolutions,” in 1848, Rapport (2008) explains, “was the economic crisis of the later 1840s: although the European economy was strikingly diverse from one region to the next, and although the social structure and political institutions of each country varied, the intense economic pressure placed on almost every section of society across the continent ensured that there was a widespread sense of distress and frustration with the inability of the existing governments to do much to meet the crisis” (p. 104). While processes of production and exchange do not explain the outbreak of revolutionary responses, the “period of dire economic distress” (p. 36) lasting throughout the 1840s (which worsened in 1845 and rose to crescendo during the crisis of 1847) helps explain the material circumstances surrounding

6 Uglik (2010) describes how Bakunin accepted philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach’s critique of religion (God) as the self-alienation of man, but also developed the line of thought, proposing it also necessary to negate “the similarly dangerous abstractions of the state—the earthly Church—and together with it the Church—God’s state” (p. 25).
insurrection. What is more, action in the economic sphere when taken in a WS context also helps explain other events outside Europe in 1848 with equally enduring consequences. With WSA, capitalism from about year 1500 onward is seen as a world economy, not a system based within any one nation-state or even within a single continent (i.e. not just in Europe).

Based on previous research regarding structural change, Frank and Fuentes (1990) suggested social movements might be stronger during Konratieff B (downward) phases, perhaps including the period 1815 to 1848. But a trans-historical correlation between economic movements/downturns even within the history of only the existing WS, let alone across time and previous systems, has not been confirmed. Their analysis of multiple historical sources and various movements across time and space did reveal “significant bunching and clustering of movements” (p. 144), with a key wave really starting in the 1820s around the beginning of a Kondratieff cycle downturn and lasting through the period more acute economic crisis in the 1840s when (around 1847-1848) the Kondratieff B phase reached its nadir. The movement waves – not to mention synchronous revolutions – do not appear coincidental but rather co-occur system-wide in some relation to changes likely economic, at least in part, although “their correlation with, let alone possible determination by, Kondratieff cycles is less than clear” (Frank & Fuentes, 1990, p. 148).

It is clear that after 1845 acute economic crisis “greatly intensified the social problems” (Price, 1988, p. 18). The problems pertained to industrialization and population growth outpacing industry’s capacity to provide for the new proletariat and the peasantry increasingly subject to market discipline. Inadequate urbanization schemes did not keep pace with rural migrations, just as economic opportunities failed to keep pace with education (Rapport, 2008, p. 34).
Situations in which educational attainment exceeds commensurate employment and remuneration are not unique to 1848, and it helps to understand how this has recurred throughout history. Historically, déclassé intellectuals have had revolutionary import. The déclassé can refer to those denied meaningful opportunities to put acquired skills and knowledge to use, and to those with some education who come from either petite-bourgeois or better-off working class backgrounds but were cast into precarious employment because of economic downturns. As Rapport (2008) put it regarding the European middle class around 1848, thrust into unstable working conditions and out of the socioeconomic strata from whence they came, “many of them had enjoyed a good standard of education,” but “there were not enough positions in the professions and the government to provide them all with employment,” thus “the middle classes experienced the population pressure in the shape of ‘an excess of educated men’” (p. 32).

As will be shown below, students at the universities played a small but not insignificant role in the European revolutions of 1848, and many of the thinkers of the time who left foundations upon which present-day radical pedagogies (e.g. Marxism, communism, socialism, anarchism) stand were veritable intellectuals stripped of their erstwhile affluence. Both Marx and Bakunin could be considered déclassé. The two “were continually in debt and were not self-supporting” (Hodges, 1960, p. 264). The former was born the son of a middle class German lawyer who converted from Judaism to Christianity, while the latter was the third of eleven children born as a Russian noble to an estate with 500 people (p. 266). Marx would rely extensively on his friend Engels for funds, while Bakunin borrowed from most of his friends. Similarly, Italian journalist-cum-nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini became déclassé somewhat consciously, foregoing personal comforts, living in exile and sacrificing employment security to
become a full-time revolutionary, relying on his parents who “kept paying up in the hope that – someday – he would get a ‘proper’ job” (Rapport, 2008, p. 20).

A close connection has historically existed between the déclassé and the lumpen-proletariat. Drawing on the philosophies of the 20th century anti-colonial figures Amílcar Cabral and Frantz Fanon, yet implicitly elaborating class formations traceable to 1848, Abdullah (2006) showed how the two labels have been used interchangeably and in relation to one another. Fanon (1963) would claim the “lumpenproletariat, that horde of starving men, uprooted from their tribe and from their clan, constitutes one of the most spontaneous and the most radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people” (p. 129). Before him, Bakunin (unlike Marx) also championed the “drudge people,” claiming there prevailed in mid-nineteenth century Italy a “wretchedly poor proletariat, about which Messrs. Marx and Engels, and following them the whole German Social Democratic School, speak with such deep disdain. Surely this is a mistake, since it is in this proletariat, and only in this, not in the bourgeois rank of the working class,” which, it is clear, “the whole reason and strength of the future Social Revolution lie” (cited in Hodges, 1960, p. 262). When periods of prosperity are followed by downturns denying the aspiring intellectuals social and economic opportunity, they have historically rebelled. Granted, from any historical perspective, “it would be a gross over-simplification to read the history of 1848 in terms simply of class conflict, although this was rarely absent” (Price, 1988, p. 95). Yet class formation, related to systemic cycles and including production of a déclassé cadre, contributed to the critical juncture of 1848 just as it suggests conditions of possibility and contingencies during our protracted structural crisis.
Comprehending key class formations requires return to an analysis of acute systemic crisis. Bad harvests hit Europe hard in 1845 (Robertson, 1952[1972], Price, 1988), simultaneous with a cyclical slump in trade (Rapport, 2008). The back-up crop, the potato, failed along with major staple crops. The long crisis of the 1840s exacerbated by crop and harvest failures devastated Ireland, paving the way for the infamous Irish Potato Famine starting in 1845 (intensifying between 1846-7). The famine, depending on how you calculate its time frame, took between half a million (Price, 1988, p. 19) and 1.5 million lives (Rapport, 2008, p. 36) before any semblance of recovery took place in the early 1850s. Despite advances in industry, “slow and expensive communications” (Price, 1988, p. 18), the still inefficient information flows that made inter-regional and international market exchange (and resource sharing) difficult, worsened the potato blight. Similar issues led to the three days of rioting during the Berlin “potato revolt” in April 1847 (p. 20), but as part of the United Kingdom, Ireland was most profoundly affected by economic policies advanced by Britain.

Within British parliament, the Whigs blocked most relief measures to aid those afflicted by the famine on the basis of the increasingly en vogue liberal economic theory arguing government intervention in free trade would cause a budgetary deficit and do a disservice to the Irish (Price, 1988, p. 19). Whether the Whigs were equally wary they might be doing a disservice to the hundreds of thousands of Irish persons dying from dearth of food one can only speculate. Liberalism as an economic doctrine and pedagogy had already emerged as hegemonic, along with the nation-state of Britain. Wallerstein (1983) captured the essence of this phenomenon:

Hegemonic powers during the period of their hegemony tended to be advocates of global ‘liberalism.’ They came forward as defenders of the principle of the free flow of the
factors of production (goods, capital, and labor) throughout the world-economy. They were hostile in general to mercantilist restrictions on trade, including the existence of overseas colonies for the stronger countries. (pp. 102-103)

If the French Revolution transformed the “geoculture” (Wallerstein, 2004, p. 51) of the system, normalizing change and helping centrist liberalism emerge as the hegemonic ideology (or public pedagogy), Britain’s actions as state hegemon in 1848 advanced and implemented doctrines of economic liberalism (e.g. free trade) favoring conquest of capital. But Britain’s hegemonic moves also initiated its gradual diminution in hegemonic status.

Karl Marx forecast this early in 1848. Marx gave a speech to the Democratic Association of Brussels at the organization’s first public meeting on January 9, 1848, in which he discussed attempts by the Anti-Corn Law League and other free trade advocates in Britain to repeal the Corn Laws, which prohibited imports of cheaper corn from outside England. Assuming a satirical tone throughout, Marx (1848[2005]) quoted one of the free trade proponents facetiously, claiming, “Jesus Christ is Free Trade, and Free Trade is Jesus Christ,” before remarking on the media of wealthy manufactures. That is, those who “have printed and distributed gratis thousands of pamphlets to enlighten the worker upon his own interests,” while spending “enormous sums to make the press favorable to their cause,” organizing “a vast administrative system for the conduct of the free trade movement,” and displaying “all their wealth of eloquence at public meetings.”

The front page of the January 1, 1848 issue of the London Times – and in 1848 the first two pages of that paper usually featured something akin to what today would be called the “classifieds” – included an ad from the Society of Guardians for the Protection of Trade indicative of similar attitudes toward. Established in 1776 “and now extending its operations
through every part of Europe,” the Society boasts “a funded capital of several thousand pounds,” with members from the ranks of “merchants, bankers, solicitors, manufacturers, and warehousemen” (p. 1), among others. The Society endeavors to “from time to time, as occasion may require, to assist in applications to the Legislature for such repeal, alteration, or amendments of any law that may appear to be injurious to their interests, and to enact such new laws as may be considered beneficial to the trading community in general” (p. 1). Economic liberalism separates the political – meaning state, democratic or collective intervention and decision making here – from the economic in the realm of ideas and as regards any economic democracy that would empower the majority of the population. The hegemony of economic liberalism, however, advanced by the then-hegemonic power within the world system, also weds the political to the economic in practice. Those owning capital advocate on behalf of capital through the private media they own and control and through societies or associations, serving as proponents of public pedagogy and mechanisms for affecting popular opinion as well as political structures. As a medium for exerting class conscious-influence on state-backed political institutions, such societies deployed their wealth to wield laws friendly to concentration of greater wealth.

An issue of the Times published on January 29, 1848, twenty day after Marx’s (1848[2005]) speech, also featured two articles propounding the virtues of economic liberalism. A report on the meeting of West Indian planters and merchants (West India was then a colony of the British Empire) dealing with international competition, asserted: “If the West Indies cannot compete with these [other] countries or even keep a footing in the market for their own wares, then it will be clear that sugar is no longer the natural or proper staple of the colonies, and due counsel may be taken for our future course. … The West Indian may or may not be swamped by the produce of the East Indies or Java” (p. 4). The article goes on to rhetorically presume the
perspective of West Indians, stating what their appeal should be (if only they were as insightful as writers as the Times), given the propitiousness of liberalizing trade:

You have decided upon a free trade in sugar, and we have no desire to quarrel with your conclusions. Let the cheapest sugar rule the market. Only, give us the common benefit of your enlightened views. Remove all your prohibitions on that machinery, your detestation of which you have survived. You have clearly recorded your indifference as to how sugar is produced, and therefore do not meddle with our methods of production. … What we want is not protection, but free trade. … We do not ask you to tax yourselves for our support; we ask you not to tax yourselves for our injury. (p. 4)

The Times only wanted what – and in its view, knew – was best for the economy of its colony. Paternalistic colonial discourse with protective overtones could, presumably without shame, be deployed to propagate the values of anti-protectionist liberalized market exchange. Such exchange tends to benefit concentrated capital in the metropole (within Britain), but not those who labor within or outside its borders.

Equalization of sugar duties in 1846, as supported by the London Times staff, did not actually benefit Britain’s colonies, but rather “exposed West Indian planters to the direct competition of other sugar producers outside the empire, including the slave-plantation economies of Brazil and Cuba” (Taylor, 2000, p. 160). Although the London Times perhaps forgot by January 1848, West Indian merchant houses in London and Liverpool failed in 1847, prompting planters to make greater (largely unfulfilled) demands for loans, which would contribute to the crisis-aggravating credit crunch described in more detail below. Jamaica and British Guiana then had to cut and suspend “public expenditures as their local economies
collapsed as a result of the equalization of the sugar duties compounded by the commercial crisis of 1847” (p. 152).

By the beginning of 1848, when local banks in British Guiana suspended cash payments, protests ensued, public works were halted, state-directed projects stopped because no taxes could be raised, and no elections could be held for the colony’s electoral assembly because authorities admitted that by “refusing to approve taxes the college had destroyed the very tax-based electoral franchise by which it was constituted” (Taylor, 2000, p. 161). Jamaica tried another approach to coping with the effects of Britain’s free trade initiatives, pursuing “a heavy-handed policy of collecting parochial tax arrears,” which resulted “in a riot involving some five hundred men and women” (p. 161) at a large landed estate on the island. The commercial crisis, and the hegemonic shift to free trade policies after 1845 especially, “developed into a full-blown constitutional crisis” (p. 160) in the West Indies around 1848. Parallels could be drawn with the constitutionalist campaigns waged throughout Europe by subordinate states under control of the Habsburg Empire and Prussian monarchy. When we lift the veil accompanying the common Eurocentric gaze and account for unrest throughout the British Empire not just in the “mother country,” the catalytic effects of the 1840s economic crisis comes into view, as do the revolutionary sentiments beyond the European continent.

Notably, it is possible Britain advanced such policies with the intent of curbing “working-class discontent” at home “by displacing the tax burden from metropole to periphery” with the “shift to free trade” (Taylor, 2000, p. 158) eliminating import duties and thus cutting indirect taxes. For the Whigs, this amounted to “a populist attack on the vested interest of colonial planters rather than an assault on the agricultural interest of Britain” (p. 158). Establishment press extolled this and other liberalization projects, like the repeal of the Corn Act. On the same
page as the article on sugar duties equalization in the West Indies, the *London Times* reported, as one of the few headlines used in their paper circa 1848 titled it, the “GREAT FREE TRADE MEETING AT MANCHESTER” (p. 4). A demonstration had taken place at the “Free Trade Hall” (the actual name of the site) on Thursday, January 27, two days before the article appeared, celebrating parliament’s return to principles of “commercial freedom” and the newly elected members of the anti-Corn Law League (an actual organization). In the meeting’s lengthy keynote, reprinted in full on pages four and five of the *Times* that day, the speaker criticized slave labor and war-mongering, calling free commerce “the most powerful of all human agencies” (p. 5) for keeping the peace. The speaker omitted mention of the class war waged by commercial interests inducing starvation for millions during the crises of the 1840s, and neglected realities of imperial conquest undertaken to satisfy the need for new resources and new markets for investment. He also overlooked concurrent events and movements about to explode that year, like the unrest in the colonies, spurred on by the effects of free trade.

In contrast, Marx (1848[2005]) made clear in his speech that liberalization of trade, including the repeal of the Corn Laws, would probably increase profits while reducing wages for workers. Wages had historically fallen when compared with profit, he said in his speech, pointing also to the directly correlated fall in bread prices and fall in wages when English capitalists owning the land and means of production were unable to sell the (expropriated) products of labor for as much they had before, so they turned to paying workers less. That is,

Doubtless, if the price of all commodities falls—and this is the necessary consequence of free trade—I can buy far more for a franc than before. And the worker's franc is as good

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7 The Corn Laws (or Corn Act) previously imposed tariffs on imported grains.
8 As Marx (1848[2005]) noted in his speech the same month as the free trade meeting at Manchester, workers have left “many corpses upon the industrial battlefield,” and will leave many more as trade undergirded by the capitalist mode of production continues.
as any other man's. Therefore, free trade will be very advantageous to the worker. There is only little difficulty in this, namely, that the worker, before he exchanges his franc for other commodities, has first exchanged his labor with the capitalist. (Marx, 1848[2005])

Cheapening of all commodities cheapens the value of labor power, a commodity on the market and the source of capitalist value, pushing wages down. So,

To sum up, what is free trade, what is free trade under the present condition of society? It is freedom of capital. When you have overthrown the few national barriers which still restrict the progress of capital, you will merely have given it complete freedom of action. So long as you let the relation of wage labor to capital exist, it does not matter how favorable the conditions under which the exchange of commodities takes place, there will always be a class which will exploit and a class which will be exploited. It is really difficult to understand the claim of the free-traders who imagine that the more advantageous application of capital will abolish the antagonism between industrial capitalists and wage workers. On the contrary, the only result will be that the antagonism of these two classes will stand out still more clearly. (Marx, 1848[2005])

Again in facetious fashion, Marx (1848[2005]) concluded that because “the free trade system hastens the social revolution,” it is from “this revolutionary sense alone, gentlemen, that I vote in favor of free trade.” As it happened, Britain’s application of free trade doctrine, part and parcel of liberalism’s advance as a public pedagogy, played out in contradictory ways. The state struggled to control a restive domestic and colonial population to avert revolt without relinquishing empire or hegemony, ultimately initiating its own decline as other forms of capital emerged hegemonic.
ABJECT POVERTY AND FINANCE CAPITAL IN AND EMERGING FROM CRISIS

As suggested, bad harvests in the 1840s had an impact on the European peasantry with repercussions for the entire continent. Peasants started dividing and subdividing fields among children until they were forced to sell to a landowner rich enough to purchase their remaining plots (Rapport, 2008, p. 33) at what people would now call bargain-basement prices. With little recompense for crops, peasants (and other sectors of society) had to start spending more just on food. Greater apportionment of wages for food meant much of the population had less to spend on other goods and services. Demand for manufactured goods and other commodities decreased as a result, plunging workers in the manufacturing and artisanal sectors into unemployment and precarious living. Precarity and joblessness, lowering wages en masse, therefore decreased aggregate demand, aggravating the crisis. In effect, prices rose following the poor harvest, and factory workers also were unable to afford even plain potatoes to feed their families (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 198). As the crisis worsened in 1846, it spread throughout Europe. In the Austrian empire, which would see revolts erupt soon enough, “factory girls began hanging around the glacis which separated the inner city from the suburbs, carrying benches and pillows with them to make prostitution easier” (p. 197). One particularly grim story circulated throughout Vienna regarding “a widow who killed one child and fed him to his brothers and sisters, at the same time that a banker gave a dinner featuring strawberries which cost £1 apiece” (pp. 197-198). Writer Fanny Lewald observed growing inequalities during that tumultuous time. Born in East Prussia to a Jewish wine merchant, she had obtained “enough of a reputation as a journalist, novelist, and travel writer that her publisher encouraged her to collect her personal letters” (Lewis, 1997, p. 7) authored while traveling across Europe in 1848 for printing, and her published works detail the gross disparities: “To be sure,” Lewald (1848[1997]) wrote during her visit to Paris in March,
“the rich—the banker princes and the aristocracy—live in large mansions built around square courtyards and have a view of the beautiful quiet gardens in the Fauborg St. Germain” (p. 56), while foreigners and tradesmen remained without income (even after onset of revolution). The conditions of the working classes continued to deteriorate. The world of finance capital, with its money capital personified in the bodies of bankers, elucidates capital’s own violent revolution.

Much of Europe suffered a credit contraction around that time as a result of mass bullion efflux in exchange for food imports (Price, 1988, p. 18). Lack of credit created problems for businesses. Many went bankrupt. The institution possessing “the sole right of issue for the whole of France” (Liesse, 1909, p. 15), the Bank of France, established under the auspices of Napoleon Bonaparte around the turn of the century, exerted major influence on the organization of its nation’s credit. France did not escape the crunch unscathed. From “the very beginning, the Bank of France was a bankers’ bank,” and it became “the pivot on which revolves the whole credit system of the country” (p. 49). As is common for capitalist institutions backed by the state as the Bank of France had been, it experienced “no disturbances of any kind” (p. 53) from 1840 to 1846 when human beings without capital fared far less well. After that “very unfavorable year of 1847” (p. 50) the ensuing “monetary crisis” (p. 51) caused it financial distress. Like England, France had also experienced poor crop cereals the year prior. Unlike the “political panic” and concomitant crisis that ensued for French financiers in 1848 amid hoarding-related coin scarcity during revolution, the crisis of 1846-7 in contrast “was produced by the flow of coin abroad to pay for wheat bought in Russia and elsewhere as a result of the grain famine in France” (p. 61). Both Britain and France had to purchase foreign grain, which had to be paid for in specie. For that reason, the Bank of France had to use its metallic reserves. The bank’s reserves diminished by about 173,000,000 francs from 1846 to January 1847 (p. 56). Commercial banks throughout
France, institutions which also ventured into areas of finance outside their normal purview, suspended payments during the panic of 1847, inducing greater panic in Paris and provinces when they closed their doors (p. 75).

Famine in 1846 and 1847 impacted England too, as stated, and resulted in a metallic currency shortage for London as well as Paris (Liesse, 1909, p. 61). Drawing on the published report on “Commercial Distress” from the “secret committee” created in the British House of Lords to investigate the crisis of 1847, and from another parliamentary report from a committee focused on Bank Acts, Marx (1894[1991]) explained causes and consequences of the 1847 depression vis-à-vis Britain. The Marxian analysis of 1847 has import for understanding capital as one engine powering the crisis, creating preconditions for revolution. Responding to a statement made by Bank of England director Mr. Norman in the latter report regarding interest rates, Marx (1894[1991]) confirms the rate of interest “is the measure of the difference between the cash price and the price on credit” (p. 548). The cash price is determined by “market price,” which is “governed by the state of demand and supply” (p. 548). That is, “the rate of profit necessarily has something to do with the market price of the commodities bought and the demand and supply for them,” while profit rates set the “general limit” for interest rates and “the industrial capitalists’ demand for money is determined by the circumstances of actual production” (p. 548). Taking a statement Lord Overstone gave to the committee about the benefits of rising interest rates (as in 1847) as being good for accomplishing the intended purpose, Marx (1894[1991]) suggested that purpose is probably in reality “to enrich bankers like

9 There’s a tendency among Marxists to dismiss demand and supply as irrelevant or an unnecessary component for analyzing the exploitative derivation and functions of capital. Marx himself, however, repeatedly emphasized the role of supply and demand in determining price, even as he stressed that the price for the advance on commodities (e.g. cotton) is dictated by the interest rate, meaning the commodity itself can become money capital under such circumstances.
Overstone” (p. 549). However, in 1847, the demand for money capital (with consequences for the rate of interest) did drop after first increasing, for multiple reasons:

Dearer corn, rising cotton prices, the unsaleability of sugar on account of overproduction, railway speculation and crash, the flooding of foreign markets with cotton goods, the forcible export and import trade with India … for the purpose of speculation in bills of exchange. All these things, overproduction in industry as well as underproduction in agriculture, i.e. quite different reasons, led to a rise in the demand for money capital, i.e. for credit and money. The increased demand for money capital had its origins in the course of the production process itself. (p. 550)

Greater demand for money capital (e.g. credit) made the value of money capital (the rate of interest) rise. The official Bank rate went from 3-3.5 percent in January 1847 to its peak of 7-10 percent in November, followed by a rate of 7-5 percent during the final month of that year (Marx, 1894[1991], p. 551). Industrial overproduction, evidenced by new railways and other infrastructures, together with the speculation introduced with those new industries, exacerbated demands for credit already enlarged by “disturbance in the reproduction process that resulted from harvest failure” (p. 550). The increased demand for credit came with high rates of interest owed on those loans because less credit became available given greater industrial demand and the initial agricultural crisis. With this, a vicious cycle ensued.

This was not unique to Britain. Liesse (1909) claimed events in the United States caused the crisis of 1847 (p. 51) that rocked the CWE. Before leaving office in 1845, US President Andrew Jackson probably irked pillars of finance capital. Jackson is associated in history with pushing methods of democratic reform – “Jacksonian democracy” – that later mitigated impetus for rebellion in the states during 1848 (Weyland, 2009). However, capital cannot tolerate too
much democracy. When populations begin democratizing capital’s money form, the material representation of their immaterial social labor, the system and those at the helm of it encounter problems. This is especially true for finance capital, which relies upon interest payments and commodifying future labor. Once embroiled in war with Mexico during Polk’s presidency, the US experienced further fiscal disturbances (Liesse, 1909, p. 51), and the commercial upheaval crossed the Atlantic and upset an already volatile system in France and England.

True to its capacity for what Schumpeter (1942) famously called “creative destruction” (pp. 82-83), capital in the US bounced back from whatever disturbances occurred just prior to 1848 to make way for new mechanisms of finance. Crises are the system’s lifeblood. Finance capital suffers immensely when compared with previous profit margins, but that suffering is typically transferred onto the rest of the economy and people who make it run. In parasitic fashion, the problems financialization produces are parlayed into problems for people, who are then subject to even greater whims of creditors and speculators. Industrialists, during this period, worked hand in glove to benefit too.

To the point, Till (2014) recounted the efforts of the less overtly corrupt “productive merchants” (p. 15) of Chicago “who started the city’s tradition of finding opportunity in crisis” (p. 16) and created Chicago Board of Trade [CBOT] in 1848.10 The CBOT would be America’s first derivatives11 market (Tillo, 2007). What is now the world’s largest futures exchange first had to lure members and grain traders with free lunches (Heise, 1997; Schwarz, 1998). But by the mid-1800s Illinois became home to lots of land speculation, especially in the 1830s thanks to

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10 Aside from the Board of Trade opening, the city’s capitalists have a whole history of “finding opportunity in crisis” (Till, 2014, p. 16). They found such opportunity in the midst of bloodshed during the Crimean War and during the US Civil War, when they turned Chicago into a major concentration point for holding grain for provision to Union armies.

11 Derivatives, in the world of finance, refer to “financial contracts whose market price, as their name implies, is derived from the price of another asset that underlines the derivative” (Millo, 2007, p. 199). These contracts can be derived from agricultural products like grain, as well as now from stocks and other market indices.
construction of a “crucial canal” (Till, 2014, p. 15) connecting farms to metropolitan areas. The canal was not completed until the critical juncture of 1848, by which time new railroads had all but rendered it obsolete. In addition to facilitating speculation and corruption oft-associated with Chicago, those new canals and railroads helped make the city a major transportation hub and grain terminal. Grain merchants started seeking ways to manage price risk for their commodity inventories accumulating in the city. What the CBOT offered was trade in “commodities-based contracts” (Millo, 2007, p. 199), also known as “forwards,” which specified terms for both buyer and seller to respectively purchase and deliver a specified amount and certain quality of product at a certain future time.

The CBOT later adopted a standardized grading for assessing grains (Till, 2014; Schwarz, 1998), which in the beginning helped manage risk. The CBOT expedited the switch from trading sacks of grain, to trading receipts for grain, to trading in promises for grain whereby members contracted to buy or sell a given quantity of the commodity at a later date betting the market would shift in their favor in the meantime (Schwarz, 1998). The new “standardized forwards contracts” came to be known as “futures,” which when bearing the same “expiration date and underlying asset” (Millo, 2007, p. 199) became interchangeable with similar contracts. Standardization eliminated “the time-consuming stage of negotiations over the details of the contracts” (p. 200), thereby super-accelerating the trading process. It also made not just material products, but actual contracts exchangeable. The function of the exchange “gradually evolved from arbitrating commercial disputes and spot trading to bilateral forward trading, and finally to becoming a member-owned exchange with standardized futures contracts” (Till, 2014, p. 15). Once traders were relieved from the burden of having to own the agricultural products from which the contracts were derived, it gave rise to rampant betting on future prices quoted in the
market (Millo, 2007, p. 200). Further, as the “enormous success of standardized futures” within the industry “eroded the importance of deliverability” (p. 201) – that is, as the necessity of the actual delivery of the assets undergirding the contractual exchange diminished – it created a growing and normalized gap (between futures trading and actual asset delivery).

The time lag in material transaction functioned as “one of the main growth engines” (Millo, 2007, p. 201) for the expanding market in futures because it paradoxically erases the lag in abstraction for exchange and valorization of capital. As Marx (1993) explained it in his unfinished manuscript left aside in 1858 and only published much later, “capital must on one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse,” to “conquer the whole earth for its market” for geographically unrestricted exchange, while “it strives on the other side to annihilate this space with time, i.e. to reduce to a minimum the time spent in motion from one place to another” (p. 539; emphasis mine). The CBOT as agricultural trade terminal hub satisfied the first drive of capital by bringing together all the Midwest grain exchange, while the trading mechanisms it introduced (e.g. standardization) also annihilated space via time, as it were, reducing the time in transit from production to sale to value realization. Further, the revolution in futures carried forth by the CBOT, afforded by its initial institutionalized system in 1848, circumvented earthly markets for the heavenly ether of capitalist abstraction. It transformed contracts between buyers and sellers into tradable commodities for exchange. That is, the CBOT helped locate a market within a market, discovering a commodity (the tradable contract) within the exchange and trade (again that same contract) of another commodity (the original asset, originally often grain).
Through the magic of “immaterial” ideas, the CBOT aided capital in its quest to conquer new markets, but the innovative financial regimes it introduced also assisted in capital’s annihilation of space with time. For capital, with help from the CBOT (which could be called “finance capital institutionalized”), the material delivery of the original asset in question (e.g. grain) ceased to matter much. It mattered less for financiers anyway; it continued to matter a great deal to humans who remained dependent upon acquirable food for sustenance. In self-reinforcing fashion, the increased permissibility in the discrepancy between the trading and the delivery could probably be attributable to the fact finance capitalists had started trading the commodities-based forwards contracts themselves, not just trading the concrete products of agriculture and whatever else. Once it became standard that “delivery would be possible in principle, but that it would not be performed in practice in all but a tiny minority of transactions” (Millo, 2007, p. 201), the time involved in the process of material transfer across space was dispensed with.

These changing dynamics of commerce and finance would be incomplete without further analysis of France leading up to 1848. Importantly, after 1830, “the usefulness of railroads begins to dawn” (Liesse, 1909, p. 69) upon developing parts of Europe. Perhaps not coincidentally, this was the same year the king of France, Charles X, violated the charter of liberties that was guaranteed to the French people after Waterloo as a way of enticing them to take back the Bourbon monarchy (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 12). The July Monarchy of Charles X was overthrown after three days of unrest in 1830. Louis Philippe came to the thrown where he would remain for just 18 years until revolution struck again. While revolution resulted in

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12 They are immaterial in the sense that they are abstract or abstracted from concrete reality (from material conditions). However, that ideas (1) reflect in part material conditions; and (2) have a material basis for generation (human material) amount to truisms.
immediate change with regard to the French Crown in 1830, opposition prevented expansion of railways in ways that would have a revolutionizing economic effect until about 1841, when it really became a “stimulus for commerce and industry” (Liesse, 1909, p. 69). By the 1840s it facilitated the borrowing of capital for purchase of raw materials necessary for construction. Likewise, it became an industry onto itself, “and one of the largest” (p. 69).

Coeval with capitalist industry came capitalist finance. Banks in France performed new functions (and old functions with greater rapidity), from issuing discounts and collections, to providing loans and advanced funds for enterprise – like the railroad industry – beginning in the early 1840s. Capital encouraged creation of new financial institutions in turn, augmenting another industry – the financial industry – in the process. The Comptoir Général du Commerce was founded in 1843 (Liesse, 1909, p. 74). The Bank of France started offering mortgages (some 34,000,000 francs worth) to metal works to assist railroad companies (p. 85), especially during the turmoil in 1848 when capital again was both in short supply and direly needed for businesses to be able to reinvest surplus and remain profitable. Once 1848 rolled around, even amid all the politicized banquets and barricades to be discussed below, and despite the uncertainty after the February Revolution in Paris when “private bankers lost their heads completely” (p. 59), the government came to the aid of Parisian merchants who appealed to them as the turmoil threatened business. The Second Republic – the provisional government in control after King Louis Philippe abdicated following the February 1848 uprising – decreed on March 7 the formation of the Comptoir d’Escompte, a key discount bank (p. 59).

The crisis and related decrees also resulted in nine previously profitable (for shareholders) departmental banks (in Rouen, Lyon, Havre, Lille, Orléans, Tolouse, Marseilles, Nantes and Bourdeaux) all asking for forced currency despite all having increased their capital,
reserves and average circulation in years prior. Without simultaneously requesting the necessary unification of paper monies for all banks, the banks faltered and had to merge with the Bank of France, which established the latter’s monopoly “as a bank of issue” (Liesse, 1909, p. 65). Both the 1848 revolutions and the economic crisis that created the necessary – but not sufficient – conditions for the revolutions also commenced consolidation of what came to be called the “state-finance nexus” (Harvey, 2014, p. 44) and concentrated “monopoly-finance capital” (Foster & McChesney, 2012, p. 100). These developments would extend beyond borders of nation-states (e.g. France, Britain, US) to become global in scope.

The intersections of finance and industry up to and during 1848 helped create the crisis conditions. Ironically, or dialectically if you rather, those intersections also formed a source of progressive inspiration. Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), a French solider and speculator, became a “self-anointed prophet” and author of “numerous books, pamphlets, and catechisms calling for a peaceful transition to the ‘new world’ which would have all men united in a universal brotherhood for the industrial exploitation of nature in the interest of all” (Eckalbar, 1979, p. 83). From his paradoxical capitalist-socialist philosophy came the Saint-Simonians, a movement that adhered to and expounded upon his doctrines touting entrepreneurial industrial progress and social welfare. Saint-Simonians went on to advocate a “general system of banks” (cited p. 84). These banks were to be directed by one central bank that would determine the destiny of workers and usher in what they called the “Final State” of human civilization (p. 84).

Two immigrants from Portugal, Émile and Isaac Péreire, brothers who became titans of finance capital and transformed the industry, were exposed to Saint-Simon’s doctrines while living with their family in Paris (Eckalbar, 1979). They joined the Saint-Simonian movement in the early 1830s, and although they left after a short time, the Péreire brothers retained its general
inspiration and set of ideas. Saint-Simonianism animated their moves within industry. The Péreires funded, promoted and managed the development of the Paris-St. Germain railroad (opened in August 1837) to “overcome the public inertia” (p. 88) by putting the wonders of industrial vision in plain view of the Paris populace. The brothers pressured the provisional government in 1848 to set up the aforementioned Comptoir Nationale d’Escompte de Paris, and oversaw its expansion into Alexandria, London, Bombay, Hong Kong and Saigon by 1875 (p. 89). Instituted in 1848, their bank supported credit expansion across the world system. “This becomes important,” as Harvey (2010) explained, “because, as the eighteenth-century French utopian thinker Saint-Simon long ago argued, it takes the ‘association of capitals’ on a large scale to set in motion the kinds of massive works such as railroads that are required to sustain long-term capitalist development” (p. 49). Saint-Simon inaugurated a public pedagogy of human progress through industrial-financial development furthering concentration of capital under the banner of benefiting humanity as a whole. The Péreires and others adopted and advanced the pedagogy, creating institutions and constructing ideas reflecting and venerating capitalist development as synonymous with human development, papering over the antagonism therein.

Another key figure who approved Péreire projects, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (Napoleon III), also had a “youthful interest in Saint-Simonianism” (Hobsbawm, 1975, p. 25). In relation, Napoleon III authored a paper, “The Extinction of Pauperism,” arguing workers deserved decent pay. It was on the basis of this work and flippant rhetoric that he “was made to seem almost a socialist,” enabling him to win “the support of large numbers of workers” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 84).13 Bonaparte even once referred to himself as “a socialist” after appointing

13 “But Louis Napoleon was one socialist the Assembly was not afraid of,” Robertson (1952[1971]) explained about Bonaparte’s acceptance by the French establishment following the revolution, and it appeared “the party of order can recognize its champions under any disguise” (p. 84). The provisional government certainly recognized it in that
himself Emperor (Rapport, 2008, p. 328). His “socialist” policies had far less to do with workers in control of production and far more to do with using the power of the state to crush residual rebellion at home and nascent republics (e.g. Rome in 1849) abroad. He managed to unite “authoritarianism, popular sovereignty and social progress” (p. 328) to partially succeed in becoming “all things to all people” (p. 328). His popularity soared early, and in 1848 he was voted into the French National Assembly at the same time as anarchist-socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (p. 206) – both with significant working class backing.

Like the Saint-Simon movement, Bonaparte embodied hypocrisy and contradiction. The nephew of the erstwhile Emperor Napoleon – from whose shared name he garnered much of his populist appeal – would of course seize power through extra-legal means with a coup d’état in December 1851. Seemingly without compunction, he also claimed the primary “quality of a people who aspire to a free government, is respect for the law. Now, the only force of a law is the interest of every citizen to respect it” (Bonaparte, 1852, p. 272).

One authentic consequence of Bonaparte’s ascension pertained to a revolutionary transformation, just not of the type the proletarians at the barricades in June 1848 fought for. Napoleon III proved critical in enabling the Péreires to change the face of finance capital in the nineteenth century and for posterity. In 1852, at the Péreire brothers’ request, Napoleon III authorized public funds for the establishment of a railway-oriented bank to concentrate capital, diminish risk to investors and steer the development of the railway industry writ large (Eckalbar, 1979, pp. 89-90). Eager to balance forces by backing a counterweight to the Bank of France and other financiers hostile to the new regime, Bonaparte helped Émile and Isaac realize their

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embodiment of contradiction and caricature whom Marx (1852[1987]) referred to when he claimed “all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice” – “the first time as tragedy, the second as farce” (p. 15).
utopian-socialist-cum-capitalist-industrial-finance dream. After first institutionalizing their ideas in 1848 with the *Comptoir d’Escompte*, the brothers took their project a step further with Bonaparte’s help and established the *Société Générale de Crédit Mobilier*.

Before implementing further financial innovations to overcome existing institutional arrangements and thereby generating its own crisis, going bust by 1868, the brothers used the *Crédit Mobilier* in solidarity with capitalist industry and finance across Europe. Through the *Crédit Mobilier* they financed the Midi railroad, the Grand Central railroad and the French Eastern railroad (all in the bank’s first year). With their new institution the brothers later backed development of the Darmstädter Bank of Germany, the first of the so-called “Great Banks” credited with advancing German industrialization (Eckalbar, 1979). Reeling from the tumult and challenge to its imperial control in 1848-9, Austria also turned to the *Crédit Mobilier* to underwrite its once state-owned railway system, the Austrian State Railway Company. Displeased with Péreire encroachment on their dominance of the nineteenth century Austrian financial industry, the Rothschilds created the Credit-Anstalt bank in Vienna. Under competitive pressure, they modeled their institution after *Crédit Mobilier*, gearing the Credit-Anstalt toward also financing industrial development. Eckalbar (1979) adds the Péreire brothers likewise established *Crédit Mobilier* divisions in Spain and Italy (p. 92).

Finance and industry hardly alleviated the class tensions inherent in the CWE, during or after 1848. Public pedagogies supported ruling class interests through an educative culture that recast those interests either as supportive of the general welfare (e.g. Saint-Simonian doctrines) or as justified on the basis that the poor deserve their plight, the rich strengthened their monopoly on the means of production and potentially infinitely expanding money power. Foregrounding the advent of early financialization, with its mediating and pedagogical nature (it came to
mediate human relations and relations of production and exchange more so than ever before), shows us how the first “world revolution” in 1848 gave rise to new features of the world system which continue to support its raison d’être while simultaneously threatening to undermine its stability because of the increased potential for systemic crises it unleashes. Like capital generally, finance mediated (and mediates) people’s relationships to each other and to production, as suggested. In 1848 it also started mediating the present and future, as with futures contracts, and what was established during the critical juncture soon gave rise to fictitious capital further mediating the medium of exchange (money and contracts) and the exchange itself. Added financial abstraction presaged future crises of the CWE to follow. More generally, liberalism and free trade, championed by establishment media like the London Times and by the empire in which that paper was published, concentrated wealth while creating and exacerbating crisis. Mass unemployment, low wages for those with work and higher commodity prices during the crisis preceding the world revolution not only produced widespread immiseration. The misery came coeval with perhaps the best known manifesto of all time – the Marx and Engels pamphlet that was grist to the mill of the seething discontent about to boil over into the streets and into parliaments. The material conditions generated déclassé intellectuals, critiques of the system and highly varied revolutionary (“radical”) public pedagogies. The following chapter considers those pedagogies within a WSA framework, noting the cracks in global power dynamics.
CHAPTER FOUR: WSA OF PUBLIC PEDAGOGIES DURING THE WORLD REVOLUTION OF 1848

INTRODUCTION

This chapter contains analysis of the public pedagogies at play during the world revolution of 1848. The focus is on Europe and the continental revolutions that reverberated throughout the world system. Countless uprisings swept the continent during the year in question, but here I focus on the main geographical-political entities wherein significant popular revolt, challenges to power structures and changes (some impermanent, others subtle yet long lasting) to structures of power occurred. Since newsprint in 1848 was fundamentally linked to the revolutions in Europe, emphasis throughout this chapter is on the pedagogical implications of the various social movements – or “societies in movement” – and how the nineteenth century media produced by prevailing power arrangements, and by those challenging the established arrangements of power, functioned (along with other interpersonal and group actions) as public pedagogy. Analysis of these public pedagogies involves examination of primary source newspaper articles circa 1848 accessed through microfilm records and digital archives, critical consideration of various newspaper articles and other writings from 1848 found in collected works and comparative reading of other historical works all with narrower focus than the WSA lens used here. While chapter five focuses more closely on the British Empire (and the Americas), this chapter includes extensive analysis of the newspaper of record, the *London Times*, published within the world system’s then-reigning hegemon, Great Britain. This puts the pedagogies at work and the assumptions of the media within the predominant power center at the time under the proverbial microscope.

The public pedagogies are foregrounded within a larger historical narrative (and within the larger-still story of the world system) detailing how revolutions commenced, proceeded and
ultimately failed in the straightforward sense within each of the territories considered below. The historical recounting is intended to provide the necessary context for understanding the public pedagogies in relation to the revolutions, in relation to world system changes. The descriptive frames, always incomplete in terms of conveying all the human activity throughout and constituting a given critical juncture, nevertheless provide historical corrective to prevailing modes of analysis of particular parts of social change. The assumption here is that the history of 1848 is contested but nevertheless really took place with material events and material effects for the world thereafter. That history cannot be understood solely by dissecting it into tiny elements. Nor can the significance of the critical juncture be conveyed through a faux objectivity simply by citing dates, facts and figures. If we accede that these (dates, facts, figures, etc.) took place in time, we should also accept that these objective factors and their event-relation structures are meaningfully only for subjects, human agents who constitute events or relations from interpreted data (Marcuse, 1964, p. 150). In the same way, wholly subjective interpretations, with their steadfast rejections of shared material truths, only reproduce ahistorical ideology incapable of seeing the real material world as riddled with antagonism and subject to change. This chapter shows how human actions throughout time, during the critical juncture of 1848, have had educative implications – but this is only possibly by framing actions within a larger narrative enabling meaning-making from what are otherwise only assemblages of information.

Elaborating past actions, especially communications, as public pedagogies demands transcending a one-dimensional historiography. It involves refusal to surrender “to the immediate facts,” instead recognizing facts but also “their historical content” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 97). This approach emphasizes the processual formation of history while at the same time it decisively “stops telling the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary” (Benjamin, 1935[2007]a, p. 263).
The narrative descriptions below have been crafted to equip readers to discern “the constellation” of pedagogies from 1848 have formed with the present. Revealing the “historical character” of contradictions within the societies and larger world system described, and depicting “the process of their mediation as historical process” is meant to unearth both past and present “potentiality as historical possibility, its realization as historical event” (Marcuse, 1964, p. 97). The dialectical, descriptive histories that follow should facilitate thinking through how past pedagogies are still in the process of being actualized and recast. This is a necessary precondition for understanding what pedagogical potentials in the present could be realized by humans to make the future. We begin by looking at the Italian states, where the year of revolutions started.

REVOLT IN ITALIAN STATES: FIRST EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS OF 1848

Price (1988) points to January 12 as the first real revolt of 1848 in Europe. Rapport (2008) refers to that early January rebellion in Palermo, Sicily, as “the year’s first full-blown revolution” (p. 44). Unrest soon spread to Naples. The northern and much of the central parts of Italy at the time were controlled by Austria, under the auspices of the Habsburg Empire. Some explanation of the Habsburg monarchy and how it ruled is necessary to understand how and why subjects in the Italian states rebelled.

The Hasbsburg dynasty, ruled from “the imperial capital, Vienna” (Rapport, 2008, p. 3) and over eight kingdoms, including Hungary, Bohemia and Lombardy (in Italy), in addition to controlling many duchies and grand duchies. Italian states like Lombardy and Venetia came under Habsburg rule in 1815, and northern Italy quickly became “one of the jewels of their crown” (p. 8) because of widespread and well-kept vineyards, fields of wheat and mulberry bushes filled with fiber-producing silk worms. Milan, the capital of the Kingdom of Lombardy-
Venetia, suffered slightly less censorship than other sites under imperial rule, and thus flourished as a cultural center.

Hopes for change had soared high in Italy after the election of Pope Pius IX in June 1846, followed by the easing of censorship, as well as amnesty for some 2,000 political prisoners (Price, 1988, p. 31). Pius IX garnered a reputation as the “liberal” pope (Rapport, 2008, p. 39). Authorities in Italy relaxed censorship after the election of the new pope, but restrictions still pervaded the Austrian empire, its Italian states included. A march in celebration of the new pope to be performed by a famous Italian composer had to be cancelled because Pius IX was considered too liberal (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 199).

Predictions of revolution proliferated in Italy before the uprisings took place. At a funeral for the Irish reformer Daniel O’Connell in 1847, a priest from Rome gave an oration warning of “a revolution which threatens to encompass the globe” (cited in Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 41). Institutions and those in designated positions within them wielding social power have historically feared the most minor threats to their authority and to the status quo that affords them their influence. Generating widespread alarm among populations – often tapping into anger, frustration, resentment and insecurities already present – can become a public pedagogy producing and legitimating the system and repressive efforts to preserve it. Material conditions surrounding 1848 produced major discontent and classes capable of acting on their indignation. Various public pedagogies projecting beyond deplorable crisis conditions, offering alternative practices and suggestions for social relations different from imperial and capitalist ones, captured people’s imaginations at a magnitude unlike before. The capitalist world economy [CWE], defined by its constant negation of humanity and alienation of dignity, inevitably engenders incessant desire to transcend and (in early 1848) struggle against the negation of life
characterized by ideas, some better than others, about recovering dignity. The priest’s funeral premonition in 1847 echoed the fear-mongering hysterics and the ostensibly authentic desires expressed among populations in the Austrian-controlled Italian states and beyond.

_Fear of Revolution in the Hegemonic Foreign Press_

While censorship might have been relaxed in places like Milan, Austria maintained a monopoly on revenue from tobacco in its Italian states up to 1848, which provided impetus for the initial stages of revolt. The January 14, 1848 edition of the _London Times_ reported how an “anonymous notice,” circulated throughout Milan in December, called abstinence from tobacco, snuff and the lottery as “the most effectual mode of affecting the finances of the Austrian Government, which derive, as is well known, a very large revenue from these monopolies” (p. 4). According to Britain’s renowned paper, the strategy was “universally adopted” (p. 4) by Milanese liberals, radicals and nationalists. If the _Times_ commentary recounted correctly, the tobacco boycott kicked off the year of revolutions:

From the 1st of January not a whiff or a pinch was allowed to taint the atmosphere or choke the respiratory organs with the merchandise of the Imperial tobacconist; and a people who are behind none of their neighbors in the use of the weed suddenly sacrificed to patriotism what they refused to cleanliness and good taste. For that instant the fate of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom seemed to hang on the proportion of those who smoke to those who did not. (p. 4)

Poetic as the above passage in the paper’s standard main story/opinion section makes the organ appear, the _Times_ staff waxed less poetic about the prospects of revolution in the continent given events in Austria’s Italian territories. “The state of popular fermentation and excitement which has now prevailed for several months with more or less intensity throughout Italy,” they wrote,
“has naturally driven the people to strange and indirect modes of expressing those feelings and opinions which the Governments of many parts of the Peninsula were prepared to repress. Even in Lombardy this species of covert warfare has within the last few days been carried on in a manner which has led, unhappily, to more serious disturbances and loss to life” (p. 4). In the *Times* version of history, “It soon became manifest in Milan that the population were resolved to enforce this sacrifice of a favourite habit” – foregoing tobacco – “by violent and illegal means” (p. 4). The Habsburg method of empire-sanctioned violence, with just a little dash of liberalism thrown in (e.g. minimal relaxation of censorship) to appease the Milanese, did not receive the same condemnation. In fact, although the paper would repeatedly condemn excessively repressive measures by governments throughout 1848 in the wake of all the uprisings, censure of imperial control did not feature prominently – or even at all in the above-cited issue.

Sticking with the *Times*’ coverage of incipient revolution(s) in Italy, readers receive a brief description of January events. “A riot ensued, large bodies of soldiers were called out, and though it is not “ascertained that they fired on the people, a very considerable number of persons were unhappily killed and wounded by their side arms” (p. 4). The adverb “unhappily” perhaps bespeaks generalized human discomfort regarding loss of other human life. However, within this context the modifier functions more as implied expression of the assumption that, when many people are killed, it is an unfortunate but obviously necessary – or at least excusable – outcome when dealing with an unruly populace. Save for that, the statement that many “were unhappily killed” casts the incident of many deaths amid revolt as generally disconcerting, just as the challenge to order itself in the form of revolt is interpreted as disconcerting for the power structure within the world system, of which the *Times* is one part.
The paper continued, claiming there “is much to be feared” given “that the irritation caused by this riot will not easily be allayed, for the spark has fallen on the most combustible materials, and every incident of this kind strengthens the disposition of the Austrian Cabinet to strike a decisive blow for the maintenance of Italian supremacy” (p. 4). Putting aside what appears as ideological inversion in the last clause, given the actual struggle that was waged in 1848 by Italian nationalists and republicans against Austrian domination (yet the paper’s concept of “Italian supremacy” remained somehow tethered to maintenance of Austrian rule), the first part of the sentence requires inquiry. It remains unclear who exactly “feared” the continuation of revolution and overthrow of the old order. The Milanese who quit smoking (not an easy task) to instigate the challenge? The Habsburg dynasty fearful of losing Italy and wary of revolution spreading (as it would) throughout its empire? The propertied classes and parliamentary actors in Britain anxious about uprisings spreading elsewhere from Italy, even to Great Britain’s own empire? Establishment media organs, with similar assumptions as the property-owners and political elite within Britain’s borders, disseminating news and opinion within the framework of suppositions supporting existing arrangements within the world system? Readers cannot know for certain. The Times does not state the source of the supposed fear regarding the possibility of insurrection spreading after the Italian riots. Evidence does suggest just who was fearful, without requiring much interpretation. “We most earnestly hope that this excitement will not overleap its bank,” the Times told readers regarding the Italian uprisings, “and that Europe will not again be called upon to witness in our time the lamentable spectacle of an Italian puppet show of freedom, followed, by a revel of anarchy, and terminated by the strong had of Austrian power” (p. 4). Equating anarchy with deplorable conditions instead of self-rule became somewhat of a recurring theme for the Times, as demonstrated below. The last excerpt quoted just above accomplished
two small feats: first, it attached defeat and farcical disorder to anarchist praxis, akin to other efforts to link anarchism with concepts like chaos, violence and disorder; second, it repudiated the spread of revolution, partly by associating it with anarchy.

Subtly invoking notions of anarchy apropos revolution, thereby debasing them both in a mutually reinforcing downward conceptual spiral, the *Times* still espoused aspirations for Italy, in accord with centrist liberal hegemony. The paper admonished “the evil Governments to which some of the Italian states are still subjected” (p. 4). True to centrist liberal doctrine, however, it also rebuked (at least implicitly) the excessive, over-excited rush to rebellion. Indeed, “the degree of excitement which now prevails throughout that country presents very formidable difficulties even to those Governments which are most disposed to advance the great interests of the nation, and that it encourages the sinister predications and designs of those who look forward to the day of retribution and oppression” (p. 4). In truth, the *Times* commentary was not mere reflection of the vested interests of order, which to a large extent surely included its presumably bourgeois subscription base, not to mention the institutional structure of Britain’s capitalist political economy of which it was enmeshed. Nor was it just a pedagogy of inculcating fear of emerging revolutionary ethos in effort to undermine potential support for radicalism in Italy or beyond. The *Times* article contained more than an iota of truth. Repressive retribution lay around the corner for most revolutionists as counter-revolution commenced almost immediately. The Milanese students who led the January tobacco riots in Lombardy were later punished with forced conscription that made them labor in the army after 1848 (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 207).

By the end of January, foreign press assumed a tone even more critical regarding both revolutionary activity and governmental repression than when the uprisings first started. All the
while, they extolled the imperative of reform. “It is now apparent that the principal danger to the tranquility of Italy and the peace of Europe are manifesting themselves not in those Italian states which have adopted a policy of reform,” the unnamed writer at the *London Times* argued on January 28, 1848, “but in those in which a peremptory resistance has been offered to the demands and supplications of the people and where despotism has taken its stand on military force to crush, if possible, the agitation of the nation” (p. 4). The author (or authors, as there is no byline) saw “signs which threaten a tempest of revolution in Naples and Lombardy,” and called the insurrectionary omens “pregnant with evil to the whole of Italy” (p. 4).

The paper lamented it would soon not be possible to keep relying on reforms from the liberal princes in Rome, Tuscany and Piedmont. To be sure, as Postgate (1920) noted, shortly after the January uprisings across Italy there were “Constitutions granted everywhere,” and by February “the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the King of Naples and the Pope of Rome himself all promised Constitutions” (p. 231). At this stage, as imperial subjects, their governing documents were all still contingent on concessions from Austria. The author(s) of that main op-ed article from the aforementioned issue of the *Times* published Friday, January 28, therefore surmised “if a formidable struggle between the two extreme principles of anarchy and despotic power is going on in Milan or in Naples” (p. 4), exalted liberalism becomes impossible. Extreme conservative reaction – but also the specter of anarchy haunting Italy – threaten the liberal order and its prerogative of progress, which is preferred – from the perspective of writers at the *Times*, so long as that progress doesn’t impede profits or impinge upon private property rights. Helping readers understand this while simultaneously promulgating a centrist liberal pedagogy critical of revolution, the *Times* warned “sympathy excited by the popular cause throughout Italy will become irresistible,” resulting in “some catastrophe, of which the least evil is that it interrupts
the hopes and designs which had been entertained by moderate reformers and threatens to sweep another nation along in the torrent of revolution” (p. 4). Whether labelled the greater or “least evil,” the paper’s inclusion of this reprobation of those who would opt for revolution over reform, risking the health of other liberal nations in the process, makes explicit the preference for moderate concessions. It does so by tethering the radical cause in Italy to both the immoral and wicked (that is, evil) and to “catastrophe,” in one form of disaster or another.

For their part, Austrian authorities did what they could to avert catastrophe, which for them meant catastrophic loss of their authority. Prince Klemens von Metternich, the “long-serving Austrian diplomat” and “one of the giants of the nineteenth century” (Rapport, 2008, p. 3), was widely known “as the real power behind the throne” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 191). As Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Metternich had promised Emperor Francis, the previous Austrian emperor, he would look after Francis’ son, Ferdinand. Until his death in 1835, Francis had maintained the “governmental machine” (p. 189) by getting to his desk every morning “to read the reports which his secret police had prepared for him—including copies they had made of the diplomatic pouches of foreign envoys and even private letters of his family and high officials” (p. 190). Throughout his reign Francis remained indifferent to science and technology, cared little for art and opposed industrial development – even objecting to construction of steam railroads in his empire. Much is made of how his son, Emperor Ferdinand, “was feebleminded, epileptic, physically impotent” (p. 189) and overall impaired by 1848, but surely the impediments to capital imposed by Ferdinand’s father – the autocratic administration and

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14 It is hard to confirm whether Ferdinand was afflicted by a diagnosable intellectual disability as the scientific community would recognize disability today, or if he rather suffered from another psychiatric condition or instead just had eccentric mental lapses. But his outbursts became legend. Ferdinand once famously and emphatically told his courtiers, “I am the Emperor and I want dumplings” (cited in Rapport, 2008, p. 8).
restrictive monarchical rule precluding constant accumulation or market expansion – created the conditions wherein revolt became inevitable.

Metternich maintained tight control of the Habsburg monarchy after Francis died. Known as “intelligent, arrogant, aloof” (Rapport, 2008, p. 3) and apparently loose with women, his time as Habsburg’s foreign minister (since 1809) and Chancellor (after 1821) provided him with opportunity to hone his imperial managing skills. Unlike Francis, this “architect of the conservative order” (p. 112) encouraged local elites under Habsburg control to research national history and read rich cultural texts, which seemed like a good way to divert them from political action (p. 29). But in Italy and throughout the Austrian empire it had another effect: fomenting anti-monarchical liberalism and nationalism. Much like with the German states under Austrian and Prussian rule, many Italians saw national unity as a precondition for political-economic modernization, and thus combined liberalism with nationalism (Price, 1988, p. 29).

With Milan and Venice on fire since the tobacco riots of early February, and constitutions being granted left and right in provinces, Metternich became increasingly obsessed with resisting the revolution in Italy (Rapport, 2008, p. 81). The minister had previously patronized Italy, calling it a mere “geographical expression” (cited p. 12).

The remark was remediated. Exemplifying emergent trans-national information sharing, the London Times picked up, and on February 14, 1848, printed a then-recently published correspondence from Prince Metternich to Count Dietrichstein dated early August 1847. In the Times’ typical all-caps headline for foreign affairs (when headlines were used, which was not always the case), under the banner, “THE POLITICAL CONDITION OF THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE,” the paper quoted the influential Austrian diplomat who wrote, “Italy is a geographical expression” (p. 6). However, in this correspondence, published first by an organ outside Britain
and then featured in the *Times*, Metternich qualified his condescension, claiming the subject of Italian agitation even in the early stages was “not interesting to our empire alone,” but that it really “has the importance of a great European question” (p. 6). Austria’s Chancellor continued, asserting the Italian states “are agitated at this moment by a spirit of subversion, the consequence of which are but too easy to foresee. The geographical position of our empire imposes upon us the duty to regard with redoubled attention the course of events in that country” (p. 6). His letter, re-published in Britain on Valentine’s Day, evinces both the prescience and perhaps panicky (yet perceptive) perspectives of those commanding positions of power within dominant institutions of the time. If nothing else, it demonstrates that the prince’s preoccupation with Italian dissent antedated the outbreak of full-blown republican revolution.

However, Austria had helped to squash earlier aborted revolutions in Naples and Piedmont in 1820-1, after which the famed “Lombard liberals” were sent to hated prisons in Bohemia (Rapport, 2008, p. 13). A highly organized “revolutionary secret society” (p. 14), the Carbonari, “dedicated to the overthrow of Austrian domination and to the establishment of a liberal order in Italy” (p. 15), produced leaders like the déclassé intellectual Giuseppe Mazzini, a Genoa-born Italian “patriot” and member of the society after 1829. The Carbonari, also known as the “good cousins,” were the best known of the organizations resembling a “secret insurrectionary brotherhood” (Hobsbawm, 1962, p. 115) first popularized toward the end of the Napoleonic period. Based loosely on the hierarchic and ritualistic “masonic model,” ostensibly passed down “from masonic lodges or similar lodges in Eastern France via anti-Bonapartist French officers in Italy,” the organization “took shape in southern Italy after 1806,” and spread

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15 According to Chivers (2010), passing love-notes started back in mid-18th century England as a precursor to modern Valentine’s Day celebrations. By the 19th century, the practice was so popular factories began mass producing cards. In 1847, the year before the “world revolution,” Esther Howland of Worcester, Massachusetts, picked up on the English tradition and started producing cards using the new and cheaper lace available in the United States.
“across the Mediterranean world after 1815” (p. 115). This was much to the chagrin of power structures, which – while always predicated upon a lack of transparency – nevertheless vilified the Cabonari for their organizational secrecy.

