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PATHWAYS TO DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: THE MEDIATING ROLES OF DELIBERATION AND POLITICAL EFFICACY IN THE EFFECTS OF OLD AND NEW MEDIA USE ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH KOREA

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For more than three decades, citizen engagement in the political process in South Korea was strictly hampered by the harsh control of the public sphere by authoritarian regimes and mainstream media's failure to provide a democratic public forum. With the penetration of online and social media, the participatory culture of South Korea has significantly and qualitatively changed. During the last 10 some years, citizens actively used Internet media, such as online and social media, in mobilizing people for social and political causes. In recent elections, the use of Internet media has been considered one of the decisive factors of turnout and election results. The wide availability of information, the supply of unfettered discussion forums, and constant connectedness beyond space and geographical boundaries of the Internet are believed to work efficiently in leading citizens to the political process.

However, unlike in Western countries, research to investigate the mechanism through which citizens engage in political affairs has been scant in South Korea. Drawing on the participatory democracy theory, this study examines how old and new media use in South Korea possibly change citizens' political attitudes and perceptions and how such changes subsequently trigger civic engagement in political affairs. Among various possible factors of political communication, this research pays special attention to the mediating roles of political efficacy and deliberation behaviors of the electorate during an election period in South Korea. A

multitude of studies have proven that political efficacy is one of the most immediate attitudinal explanations of political action. As one acquires feelings of heightened political efficacy, one becomes more likely to get involved in the democratic process. Also, deliberation behaviors, such as political conversation and reflection on news played an important role in citizens' political life. This study explores how political efficacy and deliberation jointly affect the pathway that connects news consumption with political participation, drawing on prior political communication frameworks, such as the cognitive mediation model, the communication mediation model, and the O – S – R – O – R model.

This study suggests a two-step mediation model which centers on the roles of deliberation and political efficacy in political communication. Particularly, the hypothesized model incorporates the interpersonal discussion component of the communication mediation model and the political efficacy component of the cognitive mediation model into one, in order to theorize a holistic information processing framework that channels the influences of news consumption on political engagement. The current study provides empirical evidence to the hypothesized model by carrying out two cross-sectional analyses and one auto-regressive analysis from the data of a two-wave panel survey that was conducted during the 2012 presidential campaign in South Korea.

Findings reveal that political efficacy mediated the relationship between news attention and political participation. Political efficacy also played a mediating role between deliberation behaviors and political participation. In addition, deliberation behaviors mediated the relationship between news attention and political efficacy. Most important, the deliberation behavior and political efficacy jointly mediated the impact of news attention on political participation, supporting the hypothesized model of this study. Such results imply that interpersonal political

discussion and intrapersonal reflection on political issues help citizens make sense of the information obtained from the media, and at the same time, boost the level of competence of their political beliefs. The results also suggest that deliberation and political efficacy play a pivotal role in connecting citizen's information seeking behaviors with political participation. The findings also show that, among diverse news channels, social media have the biggest performance power in explaining citizen engagement in the political process. In addition, the results of path comparisons demonstrate that the paths from news attention via online and social media to deliberation, political efficacy, and political participation were stronger in the Wave 2 model than in the Wave 1 model. The findings imply that online and social media are providing South Koreans a more effective pathway toward democratic participation than traditional media by motivating their deliberative and by shaping political attitudes.

The present study makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the ways in which South Korean citizens take advantage of recent new media technologies to engage in political affairs. Considering that many South Koreans have long been excluded from the actual political process, this study's findings provide practical meanings in understanding how we can boost citizen engagement in the democratic process in this digital age. Additionally, the hypothesized model of the present research helps organize a large body of theories on news consumption and political participation in political communication. It also suggests larger social and cultural implications for a healthy democracy across countries beyond South Korea.

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PREFACE

The media landscape in South Korea is rapidly changing mainly due to the wide penetration of digital media just as it is in other countries. Digital media, such as blogs, social networking sites, microblogging, wikis, and podcasts, provide political content to the public in ways that depart from convention. While controversy continues over the political implications of digital media, digital media based on the Internet have substantially changed the way that the public relates to political information, politicians, parties, government, and political processes.

Debate about the digital media's role and implications for politics and democracy has been widely sparked in academia. Some argue that digital media have the potential to spur a positive change in the existing political culture. Digital media can generate interest in politics among politically inattentive citizens, facilitate public discourse, and even stimulate citizen participation in the democratic process. They also act as a check on the mainstream media, which many people perceive as too closely aligned with politicians and government to play a watchdog role that the public expects. On the other hand, critics contend that digital media have not been an effective means to foster citizen engagement in democratic processes. Digital media often contribute to alienating people from public issues and trivializing politics. Critics say that digital media rarely create avenues to genuine participation.

The digital media's political role is complex and mixed. Since digital media are characterized by highly diverse forms of communication, it is not easy to reach a conclusion without finding exceptions. A good way to understand the digital media's political implications is to examine the mechanisms by which digital media use relates to the change in citizens' attitudes and behaviors. For instance, the motivations of using digital media content can

influence whether audiences end up reinforcing their disillusionment toward politics or engaging in political activities. The goal of the current study is to examine how people process news they obtain from diverse media channels and, as a result, how they get involved in the political process.

The dissertation starts by introducing previous academic efforts to explain the relationship between media use and political participation. It then reviews several mediation models of political communication that delineate information processing. Drawing on prior mediation models, the dissertation theorizes a new mediation model – a two-step mediation process in which deliberation and political efficacy jointly mediate the relationship between news consumption and political participation. It then analyzes a dataset obtained from a two-wave panel survey in South Korea in 2012, using a structural equation modeling method. The concluding remarks focus on the political implications of digital media (especially online and social media) and the roles of deliberation and political efficacy, in terms of their ability to cultivate a more participative democracy in South Korea.

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RESEARCH BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction

Citizens' active engagement in public affairs is one core element of a healthy democracy (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948; McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod, 2002). According to the theory of representative democracy, a baseline for well-functioning democracy is the presence of actively participating citizens who have access to a wide array of ideas, acquire necessary information, and have a certain amount of knowledge of public issues (Brants, 1998). Put differently, citizens' disengagement from public and political affairs is a serious threat to democracy (Bennett, Wells, & Rank, 2009). In the contemporary era, various signals of political alienation have been observed across countries (Kim, 2005). For instance, people's level of trust toward governments or politicians has been on a gradual decrease. The increase of political cynicism has been documented in various nations, such as the United States (Moy & Pfau, 2000; Norris, 1999), Great Britain (Curtice & Jowell, 1997), and Sweden (Holmberg, 1999). World Economic Forum surveyed 50,000 people in 60 countries and found that 63 percent of them believed politicians are dishonest (The Voice of the People, 2004). Research also has identified a growing level of public discontent with the operation of representative democracy (Dalton, 2004; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Norris, 1999; Pharr & Putnam, 2000). The increasing political discontent is observed from both old and young generations. In a study that targeted high school seniors, only 28% believed that people in government care about what people demand (Kahne & Middaugh, 2005).

Presumably, due to the increasing level of dissatisfaction about the political process and the attenuating political confidence in the political system, electoral and conventional participatory actions have gradually decreased in recent several decades in most countries (Blais, 2000; Caul & Gray, 2000; Franklin, 2004; Wattenberg, 2002). Voter turnout in the United States, for instance, went down from 65.0% in the 1950s to 57.5% in the 2012 elections (Center for the Study of the American Electorate, 2012). This trend of turnout decline has also been observed in other countries. Since South Korea adopted a system of direct election of the president in 1987, the turnout in this country has been on a gradual decline, with the turnout at presidential elections falling from over 89.0% in 1987 to 63.0% in 2007. Decreasing political engagement has often been attributed to a diminution in political interest, spread of individualized life style, and declining trust toward politicians and political parties (Kim & Kim, 2008).

However, such a trend toward turnout does not describe the whole picture of the current situation of South Korea. In the 2002 presidential election, an amateur politician, Roh Moo-hyun succeeded in becoming president mainly due to the explosive support by young Internet users. Even though the actual turnout of 20-year-olds was not as high as that in other age groups, South Korea saw the first case in which young voters channeled their votes toward a presidential election (Han, 2007). Since then, South Korean Internet users frequently demonstrated their collective power in various social or political decisions. In the 2010s, collective actions by Internet users became more common than before (Park, 2012). In the 2012 presidential election, even the turnout rate, which has gradually decreased for a decade, has changed its direction for the first time. The average turnout rate in 2012 was put at 75.8%, which is remarkably high when compared with 63.0% in 2007 and 70.8% in 2002. Especially, the turnout of young voters increased drastically. The turnout rate of 19-year-olds moved up from 54.2% in 2007 to 74.0% in

2012. The turnout rates of 20 year olds (47.0% in 2007, 68.5% in 2012) and 30 year olds (54.9% in 2007, 70.0% in 2012) also have significantly increased. Scholars and political pundits associated the sudden surge in the turnout with the wide penetration of social media, such as Facebook and Twitter (Chang, 2012; Lee, 2012).

Across the world, it is not uncommon for voters to rely increasingly on new types of media based on the Internet in order to obtain information about public issues. The Internet provides new content hitherto unavailable from the traditional media. During the 2012 presidential election in South Korea, 20.4% of eligible voters said that the Internet and social networking sites were most useful in deciding which candidate to vote for (Korea Election Management Commission, 2013). Today, the number of consumers of online newspapers, political blogs, and current affairs podcast shows are increasing at a stunning speed (Park, 2012). In addition to an enormous volume of information, Internet-based media tend to offer new opportunities for citizens to talk about political issues. Within the Internet, people can easily interact with other individuals with little spatial and temporal constraints. Vibrant exchanges of information online increase the possibility for people to improve their level of knowledge about politics and to change their existing attitude toward politics. A multitude of studies documented a positive association between exposure to online information and civic or political engagement (Chang, 2005a; Tolbert & McNeal, 2003).

Thus, it is logical to speculate that online media use is related to the recent trend of political engagement in South Korea. Increasingly, citizens find in the Internet an alternative channel that may provide new modes of participation (Kim, 2011). Here one question arises: Through what mechanisms do online media users end up engaging in the political process? Although it is, by and large, admitted that Internet-based media may motivate citizens to engage

in the political process, it is not clear how information-seeking behavior leads to involvement in political affairs.

According to the "participatory democracy" (Pateman, 1970; Thompson, 1970; Mason, 1982), political action becomes realized in the actual world when people believe that their action brings about positive results to them. In other words, scholars who study participatory democracy explain the feasibility of participation in terms of how citizens' behaviors can be associated with their demands and needs (Finkel, 1985). Then, what might link citizens' demands to their participation in the political process? Regarding this question, the current study attends to the concept of political efficacy. Political efficacy can be defined as the sense of being capable of acting effectively in the political realm. It is a belief that one can influence the government or politics (Craig & Maggiotto, 1982). As one acquires feelings of heighted political efficacy, one becomes more likely to get involved in the political process.

Initially introduced as a partial explanation for political participation in the United States in 1950s, political efficacy has become an important theoretical component in studies of political behaviors (Craig, 1979). Political efficacy has been considered a pivotal construct in the studies of new media's impacts on citizens' political perception or attitudes (Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Shah et al., 2007). Wolfsfeld (1986) also documented that political efficacy is "the most immediate attitudinal explanation of political action" (p. 108).

Political efficacy is useful in understanding the mechanism of political engagement in the digital age. Frequent information seeking via online media may help increase citizens' level of political efficacy, and increased efficacy in turn may contribute to expanding political engagement (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005; Nah et al., 2006). Increased political efficacy may result

in the increase of political interest, social capital, and social networks, which in turn may motivate people to get involved in diverse political activities (Gibson et al., 2005).

In addition to the concept of political efficacy, this study pays attention to the role of political discussion. Since Lazarsfeld and his colleagues (1948) first raised the importance of interpersonal conversation in political communication, interpersonal talk has been the main topic of the study of political information processing for several decades. Discussion is an integral component in democracy because it draws citizens into matters of public interest. It promotes the exchange of ideas and opinions and the blending of diverse viewpoints. In the process, vague arguments are clarified, contrasting opinions are compromised, and competitive ideas are justified to guarantee public support. Today, the discussion occurring in the online environment often creates a deliberative space by providing ample opportunities for citizens to access public issues and by motivating them to make sense of public affairs (Lee, 2009; Zhang, 2012). In other words, digital technologies are shaping a new possibility of democracy by promoting citizen engagement in the deliberations.

The present study mainly focuses on investigating how political efficacy and deliberative behaviors work in citizens' processing of information. Few attempts have been made to incorporate simultaneously political efficacy and deliberation into the political communication mechanism. This study explores the role of political efficacy and deliberative behaviors, based on mediation models that deal with media effects on attitudes toward the political process. The current study also investigates how information processing mechanisms vary depending on three media types – traditional, online, and social media. By doing so, this research theorizes a new model that accounts for media's role in triggering citizen participation in the political process. To

this end, this study relies on national data from a two-wave panel survey during the 2012 presidential election in South Korea.

1.2 Significance of Research

A number of scholars blamed the traditional media for isolating citizens from the democratic process (Brants, 1998). For example Putnam (2000) criticized television as one of the strongest evils for weakening social capital, an essential foundation of a healthy democracy. The trend of sensationalization and commercialization in media industry has often been cited as reasons for disenfranchising citizens and dissuading them from engagement in political processes (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995; Butler & Kavannagh, 1997; Hallin, 1996).

In South Korea, the negative impact of traditional media on citizens' cynicism seems to be relatively greater than in other countries. The level of trust in traditional media in South Korea is excessively low. According to the Edelman Trust Barometer (2012), only 44% of South Korean citizens trust traditional media such as television. Only 20% of citizens trust newspapers. Such low level credibility for traditional media stems mainly from people's disappointment in the media's close connection with the political power and their ignorance of basic journalism norms (Kim & Hamilton, 2006).

The media market of South Korea has been dominated by three network TV stations and the same number of newspapers for more than three decades (Kang, 2005). Under the military rule until 1987, major media outlets served as mouthpieces of the ruling bloc in return for securing oligopolistic privileges from it. After the massive democratic movements in 1987, they transformed themselves from the handmaiden of the political power to an independent power in

their own rights. Since then, the major media outlets became "independent political institutions" (Chang, 2005a).

The rise of the Internet-based media has created an alternative force to this solid media bloc. The public began to actively use various Internet media to obtain hitherto unattainable information from the traditional media. For example, the rising popularity of current affairs podcasts is notable. One podcast show, *Naggomsu*, used to be downloaded more than 600,000 times per episode during the 2011 Seoul mayoral campaign, which is larger than the combined readership of the three mainstream newspapers of South Korea (Park & Yoon, 2013). Ordinary citizens are also capitalizing on Internet media in order to expand the opportunity to participate in various elite-challenging political activities (Han, 2007; Kim, 2008).

This study starts from the observation of the recent penetration of social media in South Korea and its impact on the political behaviors of Korean citizens. Even though there have been a number of attempts to establish the relationship between social media and political engagement, research examining the role of political efficacy in the context of social media has been scant. In the West, the sense of political efficacy has been considered the most immediate attitudinal explanation of political action. This assertion is self-evident, considering that individuals are motivated when they feel that their involvement in politics will be consequential. This study investigates how political efficacy and deliberative behaviors work individually and jointly in motivating citizens to engage in the democratic process as a result of news consumption.

This study investigates the role of mass and interpersonal communication between political orientation variables and political participation. It attempts to provide insight into the direct and indirect effects of political communication on political behaviors using an advanced social cognitive approach. This study expands several mediation models, such as the cognitive

mediation model (McLeod et al., 1999), the communication mediation model (Eveland et al., 2003, 2005), and the O – S – R – O – R model (Cho et al., 2009), by mainly focusing on the individual and joint role of deliberation and political efficacy between news consumption and political participation.

Despite considerable efforts to understand the impact of mediators in political communication, few studies have taken into account deliberation behaviors and political efficacy simultaneously. To suggest an advanced mediation model in political communication, this study conducted a two-wave panel survey based on a national sample. The current study aims to provide a more thorough and appropriate test of a mediation model and ultimately to contribute to the understanding of the change of citizens' political-psychological attitudes and behaviors as a result of news consumption. By doing so, this study fills the void in the studies about the relationship between information consumption via digital media and political participation in the context of South Korea.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 New Media & Political Participation

> "Cherish, therefore, the spirit of our people, and keep alive their attention… if once they become inattentive to the public affairs, you and I, and Congress and Assemblies, Judges and Governors, shall all become wolves" (Jefferson, 1787[1967], p. 65).