In an ideological amalgamation, at least one speaker in the British House of Commons cast aspersions on the Carbonari as the 1848 revolution in Italy erupted, accusing the society of conspiracy and denouncing it for abandoning proper political methods of reform. As the assertions comport with the centrist liberal framework from which the London Times reported, it is fitting that the February 24, 1848 edition of the paper quoted the parliamentarian in the House of Commons, who claimed, “the party in Italy opposed to the Austrians did not consist entirely of persons interested in the cause of reform, but in a great measure of Carbonari, and others, anxious for the destruction of all existing states, with the view of establishing a central head of Italy” (p. 2). The statement, disseminated by the leading newspaper in the leading nation-state within the world system, managed to misuse the word “anxious,”16 reproached anarchy (juxtaposing “the destruction of all existing states” with the alternately proper mode of moderate liberal reform within the established political institutions comprising existing states) and also stoked fears of groups conspiring for a geopolitically impossible state of Italian hegemony – all in one sentence.

However, the British parliament speaker’s take on Italian radicalism contained more than a modicum of truth. As the most prominent Italian pushing for more than tepid reform, Mazzini

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16 Unless the word “anxious” carried a different meaning in nineteenth century English parlance, the speaker should have used a word like “eager” instead. Anxious connotes anxiety and unease. While revolution undoubtedly made members of the British House of Commons anxious, the context of the speaker's sentence does not suggest members of the Carbonari or other radicals would be anxious as regards their political aims, which appear to be misconstrued by the British parliamentarian at any rate. Rather, Italian revolutionists would be eager for whatever it is the speaker asserted. If the historical record is any indication of the reality of the 1848 juncture, the Italian revolutionists were actually eager for overthrow of the Austrian empire and establishment of a constitutional republic, not (unfortunately from the viewpoint of contemporary radicals like Bakunin and Proudhon) for anarchy, “for the destruction of all existing states,” as the British statesman put it.
wrote riveting manifestos of the sort not all liberals would approve.\textsuperscript{17} In their *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* publication, Marx and Engels (1850[2010]) described Mazzini’s manifestos as “purely religious in content” because they made “an appeal to faith” (p. 307) capable of representing (and cultivating or directing) the ideals of the majority of the Italian people. Mazzini opposed socialism (Postgate, 1920), but also recognized the significance of what many called the “social question” (Clark, 2012, p. 174) or the “moral question” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 4) regarding rampant poverty and extreme inequality plaguing the new industrial age. His fervid nationalism and liberal politics had a progressive side with respect to “social reform, and for some time” he “contested Marx’s supremacy in the International” (Postgate, 1920, p. 231). Whether this constituted a “real job” in the eye’s of Mazzini’s parents who helped keep their déclassé son afloat is impossible to know. Mazzini’s prominent role during the 1848 critical juncture, like the similarly significant influences of Marx and Bakunin (in regards to their communications and other in-person political activities), attests to the salience of the déclassé when it comes to pedagogies for cracking the system. Whether the revolutionary power of déclassé intellectuals is a truly transhistorical phenomenon requires more detailed, comparative case studies of various revolutionary junctures to determine. Yet the sheer magnitude of influence attributed to the aforementioned men and their mediated words at least partially supports the special relevance of the déclassé during the first world revolution; evidence below describing the role of others downgraded into déclassé status will corroborate the claim.

Before tendering his resignation in mid-March amid student revolts in Vienna and on the eve of the Milanese “Five Days,” Metternich coordinated as best he could Austrian efforts at quelling discontent stirred by leaders like the déclassé Mazzini (Postgate, 1920; Robertson, 17 Mazzini appreciated even failed uprisings because, as he proclaimed, “ideas ripen quickly when nourished by the blood of martyrs” (cited in Rapport, 2008, p. 18).
Metternich aimed to pacify the Italian states that had not up to that point rebelled. He appointed the diplomat Count Joseph von Hübner to mediate between the different Italian governments and the press, promising Austrian support should revolution break out in their territories and encouraging them to resist it.

Inspired by news of the February revolution in Paris, people planned a “peaceful protest” (Rapport, 2008, p. 80) in Milan on March 18. Some 15,000 participated in the march. Having seen successful constitutional campaigns from Naples to Tuscany to Rome – plus bearing witness to France’s banquet-turned-revolution the month before (discussed below), which given French hegemony in matters of revolution carried symbolic resonance – thousands of Milanese moved to throw off the yoke of imperial authority. With no formal leadership or plan, students, women and workers constructed barricades in the streets “comprised of overturned carriages, barrels and hastily chopped-down trees,” and soon “bolstered by paving stones, sofas, beds, pianos and church furniture” (p. 82), merchants opened shops to let insurrectionaries grab munitions while chemists concocted gun powder.\(^\text{18}\) By March 20, the insurgency started to beat back the imperial army, as Milanese men shot rifles and the women threw stones, remaining largely invisible to Austrian troops until the soldiers were physically (and psychologically) struck. Incessant street fighting ended with expulsion of Austrian forces by March 23 (Postgate, 1920, p. 234). On the same day, the revolt in Venice succeeded, and the lawyer Daniel Manin, born to a wealthy patrician family, was proclaimed president of the new Venetian Republic (Hobsbawm, 1975, p. 18; Smith IV, 2013, p. 38). Back in February, on the same day as the Metternich correspondence came to light, the *London Times* reported that, based on information

\(^{18}\) Other innovative communication strategies served the Italians well. From atop observatories and bell-towers, watchers charted enemy movements and sent down bulletins via iron wire to their republican comrades on the ground, while uniformed orphans (fresh from school) went from barricade to barricade carrying messages (Rapport, 2008, p. 86). The Milanese also tried balloon media as a makeshift mode of communicating, with ostensibly inconsistent results.
from the *Journal des Débats*, a French newspaper popular since the 1789 revolution, King Charles Albert of Piedmont granted a constitution (p. 6). Seizing the opportunity provided by success in Milan and the sense of hope people of Piedmont must have felt after their own successful constitutional campaign, Albert declared war on Austria (Postage, 1920, p. 234) the same day, March 23, as Milan’s glory days came to an end.

*The Church, Italian Unity and Autonomous Actions*

From March to April, the Church functioned as a unifying force. “As a figurehead,” Rapport (2008) chronicled, “Pius IX managed to transcend social and political divisions and offer a striking unifying focus to the Italian insurrections, but the local clergy played an important, galvanizing force as well” (p. 109). Clergy had been among the first to call for the barricades, and at least one Archbishop (in Milan) proudly wore the Italian tricolor throughout the fighting. In those first few months of 1848, the Pope “still seemed to be fulfilling his early liberal promise and offering his leadership to a rejuvenating Italy,” and he faced “intense pressure” from the “widespread popular movement across Italy” to side with republican cause in the “anti-Austrian conflict” (p. 151). In an unsurprising paradox, despite being a beacon for classical conservatism and continuation of tradition, the Church’s attitude soon enough proved fickle in matters of social transformation, as explained below.

Meanwhile, the Italian states became the theater for political contestation and debate. A pugnacious and short-statured law professor at the University of Pisa, Giuseppe Montanelli, stood with his students and advocated Italian nationalism, writing for his organ *L'Italia* (Università di Pisa, 2010). Sicilians upset Italian patriots by voicing concerns over local autonomy, prompting accusations that the former were waging a separatist war (Rapport, 2008, p. 162). Ferdinand II, King of the two Sicilies – not to be confused with Austria’s Emperor
Ferdinand, although Ferdinand II would fully side with the Habsburgs in 1849 to squash the ephemeral liberal order – would soon capitalize on the cleavages to start extinguishing Sicilian separatists (p 348). Giuseppe Garibaldi, another “figure who would soon become talismanic” (p. 168) returned to Italy with his Uruguayan wife Anita Robeiro da Silva in mid-April to assist Charles Albert – the king who sentenced him to death several years before – and fight for the national cause after having just come from fighting along the River Plate (Río de la Plata) in South America, on the border between Uruguay and Argentina (p. 168). The urban poor in Naples, known as the lazzaroni and reminiscent of the French sans-culottes from the previous century, staged another uprising in May against the wishes of moderates (p. 166). Emperor Ferdinand sent in Austrian troops and crushed the revolt, killing hundreds and persuading many of the urban workers to deflect from the cause of Italian unity.

Possibly spellbound by the relative ease of initial success in advancing Italian independence, Charles Albert made little attempt between March and July to prepare Piedmont for future struggle against Austria. Postgate (1920) documented how Albert’s focus shifted instead to the question of whether the new Lombard State would conjoin with Piedmont. Despite “Mazzini’s indignant protest” (p. 232), Lombardy and Piedmont fused with a new provisional government established on May 29. “The republican dilemma,” as Rapport (2008) put it, “was that the Piedmontese had the military strength to finish off the job of expelling the Austrians, but accepting such aid meant bowing to Charles Albert’s monarchist ambitions. The Milanese revolutionaries had all agreed to put off the political debate between monarchists and republicans a causa vinta, and Mazzini, despite his private misgivings, agreed” (p. 156). Manin’s Venetian Republic combined with them by early July. By May, republican apprehension revolving around the monarchist or dynastic ambitions of Piedmont’s Charles Albert became pervasive. Mazzini
even blasted Albert in the media, using his new newspaper, *Italia del Popolo*, to criticize Albert’s duplicity for trying to consolidate power by forging a northern Italian kingdom (Rapport, 2008, p. 158). Desires of those heading the separate Italian states to secure their own liberties left divisions within the nationalist movement.

At the same time, the Pope remained reluctant to commit Papal troops to fight against Austria. Russian journalist Alexander Herzen, who wrote feverishly on world affairs throughout the autocratic reign of Tsar Nicholas I during the 1848 juncture (McDonald, 2013), claimed the Pope “must either withdraw from rising events or ingloriously hit the ground and be crushed or be dragged along against his will” (cited in Rapport, 2008, p. 151). Herzen, celebrated as the founder of a populist “version of socialism, based on the peasant commune, which furnished the ideological basis for much of the Russian revolutionary activity that culminated in the overthrow of the monarchy in 1917” (McDonald, 2013, p. 88), advanced an anti-war ethos, which counterpoised his revolutionary ideals. “War is a savage, disgusting proof of human folly,” Herzen wrote upon seeing soldiers set out for war against Austria in the spring of 1848, “generalized brigandage, justified murder, the apotheosis of violence – and mankind still has to fight before there is a possibility of peace” (cited in Rapport, 2008, p. 153). Even given the conditions of possibility, Herzen remained wary of Papal troop deployment.

The Pope was wary too. He hoped Austria would be defeated before he would need to commit troops to fight against another Catholic monarchy. Austrian clergy had already been involved in a movement to change Roman dogmas, and the danger of the Austrian Church separating from Rome was great enough that Pius IX feared having to commit troops to fight in a war against Austria for an independent Italy (Robertson, 1952[1971]). Sensing a “schism” in the Church, Pope Pius IX would formally “repudiate unification and liberalism altogether” (Rapport,
2008, p. 163) by late April. In dialectical interplay, a left-wing democratic-republican response to the Pope’s decision compelled him to appoint a new cabinet both more favorable to the war and also inclined to empower parliament to ensure basic social provisions for citizens.

Lack of support from Papal troops, combined with key figures like Charles Albert equivocating (or trying to agglomerate their own power at the expense of virtually all other Italians), led to defeat. The Piedmont army suffered a big blow when it lost at Custozza on July 25, and Austria re-captured Milan on August 5, followed by an armistice and truce for a tentative republic (Postgate, 1920, p. 232). Mazzini managed to preside over a Roman Republic for six months. To do so, his government passed decrees like the one made by the Roman Republic (1849[1920]) on peasant proprietorship, “parceling out a large portion of the vast rural possession now actually administered, or about to be administered by the State, into small leasehold allotments at a moderate annual rent, redeemable at any given time, to one or several families of the poorest peasants” (pp. 236-237).

Venice continued resisting into the fall of 1848, without help from other Italian states. Manin held out hope for French support against Austria (Rapport, 2008, p. 317). Come March 1849, revolts took place again in Rome and Tuscany. Sicily’s Ferdinand II ended diplomatic relations with Piedmont and Tuscany, aided Austria in its war against Piedmont (and helped dissolve the latter’s parliament), ordered printing presses smashed and liberal deputies in the Naples parliament arrested, and brokered deals with Sicilian liberal leadership by early May after radicals’ resistance to royal troops featured red flags at barricades in April and frightened the liberals into acquiescence for fear their property would be imperiled (pp. 348-349).19 Charles

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19 Rapport (2008) points out that the liberal leadership even guided the royal troops into Palermo upon capitulation, although this also gave some the chance to help compromised radicals escape (p. 349).
Albert again declared war against Austrian only to be defeated at Novara before the end of the month (Postgate, 1920, p. 232).

French forces would come to someone’s aid in Italy by April 1849, although not as Manin had hoped. Postgate (1920) explained how the new President of France, “Prince Louis Bonaparte, sent troops to Rome without making clear his exact object. But it was soon seen, in spite of great duplicity, that these troops were really sent to restore the Pope, and a hopeless and bitter struggle began, ending only with the surrender of Rome on July 3” (pp. 232-233). The bitter irony of Bonaparte’s move abounds. It obviously aided Austria, even though “Metternich saw revolution as an essentially French disease” (Rapport, 2008, p. 17), and wrote to the Tsar years before that beyond “a doubt it is in Paris that the directing committee of the radicals of all Europe is today established” (cited p. 17). A year before Bonaparte sent troops to Rome to restore the Pope, the *London Times*, drawing on French media and sources, might have been correct to suggest, as the paper did on January 14, 1848, that French intentions remained “obscure,” and that the French Cabinet – still under Louis Philippe’s July Monarchy – planned to send troops to combat Austria if the Habsburgs crossed a certain point (p. 4). The *Times* acknowledged in that article they had “yet to learn what part these French troops would be destined to perform, and we suspect they would not be hailed as deliverers from the fear of an Austrian army, but rather as an addition to the foreign oppressors of the country” (p. 4). The *Times* prediction echoes expected presuppositions as regards mainstream public pedagogy within Britain, framing France and its foreign revolutionary inclinations as an oppressive force to be concerned about. Yet, for propaganda and ideology to function – that is, for mediated ideas to become publicly pedagogical – a degree of accuracy or some reality-based hypothesizing is often
necessary. As destiny would have it, the *Times* prognostication during the year of revolutions would prove disconcertingly correct.

After restoration of the papacy in Rome, Manin’s Venetian Republic tried to hold out alone against Austrian forces, holding the latter “in check all through the long Italian summer, repeatedly declaring its considered intent to fight to the last” (Postgate, 1920, p. 233). Despite dwindling supplies, a near epidemic of cholera and general spread of disease, Venice lasted until August 28, 1849, at which point Manin and the Assembly of the Venetian Republic refused to be the ones to formally return power to the Austrians, passing the task off to the old municipality instead.

But the Italian revolutions that kicked off the “world revolution” of 1848 had already left cracks in the system. Wallerstein (2011; 2014a) argued events of 1848 solidified centrist liberal hegemony. The Italian constitutional changes of 1848 corroborate his claim. Like other European governments after 1848, Italy implemented a new European political-administrative model, reflecting “a post-revolutionary *rapprochement* that proved capable of answering to the aspirations both of the more statist and moderate elements of the old liberalism and of the more innovative and entrepreneurial elements among the old conservative elites” (Clark, 2012, p. 178). The Piedmont constitution of 1848 instituted certain contradictions permitting elites – the new “pragmatic coalition” (p. 175) of conservatives and liberals (with some radicals walking a more liberal-progressve line) – to gradually “prune back the powers of the monarchy” (p. 175), isolating “the old aristocratic right” (p. 178). The flexibility of the coalition later helped Italian statesmen Count Camillo di Cavour “to secure parliamentary support for a wide range of modernising initiatives” (p. 176), concordant with the political-economic shifts in finance capital and industry generally, discussed in the previous section. The following sections will show how
some similar changes and other incredibly different developments took place in (and beyond) France in and as a result of 1848.

FRANCE IN 1848: FROM REVOLUTION TO HISTORY REPEATING IN REACTION

Unpacking Assumptions about Change and Revolution from Tocqueville to Marx

Alexis de Tocqueville, famous for writing about democracy in the New World and later for plunging into the archives to author a book about the Ancien Régime and the seminal 1789 revolution, participated in French politics during the July Monarchy of the Orléanist King Louis Philippe. Tocqueville, of aristocratic origins and bourgeois inclinations (Furet, 1978), sought to understand revolution, even as he feared it. Tocqueville’s (1856[1983]) study focusing on Old Regime institutions demonstrated the importance of attending to the conditions from which a revolution emerges – without committing the historicist error of causally attributing later moments (or the present) to select facets of the past. His candid, often evidentially apt assessments and also his underlying assumptions, offer an indispensable glimpse into ruling class frameworks of thought informing reactions to the 1848 revolution in France, and thus represent a sensible starting point for this section.

Recollecting “from a distance” on his nation’s historical trajectory, Tocqueville (1850[1970]) offered to his fellow French citizens, “our history from 1789 to 1830” – when Charles X was overthrown and the Orléanists’ July Monarchy began – “appears to be forty-one years of deadly struggle, between the Ancien Régime with its traditions, memories, hopes and men (i.e. the aristocrats), and the new France led by the middle class” (pp. 4-5). Inaugurated in 1789 and culminating in 1830, “the triumph of the middle class was decisive and so complete that the narrow limits of the bourgeoisie encompassed all political powers, franchises, prerogatives, indeed the whole of government, to the exclusion, in law, of all beneath it and, in
fact, of all that had once been above it” (p. 5). After 1830 “the bourgeoisie became not only the sole director of society, but also, one might say, its cultivator,” as that “spirit peculiar to the middle class” – a spirit “active and industrious, often dishonest, generally orderly, but sometimes rash because of vanity and selfishness, timid by temperament, moderate in all things except a taste for well-being” – “became the general spirit of the government, it dominated foreign policy as well as home affairs” (p. 5).

The assessment should not surprise. Nor is it inaccurate. Nor philosophically amiss. Karl Marx, expelled from Paris in 1844 at the behest of the Prussian government incensed over his radicalizing German exiles (Fernbach, 2010, p. 17), also “first committed himself to the proletariat” (p. 36) as the agent of change in 1844. Upon exile from France, he posed the position and perspective of the bourgeoisie as problems for the first time with serious conviction. Critiquing idealism and the Hegelian conception of the domination by spirit in history, Marx and Engels (1845[1998]) echoed Tocqueville’s take on the bourgeois zeitgeist prevailing in France, insisting:

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The

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20 In his extensive study of the evolution of Marx’s ethical thought, West (1991) noted that as early as 1842 Marx authored and published an essay, “Debates on the Law on Theft of Wood,” in which he for the first time expresses support for “the poor, politically and socially propertyless man” (cited p. 29) against society’s property-owning wealthy elite. “This shift is significant,” West (1991) remarked, “in that it occurs when he makes a connection between the needs of the poor, who are forced to gather pieces of fallen wood for heat in the cold, and the moral desirability of satisfying these needs, of gathering this wood” (p. 29). Marx’s formulation in October-November 1842, at just 24 years of age, appears as a schematic precursor to his theoretical identification shortly thereafter, and just prior to the 1848 year of revolutions, of the proletariat as the revolutionary class, rhetorically asking where society’s hope for emancipation lies, then responding: “Our answer: in the formation of a class with radical chains, a class in civil society that is not of civil society, an estate that is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere of society having a universal character because of its universal suffering and claiming no particular right because no particular wrong but unqualified wrong is perpetrated on it; a sphere that can claim no traditional title but only a human title; a sphere that does not stand partially opposed to the consequences, but totally opposed to the premises of the German political system; a sphere, finally that cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all the other spheres of society, thereby emancipating them; a sphere, in short, that is the complete loss of humanity and can only redeem itself through the total redemption of humanity. This dissolution of society existing as a particular class is the proletariat” (Marx, 1843[1978] p. 141-142; emphasis mine).
class which has the means of material production at its disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas; hence of the relations which make one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. … Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an historical epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. (p. 67)

Tocqueville (1850[1970]) in turn applied Marxian analysis, if in a reductive mode, to examine the final days of the July Monarchy. On the eve of the 1848 revolution, he claimed France was “divided into two parts, or rather into two unequal zones: in the upper, which was meant to contain the entire political life of the nation, languor, impotence, immobility and boredom reigned; but in the lower one an attentive observer could easily see from certain feverish and irregular symptoms that political life was beginning to find expression” (p. 11).

For their part, Marx and Engels also realized the capacity for politicization, conscientização and praxis among the people below who did not rule. “Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.,” they wrote, “that is, real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms” (Marx & Engels, 1845[1998], p. 42). Heteronormative and patriarchal language of their day notwithstanding, the assertion has implications for praxis. It acknowledges people are socially constructed. (Capital is a social relation too of course, arising from particular
institutional arrangements constantly re-constructed in society.) But their claim also affirms humans are endowed with the ability to attain an awareness of their conditions – and, what is more, humans have the ability to generate new ideas in order to alter those conditions.

Tocqueville feared this in France. Yet he stayed sympathetic and attentive to underlying conditions that caused mass suffering. He noticed those conditions simultaneously generated feelings of alienated apathy (as regarded formal political affairs) and subaltern politicization. Tocqueville (1850[1970]) acknowledged the “brilliant talents” (p. 10) among France’s political class just prior to the 1848 upheaval, but added “that these great orators were very bored with listening to each other, and, what was worse, the whole nation was bored with hearing them” (p. 10). Political alienation and disenfranchisement proliferated. Discovery of “instances of corruption” had further “convinced the nation that the entire governing class was corrupt” (p. 11).

Whether the focus on “corruption” was a factor of Tocqueville’s inability to recognize the legal structures of bourgeois society as inherently oppressive, or whether his assessment actually reflected the conscious focus of much of France on “corruption,” it is hard to discern. The former would accord with his overall Weltanschauung. The latter posits the majority of the French people had a less thoroughgoing critique (or critical sense). That is, it would posit that they still lacked critical perception of exploitative structures, but were on some level cognizant of systemic problems. The liberal and radical republican pretensions of the February Revolution in France no doubt garnered support because of widespread dissatisfaction with the insufficiently democratic and insufficiently republican constitutional monarchy in power since the 1830 revolution. Corruption no doubt appeared rampant. But the pedagogy of social change most operative in France in early 1848 was not a properly proletarian one; working class
discontent fueled the ascension of a decidedly liberal government with socialistic appendages the bourgeoisie and bourgeois-minded statesman could not sever from the formal body politic. At any rate, the mode of consciousness animating France’s popular classes in early 1848, before events in June pitted proletarian hopes against counter-revolutionary state forces, can be witnessed elsewhere throughout world system history, across geographical space. Tantamount to what Freire (1985) called “naïve transitive consciousness” (p. 77), referring to a transitional mode of experiencing and reflecting upon the world without quite compelling overhaul of foundational political-economic structures, this level of critical awareness was conducive to either revolution or a coup in twentieth century Latin America. And as it turned out, both occurred long before in France in, and in the wake of, 1848.

Tocqueville, the diplomat-historian, thus hit the mark with his observation, even if he aimed at another diagnosis. He tried in October 1847 to warn his friends in parliament of impending attacks on institutions he and they held sacred, like private property. Tocqueville (1850[1970]) recounted his warning, when he had prophesied:

The time is coming when the country will again be divided between two great parties. The French Revolution, which abolished all privileges and destroyed all exclusive rights, did leave one, that of property. Property holders must not delude themselves about the strength of their position, or suppose that, because it has so far nowhere been surmounted, the right to property is an insurmountable barrier; for our age is not like any other. … Property … is in great danger; it alone now has to face the direct and incessant impact of democratic opinions … Soon the political struggle will be between the Haves and the Have-nots; property will be the great battlefield; and the main political questions will turn on more or less profound modifications of the rights of property owners that are
to be made. … Why is everybody not struck by the signs that are the harbingers of this future? … Who can fail to recognize in this the last symptom of the old democratic disease of the times, whose crisis is perhaps approaching? (pp. 12-13)

His tone was overblown and infused with the fears of losing power and wealth. Power and wealth, two forms of social relations, are exercised and possessed only when wielded over others and (at least in the CWE) with one’s own abundance amid deprivation.

But he was not mistaken about imminent crisis. Nor was he alone in his preoccupation with private property. Prior to the world revolution, Marx provides a foretaste of a claim he made years later in *Capital* that commodification makes social relations among people assume “the fantastic form of a relation between things” (Marx, 1867[1977], 165). Just a few years before Tocqueville’s presentiment in the French parliament, Marx wrote about money functioning as the major media and epitome of always alienating private property. In his “Excerpt-Notes of 1844,” Marx argued

The essence of money is not primiarily that it externalizes property, but that the mediating activity or process—the human and social act in which man’s products reciprocally complement one another—becomes alienated and takes on the quality of a material thing, money, external to man. By externalizing this mediating activity, man is active only as he is lost and dehumanized. The very relationship of things and the human dealings with them become an operation beyond and above man. Through this alien mediation man regards his will, his activity, and his relationships as a power independent of himself and of them—instead of man himself being the mediator for man. (cited in West, 1991, pp. 44-45; emphasis in source’s quote)
Marx posits private property as an alienating social relation made possible because of the mass media of money. Historical media studies have yet to properly characterize or duly emphasize the role of money as media, and the social impacts it has had giving way to critical junctures like 1848.

Now, Tocqueville’s anthropomorphizing of property – “it alone now has to face the direct and incessant impact of democratic opinions” – not only reveals the extent to which propertied classes valued the institution and its disparate apportionment in their favor. It further reinforces Marx’s above-cited claim that the “alien mediation” of money makes “man regards his will, his activity, and his relationships as a power independent of himself and of them—instead of man himself being the mediator for man.” The generalized owner of a lot of money and hence private property, functioning as Marx later put it, “as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will” (1867[1977], p. 254), has a consciousness shaped by the public pedagogy of private property, by the alienating media apparatus of monetary relations. While Tocqueville said property alone would have to face the affects of “democratic opinions,” the personification of capitalist property relations, those with all the wealth, in turn, would embody and represent the source of alienation and animus, leading to Tocqueville’s “political struggle,” later “between the Haves and the Haven-nots,” as it were.

Private property protected by the state, a precondition for capital – in turn, a precondition for private appropriation of capital and production of Tocqueville’s “Haves” and “Have-nots” – also reflected (still reflects) a historically-specific human concept. The concept was repeatedly materialized and legally upheld, but contested in the realm of ideas until also challenged in revolt. In that sense, private appropriation of wealth (or property) represents human alienation. That alienation combined with the aforementioned alienation people experienced because of
their contempt for the “corrupt” politics of the late July Monarchy. Ironically, as stated, the alienation from formal politics produced a subterranean form of politicization. (By insinuating the political effects of that alienation, Tocqueville was a dialectician without knowing it!) This created the necessary, but not sufficient, preconditions for revolution.

What is more, immediately prior to the outbreak of revolution, Tocqueville recognized the growing disaffection among the French, on the verge of boiling over into revolt. Tocqueville (1850[1970]) recounted a speech he delivered to the Chamber of Deputies in late January of 1848, printed in *Le Moniteur*, the official organ of the regime, before the end of that month, which is worth quoting at length:

It is said that there is no danger because there is no riot, and that because there is no visible disorder on the surface of society, we are far from revolution. … True, there is no actual disorder, but disorder has penetrated far into men’s minds. See what is happening among the working classes who are, I realize, quiet now. It is true that they are not now tormented by what may be properly called political passions to the extent they once were; but do you not see that their passions have changed from political to social? Do you not see that opinions and ideas are gradually spreading among them that tend not simply to the overthrow of such-and-such laws, such-and-such a minister, or even such-and-such a government, but rather to the overthrow of society, breaking down the bases on which it now rests? Do you not hear them constantly repeating that all the people above them are incapable and unworthy to rule them? That the division of property in the world up to now is unjust? That property rests on the bases of inequity? And do you not realize that when such opinions take root and spread, singing deeply into the masses, they must
sooner or later (I do not know when, I do not know how) bring in their train the most 
terrifying of revolutions? (p. 13)

The emphasis on ideas in the speech above sheds light on the pedagogies at work in 1848. Given 
the economic crises immediately preceding that year’s revolutionary events, combined with the 
extreme economic disparities and formal political impasse described by Tocqueville, his 
attention to pedagogy (e.g. spread or learning of critical social understandings) appropriately 
concerns the conditions of possibility for a revolutionary praxis, the prospects of which terrified 
him so much.

From whence did these notions about the pervasiveness of radical ideas among the French emerge? Tocqueville intimated veritable concern over anarchistic sentiments among 
France’s working or lower classes. They sought “the overthrow of society,” and desired to break 
“down the bases on which it now rests,” while they went around “repeating that all the people 
above them are incapable and unworthy to rule them” (p. 13). That is, Tocqueville detected a 
growing popular repudiation of rulers. Presumably, this was a repudiation of those ruling over 
others from the Assembly of the July Monarchy, but also a repudiation of those who owned the 
means of production and controlled finance. But if Tocqueville accurately gauged his French 
citizens, then they were seemingly also rejecting the very relations of ruling-over, “the bases on 
which” society “now rests,” as it were.

Anarchism, Arendt and Pulling the Emergency Break

Another problem to pose: where might the French proletariat have learned the notion that 
“property rests on the bases of inequity”? One influential and seminal source, although certainly 
not the only one up to and during 1848, was Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Guérin (2005) called 
Proudhon “one at the same time, the father of ‘scientific socialism,’ of socialist political
economy and of modern sociology, the father of anarchism, of mutualism, of revolutionary syndicalism, of federalism and of that particular form of collectivism that has recaptured a fresh relevance today as ‘self-management’” (p. 39). Whether the descriptions, made with literal patriarchal language (“the father of”), attribute more to Proudhon than his praxis warranted, is another debate. Suffice it to note Proudhon’s ideas and praxis here. Anarchist amalgamation of “scientific socialism” principles and “utopian socialism” precepts, which find early expression in the pedagogy of Proudhon, among others, animated struggles in 1848 and after. Exemplifying the mode of pedagogy that alarmed Tocqueville, conservatives and soon enough the liberal bourgeoisie in France, Proudhon famously propounded in a pamphlet circulated just several years prior to the world revolution to come:

Property is theft, which sounds to you such a blasphemy, would act as a lightning conductor, but how many are the interests and prejudices that oppose it! Philosophy will not, alas! alter the course of events: destinies will be worked out regardless of prophecy,

21 It is worth noting that Daniel Guérin, a French anarcho-communalist and historian, wrote extensively about, advocated for and practiced free love. As an identifying bisexual, he also sharply criticized LGBTQ oppression. See Guérin (1970) for an account of anarchist experiments in cultivating free love amid revolution, namely during the Spanish Civil War. See Guérin (2005) for an edited anthology of anarchism featuring writers with similarly anti-oppressive, libertarian ideas.

22 Scientific socialism is often associated with the work of Karl Marx, and especially Friedrich Engels. In their manuscript sent to a London printer just prior to the February Revolution in France and circulated in France just before the June 1848 insurrection, Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) file the work of Proudhon under the conservative or bourgeois socialism label, referring to “the socialistic bourgeois” who are “desirous of redressing social grievances, in order to secure the continued existence of bourgeois society” (p. 93). The characterization hardly pertains to Proudhon’s praxis, which combined scientific socialism with utopian methods. Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) also described the philosophy of the utopian socialist tradition, of thinkers from Saint-Simon to Robert Owen to Charles Fourier. They claim the early utopian socialist ideas emerged in an “undeveloped period” (p. 95) before capitalist industry had fully formed the proletariat as a class, which led the leading utopian socialists early on to elide class antagonisms and downplay class struggle. That is, the utopian socialists rejected “all political, and especially all revolutionary, action,” aimed “to attain their ends by peaceful means” (p. 95), and carried out “small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, to “by the force of example” try and “pave the way for the new social gospel” (p. 96). But by painting “fantastic pictures of society” (p. 96), the “critical-utopian socialism” (p. 96) critiqued the fundaments of existing society. However, Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) argued, by continuing to “dream of experimental realization of their social utopias,” trying “to realize all these castles in the air” (p. 96) despite the modern class struggling taking a definite shape, the utopian socialists abandoned crucial contests and were forced to appeal to the bourgeoisie for funds.
moreover, should justice not be done and our education completed? (Proudhon, 1840[2005], p. 48)

Proudhon (1840[2005]) proceeded to explain his “profession of faith: although very much enamored of order, I am, in the fullest sense of the term, an anarchist. Listen to me” (p. 51). Describing anarchy as the “absence of master, of sovereign,” Proudhon (1840[2005]) proclaimed “it is the form of government to which we draw closer day by day, and which the inveterate habit of mistaking the man for the rule and his will for the law makes us regard as the last word in disorder and the exemplification of chaos” (p. 53). The text continues – with inadvertent foresight, given the order with which revolution unfolded geographically in 1848, erupting first in Italy in January, followed with revolt in France in February – to tell an old story about a “Parisian bourgeois” from centuries ago who heard “that in Venice there was no king,” leaving him laughing and “dumbfounded beyond recovery” (p. 53).

Yet the people of Paris did more than laugh at events in Italy in 1848. Tocqueville (1850[1970]) forecast the French “masses” sooner or later would be “bringing in their train the most terrifying of revolutions” (p. 13). Prescient as he was in politics, and as rigorous as he was as a historian, his philosophy of history did not have the insights of a historical materialist. Hannah Arendt – who knew something about writing histories of revolutions23 – distinguished the way theorist Walter Benjamin wrote histories as compared with Tocqueville, with insights germane to this historical recounting. Arendt (1968[2007]) explained how Benjamin’s use of quotes to deal with the past differently “was born out of despair—not the despair of a past that

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23 See the chapter in this project focusing on the French Revolution for a longer discussion of Arendt’s (1963[2006]) analyses. What is worthy of note here, is that Arendt (1963[2006]) conducted a comparative study of the American and French revolutions of the eighteenth century. The text argues, contra Wallerstein (2011), that the latter failed and the former was really a success. Arendt’s (1963[2006]) focus on (somewhat subterranean) revolutionary ideals and politics brings to light overlooked currents that animated the praxis of American revolutionists during their war for independence against Britain, although conclusions about how America drifted from early ideals led the author to advocate a council system to reinvigorate the democratic spirit.
refuses ‘to throw light on the future’ and lets the human mind ‘wander in darkness’ as in Tocqueville, but out of the despair of the present and the desire to destroy it” (pp. 38-39). The annihilative power of quotations, what Benjamin termed “thought fragments” (cited p. 39), interrupt the flow of presentation and concentrate within them the historical weight of what is presented. The method parallels Marx’s (1852[1987]) historical materialist approach in his recounting of the rise of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte in the wake of France’s 1848 revolution. The oppressive “tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living” (Marx, 1852[1987], p. 15), and so Marx’s “historiographical strategy” in his Eighteenth Brumaire “is not an objective representation of historical facts,” but an attempt to recover “multiple historical temporalities,” through “re-reading of both the past and traditions,” to unveil “the political phantasmagoria of the liberal-democratic state” (Tomba, 2013, p. 22). Like Benjamin after him, Marx aimed to annihilate the oppressive aura of history by grasping its impression on the present, so that a new radical imaginary could be possible.

But Benjamin also went further. While Tocqueville (1856[1983]) forewarned of the common French “bringing in their train the most terrifying of revolutions” (p. 13), Benjamin problematized this and Marx’s conception of revolution, writing, “Marx says that revolutions are the locomotive of world history. But perhaps it is quite otherwise. Perhaps revolutions are an attempt by the passengers on the train – namely, the human race – to activate the emergency break” (cited in Sitrin, 2012, p. xiv). When the working class tried to halt the machinic workings of a republican government ready to forsake them in the spring and summer of 1848, in an effort to stop the state from ending the National Workshops and effectively condemning workers to penniless unemployment, the efforts to pull “the emergency break” were savagely crushed, as described nearer the end of this section. Whether the public pulled the “emergency break” on the
Louis Philippe regime with the February Revolution that replaced the constitutional monarchy with the short-lived Second Republic, and what the pedagogical implications of the February overthrew were require further inquiry.

Conditions Ripen for Revolt and Banquets set the Table for Change

The peak of the financial crises in 1847, as discussed earlier in this chapter, hit France especially hard – like a train. Little wonder some would want to pull the emergency break. “At the end of 1847,” Postgate (1920) documented, “it was reckoned that of the 15,000 million francs in circulation in France, 2,500, were in coin, 400 million in banknotes, and the rest, being about 12,000 millions, in bills of exchange, which became largely waste paper when the crisis broke out” (p. 165). With as many as eight out of 12 workers unemployed around the time of the revolution, and almost half a million in need of charity just to obtain the bare necessities, the economic engine (capital) powering the second most developed economy (France) within the interconnected CWE, spurred a terrifying industrial revolution in its own right.

A significant portion of the French population were in poverty, but about 60 percent of the population could also read (Rapport, 2008, p. 21). Far less censorship existed in France during Louis Philippe’s reign than in the Habsburg Empire (where the literacy rate was still above 50 percent) or Russia (where the literacy rate was only around 5 percent). Yet fewer could vote in parliamentary elections. Rapport (2008) noted that for every Parisian man eligible to vote at the beginning of 1848 there were 10 with newspaper subscriptions (p. 38). An 1831 election law made it so that those who paid a direct tax of 200 francs or more could vote, but the number of eligible male voters – women were excluded – never reached a quarter million of the nine million adult male citizens (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 15).
François Guizot, France’s de facto prime minister in 1848 who infamously responded to calls for universal suffrage by retorting, “Get rich” (cited in Rapport, 2008, p. 38), had effectively alienated any leftover supporters of the July Monarchy by February. Louis Philippe started with “liberal convictions” (Rapport, 2008, p. 23), and his July Monarchy took pride in having restored the revolutionary tricolor after the 1830 revolution. King Louis Philippe delivered a “self-satisfied speech” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 25) in late December 1847, congratulating his country for recovering from the commercial crisis and lauding the growth of savings banks. But not everyone shared his exuberance. The king was averse to war, which irked nationalists (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 16). His desire to avoid war might have endeared him (for a time) to bankers and the commercial classes preferring free trade and the smooth flows of new industrial finance to the calamity of war and fiscal crisis.

However, whatever support Louis Philippe amassed was tenuous. For a while, a class comprised of wealthy, landed bourgeoisie together with older nobility forged “a fifteen-thousand-strong class of super rich notables who dominated life under the July Monarchy” (Rapport, 2008, p. 32), much to the chagrin of the alienated middle classes, workers and lumpenproletariat. Recall that many educated, would-be members of the middle class were stripped of their socioeconomic status around this time too. The lack of esteemed professions to satisfy the growing intellectual strata, combined with the economic contraction from the latest commercial-financial crisis produced a number of déclassé radicals. Poverty-stricken parts of the population were literate and just as attuned to the formal political machinations in France as they were alienated from those processes. Further, financiers withdrew support from Louis Philippe’s government because of the financial crisis and never returned again to support him, which left the regime exceedingly vulnerable (Postgate, 1920, p. 166).
The liberal opposition seized on popular discontent to advance a republican campaign for reforms, including universal suffrage. Under Louis Philippe, suffrage “was confined to the very richest of the bourgeoisie,” and those “small, even moderately wealthy, bourgeoisie were excluded” (Postgate, 1920, p. 166). Censorship in France was lax compared with the other autocratic regimes of 1848, but laws prevented workers from assembling and from holding political meetings (Price, 1988, p. 23). Louis Philippe’s government made it illegal to hold meetings with more than 20 people (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 15). The main complaint of the middle classes was thus that they were denied essential political rights, namely that not all could vote. The main complaint of the poor, in contrast, was that they were starving. But in repressing liberal and radical media, the government cracked down on popular workers’ publications and restricted political associations as well as workers unions (Rapport, 2008, p. 25), exasperating the middle and working classes alike.

The opposition circumvented the law preventing political meetings by holding “banquets” instead. They were political gatherings by another name. The lower and middle strata of French society attended the dinners. Given their impoverished and nutritionally-deprived conditions, the lower classes could have been as drawn to the actual food and drink, used mainly by the middle classes as window dressing for the politicized speeches taking place, as much as they were attracted to the radical messages communicated at the events. At the banquets “some parliamentary leader would deliver a speech upon Liberal principles, and be loudly applauded” (Postgate, 1920, p. 167). Recall Tocqueville’s comment about the dearth of enthusiasm in France regarding the great orators in parliament who bored the nation with their ineffectual

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24 For example, the July Monarchy banned the worker-based organization, the Society of the Rights of Man, which was founded in 1832 (Rapport, 2008, pp. 25-26). Divided into revolutionary “sections” (in reference to the old Parisian districts), the organization trained members to be disciplined and ready for insurrection to bring about a democratic republic, and they planned the uprising of 1834 before a police crackdown ended in the arrest of at least 1,156 members.
speechifying. Validating that assessment, Postgate (1920) suggested most banquet attendees were “merely occupied in a singularly noisy electoral campaign, in which they made the violent and meaningless speeches natural to politicians” (p. 166).

But the banquets made an impact. An article published January 18, 1848 in the *London Times* commenting on the aftermath of Switzerland’s civil war the year before, paraphrasing the problem posed by French publicist M. de Montalembert, cautioned, “Let no one imagine that the great contest of the French revolution is a thing of history—it is, on the contrary, the lasting peril and the undying enemy of all established principles of government and order in this as in the former time,” as “it was not two weeks ago that in one of their Liberal banquets in France they united in their scandalous toasts the principles of the Jacobin Club and the holy name of Jesus Christ!” (p. 4). Harping on those “blasphemous parodies of those days of anarchy and bloodshed” (p. 4; italics mine), the *Times* stoked fears of Switzerland, anarchy (again), the French Revolution of 1789 and the revolutionary overtones in France’s ongoing banquets.

The foreign press was not the only actor concerned about the banquets. French authorities – namely Guizot – banned a big banquet planned for February 22 in Paris (Postgate, 1920; Price, 1988). Foreign and domestic press had the story, at least in part. The *London Times* on February 21, 1848, citing the Paris papers form the day before, noted the “announcement by committee for conducting the great Reform dinner that the banquet originally contemplated for the 12th arrondissement of Paris will merge into the general one, which will be held at 12 o’clock tomorrow (Tuesday), the 22d of February” (p. 4). “The Government is prepared for resistance,” the *Times* added, “having, it is believed, abandoned its original intention to attack” (p. 4). Drawing again from reports from France, the paper informed readers the lists of batteries of field artillery at a French military school stood ready, while regiments of infantry in surrounding
towns and provinces prepared to march on Paris if necessary. The presuppositions of the establishment press remain silent but present within the frame. That armed regiments should be defending political institutions is a taken for granted assumption. The framing precludes questions as to why lots of guys with guns are a necessary part of the state and why they are necessary to protect the other elements of the state. This is ironic given the *Times*’ penchant for denouncing French militarism in other contexts. Although the amount of bloodshed might be the subject of critique, that a small section of the French population comprising business owners, financiers, elected officials, police and military personnel reserve some right to deploy force domestically against their own population is an unquestioned power. As will be shown, it is only when those sectors of the population might consider using force against similar sectors of the population within different geographic borders (e.g. against Britain) that the *Times* takes issue.

As for the February 22 banquet, the French republican newspaper, the *National*, printed the plans for the event (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 27). The idea going in was for people to come out and protest for freedom of assembly, thereby breaking the law in an orderly way, with the issue to be pursued in the courts afterward.

As the expected number of participations grew, authorities pushed back. Robertson (1952[1971]) explains how “the police announced hastily that it was illegal for any but constituted authorities to call out the national guard,” as dinner organizers planned to do, “and that therefore they would prevent the meeting by force. Posters forbade the public to attend and threatened members of the national guard with severe punishment if they showed up in uniform” (p. 27). In their “EXPRESS FROM PARIS” section, the *Times* reported on February 21, 1848 that France’s Minister of Justice also wanted to introduce a bill before the banquet declaring meetings under the banner of “dinners” illegal, but he “was so strongly opposed in the Council
that he has resolved to retire, to the great joy of the majority of his colleagues” (p. 5). But the
measure did not appear necessary, even to those in power. “I told you it would all disappear in
smoke” (cited in Rapport, 2008, p. 27), King Louis Philippe said after he got wind deputies
intended to scale back the gathering, given the prepared police response.

That is not what happened. A low-key organization with about 400 members, the
Dissenting Society, an offshoot of another clandestine organization, the Society of Seasons,
organized people the night before (Robertson, 1952[1971], pp. 28-29). They encouraged workers
to take the day off, gathered people to march down the boulevard and helped erect barricades.

Parisian students and their print media, however, proved to be the decisive factor in
instigating the initial revolt, raising it from the level of peaceful protest to the rumblings of a
revolutionary movement the rest of the city would carry through. In fact, the February
Revolution might not have happened if not for two student-based print journals that started
printing around the time of the critical juncture. One, La Lanterne, an 8-page paper first printed
in January 1847, sold for 35 centimes and ended up in the hands of polytechniciens and students
at the other ecoles (schools) throughout Paris around the third week of every month. Editor
Antonio Watripon, 25, who was not formally enrolled as a student but had experience in
journalism working for the French paper La Réforme, oversaw the journals’ dissemination of
democratic, republican and (on occasion) utopian socialist ideas all directed at the student
population. The second, L’Avant-Garde, subtitled Journal des Ecoles, edited by Henri Antoine
Bosselet, a 30-year-old Parisian newspaperman who lived with his father, became an immediate
success after its inaugural publication in January 1848. Directed toward (and adored by) the
student population of Paris like its contemporary, L’Avant Garde was the wordier and more
prosaic paper of the two. Both helped organize a major demonstration on February 3 to present
the Chamber of Deputies a petition, signed by students, demanding freedom for faculty in Paris. The Orleans monarchy had overseen the suspension of the immensely popular professors like Jules Michelet, whose lectures could be read in the pages of *La Lanterne*, and the Polish poet-cum-Slavic-literature-professor Adam Mickiewicz. Not surprisingly, both papers were under police surveillance by mid-February. Both also helped publicize the banquet that had been scheduled for February 22 and then cancelled. Several days before, students also formed the Central Committee of the Schools to coordinate their efforts. The crowd that came out before the church of the Madeleine that day had been unorganized and peaceful – until students arrived en masse and catalyzed the rebellion and construction of barricades (Gallaher, 1980, pp. 24-25; 106).

Excited and in the streets all day, Parisians went into an uproar after soldiers fired on demonstrators (Postgate, 1920, p. 166). Under their semi-regular “EXPRESS FROM PARIS” headline, with a unique subhead – “THE REFORM BANQUET” – the *London Times* reported on February 23, 1848, the day after the forbidden dinner in Paris, that a statement from the French Prefect of Police (and a published order from the Commander of the National Guard) made it clear the banquet was not permitted, after even opposition deputies (reportedly) met and resolved that it should not take place (p. 6). Citing Paris papers from the day before, the *Times* stated the garrison had been increased to some 80,000 men, with orders “given to take military occupation of all the points of the capital on which the assemblage of the people might be expected” (p. 6). “Hopes were therefore entertained,” the *Times* explained without attributing the source of those hopes or the entertainment, “that all would remain tranquil for the present” (p. 6).
The February Revolution in France, Remediated in London

As the *Times* made clear just a little space down in same issue, all did not remain tranquil. Under the headline, “THE TIMES OFFICE, Wednesday, Quarter past 4 a.m.,” the *Times* printed a letter from their Paris correspondent sent at 11:30 a.m. the day before, which read: “I regret to say that the people are at this moment proceeding by thousands towards the Champs Elysées, and that the advice of the Opposition deputies that they remain quiet will hardly prevent the occurrence of tumult and loss of life” (p. 6). Some 100,000 troops descended on Paris, the *Times* correspondent added. In another column, again under “EXPRESS FROM PARIS,” the British paper references their “private letters” from Paris, stating, “the feeling of security so general on Sunday had given way yesterday, but that, nevertheless, all would, it was expected, pass off quietly” (p. 6). The *Times* correspondent confirmed “No precaution which experience could suggest for crushing revolt in its bud has been forgotten or omitted” and noted the French government readied “in-door preparations for repressing disorder should any evil-disposed persons produce confusion or riot” (p. 6). Yet yeoman’s work on the part of foreign press to mitigate and vilify (“evil-disposed persons”) threats to the status quo notwithstanding, not all passed off quietly.

As the *Times* correspondent’s communications printed in that February 23, 1848 issue also mentioned, there had been reports that Students of Law and Medicine from the university “who, to the number of 6,000, will figure in the demonstration” (p. 6) also had an impact. The second “world revolution” in 1968 is often associated in radical memory with the student-worker coalitions, but students actually took to the streets in Paris in a similar way some 120 years prior. French students in 1848 had a strong relationship with the workers of Paris that dated back to the uprising in 1830 when a small number of the former fought alongside workers at the barricades
to overthrow the Bourbon monarchy; the relationship was strengthened by student support for
the worker-led rebellion against the July Monarchy in 1834 (Gallaher, 1980, p. 29).

On the night of February 23, 1848, the students’ committee sent out a group in search of
arms so they could prepare for the fighting they expected to follow (Gallaher, 1980, p. 54). The
Times reported on February 24, 1848 that students from the Polytechnic School jumped over
walls to join the revolutionists. In this they mirrored the actions of students in Milan leading
tobacco riots (discussed before). Perhaps this also inspired students in Bonn, Berlin, Vienna and
elsewhere who would feature prominently in revolts later that year. Upon receiving news that the
banquet was to be cancelled, student leaders in Paris – especially the more revolutionary medical
and law students (the engineers less so) – and editors of the student papers L’Avant-Garde and
La Lantern de Quartier Latin, had held a political meeting at the schools (Robertson,
1952[1971], p. 29). The students collected arms and cast musket balls, and the next day they
marched 700-strong to the Palais Bourbon. Students and workers also gathered together at
Madeleine in the Place de la Concorde the day after, where some “sporadic violence occurred”
(Price, 1988, p. 35).

The power structure sought to repress, but inevitably and quickly it substantially changed.
Recounting February events after visiting Paris shortly thereafter, Lewald (1848[1997]) wrote
how “after the prohibition of the reform banquet, the workers gathered by the hundreds of
thousands in the streets just to remind the government of the material strength of the working
class and a salvo of rifles replied to their ‘Down with Guizot!’, killing or wounding a number of
people, including women out for a walk on the arms of their husbands, the battle was on” (pp.
46-47). Come Wednesday, with barricades “building all this time” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p.
31), pressure forced Guizot to resign. The king replaced him with a comparatively liberal prime
Public outrage ensued after troops guarding the Foreign Ministry in the Boulevard des Capucines fired into the crowd around 10 p.m. on February 23. This prompted Parisians to put up some 1,500 more barricades by the next morning. The governmental armed forces at the time were ill-equipped and untrained for street fighting (Price, 1988, p. 36), while the popular classes of Paris had been using barricades periodically since 1588 against the Duke of Guise (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 35). Many residences throughout the city put up signs on their doors reading “Arms Given Up,” while some added “With Pleasure” (cited p. 35). Singing the Marseillaise much of the time, people built the barricades and cast lead balls by bonfire, while others – spurred on by coachmen irked at the new industrialized systems for taking their jobs – destroyed railways, stations and bridges outside Paris, partly to prevent troop reinforcements from sieging the city.

The *London Times*, in keeping with the paper’s preferred public pedagogy of only legitimating (tepid) liberal reforms through the proper channels, dismissed the possibility of a just and successful revolution outright. In the main news and commentary section featured on the paper’s fourth page on Thursday, February 24, 1848, readers were assured the French government would prevail. “The demonstration and the disturbances which occurred in Paris on Wednesday may occasion a vast deal of public alarm,” the Times staff wrote, “and some deplorable incidents, but we can entertain no doubt that, politically considered, they will tend to increase the strength of the Government, and expose the imprudence of the Opposition” (p. 4). Commenting on a manifesto published by the opposition Monday morning, which appealed to
the National Guard of Paris to join the republicans in “defending liberty,” the Times sympathized with the government being forced “to take more efficient measures of repression” (p. 4).

Acknowledging the desertion of workshops and “the whole population thrown into the streets” (p. 4) – or taking to the streets, as it were – Britain’s major media organ, citing “the prevailing apathy of the mass of the people” (p. 5), adhered at the peak of France’s February Revolution “to the opinion that no serious consequences will ensue, or that, at least, the popular cause will suffer much more than that of the Government” (p. 4).

Challenging the media narrative, the king abdicated that same day (Postgate, 1920; Robertson, 1952[1971]). A message from the Times’ Paris correspondent (presumably from the day before) printed in the Thursday, February 24, 1848 edition, matter-of-factly stated: “There will be bloodshed to-day, it is feared … The insurgents are desperate, but have not the shadow of a chance” (p. 5). In contradistinction and immediately under the above statement from the correspondent, the Times ran the headline “THE TIMES OFFICE,” and as of 6:30 a.m. the paper reported: “We have this moment received intelligence, by electric telegraph from Dover, announcing the important fact that the National Guards had sided with the people” (p. 5), and that the Minister of the Interior resigned. The establishment narrative so intent on denying the possibility of revolutionary success was so deeply entrenched in the Times that even events it reported which would challenge its own a priori claims (featured in the exact same issue) remained beyond the realm of the intelligible – for the liberal-bourgeois intellectual culture represented in London’s newspaper of record that is, but not for the cross-class coalitions of French revolutionists that February.

Editors at the Times had not yet received word that Louis Philippe left the Tuileries that day and eventually made it safely to England with his wife. French Newspapers like La Presse
had been suggesting abdication for some time. Subscriptions for *La Presse* went down from 80 to 40 francs per year after 1836, when Girardin’s crew came up “with the novel idea that ads would pay the expense” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 37), making it the first cheap paper in Paris. Present-day readers might be more familiar with later consequences of media commercialization, like the conversion of journalism into a system wherein large corporations, newspaper conglomerates, would effectively compete to sell a particular commodity (readers) to other large corporations (advertisers). But at this juncture in 1848, using advertisements to cover publication expenses enabled papers like *La Presse* to lower prices and thereby reach wider readership with radical ideas like the king’s abdication.

Workers immediately rejoiced after the king vacated the thrown. They entered the abandoned palace and enjoyed, with elegant manners, an actual banquet at one of the tables that had been set, before taking turns sitting on the throne, helping themselves to some royal souvenirs and putting up a sign that read “House for Rent” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 39). Looting of the Tuileries, Lewald (1848[1997]) qualified, “was limited to the destruction of the royal insignia” (p. 48), with an effigy evidently made of the royal throne, turned into a pyre in the square. Eventually, the new government would push the workers out – literally out of the palace and figuratively out of representative positions of power.

After the king’s abdication, moderate republican newspapers like the *National*, “and the anonymous secret society militants on the street” (Price, 1988, p. 36), hammered for a new republican administration. The opposition was actually “appalled” that the king fled, and was “busily arranging for a Regency when the revolutionaries burst into the Chamber of Deputies and insistently demanded a Provisional Government” (Postgate, 1920, p. 166). The new provisional government, “proclaimed at the Hôtel de Ville,” was “made up of well-known parliamentarians

Lamartine, a poet and aspiring statesmen, had “tapped into the zeitgeist” (Rapport, 2008, p. 38) to rise to fame with his 1847 book, “History of the Girondins” (Histoire des Girondins), about the 1789 revolution. With the book’s publication “France fell under some kind of spell” (Gazmuri, 2003, p. xxx). The book achieved astonishing success in Latin America in the years after its publication well, as a subsequent section will show. Spellbound and caught up in the zeitgeist, readers can be forgiven for not recognizing it as, in Gazmuri’s (2003) words, “bad history, perhaps the worst there is” (p. xxx). Poorly researched, Lamartine’s “imagination filled the ‘gaps’ in the story he told,” and the author “confuses dates, omits subjects and facts he disliked, and even invents some episodes” (p. xxx).

Perhaps Lamartine can be excused for writing poor history. It was, Gazmuri (2003) argued, “passionate” (p. xxxi). His gift was poetry, after all. Waxing poetic in the ceremonial march to the Hôtel de Ville at the February Revolution apogee, Lamartine stopped by some drinking in the street, asked for a sip of the wine, touched his lips to it and said, “Here is your banquet” (cited in Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 42). This history would be remiss without an additional dose of his published poetry provided to paint a better picture of the man. In one poem, Lamartine remarked on the transitory nature of time with respect to fleeting moments of earthly love, opining, “O time! suspend your flight; and you, propitious hours/ Suspend your too quick course” (cited in Dorschell, 2009, p. 407). Inquiring in a poem as to what time does to our
moments of bliss, Lamartine asked, “What do you make of all that you engulf? / Speak: will you give us back these sublime ecstasies/ That you ravish from us?” (cited p. 410). The question could easily be asked in regards to his popularity. By December 1848 when another round of elections for the presidency were held, he mustered only 8,000 votes compared to the 5.4 million Bonaparte received (Rapport, 2008, p. 333).

But for the time, he was riding high, like much of France. When at the height of the February Revolution radicals pressed for the provisional government to adopt the red flag that had been at the barricades as the nation’s new colors, Lamartine used his power of oratory to persuade the people otherwise. As he put it, their tested “tricolor had gone through the world in triumph,” while the red flag had been dragged through blood and mud (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 46). The red flag would be drug through more mud and blood before the year’s end. Lamartine would not side with radicals in these future struggles. Practicing to become the consummate politician, he responded to a question as to whether he would sit on the right or left in the new government with the answer, “on the ceiling” (cited p. 48). He aimed to focus more on humanitarian concerns than anything social or political so as not to lose popular support. Come June, he would betray the poverty-stricken revolutionaries like the other parliamentarians; he also got shot (not fatally) during the insurgency (Tocqueville, 1850[1970]). Later he would became a déclassé intellectual of sorts, only sans the militancy associated with other downwardly mobile educated persons in his time and since. Deeply in debt, he would later have to accept a house as a gift from Louis Napoleon Bonaparte (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 102), yet he would “spend the rest of his life in self-admiration, and kept nine portraits of himself in his living room” (p. 99).
In the end, Lamartine loved his property and appreciated the role of the state in protecting it, as did Auguste Ledru-Rollin, a republican member of the new provisional government. Ledru-Rollin was a radical republican who would later gain support from the démoc-socs (democratic socialists) (Postagene, 1920, p. 180). He favored a social republic but opposed outright socialism. Keen on reform, he was the one to read the final list of the new government aloud to applause from the crowd that February day at the Hôtel de Ville.

In a previous election address to fellow electors exemplifying his program, Ledru-Rollin (1841[1920]) repined how during the now-maligned July Monarchy the celebrated “people” had sadly come to mean “a herd led by a few privileged persons like you and me, gentlemen, who are called Electors, and then by some even more privileged persons who are dignified with the title of Deputies” (p. 187). He insisted on relieving the “poverty and sorrows” of the people by reducing taxes on the poor, and he asked his colleagues whether there were any among them who, when looking upon France’s manufacturing cities did “not feel moved—moved even to tears at the sight of men whose lives know no happiness, who can hardly gain by unremitting toil enough to satisfy their most urgent needs?” (p. 188). Yet the reluctance of radical republicans like Ledru-Rollin to endorse even the pragmatic, incremental socialist programs of the kind advanced at the time (and described below) undermined the chances for creating an authentically democratic Second Republic. Their reticence, symptomatic of an emerging pedagogy as complicit in the reproduction of the system as it was a challenge to it, opened doors for reaction and the authoritarian restoration of order to come later.

Republican concern for the proletariat only went so far, and it did not begin to contest the legitimacy of the latter’s subordination. Liberal opinion did not even approach this. But liberal commentary outside France recognized the class conflict with surprising precision.
The *London Times* on February 24, 1848, before even knowing the king had abdicated, denounced France’s opposition leaders for “deliberately” exchanging “the lawful weapons of constitutional warfare for the devices and engines of revolution,” conducting some 60 banquets and demonstrations to attempt “a species of revolution,” endeavoring “to overthrow the established powers of the country by an appeal to that species of power which is not established” (p. 5). The editorial offers a quite literal textbook affirmation of established authority, reaffirming itself as establishment media in a literal sense by excoriating the “appeal to that species of power which is not established” (p. 5; emphasis mine). Beyond that, the *Times* accused liberal parliamentarians of having “allied themselves with men whose principles in reality they dread and abhor,” having “appealed to passions which, if once really awakened, would consume them like stubble” (p. 5). To be sure, the class coalition carried forth the revolution, but “during a very severe commercial crisis, when unemployment is rife and strikes frequent, such unity could hardly continue for long” (Postgate, 1920, p. 167).

*Origins of “Right to Work,” Writing, Anarchist Praxis and Socialist Experiments*

Workers would soon demand implementation of an immensely popular “right to work” campaign. Back in 1848, it meant the right of all human beings to be able to engage in meaningful and rewarding productive employment. By February 25, 1848, the day after the king’s abdication, France’s provisional government received a petition demanding a minimum wage, the right to organize a “guaranteed right to work” (cited in Rapport, 2008, p. 192). Ledru-Rollin tepidly endorsed the campaign, but he was not its foremost backer.

Soon after the establishment of the provisional government, Ledru-Rollin was working 20 hours a day at the Ministry of the Interior to make the republic, and he helped to get a version of the “right to work” program going (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 52). His department soon
started promoting art as well, which flourished in some respects once the censorship that prevailed during the July Monarchy was relaxed.

In a pertinent anecdote regarding censorship, Lewald (1848[1997]) described meeting her favorite poet, Heinrich Heine, outside Paris (they were both originally from Germany) in a sanatorium on the Rue de l’Oursine, where he had been suffering severely from spinal tuberculosis (pp. 50-52). Heine, near bed-ridden because of illness yet working as a correspondent for the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung in France after a Bundestang resolution prohibited publication of his work in Germany, had been writing for hours the day she visited. But, he facetiously told her:

Oh, I can’t write anymore; I can’t, because we have no censorship! How can a person write without censorship, if he has always lived under censorship? All style will cease, all syntax, all good habits. When I used to write something stupid, I would think, ‘The censor will strike or change this’; I relied on good censorship. But now I feel quite unhappy, unfocused. I keep hoping it is really not true and censorship still exists. (cited in Lewald, 1848[1997], p. 52; quotation marks added)

25 Heinrich Heine was more influential during this juncture than many probably realize. According to Tomba (2013), Marx adapted the Tragedy-Farce model used in his Eighteenth Brumaire (the text about how a mediocre man, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who rose to prominence in France after 1848) from Heinrich Heine. When applied, the model critiqued historical analogies drawn from the past that obscure rather than explain, like farcical comparisons of Napoleon III’s reign to Caesar’s rule.

26 Lewald (1848[1997]) explained she always saw Heine “as a young man in spirit,” and so she did not want to paint a “picture of his bodily suffering,” but she noted he was “somewhat crippled and complains bitterly about his condition, which has robbed him of the use of his eyes to the extent that he can write only a little and cannot read at all” (p. 52). Upon visiting Heine, she wrote, “I realized how interested I was in him, how grateful for all the hours of immense reading pleasure I owe him. I would have been so happy to have known or done anything that would give him relief, distraction, or joy” (p. 52). Notably, Heine’s verse was often bitter and sardonic. In an indelible poem on lost and unrequited love, he wrote: “The joy that kissed me yesterday/ Has disappeared already;/ Long years ago I found it so/ True love is never steady./Oft curiosity has drawn/ Some lovely ladies toward me;/ But when they looked deep in my heart/ They left, and then abhorred me./ Some have grown pale before they went./ And some with laughter cleft me;/ But only Kitty really cared—/ She wept before she left me” (Heine, 1917, pp. 236-237).
But relaxation in censorship did open spaces for provocative art that had previously been prohibited. Artists resurrected theater once those royal restrictions were lifted. In a satirical show titled, “Property is Theft,” named after Proudhon’s famous treatise, actors depicted Paris ravaged by socialism, and the anarchist forefather is rumored to have attended and laughed in delight (p. 54).

Given his “apolitical”²⁷ praxis, Proudhon admitted to being “dumbfounded” by revolutionary events at first, and to initially “mourning for the republic,” for he feared “the calumnies about to strike socialism” (cited in Guérin, 2005, p. 58). “As indeed might be imagined,” Proudhon wrote, “I had no inclination to throw myself into this politico-social mess where Monsieur Lamartine was translating the commonplaces of diplomacy into poetic prose; where there was talk of bringing the whole of commerce, if industry, and soon of agriculture, one after another, into associations or State control; of buying out all property and working it along administrative lines of centralizing capital and competences in the hands of the State; then of carrying this governmental regime out to the peoples of Europe at the head of our victorious armies” (cited in Guérin, 2005, pp. 64-65). Proudhon rebuked the “governmental hypothesis” (cited p. 67) about democracy, and he challenged the prejudice that “revolution has to come from above” (cited p. 66). Instead, “experience testifies and philosophy demonstrates” (cited p. 67) that effective revolution “must be spontaneous and emanate, not from the heads of the authorities but from the bowels of the people” (cited p. 67).

²⁷ It is common, even among anarchists, to apply the term “apolitical” to refer to Proudhon’s conceptions and actions – or to anarchist theory and activity generally. The application is apt in some respects, but problematic in others. Insofar as it refers to the general inclination to avoid participating in formal, institutionalized (usually electoral) politics that legitimize either capital or the state, it correctly points to reservations held by many in the anarchist tradition. Anarcho-syndicalist protagonists during the short-lived revolution in Spain in the 1930s also described themselves as apolitical (Guérin, 1970). Once “apolitical” connotes abstention from struggle for social change, though, the label then poses a problem. Anarchism is, in a sense, a public pedagogy based on individuals actually being political and doing politics differently, often autonomously, with an understanding that power is not self-justifying.
Proudhon’s critique of governmental power had merit, as did his refusal to conflate state government with democracy. The former is a particular institutionalized and hierarchically structured set of supposedly democratic practices, whereas even in its most moderate usage the latter connotes people’s participation in political life or in the affairs that affect them. The problem remains, however, why Proudhon would eschew the spontaneous uprising made possible by the self-organization of so many Parisians in February.

In contrast, another noteworthy anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, claimed as soon as he “discovered that there was fighting underway in Paris,” he “borrowed a passport” and arrived to a proclaimed republic with “crowds everywhere, shouts of enthusiasm, red flags, on every street, in every square, and on every public building” and “barricades towered like mountains stretching to the level of roof-tops” (cited in Guérin, 2005, p. 129). Although he arrived a little late for the most intense action, Bakunin recalled living alongside Parisian workers for a week (he lived elsewhere in Paris too, staying an entire month). He claimed never to have witnessed “in any other class of society so much high-minded unselfishness, nor so much truly touching integrity” (cited p. 130). As reports came in from across Europe of simultaneous revolt (in Italy, throughout Germany), it appeared to him “the incredible was becoming the norm, the impossible possible, and the possible and normal losing all meaning” (cited p. 131).

While in Paris, Bakunin recollected living in the Rue de Tournon barracks, next to the Luxembourg Palace (cited in Guérin, 2005, p. 129). Louis Blanc, the French socialist, was given the Luxembourg Palace to live in and tasked with setting up a conference to study labor conditions (Roberston, 1952[1971], p. 67). Since Ledru-Rollin remained primarily interested in political affairs, the “social question” was left to people like Blanc (p. 53). As it happened,
Proudhon would come to loathe Blanc because of the latter’s predilection for top-down initiatives.

The provisional government had refused to create a Ministry of Labor, and on February 28 called for this “Commission for the Workers” – the Luxembourg Commission – instead, seemingly to pacify the socialists while cordonning them off in an institution without much power (Postgate, 1920, p. 169). Blanc’s accomplishments in Luxembourg are why Fernbach (2010) credits him with having “pioneered modern ‘democratic socialism’ with his scheme for self-governing ‘national workshops’ set up by government action” (p. 23).

The National Workshops, the major program providing work for the unemployed actually approved by the government, bared little resemblance to any of Blanc’s proposals. The Luxembourg Commission’s ideas were never really applied in practice to the workshops or anywhere else. Blanc even considered the National Workshops a perversion of his ideas, but he nevertheless became associated with them in the minds of people and those in power (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 72).

The conflation, as part of a broader public pedagogy, was possibly intentional because of the workshops general failure despite minor successes. It functioned to conceptually link socialism to failed social policy. Peasants already prejudiced against urban workers because of differential treatment by the state and private enterprise, were no doubt another target of anti-socialist pedagogy. Further, France’s provisional government, comprised of predominantly

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28 The new Minister of Public Works, Alexander Thomas Marie, adamantly opposed Blanc’s ideas and determined “he would never let socialism in at the back door of his project” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 70). Marie put Emile Thomas, a 26-year-old engineering student, in charge of organizing the workshops. Thomas came in with innovative ideas but also without sufficient monetary support from those in power. The workshops never had real work for more than 10,000 of the men (p. 71), and some ten times that were in need of wages.

29 The National Workshops were moderately successful in terms of providing social services: distributing meat, bread, soup and offering free medical service (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 73). The program had doctors making house calls, which many reportedly enjoyed and appreciated as a cheaper, more efficient alternative to crowding of hospitals with sick patients.
liberal parliamentarians, “while accepting the need for such stop-gap measures as the National Workshops to provide work-relief for the unemployed, was primarily concerned to promote business confidence as the means of restoring prosperity” (Price, 1988, p. 47). The analysis of finance capital in the previous chapter corroborates this claim.

The question as to how influential previously subterranean pedagogies like socialism (or anarchism) were, remains unanswered. Rapport (2008) contends many of the demands made by French citizens actually, “showed little evidence of socialism, but rather reflected the familiar concerns of artisans beleaguered by the accelerating rate of social and economic change: higher wages, a minimum rate for goods produced, better working conditions, the right to organise unions, the creation of an arbitration system for industrial relations, the abolition of marchandage (or subcontracting, which was exploitative because the subcontractor maximised his profits by paying lower salaries to his workers), the restriction of the use of machinery and use of competition from women and unskilled workers (who commanded lower wages), the creation of National Workshops for each profession of state and state support for industry” (p. 193).

However, the French demonstrated myriad other socialist and anarchist desires. Rapport (2008) is remiss to downplay support for Blanc’s labor commission, the popularity of anti-authoritarian pedagogues like Proudhon, the inherently anti-capitalist demand for le droit au travail,30 the circulation of socialistic ideas in the press (e.g. the “Manifesto of the Communist Party” made available in France in February 1848) and the pervasive presence of red flags in the streets of Paris as well as around the barricade. In addition, Rapport (2008) overlooks the

30 Calls for the “right to work,” or droit au travail, while prima facie reformist in character, along the more tempered political lines Rapport (2008) claimed prevailed in France in 1848, actually contained an anti-capitalist core. That is, given capital’s historical need and constant production of precarious and unemployed classes – what Marx (1867[1977] referred to as capital’s “surplus population,” “a disposable industrial reserve army” (p. 782) of the unemployed – the insistence on the right of everyone to meaningful and equitable labor levelled a challenge neither capitalism in France nor the CWE writ large could ever meet.
pedagogical power of the idea of working class emancipation. In contrast, within the second volume of his treatise on the tenets of political economy, first published during the year of revolutions, Mill (1848[1880]b) acknowledged the humanistic drives and idealistic force animating efforts to alter the miserable material conditions afflicting the majority of workers in 1848:

The form of association, however, which if mankind continue to improve, must be expected in the end to predominate, is not that which can exist between a capitalist as chief, and workpeople without a voice in the management, but the association of the labourers themselves on terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their operations, and working under managers elected and removable by themselves. So long as this idea remained in a state of theory, in the writings of Owen or of Louis Blanc, it may have appeared, to the common modes of judgment, incapable of being realized, and not likely to be tried … But there is a capacity of exertion and self-denial in the masses of mankind, which is never known but on the rare occasions on which it is appealed to in the name of some great idea or elevated sentiment. Such an appeal was made by the French Revolution of 1848. (p. 360)

Mill (1848[1880]b) added that with initial encouragement from the revolutionary Second Republic government, “the ideas sown by Socialist writers, of an emancipation of labour to be effected by means of association, throve and fructified,” and “excluding all the instances of failure, there exist, or existed a short time ago, upwards of a hundred successful, and many eminently prosperous, associations of operatives in Paris alone, besides a considerable number in the departments” (pp. 359-360).
Various anti-authoritarian and socialist aspirations materialized as genuine public pedagogies, as actualized ideas put into practice within, against and beyond the structural logics imposed by and sustaining the CWE. While some cooperative enterprises survived, other expressions of the radical pedagogies were repressed – forcefully so come June, and with enthusiastic approbation from establishment press, as will be shown below. Recovering the history of their ephemeral-turned-subterranean existence, however, illustrates how capitalistic pedagogies reasserted hegemony. It was “frequently affirmed in English newspapers,” Mill (1848[1880]b) remarked in the aftermath of the world revolution, “that the associations at Paris have failed, by writers who appear to mistake the predictions of their enemies at their first formation for the testimonies of subsequent experience,” but such media “representations are not only wide of the truth, but the extreme contrary of it” (p. 360). Hegemonic portrayals in the press (and broader culture) of anti-capitalist arrangements have clearly continued to have educative effects on the historical interpretations of 1848. Witness Rapport’s (2008) recounting, which reflects establishment representations and their assumptions that human relations contrary to those reproducing the same world system must necessarily fail. Yet Rapport (2008) appropriately reflected on the prevailing pedagogies of those in power (much of the provisional government), noting that to those “nineteenth-century liberals soaked in laissez-faire economics,” the demands and practices cited above “seemed dangerously socialist and economically counter-productive” (p. 192).

When she visited Paris in March, Lewald (1848[1997]) claimed everyone believed in the republic and capacity “of the people for self-government: they are only afraid of the socialist direction the revolution has taken, which has found its expression in Louis Blanc’s promise to organize labor” (p. 46). People deemed this organization impossible, she offered, especially
because “all the neighboring countries persist in the old principles, and see great complications and crises resulting from it” (p. 46). As evinced before, liberal Britain – leader of the capitalist world economy – and even the aforementioned Italian militants distrusted France’s revolutionary inclinations. Lewald echoed the notion of “permanent revolution” espoused first by Marx and Engels (1850[2006]) just two years later, which entailed continuing to push proletarian expropriation of propertied classes beyond one nation’s borders, to all major countries. The theory was later expounded upon by Leon Trotsky (1931[1996]), who argued – in a simultaneously state-centric yet internationalist way – that [1] revolution could not completely take place in only one country; but also [2] revolution could (contrary prevailing doctrines) occur in countries without fully developed capitalist industry.

Needless to note, the French provisional government, in the main, wanted no socialist revolution, permanent or otherwise. They allotted no money for Blanc’s program. However, he did receive the old Clichy prison, previously used to incarcerate debtors (vacated after the new republican government abolished the practice of imprisonment for debts). Blanc managed to establish one cooperative, the Clichy tailors (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 69). Regarding serious social change, “Blanc was only allowed to theorize” (p. 69).

Blanc’s ideas no doubt seemed dangerous. He had been the most popular socialist on the eve of the February Revolution because of his practicality, epitomized in the “right to work” slogan he helped popularize (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 19). Born in Madrid in 1812, Blanc almost starved when he moved to Paris 17 years later. But after eventually getting a job as a tutor for a wealthy manufacture, he got acquainted with the life of workers. With “dark eyes and shining white teeth,” and standing “only a bit taller than a dwarf” (p. 20), some contemporaries drew a connection between his physical appearance and his socialist vision, castigated as
authoritarian. His appearance and demeanor were seen, however unfairly, as disturbingly unpleasant and perhaps ruthlessly incisive, while his socialist theory most interpreted as enjoining popular pressure to force the nation-state to start forcefully displacing capitalist coercion and competition.

Blanc did envisage state-directed production, but with a unique blend of workers’ control. Blanc (1839[1920]), in his text regarding the organization of work, claimed “Government should be regarded as the supreme director of production, and invested with great strength to accomplish this task” (p. 186). Criticizing “the false and anti-social education” predominating in his day, Blanc argued for equal remuneration “and an entirely new education” to “change old ideas and customs” (p. 186). In effect, he proposed a mode of public pedagogy for educacting people to live, relate, act and think in the world like socialist human beings. His plan for worker association included ideas for mitigating hierarchy through shared ownership and collective control. He argued for a common fund in each association ensuring support for the old and infirm (something like modern Social Security31), as well as support to help alleviate crises across industry. Writing from prison after the revolution and repression, Proudhon blamed Blanc for not seizing the opportunity when some 100,000 men participated in a demonstration in March 1848 to push the government further and prevent further sabotaging of the revolution (Guérin, 2005, p. 64). Proudhon elsewhere criticized the newspaper La Réforme for standing by both (bourgeois) “universal suffrage and by the governmentalism of Louis Blanc” (cited in Guérin, 2005, p 65). But Blanc’s praxis was more complex. As Robertson (1952[1971]) explains regarding Blanc’s ideas for organizing labor, the aim was to create

31 Blanc’s envisioned program, with its emphasis on the role the state should play in providing a safety net and altering capitalist arrangements, in some ways presaged Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal. Simultaneously, it also coupled syndicalist principles with the sort of social democracy platforms popular in Europe in the twentieth century.
‘social workshops,’ essentially producers’ cooperatives, with state money. The state would not drive out capitalist enterprises directly, but would use competition to kill competition by offering employment to all who wished it. This was the nub of ‘the right to work,’ and Blanc not only assumed that most workers would prefer the social workshops but that they would be more efficient because of good moral and the ‘cheaper communal life’ they would offer their workers in the way of housing, laundry service, and so on. For Blanc was not free of the idea so common in his day that ultimate social happiness would be found in planned community living. (p. 20)

Blanc believed the nation-state, the assemblage of institutions at least partially responsive to popular control, could in effect become a centralized bulwark connecting and financially buttressing worker co-ops so they could outcompete and undermine capitalist enterprises and the capitalist mode of production predicated upon inter-firm competition. What is more, tenets of utopian socialism (e.g. communal living) seeped into even these state-centric doctrines.

To wit, Blanc’s praxis would find common cause with key revolutionary currents that would come later. His ideas, informed by material conditions of the population and guided by an ethic rooted in the possibility of people to maximize their potential to transcend oppressive arrangements, formed a mode of public pedagogy at the intersection of the emergent revolutionary visions of socialism and anarchism. The author of the essay that served as an introduction to a later edition of Blanc’s *L’Organisation du Travail (The Organizatin of Labour)*, first published in 1839, claimed the Blancian vision for social change possessed more than a superficial resemblance to the root idea of Syndicalism. In the scheme of the industrial syndicalist, as in that of Louis Blanc, we have the same insistence upon the necessity of proceeding on the lines of the trade-group; upon the idea of the self-
governing workshop; of the democratic election of officers in the industrial hierarchy; of the federation of social workshops in the same trade, and the affiliation of allied industrial groups. Louis Blanc has in fact more claim to be regarded as the father of modern syndicalism than of modern socialism. (Marriott, 1919, p. xlix)

As the author explains, Blanc’s pedagogy evinced cooperative production just as much as it echoed state socialist principles. His vision was as – if not more, and more coherent – a syndicalist one as Proudhon’s at any rate. Blanc’s ideas for reorganizing work reflected the already developing predilections for anarcho-syndicalism in France. As a public pedagogy in the sense used here, referring not just to action in the realm of ideas or ideology, but also as education in and through practical activity mediated by the world, anarcho-syndicalism resonated with French ouvriers. The anarcho-syndicalist emphasis on direct action and workplace self-management reflected facets of France’s legacy of artisans’ struggles and the traditional corporatist organization lasting into the mid-nineteenth century (Comninell, 2000, p. 90). Syndicalist praxis would even compete for radical political primacy with the other conventional socialist ideologies of the French Section of the Workers International years later.

In Blanc’s semi-syndicalist socialist formulation, the state, in theory, was to provide the working capital to initially augment and facilitate workplace collectivism, “after the initial send-off it is the self-governing workshop, not the State department, which is to employ labour and organize production” (Marriott, 1919, p. xlviii). Social workshops would then be poised to use competition to out-compete exploitative private firms, thereby supplanting in posterity the competitive market system with a superior form of poverty-eliminating organization.

But Blanc never managed to implement his ideas to the fullest. The public pedagogy was stillborn and incomplete. Liberal republicans and influential capitalist interest kept the
transformative knowledge detached from practical activity, in the main. Nevertheless, with Blanc at the helm, Postgate (1920) argues the Luxembourg Commission became “the real revolutionary force in Paris,” and “in composition was a forerunner of the Russian Soviet” (pp. 169-170). The Committee consisted of a somewhat casual method of delegate election from every trade, bringing 300-400 worker delegates together. It was “the first workers’ congress in the world” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 67), predating the congressional meetings of the First International where Marx and Bakunin would later butt heads. The importance of the Commission was thus not in its programmatic implementation by the state, but in it the way it facilitated workers’ self-organization. Along with the immediate reduction in the working day to 10 hours in Paris and 11 in the provinces (down from 14 or 15), the government’s acceptance of the Commission demonstrates the degree to which the French people made it more than just a political revolution.

Like Ledru-Rollin putting in 20 hour days to help realize a liberal democratic republic, all the while pushing socialists out subtly but definitively, Blanc in turn threw himself to the Luxembourg project. He started looking “like a beaten man, one who knew he had not lived up to his expectations” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 67). The establishment press, eager to educate readers about the perils of socialism, denounced even what little he and workers managed to implement. By March 1, the London Times had published an op-ed denouncing the red dangers embodied in someone like Blanc. “The works of LOUIS BLANC, who occupies a most conspicuous position in the new Government,” the press chided, “sufficiently disclose” the “true character” of the revolutionary elements among France’s new leadership. The Times continued,

These social opinions are more or less effects of what are called Communist doctrines; they originated in great measures in the writings of ST. SIMON and Fourier; and they have been disseminated with extraordinary activity during the last 15 years in all the
attractions of fiction and sophistry amongst the working classes of Europe. It is needless
to say how seductive such pictures of social regeneration are to masses of men on whom
the burdens of labour, press with unvarying severity. Political change has never realized
the hopes of material relief which its speculative advocates have rashly promised; but on
this occasion the French Republican Government may be destined to make a still greater
experiment, and to arrive at a still more disastrous result. (p. 5)
The *Times* conflates the socialist advocacy of Louis Blanc with the utopian socialism of Saint
Simon and Fourier, while equating it all with “Communist doctrines,” despite important
differences discussed before. The common thread throughout them is of course their opposition
to concentrated wealth and to concentrated private control over productive property. But their
ideas of “social regeneration” are deemed not only “seductive” but ultimately and inevitably
“disastrous,” for specific reasons the paper opts not to spell out. The assumptions embedded
within are that implementation of structures incompatible with the amassing of both immense
wealth on the one hand, and abject destitution on the other, are also incompatible with nature and
sensibilities of human society. For the *Times* imprisons discourse within the framework of the
then established order. Ideas about other possible social arrangements that would fundamentally
and systemically challenge that order, or even alter certain key structures to promote more parity
as Blanc proposed, could not be entertained as anything but ineluctably “disastrous.” Blanc’s
program and praxis irritated not only the foreign press, the French provisional government and
Proudhon. It would result in a serious conflict with another leading revolutionist in France,
Louis-Auguste Blanqui.

*Louis Blanc vs. Louis-Auguste Blanqui: Struggle for Working Class Consciousness*
One of the founders of the Society of Seasons, with offshoots so instrumental in fomenting the February revolt in France, Blanqui became revered as “one of the most dedicated republican conspirators” (Rapport, 2008, p. 188). He advocated “revolutionary power” (cited in Rapport, 2008, p. 27), along the lines of the dictatorship of the proletariat that later animated the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Blanqui, a “pallid revolutionary socialist” (Rapport, 2008, p. 188) who had spent 33 years of his life in prison by the time he died in 1881, took inspiration from Gracchus Babeuf (Fernbach, 2010, p. 24), the first communist revolutionary who spent much of his life in and out of prison before his epic trial during the late Thermidorian phase of the earlier French Revolution (Babeuf, 1967; Marcuse, 1967; Scott, 1967; Rose, 1978). Like Babeuf before him, Blanqui spent years incarcerated. After Blanqui’s wife died while he was in prison, the “uncompromising, austere, violent, sometimes sarcastic, socialist and revolutionary” (Rapport, 2008, p. 188) started wearing black from head to toe all the time, even covering his hands with black gloves. Similar to Babeuf’s earlier emphasis on organizing a small group of revolutionary conspirators to overthrow the established order, Blanqui’s political philosophy, Blanquism, envisioned a small clandestine cadre implementing a sort of coup to seize state power and introduce socialism. He exalted a conspiratorial vanguard in theory, but his practice was more complex.

Blanc and Blanqui faced off on March 17 when Blanqui led a procession of workers in a demonstration to make greater demands of the government (Postage, 1920, p. 171). Government ministers entreated Blanc to reconcile the crowd and keep peace, which he did, inducing Blanqui’s men to retreat, leaving Blanc “delighted at his own success” (p. 171). Soon enough,

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32 Like Babeuf, Louis Auguste Blanqui left quite a legacy and caused a lot of consternation among concentrated power in France. The French bourgeoisie would continue to regard Blanqui as a revolutionary menace even after 1848. In 1871, when the Paris Commune offered to M. Thiers, the chief of the executive of the French Republic, an exchange of all their hostages for only Blanqui, Thiers refused (Postgate, 1920, p. 168).
Blanc would enjoy a similar fate – sort of, and how soon and to what extent depends on who you ask.

Postgate (1920) claimed National Guardsmen and workers from the National Workshops converged to shout “Down with the Communists!” while putting down a large demonstration led by Blanc’s Luxembourg delegates on April 16, a month after the above incident (p. 171).33 Minister of the Interior Ledru-Rollin this time met the Luxembourg contingent, settled matters, compelled them to return and congratulated himself for saving society. “The Government had broken with the socialists” (p. 171) – only not exactly.

Others describe a similar fate for Blanc, but with different dates. Robertson (1952[1971]) claims it was actually on March 17 that when at least 100,000 workers marched on the Hôtel de Ville – a demonstration the author suggests was probably even Blanc’s idea originally – but the diminutive socialist’s “nerve failed” (p. 60). Upon arrival, the workers, “organized by Blanqui, the greatest secret society leader,” “stared Blanc in the face” (p. 60). Marc Causidière, another socialist who had been given (actually sort of took) control of the Prefecture of Police in the aftermath of the February events,34 purportedly had to order his forces “to stay around and protect the lives of Louis Blanc and his colleagues” (p. 60) that day in March. Blanc is believed to have been the one to have finally talked “the marchers into going home, aided by the mobilization of the national guard, after the government had decided to refuse all their demands” (p. 60). Proudhon called the day “the reaction of Louis Blanc” (cited p. 60), although Proudhon himself was missing in action in both February and during the June insurrection (detailed below).

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33 Some suspected, probably with too little evidence, there was a plot to destroy or overthrow the government underlying the April 16 demonstration, but what is certain is the workers came with a petition calling for “true organization of labor” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 74), as well with a gift (some form of money) to (at least on the surface) show gratitude for the republic.

34 The provisional government must have accepted Causidière in control of the police because it seemed like a way to mollify the socialist militants, who had been so instrumental in the revolution, with a token position.
But Proudhon was not alone in his criticism. A worker is said to have called out to Blanc, “Then you are a traitor, even you” (cited p. 60). But Blanc’s reputation would not diminish with the workers so quickly.

Blanc, Blanqui and Worker Unrest Unsettles the National Assembly

Louis Blanc would be both celebrated and attacked at a later demonstration on May 15, which was arguably the more decisive blow to the socialists than the results of the demonstrations in March or April. It happened after the April elections for the Constituent Assembly, when the Party of Order did exceedingly well. Despite his self-professed disdain for politics proper – understandable given the bourgeois character and hierarchical formulation in France as elsewhere throughout nation-states in the world system, then as now – the anarchist Proudhon nevertheless “deluded” himself “into running as a candidate” (cited in Guérin, 2005, p. 67) that April. Contra his previous position, Proudhon sought to resolve the contradictions of society in spirit, telling prospective voters in an April 3 circular:

The social question has been posed; you will not get out of it. If it is to be resolved, we must have men who marry the extreme of the conservative mentality with the extreme of the radical spirit. Workers, reach out to your employers; and you employers, do not shun the advances of those who were your wage-slaves. After all, what is it to you whether I have been more or less touched with good fortune[?] (cited in Guérin, 2005, p. 67) Proudhon sought to reconcile radical and conservative spirits, but come May 15, workers were again in the streets.

The May 15 event is one of the few times protestors did not have to worry about police. In France circa May 1848, the socialists had the token power position with Causiddière in charge. Causiddière ensured the marching workers met with no problems from his police units
The only socialist left in power after the April elections, Causidière would later lose his job as Prefecture of the Police for failing to prevent the takeover of the National Assembly that was about to take place (Rapport, 2008, p. 196). The door opened for the demonstrators that day though, as Courtais, the leading French General, ordered the National Guard not to fire on them. He would also later be dismissed.

According to Robertson (1952[1971]), Blanqui led the march to the Assembly Hall, although he did so reluctantly because he did not think the time was ripe yet for revolution. His club got geared up, though, and he felt compelled to participate. His concerns were not totally misplaced; many insurrectionist leaders and organizers would be jailed after May 15, leaving them behind bars during the June insurrection the next month (Tocqueville, 1850[1970], p. 144). Blanqui would be caught within two weeks of the May 15 uprising as well, and he would again be locked up (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 83).

Illustrating the contestability – even ambiguity – of history, Blanc’s role in the May 15 events remain hard to discern, as do the day’s events. His Luxembourg Commission had met for the final time two days before, and he had left “with ambiguous words” (Postgate, 1920, p. 172). His ambiguity aside, thousands of workers decided to do something for themselves. Tocqueville (1850[1970]) describes sitting in the Assembly, when without making noise to indicate their presence, 20,000 men surrounded the chamber (p. 115). Lamartine paced around “looking disconcerted” getting up only to return to his seat “as if pursued by some enemy” (p. 116) none of the Assembly could see. Suddenly, people flooded in. “Every possible spot was filled with sweaty, bare-armed workers wearing red sashes” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 81). A petition brought to the provisional government by the people demanded France send troops to Poland, a
misguided demand intended to exploit the French populace’s militarist zeal but with little significance for struggling workers at home.\textsuperscript{35}

The people did not appear to be obeying the command of any leader. Yet Tocqueville (1850[1970]) recalls seeing one infamous rebel figure for the first time:

It was at that moment that I saw a man go up onto the rostrum, and, although I have never seen him again, the memory of him has filled me with disgust and horror ever since. He had sunken, withered cheeks, white lips, and a sickly, malign, dirty look like a pallid, mouldy corpse; he was wearing no visible linen; an old black frockcoat covered his lean, emaciated limbs tightly; he looked as if he had lived in a sewer and only just come out. (p. 118)

He was informed only later that this was Louis Auguste Blanqui.

Soon after he set eyes on Blanqui for the first and last time, Tocqueville (1850[1970]) recalls hearing a cacophony of different slogans, from “The organization of work!” to “A ministry of Labour!” to “A tax on the rich!” and even “We want Louis Blanc!” (cited p. 120). According to Tocqueville (1850[1970]), the crowd

took Louis Blanc up in their arms and carried him in triumph through the hall. They held him over their heads by his little legs; I saw him vainly trying to escape, twisting and turning in every direction, but never succeeding in slipping through their hands, and talking the whole time in a choking, strident voice. He reminded me of a snake having its tail pinched. At last they put him down on a bench below mine. I heard him shout: ‘My friends, the right you have won …’ but the rest of his words were lost in the din. (p. 121)

\textsuperscript{35} However, there had for some time been numerous Polish exiles in France. Republican Poles founded the Polish Democratic Society in Paris in 1832, and advanced social issues while instigating revolution in Poland (Rapport, 2008, p. 125). The PDS played a role in organizing Paris demonstrations in March.
Even the intentions of those Parisians inside the Assembly Chamber during the above incident are hard to ascertain. They could have been celebrating Blanc or tormenting him. Or both.

Regardless, Blanc’s day was hardly done. Soon after he had been hoisted over people’s heads and carried about, one of the radicals wearing a red cap stood up and declared the Assembly dissolved. According to Tocqueville (1850[1970]), the Assembly members did not consider themselves dissolved, but they did disperse (p. 123). So did workers, who had already started marching to the Hôtel de Ville. Robertson (1952[1971]) contends Blanc had been on the fence about the whole affair, upset with the Assembly but wary of the workers. Blanc initially followed the crowd marching toward the Hôtel de Ville, but at some point he thought better of it and turned around to return to the Assembly Hall, where he was grabbed by members of the National Guard who blamed him for the uprising and beat him up. Blanc finally made it to “the tribune, where he defended himself so bravely that even his enemies were impressed” (p. 82).

One enemy in particular was impressed by his performance. Tocqueville (1850[1970]) explained that the Assembly began arresting members of the old provisional government and they also wanted to include Blanc on the list, but:

He courageously undertook to defend himself. He had just escaped from the fury of the national guards who held the door, and his clothes were still torn, dusty and disordered. This time he did not have the stool brought up on which he usually mounted to bring his head above the level of the rostrum balustrade (he was almost a dwarf); he even forgot about the effect he was trying to produce, concentrating entirely on what he had to say. In spite of that, or rather because of it, for the moment he made his point. (p. 125)

May 15 thus marked a major turning point, not just for Blanc, Blanqui and the socialists, but for the wave of revolutions.
State Repression and Unlikely Turns in Electoral Politics

An attempt had been made to push the revolution to the Left, and it engendered conservative backlash. Elsewhere, action in Vienna and the onset of “counter-revolution in Naples” (Rapport, 2008, p. 190) showed the specter of radicalism and the reactionary response across Europe. It haunted France with gusto. “After May 15 the Assembly—erroneously—held that the Socialists had been crushed” (Postgate, 1920, p. 177). But, the belief was not totally invalid. Indeed, the Assembly was justified in believing the socialists were finished because it made such concerted effort to crush them. Rapport (2008) points to “deep-rooted anxieties” (p. 190) – now brought to consciousness – about the political revolution being pushed so far that it politicized the social. To allay anxiety, legislation ensured the democratic socialist element of the republican movement suffered serious setbacks after the mid-May blowback. The National Assembly passed a law on June 5 to crack down on mass gatherings (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 196). The Executive Commission resolved in June to close down the National Workshops, which employed some 115,000 (Rapport, 2008, pp. 196-197). Some 50,000 more had been seeking admission (Postgate, 1920, p. 178). Initially supported by the state – possibly “to split the working-class for the benefit of the bourgeoisie” (p. 177), the National Workshops came to be seen as a drain on the nation’s finance and feared as a locus of revolt. This latter fear was not unfounded. About two-thirds of the demonstrators on May 15 were National Workshop employees (Rapport, 2008, p. 197).

Run-off elections in early June illustrated greater regression and regressive currents, even within circles sympathetic to radicalism. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was elected to the National Assembly on June 4 (Rapport, 2008, p. 204). Playing all sides and portraying himself as almost a socialist, he garnered support from ex-Luxembourg Commission workers and even an
endorsement from Louis Blanc (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 84). Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin fumed, demanding Bonaparte not be allowed an Assembly seat. The Executive Committee of the Assembly decreed on June 12 that Louis Napoleon Bonaparte should remain in exile, reaffirming the law of 1832 banishing the family of Napoleon (cited in Bonaparte, 1852, p. 89). As explained in a previous section, Bonaparte declined to take office. In a letter he sent from London, dated June 11, 1848, he resolved to remain in exile (p. 91). Maybe he sensed the time was not right, or that the nation was on the brink of a short civil war, which it was. “Without renouncing the idea of the honour of being one day a representative of the people,” he wrote from London that summer to the Assembly president after learning electors from Corsica chose him almost unanimously, “I consider it to be my duty to wait before returning to the bosom of my native country, till my presence in France may not in any way serve as a pretext for the enemies of the Republic” (p. 95).

The avowed anarchist Proudhon, on the other hand, took his seat after a successful candidacy. He had repeatedly denounced the state-based political terrain, but now he charted it. Proudhon had dismissed the February Revolution when citizens of Paris took the streets and built barricades for being political and not social. Evidently those past criticisms no longer applied, but it did not keep him from continuing to be dismissive of people’s politicization. “When I think of everything that I have said, written and published over these past ten years regarding the State’s role in society,” Proudhon wrote after being elected, “bringing the authorities, to heel and government’s disqualification from revolution, I am tempted to believe that my election in June 1848 was the result of some incomprehension on the part of the people” (cited in Guérin, 2005, p. 68). In Proudhon’s estimation, it was not as it would appear, the result of his contradictory praxis.
However, it probably seems as though a seat in the levers of power would permit greater agitation. Blanc had believed something similar, and had thought he could implement his ideas for workers’ control better with state facilitation. Proudhon might have hoped to use the apparatus to open up spaces for protecting radicals. Perhaps he hoped his position of authority would allow him to advance the principles he later espoused of non-statist, anti-capitalist “federalism,” swallowing the state up in democratized (also decentralized) industry, and “mutualism,” the practice of voluntary (non-coerced) association (Douglas, 1929, pp. 783-784). He must have known the prospects for his having an impact on policy were not good, given his polarizing positions. “One must either love me or hate me,” he admitted. Workers, surmised Proudhon, again in condescending fashion, “do not read me, but they understand me” (cited p. 785).

Once in office, however, he failed to fully understand or even pay attention to them. Entrenched in the bureaucracy of statecraft in June, in “the isolator called the National Assembly,” Proudhon admitted to knowing “nothing either about the situation of the national workshops or the government’s policy, nor the intrigues underway inside the Assembly,” proving “how men utterly ignorant of a country’s state are nearly always the ones who represent it,” and “that a governmental democracy is nothing but a monarchy resuscitated” (cited in Guérin, 2005, p. 69). After he was missing in action during the June insurrection, described below, Proudhon apologized for falling victim to “parliamentary cretinism,” and failing in his duty as a representative. I was there to see and saw not; to raise the alarm and cry out. I was like the dog that failed to bark at the enemy’s approach. I, elected by the plebs, a

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36 Douglas (1929) took pains to point out the influences that produced Proudhon as a person and political subject. Born in 1809 into a poor peasant family, he bitterly loathed poverty but retained “the warmest respect” (p. 787) for his mother, who cautioned him: “Never speak of love to a young girl, even when you are proposing marriage” (cited p. 787) – advice he took literally and to heart.
journalist of the proletariat, ought not to have left those masses without guidance and without counsel. One hundred thousand regimented men deserved my attention. (cited in Guérin, 2005, p. 70)

After dismissing the barricades in February and being derelict of direct action in June, Proudhon had essentially issued a meā culpā. In the aftermath of the “June Days” slaughter, Proudhon took to the streets to be with the people. The circumstances that brought him to that require explication.

A rapprochement between the Luxembourg folks and the National Workshops enabled them to elect four out of 11 candidates in June (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 70), but the coalition was unable to reverse the regressive course. On the opening day of the Constituent Assembly, which was first elected as the body to create a constitution but ended up assuming general governing powers, workers placarded the city with copies of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, the document adopted by revolutionary France in the late eighteenth century (Postgate, 1920; Robertson, 1952[1971]). The gesture had an ironic quality, given the document posits bourgeois rights like private property as sacrosanct. Rather, like the 1848 revolutions, the progressive facets of the Enlightenment advanced by the declaration and the earlier revolution of 1789 have to be interpreted dialectically. It is a mixed bag.

*Views from Above and Below as the “June Days” Begin*

With the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, workers considered taking up arms. They waited, but only a while. Pedagogies spreading through France appear to have profoundly affected people’s consciousness, soon enough eliciting decisive action.

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37 See Doyle (2001) for more information on the Declaration of the Rights of Man, instituted in 1789.
It started on June 13. Rapport (2008) claimed June uprisings in Paris sparked small rebellions in other French cities, like in Lyon, and several manufacturing towns, like Limoges (p. 210). “Lyons,” Marx (1852[1987]) points out, adding an “s” to the city’s name (as it is sometimes spelled) while also adding chronological accuracy, “where June 13 had given the signal for a bloody insurrection of the workers, was, along with the five surrounding Departments, likewise declared in a state of siege, a condition that has continued up to the present” (p. 52).

Paris did not fully catch on fire until a week or so later when the Assembly aimed to close the National Workshops. It tried to do so gradually at first, so as not to awaken an already sleep-walking giant, the immiserated working class (Tocqueville, 1850[1970], p. 137). Together, on June 18, the remnants of the Luxembourg Commission and National Workshops “issued a joint proclamation in favor a democratic and social republic” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 88). The workshops were ordered closed on June 20 with instructions for those who had been employed to either be conscripted into the army or go drain marshes in Sologne, and so the next two days workers paraded through Paris streets in protest (Rapport, 2008, p. 197; Tocqueville, 1850[1970], p. 137).

With chief rebel organizers in prison (e.g. Blanqui), exiled or powerless (e.g. Blanc), Louis Pujol, “a mystic of sorts” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 89), now “appears in history for this fleeting moment, never to appear again” (Postgate, 1920, p. 179). Prior to popping out of nowhere to lead a mass deputation of workers to collect denied pay on June 22, Pujol had authored an immensely popular, Biblical-style apocalyptic narrative, “Prophecy of Days of Blood,” which proved portentous of the “June Days” to come. In his prophetic text, Pujol wrote:
I say unto you, People: I am the Prophet of misfortune. They that have ears let them hear the tale of the evils that threaten our country. They that have the tongue of truth, let them go about the cities and the countryside repeating the prophecy of the quarrels which soon will bathe in blood the flag of civil war. (cited in Postgate, 1920, p. 211)

And indeed, a civil war – a class war – ensued.

Of course, from the perspective of insurgents and critics of capital, a class war had long been waged against them. Against its latest manifestation, the abolition of the National Workshops, they were simply fighting back. But they were also fighting for something – the right to the means of subsistence and some say in decisions hitherto destroying their lives.

Tocqueville (1850[1970]) described the defining characteristics of the struggle:

Another point that distinguished it from all other events of the same type during the last sixty years was that its object was not to change the form of government, but to alter the organization of society. In truth, it was not a political struggle (in the sense in which we have used the word ‘political’ up to now), but a class struggle, a sort of ‘Servile War’. It stood in the same relation to the facts of the February Revolution as the theory of socialism stood to its ideas; or rather it sprang naturally from those ideas, as a son from his mother; and one should not see it only as a brutal and blind, but as a powerful effort of the workers to escape from the necessities of their condition, which had been depicted to them as an illegitimate depression, and by the sword to open a road towards that imaginary well-being that had been shown to them in the distance as a right. (p. 136)

In contrast to Proudhon’s characterization of the 1848 rebellions as political and not social, Tocqueville’s depiction of the struggle as class-based cuts through the idealist approbation to arrive at a more potent explanation. A significant portion of the Parisian working class had
learned socialism – more broadly, they came to believe in the right to basic necessities without exploitation – a previously subterranean pedagogy, now at the forefront of everyone’s consciousness.

To wit, Marx (1852[1987]) used the metaphor of a creature burrowing feverishly during uneventful or repressive periods, digging the necessary tunnels for subterranean struggle, until the right historical moment arrives and it surfaces again at a revolutionary juncture: “Well grubbed old mole!” (p. 121). The mole was out in the open in Paris that summer.

Unlike Proudhon, and despite misdeeds in May that smacked of a bourgeois counter-revolutionary ethos, Louis Blanc remained a celebrated figure among much of the barricade-erecting working class who still considered him a comrade come late June. If the London Times reporter stationed in France on June 23, 1848, was correct, one of the few “cries uttered by the rioters,” as fighting commenced was “Vive [la] Louis Blanc” (p. 5). Despite whatever decline in popularity the diminuitive socialist suffered, the people’s chants exclaiming “long live Louis Blanc” in late June of 1848 suggest he was still exalted among the working class rebels when what would later be called the “June Days” started. Or, rather, Blanc’s vision for social transformation was still esteemed in the eyes of many who would die at the barricades that month; the ideas had been assimilated into the consciousness of the working classes.

Consciousness, in this context anyway, is always consciousness of something (of some experience or perception, implying action in the world). The anti-capitalism was thus pedagogical. It was learned in theory and through a practice in conflict with the state.

38 Marx (1852[1987]) actually used this metaphor to refer to the methodical, subterranean struggle throughout the period of “purgatory” following Bonaparte’s coup in December 1851 until the time the proletariat was to have perfected both parliamentary and executive power so that it could compel Europe “to leap from its seat” (p. 121) in exuberance.
The pseudo-historian and poet-cum-politician Alphonse de Lamartine, so exalted in February, suffered a far greater fall in popularity among the popular classes than Blanc. Lamartine’s politics mirrored his privileged position and he of course sided with the state of which he was then part. According to the Times correspondent from the June 23, 1848 piece, “Down with Lamartine!” (p. 5) was one of the only other cries heard around the barricades. And as for the relevance of key dates in March, April and May leading up to the June rebellion, a correspondent in an article published in the Times on June 24, 1848, implied the significance of those of days of demonstrations in his article, which remediated what the French journal Presse had suggested about the threat of internal revolutionary forces. The correspondent informed readers of the Times that the Presse charges the minority or revolutionary party of the Government with being in a state of permanent conspiracy, for the purpose of arriving at a dictatorship. It adds further, that the demonstration of the 17th of March, that of the 16th of April, and the attack of the 15th of May, were all prepared by the same party with a similar object. A fourth attempt is said to be in preparation. For that purpose the Republican Guard has been reorganized; new clubs have been opened, more violent than even that of Blanqui; and it is resolved not to demand any further credits for the support of the national workshops, but to finish, once for all, with the corrupt and reactionary middle classes (bourgeoisie).” (p. 8; parentheses and emphasis in original)

The frame focuses reader attention on a recurring theme with ideological serviceability: conspiracy, or conspiratorial factions. It is instructive the Presse leveled the charges. What is more, the Presse no doubt printed other commentary or reports unrelated to those accusations, but the Times correspondent opted not to report the other stories. Instead, the British paper
repeated the above allegations featured in the *Presse*, almost certainly without verifying the claims. Editors then must have opted to include the correspondent’s choice of frame featuring the aforestated particular accusation of plotting in the “FRANCE” subsection of the “STATE OF THE CONTINENT” reports from that Saturday edition of the *London Times*, as the “June Days” raged in Paris.

The pedagogical thrust reflects the liberal-yet-reactionary learned predilections of the ruling class and its ideas. That is, the pedagogy reproduces the felt fear of non-reformist social change, amplified in (potential reader) affect by the invocation of conspiracy, suggesting secret plotting. The decried revolutionary pedagogy is thus positioned to appear all the more dangerous for its lack of transparency. It is cast as more sinister, or can now be more easily interpreted that way given the editorial choices. The dominant, remediated ideas against revolution and conspiracy in turn arise from the dominant material realities. System wide, the material conditions were altered by the mid-1840s economic downturn. In France, the everyday practical activity of working class Parisians underwent significant changes after the February Revolution too, including the upheaval involved in the multiple demonstrations noted by the *Presse*, reprinted by the *Times*. The Paris proletariat, comprised of conscious and thinking persons attuned to their socioeconomic circumstances and the ties between their economic well-being and transient institutions like the National Workshops, proved capable of projecting into the future their miserable fate if the few welfare protections they had garnered during the critical juncture were summarily dissolved by the emboldened and recently elected state functionaries of the bourgeoisie serving in the National Assembly that summer.

There were those with vested interest in vilifying the revolution-prone elements of society castigated as “more violent than even that of Blanqui,” and they had an interest in
disseminating that condemnation as widely as they could through the dominant media of the time. Marshalling ideological reserves meant in this instance fearmongering with what Furet (1978) called “imputations of conspiracy” (p. 39) when writing about the preponderant ideational force that animated the earlier French Revolution. The *London Times* merely remediated accusations of revolutionary conspiracy completely consonant with a hegemonic public pedagogy whose presuppositions included belief in the virtue of institutions integral to capital (e.g. concentrated ownership of private property), portrayed from the perspective of the status quo as unjustly under attack by vile, violent conspirators.

Even those with progressive politics supported the closure of the National Workshops and upheld an anti-socialist ethos immediately prior to the June revolt. Famed writer Victor Hugo was called to the Assembly tribune in the days before the “June Days” started, and the *London Times* on June 22, 1848 published their version of his address:

He admitted that those establishments had been at first a necessity, but it was now full time, he said, to remedy an evil of which the least inconvenience was to squander uselessly the resources of the country. What, he asked, had they produced in the course of four months? Nothing. They had degraded the vigorous children of labour, deprived them of all taste for labour, and demoralized them to such a degree that they no longer blushed to beg in the streets. … M. Hugo then drew a gloomy picture of the financial and commercial situation of France, and appealing to the Socialists he summoned them in the name of humanity to cease to preach their anarchical doctrines. At the moment Paris struggled in a paroxysm which was regarded by its neighbors as an agony, London, he said, rejoiced, and its industry and commerce had trebled. Those who excited the people to revolt were most culpable, for they created distrust, and obliged capital to fly. When
they agitated Paris they asserted the power, grandeur, wealth, prosperity, and
preponderance of England. This misery of the rich constituted at no time the wealth of the
poor. The Socialists should consider that civil war was a servile war; and he again
entreated them to suspend their declamations against family and property, the basis of all
society. (p. 4)

Assuming a degree of accuracy in the report, Hugo’s statement foregrounds key contradictions
otherwise easy to elide.

In the name of humanity, Hugo reportedly enjoined socialists “to cease to preach their
anarchical doctrines,” which does three things: [1] It conflates socialism with anarchism, despite
differences emerging at the time that would continue to become more pronounced; [2] In
conflating the two, the association between anarchism and cruel, violent disorder is invoked and
tied to socialism; and [3] Both socialism and anarchism are again cast as doctrines of anti-
humanism intent on destroying society. Incredibly, these insinuations come from a prolific
Romantic poet and novelist who would later dedicate one of his poems, “Viro Major,” to
anarchist Louise Michel, an anarchist and one of the militant female organizers during the Paris
Commune of 1871 (Lowry & Gunter, 1981, p. xi). Hugo’s French nationalistic ethos, evidenced
in the comparison with English industry, is at first blush surprising to read in a London paper.
But in actuality it is consonant with the legitimation of competitive international rivalry that
served the reproduction of both nation-states as nation-states. This is a primary function of
nationalism as a public pedagogy less beneficial for most people within nations, but historically
of benefit for the state as a hierarchical, alien institution itself.

As a public pedagogy, nationalism also militated against pedagogies of anarchism and
socialism, which in 1848 were becoming more than just ideologies. revolutionary practice much
to the chagrin of even iconoclast writers like Hugo. His critique of socialism, in conjunction with
his claim that family and property were “the basis of all society,” shows the extent to which an
intellectual who in some instances cut against the grain nevertheless internalized and reproduced
hegemonic assumptions about given institutions. That is, the institutions appeared natural, eternal
and immutable – “the basis of all society” – not as human conventions that emerged historically.
Unacknowledged as conditioned social constructions and assumed to be historical constants,
such phenomena appear as “everlasting truths” (Marx, 1867[1977], p. 175; see also Fuchs, 2011,
p. 145). This what the critical tradition terms fetishism. As stated in a previous chapter, Marx
(1867[1977]) explained how relations between people, mediated by property regimes, assume
“the fantastic form of a relation between things” (p. 165), making property appear as “the basis
of all society,” as it were. Hugo’s fetishistic thought, taking the bourgeois family and private
property to be transhistorically sacrosanct, is given a platform in the French Assembly and
remediated by the Times. The paradigm of reification, wherein the capitalist institution of
property confronts a man like Hugo as inalterable, incapacitates people through a public
pedagogy of powerlessness reinforced through other dominant institutions (e.g. state
government, a widely read newspaper abroad), as it was in this case. Yet cracks in the
commonsense edifice in 1848 had workers and socialists not only assailing Hugo’s cherished
institutions as sources of injustice. It also enabled them to contest those institutions, revealing
them as subject to change through struggle.

In similar fashion, Tocqueville too left his own bourgeois assumptions unexamined in
casting aspersions on insurrectionist motivations. Tocqueville (1850[1970]) called them “a
mixture of greedy desires and false theories” (p. 136). Even after the socialists were brutally

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39 For concise explication, drawing on Györö Lukács’ work, of reification in and as a result of capitalist society, see
crushed, their pedagogies, supposedly “in the shape of greedy, envious desires,” still “continued to spread among the people, sowing the seeds of future revolutions” (p. 165). This occurred, Tocqueville (1850[1970]) asserted, even though the socialist party itself remained “beaten and impotent” (p. 165). In this assessment, although probably hyperbolic and illustrative of the frightful position of the privileged classes, he nevertheless corroborates the perseverance of Marx’s mole.

What is important to understand here are the pedagogical implications of such vilification. Tocqueville (1850[1970]) assumed envy and greed alone animate revolutions of this kind. The assumption overlooks the fact those subjected to the horrors of capitalistic class divides are human subjects endowed with capacities for critical reflection, capable of ethical determinations of what is just and unjust given the array of human needs and desires. Tocqueville also presupposes that there is such a thing as evil (or greed for that matter). It is a common enough presupposition, grounded in Biblical beliefs about original sin.

What still remains obscure is why socialist frameworks constituted “false theories” in that author’s mind. Socialists and communists were not the first ones to make the arguments comprising those theories. As would be demonstrated after 1848, much of socialist theory was predicated on arguments first made by bourgeois political economists. Marx’s (1867[1977]) immanent critique was made possible by the work of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Both Smith and Ricardo critiqued the capitalist division of labor and advanced labor as the source of all value within capitalism, respectively. Moreover, insofar as humans use innate potentials for critical appraisal, with reference to ideas about justice intimated above, those theories could be evaluated as true or false where it mattered, in practice. Insofar as the human capacity to project
beyond to better (more just) worlds could be juxtaposed with the empirically verified reality to consider how it could best be changed, the explanatory power of those theories can be tested.

Perhaps he questioned the veracity of radical theories on some other basis. As Tocqueville (1850[1970]) explained the source of the June insurrection,

These poor people had been assured that the goods of the wealthy were in some way the result of a theft committed against themselves. They had been assured that inequalities of fortune were as much opposed to morality and the interests of society as to nature. This obscure and mistaken conception of right, combined with brute force, imparted to it an energy, tenacity and strength it would never have had on its own. (p. 137)

Pregnant with ideology, the above language requires unpacking.

In the recollections above, Tocqueville does not deny the abundance of affluence amid inequality. He implicitly acknowledges extreme political and economic disparities as factors in heightening social tensions. He states that the working classes had come to incorrectly believe the “goods of the wealthy were in some way the result of a theft committed against themselves,” which is actually close to the radical critique of political economy emerging at the time. The notion that one class of society produces social value that is then privately appropriated by another class originated with classical political economists like Smith and Ricardo, before it was clarified in politicized terms by socialists. But that labor theory of value had become dangerous. Tocqueville deems pedagogies proclaiming exploitative processes unjust and unnecessary as “mistaken,” for reasons worth uncovering. His notion of a “mistaken conception of right” stems from another conception, which supposes the existing class system as just, natural or inevitable.

For a historian, the proposition is strikingly ahistorical in that it ignores the genesis of existing arrangements, taking them instead to be normal and therefore imbued with permanency.
While those ahistorical conceptions no doubt reflect the author’s privileged class position, there are other aspects of the June uprising Tocqueville (1850[1970]) observed with perspicuity, probably because of his privileged position. It was not, he noted, “the work of a certain number of conspirators, but was the revolt of one whole section of the population against another” (p. 137). Here he breaks with the aforecited analysis offered by France’s *Presse* and by the *London Times*. Conspiracy theories make for better media content than class struggle, and Tocqueville did not have to internalize the same notions of newsworthiness or other press orthodoxies.

He also transcended the prototypically patriarchal portrayals – or, perhaps more commonly, omissions – of the mainstream press. When the barricades first went up on June 23, women were right there with the men readying ammunition and when it was all over and the insurrectionists “had to surrender,” Tocqueville (1850[1970]) acknowledged “the women were the last to yield” (p. 137).

Adolphe Blanqui, a political economist favorable to free trade and (weirdly the) brother of the then-jailed revolutionary socialist Auguste Blanqui, recounted to Tocqueville (1850[1970]) a story typifying the breadth of the insurgency’s appeal. Adolphe told Tocqueville how he had brought into his home some time before young children born to the poor in the countryside. The day the insurrection started he overheard the young boy servant say, while clearing away dinner, “Next Sunday (it was on a Thursday) it is we who will be eating the chicken’s wings,” to which a young servant girl added, “And it is we who will wear the lovely silk dresses” (cited p. 142). The bourgeois Blanqui was mortified, but his imprisoned brother surely would have been delighted. The spirit of revolt really had reached every crevasse of working class society.
According to Tocqueville (1850[1970]), again serving as our inadvertent dialectician, the strength of that spirit is what ended up giving the authorities the edge in suppressing “the greatest, best armed and most furious insurrection ever known in Paris” (p. 143). As Tocqueville (1850[1970]) explained, “If the rebellion had been less radical and seemed less fierce, probably most of the bourgeoisie would have stayed at home; France would not have rushed to our aid; perhaps even the National Assembly would have yielded; at the least a minority of its members would have advised that, and its strength as a body would have been much diminished” (p. 144). As it turned out, given the relative success of revolutions the 60 years leading up to 1848, and the size of the June uprising, those in power concertedly saw the only options as “victory or defeat” (p. 144).

Nevertheless, the Assembly gave the insurrectionists ample opportunity early to erect their barricades. After the abolition of the workshops was announced, Eugene Cavaignac, the leading republican general, “in spite of the protests of the Government, was withdrawing his troops from Paris in order to give the revolt time to grow strong enough to fight a pitched battle,” and perhaps “an excuse would be provided for the extermination of the Socialist workers” (Postgate, 1920, p. 178). Those in power thought it smart “to let the insurrection get its head” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 89), the idea being it would then be easier to attack and squash. A similar strategy had been advanced back in February, and the idea would be proposed again in 1871 to deal with the Paris communards.