Active citizenry is a basic tenet of democratic theory (Bennett, 1986; Conway, 1991; Flanigan & Zingale, 1991; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Verba & Nie, 1972). Democracy, by its own definition, expects citizens to actively participate in the process of self-governance. Participation is a core element of a healthy democracy (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1948; McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod, 1994). The presence of an enlightened and engaged citizenry is an prerequisite for a democracy to exert its effective function (Almond & Verba, 1963; McClusky, Deshapande, Shah, & McLeod, 2004; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Participation enables people to take on their roles as good citizens. Political participation provides a means for citizens to have their voices heard and for ‘‘empowering the powerless in society’’ (Eveland, 1993, pp. 24–25). When citizens actively engage in political affairs, democracy becomes stronger. Therefore, democratic societies expect that all citizens have the capability and motivation to get involved in the political process (Filicko & Boiney, 1994).

The emphasis on participation has been repeated by philosophers, such as Aritstotle, Hobbes, Mill, and Rousseau. For instance, Aristotle said that only those who participate in governance should enjoy the rights of citizenship (Lipset, 2001). Rousseau emphasized that individuals who play an active role in governance would be free from control by others and

subject only to their own choices and decisions (Lipset, 2001; Wright & Street, 2007). John Stuart Mill stressed that a citizens' strong involvement in governance is crucial in guaranteeing the liberty of a society (Biagini, 1996). Rousseau (1913) contended that the participation of each citizen in political decision-making is vital in making the state function well.

Then, what does political participation mean? How can it be defined? Verba and his colleagues (1995) conceptualized political participation as a behavior that seeks to influence government action by affecting public policymaking. Political participation can include behaviors in elections, such as voting, working for political campaigns, donating money to candidates, and displaying political bumper stickers. It can also include conventional political behaviors, such as protesting, boycotting, and buying products for political reasons. Conway (1991) defined political participation as the activities that citizens perform in order to influence different levels of the government, such as its structure, policies, or election procedures. Therefore, political participation can be conceptualized as one's intentional behaviors to influence political processes by engaging in various political activities.

Since early 1990s, the Internet has significantly changed the way people consume news and participate in politics. The rise of the Internet has substantially expanded the opportunity to access news. The availability of information on the Internet has increased to an unimaginable level (Bimber, 2001; Papacharissi, 2009). At the same time, the Internet has provided uncountable spaces for interpersonal conversation (Dahlgren, 2000; White, 1997). Highlighting such unique characteristics of the Internet, many studies pointed to the medium's democratizing potential free from restrictions of time and space (Coleman & Gotze, 2001; Dahlberg, 2001a; Dahlgren, 2005; Freelon, 2010). Especially, the wide use of the Internet as a discursive medium

with newer technological advantages has made the relationship between Internet use and political participation all the more interesting.

Despite the immense potential of the Internet, views differ over the effects of the Internet on political participation. Skeptics argue that a reduction in levels of political participation could be expected as a result of the frequent use of the Internet. They contend that the Internet takes up a large part of people's free time (Nie & Erbing, 2000; Kraut et al., 1998) and even weakens social cohesion (Davis, 1999; Noveck, 2000). They also assert that the Internet does not make people become politically active or motivated. Like television, which can deflect people from involvement with public matters, the Internet may have contributed to further atomization of society (Davis, 1999). Many studies indicate that the kind of talk that occurs online is not different from face-to-face discussions in its political influence (Castells, 2007; Kerbel & Bloom, 2005; Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005; Trammell & Kaid, 2005). Internet use may erode social connections through time displacement and social withdrawal (Kraut et al., 1998; Nie & Erbring, 2000). Kraut et al. (1998) assert, "Watching television, using a home computer and the Internet generally implies physical inactivity and limited face-to-face social interaction" (p. 1019). Their longitudinal analysis concludes that frequent use of the Internet harms the communication with family and friends. Similarly, Nie (2001) argues that the increase in time spent online tends to decrease the time for socializing and attending events outside home. He argues that when preexisting differences are taken into account, Internet use causes people to lose touch with their social connections.

An alternative view, put forward by those who defend the normalization hypothesis (Bimber, 1999, 2003; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002), states that the Internet has barely affected levels of political participation. Bimber (2001) showed that political interest is less strongly

associated with obtaining campaign information on the Internet than with watching television and reading newspapers. He found that access to the Internet had little impact on voter participation. Zhang and Chia (2006) also reported that time spent reading newspapers and watching public affairs shows on television was positively related with political participation whereas frequency of the Internet use and entertainment television viewing was not associated with participation. Nisbet and Scheufele (2004) argued that the role of the Internet in promoting active and informed citizenship would be modest at best.

Lastly, optimists view that the Internet will contribute to forming a more participatory society (Negroponte, 1996). Many studies show the potential of the Internet to influence levels of citizen participation (Livingstone, Bober, & Helsper, 2005; Shah, McLeod, & Yoon, 2001; Wellman, Haase, Witte, & Hampton, 2001). Such optimists believe that the abundance of information available on the Internet and inadvertent exposure to political information online may instigate political interest, encourage political expression, or increase political motivation (Bonchek, 1997). Tolbert and McNeal (2003) found that people who had access to the Internet were more likely to cast their ballots in the 1996 and 2000 US presidential elections. Gennaro and Dutton (2006) argued that Internet experience had a significant impact on political interest, political efficacy, and online political participation (Wang, 2007). Polat (2005) argued that the Internet should be viewed as an expanded information source for politics and an expanded forum for discussing politics.

Optimistic research has found that communicating about politics over the Internet complements face-to-face political talk (Shah et al., 2005; Shah et al., 2007). The Internet allows people to "post, at minimal cost, messages and images that can be viewed instantly by global audiences" (Lupia & Sin, 2003, p. 316). Online expression may spur various forms of

participation, such as letter writing and petition signing, as well as attending speeches and working on campaigns (Corrado & Firestone, 1996).

But most of the aforementioned arguments, to a considerable extent, are based on the claim of "technological determinism." The technological determinism argues that a technology itself can exert a direct influence on individual people, society, and culture. Marshall McLuhan emphasized the importance of media, saying that "medium is the message" (1964, p. 8). The phrase indicates that the form of a medium embeds itself in the message, creating a symbiotic relationship by which the medium influences how the message is perceived. For McLuhan, it was the medium itself that shaped and controlled "the scale and form of human association and action" (1964, p. 9). Following McLuhan, scores of studies contended that the use of traditional media can exert a significant influence on individuals' perception of social and political issues. The same conclusion is being drawn from the study of the effects of new media technologies. Media "effects" have been frequently studied by measuring direct effects with little consideration for contextual backgrounds and mediated processes (Norris, 1996, 1998; Prior, 2005; Uslaner, 1998). Numerous studies tested the direct impact of media messages on participation, relying solely on the exposure to the messages.

Notably, an important issue in the examination of the impact of new media on perceptions and attitudes toward the political process is that media influences can vary depending on intervening or surrounding factors, such as individual, cultural, or geographical differences. For example, in China, where freedom of speech is considerably limited owing to its unique social system (Communism), the use of new media for political purposes can be controlled by the strict regulation or control by the government. According to one of the most influential models in the study of political participation (Verba et al., 1995), the cost of participation is a determining

factor in the decision to participate: the higher the cost, the lower the activity. Depending on available resources, people can participate more or less easily. For members of the public with little time, money or cognitive or organizational resources, the costs of participating are too high. As a result, they choose not to participate. Thus, the impact of costs on participation is contingent on the level of resources available (Anduiza et al., 2009).

Technological skills can also serve as an important factor that can provide a resource for participation. Skills can be useful when people carry out an action with a political end: Being knowledgeable of the virtual world and being able to engage in specialized uses make it easy to acquire necessary information for political purposes and subsequently engage in political affairs in a simple and easy way. The use of the Internet can increase the availability of other resources. The increased availability of resources is fundamental for participation. In this sense, frequent use of the Internet offers an opportunity to process and analyze information, which will be useful for people who wish to get involved in political activities.

Concerning the possible factors that channel the impact of new media on political engagement, the current study pays special attention to individual-level variables rather than cultural, societal, or collective-level variables. As possible individual-level factors, we can think of cognitive elements, such as motivations to use a medium, reflection on media content, and interpersonal conversation with friends, acquaintances, or colleagues. Searching for information about a specific subject requires a series of complex cognitive operations, such as selecting relevant information, evaluating the credibility of the information source and summarizing and using it. In the next section, this study reviews prior theories that deal with the links among diverse cognitive elements, interpersonal discussion, intrapersonal reflection on information, psychological orientations, and political engagement.

2.2 Mediation Models in Political Communication

Research into media effects on individuals and society has been influenced by the evolution of social psychology. According to Markus and Zajonc (1985), research in social psychology has developed from a simple stimulus – response (S – R) approach into more complicated social cognitive approaches (Tian, 2011). In the West, there have been numerous efforts to investigate plausible mediating variables between media consumption and political engagement. Among the possible mediators, psychological characteristics of human beings have often been examined. Information processing theories (Neuman, 1976), the uses and gratifications approach (Blumler, 1979), and the knowledge-gap hypothesis (Tichenor et al., 1970) are examples of such efforts. Simply put, media effects are conditional. More recently, some scholars attempted to consider individual motivations, interpersonal discussion, and political learning in the research of political information processing (Kosicki & McLeod, 1990).

2.2.1 The Cognitive Mediation Model

The cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 1998, 2000) was established by synthesizing theories in cognitive and educational psychology, the uses and gratifications (U&G) approach, and information-processing studies. It proposes that learning from news is determined through a causal process in which certain learning motivations drive the processing of news information and that this processing, to a great extent, determines the amount of political learning. This model explains, at least partially, why prior studies fail to show that individuals learn little from news even when they consume it (Graber, 1994; Neuman, 1976). The model suggests that individuals must want to learn from the news, and then, this motivation must produce information-processing behaviors conducive to learning. Only then will media exposure produce a certain level of political learning (Eveland, 2001).

The cognitive mediation model (Markus & Zajonc, 1985; McLeod et al., 1994; Eveland, 1997, 2001) is summarized as O (Orientation) – S (Stimulus) –O (Orientation) – R (Response). The first O includes cognitive motivation of the audience. The second O represents what people do with media content – news attention and elaboration. News attention refers to the amount of mental effort given to the news. Elaboration refers to "the use of news information to make cognitive connections to past experience and prior knowledge and to derive new implications from news content" (Eveland et al., 2003, p. 363). In short, this model integrates both motivational variables and information processing into one unified process and argues that information-seeking motivation and news elaboration improves the knowledge level of news consumers. In the following, each variable in the cognitive mediation model is reviewed in more detail.

First, audience motivation is considered one of the important factors that account for the impact of citizens' media use on political engagement. In the early age of communication research, especially when the strong effect theory was dominant, the audience was usually deemed as passive. During the period from 1948 to 1960, the perspective of minimal effects was widely accepted by researchers (Iyengar, 2011). But since the 1960s, the extreme-effects models were gradually replaced by "considerable effect models," such as agenda-setting and priming theories (Iyengar, 1991; McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Simultaneously, "active audience" was raised as an important concept in communication research. Later, the concept of active audience developed into the uses and gratifications (U&G) theory.

According to the U&G theory, audiences seek the media that satisfy their social and psychological needs (Katz & Foulkes, 1962). Researchers turned to the U&G approach to examine why people strive for certain types of information from the media (Wimmer &

Dominick, 2011). The U&G approach was utilized as an important conceptual tool in studies that explored audience interaction with emerging technologies, such as VCRs, cable channels, and the Internet (Ruggiero, 2000). The Internet confirms the usefulness of the U&G perspective because it requires a higher level of user activity in comparison with other media (Rayburn, 1996). For instance, many Internet users deliberately choose a website they prefer rather than randomly visiting websites. Papacharissi and Rubin (2000) relied on the U&G approach to identify five motives associated with Internet use: information seeking, interpersonal communication, entertainment, convenience, and time killing. Stafford, Stafford, and Schkade (2004) also examined why people use the Internet by focusing on social, content, and process gratifications. A study carried out by Kaye and Johnson (2002) identified four motives for using the Internet to access political information: guidance, surveillance, entertainment, and social utility.

Many previous studies on media effects failed to grasp the concept of "motivation" to consume media content. Research neglected the distinct patterns, needs, and motivations of people's media use, focusing instead on simple total volume of usage. It is not just the time spent with media that matters, but how and why people use media that affects civic engagement (Gil de Zúñiga & Rojas, 2010; Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 2001). As Gil de Zúñiga and Valenzuela (2011) emphasized, "It is not the media per se that affect individual's participations, but the specific ways in which individuals use the media" (p. 401). Indeed, numerous studies demonstrate that individuals intentionally choose particular types of content and wish to gain certain gratifications as a result of content consumption (Blumler & Katz, 1974; Katz & Gurevitch, 1974; Rosengren, Palmgren, & Wenner, 1985; Swanson, 1987; Zillmann & Bryant, 1985). Today, the active audience concept is widely admitted in communication studies. The actual mechanisms through

which an active media user leads to increased level of deliberation, interpersonal communication, political efficacy, and political engagement is yet to be solved.

The second component of the cognitive mediation model is attention to news. Many studies of learning from the news have focused on news media exposure as a central independent variable. That is, the number of days per week that an individual reads a newspaper or watches television news is used to predict a score on a test of items covered in the news media. The general conclusion from the literature is that exposure tends to increase knowledge to a certain extent (Atkin, Galloway, & Naymnan, 1976; Bennett, Flickinger, Baker, Rhine, & Bennett, 1996; Drew & Weaver, 1990; Robinson & Levy, 1996). However studies examining only exposure to media content to explain learning from news tell us little about the process because measurement of exposure cannot distinguish those who pay attention to content and those who habitually access it with little attention. In addition, only measuring media exposure fails to catch the differences in effects. For example, print media content often requires audiences to pay careful attention to it in order to get clear understanding of the content. Consumption of content from television and radio should not be considered equal.

A number of scholars explicitly noticed the above problem in information-processing research and suggested that we should consider another variable associated with news use. As a result, attention to news started to attract academic attention. Scholars began advocating news attention as an important factor in determining learning from the news (Chaffee & Schleuder, 1986; Chaffee, Zhao, & Leshner, 1994; Drew & Weaver, 1990; McLeod & McLeod, 1985). In a similar vein, attention to news is important in the studies that deal with the Internet. This study assumes that passing through content and paying attention to it on the Internet is fairly different.

The third component of the cognitive mediation model is elaboration on media content. If motivations do influence information processing (Burnkrant, 1976; Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1996; Simon, 1967), they should have an indirect effect on learning through information processing behaviors they instigate. News consumers depend on their own choice of information-processing strategies for learning. In other words, decisions about how to process information are subject to individual differences (Schmeck & Phillips, 1982). Then, what types of information processing are likely to produce effective learning? In the early 1970s, cognitive psychologists suggested that the depth of processing, "where greater 'depth' implies a greater degree of semantic or cognitive analysis" (Craik & Lockhart, 1972, p. 675), should produce more effective learning. Some psychologists suggested elaboration as an important factor in the information processing for learning (Bradshaw & Anderson, 1982).

Elaboration refers to the process of connecting new information to the information stored in memory, such as prior knowledge or personal experiences. Elaboration includes the activity of connecting diverse pieces of information in a meaningful way. By engaging in the elaboration on media content, people can expand the scope of the memory storage as well as the ability to recall information via complex mental mechanisms. Studies demonstrated that elaboration tends to facilitate learning of new information (Eveland & Dunwoody, 2001; Hamilton, 1989; Johnsey, Morrison, & Ross, 1992; Mayer, 1980; Miller et al., 1987; Perse, 1990b; Wolsoshyn, Pavio, & Pressley, 1994). Furthermore, Estes (1988), Greene (1992), and Haberlandt (1994) all found that the level of recall was substantially greater when people engaged in elaborative processing than when they did not.

Although elaboration relates to a specific cognitive action that may fluctuate over time, research shows that each individual possesses a unique pattern of elaboration. That is,

elaboration may be an individual-specific variable; on a given piece of information, some people are more likely to elaborate than others, and some people spend more time in figuring out the meaning of the information than others. Miller, Alway, and McKinley (1987) said, "An elaborative processing style is characterized by associating new ideas and new information with what is already known, using visual images, imagining new situations, looking for similarities with prior experiences, and looking for new ways to apply the information" (p. 399). Some scholars used different labels, such as "reflective integration" (Kosicki & McLeod, 1990), "active reflection" (Eveland, McLeod, & Horowitz, 1998), or the "amount of invested mental effort" (Salomon, 1981), to explain the notion of elaboration. Today, there is a general consensus about the essential role of elaboration in information processing.