What is unclear is the extent to which the government could foresee the size and scope of the forthcoming struggle. The lack of prescience that characterized the foreign press leading up to the February Revolution several months before appears to have been a recurring theme for papers like the Times in 1848. Just prior to the “June Days,” in an article published June 22,
which contained news from France from a few days before that took time to reach Britain’s press, a correspondent for the *London Times* reported that “Paris remained perfectly tranquil” (p. 8). A draft of a new constitution was presented to the Assembly that week, and the *Times* writer qualified his pronouncement of tranquility with a comment that Paris’ provinces were disturbed by proposed increases in taxation. Echoing the public pedagogy present among privileged classes in France, the *Times* reporter did give a critical synopsis of the situation foreshadowing events to come, claiming: “The number of working men out of employment after the Revolution was so great as to excite alarm in the Government; hence it became politic to support them, and even to flatter them. This was done until the working classes persuaded themselves they were of a superior caste” (p. 8). The establishment organ characterized actionable class consciousness of the French workers as haughty presumption of superiority. The *Times* remark casts the working classes as improperly pampered and accuses them of assuming themselves important (with the implication that they are not important, and how awful of them to think of themselves as anything but disposable). The comment is an exemplar of ideological inversion, an assertion of the opposite. In the *Times* worldview, the working poor wrongly consider themselves superior, not the self-important rich who routinely justify their affluence that comes at the expense of others. The capitalist class position produces a public pedagogy among its inhabitants reflecting the lived material experience of socioeconomic privilege. This generates a pretentiousness among the rich that blinds them to their own constructed sense of superiority at the same time as it compels them to transfer their own would-be compunction onto the vilified *ouvriers*.

But the remark in the *Times* does more. In contending that workers “persuaded themselves they were of a superior caste,” the writer for the prestigious British publication packages two nuggets of truth in what otherwise is ostensibly a bourgeois reproach. The notion
that the working classes abroad had “persuaded themselves” suggests that workers collectively cultivated a critical class consciousness. They are alleged, and not without evidence (more of which would come in the form of barricades and bodies in the streets), to have together realized their privileged revolutionary position40 within the CWE.

As the June insurrection in France was underway, the June 26, 1848 issue of the London Times noted that M. La Grange had submitted questions about the unemployed working classes to the National Assembly on June 23, but the Assembly had opted to postpone dealing with the matter in what the Times correspondent called an “ill-advised delay” (p. 4). The government in France appears to have both delayed preparing to thwart the rebellion and delayed dealing with the immediate impetus for revolt.

However, on the first day, the National Guard tried to get those at the barricades to surrender, and after 30 guardsmen were killed, they “shot down in succession two beautiful, disheveled young prostitutes who stood atop the barricade, lifting their skirts up to their waists and screaming in unprintable language, ‘Cowards, do you dare fire on the belly of a woman?’” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 90). Soon, the Assembly deliberated and voted to declare Paris in a state of siege, and to transfer powers of the Executive Commission over to Cavaignac (pp. 146-147).

“For several days,” the London Times printed on June 26, 1848, after getting word of the new insurrection in Paris, “amid the profound tranquility that Paris appeared to enjoy, the agents of disorder have been busy in preparing a popular movement of a very alarming character” (p. 4). The assertion should raise questions. In the paper’s previous report on the state of affairs in Paris, in which the “tranquillity” of the city was averred, why didn’t the Times journalist – or the writers

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40 For more on the proletariat as the privileged revolutionary agent, see Marx (1843[1978] p. 141-142), West (1991, p. 42) and footnote 20 in this text.
for the various French publications the *Times* was wont to remediate – get the scoop on the popular movement preparations being made by the “agents of disorder” referenced in this piece? Further, if the *Times* editorial previously opted not to print anything about the “agents of disorder” organizing for an alarming revolt, was that because they had no evidence of such organizing at the time (whether or not some organizing took place before the June insurrection)? If the preparatory work of the “agents of disorder” was deemed not newsworthy and/or was unsubstantiated just a few days before, was it newsworthy a few days later just because the plans materialized in part? Does the materialization of struggle retroactively substantiate accounts of all the organizing those “agents of disorder” were later purported to have been doing? Or is the *Times* writer fishing for an explanation, arriving at one that invokes the conspiratorial boogeyman while upholding the legitimacy of order?

An article in the June 27, 1848 edition of the *London Times* referred to the ways barricades were deftly erected at optimal places along narrow city streets, how workers strategically occupied islands of the Seine and how they converted the Hôtel-Dieu into headquarters for one detachment (p. 5). “The question then naturally arises,” the *Times* commentary continued, “by whom and by what funds have the ultra party been supplied with all the means of resistance which they have now shown themselves to possess? The quantity of arms and ammunitions and provisions required to enable an army of insurgents sufficiently numerous to occupy the vast position we have described, and to sustain an unabated combat of three days, must be enormous. The authority by which their movements have been directed has been absolute; they have obeyed it with unflinching valour, and at the sacrifice of thousands of lives; yet not a name has transpired of any one in command of these prodigious operations” (p. 5).
Presaging doctrines of revolt and mass media newsgathering proclivities to come, the press assumed someone – or a select few of some vanguard – must be commanding the operations. Leaders must have conspired. Self-organization of the popular classes is ruled out. Once there was assurance the insurgency was crushed, the Times on June 28, 1848, still alluded to the “flagitious leaders and visionary counsellors” of the working classes, the supposed vanguard who “intended to turn” the underclass revolt “to their own purposes” (p. 5). The paper elsewhere cited evidence of a sophisticated, interpersonal media among the rebels: That is, “a gangway of internal communication had been opened from house to house, which supplied ammunition or means of escape to the besieged” (p. 5). While simultaneously adducing evidence of highly ordered, horizontal organization and efficient communication taking place from below, the evidence was not enough for the Times staff to itself explicitly evince the collective democratic strength demonstrated by the people, even as it was quite clearly implied.

The press did report on the view from above in France during the “June Days,” which was equally instructive. In the meeting of France’s National Assembly, as documented by the London Times in an article published June 26, 1848, statesmen had no more qualms about taking necessary steps to squelch the dissidence. As the organ recounted,

It was time (exclaimed M. Pages) to crush the agitators, and the committee was determined to perform its duty with energy. Its task was difficult, and it was most anxious to surrender it to others, but whilst he and his colleagues continued in office they would be found at the foremost ranks in the height of danger, and ready to sacrifice their lives in defending menaced order. (p. 5)

The last part of the paraphrased quote, which claims the state’s forces were “ready to sacrifice their lives in defending menaced order,” appears awkwardly worded. It is revealing for that
reason. The awkward statement can be interpreted as an instructive slip of the subconscious comprehension of truth. One could read the stated readiness to defend “menaced order” as simply implying that the established order has been wrongfully menaced by the working class insurgency. A better way to have worded that sort of proclamation would have been to assert that military personnel were ready to die “defending against meances to order,” or something along those lines. Contrariwise, the actual word choice, the notion of a “menaced order,” offers a subtle indictment of the injurious established order, the prevailing structures of iniquity the Paris proletariat took up arms against.

As regards the protection of order, the mainstream foreign press published bountiful praise for forces protecting France’s nascent bourgeois republic. In that June 26, 1848 issue of the Times, the paper’s correspondent noted that although the National Guard had not turned out as they did in responding to the demonstrations on April 10 and May 15, “those who did present themselves have acted with the courage and the sang froid of old troops” (p. 4). “Never did men display more resolution or coolness than they did” (p. 4), the Times reporter embedded with France’s Second Legion wrote gushingly. “The National Guard behaved in a most gallant manner” (p. 4), as insurgents erected barricades near the Hôtel de Ville. In the report on the National Assembly meeting that took place Friday as the insurgency took root, Times readers were also informed “the National Guard, the real people, the only people, fought with heroic courage,” and in a reassurance to readers that order would be re-established, the article adds “a day should not pass over without the re-establishment of the laws” (p. 5). Echoing disparaging depictions of democracy that reverberated through the age of revolutions, an article in the June 27, 1848 issue of the London Times decried “this fresh demonstration of the nature of democratic power and the dangers of social insubordination” (p. 5), which justified whatever brutal means
the state could wield to crush people’s democratic desires. “Dreadful as was the alternative,” the *Times* staff wrote about General Cavaignac’s strategic marshalling of massive military force, “he was justified in employing against his misguided fellow-citizens all the forces of the country and all the rights of war,” and events in Paris have made clear that “however popular a form of government may be, the maintenance of order and the necessity of law depend, in the last resort, on a firm and even unsparing exercise of military power” (p. 5).

Class interests across borders in this case ensured the British media’s ideological justification for state suppression of challenges to capitalist authority. Indeed, in a highly unequal society such as the kinds the CWE has reproduced, maintaining “order” and “the necessity of law” are essential. Order and law are normally backed by the threat of force or by the actual deployment of force against individuals, which media narratives (including stories in the *Times*) tend to omit as a necessary (yet revealing) requirement of the system. Order and law are also backed by force when larger movements threaten that order and the rule of law, as was the case in France circa June 1848.

Serious fighting in late June that year lasted three days, four if sporadic battles are included. The Paris proletariat, standing together in a kind of solidarity the likes of which is rarely seen, became increasingly isolated from the rest of the city and France’s population. Peasants, shopkeepers and nobles poured into Paris from as far as 500 miles away to get revenge on the despised drudges from the former National Workshops (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 90). A *London Times* correspondent recounted in a piece published June 26, 1848, how one Frenchman he encountered “described the insurgents as composed mostly of young men and boys, and the very dregs of society (la drogue), and he complained that a very trifling military force might have dispersed them if sent against them in time” (p. 4). Here you have the journalist’s source
reportedly saying that the rebel forces were comprised primarily of “the very dregs of the society” – the drudges so easy to deplore yet constitutive of the class Bakunin recognized as a potentially revolutionary force, as noted in the previous chapter. Again it is reiterated in the foreign press that the military could have easily dispensed with the insurgency if they would have been instructed to act earlier. That this contradicts the framing of the revolt as thoroughly prepared by groups of conspirators did not matter enough to the editorial staff at the Times to keep both views from going to print.

The class conflict during the “June Days” is perhaps even more complex. “The struggle itself, therefore,” Rapport (2008) asserted, “was less one of bourgeois against worker than a broader antagonism between urban workers and a much wider cross-section of the French population. However, while the nineteenth-century rhetoric of class conflict obscures the complexities, the antipathy and social fear were real enough” (p. 210). Importantly, though, the bourgeoisie (broadly defined) keenly recognized it as a class war, even if the classic bourgeois-proletarian conceptions neglect key nuances of social stratification, as Bakunin averred. François Jean Arago, a French mathematician and member of the Executive Commission in 1848, went down to the barricades under construction during the early stages of the revolt to try and persuade workers to stop; the reply he received speaks volumes: “Ah, M. Arago, you have never suffered from hunger” (cited in Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 92). He returned convinced of the need for force. Arago was not the only one alarmed by the resolve of the lower classes. Tocqueville (1850[1970]) observed “the whole of the working class backed the revolt, either actively or in its heart,” and that

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41 See the previous section of this text for an overview of Bakunin’s class analysis.
spirit of insurrection circulated from end to end of that vast class and in all its parts, like blood in the body; it filled places where there was no fighting as much as those that formed the battlefield; and it had penetrated into our houses, around us, above us, below us. Even the places where we thought we were the masters were creeping with domestic enemies; it was as if an atmosphere of civil war enveloped the whole of Paris, and, no matter where one withdrew, one had to live in it. (p. 142)

Without a doubt, the “social fear was real,” and so was the class conflict. Of course, social relations undergirded the conflict. What Rapport (2008) was too quick to dismiss as simplistic “nineteenth-century rhetoric of class conflict,” contained a great deal of explanatory power. It not only helps explain the real relations of social stratification and related disparities in material conditions in 1848 that undergirded the revolt. But class conflict was embedded within countervailing public pedagogies of the time. As insurrection waged in Paris, the June 26, 1848 Monday issue of the London Times reported the apparent cause of the conflict. The reporting reveals as much about the existing class antagonisms characterizing French society within the CWE circa 1848 as it does the predispositions of the hegemonic media.

It is time that I should now turn to the alleged cause of this insurrection. I can only find it ascribed to the discontent of the ‘ouvriers’ at the proposed dispersion of them by Government. This measure has never ceased to be regarded as fraught with fearful possibilities, nor have the Communists and other Ultra-Republicans ever ceased to

42 Antipathy loomed large: “It was almost impossible for anyone who had ever owned property to extend his sympathy across those June barricades” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 92). Further, “Fear of social revolution amongst the possessing classes was an European-wide phenomenon, as was their tendency to blame discontent amongst the lower orders upon drunkenness, ignorance and greed and to deny the legitimacy of a desire for greater material security in a more egalitarian society” (Price, 1988, p. 97).
prepare for turning it to the advantage of their own projects. The sections are obviously among the insurgents. Little has been said lately about Louis Napoleon. Another more significant and more sinister feature is perceptible in this insurrection—namely, the appearance of the red flag on the barricades of the Faubourg St. Antoine. (p. 4)

Indeed, if not for revolutionary pedagogies (e.g. communist, socialist, red), the juncture would never have reached the critical impasse that it did. There might not have been the bloody street battles between barricades down historic boulevards, but there also would have been little-to-no significant material challenge to capital’s systematized injustice. Downplaying the class divide and minimizing the pedagogical influence of communism, socialism and anarchism, as Rapport (2008) risked doing in the above cited cursory remarks, amounts to historical whitewashing.

Archived media texts, primary source documents and secondary source histories beg to differ with any narrative that would idealistically dissolve those lived antagonisms of 1848 in the comfort of hindsight.

One evolving dynamic made the “June Days” that much different from the February Revolution, and possibly solidified the different outcome and workers’ defeat that summer. The students’ involvement in the “June Days” was insignificant, especially compared to their catalytic role in toppling the Orleans monarchy and supporting the inauguration of the Second Republic four months before. Students’ political activity after February declined in inverse correlation with the increase in worker militancy. To the point, some 36 polytechniciens, all bedecked in their full uniforms, marched through a working class section of Paris, shouting “Down with the traitors!” (Cited in Gallaher, 1980, p. 96) at the insurgents who (in an amazing show of hospitality and restraint) did not interfere with their passage. While some medical students cared for the wounded on both sides, there were polytechniciens who assisted the
Mobile Guard in attacking the workers’ barricades. A handful of students stood guard at the Palais-Bourbon as civil war raged, while others carried messages and performed other menial tasks to support the suppression of the workers. Henri Debot, a student at Louis-le-grand during the “June Days,” wrote to his parents on Sunday, June 25, that the morning before he and other students knew soldiers – the army putting down the proletarian revolt – at the rue Saint-Jacques had not eaten since noon on Friday. “We gave them our lunch and were pleased that we could make that small contribution for the Patrie [the nation/homeland]” (cited p. 100). Indeed, the majority of students, occasional utopian socialist sympathies aside, acceded to both a bourgeois and a nationalist republican ethos. Some ex-students unable to obtain middle strata jobs commensurate with their level of education filled the ranks of the déclassé sectors of society, but most current and former students circa 1848 (especially those then enrolled) came from relatively privileged backgrounds. They wanted change, but their answer to the “social question,” if they arrived at one at all, was more in line with Victor Hugo’s response than Louis Blanc’s. “The students of Paris were not revolutionaries in 1848,” Gallaher (1980) correctly observed, “they were reformers. They had grievances that revolved primarily around problems within the academic community although they shared some of the political grievances, both domestic and foreign, of the nation at large The changes they desired were not of a social or an economic nature, and the students were not, with the exception of a very small minority, ‘radicals’ in the contemporary sense of the term” (p. 105). They thus differed from their second “world revolution” progeny of 1968, the students who nearly overthrew the Charles de Gaulle administration when they poured into the streets and collaborated with workers in ad-hoc revolutionary committees.
The students of ’48 were far more pedagogically influenced by the bourgeois narratives found in establishment media across borders. The London Times echoed the French establishment position when it castigated the “more sinister feature” of the June insurrection: the sight of red flags at the barricades. Of course, it was not merely the sight of a primary color on a cloth waving in the wind that was so sinister in the minds of Times writers. Rather, it was what those red flags represented. The symbolic significance of the red flags, which signified the revolutionary anti-capitalist movement made manifest, incited fear and reprobation among the French republic and in the foreign press sharing similar perspectives. These early examples of anti-communist ideology in the mainstream media are refreshing in their straightforward political position and in their clarity with respect to conveying what social relations the establishment deemed respectable.

Ideas alone did not suffice for protecting those arrangements that year. Slaughter in Paris kept capitalist relations intact that June. “No such terrible orgy of blood had ever previously been seen in Paris” (Postgate, 1920, p. 179). Mass killing solved France’s unemployment problem – almost too efficiently (p. 180), eliminating the surplus population that keeps wages down. The insurrectionists went from nearly having the formidability and fortitude to take the Hôtel de Ville to getting picked off like flies. The London Times quoted on June 28, 1848, M. Senard, president of the French Assembly, who claimed, “The insurgents, perceiving all their hopes blasted, carry on the struggle with a ferocity degrading to humanity” (cited p. 6). That the struggle against the dehumanization of impending unemployment and starvation might actually be an attempt to recover a sense of humanity does not seem to have occurred to the French statesman. Nor did it occur to the Times. Although their standard practice was to quote verbatim the Assembly minutes – without inserting analysis, commentary or perspectives from other outside sources – it
is worth noting who received media attention. The media attended to members of France’s
governing body. But during what the *Times* staff recognized as one of the most intense struggles
in recent history, with two sides in the conflict, there is not a single direct voice from insurgents
to be found in the newspaper’s pages. Official sourcing dominated the day. Reports show the
state in turn endeavored to utterly dominate (i.e., destroy) the rebels. According to the same issue
of the *Times*, M. Senard is reported to have told the Assembly on Monday that he had met the
night before with four men who called themselves delegates of the insurgents, who claimed to
have come on a peace mission (p. 6). Senard recounted the encounter, which the *Times*
published:

> The four delegates were to all appearance sincere men, and I could easily perceive from
> their language that their comrades were ignorant of the acts of the Assembly. ‘We do
> not,’ they said, ‘read the Moniteur, the Siccle, Constitutionnel, nor any other serious
> journal; we read the papers we purchase for a half-penny, or are often given to us for
> nothing.’ Our colleagues are aware of the tendency of those publications, and with what
> ideas they inspire the people respecting the National Assembly. (cited p. 6)

The working class and poor people’s press, a relic from the past, no doubt did offer an array of
different ideas not found in the mainstream publications like those the delegates are alleged to
have mentioned. If the major French papers listed above where anything like the establishment
press in Britian, then they did probably print the exact minutes of Assembly meetings, as the
anecdote above implies. The “half-penny” papers, in contrast, perhaps offered some context for
the popular classes making it more like critical public pedagogy than like the major media
typecast stenography of bourgeois republic statecraft. Also, that the Assembly – or at least its
sitting president – appears to have subscribed to a magic bullet theory (hypodermic needle
model) of the mass media, meaning he appears to have assumed the ideas expressed in the papers bore primary responsibility for altering the conceptions and then compelling the actions of people, illustrates the ideological idealism among the privileged classes. Even as the preeminent French politicians waxed paternalistic about the superiority of elite intellectual culture, sympathizing with the poor proles for their inferior ideological non-conformity, there was little sympathy for disobeying in practice. After “several other supplications” were made to Senard, including one requesting amnesty, the president was quoted as replying “that nothing but an absolute submission would be listened” (cited p. 6). A public pedagogy of rebellion, when dangerous ideas actually enter into the historical process, could not be tolerated.

Statistics reveal the extent to which subversive activity was met with force. Rapport (2008) documented that at minimum 1,500 workers died and more than 2,500 were admitted to the hospital in Paris (p. 208). The Prefecture of Police put the number of total dead at just 1,500, while the English press reported 50,000 (Postgate, 1920, p. 179). Definitive figures are impossible to obtain, but based on several verifiable sources, Postgate (1920) estimated 16,000 lay dead by the time the “June Days” were over (p. 179). In the aftermath of the fighting, more than 10,000 insurgents were arrested (Gallaher, 1980, p. 100).

In an editorial with no headline or byline featured in the Wednesday, June 28, 1848 issue of the London Times, the British paper of record offered a summary of the events that transpired in France:

The battle which has raged for four entire days in the capital of France is at an end. The insurgents, expelled by the continual discharges of artillery from their strong positions, and surrounded by enormous numbers of troops and armed citizens from the town and the neighbouring departments, have been driven and dispersed beyond the walls of Paris;
thousands have perished on the barricades and in the houses which crumbled under the
cannon of the Republican generals; on both sides the combat was carried on with furious
bravery; the city is literally encumbered with the dying and the dead; so terrible a fight,
so vast a massacre, never occurred before even in the annals of civil warfare or of
Parisian revolutions. (p. 5)

Summing up the consequences of a short-lived, single-city civil war, the Times staff opted to
acknowledge “furious bravery” on both sides, not just on the side of order. This is the heralded
sort of objectivity afforded after-the-fact and from a distance. Sometimes it offers space for
perspectives that otherwise would not appear in a particular publication. If there is any partially
agreed upon conception of what constitutes a “massacre,” the Times correctly invoked the term
to refer to the annihilation of the armed proletariat threat in Paris. Dissemination of critical
perpsectives on the French state’s response could also be found in the pages of the Times.
According to the paper, France’s “late Executive Government did from first to last absolutely
NOTHING to provide against this frightful crisis” (p. 5; emphasis in original). Published within
the territory of Britian, a competitive foreign power vis-à-vis France, the approbation is not only
unsurprising, it is almost expected. The caustic all-caps critique served a three-pronged purpose.
It allowed London to take a jab at France, fulfilling nationalist prerogates. Through that criticism
it also implicitly reiterated the necessity of liberal reform of the sort Britain prided itself on
championing (with or without much evidence for that nation-state actually implementing
meaningful reforms in practice), thereby (again) reinforcing the theme of British superiority over
the French practice of politics. Finally, those pedagogical moves delegitimized revolution (the
“frightful crisis”), a recurring theme throughout the Times’ coverage of events that year.
Meeting other expectations in that same June 28, 1848 issue of the *London Times*, the paper lamented that of all the problems that then beset France, “none is more alarming than the absence of any definite and practical form of supreme authority” (p. 5), even with Louis-Eugène Cavaignac still as military dictator. Power remained, from the perspective of the prestigious foreign press, still too dispersed in the Assembly. Authority and order needed to be re-established for France to transition out of this time of crisis. Rather than considering the concentration of power, political and (more pressingly) economic, as responsible for creating the conditions underlying revolt, the *Times* instead implores France to further concentrate power in some “supreme authority,” democratic republic be damned. That this could end in a dictatorship, as it did soon enough, did not occur to or bother Britain’s best editorialists.

Accusations of larceny, plunder and rape came from both sides of the conflict (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 92; Postgate, 1920, p. 179), but the presuppositions of the major domestic press already selected targets for the greatest accusations. The French cultural affairs magazine *Revue des Deux Mondes* claimed the “wild beasts” – meaning the June insurgents – carried out “pillage, rape and arson” (cited in Price, 1988, p. 97). The *Constitutionnel*, a “liberal, monarchist” (Rapport, 2008, p. 207) publication, claimed insurgents “cowardly murdered” prisoners “by cutting off their heads,” and alleged rebels “desecrated corpses,” although, the paper admitted, “they were not actually eaten; but, patience, that will come, if they continue to listen to the socialists” (cited p. 207). Postgate (1920) suspects rape and pillage might have occurred, probably perpetrated against insurgents, “but for the most part the soldiers of the Republic had not time for these diversions, being occupied in shooting prisoners *en masse* without trial or even legitimate suspicion” (p. 179).⁴³

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⁴³ Rapport (2008) confirms it was “the forces of order” who “killed and captured rebels in cold blood” (p. 208).
Rethinking French Peasant Resistance to Power and Authority

It is commonly held that the June uprising itself, and the educative apparatus of those in power, incited already deep-seated conservative passions among the peasantry (Rapport, 2008; Hobsbawm, 1975; Marx, 1852[1987]). Peasants are supposed to have largely supported the defense of the republic and restoration of order (Rapport, 2008, p. 210). Like the elections in April and June based on universal suffrage, the peasant vote in the December 1848 election is supposed to have partially reflected the preferences of land-owning elites who maintained political power and persuasion. Rural newspapers had, since the opening of the National Workshops, referred to urban workers, like one publication did in 1848, as “lazy men … who made a trade of avoiding work” (cited p. 94). When Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was elected president on December 10, 1848, Marx (1852[1987]) even called it “a reaction of the peasants, who had to pay the costs of the February Revolution, against the remaining classes of the nation, a reaction of the country against the town” (p. 36).

In truth, property-owning peasants resented the 1848 revolts and the “forty-five centimes” tax, implemented in the wake of the uprisings, which many considered a subsidy to urban workers (Rapport, 2008, p. 276). It effectively erased the prospects for independence they hoped to achieve. Peasants started taking up arms to keep the government from collecting the tax, threatening to throw collectors in cages and shouting “Down with the forty-five centimes” or even “Long live the Emperor” (cited p. 276). “Afraid of socialism and resentful of workers,”

 Plenty of authorities shot prisoners who tried to escape – and 11,727 had been arrested – although unlike the government-sanctioned slaughter of the Paris Commune in 1871, this execution was not exactly “official policy” (p. 208).

44 It is worth recalling Marx’s analysis of the separation of town and country, spelled out elsewhere: “The contradiction between town and country can only exist within the framework of private property. It is the most crass expression of the subjection of the individual under the division of labour, under a definitive activity forced upon him—a subjection which makes one man into a restricted town-animal, another into a restricted country-animal, and daily creates anew the conflict between their interests” (Marx & Engels, 1845[1998], p. 72).
Rapport (2008) wrote, “the peasants, while not necessarily hostile to the Second Republic itself, were instrumental in pushing it into reaction” (p. 276).

Yet, just as in the towns and cities of France where community-based social networks and mutual aid societies had flourished under the radar up around the time of the revolution, peasants also retained and practiced plenty of anti-capitalist agitation (Price, 1988, p. 46). In both town and country subaltern practices promoted a sense of solidarity with shared ideas of collective action in response to power. Enclosure of common land, a form of primitive accumulation that had been going on for several centuries (Federici, 2004), continued apace up through 1848 (Price, 1988, p. 46). One reason sections of the peasantry resented the “reds” – the militant urban workers – was because they feared the social revolution would entail state-directed expropriation of land (Rapport, 2008, p. 276) – land they had fought so long to hold in common, without subjection to private appropriation, accumulation schemes or state authority.

Up through 1848, peasants protested enclosures and other “features of the growth of capitalist farming” (Price, 1988, p. 46). Western European peasants’ way of life was endangered by large-scale, market-based farming. Capital – with help from the state – had been impeding access to the woods and their common lands. This process intensified in France after the Forest Code of 1827 regulated peasant access to woods, which resulted in militant peasants rising up to protect communally-held areas and collectively taking over disputed, privately-owned woodlands (Rapport, 2008, p. 275). From that point forward, France’s government – not unlike other European regimes – sent in troops to “repress disorders caused mainly by long-standing disputes over collective rights of usage on agricultural lands and in forests” (Price, 1988, p. 47).

Remonstrance in the French countryside amounted to much more than backward primitivism. Intransigence toward the power of the clergy grew because of puritanical
persecution of peasants’ spiritual fêtes (communal, even carnival festivals in which symbols of authority were frequently burned at the end), while increased exposure to chambrées (social clubs in semi-urban areas often doubling as mutual aid centers, strengthening community solidarities) around 1848 had politicizing effects (Magraw, 2002, p. 34). Communal practices formed the basis of collective resistance. Democratic republicanism diffused throughout the peasantry by way of symbolic rituals, infusing popular culture with political potency and vice versa (McPhee, 1978). Magraw (2002) referred to an “age-old, doctrineless, village ‘communalism’ (which meant that peasants were ‘socialists’ without knowing it)” (p. 35).

Concerted efforts fighting for communal life against encroachments from clergy, capital and the state, combined with an immense spike in the rural literacy rate after 1830 (Magraw, 2002, p. 34), contributed to popular conscientização. Many peasants were conscious of their politics, whether they termed it politics or used labels like “socialism” or not. In fact, their explicit defense of libertarian communalist life more closely resembled the Left anarchist tradition. It is for this reason that anarchists like Proudhon,45 and especially Bakunin, stressed the revolutionary potential of the peasantry; they considered European peasants a formidable class in the struggle against both capitalism and the capitalist state, be it through mutualist collectivization or militant rebellion (Hodges, 1960; Kofman, 1968).

History as Tragedy, Farce and Reorganization of Power

With support from at least a portion of the peasantry, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte swept the December 1848 elections in France. Postgate (1920) claimed it was his name alone that meant anything to peasants, and the author cited a source suggesting many peasants actually

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45 Kofman (1968) qualified that Proudhon misunderstood the material conditions of other peasant populations, like those in Russia, which led him to favor a praxis for Russian peasants divorced from their existential reality and largely inapplicable in terms of its implementation.
believed they were voting for the old Napoleon (p. 180). In reality, as Rapport (2008) 
acknowledges, Louis Napoleon stepped into the gap widened by polarization of the Left and 
Right (p. 211). Once in power, Bonaparte carried out an international counter-revolutionary 
crusade, sending French troops abroad (see previous section on Italy), to the delight of sections 
of the population always hungry for war. He made friends with preeminent financiers, providing 
the Péreire brothers with the state support necessary to give even the Rothschilds baking dynasty 
a run for their money, quite literally (Hobsbawm, 1975). Business boomed in 1849-1850 until 
another downturn hit, creating an acute crisis as well as an opportunity for historical tragedy and 
farce.

Even before Bonaparte’s coup in December 1851, the election law passed on May 31, 
1850, was according to Marx (1852[1987]), “the coup d’état of the bourgeoisie” (p. 71), 
necessary because its “moral sway” declined in direct correlation to the development of its 
powers of economic domination. Political liberalism posed a threat to its rule. Revocation of 
universal suffrage was one more step toward reaction. In 1851, when the Party of Order was in 
power but also cannibalizing itself with feuds between the Catholic factions and the big 
bourgeoisie – while old Orleanist and Legitimist factionalism resurfaced too46 – Bonaparte 
smelled blood (Postgate, 1920, p. 183). Barred from running for a second term, he brought 
Generals Magnan and Leroy Saint Arnaud, the Police Inspector Maupas and others to Paris. 
Much is made of left-wing revolutionary secret societies, but Bonaparte also had his own 
clandestine organization, the Society of December 10, established in 1849 under benevolent 
pretexts and “organized into secret sections, each section led by Bonapartist agents, with a

46 “The position is far simpler to understand when we remember that while under the Legitimist Charles X, the large 
landowning interests had controlled the Government, under Louis Philippe of Orleans the big business interests had 
come into power” (Postgate, 1920, p. 182).
Bonapartist general at the head of the whole” (Marx, 1852[1987], p. 75). The Society of December 10 would go from being his private army to becoming his public army after the December 2, 1851 coup, when he dissolved the Assembly without much resistance and proceeded to crown himself Emperor Napoleon III.47

Bearing witness to the tragic-comic process, Marx (1852[1987]) distinguished developments during the first French Revolution at the end of the 18th century and what transpired in France during the first world revolution in 1848. The former moved “along an ascending line” (p. 42), with each party in power relying on more progressive elements of society for support which later supplant those in power. Yet,

It is the reverse with the Revolution of 1848. The proletarian party appears as an appendage of the petty-bourgeois-democratic party. It is betrayed and dropped by the latter on April 16, May 15, and in the June days. The democratic party, in its turn, leans on the shoulders of the bourgeois-republican party. The bourgeois republicans no sooner believe themselves well established than they shake off the troublesome comrade and support themselves on the shoulders of the party of Order. The party of Order hunches it shoulders, lets the bourgeois republicans tumble and throws itself on the shoulders of armed force. It fancies it is still sitting on its shoulders when, one fine morning, it perceives that the shoulders have transformed themselves into bayonets. Each party kicks from behind at that driving forward and in front leans over towards the party which presses backwards. No wonder that in this ridiculous posture it loses its balance and, having made the inevitable grimaces, collapses with curious capers. The revolution thus moves in a descending line. (Marx, 1852[1987], pp. 42-43)

47 “Parody of restoration of empire” (Marx, 1852[1987], p. 117).
Pedagogies at the subterranean level (e.g. communalism, anarchism) that suffused sociopolitical activity in 1848 did not necessarily fit the retrogressive linear model Marx charted. Yet, Marx was right to note the descending course of the revolution in France, just as it is right to emphasize the responsive changes in structures of power after the revolution.

France would shift to what some called a “technocratic romanticism” (Clark, 2012, p. 180) in subsequent years, with the aim of spurring economic development. After 1848, the government “encouraged a more coordinated approach to the laying of tracks and the framing of policy at a regional rather than a local level” (p. 182). The Péreire brothers and their Crédit Mobilier bank financed industrial development projects with support from the state until the next economic crisis in the 1870s.

Napoleon III’s regime, like other post-revolutionary governments, immediately tightened press controls, but the overall circulation of newspapers increased during the 1850s. Publications were soon sold at lower prices in new railway stations after press outlets turned increasingly to advertising for subsidies (p. 120). This in turn facilitated the commercialization of the media. That trend, intensified in the wake of the world revolution, still dominates still today.

The uprisings of 1848 in France further reinforced the correlation between poor living conditions and popular rebellion. Viewed as a way of addressing or responding to the challenges of the 1848 revolutions, management of urban space, especially in Paris, became a key component in the new political scheme (Harvey, 2010; Clark, 2012). New modes of urban management went beyond counter-revolutionary response. Urban space was reorganized to put a premium on infrastructural development in capital cities like Paris, providing testing grounds for state-corporate spending aimed at removing obstacles to fluid circulation of people and goods. The outer zones of cities like Paris were expanded to bring the peripheries under centralized
municipal control. Likewise, the February Revolution and June Days in France illustrated, in the view of those in power, the greater need for technical experts to address the situation, as Bakunin had warned. It further shifted the balance of power toward the state, its closely allied financial nexus and the rule of technocratic elite. (Incidentally, the uprising in France during the second “world revolution” of 1968 was in part a rejection of the bureaucratic and technocratic administration that had come to characterize not only the power structures (including the mass media), but also organized labor.) The following section explores other prominent parts of the continental revolutions and the extent to which similar modes of reaction took place throughout Europe in the aftermath of 1848.

REVOLT IN THE GERMAN STATES, HUNGARY AND AUSTRIAN EMPIRE

This section focuses on key revolutionary events that occurred in Germany, Hungary and in other places in the Austrian Empire in 1848. These are all combined because of their overlapping significance and interrelated politics at the time. To understand the context for these revolutions requires a little history. The narrative below relates the different revolutions to the pedagogies found in hegemonic media coverage of papers like the London Times (accessed via microfilm and digital archives), but also to the perspectives advanced in articles featured in radical press like the Marx and Engels daily, the Neue Rheinische Zeitung (found in published collections).

Historical Backdrop, Political-Economic Structures and Class Constitutions

Germanic states outside Austria became increasingly dominated by Prussia as far back as 1701, following the ascension of King Frederick I (Lewis, 1997, pp. 7-8). Lewis (1997) notes it is more accurate to refer to Germanic history (or Germanic states) that German history (or Germany) because there was no united Germany then, nor in 1848, although questions
concerning unification would be posed during the juncture. During his reign, King Frederick I consolidated an army of 83,000 with a population of just 2,500,000 (p. 8). He was succeeded by Frederick II (“Frederick the Great”), who proceeded to send Prussia to war with Austria several times, consolidating both Prussian and Habsburg power. After the 1789 French Revolution, German and Austrian intellectuals were enamored with the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity (who wasn’t?), but the repressiveness of the monarchical and imperial regimes inured the populations to the spread of progressive liberalism, for a while. German intellectuals were also more dependent upon the Crown and upper classes (Lewis, 1997, p. 8). Indicative of this, in the aftermath of the 1848 uprisings and gleaning of concessions, the Prussian middle classes would essentially align with the regime and turn against the peasantry, restoring older feudal relations to protect property (Marx, 1851[1907]a, pp. 74-75).

Before that came to pass, Frederick William II signed a treaty in August 1792 with then-Emperor Leopold II of Austria, committing their countries to defend monarchical rule against revolution and also agreeing to abstain from France’s internal affairs unless Russia or England acted (Lewis, 1997, p. 9). After the ascension of Frederick William III, Prussia signed a humiliating treaty (in 1806) with France, prompting war, followed by defeat and the signing of an even more humiliating treaty (in 1807), reducing Prussia’s size from 89,000 to 46,000 square miles. But with an end to hostilities, certain reforms took place. Formal serfdom was abolished, industry restrictions were relaxed, and it “essentially changed an absolute monarchy into a bureaucratic monarchy” (Lewis, 1997, p. 10).

When the Act of Confederation in June 1815 formed the German Confederation it replaced the Holy Roman Empire, and some 39 states (initially, though the number declined later) conjoined to meet in a Federal Diet with assemblies presided over by Austrian
representatives (Lewis, 1997, pp. 10-11). Along with France and the rest of the Austrian Empire stretching into southeastern Europe and Italy (discussed above), the German Confederation would be part of the central “revolutionary zone” (Hobsbawm, 1975, p. 75) in 1848. Austria’s Prince Metternich, the Habsburg’s leading diplomat, minister and chancellor, used the Confederation as an instrument for limiting Prussian power and imposing censorship on all states (Robertson, 1952[1971]; Rapport, 2008; Lewis, 1997). The Austrian-imposed restrictions were “so severe that all the brightest men in Germany were persecuted” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 145), including the aforementioned exiled poet Heinrich Heine. Prior to 1848, Austria and Prussia took pains to separate intellectuals from public life.

With Austria imposing imperial standards on others through the Confederation, which only represented German princes (not the people) anyway, constitutionalism had been discouraged, as was freedom of movement (unless you were in forced exile, like Heine). The situation stymied the spread of radical working class ideas, which had barely disseminated throughout the Austrian Empire or German states. However, the Berlin Workers’ Congress exposed some to the ideas of Stephan Born, radical reformist and member of the Communist League (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 144; Fernbach, 2010, p. 40), who would feature prominently as the German contribution to the “world revolution” came to an end.

Up until the “world revolution,” Austria maintained political and economic control throughout its empire, including parts of Germany. During the earlier war against Napoleon, Austria had to receive monetary support from the then-ascendant world system hegemon, Great Britain (Lewis, 1997, p. 10). Soon after, the Habsburgs established solid (and long-lasting) relations with creditors, and Austrian control over the Confederation after 1815 helped ensure a reliable flow of funds from key sources in the German states (Marx, 1851[1907]b, pp. 53-54;
Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 144; Lewis, 1997, pp. 10-11). Admittedly, a period of reaction ensued following the Congress of Vienna, when Austria assumed hegemony of the Confederation and refused liberal reforms as it militated against German unification (Lewis, 1997, pp. 10-11).

Yet the thousand-year-old Austrian Empire, under the auspices of Emperor Ferdinand (effectively under Metternich, who really called the shots), utilized a quid-pro-quo strategy to retain absolutist rule. That is, “the large profits which bankers, stock-jobbers, and Government contractors always contrive to draw out of an absolute monarchy, were compensated for by the almost unlimited power which the Government possessed over their persons and fortunes; and not the smallest shadow of opposition was, therefore, to be expected from this quarter” (Marx, 1851[1999], para. 3). With financial backing from Frankfurt and elsewhere, Metternich had Austrian capitalists at his mercy. It helped that the Habsburg Dynasty had warm relations with the Rothschild banking dynasty. An imperial “state-finance nexus” (Harvey, 2014, p. 44) typified and constituted concentrated power up until the uprisings. Metternich actually learned of the February Revolution in France from a telegram sent to him by his friend, the financier Salamon Rothschild (Rapport, 2008, p. 59).

Granted, Austria’s fiscal situation was not perfect. Far from it. Habsburg public debt doubled in nominal value and quadrupled in effective value between 1815 and 1840 (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 195). The government also artificially inflated security prices, but this was to the benefit of some, not unlike the effects of other favors apportioned out from the imperial capital. For some time, with its routine kick-backs and imperial fiscal schemes, “this system worked with wonderful success” (Marx, 1851[1907]b, p. 57). Austria in 1848 was considered “the China of Europe,” or “European China,” and was supposed to be just as “impenetrable” and “reactionary” as the Asian power, thanks to a litany of clandestine tactics to keep tabs on its subjects.
(Robertson, 1952[1971], 189; Marx, 1851[1907]b, p. 59). Even so, Austrian subjects adored the intellectually disabled Emperor Ferdinand. Nevertheless, as the emperor would soon realize, the Habsburgs were “marching slowly but surely toward a mighty change” (Marx, 1851[1907]b, p. 61).

Likewise, Prussia was home to mounting dissatisfaction by 1848. The Prussian Crown played politics too, but it exercised less skill in doing so after 1840 when King Frederick William IV took the throne (Rapport, 2008, p. 10). The state’s strong manufacturing and agricultural base made it a formidable power not just in Germany, but throughout Europe, Austrian regional hegemony notwithstanding. Factory-based, machinery-aided capitalist production had steadily increased throughout the German states since the turn of the century, and in East Prussia the state backed heavy industrial development, especially with respect to railway expansion (Moggach, 2000, pp. 26-27). With the prolongation of the proletarian working day up to around 14 hours by 1840, and the expansion of railroad track in the region from under 600 kilometers that year to 2000 by 1845 (and 6000 by 1850), Prussia and the rest of the Germanic world witnessed a substantial rise in the infrastructure and super-exploitation necessary for industrial capitalist growth going into 1848. These developments were not without antagonisms. The conflicts and contradictions in turn precipitated 1848 as a critical juncture. Prussian railway workers engaged in some 33 strikes and demonstrations between the spring of 1844 and the fall of 1847 (p. 30). The presence of a politicized proletariat – or what Moggach (2000) terms the “semi-proletariat” (p. 29) given the nascent and mixed character of industry and agrarian society at the time – within Prussia forcefully posed the “social question” regarding mass poverty and poor living conditions among the people. Various sectors of society attempted answers. Virtually all classes of society were in turn forced to respond.
Ruling classes and preeminent Prussian rulers were no exception. When he became king, Frederick William IV immediately loosened press censorship, but soon after reinstated the restrictions after having given his subjects a taste of liberal freedoms, whetting appetites for communication flows (Lewis, 1997, p. 13). He allowed provincial diets to meet in Berlin, but then denied them anything more than the power to assembly and pass advisory decrees. Liberal hopes had been dashed.

German liberals would rebel along with other classes, but first Austria’s Vienna would revolt, with organic intellectuals out in front. Austria kept intellectuals in Vienna as elsewhere throughout its empire on a pretty tight leash, while it gave peasants token freedoms, in truth more illusory than real (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 194). With revolutions in Italy since January, Austrian absolutism appeared far less impenetrable to its subjects than it had in years past. Both Austria and Prussia were still reeling from the 1845-7 crisis. The crisis caused a spike in food prices, which led to a drop in demand for all other commodities, leading to elimination of jobs that left a quarter million dead from starvation and disease in Prussian Silesia and Austrian Galicia (Goldstein, 2007, p. 156). Galician serfs first rebelled on a smaller scale in 1846, and during the crisis food riots spread throughout the continent (Rapport, 2008, p. 39; Goldstein, 2007).

Sharp class divisions cut through the empire, especially within the imperial capital. Those separations made solidarity more difficult, but they also made Austria more vulnerable than other absolutists regimes like Russia, which “did not have so many dissatisfied races, classes, and nationalities” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 189). From the top of the socioeconomic and political strata to the bottom, you had: nobles, big businessmen, affluent petite-bourgeoisie, poor yet proud intellectuals, “the students who were still poorer and still prouder” (p. 194) and
the appreciably poorer and more humble workers. On the outskirts there were peasants and the so-called lumpenproletariat – two sectors of society integral to events in 1848. The Austrian regime had its balancing act with its variegated class of subjects. As elsewhere, the bourgeoisie started butting heads with the bureaucratic monarchy. The former demanded finance, industry and economic liberalism while the latter continued to concentrate and arbitrarily wield authority.

Media censorship prevailed. “There was absolutely no newspaper press” throughout the empire, Marx (1851[1907]b) explained with little hyperbole, “except in Hungary, and the Hungarian papers were prohibited in all other parts of the monarchy” (p. 57). When the Estates of Lower Austria started meeting regularly in the 1840s, discussing freely (because the threat was considered low, given the Estates lack of power) issues of credit, local representation and the right to advise on matters of state, newspapers were prohibited from reporting on the debates (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 196). Unable to generate consent in the modern way through media, fissures in the imperial carapace of control cropped up—and exploded in Vienna.

Austria’s imperial capital, Vienna, had for some time been a vibrant city despite Habsburg dominance and crisis conditions. Dances and the like were held with increasingly regularity, “to keep the burghers from thinking about the adventures which were opening up to their brothers in France and the Rhineland under the capitalistic system” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 194). But dancing is not incompatible with revolution; indeed, past revolutionaries have demanded it.48 Austrians at the time were not as demanding.

Austrian authorities genuinely feared intellectuals, however, so “every single book, paper, or even advertisement printed inside the Empire had to be approved by the censor” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 198). A free press – meaning uncensored and formally free

48 Anarchist rabble-rouser Emma Goldman put it thusly: “If I can't dance I don't want to be in your revolution” (cited in Schulman, 1991, para. 1).
commercial media – not to mention a new constitution “for Austria were things considered unattainable; administrative reforms, extension of the rights of the Provincial Diets, admission of foreign books and newspapers, and a less severe censorship—the loyal and humble desires of these good Austrians did hardly go farther” (Marx, 1851[1907]b, p. 60). The Allgemeine Zeitung, “the leading German paper” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 199), acquired such prestige “officials hardly dared to forbid it to come into the country even when its news was contradicted by the official Vienna press, so that a few lucky Viennese could learn something about Europe in their cafes” (p. 199). Liberals formed reading clubs to peruse and discuss ideas in the few permitted papers, like the Allgemeine Zeitung (Rapport, 2008, p. 40). German intellectuals who established themselves in towns just out of Metternich’s reach published anti-imperial literature and Habsburg dynasty exposés that inevitably trickled into the heart of the empire, exciting liberal passions and emboldening the bourgeoisie.

“The middle classes,” Marx (1851[1907]b) averred, “had been kept in such a degree of political ignorance by Metternich that to them the news from Paris about the reign of Anarchy, Socialism, and terror, and about impending struggles between the class of capitalists and the class of laborers, proved quite unintelligible” (p. 63). The middle classes dismissed the defamation of revolution. Despite fear-mongering from the Habsburg monarchy – not to mention, as discussed before, from major media in the British Empire and elsewhere throughout the privileged sectors of the capitalist world economy – the bourgeoisie at first saw no reason to fret about socialist conspiracies or imminent anarchistic transformations of society. Further, while the class divides compounded matters for Metternich and his objective of imperial control, the middle classes had “no idea of the possibility of any differences springing up between classes
that now [by March 1848] were so heartily united in upsetting a Government hated by all” (p. 63).

Working people agreed. Trade unions were barred. Wages were low, especially after the crisis, so restrictions on organizing deepened depredation of already exploited and silenced laborers. The Habsburgs, disdainful of working class concerns while simultaneously hostile to liberal economics, remained highly protectionist, keeping imports out. They enforced a licensing system for small businesses within the empire that supposedly kept the market from getting too crowded. The system also enabled them to punish persons and businesses that pushed for too much political liberalism.

People like Baron Doblhoff facilitated communication across class lines to tepidly contest the repressive sociopolitical climate, holding parties where businessmen could mingle with professors, until he was spied on and intimidated by the Austrian government. Professors, lawyers and small capitalists formed a reading club (established in 1842, when Metternich was on vacation), which for the time and place was actually a radical act of defiance. It too was spied upon, rather than forcefully dissolved.Mixing mutual aid with the patronizing “false generosity” (Freire, 1970[2000], p. 54) of charity, the club started a soup kitchen during the depression of 1847, but the enormity of poverty in the city left them demoralized.

*Student-led Revolt in Vienna*

In early March, students in Vienna resolved to act. They had been inspired by February’s events in Paris. They knew the Hungarian Diet had also been pushing Austria for a constitution

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49 Charity is “false generosity” because it (partially) addresses the symptoms (e.g. poverty, hunger), rather than the structural causes, of injustice; it also deals with those symptoms in such a way that reinforces and obscures class relations.
(Rapport, 2008, pp. 60-61). Although, epitomizing dialectical interplay, the Diet might never have garnered a Hungarian Constitution without the revolt in Vienna (Postgate, 1920, p. 222).

The catalyst for the revolution came primarily from students at the University of Vienna, many who were “the archetypical, impoverished, garret-dwelling scholars who relished banned political literature, joined secret societies and were taught by stuffily conservative professors” (Rapport, 2008, p. 61). Occupying the university’s Aula hall on March 12, they circulated a petition for freedom of speech, press, religion and uncensored education. After a night of entreating Viennese workers from the poorer suburbs to join them, “some four thousand students streamed out of their lectures, deaf to the warnings of their professors, and marched on the Landhaus, which happened to be just around the corner from Metternich’s Chancellery on the Ballhaußplatz” (pp. 61-62). The same day the Chicago Board of Trade opened its doors, formally launching the era of finance capital on March 13 in the US Midwest (see Chapter Three), the Viennese revolution commenced.

The middle classes (e.g. doctors, lawyers, shopkeepers) joined the fray. Workers were initially kept out of the main action by imperial troops, and so they responded with attacks on landlord’s property and machine destruction inside factories, which would continue for several days (Siemann, 1985[1998]). Soon the journalist Franz Putz arrived on the scene at Landhaus, among the throngs of students, professionals and workers who managed to elude imperial guards. Putz climbed atop the central fountain, and read a recently delivered speech by the Hungarian Magyar Lajos Kossuth (Rapport, 2008, p. 62). Lajos (or Louis) Kossuth, also a prominent journalist, would espouse ethnic-nationalist aspirations as he rose to prominence during the synchronous Hungarian Revolution (Postgate, 1920, p. 222). Throughout his period of revolutionist fame, he remained “an uncompromising anti-Socialist” (p.222) and even refrained
from voicing strong republican ideals in the early months of 1848. But Putz – or a student (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 210), depending on who you ask – remediated the speech in front of thousands. He read aloud Kossuth’s demands for “liberty,” “rights,” and a “constitution,” (cited in Rapport, 2008, p. 62), and Kossuth’s calls for a return to ancient Hungarian rights as well as a constitution for it and Austria (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 210). As the crowd, galvanized by Kossuth’s reiterated oratory, clamored for a constitution and liberal reforms, a student scaled the fountain and demanded Minister Metternich, who “everyone hated” (p. 211) also be dismissed. Meanwhile, workers were building barricades and crashing through gates manned by guards.

The street fighting and arming of some 40,000 middle class radicals pushed negotiations. An agreement was reached that permitted the students to maintain their own militia, the Academic Legion, which became a sort of “autonomous branch of the national guard” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 220). The Legion would continue to meet every night for the next few months. Other conditions of the truce entailed troops vacating the capital and an agreement Metternich would resign (Rapport, 2008). The latter was at first resisted, but popular pressure carried the day. The Archduchess Sophia, previously known as a “friend of reform” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 219), had looked forward to Metternich’s resignation because the Chancellor had vowed to help the cognitively impaired Emperor Ferdinand (her husband’s brother), which kept Sophia’s son Francis Joseph from the throne (p. 192).

Sophia, who “became the revolution’s most dangerous enemy” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 219) got her wish. Threats of disorder escalated, and the Emperor had to accept Metternich’s resignation. The Chancellor, “replaced by his arch-rival Kolowrat” (Price, 1988, p. 38), left Vienna that night by carriage until they got to a train that took them across Europe before they eventually made it to London (Rapport, 2008, p. 64). Austria proceeded to promise a liberal
constitution. Sophia, whose father was the King of Bavaria and championed constitutional
reform, would soon regret the revolutionary turn. “I could have borne the loss of one of my
children, more easily than I can the ignominy of submitting to a mass of students,” she said
shortly after Metternich’s fall. “In the future, the shame of the past will seem simply incredible”
(cited in Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 219).

Sophia now no doubt abhorred the Viennese students, who relished in their own audacity.
The students would eat, sleep, drink and dance with girls in the Aula. Many had long been poor,
and even those from rich families were denied money from their fathers to pay for the Academic
Legion uniforms. Whether their social and economic position remained incommensurate with the
relatively higher level of education they had received (or were receiving), or if the economic
downturn had rendered those from relatively privileged backgrounds more downwardly mobile,
many Viennese students could nevertheless be characterized as déclassé. They were young,
rebellious, déclassé intellectuals at that. And they were living through exceedingly difficult but
equally exciting times. Problems would mount later with repression to come (some stemming
from the conservative reaction to their audacity), but for the time they remained trouble for
Austrian authorities.

Also troubling to Austrian elites, was that Hungary was just as hungry for change. The
lower house of the Hungarian Diet approved measures for constitutional reform in March to
grant the country autonomy within the empire, and Ferdinand was later forced to sanction a new
constitution for Hungary. Kossuth (1848[1920]) demanded from the Diet a new system of
representation, the common taxation on all citizens, the establishment of trial by jury, the
abolition of censorship so a free press could be secured and the formation of a National Guard,
The Viennese also wanted a National Guard. Citizens and governments in the myriad states across Austria had been warming to the idea (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 212). The US enshrined the right to bear arms in its Constitution decades ago without sacrificing wealth of the propertied classes, and the Austrian middle classes reckoned a National Guard could come in handy later for keeping order and protecting property. Two days after liberals and radicals among the University of Vienna student body hatched plans for the uprising in Aula Hall, Emperor Ferdinand (1848[1920]) proclaimed the establishment of a National Guard, trusting, as the imperial Crown put it, “in the faithfulness and devotion of my subjects for a proper response to this sign of confidence in them” (p. 252).

**Contesting Power in Prussia**

Viennese students would spearhead revolt again in May, but in the meantime the impetus for challenging the autocratic status quo spread to those German states under Prussian control.

On the resonance of revolution, Postgate (1920) put it thusly,

Austria had been closed to the world of thought, like China; Metternich had been the heart and soul of reaction, all classes were united in expelling him. The Revolution, like the Revolution of 1917, had struck directly at the center of European reaction. The King of Prussia saw in this only an occasion to profit Prussia at the expense of Austria. But on March 18 barricades were thrown up in his own city of Berlin. (p. 242)

Both establishment politics and street politics enlivened the German states.

A “pre-parliament” or “Vorparlament” convened in March with 574 members selected from existing German state assemblies and other popular meetings (Rapport, 2008, p. 117; Postgate, 1920, p. 254). But the real politicization was happening elsewhere. Students in Berlin had been congregating at the Zelte – buildings in a park with cafes, concert halls and amusement
stands where “revolutionary news and views spread and people began to organize informal public forums” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 116). Concentrating limited available news media and art in one space, it became the epitome of the public sphere. Art and news were the subject of politicized dialogic communication. The pedagogical implications could not be contained. After an assembly at the Zelte, students drafted a petition demanding a summoning of the Diet and freedom of the press, which had to be mailed to the King because in his now definitively anti-liberal stage the Crown would accept no representative. Crowds at the space grew apace. By March 13 they were almost impossible to control.

Insurrection ensued and Frederick William IV was flabbergasted. Upon hearing news of insurrection, the King of Prussia, exclaimed, “It can’t be. My people love me” (cited in Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 119). Incredulous the night of the big uprising, Frederick William IV issued a proclamation, printed and disseminated throughout the city. In this royal print media, addressed “To My Beloved Berliners,” as the Crown titled it, the king assured subjects of his “sincere good-will” towards them and “the whole German Fatherland,” while denouncing the “crowd of malcontents” who “introduced seditious and extremist demands, and increased in their numbers as the well-disposed people went away” (1848[1920]), p. 253). The tactic, long-appreciated by those in formal positions of power, could split the good protestors from the bad protestors or cleave the legitimate moderate reformists from the illegitimate extremists. The king admitted the cavalry had to clear the square after “insults had been hurled” at his “brave and faithful soldiers,” as two infantry muskets unfortunately fired in the commotion “accidentally, thank God, without hitting anyone” (p. 254). His majesty’s troops only commenced attack when many “miscreants, chiefly strangers to Berlin,” who have been in hiding, taking the opportunity in the crisis to propagate “obvious falsehoods” for “the furtherance of their evil designs,”
invidiously filling “the excited minds of my true and faithful Berliners” (p. 254), instigating revenge for blood that was not spilled. The outside agitator paradigm still popular today separated loyal domestic citizens from foreign (conspiratorial) insurgents in the ideological service of the Prussian establishment in 1848. Evoking paternalist sentiments for good measure, Frederick William IV entreated “inhabitants of my true and lovely Berlin” to listen to “the fatherly voice of your King,” “prevent greater evil,” clear away remaining barricades, accept the reduced military occupation now “confined to the necessary buildings,” and “Return to peace!” (p. 256).

The king initially had his army surround the barricades, but told them not to fire. Shots rang out from both sides. Concerned about the democratic advance of the Second Republic in France and uneasy over the collapse of the Austrian regime’s absolutist rule, he acquiesced (Price, 1988) – and fast, before Berlin burst into flames or cast his monarchy aside completely. His forces had been somewhat successful in clearing barricades, but with more than 200 military-induced casualties, they were ordered to leave the city and concessions to citizens were promised.

By March 19 the revolution triumphed, temporarily. The next day political amnesty was granted and the Prince of Prussia, who would become emperor of a united Germany 23 years later, soon fled, but not before then urging to have rebellious Berliners shot (Postgate, 1920, p. 254; Rapport, 2008, p. 74). The King of Prussia left Berlin five days later. At the time, the deaths at the barricades did not appear to be in vain. The king expressed intent to entertain the idea of a new constitution with popular representation. Moreover, media slowly moved in a liberal direction. “Printing presses began to test their new freedom, and were so successful that boys
who had formerly sold cakes, flowers, or matches now found they could make more money peddling papers and pamphlets” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 125).

With newfound commercial freedom came reintroduction of class antagonisms. Robertson (1952[1971]) regarded the Berlin revolution as tragic insofar as it made “everyone, even the liberals” (p. 125) fear the workers. “Now the Prussian bourgeoisie had, of late,” Marx (1851[1907]a) deduced, “had quite enough of working-class agitation in their own country” (p. 69). They had seized the moment with the help of the working classes and garnered concessions from the king who was disconcerted after the fall of Metternich. The Prussian Crown and bourgeoisie remained wary of the socialist pedagogies surfacing in France after February. However, the prosperous middle classes failed “to keep the people quiet in Berlin” (Marx, 1851[1907], p. 69), and permitted working people a chance to have “fought and conquered” (p. 70), enabling them “all at once” to become “conscious of their strength” (p. 70). Uncovering real and imagined fears coursing through the continental revolutions, Marx (1851[1907]b) explained,

The danger of a repetition of ‘anarchy’ was imminent. Before this danger all former differences disappeared. Against the victorious workingman, although he had not yet uttered any specific demands for himself, the friends and the foes of many years united, and the alliance between the bourgeoisie and the supporters of the over-turned system was concluded upon the very barricades of Berlin. (p. 70)

By April, the middle classes of Berlin were convinced the revolution was complete.

If it was not over, they wanted it finished. When police and military left, the arm of the state entrusted with protecting their property vacated too. With authorities gone, Berlin became a watered down version of an anarchist’s paradise, save for the remaining, if under-developed,
coercive capitalist relations. The order of self-organization, denounced as disorder by liberal-bourgeois Prussian pedagogy, nevertheless drove the propertied classes into hysterics.

Prussian journalist Fanny Lewald who traveled across the continent during the 1848 critical juncture commented on the changes in Berlin in her published diaries from that year. After returning to Germany from Paris, where she spent time in March, she participated in a student-organized pilgrimage to Friedrichshain, the large city park on the eastside of Berlin. Lewald (1848[1997]) recounted how

The streets were full of people; no police supervision or Civil Guard asserted themselves. A police inspector in civilian clothes we met on the way assured us with resigned certainty that everything would proceed peacefully and it would be a very nice procession—without police, I added in my mind. The man’s whole being and demeanor was burdened by his awareness of his own broken authority; you could see that his self-confidence lay buried under the ruins of the shattered police state. (p. 101)

This is just one of the “stories about the funk of the ruling classes” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 126). In another episode, the one-time police chief, named Duncker, “was so afraid of the plain citizens that he closed all the apertures to his apartment, including the flue of his stove, and then began burning papers. He made so much smoke that plain citizens though it was a fire and broke in to save him” (p. 126). Students now assumed the job of guarding “the new, soldierless Berlin” (Robertston, 1952[1971], p. 124). During breaks, they discussed “democracy over the coffee, bread, butter, and sausages” (p. 124) sent to them from the king’s own kitchen.

The influences of France were undeniable, but the mass movement in most of the German states sought in 1848 to set up the sort of system the French had just undertook to transform that same year. Upon returning from Paris, Lewald (1848[1997]) noted the stark
differences between France and her home country following revolution. “What was painfully obvious to me in looking back was the lack of joy or enthusiastic ardor about the victory here,” Lewald (1848[1997]) observed about Berlin, “which surprised me so much in Paris. No inspiring songs, none of those slogans filled with elation of winning that went from mouth to mouth with such an electric effect: neither a patriotic song like ‘Mourir pour la patrie!’ nor a shout like the rejoicing ‘Vive la République!’ We have no German patriotic songs, and ‘Long live defeated absolutism!’ (because that is as far as we have gotten right now) is not the type of slogan you shout” (pp. 88-89). Indeed.

The Prussian bourgeoisie, not to mention the figures of old order, feared France. More specifically, they could not stomach socialist or anarchist undercurrents in France, upsetting the insides of dyspeptic Germanic states. Some 70,000 of the privileged Prussian classes fled when soldiers and police left them (and their property and wealth) unprotected (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 126). Those that remained, who were assuaged “every danger of the old system had passed away,” thus “made use of the whole of the old State machinery” (Marx, 1851[1907]a, p. 71), altering – in the main – only persons and minsters, leaving absolutist structures intact.

These were the conditions into which David Hansemann and Ludolf Camphausen stepped in (Marx, 1851[1907]a). Hansemann, a liberal, served as the Minister of Finance for Prussia from March to September 1848 and later headed the Prussian National Bank and founded the first modern bank of Germany (Lewis, 1997, p. 92). Ludolf Camphausen, a leading Rhineland liberal and Cologne banker, became the Prime Minister of Prussia in March, serving in that spot only until June (Fernbach, 2010, p. 114).

Writing in the June 3, 1848 edition of their organ, the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, the only authentically communist – and scathingly satirical – press in Germany, Marx and Engels
Camphausen referred to the revolution as “this occurrence” – admittedly one that “brought about a complete upheaval” (cited p. 116). Camphausen explained how he recalled the Prussian United Diet, ostensibly abolished by “the occurrence” – the revolution – and his own new ministry. Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) noted “the doctrinal sleight-of-hand by which Herr Camphausen makes the transition ‘from the existing constitution to the new constitution, through the legal means provided by the former’” (p. 117). “The magician informs the ghost that he has called it up in order to liquidate its remains and to be able to behave as its loyal heir” (p. 117).

On the progressive-liberal end of the political spectrum with ecclesiastic overtones, Lewald (1848[1997]) repudiated how “Minister-President Camphausen himself already calls the battle for freedom on March 18 an ‘occurrence’ in order to avoid the world ‘revolution,’ although Mr. Camphausen and his colleagues should regard this revolution as their mother and preferably think of the Commandment: ‘Honor your father and your mother: that your days may be long upon the land which the Lord God gives you’” (p. 100).

Lewald (1848[1997]) previously recounted a soirée she attended in March where both ministers (Camphausen and Hansemann) were present. At the gathering, they had presented themselves more favorably. Approvingly, she cited Hansemann’s “good-natured expression,” “probing intelligence,” “subtle diplomacy,” keen “perception of people,” and “friendliness” (p. 94). She described how at the gathering Hansemann sat on a sofa, “listening attentively to the words of this representative from the working class,” a “day laborer, wearing the universal German colors on his blue jacket” (p. 93). Lewald (1848[1997]) stated she was pleased to see Hansemann and the worker converse. This led to her getting in an argument with an old official who claimed the worker could not possibly have anything useful to say about matters of state.
She vehemently disagreed, and with sound argumentation that upset the official. But the man, without knowing it, had a point: the working classes became far more adept at self-organization without the state – absolutist, monarchist, heavily policed, liberal or otherwise – without the machinery so adept at propping up finance and big business at their expense. This latter point refers to oft-overlooked popular revolutionary potential, which when sensed by autocrats and liberals alike, always incites reaction, as it did in 1848.

Marx (1851[1907]a) made the same point with different emphasis. Point being, Frederick William IV realized the liberal ministers needed him as much as he now needed them. As Marx (1851[1907]a) summarized it, the king “had been spared by the insurrection; the throne was the last existing obstacle to ‘anarchy’; the liberal middle class and its leaders, now in the ministry, had therefore every interest to keep on excellent terms with the crown” (p. 71).

The throne had no interest in anarchy, to be sure. Nor would it tolerate over the long haul unchecked political liberalism. Frederick William IV wrote to his new liberal minister Camphausen at the end of March to make the point, describing Prussian rebels not as his “beloved Berliners” as in his public proclamation before, but as riffraff, possibly under the influence of a plot concocted by foreign agitators (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 127). Comparing liberalism to a disease, the King of Prussia likened disbelief in conspiracies to a symptom, curable only by the Holy Cross (and perhaps brute force). The analogy became a commonplace for unsettled factions of concentrated power.

Mediated voices of foreign powers reacted differently, but with similar alarm regarding the possibility of too much popular participation in political affairs. Contents from the newspaper of record (the London Times) of the then-hegemonic power (Great Britain) illustrate the point. Several months after the March uprisings, on June 23, 1848, the London Times featured an
untitled op-ed again condemning revolutionary sentiments abroad, even as key facets of the rebellions pushed for the sort of liberalism already present in Britain. “Alas! These words, ‘authority’ and ‘dignity,’ have ceased to have a meaning in Berlin,” lamented the *Times* staff, “and for the moment the fate of the Prussian monarchy seems to be in the hands of the most stupid and savage mob which is now to be found in any great capital of Europe” (p. 6). Further, *Times* readers are informed, the German populace has become “demoralized,” meaning stripped of moral valuation here, “by successful rebellion,” as well as “by the wild sympathy of French revolutionists, and, more than all, by the want and despair which this anarchy has engendered in all classes of society” (p. 6). But what is to be done? “The direction of the country must be changed, and changed by the strong hand of authority” (p. 6), of course. The article continued with vindication of reaction in response to the authority-disregarding revolution. “If reaction meant the restoration of the discredited and rejected past, men might reasonably object to it,” the paper qualified. “But when a country is sunk into a revolution, into anarchy, into the slavery of mob-government, reaction means no more than the restoration of peace, order, and real freedom” (p. 6), etc.

Despite accounts of life going swimmingly in the absence of expelled police, as Fanny Lewald’s account of Berlin affairs made clear, the discourse of dominant media like the *London Times* opted not to entertain the notion of society running at all without concentrated power and authority (even though it did for a while before reaction set in). Rather, what can be inferred from the *Times* piece – along with previously analyzed *Times* texts – is the assumption that authority is ipso facto legitimate and absolutely necessary. The exercise of power that constitutes authority is natural, and when that authority ceases “to have a meaning,” as the *Times* asserts was the case in Berlin, the state of affairs is denounced as unnatural, driven by “the most stupid and
savage mob” of the kind undermining the proper exercise of authority throughout Europe that year. Always ready to criticize the revolution-friendly French, Britain’s premiere establishment press ensured readers understood the solidarity French revolutionists offered to those in Berlin and elsewhere was of the “wild” kind. Any sort of sympathy offered would have qualified as “wild,” however, as the rest of the paper’s commentary makes clear. Again, the country had to ‘be changed, and change by the strong hand of authority” at that. Only a change to reverse the revolutionary social change would do. Only the re-assertion of firm authority would suffice.

Reaction to restore order was in order. Although peace without police apparently prevailed in part, as Lewald averred, real peace and “real freedom” had to be restored with force. Avid readers of the *Times* were likewise entreated to practice a good degree of “doublethink”50 in order for that to make sense.

Other factions of Prussian power, namely the emergent bourgeoisie, echoed the *Times* in fearing a loss of authority – namely, their authority, their political-economic power. In truth, they had real reasons to be fearful. Financial crisis, co-occurring with the Germanic revolutions, led to skyrocketing prices and unpaid loans with interest, which financiers (and both the small and big bourgeoisie) attributed to the babel in Berlin reverberating throughout Germany. Ludwig Feuerbach, earlier denounced by Marx (1845[1998]) for not recognizing how “philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways,” and that “the point, however, is to change it” (p. 574), nonetheless offered an incisive interpretation of the German fiscal situation in a letter to his wife Bertha dated April 3. Feuerbach (1848[1920]) told her the “root of the trouble is not a real shortage of money, but the fear that war or popular revolts will ruin the possessing classes: this

50 The term “doublethink” was coined by Orwell (1949) in his dystopian novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* about an omniscient totalitarian state. Orwellian “doublethink” refers to holding two contradictory ideas in one’s head at the same time, and believing them both to be right and true.
affects all classes, stops all business, and undermines all credit. We are living in a time of revolution. It cannot be helped” (p. 255).

Problems of Polish Nationalism and Pan-Slavdom

The revolutionary fervor animated Polish desires too, but Prussian liberals – the class embodiment of contradiction – wanted to forcefully crush the Polish movement in Posen while at the same time campaigning for war against Russia to free the Poles (Postgate, 1920, p. 243). The first widely-circulated Polish newspapers also appeared in 1848. Evincing the ethnic-nationalist pedagogical concerns typical of the time, Poles demanded public education with Polish taught as the primary language. While the Polish nationalist movement made few gains in 1848, the Polish people proved resilient. Writing two decades after the “world revolution,” Bakunin would reflect on ongoing insurrectionary efforts in Poland “as a revival of the revolutions of 1848” (p. 37). His position stemmed in part from his likening “the Slav to the proletariat” (p. 37), and his ideas about anarchism “based on Slav communalism” (p. 38) – the viable “alternative to the national imperium of Germany” (p. 38). Not unlike the Prussian obsession with plots, Austrians around 1848 suspected “Pan-Slav plotters lurked behind every insurrectionary barricade” (Orton, 1974, p. 107). In point of fact, it was really only Bakunin who formulated a plan for “the total dissolution of the multi-national Habsburg and tsarist empires, and their replacement by a vast and powerful federation of Slav nations” (p. 107).

Bakunin traveled from Paris where he had stayed in March (see previous section) to Frankfurt, then to Berlin, then to Breslau and was on his way to Poznan but he stopped when he learned of the Slav Congress in Prague. Czech liberals, Galician Ukranians, Galician Poles and South Slav delegates showed up to discuss Slavdom prospects. Serving on the committee of inter-Slav relations, Bakunin drafted “The Fundamental Principles of the New Slav Policy,”
authored in French but first published (in part) by a Polish newspaper, *Dziennik Domowy*, later that summer after an aborted June uprising in Prague (Orton, 1974). Despite his later conception of both the state and religion as the self-alienation of humankind (Uglik, 2010), Bakunin utilized religious rhetoric throughout his proposal, which was really more of “an exposition of principles to guide the Slavs’ future political organization” (p. 110) than a constitutional formulation. He offered a set of ideas, on the surface anti-statist, but potentially coercive or geared toward establishing a “superstate” (p. 11) if interpreted in certain ways.

Although some Slavs partial to “Austro-Slavism” saw the Habsburg dynasty as conducive to advancing their ethnic nationality, Bakunin beseeched them that “while it promises you everything” it will renege and “avenge itself on you for its past shameful weakness that forced it to humble itself before you and to flatter your seditious demands” (cited in Orton, 1974, p. 109). Later in October, the Austrian Emperor would actually use the Slav movement, and its self-appointed militarist leader Josip Jelačić, to crush the Magyar (Hungarian) Revolution.

51 Bakunin’s fundamental principles acknowledged “centuries of enslavement” and “arduous struggles,” that have brought the Slavs together to “solemnly declare before God” (cited in Orton, 1974, p. 113) the principles of a new federation. The Slavs were to kneel “before God in gratitude for his having put an end to their harsh travail and for having conserved in them this fraternal sentiment in all its purity” (cited p. 114). Keeping with the religion motif, Bakunin claimed “certain principles” within the Slav alliance require “religious observance” (p. 115), namely “equality of all, liberty of all, and brotherly love” (p. 115).

52 The ambiguity and dearth of concrete plans in Bakunin’s principles on Slav policy open it up to interpretation as supportive of a Pan-Slav super-state. But, in accord with his anarchist praxis, Bakunin also emphasized liberation from oppression and freely determined mutual association. He explicitly rejected statist policy, although not a nationalist one. As Bakunin averred in the document, the Slavs, having been victimized by state violence before, now joined “by their common interests, and still more by the consciousness of the grand destiny which the future holds for them,” therefore put forth “not a statist policy, but one based on nations, of independent and free peoples,” predicated “on a fraternal, indissoluble alliance of all nations who comprise the Slav race, and they will seek no other centralization than that of the Slav federation as a whole” (cited in Orton, 1974, p. 113). Common in the anarchist-socialist tradition dating back to 1848, Bakunin called for a council system, the Slavic Council, to unite all of Slavdom under its “highest authority and supreme tribunal” (cited in Orton, 1974, p. 114). It either, depending on interpretation, called for centralizing decision-making power in the one body ruling over the subordinated peoples, or for decentralizing power among the Slav nations so that no one nation would have power over another.
(Postgate, 1920, p. 246). That October the emperor dissolved the Hungarian Diet and sent troops from Vienna to ensure Jelačić’s safe installation as military dictator, but more on this below.

Recurring Crises in Vienna, Frankfurt and Baden

Before all that, crisis struck, again. An “uproar” (Postgate, 1920, p. 244) in Vienna occurred in the middle of a commercial crisis brought about by the abandonment of the Court (plus, one suspects, the emigration of a portion of the bourgeoisie, as in Berlin). The economic downturn itself accelerated the flight of the wealthy from the city through the summer of 1848 (Rapport, 2008, p. 107), in a self-reinforcing negative spiral. The absence of affluence brought a drop in demand for luxury goods, one of Vienna’s primary industries (Postgate, 1920; Rapport, 2008). The decrease in conspicuous consumption in this region of the CWE came with a decline in employment and artisanal opportunities, making crisis again acute. In addition to angering the upper and middle classes, the economic distress related to high unemployment resulting in lower tax revenue – combined with the production slump due to decreased demand – caused conservative regimes to question their ability to continually deploy military might against all possible insurrection. This left the door open to ongoing revolution throughout the year (before it was slammed shut shortly thereafter).

As soon as government authorities undertook to undercut freshly gleaned liberties, fresh uprisings took place, which closed the rift between the middle class and student-worker coalition for a little while (Marx, 1851[1907]b, p. 66). The people – Austrian subjects and Germans alike – pushed back, again. People became the crisis for the Austrian authorities on May 15, the same day the radical clubs over in Paris marched from the Place de la Bastille into the National Assembly (see previous section on France in 1848). Synchronicity during the continental revolution and throughout the world system abounds.
In Austria, University of Vienna students, again the leading protagonists in the story, had been wrapped up in struggles of their own leading up to the mid-May revolt. Students and both university and governmental administration had been hotly contesting freedom of speech and press issues. The flood of new, uncensored material appalled relics of high society, and the government tried to curb the liberality by requiring every organ to pay a guarantee in advance of publishing (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 223). Irate students, interpreting it (with intuitive acuity) as an attempt to reassert old administrative restrictions, burned a copy of the law in front of the university. Since March, the students’ Academic Legion had been busy bridging class and ethnic divisions, which would enable broad-based coalitions to coalesce again. Students organized to get an anti-Semitic law off the books and “stood loyally, if a bit paternalistically, behind every need of their worker friends” (p. 221). When the new cabinet ministry tried to create a constitution and attempted to push through a resolution granting suffrage to everyone but servants and factory workers, this “enraged the students,” whose allies, the workers, had been omitted, “so they began to organize battalions of workers with hoes and shovels to protest” (p. 223).

The Academic Legion led a parade on May 15 lasting from 2 p.m. to midnight, demanding a constitutional assembly, via “storm petition” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 223), for universal suffrage that would not exclude workers. Taken aback by the strength of student-worker militancy, the Austrian imperial family fled by May 17 (Rapport, 2008, p. 136), echoing the flight of France’s King Louis XVI to Varennes in 1791. While radicals drew parallels with Louis XVI’s ignominious abdication, other upset Austrians – some 80,000 – signed a petition entreat ing the Emperor – whom many still referred to as “our Ferdy” – to return (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 217, 224). When he did return in August, Ferdinand “was greeted joyfully, with
girls scattering flowers in the imperial family’s path as they stepped off the Danube steamer” (Rapport, 2008, p. 230).

But even after the initial flight, unlike the royal family in France at the end of the 18th century, the Habsburg dynasty refused to take the torrent of revolution lying down in absentia. Austria amped up repressive measures against radicals with a new law that restricted press freedoms, making treasonous writing an offense punishable by prison time (Rapport, 2008, p. 226). By this point, students had alienated much of Austria. Robertson (1952[1971]) recorded how as of mid-May in 1848, the Academic Legion and its affiliates “had now made enemies of foreign students, had twice humiliated the new liberal government, had driven the court away from Vienna and incurred the odium of thousands of citizens who loved the Emperor” (p. 224). Complaints about students poured in, and the government decreed the university closed and the Academic Legion disbanded. Students responded with some 160 barricades in the streets on May 25, thanks to assistance from their working class allies, and the government acceded again, accepting the legitimacy of the Academic Legion by May 27 (Rapport, 2008, p. 127).

Meanwhile, there was the Frankfurt Assembly inauguration on May 18 (Postgate, 1920, p. 258) and radical campaigns in Würtemberg and the grand duchy of Baden after Friedrich Hecker had proclaimed a republic on April 12. Regarding the latter, Hecker expanded his initial base from 60 to 800 revolutionists, comprised of professionals, craftsmen, journeymen, students and wage laborers, with many “armed with scythes rather than firearms” (Rapport, 2008, p. 120). German poet Georg Hergwegh aided the advance. Fellow revolutionist Mikhail Bakunin recognized Herwegh’s tenacity, and wrote a letter to him earlier in 1847, telling the poet in not unpoetic terms, “I wait upon my, or, if you prefer, our common wife—the Revolution. Only then shall we become happy; that is to say: we ourselves will be, if the whole earth is in flames” (cited
in Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 183). Hergwegh, with help from his “indefatigable wife Emma,” who went “in trousers, a dark blouse, feathered slouch hat and with a brace of pistols in her belt” (Rapport, 2008, p. 121), led a militant group of 1,200 men, eventually coordinating with Hecker’s cadre. The liberal government in Baden crushed the rebellion by the end of April (Postgate, 1920, p. 258). The action demonstrated the liberals’ willingness to use force to crush radical republicanism to protect the emerging constitutional order, and – in their view – cement gains won in March (Rapport, 2008, p. 122).

Questions of German Unity and Ineffectual Assemblies in Frankfurt and Berlin

Additionally, questions of German unification came to the fore of political consciousness and received attention in Frankfurt. Many economically liberal Protestants in the north wanted to exclude Austria and proposed a “smaller German” (Kleindutsch) solution (Rapport, 2008, p. 130). Their position received support from Austrian monarchies and German Catholics who chaffed, respectively, at having Austria subordinated to a southern province of unified Germany or permitting Protestant Prussia to dominate. Radicals and a few conservatives championed a “greater German” (Grossdeutsch) solution, envisioning a “democratic, unitary republic of all Germans” (p. 131).

The vision of a unified Germany received belated support from Washington. US President James K. Polk said in his State of the Union address on December 5, 1848, that the country – “we” – “now hail the efforts in progress to unite the States of Germany in a

53 As for setting the earth ablaze, Hodges (1960) argued Bakunin’s anarchist praxis actually reflected his “apostleship of Satan” (p. 267). According to Hodges (1960), Bakunin had faith in the “revolutionary instincts,” which he equated with the “evil instincts,” and his avowed Satanism manifest itself in “rebellion against heavenly tyranny and its earthly representative, the State” (p. 270). Yet as Orton’s (1974) analysis of Bakunin’s pan-Slav proposals demonstrated, the inveterate insurrectionist also evinced a strong messianic message and belief in God. That is, of course, until, as Uglik (2010) showed, Bakunin’s praxis denounced religion of all sorts as an illegitimate authority, much like capital or the state. The latter is more in accord with the storied anarchist aphorism, “No Gods, No Masters” (see Guérin, 2005).
confederation similar in many respects to our own Federal Union” (Polk, 1848). The US
president continued, waxing hopeful:

If the great and enlightened German States, occupying, as they do, a central and
commanding position in Europe, shall succeed in establishing such a confederated
government, securing at the same time to the citizens of each State local governments
adapted to the peculiar condition of each, with unrestricted trade and intercourse with
each other, it will be an important era in the history of human events. Whilst it will
consolidate and strengthen the power of Germany, it must essentially promote the cause
of peace, commerce, civilization, and constitutional liberty throughout the world. (Polk, 1848)

Granted, the US was not in the hegemonic position in 1848 to reorganize and re-administer
Europe as it was after World War II and did with the Marshall Plan, also known as the European

Circa 1848, the Grossdeutsch concept abstracted from world system realities and proved
either impracticable or imprudent for policy crafters and existing centers of power. The
constitutional formula remained uncertain. Whether it would exclude Austria or contain both the
King of Prussia and the Austrian Emperor as sovereign could not easily be decided.

The Frankfurt Assembly addressed the question, but not effectively. They proved deft
instead at rendering themselves moot, epitomizing the problematic positions the liberal
bourgeoisie attempted to straddle in 1848 (against absolutism but disdainful of radicalism). The
Assembly itself was, in the main, of bourgeois character. Jurists and officials dominated the
Frankfurt Assembly because of the semi-restricted elections (Price, 1988, p. 47). About 68
percent of Frankfurt Assembly deputies were civil servant officials and 12 percent were of the
“free professions” (i.e., what is now called “coordinator class” of doctors, lawyers, professors, engineers, etc.) (Hobsbawm, 1975, p. 13; Albert, 2004, p. 182).

In one of those magical historical twists, Wilhelm and Jacob Grimm, the “Brothers Grimm” famous for their fairytales, would join the ranks at Frankfurt. The Brothers Grimm were “eminent representatives of the German Bildungsbürgertum” (Zipes, 2002, p. 55), the educated upper strata of the bourgeoisie keen on individual achievement, liberal economic rationality and appreciation of aesthetic culture (pp. 53-54). Characteristic of nineteenth century bourgeois virtues, the Grimms possessed “a notion of righteousness,” “believed they knew and could prove that right and justice were on their side,” and “thought they deserved everything they achieved and that they could conceive more equitable and rational forms of government” (p. 55). Just as their fairy tales would routinely begin with “once upon a time,” the Brothers Grimm also consistently included in their stories “a functional scheme that enables an individual to prove his merits, rise in social status, and achieve success through cunning and industriousness” (p. 56).

Their individual merit and industriousness were not enough to give the Frankfurt Assembly a fairytale quality, though. However, they did bring to the parliament influential ideas about statecraft. The Bildungsbürgertum prompted the National Assembly in Frankfurt to aim to unite the German principalities under a single state. The Assembly divested itself of meaning and power by the early summer of 1848, but before doing so it proclaimed the right to a free, uncensored press and asserted every German was a citizen of Empire.

When the Frankfurt Assembly selected Austrian Archduke John as German Regent on June 3, it effectively transferred whatever power it had into the coffers of monarchical reaction intent on its demise. As compromises continued with monarchs, both Grimm brothers’ hopes of a liberal democratic Germany were dashed, and they retired from politics after the revolutionary
movement failed in 1848 (Zipes, 2002, p. 15). Jacob Grimm resigned from his position as professor the same year and published a study of the history of the German language.

With the Assembly rendered ineffectual (their instructions would be promptly ignored in forthcoming matters), an ensuing struggle over Prussia’s impending war with Denmark consumed the spirit of struggle. It started when Germany attempted to acquire the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which King Christian VIII of Denmark considered his territory, leading to the duchies’ revolt in late March and efforts to set up a provisional government (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 157). When the Danes coercively tried to incorporate the duchies, Prussia sent in troops (Postgate, 1920, p. 245), and “all Germany went wild with excitement” (pp. 157-158). Representatives from the duchies were welcomed at the Assembly in Frankfurt. But again, the Assembly had already liquidated its own power. Not surprisingly then, in late August, the Prussian government, effectively unopposed by the Assembly, made a move. The Prussians brokered an agreement with the Danes at Malmö, ceding everything which the Danes desired. Indignant revolutionaries, enraged at the pusillanimous Assembly, attempted to purge the parliament in September, only to be beaten back by the troops of Prussia, the old entity the deputies at Frankfurt had in effect acquiesced to when it “voted itself offstage” (Postgate, 1920, p. 245).

Parallels between the pedagogies of the “Professor’s parliament” (the Frankfurt Assembly), as it was derisively called, and the Berlin Assembly abound. Following in the feckless footsteps of the former, the latter “denied its own past” (p. 124) that summer, as Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) observed in the June 18 edition of their paper. The same day their piece was hot off the press workers in France from the compromised Luxembourg Commission and from the imperiled National Workshops issued their joint proclamation for a democratic social
republic, as explained in the previous section on France in 1848. Workers in France would suffer brutal setbacks that June, while the Assembly in Berlin busied itself with a process of effortful forgetting. First it denied the March revolution, then declared its own “incompetence” (passing a June 9 resolution that its task was not to work out its own solutions, but work with the Crown), then promised to begin work on the constitution: “But the Bastille has still not been stormed” (Marx & Engels, 1848[2010], p. 125). The paradox of professorial governance revealed itself in both Berlin and Frankfurt. Those decision-making bodies and societal classes comprising them tasked with revolutionizing society embodied the broader counter-revolutionary public pedagogy.

Just as hope faded in Berlin, the uprising in Prague was also crushed. Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) again had the story, in a separate article featured in the same June 18 edition of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung. What happened, the communist press reported, is the Austrian Prince Windischgrätz prepared a “surprise attack” (p. 125) against the Slav Congress (attended by Bakunin, as mentioned before), but people swarmed his residence when they got word. Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) wrote in their organ that people built barricades and halted the advance of the troops for a time, before being driven back. Acknowledging myriad setbacks in Germany’s 1848 revolutions, they supposed Germans had to “be punished for the sins of their past,” having let themselves “be used throughout history as an instrument for oppressing all other nations” (p. 126). Germany needed to “proclaim the freedom of the peoples it had previously oppressed, at the same time as it proclaimed their own freedom” (p. 127). It did not do this. Another paradox – or perhaps defining dialectic of this critical juncture – circumscribed possibilities. And Windischgrätz would soon be called upon again to restore order.
Hungarian Rebellion and Viennese Revolution Redux

Prior to that restoration, uprisings re-occurred in the two key locales as before – Vienna and Berlin, with rebellion in the former related to events in Hungary. Hungarian peasants, still burdened with taxes and mandated to perform manual labor for the government, had pushed for further changes set the onset of upheaval earlier in the year (Rapport, 2008, p. 274). Hungarian and German peasants generally attacked houses of the wealthy, occupied lands and burned both manor houses and tax registers throughout the “world revolution” of 1848. After a Hungarian peasant rebellion in June, the National Guard was sent in and a state of siege had been declared. When in October the Habsburg Empire planned to send in troops to Hungary to aid Jelačić in quelling the Kossuth-inspired nationalist rebellion (see above), Vienna rose up (again). A smaller uprising in Vienna occurred back in late August when the unemployed battled the National Guard (Postgate, 1920, p. 258).

On October 6, as Austria planned to dispatch troops to back Jelačić, the Vienna Revolution commenced. Congratulating themselves for having earlier had the scoop on the Vienna revolt back in May, Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) delivered news of the Vienna revolution of October 6 and 7 to readers of the October 12 edition of their Neue Rheinische Zeitung. The revolution, they wrote, was “in danger, if not of being wrecked, at least of being obstructed in its development, by the bourgeoisie’s mistrust of the working class” (p. 165). While the capitalist press incited fear through outlining class divisions and competing pedagoges, associating anarchy/communist/socialist aspirations with secrecy and disorder, the radical press in Europe (e.g. the Zeitung published by Marx and Engels) cut through the fog with a pro-revolution frame and class analysis critical of the duplicitous role of the bourgeoisie. The
duplicity and mistrust stemmed from the differential class position and the educative intellectual culture that routinely decried and dismissed aspirations of the working class.

When the insurrection started on October 6, Emperor Ferdinand again fled. He left a “manifesto” that the Minister of Finance Herr Kraus read from the Austrian Diet tribune the next day. Ferdinand had condemned the “small faction, strong from its boldness,” which “urged things to the furthest extremity; pillage and crime reign in Vienna,” adding his “confidence in God” would enable him to “find means to afford assistance to” his “oppressed people,” provided “those who love Austria and her liberty rally round the emperor. (cited in Postgate, 1920, p. 261). Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) argued in that October 12 edition of their publication the emperor’s flight compelled “the bourgeoisie to continue the struggle or surrender unconditionally” (p. 165). They proceeded to criticize the “state of siege,” the tactic of old order applied in its most egregious form to the entire country of Hungary and in Vienna, where it “precipitated a revolution” (p. 165) not a counter-revolution as forces of order hoped – in Hungary.

As it happened, history played out even more dialectically. After Viennese rebels threw up barricades around the center of the imperial capital that October, the government initially moved to de-escalate the conflict, ordering troops to retreat (Rapport, 2008, p. 281). The crowd called for the head of Austria’s War Minister, Theodor Franz Baillet von Latour, deemed responsible for the decision to send troops to carry out counter-revolution in Hungary. As Ferdinand lamented in his “manifesto,” his imperial Minister of War was eventually “battered to death, his head caved in with a hammer and cleaved with a sabre before a bayonet sliced into his heart” (cited in Postgate, 1920, p. 282). The gratuitous violence matched the march to war, violent suppression and imprisonment of rebels ordered by Latour’s ministry. Ferdinand and
even the Austrian Diet (left in control of Vienna after Ferdinand’s flight) failed to mention that part. Ferdinand did not fail to order some 12,000 troops to amass outside Vienna by October 8-9 (Rapport, 2008, p. 282).

Blame for Vienna’s downfall can be attributed to two sources. First, Magyar Hungarians, having defeated Jelačić, “advanced to the Austrian frontier, crossed it, recrossed, crossed and recrossed again and stated that they had not received a formal invitation from the Austrian Diet” (Postgate, 1920, p. 246). In all likelihood, immediate assistance “from the Hungarian army, now a large and disciplined body, would have upset the dynasty,” and saved Vienna, which “was on the point of surrender” (p. 223). The workers’ uprising in Vienna later that year also expected support from Hungarian troops, which never came and left the Viennese revolutionaries vulnerable, easy to crush (Mészáros, 2000, pp. 45-46). This underscores the complex relationships among national, international and world system-wide struggles not always elaborated with the necessary nuances.

Whether or not later Marxists adequately highlighted these complexities, Marx himself contextualized the systemic dynamics when commenting on affairs at the time. Writing in the November 7 edition of their paper, Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) confirmed the “hecatombs of human sacrifices” and “dismal prophecies” offered by their Vienna correspondent, whom they suspected was “perhaps already slaughtered” (p. 173), and they too expressed disappointment over the Hungarian army’s no-show: “We hoped at one time that Vienna’s deliverance would come through the aid of the Hungarians, and we are still in the dark about the movements of the Hungarian army” (p. 173). Perhaps more interested in preserving its own nationalist achievements, the Hungarians were no help to the workers in Vienna. The Hungarians also would be unable to hold onto their own nationalist objectives, which might have benefited from
solidarity among other subjects of empire, like students and workers in Vienna. Possibly, the Hungarian forces remained loyal to anti-red bourgeois order, and anti-imperialist student-worker coalitions in the thick of a fight appeared too pink for their taste. In that vein, Marx and Engels (1848[2010]), not surprisingly, also blamed the bourgeoisie for Vienna’s demise in their November 7 news editorial. That is, they held responsible the bourgeoisie in control of the Reichstag (Constituent Assembly), the city council and the part of the citizens’ militia (the bourgeois part) fighting against the Academic Legion and the proletariat (p. 174).

With the Hungarians equivocating and the bourgeoisie being complicit, Austrian rulers had the upper hand. Emperor Ferdinand – before abdicating on December 2, permitting his teenage nephew Francis Joseph to take the throne – ordered, in concert with parliament, previously hard-won (for his subjects, not him) press liberties and freedom of assembly to be curbed (Robertson, 1952[1971], pp. 284-285). Ferdinand, directing the theater from afar, ordered imperial troop commander Windischgrätz to return to the stage “to restore order” (Rapport, 2008, p. 282) and “to recapture Vienna” (Postgate, 1920, p. 246). Windischgrätz’s predominantly Slav force, including Czech and Croat soldiers, and Jelačić’s troops, entered Vienna between October 31 and November 1. “The Viennese radicals, the National Guard, the students and the workers” (Rapport, 2008, p. 286) fought on. Once imperial reinforcements reached the capital to confront the beleaguered rebels, the “usual slaughter followed” (Postgate, 1920, p. 246). Some 2,000 died in the fighting, about 2,000 revolutionaries were arrested and a state of siege officially declared (as Marx and Engels mentioned). Both the Academic Legion and National Guard were deposed and censorship was re-imposed. Shortly after the Habsburgs regained control of the capital, the Prussian Assembly was dissolved (the feckless Frankfurt Assembly survived until the
spring of 1849), dealing revolution in Germany the same *coup de grâce* it received within the heart of the Austrian empire.

*Indefatigable Insurrection: Anarchy and the Art of Revolution in Dresden*

In the Prussian Rhineland, the reactionary forces and seeming defeat of liberal administrations only fueled the fire for constitutional reform. Much of the action would be concentrated in Dresden, the capital of Saxony. Dresden is where Richard Wagner, the renowned orchestra composer, famously said, “My business is to make a revolution wherever I go” (cited in Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 182). Wagner would meet the anarchist Mikhail Bakunin during the “world revolution” of 1848. An incessant insurrectionist, Bakunin had been cavorting around Europe during 1848, and here again the interconnectedness of 1848 struggles come to light.

As mentioned, Bakunin had rushed to France immediately upon getting wind of the February Revolution (see previous section), prompting the new socialist Prefecture of Police in Paris to remark about his presence: “On the first day of a revolution he is a perfect treasure; on the second he ought to be shot” (cited in Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 182). Chastain (1981) claimed Bakunin left Paris as a “French secret agent,” employed “by the Provisional Government of revolutionary France, which he served as propagandist and as militant, in their joint struggle to liberate captive peoples and thereby to overthrow the Tsar” (p. 5). The assertion exemplifies a kind of conspiracy theory pedagogy that functions ideologically, if also unconvincingly, to disparage substantive challenges to the status quo, past and present. The perspective takes for granted it should be learned, internalized and wholly understood that organizing efforts against established authority, however oppressive or illegitimate that authority and order might be, are ipso facto nefarious. The pedagogical move shifts focus away from the reasons why people like Bakunin rebel, diverting attention away from important strategies used by many who seek to
displace power while reconstructing society from below. It directs attention instead toward secret, illicit connections surrounding insurrectionary strategies, casting them in a suspect light, thereby validating prevailing or once-prevalent structures of power and domination. This pedagogy is deployed in Chastain’s (1981) article, featured in one of London’s illustrated historical magazines, to have both an anti-French an anti-anarchist ideological function, following the example set by establishment papers like the London Times during the juncture in question.

In truth, Bakunin supported secret society organization for collectivist emancipation from below (Cutler, 2014), with the societies kept clandestine so as to avoid repression from absolutist regimes like the one in his home country of Russia. Yet his vision of revolution remained straightforward – abolition of all illegitimate authority. It is also true he received funds from a few radical republicans and socialists in France’s short-lived provisional government (Guérin, 2005; Robertson, 1952[1971]). What has to be remembered at the same time is those socialists in France were largely excluded from positions of power and later suppressed after February and especially come June. The marginalization of Louis Blanc, whose syndicalist-like ideas of interconnected worker self-management reflect revolutionary intersections of socialism and anarchism, is case in point. The socialist and radical republican currents in France hardly had the capacity to support secret agents and conspiracies to liberate the oppressed everywhere, as debates and demonstrations regarding France’s responsibility to Poland made clear.

Yet, with borrowed funds from France and wherever else he could get it, Bakunin was supposed to go to Poland but just happened to be in in Dresden that April when Wagner conducted Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony during his final concert. As Robertson (1952[1971]) documented, “After it was all over, Bakunin walked up to Wagner and remarked that when
everything else was destroyed in the flames of the future” – he had a predilection for inflaming things – “that work of art must be preserved, even at the cost of their lives” (p. 183).

As Bakunin hoped, Wagner recognized the relationship between art and revolution. Having partaken in both, Wagner authored a pamphlet the following summer on the two interrelated topics, criticizing the subjection of art to exchange value. For the theater to reach “its higher and true calling,” Wagner (1875[2014]) called for artists’ collective self-management, wherein, “freed from the fetters of commercial speculation,” “the general body of artists themselves,” would “unite their forces in the art-work and assure success of their mutual efforts by a fit conception of their task” (p. 32). Advancing the kind of an anarcho-communalist pedagogy gaining in popularity at the time, Wagner (1875[2014]) claimed the new mode of creation required support, and “it must be the duty of the State, or rather of the particular Community, to form a common purse form which to recompense the artists for their performance as a whole, and not in parts” (p. 32; emphasis mine). Wagner’s ideas complemented Louis Blanc’s program of government-aided syndicalism, shifting emphasis from the nation-state level to less hierarchical municipal-community arrangements, consonant with Bakunin’s own anarchist vision.

Both Bakunin and Wagner brought these ideas to the fore in the spring of 1849, the culmination of the wave of revolutions in the region. While 1848 is the year associated with the first “world revolution,” revolutionary activity refuses to be pinned down to a definite time frame. Agency exercised in Dresden in 1849 is just as relevant for any history of the first “world revolution” as what happened a few months prior. To wit, revolution introduces a hiatus in time (Benjamin, 1935[2007]a; Arendt, 1963[2006]), an abolition of the staid sequence of
temporality. For this reason, it is impossible to pinpoint with exactness the revolutionary moment(s) using conventional clock time. The revolution cannot be dated, at least not with precision, no matter how precise the instruments for measurement may be.

Point being, in some places on the continent and across the world system, the “world revolution” of 1848 spilled over into 1849, as it did in Dresden where Bakunin and Wagner inserted themselves in that liminal (revolutionary) space between present and future. Workers and craftsmen filled the streets of Dresden that May in support of the king and against an ostensibly imminent Prussian invasion (Rapport, 2008). Barricades went up the first night, and by the next day Wagner had posters printed and distributed to the army asking, “Are you with us against the foreign troops?” (cited in Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 184). The king left soon after, leaving Wagner, Bakunin and fellow radical Stephan Born in control of a provisional government (Rapport, 2008, p. 343). Inexperienced in self-governance, Dresden’s de facto delegates asked for Bakunin’s input on affairs. An inaugural ceremony co-commenced to defend the (defunct) Frankfurt Constitution, and citizens tore up railroad tracks to delay arrival of Prussian troops. Bakunin, indifferent to the cause of German unification and parliamentary constitutionalism yet enthralled with insurrection, “organized everything—he deployed men, arranged for their relief, scoured the cafes for Polish officers and attended to a thousand details in his sleepless days and nights” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 184). Likewise, Wagner supervised convoys, bringing in “provisions and reinforcements from the countryside, which was enthusiastic in its support of the city people” (p. 184). Bakunin’s aforementioned unorthodox

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54 Benjamin (1935[2007]a) called this Jetztzeit, or “time filled by the presence of the now” (p. 261).
55 According to Born, who moved from Berlin to Leipzig to edit a new workers’ paper, Bakunin used to make Russian punch for friends, with his coat off, sleeves rolled up, sweating all over near the flames from the rum; Bakunin used water from the Rhine to put out the fire and proceeded to concoct the most intoxicating brew Born ever imbibed (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 183)
class analysis and his belief in the peasantry as a revolutionary force played out in Dresden. It helped that virtually anyone in Germany with any progressive aspirations whatsoever poured in for one last ditch effort to secure, at minimum, a constitution.

While the people of Dresden were inexperienced in both revolution and democratic governance, Prussia had long ago perfected the art of order and militarism. The Prussians also had new weapons technologies ready to deploy (Rapport, 2008, p. 343). However, as Wallerstein (2014a) historicized, the oppressed “always fought back as best they could” (p. 158). Stephan Born helped rebels create their own innovative systems, keeping “communication open by smashing through internal walls of houses, so that the insurgents could pass through the buildings without having to run the murderous gauntlet of enemy fire in the streets” (p. 344). But Prussian forces soon had rebels surrounded. By May 9, the revolutionists had little left. With the Prussian troops closing in on the rebel stronghold, “Bakunin, who had been rather contemptuous of the ‘amateurish’ Saxon revolutionaries, calmly puffed on his cigar and coldly” (Rapport, 2008, p. 344), “proposed blowing up the town hall where the stores of power were kept, and themselves with it, as one last gesture of defiance; but the provisional government more cautiously ordered the powder to be removed, and the church bells to ring the signal of retreat, three times three” (Robertson, 1952[1971], p. 184). Multiple sources corroborate Bakunin had been ready to go out with a bang, ending the major events on an explosive note. His colleagues were understandably less interested in self-immolation.

For all intents and purposes then, the revolution came to an end. After Austria withdrew from Germany and the Austrian Diet was dissolved in March 1849, the Frankfurt Assembly offered the crown to the King of Prussia who refused and effectively imposed a constitution instead (Clark, 2012). Elsewhere, in Baden, rank and file continued to resist until late July 1849,
when the last fortress at Rastatt was seized from the revolutionaries (Postgate, 1920, p. 247). Yet the administrative changes reflect not just reaction, but innovative reorganization as a result of revolution. The royally imposed Prussian constitution was “extremely popular” (Clark, 2012, p. 175) with liberals and moderate conservatives. Hungary modernized its police forces, paving way for the twentieth century police state. The Habsburg monarchy maintained the young Francis Joseph at the helm until he died months before another major crack in the world system, the Russian Revolution (Jászi, 1929).

Austrian neo-absolutism opened the empire to a broader array of socioeconomic concerns than previously permitted, moving the region closer to centrist liberalism, at the same time as intra-empire ethno-national divisions contributed to asymmetric (regional) economic integration coeval with empire-wide market integration (Wallerstein, 2011; Clark, 2012, pp. 177-178; Schulze & Wolf, 2012). That is, asymmetrical economic developments occurred alongside – perhaps dialectically facilitated – expansion of markets empire-wide, as well as greater integration with the also expanding CWE. This process occurred as centrist liberalism became the hegemonic pedagogy par excellence in a formerly wholly autocratic empire, thanks in part to the spread of progressive-liberal ideas, some of which disseminated through newly available and newly commercialized press. This continued after the 1867 constitutional compromise formed the Dual Monarchy (the Austro-Hungarian Empire), which moved toward a drawn out process of dissolution culminating in its break up during World War I (Schulze & Wolf, 2012; Jászi, 1929). In effect, subterranean pedagogies – namely, early anarchism, seminal syndicalism, socialism and communism – combined with recurring pedagogical projects 1848 (e.g. liberalism, finance, free trade, republicanism, nationalism, conspiracy theory, dismissal/denial) cracked the system in ways that forced it to reorganize itself, spurring new modes of resistance in turn. To observe
other system-wide effects, we return attention in the next chapter to a few key changes inside the British Empire, showing its first signs of decline. The following chapter then shifts focus from Britain, the world system hegemon in 1848, to the Americas, where public pedagogies in support of and in resistance to an emerging empire indelibly marked the world during the same critical juncture.
A lecturer in a European Civilization course delivered at Yale University in the fall semester of 2008 and made available online as part of the school’s open courses project posed the question as to why there was no revolution in Great Britain in 1848 (Open Yale Courses, 2015). Pointing out that revolutions, like those across Europe in 1848, invariably involve increased politicization of a previously less politicized part of the population, Professor John Merriman offered two reasons why there was no revolution in Britain that year despite mounting social tensions. First, Merriman pointed to the emphasis on reform and popularity of reformist movements in Britain at the time. Second, he said that, in relation to the first reason, ideals of respectability and the virtues of expanding the political arena through reform not revolution remained central to the “self-image” of British citizens. “That we, British citizens,” he said about the Briton social imaginary in the 1840s, “we reform. We don’t rebel.”

The lecture anecdote is apropos for several reasons. The celebrated American university of Yale, an Ivy League institution, has an anti- and counter-revolutionary legacy of its own. To the point, reactionary orators like Timothy Dwight IV, who would become president of Yale College (the precursor to Yale University), railed against democratizing influences from France in the 1790s. Again, Yale – established while the US was still under Great Britain’s colonial control – developed in close connection with the transatlantic slave trade (Wilder, 2013). What is more, the infrastructure for elite institutions like Yale came from, among other places, slave plantations in the West Indies, where Britain maintained colonies. The institutional connection between British Empire and US Empire is notable because, as is argued here, the crack in the
system in 1848 started Britain’s process of hegemonic decline and allowed the US to take initial infant steps toward becoming the reigning hegemon almost a century later.

The Yale lecture focused only on the British mainland. When the British Empire in its entirety is taken into account, revolution in 1848 cannot be ruled out as easily (Taylor, 2000). A WSA perspective attentive to British Empire and processes of hegemony also illumine how Britain began a process of hegemonic self-liquidation, which would proceed for several years. Granted, this process of self-liquidation started even as Britain’s economy continued to grow and industrialize at a rapid rate. British ships spurred the shift from sail to steam, with the latter increasing from 14 to 49 percent of the world’s carrying capacity between 1840 and 1870 (Hobsbawm, 1975, p. 58). British steam tonnage increased 1,600 percent between 1850 and 1880, while the rest of the world’s steamer tonnage increased just about 440 percent in that time. Further, Britain boasted about one quarter of the world’s steamer tonnage in 1840, and that increased after the world revolution, to comprise more than half of the world’s steam-powered vessels by 1880 (p. 58). Britain’s economy continued to grow through the end of the nineteenth century. Its national income doubled between and its income derived from abroad increased ninefold from 1865 to 1898 (Lenin, 1917[1975], p. 256).

Nevertheless, attention to British colonies sheds light on incipient systemic changes in and stemming from the critical juncture of 1848, suggesting the process of self-liquidation commenced even as Britain’s industrial capacity continued to become even more dominant. Considering events in the British Empire during the world revolution also recovers undercurrents otherwise overlooked. This section thus focuses on undercurrents beginning to undercut British hegemony at home and throughout the world system in 1848 relevant to understanding the
legacies of that year. The section thus concludes by segueing into the next, which will expand upon changes within the then-not-fully-formed US Empire.

Cracks in the Hegemony of Liberal Reform: Marx and Chartist Public Pedagogies

To begin, the issue of reform in Britain begs discussion. The popularity of reformist movements in the mainland are oft-emphasized, and popular movements for reform indeed resurged in the 1840s, coinciding with the economic downturn. Recall that Wallerstein (2014a) focused on 1848 as being the turning point from whence moderates (or liberals) and radicals came closer together ideologically. In contrast, Hobsbawm (1962) noted the entire post-Napoleonic period (1815-1830) of restoration erased differences between moderates and radicals throughout Europe, especially in Britain. During that period, Britain pulled far ahead of its nearest European competitor (France) in industrial development. Those outside the United Kingdom looked on in both awe and horror at capital’s assiduous production and accumulation in the system’s structural core (Wallerstein, 1989; Hobsbawm, 1962; 1975; Robertson, 1952[1971]). “Poverty in England,” exclaimed American Margaret Fuller, the literary editor of the New York Tribune who embarked on a cosmopolitan tour of Europe, starting in Great Britain just prior to the year of revolutions, “has terrors of which I never dreamed at home” (cited in Roberts, 2009, p. 97). Critical of Britain’s major newspaper coverage, Fuller also chastised the London Times as “a paper … violently opposed to the cause of freedom” (cited p. 100).

The arguments cited above regarding important political changes contain nuggets of truth, but also fail to adequately explain the diminution of Britain’s liberal hegemony leading up to, during and with changes following 1848. Relevant here is that Hobsbawm (1962) stressed the generalized Briton acceptance of reformist discourse and practice, as did the aforecited Yale professor. More than acceptance, however, maintaining the popularity of reform entailed a
process of generating consent. That is, British institutions produced public pedagogies geared toward liberal hegemony. Analyses of *London Times* articles above demonstrate the extent to which this was the case in 1848. To underline the argument again, regarding the outbreak of revolution in Italy, the January 22, 1848 edition of the *Times* took pains to point out “whilst England has shown her sympathy for the progress of moderate reform” (p. 4; emphasis added), England remained less sympathetic to revolution. The gendered nation-state in the *Times* statement refused to condone – in fact bitterly condemned – extra-parliamentary agitation.

As previously shown, the *London Times* also advocated liberal economic measures – not just for the mainland, but for the British colonies like the West Indies. Organizations championing free trade, like the Anti-Corn Law League and the Society of Guardians for the Protection of Trade (deceptively labelled because it lobbied not for protectionist measures, but for expansive trade protecting merchants, bankers and manufactures) flourished in 1848. As mentioned before, that ubiquity of free trade talk motivated Marx (1848[2005]) to deliver his satiric speech at the beginning of the year, in which he voiced support for liberalized exchange across borders because it would hasten class warfare by producing greater destitution the world over. Marx’s claim was not without foresight. The maintenance of liberal hegemony sowed the seeds of its own self-liquidation. At least, discourse and policy at the time planted the first seeds of Britain’s hegemonic decline and breakdown in the liberal consensus, which would have to be achieved through innovative means after 1848.

In the home country, Hobsbawm (1962) documented how the British working poor routinely rallied around a social program premised on the “People’s Charter,” and its six points: 1) manhood suffrage; 2) vote by ballot; 3) equal electoral districts; 4) payment for parliament members; 5) annual parliaments; and 6) abolition of property qualification for parliamentary
candidates (p. 114). The points formed the basis for the Chartist movement, which emerged in
the 1830s based on the interest of the proletariat (Fernbach, 2010, pp. 21-22). The Magna Carta
of 1215 famously gave subjects the right to resist certain injustices (Colley, 2014, p. 242), and
the call for a People’s Charter when Britain had only an unwritten (uncodified) constitution
could be seen as attempted recuperation and extension of traditional rights. Female
enfranchisement was omitted from the People’s Charter and organizational changes within the
movement would increasingly exclude women (Gurney, 2014, p. 601).

Nonetheless, women were integral to the movement’s successes. Writing in the Chartist
organ, the Northern Star, which appeared in November 1837 and for the next fifteen years
provided a critical pedagogy to help the movement cohere (Mussell, 2008), working class
women called for implementation of the Charter’s six points to check those they called
“iniquitous capitalists” (cited in Gurney, 2014, p. 593) and save families from the hardships of
coerced labor in factories and mines.

In their manifesto circulated across the European continent during the year of revolutions,
Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) acknowledged the importance of such a movement in organizing
the oppressed, however insufficient for revolutionary struggle they believed it to be. “English
Chartists,” Fernbach (2010) explained, “the first mass organization of the modern working class”
(p. 25), provided Marx and Engels a model for the revolutionary subject, the organized
proletariat. Both worked with Chartist leader Ernest Jones, who was imprisoned for two years for
his role in Chartist uprisings in 1848.

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56 British parliamentarians even recognized the historical significance of the rights associated with charters. Parliamentarian Edmund Burke made this point in a speech in the House of Commons, referring to the hard-won “rights of men” (cited in Colley, 2014, p. 246) embodied in Britain’s charters.
Shortly after the June 1848 insurrection in Paris, the Chartist organ, the *Northern Star*, also helped publicize “THE NEW RHENISH GAZETTE,” or the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, the paper published by Marx and Engels in 1848 and referenced throughout this project. The June 24, 1848, edition of the *Star*, noted the “journal lately started at Cologne,” “which announces itself ‘the organ of the democracy,’ is conducted with singular ability and extraordinary boldness; and we hail it as a worthy, able and valiant comrade in the grand crusade against tyranny and injustice” (p. 4). With writers for the *Star* anthropomorphizing the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (hailing it, the paper, as a “valiant comrade”), the McLuhan (1964) thesis that media function as extensions of man is affirmed, even before the dawn of the electronic age. In this case, the respective papers served as extensions of the movements and thinkers, Chartist and Communist, in acts of cross-fertilized solidarity. The blurb in the *Star* proceeded to describe the communist gazette’s “principal editor,” “Dr Marx, one of the ablest of the defenders of Labour’s rights in Europe,” and the staff of his new *Zeitung*, including an “ex-state prisoner,” an “unmasker of the Free Trade delusionists,” Frederick Engels and others. Illustrating the centrality of media to the struggle – at least from the perspective provided by the writer(s), the *Star* again waxed anthropomorphic: “We wish our contemporary a big career of usefulness and victory” (p. 4). The press, the primary means of media communication during the critical juncture, was understood as an active public pedagogue.

Prior to this, when the movement was young and before Marx assumed responsibilities as a journalist, he articulated ideas on the ingredients of proletarian struggle relevant for Chartist. Only 25 and honeymooning with the lovely Jenny von Westphalen in the summer of 1843 (O’Malley, 1978), he had time to write an essay criticizing Hegelian philosophy, developing
precepts of historical materialism in the process. Marx (1842[1978]) condensed his ideas, arguing:

For a popular revolution and the emancipation of a particular class to coincide, for one class to stand for the whole of society, another class must, on the other hand, concentrate in itself all the defects of society, must be the class of universal offense and the embodiment of universal limits. A particular social sphere must stand for the notorious crime of the whole society, so that liberation from this sphere appears to be universal liberation. For one class to be the class *par excellence* of liberation, another class must, on the other hand, be openly the subjugating class. (p. 140)

Whether Chartists were the most potent organizational form for the “class of universal offense” is hard to say, especially given the middle class, reformist and moderate constitutionalist elements in the movement (Hobsbawm, 1962; Taylor, 1995; Vernon, 1993). The “People’s Charter” of 1838 called not for abolition of existing property relations, but for the abolition of property qualifications for MPs (members of parliament) (Rapport, 2008, p. 94). Lecturing at Yale, Merriman equated Chartists with the broader British pedagogy of learning to change society by reform through established channels, not rebellion (Open Yale Courses, 2015). Chartism could not necessarily be labelled a socialist or communist movement.

Nevertheless, Chartists could not be dismissed as merely reformist either. The movement garnered support from Marx and Engels because it had immense support from the British working class and espoused myriad anti-establishment ideas and practices. It also had an internationalist orientation. Chartists had some 38 self-styled Democratic Associations, including the London Democratic Association, prior to reorganization of those associations into numerous local branches after 1840 (Thompson, 1984; Gurney, 2014). By the mid-1840s and after an
inspiring (if aborted) uprising in Ireland, the movement assumed a stronger international orientation, establishing the Fraternal Democrats organization and inviting German communists like Wilhelm Weitling to attend “Democratic Suppers” held in the capital (Gurney, 2014, p. 590). On the eve of the 1848 revolutions, Marx delivered a speech on the issue of Polish nationalism at a meeting organized by Fraternal Democrats. Unbothered by any concerns the moderate reform-minded members might have had, Marx (1847[2010]) pulled no punches in his speech, highlighting class conflicts about to erupt, denouncing the unified class interests of the bourgeoisie both at the national and global level (even as those capitalists compete in the world market). Marx (1847[2010]) called on the people to fight back and create common interests by abolishing existing property relations, “since the exploitation of one nation by another is caused by the existing property relations” (p. 99). The speech implied iniquitous core-periphery structure, to use WSA terminology. That is, Marx asserted world-wide systemic arrangements resulting in one nation oppressing another – as Britain, the then-hegemonic power exerted preponderant influence of others, for example – could be attributed to existing property relations.

Feargus O’Connor, a self-described “Democrat—a Chartist” (cited in Gurney, 2014, p. 575) when put on trial (not for the last time) in 1840, and James Bronterre O’Brien, “the so-called schoolmaster of Chartism” (p. 573), both “considered strikes and violence – or the threat of violence – as necessary tactics” (Rapport, 2008, p. 94). Just as the meaning of “democracy” became a site of political contestation in Britain in the 1840s, especially for Chartists (Gurney, 2014), the notion of what constituted violence or whether the negative connotations the word seemingly possessed (and still perhaps invokes) could also be contested. Suffice it to note here prominent Chartists approved of radical tactics to achieve objectives that would make a difference in working people’s lives. In addition to a wave of Chartist-organized strikes in 1842
(Gurney, 2014), there were riots in Glasgow and London on March 6 in 1848 to protest a government proposal (later withdrawn) to increase taxes (Rapport, 2008, p. 94). The latter featured largely unemployed workers tearing up railing to use as weapons until authorities called in troops to squash the rebellion and read the Riot Act to would-be insurrectionists. Later, like in France where prohibited banquets were held as platforms of protest, some 10,000 Chartists gathered in Trafalgar Square for a meeting officially banned by authorities (p. 95). Those gathered heralded the dawn of the Second Republic in France and cheered for institution of their own People’s Charter. Soon after, in early April, “genuine public alarm about the revolution began to stir” (p. 95), and authorities stationed police at the Thames Bridge and made sure to fortify financial institutions. The Bank of England was buttressed by sandbags and mounted with a cannon. The state was not about to let reformists with too much hubris impede the age of finance capital.

The big Chartist demonstration on April 10 “ended in demobilizing shambles” (Fernbach, 2010, p. 41) as authorities permitted the mass gathering but forbade a march on parliament. After a small Chartist delegation presented parliament with a petition, which the lawmakers had a good laugh at, “the wind had been taken out of the Chartists’ sails” (Rapport, 2008, p. 96), and “established order in the British Isle therefore emerged from the trauma of 1848 unaltered” (p. 98). Only, not exactly, as will be shown.

Focus on the formal political arena in the mainland obscures the theater of contestation through counter-institutional practices, politicized (mediated) dialogue and insurrection abroad. Pedagogical undercurrents and subterranean praxis emanating from the British Empire in 1848 actually forced power structures to reorganize society, precipitating hegemonic decline. Philosophical implications can be drawn from Gurney’s (2014) findings regarding the Chartist
recuperation of the term “democracy,” and then an independent look at digitally preserved Chartist media will throw additional light on the cracks created within empire during the critical juncture.