The cognitive mediation model has some weaknesses. First, many studies based on this model focused only on one type of personality variable (surveillance motivation). There has been little consideration of other types of predispositions of individuals. For example, the need for cognition, which means "a need to structure relevant situations in meaningful, integrated ways," (Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe, 1955, p. 291), can affect the way people consume information. The need for cognition has been found to have a positive relation with exposure to news (Bizer, Krosnick, Petty, Rucker, & Wheeler, 2000). The need to evaluate, which is defined as ''an individual difference variable that measures the extent to which people spontaneously evaluate objects or experiences as either good or bad'' (Bizer et al., 2004, p. 997), may be another important factor that can influence cognitive and behavioral behaviors of news consumers. Individuals with a high level of need to evaluate are more attracted to political information in the media because they like to hold attitudes on political figures and affairs. In a similar vein, those

who have more extreme political orientations tend to be more active in accessing likeminded viewpoints than those with less extreme political orientations (Tsfati & Cappella, 2003).

Second, the cognitive mediation model does not incorporate the role of interpersonal discussion. News media and political discussion largely channel the effects of individuals' dispositions and orientations on learning and participation (McLeod et al., 2001; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001). Attention to news stimulates the information-seeking behavior via the media, which in turn leads to increased exchanges of ideas about politics (Cho et al., 2009). In other words, discussing political issues helps individuals to gain mobilizing information from the mass media, thereby increasing individuals' willingness to engage in political affairs (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005). The exchange of views with fellow citizens tends to provide a better understanding of the political process.

Another weakness in the cognitive mediation model is its assumption that political knowledge is a final outcome of news consumption. Political knowledge may not be the final outcome of cognitive processing of news. Much research has been conducted to investigate the relationship between political knowledge and participation. Numerous works in political communication demonstrate a positive association between the level of political knowledge and political engagement (Jennings, 1996; Kaid et al., 2007; Klingemann, 1979; Neuman, 1986; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).

2.2.2 The Communication Mediation Model

In explaining the connection between media use and political participation, some scholars paid considerable attention to the role of interpersonal communication (Gil de Zúñiga, 2002). The function of interpersonal discussion is particularly important in this new media environment where diverse interactive communication tools exist, such as e-mails, instant messenger services,

blogs, and social networking services. The communication mediation model focuses on the role of interpersonal conversation in political communication. The model posits that informational uses of the media and political discussion largely channel the effects of individual orientations on citizen learning and participatory behaviors (McLeod et al., 2001; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001). Its basic idea is that communication among users mediates the effects of news consumption and news reflection on political engagement. Several empirical studies proved that citizen communication largely mediates the effects of news consumption on citizen engagement in the public process (McLeod et al., 2001; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001).

Since Lazarsfeld (1954) proposed the two-step flow thesis, the importance of interpersonal discussion has been repeatedly examined and supported. Contemporary political life relies much upon vibrant exchanges of political ideas and evaluations (Beaumont, 2011). Talking about politics not only fosters the increase of political knowledge and communication skills, but also encourages people to see politics as relevant to their own lives and concerns. Individuals who discuss politics frequently tend to expose themselves to a wider range of political views, and this exposure often helps boost their levels of political interest, opinion quality, and social tolerance (Mutz, 2002a). Discussing current affairs with others exerts an significant influence on the political socialization process (Niemi & Junn, 1998; Torney-Purta, 2002). Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) found that engaging in political talks with family and friends is a key variable in a chain of communication effects on civic engagement.

A number of studies found that news consumption and interpersonal political discussion work together in motivating media users to get involved in various forms of participation (McLeod et al., 2001; McLeod et al., 1996). News media provide a resource for political discussion and create opportunities to encounter diverse viewpoints that might not otherwise take

place (Mutz, 2002a; Mutz & Martin, 2001). In turn, political discussion raises awareness about collective problems, highlights the importance of civic issues, and finally helps promote civic participation (Kwak, Williams, Wang, & Lee, 2005; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999). Therefore, news consumption and interpersonal discussion are factors that complement each other in provoking citizen involvement in public issues (Chaffee, 1972; Chaffee & Mutz, 1988). The mediation effect of interpersonal communication was documented across a variety of media types, such as television, newspapers, and the Internet. Mutz and Martin (2001) argued that consumption of public affairs content results in vibrant interpersonal discussion and such increased discussion, in turn, leads to involvement in political processes.

Notably, the communication mediation model treats both news consumption and interpersonal communication as important stimuli (S), and focuses on how they jointly mediate the effects of individual dispositions and news consumption on political outcomes. The citizen communication model is an effort to develop prior information processing models in political communication. It theorizes that the mass media's influence on participation is both strong and indirect (Shah et al., 2005). It finds evidence that the same mediation mechanism works for the information processing via the Internet. The citizen communication model sophisticates the relationship between information seeking and participation in two ways: (1) it places citizen communication as a critical mediator between news consumption and political engagement; (2) it asserts that online pathways to political participation complement existing offline pathways of information and conversation (Cho et al., 2009).

In the digital age, real-time discussions are likely to encourage people to be more exposed to numerous political issues and a variety of political ideas (Beaumont, 2011). The Internet paves a way to share political opinions through interactive messaging technologies, such as emails,

instant messaging, electronic bulletin boards, and online chats (Price & Cappella, 2002; Shah et al., 2005). It allows people to ‘‘post, at minimal cost, messages and images that can be viewed instantly by global audiences’’ (Lupia & Sin, 2003, p. 316). Discussion in cyberspace takes on the nature of textual expression rather than verbal expression, and thereby helps to have a clear grasp of political information (Pennebaker, 1997; Pennebaker & Beall, 1986).

Both the communication mediation model and the citizen communication model integrate mass and interpersonal communication into the pathways to political participation. But unlike the cognitive mediation model, they pay less attention to possible cognitive mediators that can be incorporated into them. For instance, components such as attention to news and reflection on media content are missing in the communication mediation model and the citizen communication model. Omitting cognitive variables may oversimplify the processes that connect news consumption with citizen participation, as Lazarsfeld et al. (1955) oversimplified the process the media effect as a two-step flow.

Another drawback in the communication mediation and the citizen communication models is that they failed to specify nuanced relationships between interpersonal discussion and political engagement. While some scholars who depended on the communication mediation model claimed that political discussion mediates the impact of news consumption on participatory behaviors, other scholars argued that political talk functions as a moderator between news consumption and civic or political engagement (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005). Such mixed outcomes may be due to the oversimplification of possible processes. For instance, proponents of the communication mediation model and the citizen communication model hardly considered possible cognitive mediators. Thus, the two models fail to provide a holistic picture of the information processing process in political communication. The influence of offline discussion

and online messaging on political participation may be not only a function of the exchange of information with others but also a product of the intrapersonal reflection on media content (Pingree, 2007).

2.2.3 Attempts to Synthesize Mediation Models

Following the cognitive and communication mediation models, scholars made efforts to clarify the processes by which media effects occur. One recent attempt is the O – S – R – O – R model. Cho and his colleagues (2009) proposed the O – S – R – O – R (Orientations – Stimulus – Reasoning – Orientations – Response) model of communication effects in prediction of political engagement. They introduced an additional mediating step, "reasoning," between media content consumption (S) and second cognitive orientations (second O). The reasoning process, which refers to mental elaboration and collective consideration of a topic, is a critical condition for news consumption to produce political outcomes (Eveland, 2004; Eveland & Thomson, 2006).

The O – S – R – O – R model starts from the observation that previous mediation models paid less attention to examining an additional mediating step between message processing and outcome orientations. The S – O portion of the O – S – O – R model (e.g., the cognitive mediation, the communication mediation, and the citizen communication models) includes news consumption, interpersonal discussion, and cognitions and attitudes that are triggered in this process. Interpersonal conversation and reflection on media content are particularly difficult to situate within this set of framework. Discussion and reflection about news have often been regarded as the consequence of surveillance motivation or as mediators between news consumption and political participation (Eveland et al., 2003; Shah et al., 2005). But they are not stimuli in a strict sense because they are typically placed at the position of the outcomes of

information consumption. Neither are they conventional outcomes, such as learning because reasoning also relates to participatory behaviors.

Shah et al. (2007) argued for the need to add a step for reasoning between media content (S) and subsequent responses (O – R): Reasoning behaviors should be placed "between stimuli and outcome orientations, indicative of efforts to form an understanding and reason through ideas encountered in message stimuli" (Shah et al., 2007, p. 698). Reasoning refers to mental elaboration on information (Cho et al., 2009). Reasoning may take diverse forms: reflection on media content (Eveland, 2001; Mutz, 2006), anticipation of conversation (Eveland, Hayes, Shah, & Kwak, 2005), composition of ideas for expression (Pingree, 2007), and integration and understanding (McLeod et al., 2001).

In addition to intrapersonal processes, Cho et al. (2009) also argue that interpersonal discussion plays a pivotal role in the reasoning process. Stressing the deliberative nature of interpersonal communication, Benhabib (1996) said, "When presenting their point of view and position to others, individuals must support them by articulating good reasons in a public context to their codeliberators. This process of articulating good reasons in public forces the individual to think of what would count as a good reason for all others involved" (pp. 71–72). Southwell and Yzer (2007) also suggest that political conversation is a reasoned and consequential behavior through which information is reconsidered, elaborated, and clarified. Interpersonal discussion increases not only factual knowledge but also cognitive ability to make connections among concepts (McLeod et al., 2001). Discussion also tends to improve the quality of opinion (Cappella, Price, & Nir, 2002; Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999). The O – S – R – O – R model posits that political discussion is a crucial construct through which reasoning materializes.

Taken together, the O – S – R – O – R model contends that the effects of news media use (S) on political engagement (second R) are mediated by reasoning behaviors (first R), which include both interpersonal political discussion and intrapersonal reflection on media content. However, studies that depend on this model do not test the mediating role of the second O, political-psychological variables suggested by Cho et al. (2009). Thus, the O – S – R – O – R model looks very similar to the communication mediation model, except that it adds political participation to the dependent variable block.

Recently, Jung et al. (2011) attempted to develop the O – S – R – O – R model by investigating the mediating role of political knowledge and political efficacy between news consumption and political participation. They found that political knowledge and efficacy are important variables that mediate news consumption and citizen engagement in political activities. They also found that interpersonal discussion and online political messaging (second R) largely mediate the effects of news consumption on political outcomes.

Jung et al.'s model, however, does not divide the news consumption variable into more segmented elements. News consumption via traditional media is not the same as that via online media or social media. For instance, old generations are more likely to depend on traditional news while young people are more likely to access political news via online newspapers or news feed in social media. Also, the nature of political news is not the same across different media types. News stories from the current affairs podcasts shows in South Korea tend to focus more on parody and satire than on factual reporting. The current study expects that the information processing of political news will vary depending on the medium from which an audience consumes news.

Another controversy regarding the Jung et al.'s model is about the position of political knowledge in the suggested framework. Theoretically, political knowledge can be regarded as both a mediating variable and an outcome variable. It is logical to speculate that those who consume more political news and talk more frequently about politics are more likely to have a higher level of political knowledge, which in turn may encourage them to get involved in political affairs. But at the same time it is also reasonable to assume that political knowledge leads people to pay more attention to news and to engage in political discussion with others. Because Jung et al.'s study is based on a one-time cross-sectional survey, it needs more pieces of evidence before it claims clear causal relationships among variables, including political knowledge.

2.3 The Importance of Political Efficacy in Political Communication

Although a sizable body of research attempted to examine detailed processes by which the media impact political engagement, many questions still remain unanswered. One of the concerns is the lack of consideration for political efficacy. Even though some scholars (e.g., Jung & Gil de Zúñiga, 2011) paid attention to the role of political efficacy, they did not consider it a key component that connects the impact of information consumption on democratic engagement. This study argues that the sense of political efficacy plays a decisive role in the mediating processes of political communication.

A considerable amount of research has been devoted to answering the question of why some citizens participate while others do not. Regarding this question, some scholars paid attention to the effects of political efficacy on political participation, such as voting, campaign involvement (Abramson, 1983; Bennett, 1986; Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Hetherington, 1998;

Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Uslaner, 2002; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). The logic underlying these impacts is that individuals feel empowered and motivated when they believe that their involvement in politics will bring about meaningful impacts on their government.

What exactly does political efficacy refer to? According to Bandura (1977), self-efficacy is the belief that what one can make positive changes about his/her surrounding environments. In a similar vein, political efficacy can be understood as the belief in one's competence in politics. In other words, it is the feeling that an individual citizen can play a significant role in making political and social changes possible. The concept of political efficacy was first proposed by Campbell, Gurin, and Miller in 1954. They said, "Political efficacy is the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process" (p. 187). Later, Finkel sophisticated the concept as "the sense of being capable of acting effectively in the political realm" (1985, p. 892).

One underlying assumption of political efficacy is that individuals tend to make a decision based on rationality. For example, people will vote if they believe that their vote is likely to make a difference (Becker, 2004). When voters are not sure of the outcome of their participation in voting, they may end up not going to the polls, even though they are motivated to obtain information about elections and possess some amount of knowledge about candidates. Bandura (1977) explained the role of efficacy using a coping mechanism. According to Bandura, people are likely to escape a threatening situation that is beyond their coping ability. On the contrary, people tend to confront a situation if they think they can manage the situation according to their will. Bandura stresses that the stronger the perceived self-efficacy, the more active people become in their efforts. Likewise, perceived political efficacy can be thought as a crucial determinant of people's choice of political behaviors.

In support of the above rationale, prior literature suggests that political efficacy is closely tied to political activity and strongly associated with participatory behaviors (Abramson, 1983; Bennett, 1986; Rudolph, Gangl, & Stevens, 2000; Verba, Burns, & Schlozman, 1997; Verba et al., 1995; Zimmerman & Rapport, 1988). Political efficacy has been widely used to account for various types of political behaviors, such as voting, volunteering for a campaign, signing petitions, attending rallies, discussing politics, and so forth (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Finkel, 1985; Hirlinger, 1992; Sharp, 1984; Stewart, Kornberg, Clarke, & Acock, 1992; Verba & Nie, 1972). Political efficacy is also believed to enable self-confident citizens to become citizens who show a certain level of commitment to democracy (Almond & Verba, 1963).

The importance of political efficacy in the political process needs to be highlighted in South Korea, which has a unique political culture. The level of political competence among South Koreans is relatively low compared with their levels of political trust and interest (Kim, 2010). As discussed in the following Chapter 3, a low level of political efficacy mainly stems from the accumulated experience of governmental control of democratic public sphere. The present study posits that the situation of South Korea makes political efficacy as an important factor that should be considered in political communication.

Most past studies on political efficacy have treated it as a given and fixed concept, without considering its diverse nature. They postulate that a sense of political efficacy is largely independent of political environments where one is placed (Weissberg, 1975). Some argue that people shape their political efficacy attitude around the age of eight (Easton & Dennis, 1967). Weissberg (1975) said that feelings of political efficacy functions "as a method of mass satisfaction and quiescence and as an individual predisposition to action" (p. 487). If these arguments are correct, political efficacy always should be treated as an independent variable in

political communication. Similarly, Buehler (1975) points out that the sense of political efficacy is shaped by cultural and structural factors. The cultural determinism perspective explains that the process of socialization plays a crucial role in the formation of political efficacy. For example, a person can be socialized into either a group of higher political efficacy or a group of lower political efficacy. The structural determinism perspective views the socio-economic status (SES) as a decisive factor of political efficacy formation. A person with a low SES tends to have weak political efficacy, while a person with a high SES is likely to have strong political efficacy.

If the sense of political efficacy is stable, it cannot be tapped as a mediator between media content consumption and citizen engagement in the political process. If political efficacy is a fixed characteristic of an individual, it should be treated at the same level as individual political predispositions, such as partisanship and political interest. Yet, to date it is not certain where political efficacy originally stems from and what factors contribute to the formation of political efficacy. Here, Beaumont's argument deserves attention. Beaumont (2011) suggests an interesting explanation about the nature of political efficacy. Her point is that the sense of political efficacy is both a fixed and a changeable cognition. She argues that political efficacy can be developed by sociopolitical learning mechanism.