**Struggles over Democracy: Chartists Challenge the Revolution-Reform Dichotomy**

As far back as 1848 – perhaps even earlier – the idea of “democracy” became a “site of intense ideological struggle” (Gurney, 2014). The genealogy is all the more necessary today, as social movements attempt to recover the meaning of “democracy,” disassociating it from parliamentary representation tied to the capitalist liberal democracy practiced at the level of the state, and reconnecting it with ways of deciding, communicating, relating and creatively doing that do not conform to existing logics of power (Smaligo, 2014; Sitrin & Azzellini, 2014; Hardt & Negri, 2004). Many Chartists in the 1830s and 1840s viewed their “real cause” not with a constitutional lens, but, as the letters they often signed to the radical press suggested, “Yours in the cause of democracy” (cited in Gurney, 2014, p. 568). Similarly, women in Manchester assuming an active role in the movement signed letters to the press “Sisters, in the cause of Democracy” (cited p. 580).

Parliamentarians at the time either denigrated democracy in political debates, as many Tories did, or distinguished “the democracy” – legitimate ascendency of the middle class – from “a democracy,” the radical rupture with the past (Gurney, 2014, p. 571). Coincidentally, both anarchists Proudhon and Bakunin leading up to 1848 had ties to, “The Democracy,” “a radical community which apparently joined democracy and universalism to national fervour” (Kofman, 1968, p. 34). The latter, “The Democracy” of Proudhon and Bakunin, took the French Revolution as a defining event in modern history inspiring elements of their democratic praxis. Like the earlier French Revolution, with its aims at obliterating the past (annihilating all
remnants of the Ancien Régime), some Chartists also wanted “a clean break with the past, the complete rejection of tradition and authority” (Gurney, 2014, p. 574). Rejection of authority assayed as illegitimate resonates with the anarchist ethos advanced by Proudhon, Bakunin and others in 1848 and after – a point returned to below. As evident above, a significant slice of the Chartist movement also aimed at, to paraphrase Benjamin (1935[2007]b), eradicating the aura of tradition that weighs on and oppresses the present, circumscribing the future. Pertinent to the revolutionary period, Chartist currents (or undercurrents), cognizant of how the “tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living” (Marx, 1852[1987], p. 15), worked to wake up from the bad dream. That is, Chartism tried to break the hold the oppressive past had on the future by eliding the dichotomy between reform and revolution and dissolving the boundary between theory and action. Chartists united discourse with practice by enacting democracy through intra-organizational social relations and through conscientização, extending democracy as a public pedagogy into the Star.

Ironically, however, some Chartists attempted to accomplish the break with the past by invoking the past, namely the democratic legacy of the French Revolution. To paraphrase Marx, they conjured up the ghost of bygone revolutions to tell the specter he and his age were dead.57 Leading Chartists like O’Brien drew inspiration from Robespierre and the radical Jacobins who “heroically sought to transfer real control from executive government to primary assemblies that elected representatives on an annual basis” (Gurney, 2014, p. 574).

Chartist admiration for social democracy in France did not end there. In some cases it bordered on obsessive preoccupation. During the critical juncture of 1848, radical Chartist

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57 See the previous discussion of analysis provided in an 1848 issue of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung by Marx and Engels (1848[2010]) regarding the Cologne banker turned Ministry of State in Berlin, Gottfried Ludolf Camphausen, who they claimed convoked the ghost of an old governing body just to declare it dead.
George Julian Harney, a paid contributor to the *Northern Star* in 1842 and a sub-editor by 1843 (Mussell, 2008), repeatedly referenced France circa 1789 and the French uprisings in 1848. Harney was in Paris in March 1848, and was one of the radicals who ate breakfast off Louis Philippe’s table after the king abdicated (Gurney, 2014, p. 591). In the Chartist press, he condemned the French General Cavaignac’s publication of tracts on “Justice and Charity” in 1848 (p. 592). Harney likened the tracts to what Freire (1970[2000]) would much later term “false generosity” (p. 54), those practices that superficially aid the oppressed so that the persons complicit in oppression can feel better about themselves without actually contesting (in fact, often obscuring and reproducing) the structures responsible for the oppressive conditions. Harney went further than mere critique, becoming “almost a revolutionary caricature, styled himself on the martyred Marat, signed articles ‘L’Ami du Peuple,’ and increasingly” (Gurney, 2014, p. 592) used the language of class war in the *Star*, borrowing terms from France. Keen on the Jean-Paul Marat martyrdom theme as well as revolution (not just reform), but appreciably less obsessed with France, the Chartist O’Connor said self-reflectively that no revolution had been realized without many martyrs, and he thought that probably his fate too (Gurney, 2014, p. 579). Again, much of the “rhetoric of revolution” within the movement in 1848 “was just that” – rhetoric, but “the news of the February revolution in Paris caused some anxiety in official circles that the Chartist agitation might turn into something more aggressive than propaganda and patient petitioning” (Rapport, 2008, p. 94).

Over-the-top mimesis in the media and elsewhere did not resonate with the thousands of Chartist workers, nor for the most part did calls for revolution. But actual democratic practices with revolutionary potential did. More than just waging war on the discursive terrain over meanings of democracy, or fighting for formal democratic rights by means of petition alone,
Chartists put democratic ideas into practice where possible. Producer and consumer cooperatives, trade unions, initiatives for cooperative formations (e.g. the Land Plan), and cooperative societies were supported by Chartists with bodily actions and in the press (Gurney, 2014, pp. 589-590).

Cooperative societies supported by the Chartists, like the Rochdale Equitable Pioneers, received criticism from contemporaries, as Gurney (2014) explained, for avoiding “the language of democracy” (p. 590) and remaining politically neutral. But that apolitical position is more like the anarchist rejection of existing power politics. Regardless, education is never neutral (Freire, 1970[2000]). Neither is public pedagogy. Cooperative societies might have abstained from institutionalized politics proper, but their non-statist practices were every bit as political. The British working class, effectively barred from participation in state politics – hence the universal suffrage aspect of the Chartist movement – found other means of political participation and other avenues for enacting authentic democracy. Even though – in point of fact, probably because – not all facets of the movement involved direct contestation with the power structure, Chartism retained an air of political radicalism that transcended the hegemonic model of reform.

Democratic self-governance permeated Chartist culture. Tea parties, festivals and events held to celebrate release of members from prison helped develop “mutualistic ties between members” (Gurney, 2014, p. 580). The Chartist Leeds Working Men’s Association asserted self-government was a must, and the Manchester Political Union told members “Take your affairs into your own hand,” affirming they do not permit there to be “rich men leading or driving us but, in the true democratic spirit manage our own affairs” (cited p. 582). What is more, regular election of readily recallable delegates – not representatives – within Chartist conventions promoted participatory democracy and distinguished them from “many of their middle-class
sympathizers from the start” (p. 582). Inherently revolutionary communal-anarchist relations informed the organization’s core structure, educating members about a different way to do democracy, even as the movement’s orientation was toward reforming structures of power to improve workers’ lives. If consciousness is considered not just an individual and ideal state, but rather is taken as always implying consciousness of something (e.g. crucial aspects of the life process), then the lived experience of practicing directly democratic organizing and communicating in the Chartist movement illustrated collective conscientização. If the authentically pedagogical is understood not as simply cognition in the ideal realm divorced from material realities, but instead as education through doing, then the Chartists’ advanced a highly politicized public pedagogy of direct democracy within their organization and its print organ.

In some respects then, Chartists shared common ground – and key differences – with so-called “utopian socialists,” like Robert Owen (1771-1858), who influenced radical politics in Britain up through 1848. Owen understood the concept of public pedagogy. He conceived of education in terms not limited to institutional training, but also as synonymous with the social environment or circumstances in which individuals experience the world (Leopold, 2011, p. 621). A capitalist in his own right as manager and part owner of the New Lanark Mill in Scotland, it is not surprising that Owen “viewed ‘self-emancipation’ and democratic control with mistrust” (p. 621) and considered class struggle irrational (p. 622). Also not surprising, and in keeping with the (somewhat accurate) stereotype of British penchant for reform in 1848, Owen thought the advent of his “communitarian socialism would take a gradualist and non-confrontational form” (p. 623).

As will be detailed in the subsequent section on the Americas, Owen hoped to establish – and funded attempts at – utopian border communities in Texas aimed at assuaging tensions
between North American settlers and Mexicans, to forestall armed conflict (Herrera, 2013). By 1848 war had been waging between the US and Mexico for two years, and the efforts of the British industrialist at colonizing the Texas borderlands with socialist settlements designed by him had failed. Even with socialist aspirations, as a consummate capitalist Owen aimed to influence the state, especially in Britain, where he advocated reforming the Poor Law and supported restrictions on the sale of alcohol (Leopold, 2011). Owen disdained capitalist competition (many capitalists do, at least when it comes to their own enterprise), favoring common property and paternalistic control over his utopian experiments.

Chartists and Owenites thus shared respect for radical, perhaps revolutionary reforms. They differed insofar as Owen’s vision was socialist but insidiously authoritarian at the same time. Chartism had hierarchies. However, the movement also had anti-authoritarian horizontal qualities, with intra-organizational communalist practices and participatory decision-making prefiguring the sort of society Chartists considered desirable. The movement’s prefigurative politics, those attempts to embody justice within Chartist organizational forms and media strategies, accompanied Chartist confrontation with the state to better society through reform measures intended to mitigate the crises of capital.

Relatively minor liberal influences aside, Chartism refused to shy away from either class conflict or ideas of liberation mediated through democracy. In this respect it differed appreciably from Owenite socialism. Chartists had a “dialogic press” with an “often fluid boundary between radical readers and writers” (Gurney, 2014, p. 582). During the year of revolutions, the Northern Star, Chartism’s main organ, demonstrated commitment to a radicalism that dissolved the divide between revolution and reform with poetic appreciation of 1848.
The proprietor of the paper, Feargus O’Connor, who was committed to an asylum in 1855 following a series of persecutions by authorities, wrote treaties for the organ epitomizing the movement’s countervailing power. Caught up in legal disputes and writing for the Star, which was published until 1852, O’Connor (1848a) resolved to make “speculators blush” (p. 1) by ensuring passage of the Land Plan and fighting back against destructive free trade policies. Elsewhere in the organ, O’Connor (1848b) gave readers a linear account of the progress of “popular agitation” (p. 4). Written after Chartism’s setbacks in April 1848 (and after similarly defeated agitation in June), O’Connor (1848b) told fellow Chartists about their progressive path, “First—scoff, derision, and laughter; next, apprehension, doubt, and fear; then slander, reviling, and prosecution; then deliberation; then argument; then legislation; and finally, ascendancy as from the very nature of man he is averse to the principle of finality” (p. 4). As the laboring poor in England contend “for ascendancy,” O’Connor (1848b) posed the question, “Does not the parent assume dominion over his offspring, and is not Labour the parent of Capital? although, hitherto, the unnatural laws made by the few have made the parent subservient to the edicts of the child” (p. 4).

The path he charted of progress toward ascendancy could imply a teleological philosophy of history. It begs the question: To what exactly do the movement of people ascend to? Is it power, as in power-over others to realize change through means of the state? Or, is it empowerment – ascendancy of democracy transcending then-existing power relations? On the other hand, O’Connor rejected finality, an anti-teleological move, and one consonant with a problem-posing pedagogy of hope. Inspiring hope among readers – the multitude of Chartists who also wrote for the Star – no doubt animated his praxis. That praxis appears predicated on O’Connor’s conception of human nature (reference to “the very nature of man”). He advanced a
humanist perspective. His statement contained the assumption people learn from open-ended and dialogic problem-posing throughout history. O’Connor’s ideas implied problematization as opposed to “banking” (Freire, 1970[2000], p. 72) education, the flawed mode of teaching that seeks to deposit definitive, un-critically axiomatic nuggets of knowledge into the oppressed. O’Connor’s notion of historical progress, un-dialectical if interpreted as acceding to a trans-historical Enlightenment model of progress, also articulated a humanist pedagogy averse to finality but invocative of hope. The philosophical ambiguity of the statement combined with clarity of purpose (progress toward ending exploitation) opened it up further to hopeful interpretations.

In his subsequent statement, O’Connor echoed the Marxian labor theory of value and Marx’s penchant for metaphor. He affirmed labor as the source of value, the basis of capital (alienated, symbolic labor power). His metaphor of the parent and child (labor and capital) could be construed as having patriarchal undertones. On the surface, it assumes the legitimacy of subservience in a parent-child relationship, but on a more basic level it foregrounds the truth of human species-being: every human is not simply an atomized being who magically pops into the world ready to maximize individual self-interest; rather, in point of fact, all humans emerge from the womb of a parent and rely upon innumerable societal relations that shape and give their life meaning. Further, O’Connor’s critique of “unnatural laws” suggests some “laws” are natural or knowable. In interests of human liberation, this could be problematic if imposition of natural “laws” is required by force or coercive authority. In the same vein, it would be a problem if otherwise unjust social relations are naturalized by appeal to “laws” of supposedly innate origin, with all the uncertainty (and ideology) that would entail. On the other hand, O’Connor’s claim could be interpreted by Chartist readers as condemnation of capitalist logics impeding on latent
potentials of human nature – a persuasive, humanist supposition. Again, within the ambiguity, clarity of purpose or cause for hope could be found. At a moment in history when British working class words were backed up by actions, it comes as no surprise official circles – if they paid any attention to radical press – would grow concerned about existential threats to their social positions.

Other anonymous and pseudonym-using writers for the Star projected beyond reform in the realm of the radical imaginary, using lyrics to communicate common cause with the continent’s revolutions in 1848. In a piece unabashedly titled, “THE SONG OF FREEDOM” featured in the poetry section of the June 24, 1848 edition of the Northern Star, the writer, identified as “One of the people,” asked, “Shall England tamely stand and see/ Young FREEDOM’s glittering lights/ Nor raise the watchword—Liberty/ Our CHARTER and our RIGHTS?/ No! They shall see/ We will be free/ For Falsehood’s reign is o’er/ With heart and hand/ In strength we stand/ And will be slaves no more!/ No more!/ And will be slaves no more!” (p. 3). As Gurney (2014) noted, Chartist leaders expressed opposition to enslavement of Africans in the Americas and elsewhere. Likewise, they did not hesitate to use the term (slavery) in reference to imposed servility in the form of wage work, selling one’s self for a given time to others that have appropriated through violence the necessary means of subsistence. The poem above, printed in the Chartists’ organ, evinces a similar gesture with lyrical repudiation of working class enslavement. It expressed hopes of salvation to come by standing together for the Charter. Religious overtones criticized existing oppressive conditions and conveyed a message of liberation to come if members united for the Chartist cause.

Another anonymous poem, included in the December 30, 1848 edition of the Star, after what the editor called a drought in political poems, provided readers a recap of the year with
yearnings for liberation from oppression, to be realized in the near future: “When man is rife/ For freedom, he’ll scorn each tyrant’s fears/ And teach the lesson he hath dearly brought/ Till all his woes be on the oppressor wrought/ … Be sure a day of reck’ning is at hand, Let all who wish their country to be free/ … By deeds, not words, prove their sincerity/ Support the class-made victims, and command/ Success by being worthy liberty/ Let all do this, we need not repine/ Farewell old year, and welcome ‘Forty-nine” (p. 3). Pregnant with a public pedagogy of participatory democracy, the movement’s print media augmented members’ critical faculties, enabling them to both assail and project beyond the existing order. This complemented their prefigurative political organization, which created the nascent material basis and sensuous experience necessary for catalyzing artistic communication of the better unreal, illusory world that does not (yet) exist. Put differently, their inextricable movement and media expressed the classless and authentically democratic society existing then in the form of being (mostly) denied. Such expression of what lies latent can demand and drive actualization. Other tropes in the Chartist press similar produced comparably moving effects, but the verse above proved less prophetic than hoped. In short, 1849 did not bring liberation.

Policy Shifts and Cracks in Colonial Rule: Harbingers of Hegemonic Decline

Chartism weathered the storm of state repression after the series of strikes in 1842, and it endured after 1848 – but not for long. Like its organ the Northern Star, the movement all but disappeared in the early 1850s. The state reacted to the threat of revolution with not just force, but also coercion and administrative reorganization. Geographically non-contiguous with the rest of Europe, Britain had the benefit from the perspective of those in power of being “removed from the European theatre” (Taylor, 2000, p. 149), so as to be relatively unaffected by the wave
of revolutions on the continent. Unlike other European countries, Britain did not grant significant liberal constitutional reforms after 1848. Major reforms would not come until the 1860s.

However, actions were taken by Britain in and around 1848 to quell a potentially revolutionary population at home. Amped up police repression to check Chartist resistance, reproduction of fealty from middle classes (e.g. faithful London Times readers) and reduction of indirect taxes on the working classes to diminish catalysts for proletariat revolt all played a part in preventing growing unrest from reaching a boiling point. But as Taylor (2000) underlined, Britain has to viewed in “an imperial context” (p. 153) to comprehend other methods deployed by the state to hold revolution at bay. An imperial context informs how Britain dealt with the Chartist movement. To address both Chartist agitation and other portents of rebellion in Ireland in the wake of famine, Great Britain resorted to mass transport and exile of prisoners at the behest of colonial secretary Earl Grey. The number of males transported from England and Ireland increased from 837 in 1847 to 2,441 in 1848 and 2,632 in 1849 (Taylor, 2000, p. 153). The last two years the majority came from Ireland.

As a letter to the editor of the London Times printed January 22, 1848, corroborates, the British middle classes took notice of mass emigration and the dangerous conditions in the home country. Under what the Times titled, “SYSTEMATIC EMIGRATION,” the letter called for the state to give greater incentive for affluent and intellectual classes to emigrate to Britain’s Canadian territory. Strategic emigration could make “Canada a transatlantic Britain,” which the writer claimed required more than “transplanting yearly 50,000 or 100,000 paupers form Ireland and England” (p. 5).

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58 Again, revolutionaries across Europe seldom received the written constitutions with all the liberal political freedoms they hoped for in 1848, and not all of the constitutions or reforms endured the counter-revolution. There were exceptions, like the statuto of Piedmont-Sardinia, which was actually lauded by even English conservatives because it constituted institutions resembling those already existing in Britain (Colley, 2014, p. 261).
Capital enjoys having a surplus population to keep wages down, but capitalists and state authorities remain wary of too many unemployed persons and declassé intellectuals, those the Dean of Carlisle would, when reflecting on unrest in 1848, call a “large and important class of dangerous and discontented men” (cited in Ellis, 2013, p. 26). State-directed emigration became a “palliative for domestic overpopulation,” relieving “population pressures being experienced in continental Europe,” as it simultaneously “undercut the rhetoric of British radicalism,” providing a method for “averting Chartism and socialism at home” (Taylor, 2000, p. 159). The transport strategy offered authorities a way to get rid of angry individual militants and a means for removing a potentially “dangerous criminal class from society” (p. 156). Grey expanded Britain’s convict colony in Gibraltar and after autumn of 1848 shipped unruly subjects to the Cape Colony (South Africa), New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land (Australia) to prevent them from congregating in the mainland.

Efflux of Britain’s prisoners and surplus population sparked resistance in the colonies. Grey’s transportation policy inaugurated “a revival of a campaign for self-government” in the Cape, “which had been dormant for several years” (Taylor, 2000, p. 168). That is, machinations of empire needed to address radicalism at home amid continental revolutions brought subterranean pedagogies of anti-imperialism and democratic autonomy to the surface in colonial dependencies. The Anti-Convict Association at the Cape coordinated a campaign against the Colonial Office after it was announced the convict ship, the Neptune, would be transporting some 288 prisoners, many “Irishmen convicted during the agrarian agitation of 1848” (p. 168), to the colony. Cape residents protested the docking of the ship, forcing it to move on to Australia where it had to dock in secret in June 1849 to escape the wrath of some 5,000 protestors ready to force it back out to sea.
At the same time as many British were working to abolish the slave trade in the Atlantic, the British East India Company also facilitated convict transportation (trans-\textit{port}-ation, or literally the shipping of prisoners across ports) via the Indian Ocean, from and to different port cities in colonies and areas of intended conquest in south Asia and south-east Asia (Anderson, 2013). As Anderson (2013) showed, the East India Company took to criminalizing unruly (or potentially rebellious) colonial (or would-be colonial) populations as a means for deterring unrest in areas of interest abroad, and to convert those potentially unruly populations into convicts to be transported across the ocean as a means for satisfying new labor demands associated with regional expansion. In effect, the power of the state, or of the empire, enacted laws to criminalize individuals and communities as a means for generating cheap labor power needed for opening up new areas for colonial-imperial expansion. Imperialism, as has long been argued, is in part driven by the demand to open new markets abroad in order to reabsorb (reinvest) surplus and meet the demands of capitalist growth and continuous accumulation (Luxemburg, 1913[1951]; Harvey, 2010, p. 45). Capital’s (compound) growth and perpetual accumulation are in turn propelled by the system’s perpetual reproduction of a surplus and requirement of reinvesting that surplus by searching for new areas for investment.

Notably, Lenin (1917[1975]) linked imperialism to the emergence of finance capital and monopoly related to the tendency toward increased concentration of production. While Lenin (1917[1975]) put these imperialist developments at the beginning of the twentieth century – for legitimate reasons, given the greater monopoly power in key industries (e.g. steel) and new colonial and imperial projects initiated in the latter part of the nineteenth century continuing into the twentieth – perhaps greater attention should be given to the importance of earlier forms of colonialism and imperialism around 1848. Given the developments in finance capital mentioned
before, and considering the hegemonic shift toward exploiting colonies’ capacities to quell revolutionary sentiments, the advent of the system’s imperial stage might need to be dated back several decades to around the year of revolutions.

Consider Lenin’s (1917[1975]) other criteria, like the necessity of geographically “uneven development” (p. 226) across the globe as an intrinsic feature of the CWE. Or, take the tendency to utilize surplus for maximizing profits by exporting capital to countries where it (capital) is scarce, raw materials are available for exploitation and wages are low. This tendency to export capital is furthered when there is lack of domestic demand that renders profitable investment at home exceedingly difficult, pushing the drive for reinvestment outside a nation’s borders. Such was the case in Britain as a result of the economic crisis of the 1840s, and the liberalization policies initiated by the empire. This combined with the drive to open new markets for exploitation abroad to extract surplus from satellites in order to appease and raise the standard of living of the working classes at home. Chartists, with their democratic inclinations dangerous to elite interests, the growing criminal class at home and the fear of socialism spreading from the continent to the mainland all posed problems for concentrated power. The populace at home and abroad in colonial territories appeared on the verge of becoming disconcertingly disobedient, close to becoming insurrectionary. Thus, colonial subjects were criminalized, and those convicts were transported to and fro from Britain’s colonies to labor in ports and in the interior islands of the Indian Ocean doing jungle clearance, bridge and road construction, salt extraction, silk cultivation and also (in a bitterly ironic form of subjugation) in prison manufacture (Anderson, 2013, p. 234).

However, Lenin (1917[1975]), who was not wrong to argue imperialism amounted to “the epoch of finance capital and of monopolies” (p. 268), also mistakenly referred to the same
stage of development as “the transition from the capitalist system to a higher socio-economic order,” and defined early twentieth century imperialism “as capitalism in transition, or, more precisely, as moribund capitalism” (p. 272). If true, that transition has taken some time. If the existing system is still synomous with the CWE, then the imperialist stage of capitalism described by Lenin (1917[1975]) appears to have been far less “moribund” than he imagined. In light of the protracted period of transition and decay, reconsidering the complexities of and challenges to colonialism, imperialism and finance during the world revolution thus becomes essential.

To the point, Anderson’s (2013) analysis of the “subaltern history of convict transportation in the Indian Ocean” (p. 229) evinced convict transportation as “a sort of circuit that connects together imperial expansion and native resistance” (p. 231), specifically “anti-colonial struggle” (p. 237). Carried out during and around penal transport throughout Britain’s colonies and other territories the hegemon sought to conquer, this history of struggles adds to an understanding of undercurrents undercutting the empire in 1848. That history of anti-imperial struggle cannot be so easily extirpated from the history of world revolution during the juncture.

The struggle against the system among the criminalized classes in the colonies illustrates the dialectical interplay and alternative pedagogical activity affecting the system’s hegemon. While convicts built and networked much of the expanding empire, they “also created subaltern circuits of mobility, rebellion, and resistance” (Anderson, 2013, p. 234). In 1848, the General Wood, a ship carrying 92 convicted pirates from Hong Kong to Penang via Singapore, witnessed a mutiny the day after setting sail from Singapore harbor (p. 239). The convicts seized firearms, threw the ship’s crew overboard, killed the captain and commandeered the ship, steering it for 13 days until reaching a small island off the South China Sea. Many were later recaptured, but some
of those that were caught by authorities informed British officers that their convict comrades had already escaped for Siam, Singapore or southern China (pp. 240-241). A note found on one convict conveyed the bonds forged among prisoners in their anti-colonial struggle, reading: “We are to share alike in everything, if we procure food we are to share alike … We all swear to assist and stand by one another to the last” (cited p. 241). Such solidarity appeared consistently among the oppressed in the context of resistance to changing colonial rule.

Signs of resistance and movements for independence from colonial rule intensified elsewhere within the British Empire and for other reasons as well. Although Canada did not become a primary destination for expatriated dissidents, elimination of the Corn Laws after 1846 – an abolition advocated by free trade societies in Britain, in accord with liberal doctrines – ended privileges previously afforded Canadian agriculture, leading to financial distress and ensuing blowback. Insurgents threw up barricades in Montreal, protesters set fire to the parliament building, Canadian Governor Elgin was pelted with eggs in April 1849 and a campaign for Canadian annexation gained momentum (Taylor, 2000, p. 163). Similar issues over sugar duty equalization (liberalization) and other free trade reforms brutalized the economy of Britain’s colonies, like the West Indies, as discussed before, contributing to crisis.

Concurrent with those crises throughout the empire, Imperial British India was also at war, again. After the British annexed part of the Indus Valley in 1843, elected committees of common soldiers in the Punjab called the Khalsa, concerned the British East India Company had set its sights on their territory, started the First Anglo-Sikh War in 1845, which continued into the next year (Hyland, 2002). The military excursion to protect and open markets co-occurred with the onset of the economic crisis back in England and throughout Europe, which galvanized Chartism and similar social movements. Chartists and discontented disposable populations
within Britain raised the specter of rebellion, which worried London financiers and parliamentarians alike. Imperial efforts to placate discontent included cutbacks in state spending to avoid having to increase income taxes on middle and working classes (Taylor, 2000). With major media like the *London Times* routinely raising alarms about the possibilities of attack or malicious military moves by the French (see previous sections), coupled with the potential need to call in the armed forces to put down rebellion at home, state officials remained reluctant to reduce military spending or troops in the mother country.

Instead, they moved to cut colonial military expenditures (Taylor, 2000). With Whigs wary of increasing taxes for fear of losing the loyalty of middle and more prosperous working classes, Britain tried to displace the tax burden by utilizing local alternatives throughout the empire, like military pensioners and employing indigenous troops for colonial corps. Britain focused this “colonial retrenchment” (p. 158) on New Zealand and the Cape Colony, but the East India Company troops in the Punjab were also forced to forego their *batta* pay, receiving remuneration “only when serving outside dependencies of the Crown” (p. 158). In trying to retain control of its Punjab protectorate, British officers P.A. Vans Agnew and William Anderson went to assume governance of the Multan in April 1848, prompting a Multanis uprising and another chance for the *Khalsa* to beat back the imperialists (Latimer, 2006, p. 40). The Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848-1849) was underway, and British General Baron Gough soon needed 24,000 men he did not have and the state could not provide.

Given state cutbacks it is likely the Second Anglo-Sikh War was undermanned and underfunded all around. Sizable reductions in the colonial army made in 1848 to address general revenue shortfalls prompted British commanders to start policing the borders of territories like the Cape and the Punjab “with unpredictable non-British troops” (Taylor, 2000, p. 165). Taylor
(2000) documents how when Commander Charles Napier arrived in India and travelled “the length and breadth of the newly annexed Punjab,” he soon “rooted out an organized conspiracy to mutiny, which, almost telepathically, was being prepared in sepoy regiments hundreds of miles apart” (p. 165). It is not certain anti-imperialist organization should accurately be called conspiring, nor whether troops in the Punjab used telepathic-like abilities to revolt. More likely than telepathy, the interpretation reflects what Said (1978) analyzed as Orientalism, attributing mystical powers to persons in the East, mythologized as Other. The Orientalism-like treatment in historical scholarship pales in comparison to the racist imperial pedagogy propagated by prestigious English papers like the London Times, as noted below.

As it happened, a contingent of Indian soldiers in service to Britain (sepoys) did desert from British service to rebel forces in September 1848, forcing imperial troops to postpone plans for a siege (Latimer, 2006, p. 41). Another Indian regiment would mutiny in 1850, after the Punjab had been annexed (in March 1849) by Britain to neutralize Sikh incursions (Taylor, 2000, p. 165). For his imperial service, Sir Charles Napier received a pension of 2,000 pounds from both parliament and the East India Company upon his return home, and would later be called on to resume his role as commander in chief during the 1857 Indian Mutiny (Latimer, 2006, p. 45).

During the critical juncture, the London Times correspondent in the Britain’s Indian colonies incited fears of a “flaunting evil and oppression” in Oude, in its January 24, 1848 paper. The correspondent in Deccan admonished a “more decrepit and more dangerous evil of decay and indifference,” in Hyderabad, “pervading all classes, from the cultivator who just does enough to pay a quantum of rent, to support himself, and maintain his position in the village, to the Minister, who dallies with the state decrepitude, and has not the real desire nor the ability and firmness to execute measures for its redemption” (p. 6). The Times, elsewhere reserved with
comparatively subtle racist undertones, did not hold back in this article. The correspondent explained how no “revolution” in religious belief or “in the habits of these savages,” referring to peoples in the Khoond (a division within Koonawur, in present-day Himachal Pradesh), “as would induce them to abandon their old practices, could be expected by the mere moral influence of the agent or his Government” (p. 6). The Times writer told readers why those in the Khoond remained beyond moral redemption: “Savages can hardly be supposed to be susceptible of mere moral influence till they have experienced the weight of physical power” (p. 6).

The racist diatribe illustrates the bubbling contradictions within empire and within world system hegemony. The tension appeared as follows. Consent is necessary from the domestic populace for the colonial project, in part favored by concentrated capital (e.g. East India Company). Imperialism provides a unifying force amid a year of revolutions with worrisome regeneration of Chartist resistance at home buoyed by mass unemployment agitation. Military excursions require funds, which require the state to increase taxes. Increased taxes irk either the increasingly radical working class or other factions of the capitalist classes closely allied with the state (parliament had property qualifications) and intolerant of too much wealth redistribution. Efforts undertaken to avert taxes through military retrenchment and allay economic woes in the mainland through free trade initiatives constituted an attack on the interests of colonial planters. Unrest in the dependencies followed, requiring funds and a further drain on state resources to deal with rebellion or risk forfeiting elements of empire. The hegemon’s ability to exercise its influence abroad lessens appreciably under undue stress within its territories. Concurrent during the crisis, the US is entangled in a war of aggression against Mexico, which Britain resigns itself to condemning through its establishment media, like the London Times (see subsequent section on the Americas), without acting or intervening militarily.
This is not to suggest Britain took no successful action to maintain the dominance of centrist liberalism, its hegemonic status and its own empire. At the prodding of British colonial administrator and civil servant Charles Trevelyan, who cited the 1848 revolutions as primary impetus for civil service reforms in his co-authored Northcote-Trevelyan report (1854), Britain made use of its heralded capacity for reform to diffuse working class radicalism and “fight against the revolutionary threat from below” (Ellis, 2013, p. 24). A widespread belief in England’s “overproduction of educated men” (p. 26) in the mid-nineteenth century meant an alarming rise déclassé intellectuals, those who history confirms tend to play a catalytic role in uprisings and revolutions. Policy-making elite likewise became increasingly concerned the middle class would gravitate to some offshoot of Chartism or undergo some other form of radical politicization.

As Marx (1867[1977]) noted in one of his rhetorical flourishes regarding the gratuitous drama of English manufacture and changing industrial capital dynamics, privileged classes across Europe united in response to the continental revolutions, and revolution-less Great Britain was no exception. While Marx (1967[1977]) decried “the fiasco of the Chartist party, whose leaders had been imprisoned and whose organization dismembered,” shattering “the self-confidence of the English working class” (p. 397), he downplays the extent to which this was precipitated by immensely empowering workers’ self-organization. That, combined with revolution abroad and insurrection in the colonies, incited fear in the propertied classes capable of using their class power to transcend national divisions and crush incipient revolutionary sentiments (but not completely nor without consequences). Marx (1867[1977]) notes that along with Chartist decline, and dialectically, one could suggest, also in response to the Chartist crescendo just prior to the movement’s systematic destruction, the Ten Hours’ Act went into
effect in England on May 1, 1848, limiting the unceasing prolongation of the working day up to that point. Yet,

Soon after this the June insurrection in Paris and its bloody suppression united, in England as on the Continent, all fractions of the ruling classes, land-owners and capitalists, stock-exchange sharks and small-time shop-keepers, Protectionists and Freetraders, government and opposition, priests and free-thinkers, young whores and old nuns, under the common slogan of the salvation of property, religion, the family and society. Everywhere the working class was outlawed, anathematized, placed under the ‘loï des suspects’. The manufacturers no longer needed to restrain themselves. They broke out in open revolt, not only against the Ten Hours’ Act, but against all the legislation since 1833 that had aimed at restricting to some extent the ‘free’ exploitation of labour-power. It was a pro-slavery rebellion in miniature, carried on for over two years with a cynical recklessness and a terroristic energy which were so much the easier to achieve in that the rebel capitalist risked nothing but the skin of his workers. (pp. 397-398)

While industrialists riled against the state’s concessions to workers’ quixotic (from the vantage point of capital) quest for basic survival with the implementation of factory regulation, they also found ways to continue to extract wealth under these abhorrent (from capital’s perspective) conditions. They introduced the factory “relay system,” widely regarded in the “respectable press” as the epitome of “what a reasonable degree of care and method can accomplish” (cited p. 403). The system had workers scheduled to constantly rotate and come in and out, hounding the worker “hither and tither, in scattered shreds of time” (p. 403) to get the most of the 10 hours of labor per day. So when the state prohibits the prolongation of the hours of labor, capital
compensates by “converting every improvement in machinery into a more perfect means for soaking up labour-power” (p. 542). Notably, English industry advanced far more rapidly after 1848 during the period of the 10-hour working day than in the previous period of the 12-hour working day, and far more than during the period of the unrestricted working day (pp. 542-543).

However, these advances were part of a self-liquidation process wherein steps forward would over time reduce the power of Great Britain within the world system. Whether the fears of revolution within England could be attributed to legitimate fear regarding real radical political potential in the nation, or if the fears were more the product of a broader public pedagogy teaching Brits to fear movement for anything beyond tepid, top-down parliamentary reforms, cannot be said for certain. What is for certain is that changes were afoot, and not all of them involved innovative factory techniques to extract greater surplus from labor. The powerful political-economic interests closely associated with (also powerful) producers of fearful conceptions were not immune from their own ideological machinations. As a result, Britain began to reform its civil service administration in the wake of 1848. Newly introduced “open competition” civil service examinations strengthened an ideology of meritocracy, making it appear as though upper-level civil service positions were attainable by anyone, while in practice new procedures privileged men who received elite educations at Oxford and Cambridge (Ellis, 2013). This put those with a cultivated allegiance to capital and the state in positions of power. Trevelyan wanted to further combat Chartist ideas among the working classes, and he supported outreach to popular weekly papers to disseminate proper notions about respect for order and the state. Similarly, to deal with the problem of desertion in the Indian Civil Service and disaffection among colonial elite, the East India Company supported classical education of the English variety for civil servants in India entrusted with political and financial administration (p. 31).
But irreparable damage had already been done. Successful expansion of the US Empire in the 1840s, enabled by territory taken after the US-Mexican War (see section below) pushed Britain to take other measures that would undercut its hegemonic control. The US wove together new territories with written constitutions, compelling British reformers to dispatch new constitutions to its Austrian colonies (Colley, 2014, pp. 265-266). Fears of democracy related to the 1848 “world revolution” gave constitutional reform particular appeal among British policy makers who viewed the measures as token rights to placate the masses. The new constitutions led to greater demands for local autonomy and other anti-imperial campaigns, however, hastening Britain’s hold on the world system, precipitating its hegemonic decline. The following section details how that decline relates to succession a century later of another hegemonic power, with pedagogical undercurrents elsewhere in the Americas cracking the system all the way through.

**CRACKING THE AMERICAS: MANIFEST DESTINY, EMPIRE AND RESISTANCE**

This section begins with a description of cracks in the system found in the region known today as Latin America, followed by focus on struggles within and between the US and Mexico. As will be shown, 1848 marked the moment when the US made the first pivotal moves that put it on the path toward empire construction and enabled it to ascend to hegemonic status within the world system by 1945. Various public pedagogies, including the doctrine of manifest destiny, helped facilitate or legitimate some of those changes at the ideological level. Synchronously, subterranean pedagogies and subaltern praxis – the marginalized and alternative ways of relating, dialoguing and doing – also appeared in the Americas, occasionally with revolutionary import.

*The French Connection in Chile and Peru: History and Media beyond Borders*

To begin, the impact of revolution in France – both France during its earlier revolution starting in 1789 and France in 1848 – was felt in Chile. A group of young liberals known as the
“Chilean Girondins” refused to accept the authority of the conservative president Manuel Montt, elected in 1851 (Gazmuri, 2003, p. xli; Rock, 2002, p. 127). One of Chile’s so-named Girondins, Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, spent time in Paris in the early 1850s, and gained nuanced appreciation of the French people’s combative resistance to oppression, qualifying at one point that “those French people have barricades in place of heads” (cited in Millé, 2002, p. 155). Mackenna sensed the dormant revolutionary impulse still present in the French people even after Napoleon III’s rise to power. In Lyon he observed the specter haunting “despotic France” during the “insomniac night” (cited p. 155). He became well-versed in French intellectual culture, reading authors from Victor Hugo to George Sand.

One author that left an indelible impression was the statesmen Alphonse de Lamartine. Mackenna (1875[2003]) described in his recollections reading Lamartine daily back in Chile (p. 19). Lamartine wrote a history of the French Girondins, the political faction that rose to prominence in the early French Revolution. Lamartine’s book was replete with, as Mackenna described it, “accounts of the deeds of those celebrated men, their eloquence, their patriotism, their mistakes, their sublime and lamentable sacrifice, the posthumously glory that radiated from their genius and from their bloody end” (p. 19).

According to Mackenna, who earned a law degree at the age of 18 (Millé, 2002, p. 145), Lamartine’s “Histoire Des Girondins,” published in early 1847, through “means of love and poetry,” managed to rehabilitate “an age that until then had floated ghostlike in the popular mind amid the blood and flames of an incomprehensible catastrophe,” that age of Terror, transforming the guillotine into “an instrument of study, of justice, and of glorification” (Mackenna, 1875[2003], p. 7). Historical facts fell victim in the text to the power of Lamartine’s words, but
As mentioned in the section on France, it stirred revolutionary impulses that came to the fore in Europe in early 1848. In Chile, especially in Santiago where the book outsold all previous books, going for the price of six gold onzas (the cost of an entire library when Mackenna recounted events some 15 years later), Lamartine’s text prompted people to start calling everything á la Girondine or á la Vergniaud or á la Barbaroux or á la Lamartine (Mackenna, 1875[2003], pp. 7-8). It became a “prophetic book, like the Gospels,” and its author shone in the eyes of radical liberal Chileans like “a blinding glory as though his figure were that of a divine herald” (pp. 8-9).

The echo of the French Revolutions materialized in the Chilean men who formed the Society of Equality – or Sociedad de la Igualdad, or Egalitarian Society – in February-March 1850 (Rock, 2002, p. 127; Mackenna, 1875[2003], p. 15; Millé, 2002, p. 147). Mackenna served as secretary of the Club de la Reforma (Reform Club), and he was one of the founders of the new Society of Equality who wrote articles for its organ, *El Amigo Del Pueblo* (*The Friend of the People*) (Millé, 2002, p. 147). Leading members of the Society took names of famous French Revolutionaries: Girondins and Jacobins both, it did not matter. Francisco Bilbao, another Chilean intellectual who spent some of his childhood in Lima (Peru), was in Europe in 1848 defending barricades with Parisian insurrectionists that June (Perea, 2002, p. 209). During his revolutionary years in Chile, Bilbao took the name of Vergniaud. Santiago Arcos, who later wrote to a confidant to “Make use of your dagger, my boy” (cited in Mackenna, 1875[2003], p. 24) while in exile in California, appropriately took the name of the martyred French revolutionary Jean-Paul Marat. As a youth, Arcos received an education in France, and was influenced by the socialist pedagogies associated with Charles Fourier, Saint-Simon and others.

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59 Mackenna (1875[2003]) notes that Lamartine, “as a poet does not shy from taking liberties,” and his book remains as Lamartine even acknowledged, without notes or references, “so as not to clutter the text” (cited p. 35).
Coincidentally, his father had been a financier. Again, the influence of Saint-Simon’s doctrines on the financial class (e.g. the Péreire brothers) appears as a recurring theme throughout the world during this revolutionary juncture. In another historical coincidence, Arcos died while bathing in the River Seine when residing in Europe, just as the French martyr Marat had been, as the famous Jacques-Louis David depicted in his famous painting of the French political journalist, assassinated in his bathtub (Mackenna, 1875[2003], p. 25).

Like the French revolutionists before them, the radical Chilean liberals aimed to unite the small property-owning middle class with intellectuals and artisans. Through its organ and other work, the association tried to inform and educate the working classes of Chile. Montt’s administration shutdown the Society in November 1851 and imposed a state of siege, not unlike Napoleon in France or the Habsburgs in Austria or Frederick William IV in Prussia. Lamartine, deemed a “demigod” (Mackenna, 1875[2003], p. 9) by Chilean intellectuals, inspired their uprising. Despite repression, political clubs in Chile did not die. They formed the nuclei from which Chile’s delayed 1848 developed. A rebellion in the streets of Santiago in April 1851 – an attempted coup – tried to prevent Montt from taking power (Mackenna, 1875[2003], p. 26; Gazmuri, 2003, p. 40; Rock, 2002, p. 127). Only a few mutinous members of the army and small sections of the artisan population rose up and were swiftly crushed. Liberals in northern and southern Chile led another rebellion later that September, a veritable “civil war” (Millé, 2002, p. 147), but it was also put down quickly. Mackenna was forced into hiding, taking refuge in his family’s hacienda in Tabolango from January to November in 1852. Bilbao and comrades like Manuel Recabarren tried to carry on insurrectionary activities while camped out in the capital amid the atmosphere of repression that followed (Mackenna, 1875[2003], p. 32), but without much success. Mackenna would go on to publish the newspaper La Asamblea Constituyente

during renewed political upheavals in 1857 (Gazmuri, 2003, p. xliiv). After Arcos ended the ineffectual Reform Club and replaced it with a modern circle similar to those that thrived in France during the July Monarchy, he established the model for a Club de La Reforma redux, dubbed the Radical Party in Chile in the 1860s (Gazmuri, 2003, pp. xliii-xliv, li). It lasted into the twenty-first century.

The Chilean Bilbao lived in Peru around the time revolutionary activities picked up in that country. He organized the Sociedad Republicana, an abolitionist organization dedicated to promoting rationalism, and published an article in the paper El Comercio arguing slavery was incompatible with Catholicism and on a rational basis had to be ended (Perea, 2002, p. 207). From 1847 to 1849, the Peruvian artisan classes experienced an unprecedented level of politicization. Mid-century constitutional reforms spurred by liberal influences and debates in the press provided opportunities for political participation. Newspapers in Lima covered events in Europe during its year of revolutions religiously, and new papers, like Demócrata Americano and Los Intereses del País, started publishing in the provinces in 1848 (Perea, 2002, p. 199). The former featured articles arguing for the rights of workers to organize and for the rights of artisans to free association. Mobilized artisans carried through a campaign – the “Artisan Law” – later in 1849, to end trade liberalization endangering their professions and producing mass poverty (p. 202). Given their levels of literacy and informal educational attainment through popular print media, coupled with their precarious economic positions, the Chilean artisans arguably constituted a class of déclassé intellectuals. While their French-inspired politicized resistance was remarkable, it was also thus as would be predicted.

Like others in the Americas, Peruvians also felt the influence of Paris. They held Parisian-style banquets in Lima leading up to a rebellion against the government of José Rufino
Echenique Benavente in 1854. The uprising came in response to the president’s policy of consolidating debt bonds and allowing devalued Bolivian currency to enter the country, which many believed benefited him but not the Peruvian economy or population. In the contested political juncture a tribute owed by indigenous persons was abolished by liberals (only later did those affected realize the tributary abolition restricted their access to the village commons), and Echenique was compelled to liberate all slaves who served in the army for two years. As Perea (2002) documented, the Chilean Girondin Bilbao wrote a pamphlet, *La Revolución de la honradez*, which circulated widely and proved instrumental in Echenique’s downfall. A liberal president and administration soon assumed power, and a liberal organ, *La Voz del Pueblo*, started publication alongside a panoply of new pamphlets, gazettes and circulars. Political power plays for the next several years scaled back some liberal reforms, but a constitution in 1860 cemented certain gains made possible by the earlier revolution.

*Brazil’s Praiaera Revolt and Latin America Informed by Freire’s Insights*

Elsewhere in Latin America, the “world revolution” reverberated through Brazil, where a Praiaera Revolt started in 1848. Primarily a “provincial political movement” originating in Pernambuco, the Praia revolution effected a push back against the centralizing tendencies of the imperial court in Rio de Janeiro, and against rampant wealth disparities raised to the level of critical collective consciousness among urban poor in Recife where “street orators and

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60 Brazil was one of the many Latin American nations that obtained formal independence in the nineteenth century. Brazil ended its colonial pact with Portugal in 1822, but it remained a monarchy within the Bragança dynasty, despite ensuing movements for republicanism (Naro, 2002, pp. 101-102). Also like other former colonies in Latin America, the shift to independence for Brazil was more superficial than liberating in any substantive sense. Virtually all of Latin America after independence became subject to the new industrial imperialism imposed by the former colonizers through the coercive mechanisms of concentrated capital and the tighter integration (through continued privatization of land and commodification of resources) of the capitalist world economy, with its built-in core-periphery structural divides cutting across the globe (Powelson, 2011; Wallerstein, 1974; Gallagher & Robinson, 1953).
sensationalist newspapers highlighted social inequalities” (Naro, 2002, p. 100). International sugar prices fell during the economic downturn of the 1840s. This was when the emerging era of imperialism thrust former colonies into neo-colonial dependency, compelling the countries to produce tropical stimulants (e.g. coffee, tea, sugar) for export to provide Europe’s industrial laborforce with foodstuffs of less nutritious value but adept at helping them work in the factories (Jamieson, 2001; Kemasang, 2009; Powelson, 2011). Brazil, still using slave labor, suffered under Britain’s move to restrict imports of slave-producing sugar (Naro, 2002), and from Britain’s new free trade schemes subjecting other Brazilian exports like coffee to greater competition on the world market (Gallagher & Robinson, 1953). Falling exchange rates of Britain’s pound against the Brazilian real exacerbated matters (Naro, 2002, p. 103). Foreign merchants put pressure on local creditors, who put pressure on owners of small and medium size estates, who formed part of the resistance in Pernambuco.

With a right-wing government in power in September 1848, and media like O Progresso, published by the socialist-republican writer António Pedro de Figueiredo, conditions were ripe for revolt. When conservatives pushed those from the left-leaning Praia party out of provincial positions, a cross-class coalition of planters, artisans, recently fired civil servants (déclassé intellectuals), migrant workers and low wage or out-of-work poor (the infamous lumpenproletariat) gathered arms and went about burning cane fields and releasing prisoners from jails along the inland periphery (Naro, 2002, p. 113). Authorities placed the provincial port city capital of Recife on high alert, and elections scheduled for November 1848 had to be postponed. The publisher of the radical Diario Novo, Praia intellectual João Ignacio Ribeiro Roma, was forced to flee when police raided his home and newspaper office. Meanwhile, beggars, unemployed workers, farmers and vagabonds in Recife rebelled against the rule of
wealthy Portuguese creditors, merchants and planters with monopolies on land and commerce in straightforward class warfare; a few also engaged in wanton attacks on all Portuguese, screaming “*Mata Marinheiro!*” (“Kill the Portugese!”) (Naro, 2002, p. 117).

However, the general targeting of Portuguese by Praia rebels requires greater context. Portuguese in Brazil overwhelmingly supported the slave trade and attempted restoration of colonial rule before the 1840s economic crisis (Naro, 2002, p. 123), which formed the basis of much anti-Portuguese sentiment that boiled over in 1848. By the time the government definitively crushed the *Praíera* revolt in 1851, many Portuguese had left Pernambuco. Like the British after 1848 discussed before (see also: Ellis, 2013), the monarchy increasingly exerted selective control over civil service appointments and over local politics in the provinces to quell prospects of future rebellion (Naro, 2002, p. 123).

The Latin American countries of Chile, Peru and Brazil were not the only ones in the region to experience unrest during or immediately after the critical juncture. Colombia abolished slavery soon after liberal electoral victories in 1849 (Naro, 2002, p. 101). In the Rio de la Plata region (Argentina and Uruguay) events in Europe pushed the liberal intelligentsia to both oppose the dictatorial Juan Manuel de Rosas government and to move in an anti-democratic direction themselves. Liberal Argentine politician and journalist Félix Frías “became the inveterate foe of all the ideas and objectives of working class libertarian socialism” (Rock, 2002, p. 137), denouncing it as a “plebeian philosophy of sensual arrogance” (cited p. 137). Frías condemned the 1851 uprising in Chile, and claimed those “who sow anarchy will harvest bloody dictators” (cited p. 138). Other liberals in the Rio de la Plata acquired similar disdain for socialist ideas and generally gravitated toward elitist politics upon witnessing events in Europe. Yet, France’s revolution helped pave the way for a constitution to come in 1853 and later inspired elements of
the *El Noventa* revolution in Buenos Aires in July 1890 that (like most European movements in 1848) ended in reaction (Rock, 2002, pp. 140-141).

The Venezuelan-born Narciso López also led a series of attempted clandestine rebellions starting in 1848 to liberate Cuba from Spain’s colonial authority (Roberts, 2009, p. 46). Illustrating again the influence – as well as the reciprocal effects – of the European revolutions on the Americas, López led armies that wore red attire resembling the outfits of the Italian Carbonari and other clothes similar to those worn by the legion of Italian General Giuseppe Garibaldi. López took refuge in the United States during the summer of 1848 after his first foiled effort to achieve Cuban independence (Denton, 2015, p. 5). López’s flight to the US was an ironic historical move considering that as early as 1848 US planners had been contemplating the annexation of Cuba – ideas that circulated in the American press during that critical juncture (Roberts, 2009, p. 75). The US would also seize Cuban territory (e.g. Guantánamo Bay) years later after Spain relinquished control of the island. The US would also engage in a multitude of well-documented efforts to destabilize the Cuban government after the revolution of 1959 replaced the US-backed dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista with a formally communist state (Talbot, 2015; Foran, 2005), including efforts like the recent US Agency for International Development (USAID) funding of a social media subversion network to foment unrest in the country (Butler, Gillum & Arce, 2014; Butler, Gillum, Arce & Rodriguez, 2014). To better understand these sorts of actions undertaken by the interventionist-prone North American hegemon we turn now to events in the US during the critical juncture of 1848.

*The United States: Manufacturing Consent for Manifest Destiny*

In comparison and farther north, cracks in the system caused subsequent reconfigurations of world power. Events in and between Mexico and the US reached a pivotal apogee. The work
of philosophers, newspapermen, political elite and poets provide insight into the pedagogies that made it possible and the undercurrents of resistance coursing through the juncture. Previous historians and video historiographers have highlighted or used American newspapers to tell a narrative about the US (and Mexico) circa 1848 (Frasca, 2005; 2007; Zinn, 1980[2005]; Martin, Boardman & Tranchin, 1998). These have included little-to-no ideological analysis of how media functions as public pedagogy (e.g. promoting doctrines of Manifest Destiny) nor has previous research then placed this in a world system context, as is done below.

To the point, Walt Whitman, American poet and journalist probably best known for his verse in “O Captain! My Captain!” about the death of Abraham Lincoln, edited the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, a newspaper published in New York’s Kings County, from March 1846 until January 1848 (Belasco, 2008). During that time, the United States waged war on Mexico. While Whitman’s image has been rehabilitated in historical accounts since, with recovery of his (supposed) socialist politics identified as a possible savior for America going forward (Marsh, 2015) and his free verse poetry likened to a kind of anti-authoritarian, transcendental cultural anarchism (Vodovnik, 2013, p. 136-137), a closer look at his pedagogical influence challenges those narratives. The historical whitewashing of Whitman’s legacy erases the profoundly imperialist aspects of his public pedagogy.

Text from his Brooklyn Daily Eagle exemplifies Whitman’s imperial public pedagogy, both with his editing a platform wherein US aggression was ideologically justified and with his own words that appeared in the publication. As regards the latter, Whitman proclaimed in the Eagle during the build-up to the Mexican-American War: “Let our arms now be carried with a spirit which shall teach the world that while we are not forward for a quarrel, America knows how to crush, as well as how to expand. What is miserable, inefficient Mexico, with her
superstition, her burlesque upon freedom, her actual tyranny of the few over the many? What has she to do with the peopling of the New World, with a noble race? Be it ours to achieve that mission” (cited in Martin, Boardman & Tranchin, 1998).

Whitman’s newspaper further featured favorable coverage of politicians and political decisions reflecting a pedagogy of imperialism. To be sure, the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* was not alone among American working class papers in its support for militarist expansion. The *New York Sun*, one popular “penny newspaper,” as the publications were called because of their affordability and working class readership, also defended the US invasion of Mexico as part of “the open law of nature,” a proper reflection of “the instincts of animal life” (cited in Roberts, 2009, p. 74).

Whitman’s daily became especially adept at channeling populist impulses to back expansionism, however. On January 29, 1848, as Whitman’s tenure as editor for the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* was winding down, the paper published a piece reporting on a speech delivered by the “learned Senator” (p. 1), John Adams Dix. The speech, “on the subject of war,” the *Eagle* explained, “appears to have been a very brilliant effort and is marked by moderation and good sense which have usually characterized him” (p. 1).

Closer inspection of Dix’s speech and the laudatory *Eagle* article about it illustrates the emerging trends of the time. Reading on, *Eagle* subscribers learn what “moderation and good sense” mean. In contrast to Senator John C. Calhoun’s opposition to the war and calls for withdrawing troops, Dix “contended for the occupation of Mexico as the best means of securing peace” (Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1848, p. 1). Calhoun’s calls were framed as suspect, in the speech and article, whereas Dix’s contention, war is peace, was assumed axiomatic in the *Eagle*. The piece then informed readers of Dix’s moderation. While Dix believed “war was opposed to the
spirit of our institutions and ought if possible to be avoided,” he nevertheless “maintained that they were sometimes necessary and not to be avoided” (p. 1). That is, as contrary to American institutional ideals, war should be avoided, except for when it should not.

The question is begged as to why this war was necessary. Dix offered an answer, readily reported by Whitman’s organ. Premature evacuation of US troops from Mexico would result in “the wildest anarchy and by scenes of wretchedness and blood greater than have been witnessed any time before and leading the nation ultimately to place herself under the protection of some foreign power, under whose patronage a throne would be established and the way opened for further and more expensive and bloody wars” (Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1848, p. 1). According to Dix and the Eagle, one of many papers implicitly accepting such assessments, cessation of a war waged by the US would unleash “scenes of wretchedness and blood” (p. 1). That the battles fought in the war itself might have been responsible for thousands of deaths and hardship, for “scenes of wretchedness and blood,” did not enter into the frame. Somehow, stopping the then-ubiquitous “scenes of wretchedness and blood” was going to result in “scenes of wretchedness and blood,” as it were. An end to the generally agreed upon wretchedness and bloodshed of war, which (as Dix suggested) is to be avoided, according to this logic, brings about a new round of blood and horror – and anarchy, the ideologically loaded word favored by press intent on valorizing a particular kind of order, demonizing another.61 In the remainder of the “very brilliant” speech delivered by the “learned Senator,” as the story in Whitman’s paper put it, Brooklyn readers were informed “we were destined to go forward in spite of ourselves. We were destined to spread across this continent” (p. 1).

61 French anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon famously proclaimed “Anarchy is Order” (cited in Marshall, 2010, p. 5). Compared with the disorder perpetrated against Mexico in the 1846-48 war, Proudhon’s slogan and anarchy (even as the maligned alternative to ongoing war, as described by Dix and the Brooklyn Daily Eagle) appears all the more prescient and appealing.
This notion of Manifest Destiny cannot but help entrance politicians and press who remediate the doctrine. Subsuming early sentiments of American exceptionalism, the unexamined belief that the US is the the most exceptional nation entitled of course to dictate to others how to better run their affairs, the doctrine of Manifest Destiny emerged as a mediated public pedagogy in 1848. Material acts of aggression and plunder against Mexico soon tapped into and in turn reaffirmed commonsense exceptionalist assumptions that might makes right. Conquest offered and affirmed experiential facets of the imperial public pedagogy, and then both the press and the political class functioned pedagogically at the level of ideas to reaffirm the legitimacy of Manifest Destiny in action. Echoing Whitman’s Brooklyn-based publication, the New York Herald, another paper (and public pedagogy) produced for working class consumption, referred to the revolutions abroad and American expansionism together as “the hand of destiny” (cited in Roberts, 2009, p. 75). The populism of these papers aided President James K. Polk’s expansionist agenda.

In his December 1848 State of the Union address, delivered the year the US concluded its war against Mexico, President Polk exemplified the political elite’s promotion of Manifest Destiny as public pedagogy. Having recently acquired through conquest territory that would become the states of Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and parts of Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma and Wyoming (Frasca, 2007, p. 86), Polk praised the fraternity and munificence made possible by America. The president remarked, “Peace, plenty and contentment reign throughout our borders, and our beloved country presents a sublime moral spectacle to the world” (Polk, 1848). Further, “we may congratulate ourselves that we are the

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62 In his State of the Union Address, Polk (1848) actually refers to “the conquest of the Californias,” in addition to the unprecedented acquisition of Texas, New Mexico and Oregon territory. After the war ended in 1848 and the US gave Mexico $15 million for its ceding New Mexico, California and Texas territory down to the Rio Grande, the Whig Intelligencer contradicted the president, concluding, “we take nothing by conquest. … Thank God” (cited in Zinn, 1980[2005], p. 169).
most favored people on the face of the earth,” providing a fine “example of a prosperous and free self-governed republic, commanding the admiration and the imitation of all the lovers of freedom throughout the world” (Polk, 1848).

The president’s speech was not without precedent. Expressions of Manifest Destiny filled the speeches of politicians and pages of US media publications throughout the 1840s. Ironically, South Carolina Senator John C. Calhoun, whom Dix challenged in the speech covered by the Eagle, had earlier (when serving as US Secretary of State, from 1844 to 1845) claimed with respect to territory previously under Mexico’s control, “It is our destiny to occupy that vast region; to intersect it with roads and canals; to fill it with cities, towns, villages, and farms; to extend it over religion, customs, constitution, and laws; and to present it as a peaceful and splendid addition to the domains of commerce and civilization” (cited in Frasca, 2007, p. 87). Yet a long-time vocal critic of war, Calhoun denounced the fight against Mexico and introduced bills and resolutions to bring it to an end (Calhoun, 1847; 1848). Upon introducing resolutions the month before the war ended, Calhoun gave a speech to the senate during the year of “world revolution,” explaining he

opposed the war not only because it might have been easily avoided; not only because the president had no authority to order a part of the disputed territory in possession of the Mexicans to be occupied by our troops; not only because I belived the allegations upon which Congress sanctioned the war untrue; but from high considerations of policy; because I believed it would lead to many and serious evils to the country, and greatly endanger its free institutions. But, after the war was declared, by authority of the Government, I acquiesced in what I could not prevent, and which it was impossible for me to arrest; and I then felt it to be my duty to limit my efforts to giving such direction to
the war as would, as far as possible, preven the evils and dangers with which it threatned
the country and its institutions. (Calhoun, 1848)

The presumed futility of continued opposition to the war conveyed by Calhoun speaks to the
machinic operations of the state assailed by other anti-war critics less entrenched in the political
establishment, as discussed below. Initial opposition followed by acquiescence would be a
recurring theme among US political elite, enabling conquest, as also touched on in the
paragraphs regarding resistances near the end of this section.

Underpinning servility to state violence, pedagogies of American exceptionalism and the
aforementioned pedagogical doctrine of Manifest Destiny coursed through the critical year of
1848, as the US took measures that later made it possible to become the hegemonic power in the
world. The concept of Manifest Destiny had been popularized just several years prior by John L.
O’Sullivan, editor of the New York-based United States Magazine and Democratic Review.
O’Sullivan (1839[2005]), commenting on “our national birth,” as “the beginning of a new
history, the formation and progress of an untried political system, which separates us from the
past and connects us with the future only,” told readers that regarding “the entire development of
the natural rights of man,” Americans “could confidently assume that our country is destined to
be the great nation of futurity” (p. 43). O’Sullivan (1839[2005]) informed readers America “is so
destined, because the principle upon which a nation is organized fixes its destiny, and that of
equality is perfect, is universal” (p. 43). Predicting an “era of American greatness” within “the
magnificent domain of space and time, the nation of many nations is destined to manifest to
mankind the excellence of divine principles,” in this “nation of progress, of individual freedom,
of universal enfranchisement” (p. 44). “We must onward,” O’Sullivan (1839[2005]) averred –
“to the fulfillment of our mission,” “our high destiny,” “has America been chosen,” to establish
the “salvation of man,” because (again), the “country is destined to be the great nation of futurity” (p. 49).

As stated, ideas of Manifest Destiny animated institutional discourses during the first “world revolution,” in the political and media spheres. All editors in the war up to 1848 were not annexationists, but most papers supported Polk’s war against Mexico, some more so because they relied upon the system of spoils (political patronage) for revenue (Frasca, 2007, p. 87). Others, like Whitman, internalized the pedagogical assumptions necessary to support the US invasion. Whitman’s early editorial influence then informed the framing of articles published in the *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* up through 1848. In gushing over Senator Dix’s pro-war speech, the *Eagle* represented the prevailing pedagogy of the period. It remediated with pleasure the voices of politicians comporting with its generally pro-war presuppositions. The *Eagle* thus earnestly reported in its January 29, 1848 edition how Senator Dix questioned if the US could give in and give up Mexico, or if instead, “the behest of Providence, barbarism [sic] and ignorance must give way to enterprise, christianity and civilization” (p. 1). To the point and as reported, Mexico’s “aboriginal tribes must be extinguished or compressed into continually contracting areas. This was the inevitable law. Why should we hesitate to discuss laws over which we have no control. Emigration, then, would set into Mexico, and piece by piece, her territories and her people would melt away before the approach of the stronger and more enterprising races of the north” (Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 1848, p. 1)

As the *Eagle* extolled, Dix called for extinguishing the indigenous population, as part of the project of Manifest Destiny and in accord with “inevitable law,” “over which we have no control” (p. 1). A call from the “learned Senator” to exercise aggressive, warlike agency reverberates through the circulation of Whitman’s old organ, at the same time as the exercise of
any other agency (e.g. not waging war to annex Mexican territories) is dismissed as a matter over which “no control” can be exercised. Inexorably, natural “law” requires exterminating aboriginal populations and extirpating “barbarbarism” [sic]. Recall how the Chartist *Northern Star* in Britain referenced nature quite differently in 1848 than did the *Eagle*. The *Northern Star* appealed to aspects of the natural world like human nature – that is the constitution of conscious beings conscious of being conscious, as verified by capacities of self-reflection upon the world and one’s place within it. Lacking the directly democratic working class ethos of the Chartists’ paper, the *Eagle* contrarily repeats the “very brilliant” attribution of US aggression – or “enterprise, christianity and civilization” in ideological parlance – to the “inevitable law,” whereby concentrated power in the form of the state must expand to extend civilization through war and annexation.

Whereas Marx and Engels, in their manifesto circulated around the same time as this issue of the *Eagle*, wrote the history of hitherto existing society had been the history of class struggle, Dix and Whitman’s publication had a different philosophy of history. “Our past history,” according to the interpretation of Dix’s speech in that January 29, 1848 issue of the *Eagle*, “had been a history of the subjugation of the wilderness, and the path of our glory had been in building up the institutions of peace, civilization and christianity, and while our continued progress was certain from causes which we could not control, he hoped that our policy would never be inconsistent with the true character of our institutions, and the great ends of our mission among the nations of the earth” (p. 1). Consonant with the requisite ideology of industrial capitalism, history was conceived as involving domination of nature. The notion is ideological because the natural world cannot be dominated. Parts of it can be destroyed by humans and made uninhabitable for and by them, but ecology is not a human being that can be
made servile. Of course, capital is contingent upon social relations in which some classes of human beings submit to authority and exploitation, while other classes assume positions of authority, exert control over and exploit the former. A worldview wherein “subjugation of wilderness” can even be imagined illustrates the power of material conditions (e.g. emerging industrial capitalist relations in 1848) over ideas, and in turn the articulation and spread of those ideas informing actions that re-create those same conditions or structures. The same worldview lends itself well to appropriation of territory (expansion), and to ideas among men – it was men, not women, who were primarily responsible for this – that this expansion was perfectly right and natural.

*Jacksonian Democracy to Anti-Catholic Conspiracy Theory*

Mexico had become accustomed to the treatment part and parcel of those worldviews. The Spanish invaded Mexico back in 1829 to reassert imperial order over its former colony, unleashing another round of “aggressive militarism” (Powelson, 2011, p. 829) that brought “the Napoleon of the Desert,” General Antonio López de Santa Anna to prominence. He led the charge against the Spaniards. Texas fought and obtained independence from Mexico in 1836, but was rebuffed by the US when Texas President Sam Houston sent an envoy to Washington to ask for the state’s recognition and (Texans hoped) later annexation (Frasca, 2005, p. 47). Andrew Jackson, president of the US until 1837, feared annexation of Texas would create a slew of new social, political and economic problems. Jackson preferred policies alleviating the pressing problems to the extent possible within existing frameworks. Democratic reforms introduced by Jackson during his presidency, reducing the creeping oligarchic tendencies in the US republic, would later help allay social unrest during 1848 (Weyland, 2009, p. 411). Hobsbawm (1962) figured the “American Jacksonian Democrats” (p. 39), those pushing a populist “Jacksonian
democracy” (p. 63), an extension of the Jeffersonian tradition, unified labor and the petty-
bourgeoisie in the US in favor of republican reforms. The unified front mirrored concurrent
Chartist efforts in Britain, as well as the radical French republicans of 1848, only minus the
revolutionary impetus of the latter.

Just as Jackson’s political platform eased social tensions, his international policy sought
to do the same. Jackson did not recognize Texas independence until 1837 and did little to suggest
the US would annex the territory (Frasca, 2005, p. 47). Wall Street magnate Jay Cooke
speculated later that initial reluctance to annex Texas was soon enough counterpoised by
financial interests in the North eager to get full payment for their Texas bonds that would come
with annexation (Powelson, 2011, p. 829). English-speaking “Texians” (settlers in Texas, or
“Tejas”), “rebelled against the Mexican government” (p. 829) and were defeated by Santa
Anna’s forces at the Alamo, where the now-mythologized David Crockett helped occupy the
garrison. When Santa Anna was later captured, his release was contingent upon recognizing
Texas independence, which Mexico later rebuked as coerced. Mexico also suffered a French
invasion in 1838-39 in the “Pastry War,” when Mexico fell behind on loan payments to foreign
banks and subsequently felt the wrath of Louis Philippe’s forces while Mexican nationalists
attacked French pastry chefs. By 1846, English-speaking persons outnumbered the Spanish-
speaking population in disputed Texas territory, giving the US incentive to go to war, which
would culminate in “the US’s successful seizure of roughly one-half of Mexico’s territory” (p.
829). The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed February 2, 1848, established the new
boundaries to be “religiously respected by the two republics” (cited in Avalon Project, 2008), as
Article V of the agreement stipulated. The treaty of course afforded merchants from either nation
freedom “to settle their affairs” (in Article XXII), protecting them if “God fordid,” as the agreement read, “war should unhappily breakout” (cited in Avalon Project, 2008) again.

Prior to the February treaty, time-tested public pedagogies generated consent among the US populace for the war. In addition to vociferous calls for Manifest Destiny from media like Whitman’s *Brooklyn Daily Eagle* to pronouncements from a variety of political elite, other ideological instruments were put to work. Given generalized economic depression in the 1840s, the promise of new markets and new economic opportunities wetted American appetites for expansion in both the property-owning and wage-working classes. Of course, this expansion came at Mexicans expense, so it had to be justified by casting “Mexicans as inferior and unworthy of holding these territories” (Guardino, 2014, p. 343) by using nationalism, racism, religion and accusations of conspiracy to motivate and justify expansionism.

The use of religion and accusations of conspiracy for purposes of hegemony had to be accomplished in different ways, by different persons. American Protestants associated Catholicism with conspiracy, as evidenced by publications like “Pope or President?” which claimed, “The hand of popery,” would “secretly move,” “misdirecting or holding in check the rights of the people” (cited in Roberts, 2009, p. 107). Prominent pedagogues picked up on the frame. Samuel Morse, who wrote a series of tracts for the *New York Observer* (later published as a book), claiming evidence of a Papal plot to send scores of Catholics into the American West to prevent the spread of democracy (Guardino, 2014, p. 346; Frasca, 2007, p. 88). Another minister did him one better: Reverend Lyman Beecher. His daughter, Harriet Beecher Stowe, wrote the well-known “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” and remained a dedicated abolitionist. Harriet’s father was not quite as progressive as she was.
In a work widely circulated by 1848, the elder Beecher (1835) referenced the “signs of the times” and a new millennium about to “commence in America” (p. 10), that nation, “in the providence of God, destined to lead the way in the moral and political emancipation of the world,” so that its “character and destiny will be stereotyped forever” (p. 11). Religion and American exceptionalism converged in Beecher’s brand of Manifest Destiny. The text in a way forecast the famous essay by Henry Luce, “The American Century,” published in *Life* magazine almost a century later on February 21, 1941, near the dawn of US hegemony.\(^{63}\) Like Luce who so many years later called for America to assume global leadership and share its Bill of Rights and Declaration of Independence as models for other nations, Beecher proposed America cement its legacy of leadership by peopling the frontier and protecting republican and Protestant values.

Beecher did not stop by simply echoing emergent tropes of Manifest Destiny sprinkled with religious fervor. A Protestant reverend, Beecher followed in the footsteps of conspiracy-obsessed clergy in the US that came before him, like Timothy Dwight IV who riled against the democratizing influences of France back in the 1790s (Clark, 1987; Kramer, 1994[2002]). Beecher’s rhetoric presaged the xenophobic fits that would pervade the US; although the US seized much of Mexico’s territory, Americans have routinely been whipped into a frenzy over immigration as Mexicans would continue to cross the border imposed by dispossession. Similarly, Beecher (1835) stoked fears of “a consolidated mass of alien voters, to balance in contested elections the suffrages of the nation; rendering foreigners the most favored and most courted people, and giving and easy predominance to foreign influence in our national councils” (p. 55). At the time, it was not Mexicans per se who Beecher singled out, but he did criticize the religious affiliation predominant in Mexico, setting the stage for ideological expansion later.

\(^{63}\) See Bacevich (2012) for both critical and historically informed assessments of Luce’s essay and its legacy.
Beecher (1835) made clear “ministers of no Protestant sect could or would dare to attempt to regulate the votes of their people as the Catholic priests can do, who at the confessional learn all the private concerns of their people, and have almost unlimited power over the conscience as it respects the performance of every civil or social duty” (p. 60). An imminent danger was afoot, as “the Catholic powers of Europe, might decide our elections, perplex our policy, inflame and divide the nation, break the bond of our union, and throw down our free institutions” (p. 63). Catholicism, Beecher (1835) claimed, “a religion which never prospered but in alliance with despotic governments, has always been and still is the inflexible enemy of liberty of conscience and free inquiry, and at this moment is the main stay of the battle against republican institutions” (p. 85-86; emphasis in original). What is more, with some foresight as to the continental revolutions to come, Beecher (1835) cautioned:

> Capitalists and landholders, who feel in Europe the premonitions of coming evil are transferring their treasures to our funds, and making large investments in land, and facilitating emigration to augment the value of their property. Our unoccupied soil is coming fast into the European market, and foreign capitalists and speculators are holding competition with our own. (p. 73)

Fittingly, in this, his “plea for the west,” the preacher called for educating Americans so that the Catholic conspiracy could be defeated and domestic capitalists (the text implies) might outperform their European counterparts. Beecher’s anti-Papal paranoia has been documented before (Guardino, 2014), but returning to and highlighting his actual words, as has been done here, puts the anti-Catholic and American expansionist religious rhetoric in a systemic context showing where it fits within the project of Manifest Destiny and systematic US aggression against Mexico in the service of incipient hegemonic ascendance. Notably, as Europe was awash in revolution in
1848, evangelist writer Edward Norris Kirk elaborated Beecher’s ideas and called for American missionaries to head West, using the tumult abroad to carve out a distinct US identity in accord with Manifest Destiny and American exceptionalism. “We dwell in peace,” Kirk wrote, ostensibly oblivious to the fact the US had been waging war on Mexico for two years prior, “while Europe is in commotion. This is truly a chosen soil for the seed of the kingdom” (cited in Roberts, 2009, p. 109).

During the war against Mexico, religion remained bound up with nationalism. On the heels of the Second Great Awakening religious revival movement, many “Americans saw Protestantism as essential to American republicanism” (Guardino, 2014, p. 344). Some saw events in Europe as the sign of the end times and believed they were living in the period of the imminent Second Coming. The Baptist Banner, a publication read religiously (pun intended) by American evangelicals in 1848, derived the number 666, the so-called “number of the beast” mentioned in the Bible (Revelation 13:18), by assigning numbers to Latin translations of the French monarch Louis Philippe and of the new Pope Pius IX – prompting the suggestion that the continental revolutions were, as the Banner put it, “but preparatory to the millennial reign of Christ” (cited in Roberts, 2009, p. 110). Meanwhile, a Methodist minister in Virginia declared in 1848, “These are the latter days of the earth,” adding: Manking are shortly to see the fulfillment of the great purpose of the Gospel” (cited p. 110). Clergymen James Henley Thornwell asserted that European and American agitators going against the grain in 1848 were “not merely Abolitionists and Slaveholders,” they were also “Atheists, Socialists, Communists, Red Republicans, [and] Jacobins on the one side” (cited p. 113).

This all combined with a “dramatic increase in anti-Catholic sentiment” (Guardino, 2014, p. 345). Some of it came from Protestant churchmen like Beecher, concerned about – and
spreading fears of – Catholic conspiracies. The large influx of largely Catholic Irish and German immigrants in America in the 1830s and 1840s as a result of the economic crisis sweeping Europe and later from events surrounding 1848, exacerbated both anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic animus (Frasca, 2007). Guardino (2014) cites “the market revolution and rapid urbanization” (p. 346) in the US as culprits, coupled with mass immigration from famine-stricken Ireland unsettling society, especially the lives of the poor, now forced to compete for wages on the market with immigrant populations. Anti-Catholic ideas became “intimately linked with nativism” (p. 346). By the 1840s, Catholics came to be cast “as racial Others, subject to vicious attack in the media” (p. 345).

The best-selling American book prior to Harriet Beecher Stowe’s “Uncle Tom’s Cabin” was a text about a woman named Maria Monk, who described being sexually exploited in a Montreal convent in her narrative that sold some 300,000 copies (Guardino, 2014, p. 346). This fuelled sensationalist accounts of vile sexual acts perpetrated in monasteries and convents at the same time as fears of a Papal plot were rampant. One organ, the Boston Pilot, published by Irish Fenians, the movement seeking Irish independence in Great Britain, had called for an attack on Canada in 1848 after British policy ended privileges for Canadian exports, which incited fears in the Canadian government “if Irishmen and French-Canadians conspiring together in armed secret societies” (Taylor, 2000, p. 163).

Back in the US, ideas of spreading Protestantism became encompassed in the pedagogy of Manifest Destiny, as the speech excerpt from the Brooklyn Daily Eagle above illustrates. Imbricated in the pedagogy were also ideals of liberty, republicanism and free enterprise – as well as a nationalism that vilified the other. Conspiracy theories also entered the fray, forming a compound establishment pedagogy, a toxic brew of ideas with ideological serviceability.
Examples of these complex intersecting pedagogies abound. For instance, Hungarian revolutionary Louis Kossuth, who visited the US soon after the uprisings of 1848 were crushed, was denigrated as the “veritable Antichrist of the age” (cited in Roberts, 2009, p. 114) by Pennsylvania theologian John Williamson Nevin, despite Kossuth’s staunch anti-Catholicism. Even though Kossuth also rejected socialism, Nevin and others, prominent members of the religious community especially, nevertheless feared that tying American republicanism to the European revolutions would risk letting socialism in through the backdoor. American labor reformer and novelist George Lippard, just 26 after April 1848 (he died in 1854 at age 31), started studying the works of French socialists and radical republicans like Fourier, Blanc and Ledru-Rollin that year, and was consequently labeled “a Red” by critics (Roberts, 2009, p. 88). He responded by penning a satire about a three-headed Socialist, Red Republican and Fourerirte monster that destroys New York City, only with the twist that the story’s protagonist discovers the monster is really comprised of corrupt newspaper editors, merchants and clergy. His style foreshadowed the satirical works of another American, Mark Twain, who was only 12 throughout most of 1848. Lippard, a tireless advocate for the working poor, founded the Brotherhood of the Union to promote “cooperative unionism” and non-sectarian land reform (p. 88). Unlike many utopian socialists he acknowledged class conflict, and advocated for (if peaceful reform failed) “Labor to go to War … with the Rifle, Sword and Knife” (cited p. 88). Like Whitman and other writers at the time, however, his ideas on economic justice, far from the Marxian and Chartist visions of international solidarity, were distorted and undermined by his ardent support for militarist expansion through public pedagogies of Manifest Destiny and American exceptionalism. In his speech delivered at the National Reform Congress in Philadelphia in 1848 he emphasized the relationship between American and European workers,
but he also based his powerful pro-labor and anti-capitalist position in large part on the need for further Westward homestead expansion in the US to be realized by territorial annexation (Streeby, 2001, p. 8). In Lippard’s (1847) novel, Legends of Mexico, one of the many formulaic war-themed fictions benefitting from the American print revolution of the 1830s and 1840s enabling newspapers and books to be reproduced at cheaper prices and larger quantities than ever before (Denning, 1987), the author arguably “makes manifest a racialized definition of the nation-people and labors to justify exceptionalist theories of US empire as uniquely progressive and beneficent” (Streeby, 2001, p. 9).

A variety of broader public pedagogies, even those seemingly anti-systemic in nature, thus underpinned US expansionists’ ambitions. The US had annexed Texas in December 1845, after which US President James K. Polk had ordered General Zachary Taylor to protect the border, which was in dispute (Frasca, 2005, p. xxiv). The US and Texans who had taken the territory initially took the lower point of the Rio Grande River as the border, while Mexico insisted its northernmost border remained the Nueces (Nuts) River about 150 miles farther north. In 1846, after Mexican soldiers crossed the Rio Grande and ambushed American troops in the disputed border territory, Polk reacted by committing the US to war without the official measures required in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution that grants Congress the power to declare war (Frasco, 2005, p. xxv). Congressional authority was later granted, to the chagrin of senators like John C. Calhoun.

Imbricating pedagogies of Manifest Destiny coupled with anti-Catholicism galvanized US troops, as did the rugged individualist lust for adventure and fortune so celebrated in the annals of American culture. For example, an officer from Illinois, Samuel Chamberlain, personified the amalgam of that American ethos. Chamberlain later had his memoirs of war and
intrigue published – his “Recollections of a Rogue” (see Chamberlain, 1996). As Melzer (1999) wrote in his review upon the 150th anniversary of the US-Mexican War, “There is no denying that Samuel Chamberlain was a rogue” (p. 85). Chamberlain’s recollections are replete with pompous accounts of his sexual escapades and violent outbursts (e.g. stabbing his gambling partner with a toothpick). As an officer recruiting volunteers to fight against Mexico, Chamberlain promised potential soldiers all “the Golden Jesus’s of Mexico” (cited in Guardino, 2014, p. 349) they could grab.

In fact, volunteers often “fulfilled their fantasies” (Guardino, 2014, p. 350), as when a unit looted and burned the central Mexican village of Zacualtipan in March of 1848. Guardino (2014) qualified that far from just burning it down, American soldiers went about ransacking the “tabernacle and defecating in the church, breaking the statues, emptying vessels of chrism and holy oils onto the floor, stealing all of the chalices and other religious utensils, and stabling their horses in the church overnight” (p. 350). Properly pedagogical, this learned sadism actualized the anger and resentment being manufactured and channeled through the ideas of Manifest Destiny mixed with religious fervor and anti-Catholic conspiracy into aggressive behavior at the behest of emerging empire.

That same month, an army sergeant, John Peoples, editor of an American newspaper in Mexico, the American Star, castigated the Catholic faith, holding it culpable for the northern neighbor’s aggression. Peoples (1848[2007]) commented Mexico had been “destined” (p. 12) to succumb to defeat, given its belief in “the unnatural and abhorrent inventions of the superstitious spirit which gave rise to the institutions of Jesuitism and the Inquisition” (p. 13). As with the once powerful nations of Spain and Portugal “the festering canker-worm” of Catholicism infected “every organ of vitality and every fibre of strength with the poison of premature
rottenness and decay” (p. 13). Mexico had inherited the Catholic “canker-worm,” and its
“thousand superstitious absurdities” (p. 13). This gave “rise to a want and sincerity of truth,” so
that no Catholic “thinks of keeping his word; no one forbears corrupting his neighbor’s wife or
betraying his government; no one thinks it a disgrace to follow gaming or robbing as a
profession,” and “the military man who swears loudest to maintain his post with his life, is the
first to run away” (p. 13). Elsewhere, the sergeant affirmed that, in contrast to Catholic Mexico,
the Americans had “done well—done nobly,—and convinced the world that though we are a
peace-loving nation we are no strangers to the arts and sciences of war. With what pride can we
then call ourselves Americans!” (cited in Frasca, 2007, p. 86). The sergeant-cum-editor Peoples,
with his remediated anti-Catholic diatribe, insinuated the loose morals associated with the
religion left soldiers more inclined to run away, but he did not recount that sometimes Catholic
soldiers ran to fight for the other side, against US “peace-loving” aggression. In all likelihood,
the vitriol of the pedagogy embedded in the words of Peoples, Chamberlain, Beecher and
countless others contributed to the shift.

The shift came about in part because both regular troops and volunteers comprised the
US armed forces up through 1848. Urban poor and immigrants made up much of the smaller
regular army (about 40 percent), and their anti-Catholic nativism was less virulent (Guardino,
2014). However, officers in the regular army still garnered a reputation for treating Irish and
German soldiers almost as poorly as the Mexicans they were fighting. Coupled with the larger
pedagogical project of legitimating struggle for more land to be subsumed by the nation-state,
the poor treatment had consequences.
The San Patricios, the Polkos and Concomitant Press Coverage

Branded by the editor of the *North American* organ, William C. Tobey, as “miserable apologies for humanity” (cited in Frasca, 2007, p. 87), the San Patricios (or St. Patrick’s Battalion), a band of largely – but not exclusively – Irish and Catholic soldiers defected from the milieu of anti-Catholicism amid US troops and took up arms for the Mexican side. Causes and explanations for the San Patricios defection differ. Irish immigrants that poured into America during the famine years enlisted in the military with hopes of not starving, witnessed rape and pillaging perpetrated against fellow-Catholic Mexicans by US troops, and faced deplorable treatment from their fellow US soldiers committing the wanton exploits (Guardino, 2014; Frasco, 2005; 2007). Several years prior Irish workers in Boston and New York protested annexation of Texas; they also held a meeting denouncing the war against Mexico as a plot concocted by slave owners to expand slave-holding territory (Zinn, 1980[2005], p. 159). Significant numbers of Irish workers in America called for immediate withdrawal. Later, in combat, Irish-American soldiers were exposed to commentaries in the Mexican press sympathizing with them, as well as propagandistic pamphlets and leaflets distributed in the vicinity of US forces by the Mexican government (Frasco, 2007).

It was not just American troops that conflated Catholicism with Mexican nationalism, piling layers of White Christian supremacy and visions of Manifest Destiny on top of their pasty ideological epidermis. After Mexico gained independence from Spain in 1821, many Mexican writers posited “Catholicism was inseparable from Mexicanness,” and “that Mexico was fated to regenerate man morally in the New World, providing an example to redeem a decadent and materialist Europe” (Guardino, 2014, p. 353). The latter celebrated the Catholic influence on the nation as impetus for social change to redress the excesses of early industrial capitalist
development and concomitant public pedagogies undergirding those developments in the Americas. The former, in contrast, brought together ideological currents to justify the capitalist and imperialist expansion propelled by the enterprising US acting in accord with a powerful public pedagogy, and it did so by shaping that pedagogy to vilify the inferior Catholic-Mexican other, legitimating physical aggression and pillage. The material component of the pedagogy reinforced the ideational understanding of the US as sanctioned by God, destined for greater territorial acquisition at the expense of those Papal-dictated transgressors trying to takeover the republic.

Not only did that drastically distort reality, it also proved ineffectively educative for some within the emerging empire. There were those increasingly experiencing the perverse pedagogical effects of the imperial culture and the material activities in concert with it. Constantly subject to anti-Catholic and xenophobic harassment from American troops, about 2,000 men formed the St. Patrick’s Battalion and fought alongside Mexico’s army as the in major battles throughout the war (Frasco, 2007). The pivotal contest came just before the critical juncture of 1848. In August 1847 the San Patricios defended the Santa María de los Ángeles monestary in the small village of Churubusco south of Mexico City, holding it down as some 9,000 American soldiers shelled the site for three hours (pp. 91-92). When Mexican fighters started to run out of ammunition and moved to raise the white flag of surrender, those from the St. Patrick’s Battalion tore the flag down, knowing they would face death if caught by the US army they deserted. Some were eventually caught, others shot on spot and still others escaped. Many of those caught were later hanged. Some who escaped set sail for Ireland in 1848 to aid the insurgency against Britain. Both Britain and the US papers disparaged them. The

64 The total number of deserters reached 9,207 by the time the war ended in early February 1848: 5,331 regular soldiers and 3,876 volunteers defected (Zinn, 1980[2005], p. 168).
British Colonist newspaper reported that the mother country made arrangements to “ensure capture of this band of pirates” (cited in Frasca, 2007, p. 95).

Mexico also experienced seditious revolt of its own, but from “aristocratic rebels” (Costeloe, 1966, p. 171) who fought against a law passed in January 1847 approving state appropriation of ecclesiastical property. With similar, but more numerous, incidents within the US, the revolt against Mexico from within Mexico illustrates again the inevitable resistance to nation-state authority from within and in response to the state as an assemblage of hierarchical and hegemonic institutions always in the process of reproducing the power structures constituting their interlocking parts. In the case of Mexico’s sedition, it also highlights a case of partial breakdown in hegemony, a cleavage in elite consensus wherein different dominant structures of power and authority – the state and the Church, in this instance – diverge. The ecclesiastically-backed rebels in and against Mexico became known as the Polkos. A clandestine memorandum authored by the Church and now available in the Mexican government archives shows convent administrators provided 90,000 pesos to a leading Polkos general to aid the rebellion (pp. 174-175). The clerical press supported the Polkos until the insurrection was crushed without sizable gains from the military endeavors.

The Conservative Catholic press in Mexico, like El Universal, also covered the 1848 revolutions in Europe and ran articles comparing the French 1789 and 1848 uprisings, calling the former “unjust” and “depraved” and the latter morally askew because of attacks on private property (Lida, 2002, pp. 68-69). Liberal Mexican press like El Monitor Republicano and the moderate El Siglo XIX reported on Europe’s revolutions with favorable frames. By 1849 the left-wing organ El Socialista appeared on the scene, only to be denounced by the Catholic El Universal as demonic: “the first foundations of socialist doctrine are being laid,” the paper
informed readers, as “aberrations” against “the holy books” (cited in p Lida, 2002, p. 70). El Universal criticized even the liberal publication of El Republicano as “socialist” supporters of “stupid and evil individuals,” while the staff at the more moderate El Siglo XIX were similarly blasted as “the socialists” and “advocates of theft” (cited p. 70). After the May demonstrations in Paris, establishment papers in Mexico moved further to the Right. El Comercio, for example, cautioned Mexicans not to get caught in the web of confusion spun by men like Blanqui or Blanc in Europe, or those other “disorderly men, ultra-revolutionaries, communists” and “anarchists” sponsoring social disorder in France (cited p. 68).

_Taking California, Finding Gold and Exterminating the Indigenous_

But Mexico had more pressing concerns than specters of communism coming into 1848 and just prior. Rebels in California who asserted control over that portion of Mexico’s territory fared better than both the San Patricios and the Polkos in their conquering endeavors, but they were of a different stripe. US President Polk had tried to annex California prior to the rebel seizure, but without success. Under Mexican control in the 1820s, the province was home to myriad American Indian tribes and several hundred Mexican settlers who “lived a peaceful agrarian life” (Frasca, 2005, p. 75). Polk tried to buy California, but “the Mexican government did not wish to conduct a land transaction with a nation that had invaded its territory” (p. 76).

John Bidwell, a soldier in California, participated in what came to be called the “Bear Flag Revolt,” and years later told _Century Illustrated Magazine_ that “it was in everyone’s mouth (and I think it must have come from Freemont) that the war was begun in defense of American settlers!” (Bidwell, 1891[2005], p. 78). As the one-time soldier recounted about that “first conquest of California” (p. 78), he and a band of soldiers led by John Charles Freemont “simply marched all over California, from Sonoma to San Diego, and raised the American flag without
opposition” (p. 78). They first raised the “Bear Flag” – featuring one stripe and a picture of a grizzly bear that looked more like a pig – after seizing a small arsenal at the home of Mexican general Mariano Vallejo in June 1846 (Frasca, 2007, p. 76). Rebels declared the “Bear Flag Republic,” which lasted less than a month before the US took control. During the year of the first “world revolution,” the leader of the Bear Flag revolt, John Freemont, who assumed governorship of California after his soldiers seized the territory, would later face prosecution for refusing to give it up. He published a petition in the newspaper the Richmond Whig affirming his good intentions, noting “immediately on hearing of the war between the United States and Mexico, the flag of independence was pulled down and that of the United States run up in its place, and under the flag military service was rendered until the conquest was complete” (Freemont, 1848[2005], p. 79).

Around the time Freemont’s petition circulated in the press, people started rushing to the former Bear Flag Republic for gold. James Marshall discovered gold at John Sutter’s mill in January 1848, and immediately there was serious effort to keep it secret (Norton, 2014, p. 85). But by March 1848, the San Francisco-based newspaper, The Californian, published an article letting readers know, “California, no doubt, is rich in mineral wealth; great chances here for scientific capitalists. Gold has been found in almost every part of the country (The Californian, 1848[2005], p. 165). Sutter’s Mill, located near present-day Sacramento, lied within northern Mexican territory only just annexed by the US (Hobsbawm, 1975, p. 61). The discovery spurred a mass influx of people hoping to strike it rich. By November, a Texas paper reported that three quarters “of the houses in San Francisco are actually vacated; even lawyers have closed their books, and taken passage with a spade and wooden dish, to make fortunes by washing out gold from the sands on the Sacramento” (Democratic Telegraph and Texas Register, 1848[2005], p.
The paper went on to report that the real source of value, human labor, commanded higher price in turn:

Cooks and stewards have refused fifty dollars a month to remain under their former employers. Clerk’s wages have risen to a thousand dollars a year. Carpenters, blacksmiths and teamsters, who in April received three dollars a day, now refuse ten; a few still remain, making shovels, spades and pick-axes, and turning wooden bowls, and are making upwards of twenty dollars a day. (p. 166)

It was not just the “scientific capitalists” who prospered, but also the working classes who benefited from less competition in the labor force. Discovery of gold in California led to increased wages for sailors, freight workers and those involved in any of the exponentially multiplied exports to California (Hobsbawm, 1975, p. 62).

In the wake of these events, Friedrich Engels lamented how the 1848 Communist Manifesto he authored with Karl Marx failed to account for that unprecedented engineering of new markets out of seemingly nothing resulting from a fortuitous finding of a precious metal at Sutter’s Mill (Hobsbawm, 1975). The impact of the discovery also illustrated and strengthened the interdependence of the world economy. New gold “multiplied the means of payment” (p. 34) across the CWE, lowered interest rates and encouraged the expansion of credit essential for financing industrial development. California became a crucial node in a new trade network, linking the Pacific coast to Europe, China, Chile, Peru, Australia and other regions showing new interest in maximizing financial prospects afforded by the Golden State. The gold rush facilitated innovation in sea travel too, as merchants funded construction of new clippers capable of reaching the new capitalist hub quicker and with more secured cargo than before. The immediate consequences of Marshall’s discovery confirmed and solidified “the economic world as not
merely a single interlocking complex,” but as astute observers argued, “one where each part was sensitive to what happened elsewhere, and through which money goods, and men moved smoothly and with increasing rapidity, according to the irresistible stimuli of supply and demand, gain and loss and with the help of modern technology” (p. 64).

Of course, there were drawbacks. Not everyone was as fortunate as the few who found riches. The Chinese population of California increased quickly after 1848, from just 76 Chinese persons in the state in 1849 to about 20,000 by 1852 and 111,000 by 1876 (Hobsbawm, 1975, p. 63). Periodic economic slumps also spawned an increase in oppression, public ridicule and lynchings of Chinese immigrants in California, the “climax of a long racist agitation” (p. 63), the Chinese Restriction Act of 1882. When prospective miners first travelled from Russia, Mexico, Hawaii, Australia, China and from across the US in 1848-49 to strike it rich in California on the chance they could find gold, a series of violent attacks upon Californian Indians also ensued (Norton, 2014, p. 84). A byproduct of Manifest Destiny, the “conquest” of California and concomitant gold rush accelerated extermination of the indigenous populations of the Americas. Mass elimination of indigenous populations started at the dawn of Wallerstein’s (1974) “modern world-system” some 500 years ago, but America’s acquisition in and around 1848 accelerated the process.

Less than two years after Marshall’s discovery, the California legislature passed a law permitting white citizens to indenture Indians for an average of 16 years if they paid a fee of $2 (Norton, 2014, p. 89). An estimated 10,000 or more Indians in California were indentured between 1850 and 1863 (p. 91). Throughout the expansionist frenzy fueled by the gold rush, examples of brutality abound. Men at the deceptively named “Happy Camp” mine murdered some 30 or 40 Indians in cold blood (Norton, 2014, p. 85). Others raped, shot Indians in the back
and otherwise established a pattern of genocide. The state of California received subsidies in the form of reimbursement from the US government for citizen squad killings of indigenous peoples. Many murders followed. To cite just one incident, when the Tolowa tribe gathered in the village of Yontocket in the fall of 1853, to “pray around the world” – a spiritual practice conducted around the river, understood as the system’s center where heaven and earth converge – citizens from California’s Crescent City sacked the village, murdering men, women and children – some 450 in all (Norton, 2014, p. 84). Systematic excision of existing societies did not start in 1848, but the critical juncture paved the way for bloodshed in the name of expansion and silencing to follow.65

James K. Polk’s Presidential Discourse and Hegemonic Public Pedagogy

Without affording too much credit to one administration, actions taken and words uttered from Washington when James K. Polk was president helped pave the way for replacing populations (that previously held land in common) with white Americans (in the main, committed to private property rights and expansion of that rights regime through conquest). With some exceptions (e.g. Thomson, 2002; Roberts, 2009), historians have not adequately attended to America in 1848 in light of the European revolutions across the globe, and have thus overlooked the important (if still quite early) advances toward US hegemony and concomitant pedagogies promoting hegemonic ascendancy, including those coming from the president’s office.

Accessing the official transcript and examining the content of the aforementioned State of the Union Address delivered by Polk in early December 1848, illustrates the point. In the speech, the president invoked “the policy of humanity,” the “one which has always been pursued by the

65 Significant incidents of atrocity against American Indians after 1848 include the killing of 280 Northern Shoshoni in the Bear River Massacre of 1863, a massacre of Apache tribespersons carried out by Anglo-Americans, Mexican Americans and Papago [Tohono O’odham] Indians at Camp Grant around the borderlands between Mexico and the US in April 1871, and the US Army’s cannon abetted killing of 250 Lakota Indians in the massacre at Wounded Knee in 1890 (Jacoby, 2008).
United States, to cultivate the good will of the aboriginal tribes of this continent and to restrain
them from making war and indulging in excesses by mild means rather than by force” (Polk,
1848). The eleventh president of the US made the speech the same year the war with Mexico,
provoked by Polk back in 1845-1846, came to an end, after surfacing of stories about American
troops “indulging in excesses” through *the use of force* as they plundered Mexican villages,
ransacking churches. Greater excesses against “aboriginal tribes” would follow, with many
occurring in newly acquired California, as mentioned above. The president commented on the
immense importance of California for the US (once the Mexicans and Indians had been cast
aside). He noted the “surprising change” produced in California by “the labors of those who have
resorted” to “the discovery of these rich mineral deposits” (Polk, 1848) in its northern zone. He
acknowledged the increased cost of labor (higher wages), and how “all other pursuits but that of
searching for the precious metals are abandoned,” as almost “the whole of the male population of
the country have gone to the gold districts” (Polk, 1848).

Admitting the “abundance of gold and the all-engrossing pursuit of it have already caused
in California an unprecedented rise in the price of all the necessities of life,” Polk (1848) pointed
to other positives for the expanding US republic endowed by conquest of the state. Together with
newly acquired Texas and former parts of Mexico, the 851,598 square miles of new US land
constituted an “addition equal to more than one-third of all the territory owned by the United
States before their acquisition, and, including Oregon, nearly as great an extent of territory as the
whole of Europe, Russia only accepted” (Polk, 1848). Northern California in particular,
“irrespective of the vast mineral wealth recently developed there,” holds as much value as did
Louisiana when it was acquired from the French. “From its position,” Polk (1848) attested, “it
must command the rich commerce of China, of Asia, of the islands of the Pacific, of western
Mexico, of Central America, the South American States, and of the Russian possessions bordering on that ocean.” The new “great emporium” of the California coast would advance American glory, the president assured citizens.

The State of the Union Address in 1848 contained other inadvertently prescient remarks. Considering “the great aggregate of all our interests,” in the interest of ideological unification for which nationalism has historically availed itself, the president could have added, “the whole country was never more prosperous than at the present period, and never more rapidly advancing in wealth and population” (Polk, 1848). If not for the “disturbances in Europe” that year, he said as his words passed blame, “our commerce would undoubtedly have been still more extended, and would have added still more to the national wealth and public prosperity” (Polk, 1848).

Although he cautioned against a centralized National Bank – capital at different stages thrives with select decentralized institutions and dispersed abstract labor in myriad markets – he called for establishing a branch Mint of the US in California. The same year, as noted before, the Chicago Board of Trade opened its doors in the US Midwest, through which the era of finance capital walked through.

The doors to empire and hegemony simultaneously sprung open for the US, as they started to close for Britain. Like free marketeers in Britian, the president used populist rhetoric in his speech to argue against protectionism, in favor of liberalized trade and against “enlarged taxation and expenditures,” as had such a system “continued to prevail,” it would “soon have converted the Government of the Union, intended by its framers to be a plain, cheap, and simple

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66 The president expounded upon the point with greater exceptionalism: “During the present year nearly the whole continent of Europe has been convulsed by civil war and revolutions, attended by numerous bankruptcies, by an unprecedented fall in their public securities, and an almost universal paralysis of commerce and industry; and yet, although our trade and the prices of our products must have been somewhat unfavourably affected by these causes, we have escaped a revulsion, our money market is comparatively easy, and public and private credit have advanced and improved” (Polk, 1848).
confederation of States,” united for select affairs, “into a consolidated empire” (Polk, 1848; emphasis mine). As Grocott and Grady (2014) argued, US rhetoric rejecting the imperialist label functioned ideologically to occlude “the continuity of imperial purpose” (p. 546) carried on by America after Britain, expanding the institutions and relations of capitalism (e.g. free trade). The processes started in America in 1848 were a continuation of the British imperialism, not predicated on Britain’s formal colonial empire, but on its extension of liberal economic practices. Extension continued or deepened under US auspices. “Ours is not a consolidated empire,” Polk objected later in the address, “but a confederated union” (Polk, 1848; emphasis mine). The president’s words, portentous of the emergent age his administration helped usher in, came pregnant with irony.

Some of the irony could have been detected at the time. Near the end of his speech, defending at length presidential veto power, he emphasized the “proper checks upon the Executive, wisely interposed by the Constitution,” that “doctrine of restriction upon legislative and executive power,” to which nobody “will be found to object to them or wish them to be removed” (Polk, 1848). As stated before, the commencement of war against Mexico at first received no congressional authorization in the US. The president circumvented that requirement – at least superficially – provoking Mexico to react against encroachment on disputed territory around the Rio Grande (see also Frasco, 2005; Zinn, 1980[2005]). The irony of celebrating constitutional checks on the executive either conceals or elucidates consolidation of empire, depending upon the criticality of the observer.

67 See Gallagher and Robinson (1953) for analysis of the imperialism carried out by the British under the aegis of free trade promotion while it was still a hegemonic power.
Cracks in the Edifice of American Aggression

Aggrandizement of the nation-state and war for expansion were not universally condoned, however, just as resistance to other existing forms of oppression in the world system of 1848 cracked the surface. Reflecting later in life about his role as a 23-year-old second lieutenant in the army when he was sent to Texas to serve in the fight against Mexico, Ulysses S. Grant reiterated his opposition. The future Commanding General of the Union army in the US Civil War and the 18th president of the US recalled, “I was bitterly opposed to the measure, and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation” (cited in Frasca, 2007, pp. 85-86). Likewise, the newspaper of prominent abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison called the war “one of aggression, of invasion, of conquest, and rapine---marked by ruffianism, perfidy, and every other feature of national depravity” (cited in Zinn, 1980[2005], p. 157).

According to Zinn (1980[2005]) the whole affair “was a war of the American elite against the Mexican elite, each side exhorting, using, killing its own population as well as the other” (p. 166). From the annexationist and expansionist political establishment in the US, servile to speculators and moneyed interests hungry for unencumbered access to Mexican markets, to the self-glorifying pomp of Mexican General-President Santa Anna, the argument carries weight. Yet, like a plethora of historical narratives, it also downplays contextual complexities and the struggles of the underclass – perspectives from the subterranean “people’s history,” as it were.

A key fight in Mexico’s capital is case in point. When US troops moved to occupy Mexico City in September 1847, Mexico’s urban underclass (leperos), joined with criminals released from the prisons after Santa Anna resigned his presidency and withdrew his forces from
the capital, and fought back against the invaders they called the “Barbarians of the North” (Center for Greater Southwestern Studies, 2014). With help from holdover troops who did not go with Santa Anna, the lower classes of Mexico City gathered what pistols they could muster and tried to defend the capital. Both the US occupation and the undercurrent of resistance lasted until the war’s end in early 1848. A narrator for a Public Broadcasting Service four-part documentary, *U.S.-Mexican War: 1846-1848* (1995) recovered the history, recalling how the “thousands of beggars and indigents,” joined by ex-prisoners, “coursing through the streets,” most sans weapons, were only able to “heave stones at the invaders,” as the Mexican bourgeoisie bitterly denounced the efforts at resistance. Those in Mexico Marx would have considered the abject *lumpenproletariat* drew contempt from their country’s elite who looked upon the struggle against the US with generalized indifference, so long as their property and privilege were protected. They preferred their nation risk losing the war rather than risk losing their own wealth should the wave of revolutions traversing the world empower the masses of Mexico, like the underclasses who took up arms against invading Americans in the capital. The lower class revolt remained tinged not only with strong anti-American feeling, but with an ethos of nationalism many on the Left find disconcerting, then and now. Yet their nationalism was bounded to testable hypotheses and not crude devotion to abstract country. The lower classes realized if the US nation triumphed, their already deplorable conditions could become far worse.68

Back in the US, anti-war critics had greater luxury to consider the philosophical implications of American aggression, levelling explicit critiques of the state and any pedagogies of nationalism undergirding it. Writer Henry David Thoreau, residing in Massachusetts,

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68 It is for these sorts of reasons that the opinions of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels on the national question evolved, and they came to appreciate the progressive elements, complexities and varieties of nationalism after the 1840s (Kasprzak, 2012). Likewise, anarchists Mikhail Bakunin and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon were sympathetic to certain ethno-nationalist plights (especially Bakunin), although both recognized inherent, ineluctable dangers of any nationalism and the system of nation-states it entails (Kofman, 1968).
famously started refusing to pay poll taxes to the state to protest the war as early as the summer of 1846. He gave a speech in 1848 on “Resistance to Civil Government,” which would be published in a short-lived magazine in 1849 (Frasca, 2005, p. 98; Zinn, 1980[2005], p. 156). Thoreau (1849[1993]) wrote how our “mass of men serve the State thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies” (p. 3). That is, “the State never intentionally confronts a man’s sense, intellectual or moral, but only his body, his senses” (p. 12). His words correctly convey the intimidating aspects of concentrated power. The threats of force and violence, monopolized by the state, functioned then as now as highly effective mechanisms of coercion. Yet, his words belie the power of public pedagogy, the manufacturing of consent through education and media institutions embedded with assumptions about the legitimacy of state actions (e.g. war, imprisonment of populations) or about the normality of other existing institutions (e.g. capitalist production). Thoreau (1849[1993]) even criticized the government for not acting faster to enable free trade (p. 5), and chastised it for standing in the way of unbridled commerce and enterprise (pp. 1-2).

Writing during an earlier phase of industrial capitalism, prior to the age of concentrated corporate media, his assessment seemed apt, at least when contrasted with today. Having been jailed for opposition to war and concomitant taxation, he posed matter-of-factly problems portrayed as intrinsic to the state apart from property or production. Those who “necessarily resist it for the most part,” Thoreau (1849[1993]) surmised about opposition to the state in his time, “are commonly treated by it as enemies” (p. 3). When one lives with “a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison” (p. 9). And just as

69 However, his essay included – an albeit crude – class analysis. Thoreau (1849[1993]) observed “the rich man—not to make any invidious comparison—is always sold to the institution that makes him rich” (p. 10). He went on to draw a correlation between the more money an individual has and the less virtue that person must possess. But his analysis did not go so far as to critique a system where someone lacking ownership of productive property necessarily sells his or herself to a capitalist to work in the institution making that capitalist rich.
Tocqueville, Marx and Engels forecast European unrest in 1848, Thoreau (1849[1993]) likewise affirmed the legitimacy of revolt, even though it did not happen in the US as he hoped:

All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to and to resist the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. But almost all say that such is not the case now. But such was the case, they think, in the Revolution of ’75. If one were to tell me this were a bad government because it taxed certain foreign commodities brought to its ports, it is most probably that I should not make an ado about it, for I can do without them: all machines have their friction; and possibly this does enough good to counterbalance the evil. At any rate, it is a great evil to make a stir about it. But when the friction comes to have its machine, and oppression and robbery are organized, I say, let us not have such a machine any longer. In other words, when a sixth of the population of a nation which has undertaken to be the refuge of liberty are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun and conquered by a foreign army, and subjected to military law, I think that it is not too soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize. What makes this duty the more urgent is the fact, that the country so overrun is not our own, but ours is the invading army. (pp. 3-4)

With what would today be labelled an anti-imperialist anarchist averment, albeit of an adulterated kind sullied by acceptance of capital, Thoreau (1849[1993]) admitted, “I quietly declare war on the state” (p. 15). In effect, Thoreau emerged as an implicitly anarchism-inclined and less anti-capitalist American version of Europe’s Marx, without the same incisive socio-economic analyses or generations of followers in posterity. Thoreau’s anti-statist analysis differed appreciably from the pro-imperialist pedagogy of his contemporary, Walt Whitman, described above. Their different positions vis-à-vis the state made for very different
presuppositions about the ways of the world, which in turn led them to different public pedagogies.

Criticism of the US also came from abroad, but with decidedly lest anarchistic tones. In the first issue of the year, published January 1, 1848, the *London Times* critically analyzed actions of the US at war. Under their “AMERICAN AFFAIRS” section and authored by an anonymous “GENEVESE TRAVELLER,” the article stated there was no hope for peace, only “devastation, blood, carnage, and conquest,” as military officials revile in the “halls of the Montezumans,” and the “President appears to triumph and glory in the slaughter and destruction which he anticipates” (p. 3). No prospects for peace existed, so long as “Congress sustain Mr. Polk, until the nationality of Mexico is annihilated” (p. 3). What was being “levied” on the Mexicans, according to the writer for the *Times*, was done “for the sole purpose of reducing them to a state of vassalage, and when they are reduced to worse than southern slavery the Mexicans, as the last act of desolation, may be compelled to give up the gold and silver and other valuables, with which their churches, &c, are ornamented” (p. 3). “While this sacrilege and plunder are glimmering in the distance,” the editorial continued, “and while all good men shrink appalled at the prospect, there is a war party pretending to Christianity who justify the contemplated measures of the Government, and ascribe to the Giver of all good gifts this visitation as a punishment for the idolatry of the victims” (p. 3), quoting Scripture texts in support of the revolting movement.

Great Britain at another historical moment might have took action to prevent the US from acquiring more land by conquering disputed territory. Beset by the economic crises of the 1840s, beseeched by calls for serious reform with threats of insurrection at home and entangled in colonial war in the Punjab, British officials could do little to prevent the emergence of US
Empire.\textsuperscript{70} British press could condemn American conquest with a degree of veracity lacking in the parade of US publications parroting the official state line. But as a hegemonic power, Britain began its gradual decline, looking on as the US learned to exert preponderant influence in its hemisphere by putting interrelated public pedagogies for domination into practice.

Criticism of the war came from the US establishment too, but even when incisive and eloquent, it tended to remain within the framework of suppositions uncritical of US state power or exceptionalism, as stated above. When Illinois Congressman Abraham Lincoln – later the 16\textsuperscript{th} president during the US Civil War – spoke in the House on July 27, 1848, in support of General Zachary Taylor’s bid for president, he offered a prudent qualification about the recently concluded war. Addressing the Democrats regarding their belief the Whigs were hypocritical for not supporting the war but then supporting General Taylor’s candidacy, he said they all probably think it must be very awkward and embarrassing for us to go for General Taylor. The declaration that we have always opposed the war is true or false, according as one may understand the term ‘oppose the war.’ If to say ‘the war was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced by the President’ be opposing the war, then the Whigs have very generally opposed to it…. The marching into the midst of a peaceful Mexican settlement, frightening the inhabitants away, leaving their growing crops and other property to destruction, to you may appear a perfectly amiable peaceful, unprovoking procedure; but it does not appear so to us…. But if, when the war had begun, and had become the cause of the country, the giving of our money and our blood, in common with

\textsuperscript{70} Evidence for this claim has already been adduced. British statesmen and concentrated private power in the British Empire almost certainly would have preferred the US not to expand and gain access to new markets through conquest. The \textit{London Times} commentaries disparaging the US war corroborate this claim. But Britain was indisputably embroiled in conflicts with its colonies, exacerbated by the liberal economic doctrines advanced by British capitalists. The Chartist movement raised the specter of rebellion in the British mainland. If British authorities had wanted to pressure the US and try to stop the latter from making incipient moves toward hegemony, they were not in a position to do so.
yours, was support of the war, then it is not true that we have always opposed the war.


Lincoln’s statement invoked patriotism and national fealty so as to delineate a respectable terrain of war opposition, distinct from those who would abandon the country once aggression commenced. Senator Calhoun sketched a similarly qualified position for himself, as previously detailed. Similar values also informed Lincoln’s presidency during the Civil War when issues of slavery in the US came to the fore. Slavery, as an institution, held humans in bondage and provided the capital for capitalism in America to develop.

Another anti-war writer and abolitionist, familiar with issues of slavery, deviated from the bounds of establishment discourse at the time without sacrificing eloquence. Frederick Douglass, a former slave, wrote in the January 21, 1848 issue of the North Star, a Rochester newspaper not to be confused with the Chartist Northern Star in Britain, of “the present disgraceful, cruel, and iniquitous war with our sister republic. Mexico seems a doomed victim to Anglo Saxon cupidity and love of dominion” (cited in Zinn, 1980[2005], p. 157). Like Thoreau, he implored Americans to take real risks to stop the machine. That same year, Douglass continued his abolitionist media writing as well. He wrote for the Liberator, an abolitionist organ published by William Lloyd Garrison (Seldon, 2015). In an open letter addressed to his former slave master Thomas Auld and published in the September 3 edition of the Liberator, Douglass (1848[1999]) openly informed Auld, “I wear stripes on my back inflicted by your direction,” and he reminded him how he had been “dragged at the pistol’s mouth,” for fifteen miles “like a beast in the market” (p. 111). Likening Auld’s actions to those of all slave-owners, he lashed back at him for having deprived his sister and brother “of the power to read and write,” robbing “them of the sweet enjoyments of writing and receiving letters,” adding: “Your wickedness and cruelty
committed in this respect on your fellow-creatures, are greater than all the stripes you have laid upon my back, or theirs. It is an outrage upon the soul—a war upon the immortal spirit, and one for which you must give account at the bar of our common Father and Creator” (p. 111).

Douglass concluded by letting Auld, a self-righteous religious man, know “I shall make use of you as a means of exposing the character of the American church and clergy—and as a means of bringing this guilty nation with yourself to repentance” (p. 111).

The intersections of the war on Mexico and institution of slavery – and opposition to both – coupled with other pressing issues, emerged irrevocably during this critical juncture. As predicted by abolitionists and anti-war activists in the press, acquisition of Mexican land fueled further dissension between the proponents and opponents of slavery, culminating in a Civil War less than 15 years afterward (Frasca, 2007, p. 96).

Highlighting similar intersections, the emergence of the abolitionist Free Soil Party in the US during the 1848 national election\(^{71}\) showcased how the European revolutions functioned as reference point for slavery debates. Advocates of the Free Soil cause like Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner claimed the campaign of Whig candidate Zachary Taylor was a conspiracy engineered by those he likened to the absolutist European reactionaries responsible for crushing the ’48 revolutions (Roberts, 2009, p. 67). The reference point went both ways: Free Soilers were associated with dangerous European-style insurrection, especially after the June Days in France. The Free Soil anti-slavery cause found its way into the platform of the new Republican Party founded in 1856.\(^{72}\) It might be hard for Americans to understand today, but

\(^{71}\) Martin Van Buren ran on the Free Soil Party ticket in 1848. The third party intervention might have hurt Democratic candidate Lewis Cass, who lost to Taylor, who ran as a Whig and won the popular vote by five percent (Roberts, 2009, p. 80). Granted, Cass had been abroad in Europe in 1848, and many Americans were wary of him for that reason, fearing foreign revolutions would mutate into domestic turmoil if dangerous influences prevailed.

\(^{72}\) One of the early Republican leaders, Carl Schurz, had been a “forty-eighter” in Europe and only arrived in the US in 1852 (Roberts, 2009, p. 184).
when it was founded the Party was also pejoratively associated with the revolutions that had recently transpired in Europe: Slavery defenders started describing the party as “Red Republican,” equating it with the socialist undertones of revolutionary republicanism in the Old World. Demonstrating the pedagogical effect of the veritable “world revolution,” Republicans in the US indeed re-enacted their own version of 1848, insisting the US – whatever exceptional identity that might have been constructed for it vis-à-vis revolutionary Europe – was not immune to social upheaval. The Civil War hammered this point home.

Back in July 1848, during the year of “world revolution,” early forms of intersectionality took root when dissenting voices gathered at the Seneca Falls Convention in New York for a two-day discussion about the social, political, economic, civil and religious rights of women (Bratt, 1995). Frederick Douglass was one of the men who joined the approximately 300 women for the meeting. Douglass also supported the controversial call for women’s suffrage advanced by Elizabeth Cady Stanton.73 He also wrote in the North Star in the wake of the convention that while many had “at last made the discovery that the [N]egroes have some rights [like] other members of the human family,” they had yet “to be convinced women are entitled to any” (cited in Roberts, 2009, p. 90). In contrast, newspapers like the New Orleans Picayune and the New York Herald connected the Seneca convention to women participating in a bloody insurrection, as in the workers’ uprising in Paris that June (p. 91). In actuality, the convention culminated with 68 women and 32 men signing the Declaration of Sentiments, the first public pronouncement of women’s equality in all the aforementioned spheres. Bratt (1995) identified this moment in 1848 as the inauguration of the organized women’s rights movement in the US. The Declaration

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73 The irony regarding the controversial aspects of universal suffrage in 1848 were not lost on Bratt (1995), who acknowledged suffrage for women was one of the only resolutions adopted at the Seneca Falls Convention which has been fully realized.
altered the discourse on women’s work, offering that man “has monopolized nearly all the profitable employments, and from those she is permitted to follow, she receives but a scanty remuneration” (cited in Bratt, 1995, p. 717). Seneca Falls attendees criticized the socialization supporting patriarchy. “He has endeavored,” their Declaration of Sentiments stated, “in every way that he could, to destroy her confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and to make her willing to lead a dependent life” (cited in Bratt, 1995, p. 718). However, for all of its historic achievements, even given America’s situation, embroiled in a war of aggression, the problem of women’s rights across borders was not posed or pursued at Seneca.

Communalism, Utopian Socialism and Prefigurative Politics in America

Elsewhere there were attempts in 1848 to address the national question. Both prefigurative political action to create utopia amid chaos and armed class struggle in the Americas took this beyond the tax refusal method of resistance advocated by Thoreau. As documented, economic disturbances and outbreak of revolution in Europe created a new class of the insecure, those stripped of erstwhile middle and working class protections. Kagay (2013) cites the formation of this new class as a primary reason for renewed interest in utopian socialist experiments – not just in theory, but in practice and, as argued here, in America.