Beaumont (2011) examines four plausible factors that can account for the formation and change of political efficacy, based on the sociopolitical learning theory. According to this theory, we are most likely to develop political confidence when our environments and relationships help us to care about political affairs, to get connected with others, and to obtain necessary political resources and skills. Beaumont notes that sharing political experiences with others may be a good nurturer of political efficacy. The acquisition of skills necessary for political actions can also help shape political efficacy. Furthermore, discussing current affairs with others encourages people to

be more attentive to political issues. Lastly, interracial and other pluralist contexts can contribute to developing political efficacy. Based on a survey of about 1,000 undergraduate students, Beaumont finds that even though SES, race, and gender play a role in shaping the initial foundation of political efficacy, they do not exert additional influence on political efficacy change. Instead, experiences in a politically active community, acquiring skills for political actions, involvement in political discussion, and inclusion in collaborative pluralist contexts heighten the level of political efficacy.

Beaumont's findings provide a new rationale to incorporate political efficacy into a mediation model in political communication. The presence of various digital media may provide more persuasive political messages than in the past when traditional media dominated. For example, only if one has a modicum of interest in politics, one can access immense political information because of the great availability of information in the Internet world. Digital media lead even those with little interest in politics to encounter political messages inadvertently (Brundidge, 2010). Such increased possibility of meeting diverse political messages can help heighten people's level of political efficacy. Increased political efficacy in turn may result in actual involvement in civic and political activities.

2.4. Two-Step Mediation: Deliberation and Political Efficacy as Joint Mediators between News Consumption and Political Engagement

Drawing on the review of prior studies on the information processing of political news, this study proposes a new mediation model which delineates the process of political communication: attention to news → deliberation → political efficacy → political outcomes. In the model, news attention serves as stimuli (the exogenous variable); political talk and news

elaboration function as deliberation behaviors (the first mediator); political efficacy serves as a political-psychological response to deliberation behaviors (the second mediator); political participation represents a set of political outcomes (the endogenous variable). Demographics and political orientation variables are included as control variables in the hypothesized model.

Findings from prior studies can be put together to make the hypothesized model plausible and solid. For instance, news media use tends to stimulates people' political interest so that they are cognizant of political affairs, and heightened interest tends to encourage efficacious feelings about politics (Delli Carpini, 2004; Hoffman & Thompson, 2009; Kenski & Stroud, 2006; McLeod et al., 1999). Semetko and Valkenburg (1998) empirically proved the presence of a causal flow from news consumption to political efficacy. To the previous proved relations, the hypothesized model of the current study adds three types of news sources as exogenous variables: traditional, online, and social media.[1] And then the hypothesized model examines how news attention via each medium is related to political participation through the mediating role of political efficacy.

The present study also regards deliberation as an important mediator in political communication. Here deliberation is defined as behaviors that include both interpersonal political

[1] A medium usually refers to an instrument of communication. Traditional media, such as newspaper, television, or radio, are easily conceptualized because of their physical forms of vehicles. Online media generally indicate a type of media that include photos, video and music, distributed over the Internet freely or for a fee (Business Dictionary.com). This study operationalizes online news media as a media type that deal mainly with news content. Social media is defined as "a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content" (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010, p. 61). Social media technologies take on diverse forms, such as social blogs, microblogging, wikis, social networking services, and podcasts. Social media differ from traditional and online news media in many ways, including content quality, content producers, and delivery methods. More than anything else, social media are based on a two-way communication in which content creation and delivery are controlled mainly by the public. On the other hand, traditional media are based on a one-way communication. Online new media are more open to the public, yet their content is mostly occupied by professionals such as journalists. This study operationalizes social media as a type of media whose content creation and delivery are mostly handled by ordinary people.

discussion and reflection on news. Deliberation in this study is similar to what Cho and his colleagues (2009) named as "reasoning." Research consistently shows that interpersonal political discussion is a deliberative behavior because exchanging opinions inherently entails mental elaboration (Cho et al., 2009; Shah et al., 2007). Literature also shows that political discussion positively relates to political efficacy. Citizens' discussion about politics facilitates rational political decisions while forming orientations and attitudes that support citizen engagement in political issues (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Morrell, 2005). In addition, as noted earlier, elaboration on media content tends to increase political efficacy (Fishkin, 1999; Min, 2007). Empirical support for the positive effect of political discussion and news elaboration on increased political efficacy is solid.

Unlike previous studies, this study's model investigates simultaneous impact of deliberation and political efficacy on civic participation in political affairs. To this end, the current study, based on two-wave panel survey data, employs three different approaches that utilize structural equation modeling as the analysis method. Findings supportive of the hypothesized two-step mediation model can make a significant contribution to the literature on the relationship between news consumption and political engagement.

CHAPTER 3

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIA SYSTEM AND PARTICIPATORY CULTURE IN SOUTH KOREA

3.1 History of Media Development in South Korea

The contextual background of this study is South Korea. Thus, it is necessary to look at the overall media system of this country as well as the participatory culture of South Koreans. This subsection reviews the history of South Koran media by breaking down it into three periods. The review mainly focuses on how the political power exercised control over the media and how the media landscape has changed in contemporary South Korea.

3.1.1 Authoritarian Period: Strict Control of the Media

Since the birth of South Korea in 1948, the media have been subject to constant suppression up until the mid-1980s. From the First Republic of Rhee Syng-man to the military regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, the authoritarian governments exercised direct control over the media (Lee, 1997; Kim & Johnson, 2009). In 1961, President Park Chung-hee prohibited news stories critical of his government and stationed intelligence agents in newsrooms (MacIntyre, 2001). Under Park's dictatorship, all journalistic activities including news products were placed either under the close scrutiny of government censors or voluntary self-censors within the news organizations (Kwak, 2012). Some journalists, who challenged the system, were either fired or prosecuted. According to Kang (2005), the press lost its autonomy and came to be subsumed in the "ideological state apparatus" of dictatorship. Most journalists faithfully fulfilled their role as de facto propaganda bureaucrats by supporting the authoritarian rulers (Kim 1994).

After President Park was assassinated by his close aide in 1979, the South Korean media gained their independence and enjoyed a brief respite. However, when General Chun Doo-hwan took the power in 1980 via a military coup, a gag on the media quickly reverted to its previous position. Under the pretext of overhauling the media industry in 1980, the Chun regime made the public-owned *Korea Broadcasting System* (*KBS*) merge two of the four privately owned stations – *TBC* and *Donga*. Operations of the two remaining stations, the pro-government *Munhwa Broadcasting Company* (*MBC*) and the *Christian Broadcasting Station* (*CBS*), were also placed under strong restriction so as not to pose a threat to the regime. The print media was forced into political submission, too. *Shin-A Daily* was absorbed by the pro-government *Kyunghyang Daily* and at least six provincial newspapers were forced to close their doors permanently. The surviving newspapers were subjected to a high degree of governmental control and restriction via the Basic Press Law enacted in 1980 (Billet, 1990). Relying on this law the Minister of Culture and Information was able to revoke or suspend registration of any publications only depending on arbitrary assessment for any violations (Lee, 1997). During the Chun regime, journalists were often taken away, beaten, and even tortured (Youm, 1986). In this process of forceful merger by the government, more than 800 journalists were dismissed from their jobs (Lee, 1997; Yang, 1999). In the broadcasting industry alone, 246 journalists (*KBS* 135, *MBC* 111) had to leave their jobs (Kim, 2001c).

Lee (1993) identified three devices for the dictatorial authorities to monitor and control daily media activities. One is the political appointment of key media elites. President Chun appointed his own hand-picked personnel as presidents of two major television networks – *KBS*, *MBC* – and the two government-owned newspapers – *Seoul Daily* and *Kyunghyang Daily*. These political appointees, in turn, filled important editorial positions with those who showed high

loyalty to the government (Lee, 1997). The second control method was the regular surveillance of the media by national security agencies. The National Police, the Defense Security Command, and the National Security Planning competitively watched newsrooms around the country. The last control mechanism was the enforcement of 'press guidelines' by the Ministry of Culture and Information on how events should be reported. The guidelines were so itemized that they even specified pages, headlines, and relative weight of stories. By strenuously maintaining this practice, the regime continued to take a strong grasp on the media.

In short, during the authoritarian period, the South Korean media had to suffer from harsh control from the governments. As a result, most media outlets could not play their journalism role as a provider of accurate and fair information and as a watchdog of government. Rather, strict control by the regimes forced major media organizations to play the mouthpiece role of the political power.

3.1.2 Transitional Period

In South Korea, 1987 was a momentous year (Han, 1988). Around the nation massive demonstrations occurred by the general public who asked for democracy. Demonstrations lasted unusually long, being supported by people from all walks of life, from intellectuals to factory workers. After the protests, the government relaxed somewhat the control of the media. Prior constraints on press freedom were eliminated. The Ministry of Culture and Information no longer issued formal press guidelines and allowed publication of once-banned content. The Basic Law of the Press was abolished. Restraints on media establishment were also lifted, allowing a good number of small media companies to appear. As a result, media organizations were given the opportunity to enjoy freedom and autonomy (Heuvel & Dennis, 1993; Youm, 1994).

Although the changed political environment contributed to the expansion of media freedom, political authorities still maintained indirect control over the media. Lee (1997) pointed out that behind-the-scene threats from the government and ruling elites did not completely vanish. There remained a complicated interplay between politicians and senior journalists who controlled newsroom gatekeeping. Frequently specific news items were intentionally selected, positioned, and weighed, based upon intricate clandestine deals between government officials and senior editors. The presidential Blue House exerted considerable influence on the angle and placement of specific news items. In a survey, broadcast journalists noted that government influence was still the most influential factor that restricted media freedom (Korea Press Foundation, 1999).

The growing concentration of a few media outlets appeared as another problem that threatened media development at this period. Despite the increase of media outlets after the 1987 democratization, only three conservative daily newspapers – *Chosun*, *Joongang*, and *Donga Daily* – thrived in the newspaper market thanks mainly to their dominant market power while other mid- to smaller-sized newspapers including newly opened progressive media outlets struggled to occupy a small piece of the market. The three newspapers still control about 64% of the newspaper market of South Korea (Lee, 2013).

The high concentration of a few conservative presses is a legacy of more than three decades of military control. In order to strengthen the control over the press, military regimes restricted the number of newspapers in major cities. Moreover, access to the market was reserved for loyal newspaper companies (Peters, 2004). As a result, the three conservative newspapers came to hold a strong domination over the media market, maintaining a close relationship with the political power. After the amalgamation of the press in 1980, the ruling power guaranteed the

press diverse privileges, such as tax benefits, and the press in return started functioning as a mouthpiece of the ruling bloc (Kang, 2005). In other words, the press served not as a watchdog of power but as a propaganda organ of the political power (Yim, 2001; Youn, 2002).

During this period, the market power of the few major newspapers was accelerated via unjust tactics such as distributing their newspapers at no cost, or offering subscriptions with free gifts (Kim & Hamilton, 2006). Such strategies in turn resulted in the suffocation of small media outlets, harming the overall media diversity of South Korea. Small media organizations were not able to secure even a minimal market power through which they could play their roles as new media. The monopolization of the media market by a few major newspapers was strong enough to make them independent political power agencies. For instance, during the ten years of liberal presidents from 1998 to 2006, the big three newspapers persistently attacked the government as equal political counterparts (Chang, 2005a; Choi, 2005; Kang, 2005).

Table 1 Changes in the Social Characteristics of South Korean Media

Period	Relationship with Politics	Nature of Journalism
1945 ~ 1960	Collaborator in the formation of a modern nation-state	Formation of modern, postcolonial journalism
1960 ~ 1972	Mouthpiece of modernization	Development journalism, Educator of modernization
1972 ~ 1986	Mouthpiece of dictatorship	Propaganda journalism
1987 ~ 1992	Mouthpiece of dictatorship	Propaganda journalism
1993 ~ 1997	Collusion of the state and major media organizations	Populist mobilization of public opinion
1998 ~ 2006	Little association	Profit-making, Populist mobilization of public opinion
2007 ~ present	Collusion of the state and major media organizations	Profit-making, Populist mobilization of public opinion

3.1.3 New Media Period: Penetration of Online Media and Continuity of Control

The advent of new information technology in the late 1990s was a turning point in the media system of South Korea. The public for the first time started to have confidence that it could be one of the main agents in the media sector of South Korea. New media technologies have been effectively used in promoting participatory democracy by allowing people to vigorously express their opinions (Chang, 2005; Park, 2013). The spread of digital technology not only changed the one-way, unilateral relationship between the media and the audience, but also challenged the solid oligopoly by several mainstream media outlets. But, at the same time it should also be noted that traces of governmental control of media and citizen expression are still found even in the digital age although the magnitude of control has diminished compared with the past. And the mainstream media manage to maintain its market power in part via the collusion with the conservative ruling bloc.

The rapid diffusion of Internet broadband technology toward the end of the 1990s has been particularly important in reshuffling the existing media system. In 1998, the Kim Dae-jung government added the establishment of a highly efficient broadband infrastructure to the top of its agenda. As a result, today the rate of broadband penetration in South Korea belongs to the top 10 in the world. In case of wireless broadband, South Korea lies above the 100% penetration threshold as of the first half of 2013 (Shankland, 2014). Broadband technology has two features. First, compared with conventional printing or broadcasting technologies, it dramatically reduces the costs of access to the public sphere. It does not take much money, manpower, or physical resources to operate Internet-based media such as blogs and community websites. Second, the bilateral communication features of broadband Internet technology are not only superior to the

unilateral features of the conventional mass media but also correspond with the participative ideals of citizen journalism (Sawhney & Lee, 2005).

The availability of digital technology contributed to the development new types of media which can represent ordinary citizens' voices, challenging mainstream media. The focus of these changes has been on interpersonal exchange, social mobilization, and political debate. For example, in 1999, young researchers opened a blog *Urimodu* mainly to distribute agendas that resist the mainstream media, especially the conservative *Chosun Daily*. Internet newspapers closely related to labor unions or other civic organizations also appeared, mainly representing the voices of masses: *NGOtimes, Newsnjoy, Chamsesang,* and *Jinbonet*. Internet newspapers with a strong community character are another type of alternative media. They usually offered spaces for parodies, comments, and discussions, and relied on the contribution of citizen reporters. For example, in July 1998, a parody newspaper *Ddanzi-Ilbo* emerged as the first commercially successful Internet newspaper. *Ohmynews,* whose content is created mainly by hundreds of citizen reporters, showed a new model in which citizen journalism and professional journalism are effectively combined. Internet newspapers established by professional journalists also appeared. *Pressian* is one of them.

The newly-emerged online media have exerted an enormous influence on the media landscape of South Korea. Internet media have established themselves as opinion leaders and powerful actors regarding public issues. The agenda-setting power mainly held by the mainstream media weakened, and Internet media started establishing themselves as another important media sector. This change was revolutionary considering the long history where several conservative media outlets monopolized the public opinion market. The advent of online media also brought a sea change in participatory culture of South Korea. The public was given an

opportunity to get involved in the political process, without depending on the mainstream media. Frequent use of online media also boosted citizens' competence toward public and political issues (Joyce, 2007). For instance, in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2004, Internet media made a significant contribution to fostering citizen engagement in politics.

However, on the other side of the wide expansion of the new media sector, governmental control still persisted. Also, a few mainstream media exercised all efforts to maintain their vested rights, mainly taking advantage of the collusion with the political power. During the ten years when two liberal presidents held the power (1998 ~2007), governmental interference diminished significantly compared with the previous authoritarian governments. As a result, most media organizations were free from restraints or regulations. However, since Lee Myung-bak took over the presidency in 2007, the South Korean public media organizations have again encountered hardship. Under the Lee's government, the oppression of the public media was carried out very systematically in varied directions.

First, under the Lee's government, former presidential aides and advisers were appointed at key positions in a number of major media companies, doing a serious harm to media independence. The CEOs of two major terrestrial television networks, *KBS* and *MBC* were chosen from the pool of Lee's close associates. The CEOs of the *Yonhap News Agency* and *Seoul Daily* were also replaced by associates of president Lee. The hand-picked CEOs then gave their personal favorites important positions. President Lee even forced the some major private media, such as a satellite broadcasting *SkyLife*, a 24-hour news channel *YTN*, and an English broadcasting company *Arirang TV*, to fill the CEO positions with pro-government people. Although the previous two governments also appointed pro-government people as the presidents of public media organizations, they scarcely attempted to intervene in the editorial directions of

those media. But, the Lee administration officials plainly gave pressure even to detailed editorial directions. Accordingly the media with pro-government CEOs directly and indirectly supported the regime in power by remaining silent at times and serving willingly as the advocate of the government at other times. In other words, major media outlets toed the line in accordance with the government's agenda, controlling the public opinion. The International Federation of Journalists has condemned such actions of the Lee government as an attempt to manipulate media to suit the President (Park, 2010).

Second, suppression for journalists, which is an old legacy of the military regimes, resurrected under the Lee's government. Approximately 160 journalists have been penalized for writing critical reports about government policies, as well as for their roles in advocating for the freedom of press since 2008. As of June 2012, eight journalists remained dismissed from their positions at the *YTN* station and *MBC* for their participation in similar acts. The Seoul District Court ruled in November 2009 that the dismissals were an abuse of management's disciplinary discretion. The court ordered *YTN* to reinstate six of its employees, but the station is still resistant to comply with it. In June 2009, four producers and a writer for the program "PD Notebook" of *MBC* were indicted on defamation charges for a report on U.S. beef imports that sparked weeks of massive protests and demonstrations in 2008, as paranoia of potential "mad cow disease" overwhelmed the country. The government claimed that the show deliberately distorted the government policy on beef import. The prosecution demanded five-year prison sentences for the journalists, but they were exonerated by the court in January 2010.

Third, President Lee not only controlled the public media sector but also exerted influence on online content and its users. An increasing number of online comments were removed only for the reason that they contained anti-governmental views. Since 2008, the government

requested all website operators to monitor the content that is critical toward the government or social customs. By such a strict censorship drive, in 2009, a blogger, Park Dae-sung, who went by the alias "Minerva," was arrested on the charges of spreading online rumors that the prosecution claimed led to dollar hoarding, prompting the government to inject $2 billion to stabilize the currency market. The prosecution sought an 18-month prison term, but Park was acquitted by the Seoul Central District Court in 2011 (Freedom House, 2011). On May 12, 2011, the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) blocked a Twitter account, "2MB18nomA," which contains derogatory meaning toward president Lee. On August 5, 2011, the Seoul Executive Court made a plea to the KCC to unblock the Twitter account based on the ground of freedom of expression. In addition, several laws (i.e., the Electronic Communication Business Law and the Korean Communication Decency Act) were revised to insert additional articles that cover Internet media.

Due to such harsh control over both public media and Internet media, media freedom in South Korea during the Lee's administration slipped to its lowest ranking ever. Freedom House's annual Freedom of the Press survey downgraded Korea's media freedom rating from "free" to "partly free" for the first time since it started publishing worldwide press freedom ranking (Freedom House, 2013). The organization pointed out "an increase in official censorship" and "government attempts to influence news and information" (Freedom House, 2013). Reporters without Borders (RSF) placed South Korea at 69th out of 157 nations according to its Press Freedom Index (RSF, 2013). In 2008 RSF index score for South Korea was 47.

On the other hand, the collusion of mainstream press and the ruling bloc became considerably restored under the Lee government. The Lee administration provided considerable privileges only to the pro-government conservative media. A good example was the revision of a

media law so that it can allow the cross-ownership between newspapers and broadcasters. In 2011, the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) awarded new broadcast licenses to five pro-government news corporations – *Chosun Daily*, *Joongang Daily*, *Donga Daily*, *Maekyung Daily*, *Yonhap News Agency*. Since then, people's concern for the erosion of media diversity has been growing in South Korea.

Park Geun-hye, the daughter of the former dictator Park Jung-hee, succeeded Present Lee in 2013. So far, the media policy under the present President Park is almost similar to that of former president Lee. All CEOs of public media organizations are people who have close connection with President Park or the ruling Saenuri Party. The government provides unfair support to the five new broadcasters, while it often regulates anti-government media and citizen media.

3.2 Today's Media Landscape in South Korea

The main features of media landscape in South Korea are broadcast, print and Internet in the form of both public and private ownership. The major stations are *KBS* and *MBC* (public service broadcasters). There are also approximately 120 private television stations among which *SBS* is the biggest. South Korea has about 200 public and private radio stations. In 2002, a digital satellite broadcasting system, *SkyLife*, began its operation, offering seventy-four channels. It is heavily financed with public-sector investment. The government has the sole authority to give permits for broadcast business in South Korea. In particular, the public service providers are directly or indirectly influenced by the government in their business decisions as well as executive level manpower matters. The government has the official authority to appoint the CEOs of the public broadcasters and by doing so it can easily control broadcasters. If the

journalists protest these decisions, they are subject to be punished by the law. The political tone of the public broadcasters tends to fluctuate according to the change of the government.

There are 12 national newspapers in South Korea. *Chosun Daily*, *Joongang Daily*, and *Dong-a Daily* are the leading papers among them. They boast circulation of more than one million copies each. They are all family-owned. These papers are mammoth media conglomerates, producing not only nation-wide papers but also weekly/monthly newsmagazines, women's magazines, children's dailies, sports dailies, and cable TV channels. They even own art galleries and tourist hotels. They also sponsor a variety of promotional programs, such as an annual literary debut award, arts and cultural presentations, sports events, and special lecture series on salient social issues. The three major newspapers particularly have a clear inclination toward conservatism. Only two national newspapers, *Hankyoreh Daily* and *Kyunghyang Daily*, speak for the left-wing sector. Additionally, there are more than 100 hundred local or specialized newspapers across the nation. The readership of the local newspapers is very low compared with that of national newspapers (Kim & Chung, 2013).

As stated earlier, the South Korean news media, especially the conservative major newspapers, became a dominant power agent as the society underwent democratization (Chang, 2009; Lee, 1997; Yang, 1999). There is even an argument that the press has developed into a "state institution" that can take a partial role of the state (Park & Jang, 2001). In that point, "Political parallelism" may be an appropriate concept to portray the main characteristic of the press of South Korea. Originally, party-press parallelism refers to the degree of ideological correspondence between the press and political parties. The correspondence is composed of (1) the ideology of content, (2) connections between the press and the political parties on individual and organizational levels, (3) the overlap of the readers and political party supporters, and (4) the

conformity of the journalists to the causes of the political parties they support (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). The Korean press tends to be highly politically-oriented not only in editorials but also in straight news. Therefore, the degree of political parallelism in Korea must be high (Nam 2006). Under the condition that conservative newspapers dominate the public opinion market, the initiative of them could be even stronger. A multitude of studies suggested the notion of "political empowerment of the press" when discussing the characteristics of South Korean news media (Cho, 2003; Park & Jang, 2000).

There is only one supplier of foreign news in South Korea, the *Yonhap News Agency*. In the 1980 restructuring of media systems, the government forcefully consolidated several existing wire services into this one and put it under ownership by two leading broadcasting networks – *KBS* and *MBC*. Since these two broadcasting networks are state-controlled, the *Yonhap News Agency* is in effect under government control. Its top management is usually occupied by government-related people. Because of this governmental intervention, *Yonhap*'s news coverage is often blamed for its pro-governmental orientation and lack of fairness (National Union of Mediaworkers, 2010).

South Korea is one of the most connected nations in the world with high broadband penetration rates and a tech savvy population. It is a trailblazer for high-speed and wireless internet. This country boasts the fastest Internet connection speed in the world (Han, 2007). The country is also a pioneer of mobile TV and Internet TV (IPTV). The adoption and use of the Internet in the traditional media are extensive in South Korea. Most of the nation's media provide their news and content via online platforms. Most of them are accessible free of charge.

Online-only news sites are also increasing in number and drawing public's attention for their occasional scoops in publishing important news. They emerge as alternative media,

fostering their own specialty and followers. One of the news sites is *OhmyNews* (www.ohmynews.co.kr). Founded by a former journalist, this news site relies on as many as 1,300 volunteer reporters who practice the site's catchphrase, "All citizens are reporters." In one poll, this site was rated as one of the nation's top ten news media of influence. Surveys consistently show that the online press is being taken as the third most important news medium after television and newspapers.

South Koreans use a variety of social media to meet their needs and demands. Recent figures reveal that Twitter users in South Korea exceeded 3 million, two times higher than the world average (Kim & Shin, 2013). Since January 19, 2011, Twitter has been offering Korean language service, making Korean the seventh language available in Twitter. According to Korea Information Society Development Institute, Kakatostory is most widely used in South Korea, recording 55.4% penetration rate of the whole Korean population. Facebook is used by 23.4% (approximately 11 million) of the population. Twitter occupies the third place as a penetration rate of 13.1% (KISDI, 2013). Podcast shows are also popular among South Korean. According a podcast portal, about 150~200 new podcast shows start airing in South Korea, and more than 6,000 podcast shows are consumed across the country (Podbbang, 2014). Average hours spent on social media every day was 72.8 minutes as of as of 2013. Most social media users in South Korea access them using their mobile devices (Shim & Kim, 2013). South Korea is the home to one of the largest blogging communities in the world, second only to China. Popular blog hosting sites include: Naver Blogs, Daum Blogs, Egloos, Blogin, Tistory.

Overall, the media landscape of South Korea can be described as having three features. First, traditional mass media still have dominant power in the market. Second, several major media organizations maintain close connections with the political power, often disrupting the

health and diversity in media industry. Lastly, alternative media based on the Internet are expanding their influence by providing people with new public forums of civic engagement.

3.3 Citizen Participation and Media

This subsection reviews the relationship between media use and political participation in South Korea. The ways in which the media report social facts, mediate social conflicts, and build social consensus has significant consequences for the outlook of democracy, especially in the process of democratization. Then, what kind of role did and do the South Korean media play in motivating citizens to get involved in the democratic process?

Under the authoritarian regimes, South Koreans had to remain passive and muted because the dictatorial regimes prevented people from expressing their voices, using physical and legal measures. Likewise, the media were not able to function as public-sphere providers that help citizens to exchange ideas and motivate them to engage in public and political processes. Political participation or resistance against the government was mainly the work of determined civic activists. Activists-driven actions often failed to be shared by the general public. After the massive protests in 1987, the opportunities for masses to engage in public and political issues increased drastically. Newly-appeared media outlets since 1987 not only provided people with different perspectives hitherto unattainable in established media outlets, but also helped shape new public sphere where citizens freely express their voices. Such roles by young minor media outlets provoked citizens' interest in politics and encouraged them to engage in political affairs.

The participatory culture of South Koreans has developed into a new stage with the penetration of Internet-based digital media (Kim, 2006). Since the late 1990s, citizens have started relying on newly-established online media instead of the existing media in order to obtain

more balanced, accurate, and unfiltered information on social and political issues. At the same time, people began to take advantage of new media technologies to produce their own content, discuss public issues freely, and mobilize other citizens in democratic activities. With regard to this change in participatory culture, two things should be considered – the diversification of social agenda and the advent of new generations.

Under the military dictatorship, the main goal of civic groups was obtaining political democratization. The objective was a simple one and there was a general consensus about the goal among different social groups. After the 1987 reform, the goal moved from the political democratization to social democratization. Many citizens thought that even though the society achieved a certain level of "procedural democracy," an actual democracy was not yet reached (Kang, 2005). In the 1990s, citizens showed interest in a much greater diversity of issues, such as environment, consumerism, gender, equality, and welfare. Also, the number of civic groups increased considerably during the 1990s. These organizations, composed of professionals, white-collars, religious leaders, and intellectuals as well as ordinary citizens, deemphasized direct politics-oriented activism. Instead, they stressed a new form of civic mobilization, mainly directed to the achievement of legal reforms, accountability, and the promotion of social welfare (Kim, 2007). The diversification of interest expanded the opportunity for individuals to voice their opinions and participate in social and political processes.

In addition, the younger generation has played a significant role in fostering political expression and participation of citizens. Many South Korean scholars note a new type of participatory culture conducted by so-called "2030 Generation." This generation refers to young people in their twenties and early thirties whose political memories were forged after the military dictatorship. This generation grew up with democracy in an affluent environment. Before 2002,

the 2030 Generation was oriented toward individualism (Han, 2007) and indifferent in politics (Gallup Korea, 2003; Lee, 2006; Roh, 2002; Song, 2005; Watts, 2003). This generational consciousness and the political inclinations of the 2030 Generation have changed along with the explosion of the Internet (Kim & Hamilton, 2006).

The embryonic form of young people's participation in social or political issues can be found in the vigorous use of online Bulletin Board System (BBS) in the early 1990s. BBS was an early form of the online discussion forum where individual citizens meet and exchange opinions. Students and intellectuals regarded the new communication system as a space of liberation. As a result, Internet media enjoyed much more freedom than already established traditional media. In the mid-1990s, the now democratic but still authoritarian state became increasingly aware of the impact of online media and online public spaces. As a result, the government started pressing online expression, and this provoked strong resistance among digital generations.

The 2002 World Cup provided the 2030 Generation with an opportunity to use the Internet for large-scale collective gatherings. The "Red Devils," an Internet-based fan club for the South Korean national soccer team, played a pivotal role in mobilizing collective actions to cheer the team. Throughout the World Cup games, the Red Devils mobilized 22 million people and organized cheers and celebrations both online and offline. Young people relied on the Internet to share the information about the time and place of gatherings, clothes to be worn, and slogans or songs to be chanted at the spot. Through the 2002 World Cup Game, young generations, which had been regarded as an individualistic cohort group, emerged as a new agent of collective action, gaining confidence in their ability to express their voices and to share information through the Internet (Cho et al., 2004).

Massive candlelight demonstrations in 2002 are another example that shows how young people increasingly engage in voluntary activism using digital technologies. On June 13, 2002, two middle-school girls were crushed to death by a U.S. armored vehicle driven by two U.S. soldiers in South Korea. However, a U.S. military tribunal in South Korea acquitted the two soldiers of negligent homicide, allowing the soldiers to leave South Korea. While mainstream media paid little attention to this incident, a citizen reporter of an online newspaper, *OhmyNews*, triggered the start of nationwide demonstrations against the U.S. juridical decision. Following the citizen reporter's suggestion to hold candlelight vigils, a number of citizens began to gather each weekend at the Kwanghwamoon square in downtown Seoul, demanding a public apology from the U.S. A total of 422 candlelight demonstrations were held for twenty months.

The 2002 presidential election showed how young people's digital activities can influence even the decision of a president. During the campaign, Roh Moo-hyun, a high school graduate without a college degree appeared suddenly as an icon of change among young people who traditionally were considered to be indifferent in political affairs (Park & Joo, 2004). Roh was a new type of politician, who managed to become a human rights lawyer and advocate for laborers and activists. Roh's supporters voluntarily gathered online under the name of "Nosamo," a Korean acronym for "People who love Roh Moo-hyun." Nosamo started with only seven founding members, but its membership rapidly grew more than 40,000 by May, 2002 (Park & Joo, 2004). Nosamo rallied support and spread the word using messenger services, mobile phones, and urgent messages posted on Internet boards. At last, Roh beat Lee Hoi-chang, a former Supreme Court justice and the leader of the conservative ruling party, which represented the vested interests of South Korea. Kim and Johnson (2006) described the election as "'a victory of the Internet." Internet users, particularly young supporters who were distrustful about the news

coverage of conservative and right-wing media, viewed the Internet as "a cyber Acropolis" where they could post their opinions and create a counter-agenda forum for their political debates.

From 2005, citizens' online activism started moving to social media. Social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Cyworld have become increasingly the hub of political mobilization by individual citizens. As mentioned the 3.1.3 section, social media, mainly due to their great potential as a provider of open, horizontal, networked, and real-time exchange of information, have been widely used as tools of public expression and participation. Especially, social media have shown their political power in almost every election since the late 2000s. The 2011 Seoul mayoral election demonstrates well how social media can be an effective tool to trigger citizen engagement in election processes. The mayor of Seoul is one of the nation's high-profile political posts. The Seoul mayor seat had been held by conservatives for the last decade. But, in 2011, Park Won-soon, a political neophyte, who was supported by a majority of masses, clinched the mayoral race. Surprisingly, he beat his ruling-party-backed competitor who worked as a former judge. A number of political pundits paid attention to the explosive use of social media, especially Twitter, as a new political mobilizer. Most new media described the election as a "Twitter election."

In summary, the participatory culture has developed significantly in South Korea with the penetration of online news media and social media during the last 10 some years (Joyce, 2007). Under the authoritarian regimes, citizen participation was strictly limited mainly because of the governmental control of public sphere where citizens get unfiltered and accurate information about public issues and get together to initiate social actions. But, in the digital age, citizens can find enough alternative media channels to form a public sphere and voice their opinions to the political power. In other words, digital media have started providing a new pathway for the

public to get involved in public issues without depending on mainstream media. Although it is hard to say that new media directly influence citizens' interest in public and political agendas, it is evident that they offer a greater opportunity for people to engage in the democratic process. Frequent use of new media seems to affect even politically-inattentive or highly cynical people. The present study investigates whether and how the use of new media technologies can influence citizens' perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors toward political processes.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

4.1 Control Variables

In the O – S – R – O –R model, the first O ‘‘represents the set of structural, cultural, cognitive, and motivational characteristics the audience brings to the reception situation that affect the impact of the messages’’ (McLeod et al., 2002, p. 238). Political interest and political orientation may fall into the first O. For instance, political interest has been reported to have a positive impact on attention to and recall of political information (Ainley, Hidi, & Berndorff, 2002; Renninger & Wozniak, 1985). In the hypothesized model of the current study, variables related to the first O were controlled in order to examine accurate impacts of major constructs on political participation. In addition, basic demographic variables, such as age, gender, education, and income were controlled, to remove their impacts on major constructs.

4.2 Direct Relations

4.2.1 News Attention – Political Talk

News consumption, in the deliberative democracy model, can play a vital role in encouraging political talk among people (Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999). Gabriel Tarde (1899) emphasized the role of the press as the necessary condition for political conversation. He argued that news media function as an important trigger of discussion by providing people with topics to be used in daily conversations. Page (1996) also pointed out that mass media motivate public discussion. As Anderson, Dardenne, and Killenberg (1994) appropriately said, “News is what people talk about, and news makes people talk” (p. 37). Habermas (1989) argued that historically

the press created the "reading public" who started talking about public affairs. Research shows a positive link between newspaper reading and political talk. In Koch's experimental study (1994), those who read *The New York Times* on a daily basis showed a significant increase in engagement in political discussion.

Based on the prior literature, the present study hypothesizes:

H1-1: Attention to traditional media news will have a significant and positive relationship with offline political talk.

H1-2: Attention to traditional media news will have a significant and positive relationship with online political talk.

News consumption alone might not be a sufficient condition for information gain or mobilization effects (Scheufele, 2001, 2002). The impact of mediated information on a person's understanding of political affairs should be highest if this person exposes him or herself to relevant information in the media and also talks about it with other people. By engaging in interpersonal discussion, people obtain other viewpoints about an issue and develop a better knowledge of it (Nisbet & Scheufele, 2004). That is, people who engage in interpersonal discussion with others about what they read or heard in news are likely to have a higher level of understanding.

The Internet has long been regarded as a medium that is amenable to interpersonal connection and social activities (Hampton & Wellman, 2003; Harasim, 1993). For example, social media allow users to easily connect themselves to people and share information (Fernando, 2007). Most social media are originally designed for this purpose (Valkenburg, Peter & Schouten, 2006). Using social media help people engage in a conversation with others because of their functionality of constant contact with others and incessant updates for current issues. Online

information seeking tends to be linked to the increase in online interactive messaging (Shah et al., 2005). Online news consumption often results in the increase in face-to-face conversation (Shah et al., 2005). Some studies highlight Internet's potential to foster political talk among those who have a high level of information-seeking motivation (van Dijk, 2000). Thus, it is posed:

H2-1: Attention to news via online news outlets will have a significant and positive relationship with offline political talk.

H2-2: Attention to news via online news outlets will have a significant and positive relationship with online political talk.

H3-1: Attention to news via social media will have a significant and positive relationship with offline political talk.

H3-2: Attention to news via social media will have a significant and positive relationship with online political talk.

4.2.2 News Attention – News Elaboration

Human beings have a desire to learn from news to monitor the environment surrounding them (Shoemaker, 1996). In general, people with strong surveillance motives tend to seek news to gratify their information needs (Graber, 1993; Shah, 1998; Zillman & Bryant, 1985). Attention to news in turn may lead to engagement in a high level of elaboration on the news obtained. Elaboration refers to "the use of news information to make cognitive connections to past experience and prior knowledge and to drive new implications from news content" (Eveland et al., 2003, p. 363). The cognitive mediation model posits that a surveillance motive tends to promote information processing behaviors, including elaboration on news content. Other studies also suggest that news elaboration is more likely to take place among those who profess strong surveillance motivations for using news media (Kim & Rubin, 1997; Perse, 1990b; Rubin &

Perse, 1987). In short, when motivated to gain information from media exposure, people are more likely to engage in effortful forms of processing to achieve their goals. Thus it is posed:

H4-1: Attention to news via traditional media will be positively and significantly related to elaboration on news content.

H4-2: Attention to news via online media will be positively and significantly related to elaboration on news content.

H4-3: Attention to news via social media will be positively and significantly related to elaboration on news content.

4.2.3 News Attention – Political Efficacy

Some studies lend support to the association of news consumption and political efficacy. News media use stimulates people's perception that they are knowledgeable of political affairs. Consumption of news also has positive influence on efficacious feeling about politics (Delli Carpini, 2004; Hoffman & Thompson, 2009; Kenski & Stroud, 2006; McLeod et al., 1999). Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) suggest that the media provide the requisite knowledge for political efficacy which encourages participation. In a longitudinal study by Semetko and Valkenburg (1998), "thematic" portrayal of news was found to encourage people to reason with political issues or about the role of government, and, as a result, increased political efficacy (Iyengar, 1991). Pinkleton, Austin, and Fortman (1998) argue that the effects of media use on political efficacy are generally positive.

On the other hand, Scheufele and Nisbet (2002) negate such a positive link between news consumption and political efficacy. Their study found information seeking to be unrelated to political efficacy. The availability of information did not directly result in boosting people's

willingness to get involved in democratic citizenship. Considering mixed results about the relationship between news attention and political efficacy, this study poses a research question:

RQ1: In what ways is attention to news related to political efficacy?

4.2.4 News Attention – Political Participation

There is much research on the effects of mass media on citizens' involvement in the political process. Some scholars focus more on detrimental effects of media on participation. For example, Putnam (2000) blamed television as a culprit of citizens' disengagement from the democratic life. Nie (2001) and Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) argued that Internet and political advertising, respectively, eroded political engagement. On the other hand, some studies found a positive role of news media in the political process. For instance, newspapers have been viewed as having a beneficial relationship with political engagement (Newton, 1999; Norris, 2000; Gil de Zúñiga, 2007).

Such contradictory findings may be due to imprecise measurement. For example, some studies relied on crude questionnaires, such as hours or frequency of consumption of a medium (Freedman & Goldstein, 1999). Studies of media effect based on cultivation theory (Gerbner et al., 1994) and the "time displacement thesis" (Putnam, 1996) drew a conclusion that the time spent on media takes away the required time for socializing and resolving community problems. Conclusions about media effects on participation often have been based on imprecise and monolithic measures of media consumption, with little regard for specific patterns of media use (Kraut et al., 1998; Nie, 2001; Putnam, 2000).

This research argues that such confusion stems mainly from the failure to segment different usage patterns of media. Therefore, this study focuses on informational uses of media rather than media use in general. In this regard, a multitude of studies shown that informational

use of media in general had a beneficial impact on civic attitude and participatory behaviors (Holbert, 2005; Jennings & Zeitner, 2003). Consumption of public affairs content in newspapers and television was found to increase citizen participation (Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997; McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001). News consumers not only identify important social issues or problems (Stamm, Emig, & Hesse, 1997) but also acquire mobilizing information about political activities (Lemert, Mitzman, Seither, Cook, & Hacket, 1997). Prior (2003b) found that people who took advantage of abundant political information were more likely to cast their ballots in elections.

The positive association between informational use of media and participation has been witnessed in both traditional and new media. For instance, Xenos and Moy (2007) found a positive link between consumption of online political information and political engagement. Internet hard-news use had a positive relationship with political participation (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005). Research also shows that informational uses of the Internet are positively related to citizen participation because advanced tools, such as search engines and chat interfaces, allow people to use the Internet more effectively for political purposes (Park & Joo, 2004). Following the literature, this study expects:

H5-1: Attention to news via traditional media will be significantly and positively associated with offline political participation.

H5-2: Attention to news via traditional media will be significantly and positively associated with online political participation.

H5-3: Attention to news via online media will be significantly and positively associated with offline political participation.

H5-4: Attention to news via online media will be significantly and positively associated with online political participation.

H5-5: Attention to news via social media will be significantly and positively associated with offline political participation.

H5-6: Attention to news via social media will be significantly and positively associated with online political participation.

4.2.5 Political Talk – Political Efficacy

Talking through vague political ideas helps citizens understand political processes. Discussion of media content has been linked to increases in individuals' understanding of it (Robinson & Levy, 1986). People who talk frequently about what they have read and seen in the media are more likely to make sense of them. This is consistent with the Habermasian (1962) deliberative democracy model, which posits that citizens come to optimal decisions through deliberative discussion.

Political talk even helps people to reconcile potentially inconsistent points of view (Eliashoph, 1998). People who discuss politics frequently with others expect their opinions to be challenged. As a result, discussion allows citizens to weigh different viewpoints and integrate them into their final decision, thereby increasing citizens' understanding of issues beyond what they have learned from the media (Fishkin, 1995, 1996). People who talk to other people about information gained from the media may obtain other ways of thinking about the information, and ultimately develop a better understanding about it (Scheufele, 2001).

Scores of scholars noted that the more people talk about the information they obtain from the media, the more likely the mediated information is to influence people's political attitudes (Chaffee, 1972; Eveland, 2004; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001). Furthermore, some studies have

shown that political discussion is positively related to political efficacy (Fishkin, 1999; Min, 2007). Lin found that "citizens who engage in interpersonal discussion about politics with a greater number of fellow citizens are more likely to have confidence in their ability to make sense of and to get involved in the political process" (2003, p. 9). Discussion about politics facilitates rational political decisions while forming orientations and attitudes that motivate participation (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Morrell, 2005). No matter what a political conversation occurs in offline or online situation, the conversation tends to facilitate the flow of media information and to help citizens interpret media messages and construct meaning on their own (Kim & Kim, 2008; Southwell & Yzer, 2007). In short, discussions on political issues help individuals to gain mobilizing information from the media, thereby increasing their willingness to get involved in the political process (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005).

H6-1: Offline political talk will be positively and significantly related to political efficacy.

H6-2: Online political talk will be positively and significantly related to political efficacy.

4.2.6 News Elaboration – Political Efficacy

Unlike news attention through which people intentionally select news they prefer to read or to view, news elaboration concerns more in-depth and effortful mental efforts to make sense of what people obtain from news (Eveland, 2002). Through elaboration, people sort and reorganize information in personally meaningful ways (Graber, 1988). Elaboration can take place in two ways. First, people may perceive a connection between themselves and media content through an elaboration process. Second, people may interact psychologically with a medium's messages in the elaboration process (Levy & Windahl, 1985). Therefore, elaboration goes beyond mere attention to media content. Elaboration contains news consumers' intentional efforts to cope with obtained news.

According to the cognitive mediation model, greater elaboration should lead to a higher level of learning from news because elaboration propels the connection between news content, past experiences, and existing knowledge (Eveland et al., 2003). By linking the new information with previously stored knowledge, the news content will be more easily recalled. Research shows that elaboration is also positively associated with increased political interest and involvement in public events (Eveland, 2001, 2002; Kosicki & McLeod, 1989).

Little research has examined the direct relationship between elaboration and the sense of political efficacy. While elaboration refers to the tendency of making links what one obtained from information with one's prior experiences or knowledge, political efficacy means the belief that one can make a significant change about the political process. Unlike elaboration, which is a kind of attitudinal orientation, political efficacy much relates to a behavioral attitude toward the politics. Despite their differences, it is presumed that the more one elaborates on the media content, the more efficacious one feels about the political process, because as one exercises enough mental efforts about political information, one is more likely to have higher confidence in handling political situations that otherwise would be complex or intimidating (Bandura, 1977). In other words, active reflection on media content may help construct and understand the political world more easily. Thus, it is posed:

H6-3: Elaboration on news content will be positively and significantly related to political efficacy.

4.2.7 Political Talk – Political Participation

Political talk is "a public-spirited way of talking whereby citizens make connections from their individual and personal experiences, issues and so forth to society" (Graham & Hajru, 2011, p. 22). Political discussion has consistently been a central element to theories of democracy. The

influence of communication on levels of democratic engagement has been well documented. Scores of studies found that discussion about public affairs had a positive effect on engagement in the political process (Eveland, 2004; Kim et al., 1999; La Due Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998; Mutz, 2006; Rojas, 2008; Shah et al., 2005). Scheufele (2002) said, "Interpersonal discussion plays a role in the reception and processing of political news when it comes to translating mass-mediated messages into meaningful individual action" (pp. 57-58). Political debate and discussion function as a baseline or an antecedent for political engagement (Jankowski & van Selm, 2000; McLeod et al., 1996). Information sharing among citizens through interpersonal communication sufficiently accounts for political participation (McLeod et al., 1999; Verba et al., 1995). Interpersonal communication can allow citizens to exchange information, elaborate on public issues, and learn about opportunities to participate in political activities (Gastil & Dillard, 1999; Gil de Zúñiga, 2009; Klofstad, 2007; Rojas et al., 2005).

Online political talk can also play a crucial role in encouraging political participation. Price and Cappella (2002) found that participation in online discussion forums increased political engagement. Shah et al. (2005) reported a positive link between discussion about community affairs over emails and the like and engagement in community activities. Thus, it is hypothesized:

H7-1: Offline political talk will be positively and significantly associated with offline political participation.

H7-2: Offline political talk will be positively and significantly associated with online political participation.

H7-3: Online political talk will be positively and significantly associated with offline political participation.

H7-4: Online political talk will be positively and significantly associated with online political participation.

4.2.8 Political Efficacy – Political Participation

Political efficacy could prove to be an important mechanism by which the media effect occurs. Political efficacy is the belief in one's own competency and the feeling that political and social change is possible (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954). Political efficacy determines a myriad of political behaviors because it provides incentive to participate in politics (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982). Political efficacy has been considered one of the most important psychological constructs closely related to political participation (Cohen et al., 2001; Delli Carpini, 2004; Gans, 1967; Kenski & Stroud, 2006). Scores of empirical studies showed that political efficacy increased citizen participation in the political process (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Finkel, 1985; Gastil & Xenos, 2010; Stenner-Day & Fischle, 1992). Thus, it is posed:

H8-1: Political efficacy will have a significantly positive association with offline political participation.

H8-2: Political efficacy will have a significantly positive association with online political participation.

4.3 Indirect Relations

4.3.1 News Attention → Political Efficacy → Participation

It is questionable whether two different persons who consume the same media content show the same level of participation in political activities. After exposure to news, one of them may feel increased self-competence to engage in real activities due to increased political efficacy, while the other may feel heightened frustration or apathy in relation to society or politics. The

extent of political efficacy varies depending on each individual. For instance, Capella and Jamieson (1997) questioned whether certain patterns of television reporting lead more to the increase of political cynicism and withdrawal from public engagement rather than to the increase of political efficacy and engagement. Nisbet and Scheufele (2004) found that news consumption had an indirect impact on participation as mediated by political efficacy. Drawing on the above reasoning, the current study expects:

H9: Political efficacy will mediate the relationship between news attention and political participation.

4.3.2 Deliberation → Political Efficacy → Participation

Research on deliberative democratic theories suggests that citizens' discussion about politics facilitates rational political decisions while forming orientations and attitudes that are supportive of political participation (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Morrell, 2005). In addition, as noted earlier, elaboration that takes place during interpersonal communication may lead to strong political outcomes, such as strengthened political efficacy. Several studies documented evidence to support the positive impact of political discussion and deliberation on political efficacy (Fishkin, 1999; Min, 2007). Taken together, this study hypothesizes that political efficacy is a function of interpersonal political discussion and intrapersonal news elaboration. It also expects a positive relationship between political efficacy and political participation.

H10-1: Political efficacy will mediate the impact of interpersonal political talk on political participation.

H10-2: Political efficacy will mediate the impact of news elaboration on political participation.

4.3.3 News Attention → Deliberation → Participation

According to the traditional "two-step flow" model of communication, interpersonal discussions can mediate the effects of mass media on the audience (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955). In other words, the impact of mass media on audience behavior functions through interpersonal political discussion. This mediation process helps audiences to make sense of the political information they gain from the media. Tarde contended that the public emerged as a result of the rapid diffusion of newspapers that provoked political conversation in salons and coffee houses. Katz (1992) summarizes Tarde's argument in three bullet points: (1) the newspaper fuels conversation, (2) conversation shapes opinion, and (3) opinion triggers action.

Bryce (1888) succinctly described the public opinion formation process in four stages: (1) reading newspapers, (2) political conversation, (3) opinion formation, and (4) participatory activities. Bryce clearly shows the relationship between news media use, political conversation, and political participation within the context of an individual's behavior. Kim, Wyatt, and Katz (1999) found that news media use and political conversation are closely associated with participatory activities.

Scheufele (2001) argues that talking about certain issues with others is an essential condition for an individual to understand those issues more clearly, to tie them to preexisting knowledge, and to meaningfully participate in political life. To put it differently, interpersonal discussion on politics plays a significant role in translating mediated messages into meaningful engagement in the political process. Citizens will be able to participate in political events when they talk about politics with other people. Therefore, this study tests the variable of interpersonal political discussion as a deliberation process through which individuals make sense of and evaluate political information gained through different types of media.

Online political talk is another important type of interpersonal discussion in the current study. A number of researchers suggest that online political talk has a similar deliberative nature like face-to-face discussion (Price& Cappella, 2002; Shah et al., 2005; Shah et al., 2007). Cho et al. (2009) argue that online political discussion can result in an even stronger degree of elaboration because of its emphasis on texts. Indeed, in many ways, online talk excels offline talk. For instance, online messages can be widely distributed and shared without temporal or geographical limitations. Online discussion also takes advantage of diverse formats: e-mails, discussion boards, or instant messaging, microblogging, and podcasts (Evans, 2008; Mayfield, 2004). Thus, it is posed:

H11: Political talk both offline and online will mediate the impact of news attention on political participation.

4.3.4 News Attention → Deliberation → Political Efficacy

As stated earlier, news attention tends to increase political efficacy of those who consume news. However, political conversation and news elaboration are prerequisites for the understanding of political information (McLeod, 1996; Scheufele, 2001). Political talk and reflection on political information are crucial in translating the influence of news consumption on civic engagement in political affairs. Also, those who talk frequently about politics and reflect on political information are more likely to feel competent about their ability to make sense of politics. Taken together, this study hypothesizes:

H12-1: Political talk both offline and online will mediate the impact of news attention on political efficacy.

H12-2: News elaboration will mediate the impact of news attention on political efficacy.

4.3.5 News Attention → Deliberation → Political Efficacy → Political Participation

As hypothesized in the research model, this study expects that deliberation and political efficacy jointly mediate the relationship between news attention and political participation. However, since there is little research on this relationship, the current study suggests a research question:

RQ2: In what ways do offline and online political talk and political efficacy jointly influence the relationship between news attention and political participation?

CHAPTER 5

METHODS

5.1 Research Design

In order to test the proposed hypotheses, a panel survey was employed as a major research design because this study was particularly interested in the analysis of change in political attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors – especially change in political efficacy, trust, and engagement. In other words, because this study aimed to describe patterns of change and then explain how and why such change occurs, a panel survey was chosen.

Inferences about change can be obtained by several analytical strategies. First, in a cross-sectional analysis, data are gathered from a representative sample at only one point in time, and the effects of change are inferred from "variations between units" (Kessler & Greenberg, 1981, p. 2). This approach does not meet one of the critical conditions for causality. Three conditions should be met in order for a certain result to prove a causal relationship (Lazarsfeld & Morris, 1955): time order, correlation, and the absence of spuriousness. When we are satisfied with simply figuring out by how much a single variable has changed in a population, we can conduct a trend study (Kessler & Greenberg, 1981). This study offers information about "net changes" at a collective level. Yet, when data collection of each wave is done from qualitatively different types of subjects, false trends may come up. Cohort analysis is another method to obtain inferences of change. A cohort means "any group of individuals who are linked in some way or who have experienced the same significant life event within a given period" (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011, p. 221). A cohort study has some disadvantages, such as subject maturation or sample mortality.

The current study intends to draw samples from the whole population of South Korea; thus, a cohort study is not appropriate.

Another study design that can examine the inferential causality of samples between two different points in time is a panel study. A panel study tracks the same sample of respondents at different points in time, and thus, provides information about both "net change" and "gross change" in the target variable (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). For example, a panel study can be particularly useful in getting answers for a question that asks the roles of a certain medium in changing political attitudes. This design is powerful in that it "provides information about cross-sectional as well as longitudinal variation" (Kessler & Greenberg, 1981, p. 3). In addition, it allows us to produce data suitable for advanced statistical techniques. For example, structural equation modeling predicts reliable cause-and-effect relationships that occur between different time points. A panel design is also fairly advantageous in measuring reciprocal effects within the same model (Kessler & Greenberg, 1981; Eveland et al., 2003). In other words, a panel study allows us to make a conclusion of a reciprocal causal claim as well as of a simple causal claim.

As mentioned above, this study aims to examine a possible linear relationship of variables at one point in time: news media use – deliberation behaviors – political efficacy – political engagement. The current research is interested in simultaneously investigating associations of the causality of variables between two points in time, e.g., to what extent an individual's attention to a certain medium influences her/his level of political engagement over time. In other words, this research seeks to understand causality between variables which is representative of a whole population both at one single point and at two different points in time. Therefore, a panel study was employed as a necessary and desirable research design.

There are several ways to carry out a panel survey, such as face-to-face interviews, telephone surveys, and computer-aided surveys. Among the various techniques of survey, the current study relies on an online panel survey. An online survey allows us to recruit a large number of samples at a low cost compared with other techniques (Wimmer & Dominick, 2011). In addition, collecting data over the Internet is swift. Of course a web-based survey may reveal some problems, such as mortality and representativeness. Such problems can be reduced by taking some cautionary measures in the data collection process.

5.2 Data Collection

The study conducted a two-wave panel survey during the 2012 presidential campaign in South Korea. In order to assure the representativeness of the sample, data were collected via a stratified sampling method. Before doing stratification, this study constructed a sampling frame based on 2012 voter registration data of the Korea Election Management Commission. A sampling frame is the list of units composing a population from which a sample is selected. In order to generalize research results, all elements should have equal chance to be selected from the defined sampling frame. Then, a target sample was stratified according to four criteria, including age, gender, education, and household income. Stratification refers to the grouping of the units composing a population into homogeneous strata before sampling is conducted. This procedure "improves the representativeness of a sample, at least in terms of the stratification variables by reducing the degree of sampling error" (Babbie, 2007, p. 205). After stratification, a total of 1,200 target respondents were chosen using a four-way cross-classification system (age x gender x education x income) among the defined frame.

Finally, the target participants were provided the present survey's URL via e-mail. The first invitation (Wave 1) was sent to selected individuals on September 16, 2012. A total of 800 participated in the first survey (response rate = 66.7%). All respondents who completed the first wave were invited to a subsequent survey (December 10, 2012) with an explanation of compensatory incentive of $2, which would reduce a possible dropout rate. A total of 413 participated in the second survey. The final response rate was 34.4%.

The decision of two time points of two surveys was made under the consideration of the election campaign system of South Korea. According to an election law in South Korea, a presidential campaign officially starts three months before the election (December 19, 2012). Thus, the first survey was conducted three months prior to the election and the second survey was conducted nine days before it. Since South Korea first adopted a direct presidential election system in 1987, in every election, the competition between two major political parties (one conservative and one liberal) has been as fierce as a campaign in the United States. Therefore, this study assumed that voters' attitudes or behaviors during the three months would be greatly influenced by campaign messages and media coverage on them.

5.3 Measurement

5.3.1 Media Use & News Attention

For measurement of media use on a 4-point scale (1 = never; 4 = regularly), respondents were asked during the last three months before the date of each survey how often they had read or watched news in the following media: web-only news sites, portal news boxes, social networking sites, current affairs podcast shows, local newspapers, national newspapers, news magazines,

network TV evening news, network TV news magazine programs, local network TV news, radio news or news magazine programs, and cable TV news.

For measurement of news attention, respondents were asked during the last three months before the date of each survey how much attention they had paid to the media outlets mentioned above on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all; 5 = very much). Based on the result of scale validation of factor loadings, network TV, national newspapers, and radios were condensed into an index of traditional news attention: Wave 1 - α = .71, *M* = 2.10, *SD* = .85; Wave 2 - α = .64, *M* = 1.84, *SD* = .81. Portal sites and Web-only newspapers were averaged to create an index of online news attention: Wave 1 - r = .75, *M* = 2.63, *SD* = .73; Wave 2 - r = .73, *M* = 2.65, *SD* = .74. Current affairs podcast shows and social networking sites were averaged to create an index of social media news attention: Wave 1 - r = .72, *M* = 1.70, *SD* = .75; Wave 2 - r = .68, *M* = 1.79, *SD* = .80.

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Traditional Media Use

		Network TV news	National newspapers	Radio news
Wave 1	Mean	2.682	2.393	2.079
	SD	.538	.706	.688
Wave 2	Mean	2.293	1.999	1.934
	SD	.513	.742	.719

Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Online and Social Media Use

		Portal news	Web-only newspapers	Social networking sites	Current affairs podcast shows
Wave 1	Mean	2.770	2.030	2.240	1.820
	SD	.473	.742	.745	.747
Wave 2	Mean	2.794	2.366	2.498	2.105
	SD	.731	.482	.708	.791

Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of News Attention via Traditional Media

		Network TV news	National newspapers	Radio news
Wave 1	Mean	2.435	1.905	1.968
	SD	1.242	1.167	1.108
Wave 2	Mean	1.613	1.966	1.954
	SD	.960	1.159	1.077

Table 5 Descriptive Statistics of News Attention via Online and Social Media

		Portal news	Web-only newspapers	Social networking sites	Current affairs podcast shows
Wave 1	Mean	3.051	2.200	1.945	1.458
	SD	.887	.979	1.007	.900
Wave 2	Mean	3.000	2.298	2.019	1.569
	SD	.898	.963	1.014	.989

5.3.2 Political Efficacy

Despite the importance of political efficacy in political communication, measurement has been in controversy. Originally, political efficacy was considered a one-dimensional construct. Later, via repeated theoretical and empirical trials, scholars reached a general consensus that efficacy has two dimensions: internal efficacy and external efficacy (Balch, 1974; Craig et al., 1990). Many studies have relied on their own operationalization and failed to distinguish between internal and external efficacy (Morrell, 2003). Internal efficacy means a sense of one's own ability to participate effectively in the political process. External efficacy is defined as the perception of how much the government and political institutions respond to citizens' demands (Morrell, 2003). Usually, internal efficacy is believed to have a positive relationship with political engagement, while external efficacy does not exhibit a consistent association with political activity (Kahne & Westheimer, 2002; Shingles, 1981). The controversy about the impact of internal and external efficacy on people's perception and attitude is an on-going issue.

The current study focused only on internal political efficacy because of two reasons. First, this study assumed that internal political efficacy is more closely related to news consumption and political discussion than external efficacy is. Shah et al. (2007) also pointed out the same logic. Second, internal political efficacy was more relevant than external efficacy to the items of political participation in this study. Most items of political participation dealt with how people engage in election processes, such as contacting political officials.

This study relied on the measurement established by the American National Election Studies (ANES), which started using a new set of efficacy items in 1988. To assess internal efficacy, three items were used: (1) "I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics," (2) "I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country," and (3) "I think that I am as much as informed about politics and government as most people." Responses were coded on a 5-point agree-disagree scale. In each wave, an index was constructed by averaging the responses: Wave 1 – α = .71, M = 3.28, SD = .66; Wave 2 - α = .75, M = 3.41, SD = .67.

Table 6 Descriptive Statistics of Internal Political Efficacy

		Internal Efficacy 1	Internal Efficacy 2	Internal Efficacy 3
Wave 1	Mean	3.556	3.223	3.074
	SD	.847	.807	.836
Wave 2	Mean	3.608	3.417	3.201
	SD	.837	.837	.810

5.3.3 Political Trust

Many previous studies employed single item to measure political trust, which may undermine the reliability of research. Items to measure political trust also have been developed

by the ANES since the 1950s. Among them, this study drew three items and revised them to fit into the South Korean context: (1) “you can generally trust public officials who run our government to do what is right,” (2) “The people in government do not waste the money we pay in taxes,” and (3) “When the government leaders make statements to the South Korean people on the media, they are usually telling the truth.” Responses were coded on a on a 5-point agree-disagree scale. In each wave, an index was constructed by averaging the responses: Wave 1 – α = .73, *M* = 2.13, *SD* = .73; Wave 2 - α = .71, *M* = 2.19, *SD* = .73.

Table 7 Descriptive Statistics of Political Trust

		Political Trust 1	Political Trust 2	Political Trust 3
Wave 1	Mean	2.213	1.876	2.304
	SD	.874	.879	.729
Wave 2	Mean	2.283	1.910	2.375
	SD	.903	.900	.954

5.3.4 Political Participation

Traditional political participation often includes activities, such as voting, working for political campaigns, donating money to candidates, and displaying political bumper stickers (Verba et al., 1995; Conway, 1985). It also includes conventional behaviors, such as protesting, boycotting, and buying products for political reasons. With the influence of digital media, the forms of political participation are changing. However, many studies still stick to the traditional forms of participation, neglecting newly-emerged participatory behaviors (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2007). Gennaro and Dutton (2006) said, “the context provided by the Internet means that the activities take on new dimensions and forms that are at once more visual, immediate, self-selected and impersonal” (p. 566).

Therefore, this study takes into account both traditional and emerging forms of political participation. The current research distinguishes traditional offline participation from online participation under the assumption that heavy digital media users are more likely to show engaging behaviors in cyberspace because digital media provide users with various benefits, such as low participation cost and easy accessibility. On the other hand, the study expects that people who are heavily dependent on traditional media are more accustomed to traditional ways of participation. The study used nine items to measure online participation: (1) sending an e-mail to an editor of a newspaper or magazine, (2) contacting a politician using e-mails, (3) signing an online petition, (4) commenting on news online, (5) participating in online discussion forums, (6) posting political opinion on social networking sites, (7) forwarding a link with a political video or news to others, (8) meeting members of an online political group, and (9) engagement in a collective action online. Seven items were used to measure offline participation: (1) writing a letter to an editor of a newspaper or magazine, (2) displaying a campaign sticker or button, (3) writing a letter to a politician, (4) attending a political meeting, rally, or speech, (5) working for a political party or a candidate, (6) contributing money to political campaign or candidates, and (7) volunteering for political projects.

Responses were coded on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 4 (regularly). In each wave, an index was constructed by averaging respondents' answers: offline political participation in Wave 1 – $\alpha = .93$, $M = 1.32$, $SD = .51$; offline political participation in Wave 2 - $\alpha = .93$, $M = 1.35$, $SD = .55$; online political participation in Wave 1 – $\alpha = .91$, $M = 1.66$, $SD = .59$; online political participation in Wave 2 - $\alpha = .87$, $M = 1.78$, $SD = .56$.

Table 8 Descriptive Statistics of Offline Political Participation

		Offline Participa-tion 1	Offline Participation 2	Offline Participa-tion 3	Offline Participa-tion 4	Offline Participa-tion 5	Offline Participa-tion 6	Offline Participa-tion 7
Wave 1	Mean	1.266	1.265	1.243	1.371	1.371	1.414	1.340
	SD	.523	.546	.538	.649	.651	.704	.632
Wave 2	Mean	1.315	1.315	1.281	1.421	1.361	1.453	1.320
	SD	.602	.625	.594	.715	.648	.741	.627

Table 9 Descriptive Statistics of Online Political Participation

		Online Participation 1	Online Participation 2	Online Participation 3	Online Participation 4	Online Participation 5	Online Participation 6	Online Participation 7	Online Participation 8	Online Participation 9
Wave 1	Mean	1.420	1.450	1.853	2.086	2.086	1.693	1.715	1.359	1.318
	SD	.651	.704	.883	.911	.910	.787	.815	.613	.602
Wave 2	Mean	1.414	1.547	1.954	2.165	2.591	1.760	1.787	1.409	1.366
	SD	.650	.761	.892	.920	.830	.823	.869	.661	.642

5.3.5 Political Talk

This study measured two types of political discussion: offline political talk and online political talk. To measure offline political discussion, respondents were asked during the last one month how often they had talked about politics or current issues face-to-face with (1) friends, (2) colleagues, and (3) acquaintances. To measure online political talk, respondents were asked during the last one month how often they had talked about politics or current issues via e-mails, social networking sites, or online discussion forums with (1) friends, (2) colleagues, and (3) acquaintances. Responses were coded on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). In each wave, an index was constructed by averaging respondents' answers: offline political talk in Wave 1 – $\alpha = .65$, $M = 1.86$, $SD = .79$; offline political talk in Wave 2 - $\alpha = .70$, M

= 2.14, *SD* = .93; online political talk in Wave 1 – α = .91, *M* = 1.84, *SD* = .85; online political talk in Wave 2 - α = .72, *M* = 1.80, *SD* = .84.

Table 10 Descriptive Statistics of Offline and Online Political Talk

		Offline Talk 1	Offline Talk 2	Offline Talk 3	Online Talk 1	Online Talk 2	Online Talk 3
Wave 1	Mean	1.951	1.721	1.910	1.971	1.698	1.836
	SD	1.151	1.056	1.183	1.114	1.038	1.174
Wave 2	Mean	2.148	2.000	2.259	2.000	1.763	1.630
	SD	1.217	1.213	1.316	1.153	1.109	1.077

5.3.6 News Elaboration

The indicators of news elaboration were borrowed from prior studies (Eveland, 2002; Eveland & Dunwood, 2002; Kosicki & McLeod, 1990). Elaboration was measured with two 5-point Likert-type items: (1) "I often find myself thinking about what I've encountered in the news" and (2) "I often try to relate what I encounter in the news to my own personal experience." The indicators were averaged to create an index, r = .63, *M* = 3.59, *SD* = .66.

Table 11 Descriptive Statistics of News Elaboration

		Reflect on the news I read	Connect the news to my experience
Wave 1	Mean	3.548	3.626
	SD	.732	.724

5.3.7 Control Variables

Political interest was assessed with a two-item index. Respondents were asked how much they were interested in local politics and national politics on a 5-point scale. Political ideology was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very liberal) 5 (very conservative). Gender, age,

education, and annual household income were also included in the measurement.[2]

Table 12 Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables

		Age	Gender	Education	Annual Income	Political Interest	Political Ideology
Wave 1	Mean	39.18	Male 408 (51%)	2.794	2.758	3.046	2.950
	SD	10.71	Female 392 (49%)	.663	1.169	1.029	.805
Wave 2	Mean	39.62	Male 221 (53.5%)	2.804	2.751	3.090	2.927
	SD	10.45	Female 192 (46.5%)	.633	1.131	.789	.803

5.4 Analytic Procedure

5.4.1 Major Characteristics of the Partial Least Squares (PLS) Approach

In estimating structural equation models, either the covariance-based SEM method or the variance-based PLS (Partial Least Squares) approach can be used. PLS is a type of modeling to test causal relationships. It was developed as an alternative to covariance-based SEMs, such as LISREL, EQS, or AMOS. PLS simultaneously tests the "measurement model" (relationships between indicators and their corresponding constructs) and the "structural model" (relationships between constructs) (Barclay, Thompson & Higgins, 1995; Hulland, 1999). PLS calculates loadings from reflective constructs to their indicators, standardized regression coefficients between constructs, and coefficients of multiple determination (R-squared) for endogenous constructs (Gefen, Straub & Boudreau, 2000). Both covariance-based SEM and PLS are useful in testing complex models that have latent variable relationships. Many communication theories

[2] Refer to Appendix for specifics of the demographic questions.

rely on latent variables, which cannot be directly measured but must be analyzed through indirect means. Both PLS and covariance-based SEM rely on manifest variables, such as people's responses on a topic, in order to estimate a given latent variable.

However, compared with covariance-based SEMs, the PLS approach offers several advantages. First, PLS allows for relatively small sample sizes and makes less strict assumptions about the distribution of the data (Hair, Anderson, Tatham et al., 1998). Small samples do not always meet normality and homogeneity assumptions. Similarly, categorical variables also may not satisfy the distributional assumptions of the covariance-based SEM. It is believed that PLS provides more accurate coefficient results with smaller sample sizes than covariance-based SEMs (Chin, 1998; Mayfield et al., 2012).

Second, PLS can test a complex model that contains multiple independent and dependent variables. Thus, it is useful in testing relationships that cannot be easily analyzed by standard regression methods. Although no statistical method can perfectly examine causation between variables, PLS allows for the examination of complex relationships, such as a mediating relationship, which is embedded within a larger theoretical framework. As such, tests of a PLS model can provide greater and more nuanced evidence for relationships between variables (Howson & Urbach, 2005). Garson (2004) said, "PLS is a predictive technique which can handle many independent variables, even when these display multi-collinearity. One very important distributional condition indicates when PLS can be a more appropriate technique: data come from non-normal or unknown distributions" (Falk & Miller, 1992, p. 6). In summary, PLS could be a more reliable alternative to other statistical techniques.

Following the aforementioned arguments, this study decided to use the PLS approach because PLS is beneficial in setting up a complex model like the case in this study (Klarner,

Sarstedt, Hoeck & Ringle, 2013). In addition, the PLS methodology allows for the simultaneous testing of multiple paths (correlations). This study examines multiple paths among variables that relate to political efficacy, which is expected to mediate the relationship between news attention and political outcomes. The goal of this study is to explain the complex role of political efficacy in the political process, thus the variance-based PLS approach seems to be more suitable than other techniques.

5.4.2 Test of Model Adequacy in PLS

As with covariance-based SEM, PLS lacks general consensus about overall model adequacy. Instead, there are multiple methods that should be tested to determine model adequacy. Once model adequacy has been judged, the significance of the links between latent variables can be tested. Latent variables cannot be directly assessed; It must be estimated through statistical methods. A test should be conducted on how well manifest variables reflect the latent variables. Manifest variables can be directly measured and be used to estimate the latent variables.

A PLS model adequacy measure provides two types of scale reliability: Cronbach's alpha measure and composite reliability. The composite reliability measure is useful because it is free from the Cronbach's alpha assumption that all scale items have the same relationship with the attendant latent variable. The composite reliability measure, instead, uses a manifest variable's relationship with its associated latent variable in determining reliability. Such a method produces a score that is equivalent to Cronbach's alpha. To satisfy composite reliability adequacy, these metrics should be higher than .70 (Chin, 1998; Churchill, 1979; Lohmöller, 1989).

Average variance extracted (AVE) is another model adequacy measure in PLS. The AVE provides a piece of evidence to model adequacy if a set of manifest variables from a given measure correctly reflect an underlying latent construct (Hair et al., 2012). As the PLS approach

draws more variance, we can be more certain that the manifest variables are measuring a common latent variable. When the AVE score is greater than 0.50 (on a 0 ~1 scale), it can be said that the manifest variables are doing a good job in measuring the latent variable (Hair et al., 2012).

In addition to examining the AVE, item cross-loadings must be calculated. Cross-loadings are similar to the factor scores in a factor analysis. The cross-loading scores give information on how a given manifest variable relates to all latent constructs. Items that are empirically distinct will have their highest loadings on their associated latent construct, and will have low loadings on all other constructs. In order to have appropriate cross-loadings, an item should load at least 0.707 on the intended construct (Chin, 1998; Lohmöller, 1989; J. Mayfield & Mayfield, 2010).

5.4.3 Test of Relationships in PLS

Once model adequacy has been established, the next step is to assess the structural model results. This process involves investigating whether the hypothesized model has enough capability of result prediction and how the constructs are interconnected. To this end, this study examines the strengths of the relationships between latent variables. It also tests whether the paths between the latent variables are significant and whether the coefficient signs move toward hypothesized directions. In PLS, the significance of paths is calculated through a bootstrapping procedure because parametric significance determination is not possible with PLS algorithms. In addition to the tests of path coefficients and their significance, PLS also provides information on how much variance a set of exogenous variables explains for its corresponding endogenous variables. This information is provided through R^2 measures for the latent variables. An

exogenous variable is usually called an independent variable because no other variable in the

model is expected to cause changes in it. An endogenous variable, equivalent to a dependent variable, has at least one other variable that influences it. Some constructs may be an independent variable in one relationship and a dependent variable in another relationship. For example, political efficacy can function as an independent variable when it is assessed together with political participation. But when political efficacy is included in a model that deals with news consumption and deliberation behaviors, it becomes a dependent variable. Therefore, in PLS, the terminology exogenous and endogenous variables are preferred rather than independent and dependent variables.

5.4.4 Application of PLS to the Current Study

This study used the smartPLS 2.0 M3 software developed by Christian Ringle and his colleagues in 2005. To examine the simultaneous effects of news attention and deliberation behaviors on political participation, the current research employed two different analytic strategies using smartPLS: (1) two cross-sectional models that relate individual differences in indicators based on the Wave 1 and Wave 2 data and (2) an auto-regressive model that relates aggregate change estimates generated by lagging Wave 1 variables on their Wave 2 counterparts.

Both approaches have strengths and drawbacks that are counterbalanced by the other model (Finkel, 1995). A cross-sectional model examines contemporaneous relations at the first and second wave of data collection. Although this analytic strategy does not take advantage of a panel design, this study adopts that method for three reasons. First, a cross-sectional model retains a larger and more representative sample. Secondly, it serves as a baseline to be compared with the auto-regressive model. Lastly, it allows this research to be connected to previous studies that have employed cross-sectional analyses.

The current study also employs an auto-regressive model in which each Wave 2 measure is

regressed on its corresponding Wave 1 measure. The study controls for demographic variables and political orientation variables by residualizing them. The auto-regressive model counts on change scores estimated at the aggregated level. The paths between Wave 1 and Wave 2 measures indicate temporal stability and effectively control for prior levels of the variable. By doing so, this method helps to interpret other paths in a synchronous model. This approach explains clearly the unexplained variance among endogenous Wave 2 variables while accounting for stability in these variables over time. Estimates of change are derived across the sample rather than within each individual. As a result, error variances are generally reduced, and an analysis can produce more stable estimates of gains or losses (Shah et al., 2005).

CHAPTER 6

RESULTS

6.1 Wave 1 Results

6.1.1 Scale Validation in the Measurement Model

For reflective indicators in the PLS approach, there are two important aspects of the measurement model that should be evaluated: convergent and discriminant validity (Gefen et al., 2000). Convergent validity can be assessed using three criteria – indicator reliability, composite reliability, and average variance extracted (AVE). As shown in Table 13, standardized loadings for all scale items were significant at $p < .001$ and exceeded the minimum loading criterion of .707 except a few cases. Although the indicator reliability score should be at least .707, a reliability score of at least 0.50 might be acceptable if some other items measuring the same construct had high reliability scores (Chin, 1998). Table 15 shows that all loadings except one were above the .60 for their respective construct, suggesting good indicator reliability (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The variable that showed the lowest indicator reliability score in the 1st wave data was ‘attention to portal site news’ ($\lambda = .582$). According to the criteria mentioned earlier, three items from traditional news use (local newspapers, local network TV news, and current affairs magazines), one item from offline participation (displaying campaign buttons or stickers) were dropped from subsequent analyses since their loadings were lower than .50.

The composite reliabilities of all factors ranged from .73 to .95, which exceeded the recommended the threshold value of .70 (Table 13). In addition, all latent variables indicated good AVE scores as shown in Table 13. The AVE scores ranged from .50 to .82, consistent with the guidelines of Fornell and Larcker (1981). Hence, all three conditions of convergent validity

were met.

For the discriminant validity, cross-loadings and intercorrelations were calculated following Fornell and Larcker's (1981) recommendation. The square root of AVE for each construct should exceed all correlations between that construct and other constructs. This test is supposedly stronger than pairwise comparison of χ^2 values of unconstrained and constrained confirmatory factory analysis (CFA) models (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). As shown in Table 15, all AVE scores in the matrix diagonals were larger than the off-diagonal correlations, suggesting good discriminant validity. In the case of cross-loadings, the magnitude of the factor loading of an item on its corresponding construct should exceed the magnitude of its cross-factor loadings. Following the way suggested by Chin (1998), the current study calculated cross-loadings. All indicators showed higher loadings with their respective construct than with any other reflective construct (Table 15) except two items – "meeting members of an online political group" and "engagement a collective action online." The two items were removed from the final analysis. Hence, the discriminant validity criteria were met for the 1st wave, giving further confidence in the adequacy of measurement scales.

Table13 Assessment of the Convergent Validity (Wave 1)

	AVE	Composite Reliability
Traditional News	.563	.793
Online News	.591	.733
Social Media News	.622	.766
Offline Political Talk	.501	.738
Online Political Talk	.585	.808
News Elaboration	.816	.899
Political Efficacy	.639	.840
Offline Political Participation	.721	.948
Online Political Participation	.589	.928

Table 14 Construct Correlations and Square Root of AVE (Wave 1)

	1.Tradi-tional News	2.On-line News	3.So-cial Media News	4.Off-line Talk	5.On-line Talk	6.News Elabora-tion	7.Politi-cal Effica-cy	8.Offline Participa-tion	9.On-line Partici-pation
1	**.751**								
2	.238	**.769**							
3	.175	.382	**.789**						
4	.247	.162	.139	**.708**					
5	.184	.183	.267	.414	**.765**				
6	.258	.177	.201	.231	.203	**.903**			
7	.292	.140	.229	.265	.248	.464	**.800**		
8	.098	.069	.109	.214	.691	.086	.159	**.849**	
9	.178	.183	.293	.293	.374	.254	.326	.691	**0.767**

Note: Diagonal elements (shaded) are the square root of the variance shared between the constructs and their measures. Off diagonal elements are the correlations among constructs. For discriminant validity, diagonal elements should be larger than off-diagonal elements.

Table 15 Factor Loadings (bolded) and Cross-Loadings (Wave 1)

	Tradi-tional News	On-line News	Social Media News	Off-line Talk	On-line Talk	News Elabo ration	Politi-cal Effica-cy	Offline Partici-pation	Online Partici -pation
TV News	**.823**	.236	.152	.189	.156	.214	.275	.058	.179
Newspapers	**.642**	.129	.043	.206	.079	.130	.159	.103	.109
Radio News	**.775**	.158	.181	.169	.168	.227	.208	.070	.106
Internet Newspapers	.254	**.918**	.363	.148	.166	.172	.137	.089	.188
Portal News	.066	**.582**	.196	.098	.109	.084	.064	-.013	.065
Social Networking Sites Newsfeed	.077	.337	**.738**	.097	.250	.107	.107	.052	.224
Current Affairs Podcast	.188	.275	**.837**	.122	.180	.202	.242	.115	.239
Off-Talk 1	.135	.086	.060	**.644**	.279	.138	.105	.137	.174
Off-Talk 2	.231	.135	.105	**.778**	.253	.199	.250	.171	.240
Off-Talk 3	.130	.111	.122	**.662**	.358	.135	.172	.136	.189
On-Talk 1	.122	.146	.191	.302	**.777**	.142	.192	.226	.330
On-Talk 2	.165	.130	.150	.371	**.712**	.135	.191	.144	.216

Table 15 (Continued)

	Tradi-tional News	On-line News	Social Media News	Off-line Talk	On-line Talk	News Elabo ration	Politi-cal Effica-cy	Offline Partici-pation	Online Partici -pation
On-Talk 3	.142	.142	.262	.292	**.802**	.185	.175	.191	.300
Elaboration 1	.220	.159	.180	.205	.202	**.919**	.443	.133	.279
Elaboration 2	.249	.161	.185	.214	.161	**.888**	.392	.013	.173
Efficacy 1	.281	.099	.183	.280	.212	.406	**.848**	.187	.291
Efficacy 2	.119	.102	.174	.115	.127	.344	**.664**	.052	.173
Efficacy 3	.270	.136	.197	.214	.227	.365	**.871**	.118	.298
Off-Participation 1	.099	.082	.120	.165	.200	.090	.152	**.789**	.558
Off-Participation 2	.022	.009	.067	.121	.136	.041	.122	**.852**	.598
Off-Participation 3	.086	.081	.157	.204	.271	.088	.170	**.854**	.609
Off-Participation 4	.079	.033	.052	.157	.198	.033	.102	**.868**	.572
Off-Participation 5	.104	.077	.080	.207	.212	.091	.122	**.898**	.577
Off-Participation 6	.101	.047	.058	.187	.206	.068	.127	**.865**	.538
On-Participation 1	.174	.186	.256	.258	.303	.271	.290	.399	**.824**
On-Participation 2	.144	.169	.307	.232	.335	.212	.285	.520	**.813**
On-Participation 3	.181	.181	.232	.269	.317	.247	.308	.528	**.841**
On-Participation 4	.174	.186	.256	.258	.303	.271	.290	.399	**.824**
On-Participation 5	.109	.125	.252	.209	.311	.162	.202	.627	**.762**

Table 15 (Continued)

	Tradi-tional News	On-line News	Social Media News	Off-line Talk	On-line Talk	News Elabo ration	Politi-cal Effica-cy	Offline Partici-pation	Online Partici -pation
On-Participation 6	.118	.047	.117	.191	.250	.124	.193	.648	**.713**
On-Participation 7	.147	.145	.249	