Welshman Robert Owen and Frenchman Ètienne Cabet emerged as influential figures in the US-based utopian socialist experiments. Ètienne Cabet, born into a petite-bourgeois family in Dijon in 1788, became a strong (if paternalistic and authoritarian74) advocate of the proletariat. He became a strong advocate of utopian socialism too, especially after spending five years in exile in England and coming under the influence of Robert Owen (Kagay, 2013, p. 361). Years earlier, prior to the annexation of Texas, Owen networked with elite sectors of society in Britain

74 “As apparent in his later utopian ventures, Cabet had little use for democratic consultation and did not tolerate lightly freethinkers among his followers” (Kagay, 2013, p. 364).
and the Americas to see about securing a liminal space between the US and Mexico for a utopian socialist colony. He travelled to Mexico in the late 1820s and networked with influential persons, including: the Prime Minister of Great Britain; the US ambassador to Britain; Mexico’s Santa Anna; Richard Exter (a wealthy British merchant in possession of Texas land); Guadalupe Victoria (then-president of Mexico); José María Bocanegra (Mexico’s minister of foreign affairs); various other Latin American dignitaries and the US diplomat Joel Roberts Poinsett (Herrera, 2013). Having explained to Poinsett his plans to establish a communitarian settlement in Texas that could function as a utopic buffer zone between Mexico and the US, maintaining peace between the two nations and serving as a model to both states of what a better society might look like, Owen thought he had secured a partner in his colonization quest. Unfortunately for Owen, Poinsett, an ardent American nationalist and expansionist, was on a diplomatic mission “to obtain as much of Texas as possible” (Herrera, 2013, p. 349). Poinsett listened attentively to Owen’s plans, likely so as to obtain information making it easier for the US to acquire Texas territory later, not to help facilitate realization of utopian dreams.

Owen’s initial plans fell through, but Cabet recuperated his project in 1847-48. Like Owen, Cabet eschewed class-based movements. Elected a member of the Chamber of Deputies under Louis Philippe’s government – the royal administration later charged him with treason prior to the 1848 revolution – Cabet wanted the bourgeoisie and proletariat to work together for a gradual democratic socialist transition to a world with property held and worked in common (Kagay, 2013, pp. 361-362). In that way he echoed the electioneering ideology of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, who entreated employers and workers to rally around him in his campaign efforts, explained before. Like Proudhon, Cabet wrote for and published his own organ. Using the newspaper *Le Populaire*, he disseminated his ideas en masse. Just before the February
Revolution, Cabet used his organ to denounce Louis Philippe as the “Bourgeois King” (cited in Kagay, 2013, p. 368). He authored the popular novel *Voyage en Icarie* (1839) based loosely on Thomas More’s (1516) *Utopia*, and he tried to turn his fictional narrative into a reality. Cabet consulted with Owen and arranged by May 1847 to constitute a real-life Icaria, a workers’ community-colony in north-central Texas (Kagay, 2013, p. 366). Working with a St. Louis investor, Cabet purchased the land necessary, although he did not know when he entered the business arrangement that the territory would be non-contiguous. Publicizing his project as the new paradise on earth, he managed to entice 69 men to sail from Paris on January 29, 1848, singing “La Marseillaise” as they embarked on their journey, all wearing the same style clothes in a show of communal (slightly cultish) solidarity (p. 372). The Icarians reached America in late March, and while a few departed to return to France upon learning of the February Revolution back home, the rest continued on what proved a hellacious journey across rough terrain without roads and against the unbearable heat to which none of the European urbanites were acclimated. Despite lack of adequate provisions and an epidemic of dysentery among the crew, they arrived at their destination in early June 1848.

While back in France, Cabet wrote about the Icarian’s adventures, but he downplayed their hardships endured. Cabet’s articles omitted the effects of working relentlessly to manage the foreign soil amid swarms of mosquitoes, chiggers and black flies that left the colonizers morally and mentally defeated (Kagay, 2013). Several died. One doctor became deranged. Others fell sick with severe scurvy attributed to gross malnutrition. Many contracted malaria (Vial, 1957, p. 144). And at least one Icarian was struck by lightning. As a public pedagogy,

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75 Police ransacked the office of Cabet’s newspaper on January 4, 1848, confiscating his documents and charging him with forming a secret society of Icarian youth (Kagay, 2013, p. 370).
76 The crew split earlier to chart different routes to the Promised Land, but both cadres made it to the site early in June 1848 (Kagay, 2013).
Cabet’s utopian socialism suffered from insidious chasms between its theoretical, media image and the lived experiences of those learning to loathe top-down dogmas. Upset over reports of the fictitious accounts of their venture littering the pages of *Le Populaire* back home, remaining Icarians sought a new settlement. Some migrated to Nauvoo, Illinois, an abandoned town bereft of citizens ever since a spate of anti-Mormon violence forced the majority Mormon population who lived there to flee (Flandes, 1975). Upon relocating to the US Midwest, the French communalists accepted their erstwhile pedagogue with open arms, and Cabet joined them in Illinois for what became a moderately successful utopian venture. Thereafter, the Icarians and Cabet “repaired old buildings, constructed living quarters and printed a great many books and pamphlets promulgating his ideas” (Juan-Navarro, 2009, p. 95). Within 10 years they had shops, schools and of course a regularly published newspaper (Friesen & Friesen, 2004, pp. 136-139). Icarians in America fared a bit better up north, but not much. Cabet’s communal experiment also involved the meeting of a general assembly to select persons to oversee administration of those goods and services. The Icarian philosophy called for equal work for all, with the products of labor held in common. The community expanded to include 500, but eventually lost monetary backing because of legal claims made against Cabet back in France. He died in 1856. Efforts at communalist socialism in the settlement gradually degenerated, and Cabet’s Icarian communities disappeared before the turn of the century.

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77 Friesen and Friesen (2004) claim the Icarians relocated to *Nauvoo, Texas*, after efforts at utopian living along the Red River in Fannin County, Texas proved feckless. However, a slew of other historians refer to the abandoned Mormon town of *Nauvoo, Illinois* (Kagay, 2013, p. 373; Flanders, 1975; Berry, 1992). Vial (1957) even describes the trip 260 Icarians took on steamboat up the Mississippi, then crossing the river by ferry and then seeing the abandoned temple sacred to the Mormons who had lived in Nauvoo previously (p. 145). “While the details of the ill-fated expedition to Texas are sketchy and still obscure on many points,” Vial (1957) adds, “we are fortunate in having in our possession a full account of the life at Nauvoo, thanks to the diaries of two later colonists discovered lately and published by M. Fernand Rude” (p. 146). Friesen and Freisen (2004), evidently, did not read the documents (or did not read them very closely). Kagay (2013) also notes it was *Denton County, Texas* – in contrast to Friesen and Friesen’s (2004) claim the utopian attempt was started in Fannin County – where Cabet’s followers attempted to found their utopian settlement in 1848 (p. 358).
Incidentally, another communalist experiment in America started in 1848. Vermont-native John Humphrey Noyes, a devout-yet-unorthodox millenarian, founded the Oneida Community in central New York State that year (Foster, 2011). Oneida differed from Icaria. The latter was founded by a utopian socialist Frenchmen; the former vehemently disproved of the French. In his rhetoric, Noyes reiterated some of the earlier eighteenth century sentiments of contempt for the French Revolution in his rhetoric. Noyes added a twist. Unlike plot-obsessed US clergy who used accusations of French conspiracies to ideologically legitimate anti-democratic conservatism, Noyes inverted the strategy. In a letter to journalist William Lloyd Garrison just a few years prior to the institution of Oneida in New York during the “world revolution,” Noyes rejected nationalism of both the Amerian and French varieties:

I am writing that all men should know that I have subscribed my name to an instrument similar to the Declaration of ’76, renouncing allegiance to the government of the United States, and asserting the title of Jesus Christ to the throne of the world. … [The US is] ripe for a convulsion like that of France; rather, I should say, for the French Revolution reversed. Infidelity roused the whirlwind in France. The Bible, by the Anti-Slavery and similar movements, is doing the same work in this country. So, in the end, Jesus Christ, instead of a blood-thirsty Napoleon, will ascend the throne of the world. The convulsion which is coming will be, not the struggle of death, but the travail of childbirth—the birth of a ransomed world. (cited in Foster, 2011, pp. 4-5)

Noyes’ rhetoric invoked religion as justification for a revolution in living, or a transvaluation of values in a non-statist, communalist mode. The timing of this cannot be emphasized enough. Noye’s revolutionary proclamations and the Oneida project commenced amid a wave of revolutions occurring on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean and in the wake of a major US
military appropriation from Mexico. In contradistinction, Noyes elicited a subaltern consciousness, re-signifying religion’s malleable and elastic social and cultural properties to construct a radical and alternative public pedagogy.

Despite revolutionary overtones and embodied subversive relations within the commune, Noyes largely sought a conciliatory relationship with the outside world, opting to prefigure in relative isolation rather than contest the problematic society from which the Oneidans partially aimed to escape (Foster, 2011). Noyes and his Oneida Perfectionists focused on creating the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, as called for by the famous biblical prayer in Matthew 22:30. They embraced the communalism of the early Christian Church founded on the Pentacost, where all things were held in common. The self-styled “Bible Communists,” a term they soon adopted for themselves (Barnard, 2007), even took it a step further.

Part of the impetus for establishing the community in Oneida, New York, had to do with the relative seclusion of the area and the sympathetic views of surrounding neighbors regarding the commune’s sexual practices (La Moy, 2012). The Oneidans practiced a form of “free love” based on the system of “complex marriage” the community practiced. Noyes based this Oneidan doctrine on biblical scripture explaining angelic existence in Heaven precludes marriage. Consonant with the logic that life on earth should emulate Heaven, the Oneidans adopted polyamorous relations with one another. With monogamy prohibited on the grounds it undermined communalism, all men and women were considered heterosexually wed to everyone else in the group; all were empowered to enjoy frequent love-making with multiple partners on an open-ended but monitored basis (Barnard, 2007; Foster, 2011). To avoid burdening women

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79 Noyes cited Matthew 22:30, which explains, “In the Kingdom of Heaven they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels” (cited in La May, 2012, p. 123). “The new commandment is that we love one another,” Noyes explained, “not by pairs, as in the world, but en masse” (cited in Barnard, 2007, para. 19).
with incessant pregnancies, men trained in the art of “male continence,” or *coitus reservatus* (La Moy, 2012). In the brick Mansion House the community had built by 1862 (Barnard, 2007), the men learned how to withhold ejaculation in order to allow for the fullest development and arousal of what Oneida community member Dr. Geo Edward Cragin called the “amative nature” of both men and women (cited in Lay Moy, 2012, p. 125). As Cragin explained,

> The principle of Community of interests in property was simply extended to the human relation. … We found in actual practice there was a great difference in the power of sexual Self Control among men. While one man would develop strong power of Control and could prolong sexual intercourse indefinitely, another man would have no control whatever, a bare penetration would cause the ejaculatory orgasm and only a prompt withdrawal would prevent an exposure to conception. This was found to be the case particularly with young unmarried men who had had no previous sexual experience. The mere presence of the male organ within the vagina without any attempt at reciprocal motion would bring on the sexual crisis. (cited in La Moy, 2012, p. 125)

Sympathy could easily be extended to the overly-excited young Oneidan men – and to the communal experiment as a whole, given its utopian vision.

> As a whole, Oneida embodied a lot of promise. What started in Oneida in 1848 inspired future utopian living. What was “arguably the most successful commune in American history” (Barnard, 2007, para. 4), lasting more than 30 years, advanced notions of human self-improvement, healthy critiques of existing orthodoxies, conceptions of freedom accounting for *both* individual *and* social concerns, as well as early modern ideas about sexual liberation. Oneidans built a big library in their mansion for advancement of knowledge, and they coupled their studies with face-to-face meetings involving “mutual criticism” aimed at airing grievances
and bettering everybody in the group (Barnard, 2007). Cragin, the aforementioned Oneidan physician, echoed Robert Owen’s conception of human nature as highly mutable, and admitted his community’s practices were “going against Nature,” if nature is taken to mean the pristine world prior to exercise of any human faculties or saved from basic decisions like our wearing clothes (cited in La Moy, 2012, p. 128).

Yet, Oneida contained irresolvable contradictions. Cragin stressed Oneida’s religious foundation as a necessary component for enabling their communal arrangements and “complex marriage” system to work (La Moy, 2012). But the religious fundamentalism – barring monogamous relations, banning male ejaculation during intercourse\textsuperscript{80} and letting the group determine what men and women could reproduce within a eugenics-like framework – clashed with the commune’s secular ideals of freedom (Barnard, 2007). Noyes came from a wealthy and well-connected family (Foster, 2011, p. 5). His “flamboyant rhetoric and wild mood swings” prompted “his immediate family to think him temporarily insane during the mid-1830s” (p. 5). With his influences, Oneida constituted a paradox: the sexual liberation and communal empowerment were based not on free association or non-binding mutual aid with consensus decision-making, but on a rigid counter-culture with little tolerance for deviance outside of the prescribed anti-establishment doctrines. Although Oneidans attempted to create a “self-sustaining economy” (La Moy, 2012, p. 121), they relied on a business plan that involved employing workers from surrounding towns, with no connection to the community, to produce silver-plated flatware for the market.

Oneida communalism was founded upon the surplus labor expropriated from others. An overly critical reading would cast Oneidans as hypocritical Communal Capitalists. Their intra-

\textsuperscript{80} To be sure, this is a difficult physiological response to control, in more ways than one.
community arrangements prefigured a sexually liberated society with possessions held in common, but to accomplish this it relied on a thoroughly capitalist enterprise not at all outside of dominant economic relations. The silverware company started under their auspices is still in existence, operating under the name Oneida Ltd. (Barnard, 2007). In its nineteenth century manifestation, the manufacturing corporation provided income for former Oneidean utopists after the commune dissolved shortly after Noyes fled to Canada. Noyes, who fellow Oneidan Dr. Cragin remarked had “led the crowd in the number and vigor of the seminal zoosperms” (cited in La Moy, 2012, p. 128) after years of male continence practice, left for Ontario in June 1879 to avoid facing statutory rape charges stemming from his introduction of young persons to the community’s sexual alternatives (Barnard, 2007; La Moy, 2012). Within two months the community ended “complex marriage” and converted the silverware business into a joint-stock company.

Irrespective of the problems, both Icarian and Oneidan efforts at realizing utopia in 1848 animated struggles thereafter. Berman (2011) downplayed socialist undercurrents throughout US history, arguing America “failed” because the dominant ethos of rugged individualism and frontier culture militated against socialism. Yet if the focus shifts to the subterranean public pedagogies of anarchist-socialism and communalism – with focus on exemplars of collective self-organization (e.g. Oneidans), a do-it-yourself ethic (e.g. Icarians), independent press for alternative public pedagogy (e.g. Cabet’s newspaper in Nauvoo, Ill.), direct action and a critique of illegitimate authority (e.g. Thoreau, Douglass, Seneca Falls), the historical perspective changes. The radical imaginaries of Noyes, Cabet and their comrades – but especially Robert Owen’s ideas about liminal utopias serving as a buffer in-between borders – also remain germane.
Finally, confrontational forms of resistance with a complicated but close ethnic-class correlation surfaced in Mexico during the critical juncture of 1848. The Caste War of Yucatán fought between the predominantly poor Mayan peoples in Southeastern Mexico and the Landino\textsuperscript{81} ruling class in the area started in 1847 (Hae-Joo, 2011). The government’s centralization schemes aggravated unrest. The war between the US and Mexico provided the rebels with arms. With the chance to fight back, as Hae-Joo (2011) asserted: “300 years of pent up anger was released by the Mayan people” (p. 129). Gabbert (2004) emphasized that the Caste War was not a clear-cut “race war” or dichotomous ethnic clash as has been assumed, but rather “it is very likely that the rebels considered their uprising as a lower class affair” (p. 105). To the point, about 10,000 of the 25,000 strong units fighting against the rebels were Indians, but other Maya-speaking peasants in the north and west of the peninsula either did not support the uprising or fought for the government (p. 100).

Social differentiation and class composition took different forms in the mid-nineteenth century Yucatán too. Depicting the Caste War even as a peasant rebellion remains problematic because it equates peasant with Indian, and it imposes a dichotomous interpretation of the conflict (Gabbert, 2004, p. 97). Nevertheless, increased commercialization of sugar and encroaching privatization of communal lands made agrarian issues central to the conflict. Almost 45 percent of the land converted into private property in the years precipitating the revolt were in the areas where the fighting concentrated, and the places outside the Yucatán experiencing the same privatization were quelled by government efforts to relieve debt or exempt lower classes.

\textsuperscript{81} Gabbert (2004) notes that the term Landino is not often used in the Yucatán as it is across other areas in Latin America, but it is the most appropriate term applied in reference to the Spanish-speaking part of the population that controlled the government (p. 106).
from taxes (p. 101). By 1855, committed rebels established an autonomous Mayan Indian
Republic in the Yucatán that lasted until severe repression and various external factors ended
resistance in 1901 (Hae-Joe, 2011). Struggle against debt-peonage and the power of the large
haciendas in Mexico took another form by 1910, when the armies of Pancho Villo and Emilliano
Zapata fought for equitable land restitution and redistribution during the Mexican Revolution
(Foran, 2005; Amin, 1990). That peasant-based uprising against capitalist expansion, augmented
by mass pamphleteering that spurred dialogue and debate, had unintended consequences: it
deepened the country’s integration into the capitalist world economy (Garza, 1979; White, 1969;
Frank & Fuentes, 1990; Amin, 1990). This in turn came to a head in 1968, and the student
uprising in Mexico during that second “world revolution” spilled over into the urban guerilla
movement that merged with indigenous Mayans in the highlands of Chiapas to form the
Zapatista movement in November 1983 (Marcos, 2001; Dellacioppa, 2009). As the North
American Free Trade Agreement went into effect on New Year’s Day about ten years later,
granting capital unprecedented power to traverse borders, the Zapatistas rebelled. One crack
begets another.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS ARE ILLUSIONS – HOW TO LEARN FROM PUBLIC PEDAGOGIES CIRCA 1848, THROUGH STRUCTURAL CRISIS AND BEYOND

THE BEGINNING OF THE END: 1848 THROUGH STRUCTURAL CRISIS

The final chapter of this work comes in lieu of a conclusion. Rather than regurgitate key points from the preceding two chapters, what follows is my three-fold attempt to [1] critique our current historical conjuncture and the public pedagogies it has produced; [2] illustrate why a World Systems Analysis [WSA] approach using the conceptual apparatus of public pedagogy to examine print media and human practices during the “world revolution” of 1848 is much more relevant to the present than one might suspect at first blush; and [3] insert myself into the study, dispensing with flawed assumptions about objectivity to reflect autobiographically and show why what I have learned from the pedagogies of 1848 matters to me in the here and now (and should matter to readers as well).

The most obvious reason a return to the first “world revolution” of 1848 is so essential is that the world system, as noted before, entered a terminal period of what Wallerstein (2010) termed “structural crisis” (p. 141) following the second “world revolution” in 1968. The normal economic cycles of expansion and contraction characterizing the capitalist world economy [CWE] have reached an asymptote and cannot return to the dynamic (and destructive) equilibrium that previously defined the system. Nation-state interactions, from core-periphery relations to hegemonic rule, have substantively changed or are in the process of significantly changing. Just as expanding and newly accessible print media performed pedagogical functions for both resistance and domination in 1848, the advent and diffusion of electronic and network communication technologies since the onset of structural crisis has both accelerated the possibilities for greater capital accumulation and simultaneously – dialectically, through the
same processes – endangered the constant self-valorization of capital necessary for the system’s reproduction. If 1848 could be called a major critical juncture, then perhaps the recent claim by a media scholar that we have entered “the mother of all critical junctures” (McChesney, 2013, p. 93) is not far off the mark.

**Unpacking the Present Period of Structural Crisis**

Before drawing connections between lessons relevant for the present that should be learned from the public pedagogies of 1848 analyzed in previous chapters, I first outline the contours of our present period. The following abridged critique of the existing world system highlights key features of systemic changes since 1968. The exercise uncovers a variety of what Freire (1970[2000]) termed “generative themes” (p. 96) constitutive of public pedagogies that can then be traced back to or informed by this project’s analysis of 1848.

As is commonly understood within the WSA tradition (Wallerstein, 2003; 2010), the second “world revolution” of 1968 inaugurated a period of structural crisis in the world system coeval with the early phases of declining US hegemony.82 The third chapter of this project showed how under-appreciated changes in the political economy of the world system, namely the inauguration of new forms of finance capital, occurred in and around 1848. Our historical recounting shows that seemingly recent trends toward the use of new financial instruments and speculation since the start of structural crisis when new network communications and shifting class power made it possible really emerged in incipient form during the first “world revolution” more than a century prior. The Chicago Board of Trade and the Comptoir d’Escompte, both established amid the crisis of 1848, were forerunners of today’s fictitious capital. The acquisition

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82 The unraveling of American empire, or the decline of US hegemony, if you prefer, has been analyzed in detail elsewhere (Wallerstein, 2003; Galtung, 2009; Bacevich, 2012). Suffice it to also note here that the majority of Americans now no longer believe the US can exert the preponderant influence in the world that in once could (PewResearchCenter, 2013).
of various other departmental banks with the Bank of France in 1848 similarly forecast the future reign of “too big to fail” financial institutions capable of extracting public wealth when the risky investments and speculative activities their high-level personnel engage in leave them in the red.⁸³

Furthermore, just as Britain reconfigured its imperial rule and colonial administration strategies under pressure from at home and abroad in 1848, forces in the US after 1968 also attempted to reconfigure arrangements in order to restore class power and reduce the impetus for more than spectator democracy. Empowering finance helped. Yet that was not enough.

To the point, Lewis F. Powell Jr., a corporate attorney who would go on to become a Supreme Court Justice, sent a memo to the US Chamber of Commerce shortly after the uprisings and counter-cultural threats of the late 1960s. Powell implored the Chamber to take a more proactive role in protecting the system of “free enterprise” (i.e. capitalism at home and abroad) by using its monetary muscle to disseminate pro-market ideas in major media outlets. He implored commercial magnates to help put more aggressive champions of the “free enterprise” system in universities across the US. Powell told the Chamber there “should be no hesitation to attack the [Ralph] Naders, the [Herbert] Marcuses and others who openly seek destruction of the system,” and he called for a “broadly based combination of education and political action” (cited in PBS, 2006). In effect, Powell entreated powerful sectors of society to use their money power to better (re-)educate the masses. Similarly, the Trilateral Commission, an internationally-oriented think tank published a book (initially released as a shorter report) concerning the “crisis of democracy” (Crozier, Huntington & Watanuki, 1975) – referring to disconcerting levels of

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⁸³ “The banks and investment firms,” as Chomsky (2011) observed, satirically pinpointing the contradiction between dominant rhetoric and the very different reality that influential pseudo-intellectual thought and concomitant ideology obfuscates, “can make risky transactions, with rich rewards, and when the system inevitably crashes, they can run to the nanny state for a taxpayer bailout, clutching their copies of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman” (“Privatizing the Planet” section, para. 5).
popular participation in civic-political affairs coming from many sectors of society. The commission remarked on the role mass media could play in either enabling or, as the authors preferred, restraining the disturbing democratic trends.

Their concerns did not go unnoticed, and we now inhabit a very different world (system) than the one that existed at the onset of structural crisis. As one historian of the ’68 revolution and its ramifications put it, together “with their peers abroad, protesting Americans did not realize that 1968 marked an end of an era. The prevalent assumption of the 1960s was that the affluent ye shall always have with you,” yet “the politics of plenty became the politics of parsimony,” and that “year 1968 rang down the curtain on share the wealth economics” (Kunz, 1998, p. 109).

Changes in discourse highlight the operations of new hegemonic public pedagogy on several registers. Whereas Louis Blanc and the French ouvriers demanded the “right to work” in 1848 when it was understood to actually mean the social obligation to ensure everyone their right to earn decent remuneration doing meaningful labor under decent conditions, the ideological inversion of language since the second world revolution has turned the term into a slogan for further undermining the already weakened ability of organized labor to secure better working conditions. Duplicitously labelled “right-to-work” (RTW) laws, which have been enacted in many states across the US, the legislation undermines the bargaining strength of labor unions by making it illegal for a union to require every employee who benefits from a collectively bargained contract to pay their share of the costs of the negotiating and enforcing that contract (Gius, 2013, p. 21; Varga, 2014). While in accord with Powell memo appeals, the Indiana Chamber of Commerce released a report in early 2011 promoting RTW laws to improve the local economy by attracting more companies to set up shop in the state, Lafer and Allegretto
(2011a) took pains to demonstrate the business lobby’s faulty methodology and point out that other research shows RTW laws have virtually no impact on a state’s job growth, although they are successful at reducing worker wages and benefits (see also: Shierholz & Gould, 2011; Lafer & Allegretto, 2011b). Cooper and Mishel (2015) further documented the connection between the erosion of collective bargaining and the growing gap between productivity and pay in the US.

With these changes, both ideological and material, has also come the breakdown in publicly recognized state authority within a declining empire. The anti-statist rhetoric popularized to ideologically justify the gutting of publicly-funded services and the dismantling of New Deal protections in the US (and social democracy through austerity measures elsewhere) no doubt represents hegemonic co-optation of the anti-authoritarian radical democratic challenge to state and system legitimacy levelled so forcefully in 1968. If the populace wants to rebel, then they can now be sold their rebellion.

With his disdain for traditional suit and tie, Apple’s Steve Jobs himself personified the counter-culture ethos, using it to create a mega-conglomerate adept at marketing us our swank individualism in line with the homogenous hegemony of exchange value. Apple’s success also illustrates an insidious ideology at work (double entendre regarding the phrase “at work” intended). The ideology has assumed the form of a pervasive public pedagogy during this period of world system flux. Apple’s appropriation of that anti-authoritarian counter-cultural ethos that reached a crescendo in the late 1960s typifies the co-opting function of hegemonic public pedagogy. Suffice it here to point out that Apple could borrow images from George Orwell’s (1949) Nineteen Eighty-Four for its famous Super Bowl commercial that aired the year of Orwell’s eerily prescient book title. The advertisement showed a young, athletic woman refusing the indoctrination by the Big Brother telescreen. It showed her running past both security and the
mindless seated masses to then smash the screen with a sledgehammer thrown Olympian style, showing why 1984 would not be like Orwell’s dystopic totalitarian *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, so long as you bought a Mac.

This is noteworthy now because major media communications corporations like Apple, which ranked number one on the list of the biggest US companies with the largest stock market capitalization, boasting $666.25 in late October 2015 (iWeblists, 2015), realize enormous profits by outsourcing production and assembly to plants in countries like China where wages for workers are much lower than in the US (for now). Reports from labor and consumer rights organizations, among others, routinely condemn companies like Apple for outsourcing to factories accused of the following: paying below subsistence wages; subjecting employees to abhorrent working conditions; coercively extending the working day beyond far beyond standard hours; and utilizing child labor or super-exploiting young adult interns to undercut wages (National Consumers League, 2013; China Labor Watch, 2013; Kwan, 2013; SACOM, 2010).

Even though this project expanded the scope of inquiry beyond the continental revolutions in Europe to also closely examine the Americas and the British Empire, one limitation of this study still has to do with the under-emphasis on both Asia and Africa compared to what happened on other continents in the world system circa 1848. Likewise, this study relied heavily on analysis of English-language papers like the *London Times*, due to language barriers (the author does not speak or read French, nor is he fluent in the many dialects of Italian or German). Monolingualism precluded both analysis of region-specific papers across those European countries included in this study’s narrative reconstruction of the critical juncture and analysis of newsprint in the under-examined continents of Asia and Africa. While the sites of focus for this study offered an admitted over-abundance of fascinating and pertinent material for
analysis, future work would be remiss not to invesgitate actions and changes in the under-explored regions of the world system of 1848 – with special attention to working class and revolutionary media published in those hitherto neglected parts of the globe – in greater detail to better clarify connections to the present crisis.

Returning to the present period of perpetual upheaval, attention to the new media milieu helps us observe how CEO of the prominent social networking site Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, with his penchant for rocking the hooded sweatshirt (or “hoodie”) instead of stuffy business attire, appears to have been passed the high-tech corporate torch and thus continues the co-opting trend inaugurated by the late Steve Jobs and Apple. Zuckerberg, age 31 at the time of this writing, personifies the evolving nature of public pedagogy of specious anti-authoritarianism undergirding the sclerotic capitalist world economy as it nears its end.

Zuckerberg practices high-profile charity, a new model of what Freire (1970[2000]) termed “false generosity” (p. 54). The charity-industrial complex offers billionaires like Bill Gates, Zuckerberg and others to score PR points by in effect wresting even the little bit of say people have in the decisions affecting their lives away from them. Just as wealth is redistributed upward, decision-making power is further transferred into the hands of those heading major private enterprises\textsuperscript{84} that remain almost entirely unaccountable to the majority of the population. In extreme cases, the wealthiest – and we live in a world system where the richest one percent now own as much as the rest of the world, while 62 people boast as much wealth as the bottom half of humanity, 3.6 billion people (Hardoon, Ayele & Fuentes-Nieva, 2016) – become self-appointed dictators, monopolizing the power to decide which causes to support and, ultimately,

\textsuperscript{84} In most corporations, the CEO and other officers in positions of power are selected by the Board of Directors, who are in turn elected by shareholders with the most shares. The number of shares one owns, of course, is determined by the amount of money you have.
who gets to live and who dies. In a less extreme but still egregious example, you have millionaire athletes like Tony Hawk, the ex-professional skateboard who became a household name thanks to the televised X-Games and the immensely popular video game bearing his name, who operates a charity out of Carlsbad, Calif., about 15 minutes from where I live, determining which nearby neighborhoods get to have skateparks and various recreational facilities (and which do not).

Zuckerberg, the new face of Silicon Valley, personally has a predilection for throwing hundreds of millions of dollars around to promote social change. He donated $100 million for (non-unionized) charter school expansion, announcing his largesse on Oprah (Weiner, 2013). Notorious for their circumventing teacher unions, the charters not only equate to lower pay for already strapped educators, but also have resulted in layoffs and the closure of public schools (Russakoff, 2015).

As someone who was raised by a single parent mother who worked as an eighth grade public school teacher, I understand all too well what is at stake. A perverse public pedagogy appealing to freedom, liberty and quality education is justifying the removal of all semblance of democratic control by those actually teaching students. Underlining the connection between this broader, mediated public pedagogy and the formal pedagogical practice in schools, the “false generosity” from billionaires like Zuckerberg undermines living wages for teachers. In the Bay Area of California, where Zuckerberg owns five homes, educators cannot afford to live where they teach (Posnik-Goodwin, 2015). Gentrification in cities like Palo Alto, Santa Clara and San Francisco – driven by the high paid high-tech workers hired by company’s like Zuckerberg’s Facebook and other Silicon Valley behemoths, causing rental prices to skyrocket – has made it almost impossible to live as a public school teacher in the area (or to live working any of the
many low-wage jobs providing services for the high-tech class), especially as anti-union media
campaigns and charter schools put downward pressure on wages. Only those from more affluent
backgrounds can afford to teach throughout many places in the state of California, and this no
doubt has effects on the kind of education and attentiveness to socioeconomic reproduction
present (or more likely now, absent) in schools.

Zuckerberg is actually an extension of the social media phenomenon that made him billions. Facebook, the immensely popular social networking site he helped create, boasts more
than one billion active monthly users according to its own estimates (Facebook, 2014). As of this
writing, the company ranked eighth on the U.S. Commerce list citing the stock market
capitalization of the largest American companies; Facebook grabbed $287.31 billion in market
capitalization (iWeblists, 2015). Facebook, like other prominent Web 2.0 platforms, maintains a
business model based on commodifying user-generated content (user data) to sell to advertisers
who then market to users directly (Fuchs, 2011). The atomization and alienation people feel, no
doubt reinforced in part by a mediated screen culture that separates people and can militate
against intimate interpersonal relations at the same time as it connects individuals across the
globe, is exploited through the concealed operation of users’ super-exploitation online. Lacking a
sense of agency and unable to connect individual hardships to social and structural concerns,
producing content (e.g. posting, uploading) on sites like Facebook offers a false sense of agency
and feeds into a culture of narcissism erected as a palliative to deal with being rendered
economically disposable. Facebook users engage in wholly unpaid labor time online, producing
content on the site that gets commodified and serves as the basis for the company’s profits,85 and
they are “therefore infinitely exploited” (Fuchs, 2012, p. 143).

85 In other words, all of the value users produce is surplus value for the company realized in the form of
Zuckerberg and his company promote what they call “sharing” among the billion-plus Facebook users. In point of fact, users of the social networking site share as much if not more with third-party clients, as well as with the National Security Agency-driven surveillance state, as they do with each other (Fuchs, 2011; Greenwald & Hussain, 2014; Gallagher & Greenwald, 2014; Department of Homeland Security, 2011). Zuckerberg, in effect, purchases multiple million-dollar homes in the Bay to guarantee his own privacy while the privacy of those using his company’s online platform is routinely infringed upon so profits can be made, ultimately enabling him to afford his five homes. He contends that Facebook is about the “concept that the world will be better if you share more” (cited in Fuchs, 2012, p. 155). The assertion epitomizes the euphemistic and ideologically-laden language used as part of this broader public pedagogy shifting the world in the direction of continued domination.

The comment also portends a new system post-bifurcation that keeps the worst of what the world has now, like gross power disparities, but packages it in a new non-capitalist form. Make no mistake, post-CWE visions are being discussed by those in and interested in maintaining class power. The 2012 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, a meeting of some of the most powerful representatives of the corporate capitalist class, even featured forthright and spirited debate on whether or not capitalism has a future, as the forum’s founder documented (Schwab, 2012).

Instructively, other strategies for sustaining class power in a system beset by crisis also come from the new media corporate sector. Media personality and Facebook executive Sheryl Sandberg, whose book, Lean In, is supposedly, as she contends, “sort of a feminist manifesto” (Sandberg, 2013, p. 7), embodies another example of crisis-ridden capital personified. Her claim
that she wrote a “feminist manifesto” was semi-facetious, but that facetiousness is what has allowed her brand of what hooks (2013) termed “faux feminism” to reinforce a corporate public pedagogy. It also taps into anti-authoritarian desires to transcend patriarchy. Yet it divorces feminism from its radical roots, erasing the history of resistance against interlocking modes of patriarchal and capitalist domination in the process.

The Pew Research Center regurgitated those learned presuppositions, as demonstrated in a recently released report lamenting the lack of women bosses and dearth of appreciation of women in positions of power (Brown, 2014). The implication of course is that bosses and hierarchical power are legitimate. Those institutions, it implies, are legitimate objectives for feminism to achieve. Further, a former vice president of Goldman Sachs, a financial institution implicated in the 2007-09 global financial crisis that gave top executives responsible millions of dollars in bonuses (Scheer, 2010; Kaufman, 2011; Russi & Ferrando, 2014), founded a networking group to pair young women with corporate executives (Fairchild, 2014). Again, equality in a context of gross inequality is exalted as the goal for women’s liberation. This occurs even as, for example, the Restaurant Opportunities Center United (2014) released a report recognizing women still work the majority of financially precarious jobs, noting some 70 percent of all restaurant workers and 60 percent of all tipped positions are performed by women. As a result, the report suggests women end up resigned to endure far higher incidences of sexual harassment in the workplace for fear of losing out on needed tips if they speak up. But the anti-capitalist gender-class dynamic remains out of bounds; it is not taught as part of a much-needed broader public pedagogy and counter-cultural critique.

Similarly, neoliberal feminism bleeds over into a reprehensible, if also partly comprehensible, “carceral feminism” (Law, 2014). Masquerading as feminism, these sets of
assumptions mistakenly put faith in prisons and police to address patriarchy and interpersonal violence. In the modern-day US Empire, which showed itself in germinal form in 1848 (as did the modern feminist movement at Seneca), the prison-industrial complex has grown exponentially. It expanded after the second “world revolution” of 1968 as one mechanism for maintaining class power, recovering profits and addressing issues of chronic unemployment, under-employment and stagnating wages stemming from the world system’s entry into structural crisis and the ensuing economic effects experienced inside the declining hegemon (Parenti, 1999; Davis, 2003; 2005).

As structural crisis ensued and the new era of globalization dawned, technologies and (formal and informal) trade agreements (e.g. the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, passed in 1994) facilitated the de-industrialization of the US economy. Corporations started offshoring manufacturing jobs to lower the cost of production by purchasing appreciably cheaper labor power abroad. As Census Bureau statistics show, Detroit, Michigan, the one-time industrial capital of the world, went from a budding Motor City metropolis with abundant automotive industry employment in 1950, when its population reached 1,849,568, to the exemplar of the deindustrialized American economy and downsized city as decades of structural crisis consequences reduced its population to 680,250 by 2014 (Gibson, 1998; U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Paul Verhoeven’s cyberpunk thriller, RoboCop (1987), set in a dystopic and crime-infested Detroit and starring Peter Weller as a police officer gunned down in the line of duty near an abandoned steel mill – then miraculously brought back to life, albeit in metallic and clunky mechanical form, to get tough on crime – hyperbolically revealed the harsh realities connecting capitalism, crime and policing in the city during its period of decline. The film also simultaneously reinforced and critically reflected upon dominant media narratives supported
concerted state-backed violent restoration of order. And as Davis (2003; 2005) argues, the prison industry, which relies on expanded policing, appears to have provided a (particularly perverse) method for addressing the new economic situation. The employment void created by capitalist firms relocating to other countries with little labor protections or contracting out production beyond borders was filled by all the new jobs on offer at home as a result of mushrooming mass incarceration (e.g. new special operations officers, more law enforcement generally, greater number of prison guards to maintain newly constructed detention facilities).

As for those left unemployed, under-employed or with jobs paying inadequate income – the populations rendered superfluous by the US economy during the world system’s structural crisis phase – they could increasingly be criminalized and locked up in cages. They could thus be kept out of sight and out of mind, unable (in theory) to interfere with the consumption of the affluent classes in recently gentrified inner cities and newly reconstructed business districts emptied of potentially rebellious riff-raff and homeless persons. A public pedagogy of disposability, reinforced by the political class and major media receptive to the rhetoric about getting tough on crime and the onslaught of carceral legislation that started passing around the onset of structural crisis around 1968, 86 normalized the new authoritarianism concealed by the co-opting anti-authoritarian rhetoric of entrepreneurial-style individualism.

86 Parenti (1999) documented the pertinent legislation implicated in expanded militarized policing and the mass criminalization of the populace: under Lyndon Johnson’s administration, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act passed in 1968 weakened Miranda rights in federal cases and permitted law enforcement for the first time to tap phones and intercept communications for up to 48 hours without a warrant if they deemed the situation an “emergency”; the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act passed during the Reagan years gave judges the right to deny bail to defendants, established new mandatory minimum sentences, eliminated federal parole and made it a federal crime to misuse credit cards or computers; the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 passed under the speciously “progressive” Clinton administration provided for $8.8 billion in policing grants to hire 100,000 new officers and acquire new state-of-the-art equipment, apportioned $7.9 billion in grants for state prison construction, allotted more than a billion dollars for increased patrolling of the borders and surveillance of immigration, and rendered those convicted of dealing drugs in newly sanctioned “drug free zones” ineligible for parole (pp. 8, 49-50, 65-66).
Unlike those invisibilized by the new public pedagogy and the actual carceral infrastructure it spurs and supports, the societal effects have become hard to ignore. More black men are incarcerated in the US today than were enslaved in 1850, and the US has more people behind bars than any other nation on the planet (Alexander, 2010). The carceral apparatus increasingly operates along class closely – but not entirely – correlated with racial injustice. As of this writing, my sister is doing time in the women’s correctional facility in Decatur, Ill., for a non-violent drug-related offense that someone with more disposable income (or with a more affluent family) probably would not get locked up for. Carceral feminism is so insidious not only because it incarcerates the desire to eliminate patriarchy and misogynistic violence within a narrow framework that actually reinforces those modes of oppression through the legitimization of state violence historically integral to the reproduction of gendered violence (Federici, 2004; Law, 2014). It also imprisons the potential of a radical movement for a more just society inside an institutional framework constructed to protect the bedrock of injustice (e.g. private control of productive property, market discipline for those without class power). And like hegemonic public pedagogy more generally, it still hurts those it alleges to protect.

CRITICAL PUBLIC PEDAGOGY IN AND OUT OF CRISIS

Working within their version of WSA, Fuentes and Frank (1993) noted that by “seeking and organizing to change society in smaller, immediate but do-able steps that did not require state power” (p. 151) early utopian socialists were actually quite realistic. Fuentes and Frank (1993) suggested present-day social movements might learn from them and “some anarchists as well” (p. 151). As the state recedes from its previous role in providing social services and ensuring basic needs are met, subjecting people instead to the vagaries of the market – while
simultaneously strengthening military and surveillance powers and sustaining an enormous prison-industrial complex – the salience of anti-statist and non-hierarchical movements assumes added importance. Those movements, though, must make use of media and also provide the kind of class analysis so seriously lacking among activists today. The dearth of class analysis of course reflects the ideological co-optation of anti-authoritarianism discussed above, which made neo-capitalist structures so properly hegemonic, removed from the realm of debate.

Recovering the public pedagogies from 1848 can, I argue, enable us to draw admittedly rough parallels between then and now. It is true that the revolutions that year, in the main, failed insofar as most did not cast off the yolk of imperial control or establish a socialist society capable of meaningfully addressing the so-called “social question” posed during the critical juncture. Yet in light of objective world system realities, we need to reconsider what failure and success in 1848 must mean when recollected now. What is more, we need to rethink what it would mean to learn from both the successes and failures of that major revolutionary juncture so new notions of revolutionary success can be theorized and realized in our extant epoch characterized by the greater influence theory-informed agency can have on totally transforming the increasingly mutable structures comprising the CWE, core-periphery relations among nation-states and the inter-state paradigm itself. Recall how all sorts of radical and subterranean pedagogies surfaced in a signicant way for the first time during the first “world revolution”. They would animate anti-capitalist and humanist aspirations thereafter, if often just below the field of the mainstream gaze. As argued, that mid-nineteenth century crack in the system also initiated changes in systemic arrangements and prompted re-organizations of power relations, some of which can be seen as either hastening, or at least setting the stage for, the structural crisis of

87 A recent Human Rights Watch (2014) report documents the disastrous consequences the high levels of surveillance are having for journalism and democracy in the US.
today. The year revealed how establishment media reacts to threats to the established order, and how hegemonic public pedagogy functions in response to cracks in the system. Media technologies and formats have changed dramatically since 1848, but as suggested below, the drama of present-day public pedagogy serving the interests of power and privilege sometimes reflects the establishment rhetoric from that year in remarkably telling ways.

The vilification of social transformation in the press back in 1848 discussed in the two previous chapters continues, albeit through new media channels. It needs to be challenged not only by a (very necessary) analysis of how media frames function pedagogically. The conjuncture also requires a vision of what could and ought to be contrasted with what exists. What is more, it demands an immediate partial implementation of that vision so as to provide a germinal material basis from which more widespread alternative forms of organization and heterodox communication can flourish.

For example, the utopian communalist experiments in 1848 (e.g. Oneida, Icaria) can be reinvented for today in the form of intentional communities that fundamentally alter the alienating social relations producing angry, frustrated and alienated individuals today. Eros, the life instincts, and associated libidinal energies are reduced today to crude expressions that appear liberating on the surface but actually reflect what Marcuse (1964) termed “repressive desublimation,” operating “as the by-product of social controls of technological reality” (p. 72). Pornography, accessed online and used in North America by approximately 70 to 80 percent of young men and by 20 to 30 percent of young women (Boies, 2002; Carroll et al., 2008; Hare et al., 2014), remains a prolific mode of repressive desublimation in the Internet era, offering a modicum of short-lived sexual gratification through mediated imagery. It replaces the affection, touch and caress of other actual human bodies necessary for healthy lives. Oneidan “free love”
and communal relations (holding property in common) are suggestive of an arousing antidote that could be consciously adopted and adapted for today.

In an interview a few years before his death, what Marcuse suggested were the “socially conditioned” so-called “feminine qualities” such as care, receptivity and tenderness, “could be the beginning of a qualitatively different society, the very antithesis to male domination with its violent and brutal character” (cited in Anderson, 2014). Within the WSA tradition, Fuentes and Frank (1993) noted that the women’s movement and the greater participation of women in so-called “new” social movements of recent years actually date back much further than most realize, perhaps to the Seneca Falls convention during the critical juncture of 1848 discussed in the previous chapter. Cultivating new sensibilities and returning to a militant, uncomprising (if also compassionate and critical) anti-capitalist feminism means forcefully combating the Sheryl Sandberg-style faux feminism and the carceral feminism that together support a state-corporate nexus historically responsible for reinforcing patriarchy and culpable for plucking people out of communities today in the case of prisons (which create burdens that women disproportionately have to bear). It also means learning from the failures and shortcomings of Seneca – like the lack of criticism at the convention of the US war against Mexico. Journalist Fanny Lewald also wrote about Berlin doing fine without police (see chapter four). Creating intentional communities characterized by a different type of affective politics predicated upon forging bonds of love and trust incompatible with the state and capital,\(^\text{88}\) can start rendering police irrelevant and prisons obsolete. It can only really do so provided a critique of both militarist imperialism and capitalist

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\(^{88}\) Sitrin (2012) describes affective politics, or politica afectiva, as involving relationships “based in open, direct communication, grounded in trust and love” (p. 91). If capital is conceived (correctly, in my view) in part as a social relation, and the state is taken as an enduring mode of hierarchically structured social relations, the emphasis on establishing new relations and thus affects is especially important for displacing existing forms of domination.
class society are also levelled, both the level of ideas and through a radically different practice constitutive of different material conditions.

Incisive class analysis is necessary because it reminds us that the carceral state is in place because competition among workers stripped of the means of subsistence under capitalism produces a surplus (or now often precarious) population of unemployed or underemployed individuals. These people, it turns out, have to eat. To obtain the money necessary to acquire food and other commodities they are forced to engage in the informal economy, which like the formal one, requires violence to sustain it. Engaging in the illicit economy and the violence necessarily associated with it means engaging in criminal activities, subject to punishment by the state. As was the case with colonial Britain in 1848, potentially rebellious poor and déclassé populations are also criminalized in other arbitrary ways so that meaningful resistance can forestalled by making it easier to lock them up. New movements for racial justice against police violence, like Black Lives Matter in the US, could benefit from this applied analysis.

Additionally, while Walt Whitman’s work might still be essential reading for American high school students, we can also learn much more from the anti-statist and anti-militarist public pedagogy of someone like Thoreau. The adherence of Whitman, George Lippard and of many writers for the American penny papers to a saber-rattling working class populism justifying the US war on Mexico circa 1848 shows how essential it is to couple a militant, anti-militarist public pedagogy with meaningful class struggle to advance economic justice.

In contrast to the American exceptionalism dripping from the pages of Whitman’s *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, the Chartist movement in Britain that witnessed a resurgence around 1848 demonstrates the (still unrealized) potential of a dialogic press and internationalist outlook. The Chartists’ internationalism did not really extend to solidarity with uprisings in Britian’s
dependencies, where convicts challenged imperialism with frequent mutinies. The advent of network technologies and online space for trans-border independent media make a much-needed new internationalism – or rather, transnationalism of solidarity – possible now. Using new media to network with the criminalized classes at home and abroad, which the Chartists failed to do, would go along way to advancing the causes of the racial, gendered and economic justice many pay lip service to.

Recuperating the direct and participatory democracy practiced by the Chartists within their own organization and through their Northern Star newspaper, seems all the more necessary now given the disempowering effects of domination today. Chartist prefigurative politics created the partial material basis conducive to the production of art and ideas capable of informing resistance. As demonstrated in chapter five, the Chartist organ, the Northern Star, was not just your run-of-the-mill radical press. It functioned as a medium for authentically dialogic communication in which all Chartists were encouraged to participate. Denied suffrage within the sphere of parliamentary politics and rebuffed by British authorities when it came to their People’s Charter, the Chartist Star shined a light on working class concerns as articulated by working class people in 1848, quite different from the coverage of events seen in the London Times that year. In so doing it aided in the recovery of sociopolitical agency otherwise expropriated by the state and by those owning and controlling state-protected productive property.

What is more, the Chartist organ printed moving movement-authored poetry that retained what Marcuse (1972) would refer to as the “second alienation” (p. 101), or double alienation,

89 New research suggests approximately 70 percent of the population in the present-day (also declining) hegemonic power of the US have basically no say when it comes to policy (Gilens & Page, 2014), meaning they are more or less totally disenfranchised by existing electoral politics. The current situation makes the dual strategy of the Chartists, involving contestation within the formal political terrain but also practicing real democracy within their own organization, seem even more germane for us today.
enabling art to communicate transformative potential. The Chartist poem printed in the *Star* and unpacked in the previous chapter presented newspaper readers another dimension, an unreal illusory world that existed and exists not (yet – but could be). The art emerged from within the alienated, CWE characterizing the period. It remained alienated or distanced from those oppressive material realities by virtue of its invocation of what could and ought to be. This double alienation, found within the poetic pages of the Chartist press, politicized art as part of a larger movement toward participatory democracy, and it meant that Chartism’s dialogic communication evinced an important negative element. By giving concrete expression to what Marcuse (1972) termed the “idealistic core of dialectical materialism” (p. 70; emphasis in original), by representing the imaginative and creative human projection beyond the given material conditions, Chartist poetry in the *Star* undermined the prevailing socioeconomic arrangements. That is, working class people under the banner of Chartism and through their collectively self-organized print media organ undermined the supposed legitimacy of then-established socioeconomic relations and politics proper. It illuminated the dialectical difference between the poetically portrayed potential and the world system actual, between the reality of the class-divided industrial capitalist life of 1848 and the unreality desired yet denied. The movement’s transcendent projection through mediated art (poetry and prose) implies an expanded horizon of liberatory possibilities. New modes of sensory perception – a new sensibility can emerge, breaking “with the mutilated sensibility” (Marcuse, 1972, p. 62) dominating at present. “Emancipation of the senses” (p. 64; emphasis in original), as Marcuse (1972) referred to such processes, means the senses and sensibilities of peoples previously

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90 The politicization of art is what Benjamin (1935[2007]b) identified as an emancipatory response to the fascist aestheticization of politics. The latter could be seen in the technology-enabled bloodbaths of World War I, which allowed an alienated humanity to witness the destruction of its own species as an aesthetic pleasure of the highest order.
blunted by capitalism become liberated in part by the prefigurative political practices and the heightened imaginative capacities strengthened by that (very) partial material liberation.

The Chartist media arts stands in diametric opposition to the current modes of repressive desublimation and agency-subverting commodified social media use described above, and thus suggests a possible avenue for mediating and remixing productive struggle. While accusations of conspiracy in European establishment press during the first “world revolution” sought to tarnish ideas of revolutionary social change, and also functioned in the US with theories of purported Papal plots to generate consent for a war of aggression against predominantly Catholic Mexico, conspiracy theories today proliferate through new media channels. They too tap into widespread alienation while offering a false sense of superiority for those who are made to feel in the know about secret societies that supposedly control the world. The superficial recovery of the capacity to meaningfully intervene in the world, coupled with the distorted conscientization those theories promote, actually misdirect frustrations away from underlying structural causes of people’s pain. Authentic conscientização is countered pedagogically, thereby obstructing the kinds of collective action capable of changing people’s conditions.

One resistance strategy is to vociferously defend the right to a Blanquist or Italian Carbonari-type conspiracy. Debates about privacy regarding state surveillance through electronic media that today take place within narrow ideological bounds could be reframed as a radical public pedagogy, pointing out that clandestine organizing in the past (e.g. against Habsburg absolutism, or against repression during France’s July Monarchy) has been absolutely essential.

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91 Present-day conspiracy theorists have a significant radio, film and online presence. Prominent conspiracy theorist Alex Jones, who runs his own website and radio show, InfoWars, has also directed documentaries like Are You Practicing Communism? (1999) and New World Order: Blueprint of Madmen (2012). His Twitter account, @RealAlexJones, had some 295,000 followers as of this writing. Similarly, David Icke, regarded as “the most fluent of conspiracist authors” (Barkun, 2013, p. 164), has fashioned himself into a public speaker and author of multiple books while posting weekly videocasts on his website (“exposing the dreamworld” at davidicke.com). He boasted 132,000 Twitter followers at his official account as of this writing.
Another strategy – not necessarily mutually exclusive with the other – would be to do most all heterodox organizing out in the open, popularizing resistance and alternative organizational forms in the process. This could entail championing Chartist-inspired pedagogy of participatory democracy and democratic communication, perhaps complemented by re-envisioning French theorist Louis Blanc’s ideas for a better organization of labor. Blanc’s syndicalist vision of state-supported producer cooperatives represent a way to advance economic democracy at the organizational or enterprise level – ideas with particular appeal now given the shortcomings of the top-down centralized planning seen in versions of twentieth century socialism. Chapter four of this project noted how Richard Wagner argued back in 1848 that it might be better to fund such new organizational forms and new media arts collectives at the community or municipal level. The complete capture of state power by concentrated private interests and finance make municipal economic control an attractive option. Another option is to use what remains of progressive institutions like labor unions to support worker and community control of what is produced, how it is allocated and who receives the surplus from those activities. The United Steelworkers have already committed to supporting a “union co-op” model (Witherell, Cooper & Peck, 2012). The model helps protect the rights of worker-owners as workers in cooperatives – rights which can be neglected in co-ops when there are managerial or supervisory staff in positions wielding power over other part-owners.

The model can be used as part of a pedagogical project to recover the 1848 meaning of “right to work,” as championed by Blanc. Select unions in the public sector that have so far weathered the storm of union-busting that has decimated the labor movement in the US in the past few decades would be wise to forget the Faustian bargains they previously made with corporate employers. They can shift focus instead to deploying resources for social regeneration.
Higher education unions especially need to adopt this sort of model given the massive shift toward adjunct labor.\footnote{Part-time adjunct faculty went from 30 percent overall within academia in 1975 to 51 percent overall by 2011 (AAUP, 2013). Grouping and comparing tenure-line to contingent, the latter increased from 43 to 70 percent in that same period, while tenure faculty dropped from 57 to 30 percent in that time.} As someone who has worked as an adjunct professor, I can attest to the necessity of a new “right to work” public pedagogy and practice. Higher education unions could start using their funds to plug adjuncts unable to get classes some semesters into either a co-op affiliated with the union or into a job with the revitalized union itself doing educative, media or cultural work to promote a solidarity economy.

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DÉCLASÉ INTELLECTUALS

Neither dominant intellectual culture nor much of the existing intellectual classes can be counted on to catalyze this systemic shift during our pivotal period of structural crisis that will determine the next system within a few years. As shown in this project, the London Times in 1848 utilized every opportunity to condemn the anarchy, chaos and disorder caused by European peoples refusing their subordination. Voices of quasi-critical intellectuals like Victor Hugo circa 1848 made it into the Times when they repudiated proletarian attacks on sacred capitalist institutions like private ownership of productive property. Intellectuals, those occupying particular social roles, tend to be both producers and guardians of ideas. Intellectual culture, reflecting the material base (class position) of those who create it and are in turn most educated by it, has heretofore served the centrist-liberal order, in the main. Tocqueville’s prescient warning, his role in and his commentary on the uprisings in France in 1848 are case in point. Even writers sympathetic to socialism actively propounded public pedagogies of Manifest Destiny and American exceptionalism, justifying US aggression and conquest in the imperial process. The public pedagogy of which intellectual culture, in the main, is part and parcel, rarely
reaches the point of becoming subversively self-reflective because that could be potentially dangerous to the institutional hierarchy bestowing intellectuals relative privilege. Nor is the pedagogy of privileged intellectuals expressly militant, meaning productive of people willing to break laws determined to be unjust because they sustain unjust social arrangements backed by the state’s monopoly on violence.

However, the characteristics common to the intellectual classes do not (necessarily) apply to the déclassé intellectuals. From the students in Vienna, to young persons in Berlin, to many of the anti-imperialist radicals in Italy – not to mention Marx and Bakunin – the catalytic role of the déclassé intellectual (in 1848, as now) should not be discounted. The first “world revolution” would arguably not have happened if it was not for the excess of educated persons unable to find decent-paying work commensurate with their education or with their parents’ class status. Today’s parallel is the prototypical low-wage, precariously employed adjunct professor on a per-semester contract informed three months in that he will not have a position in his department when tenured faculty return in the spring semester, leaving him within arm’s reach of a terminal degree while still forced to bag groceries purchased by schadenfreude-inclined customers quick to patronize any person in a lowly service position. If it sounds as though I speak from experience, it is because I do. We could also reference here the ex-journalism or former film student owing just under $30,000 in student loans (if she is around the average)² used to finance exorbitant tuition costs, leaving her with a degree, in massive debt and only (if she’s lucky) with prospects of an unpaid internship with a major media outlet in Manhattan or the Hollywood Hills where the cost of living makes the experience an impossibility.

² The Project on Student Debt (2015) notes that of the approximately 70 percent of college seniors who graduated from public and private universities with student debt in 2014, the average amount owed was $28,950, up two percent from the previous year (p. 2). Additionally, we have witnessed in recent years an explosion in unpaid or small stipend-based internships, many in the culture industries or with online news/entertainment outlets, which undercut wages for many other media workers (Hickman, 2014).
These younger déclassé intellectuals, many with new media expertise, would be ill-advised to attempt to assume a vanguard role, subordinating other oppressed peoples in anti-systemic movements to their dictates. The can continue to play a catalytic role, however. They can offer analysis of oppressive public pedagogies and of their historical function, thereby “tilting the bifurcation,” as Wallerstein (2014b) terms the impending systemic transition, “in the direction of a relatively democratic, relatively egalitarian world-system (or world-systems)” (p. 171). Recuperating insights from 1848 – from the early feminist drives, to anarchist-socialist and syndicalist organizing, to democratic-dialogic media – they could utilize their generation’s technological proficiency together with new media arts to cultivate the anti-systemic sensibilities supportive of the new human being necessary for a decent outcome when disequilibrium precipitates an end to the world system as we know it some 25-50 years down the road. Re-appropriating the appropriators, as it were, to combat the ideological inversion since (at least) the second world revolution becomes their primary pedagogical task.

Wallerstein (2013) argued the prospects for again realizing these possibilities are amplified during the current crisis:

Who will win out in this battle? No-one can predict. It will be the result of an infinity of nano-actions by an infinity of nano-actors at an infinity of nano-moments. At some point, the tension between the two alternative solutions will tilt definitively in favor of one or the other. This is what gives us hope. What each of us does at each moment about each immediate issue matters. Some people call it the ‘butterfly effect.’ The fluttering of a butterfly’s wings affects the climate at the other end of the world. In that sense, we are all little butterflies today. (para. 12)
As humans who “tri-dimensionalize time” (Freire, 1970[2000], p. 101) into past, present and future, creating a history of “epochal units” (p. 101), it is critical to realize how human agency has shaped, eluded and undercut epochs before. To burst forth from our cocoons and become beautiful butterflies in the Wallersteinian sense, we have to start understanding the same desires for fuller freedom seen on display in 1848 as actually still alive today. We have start perceiving not the end of history and all of the world with it, but the end of our world system already fraught with cracks we can add to, titling the outcome in one way or another.
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Dissertation Title:
Cracking the World System

Major Professor: Walter C. Metz

Publications:


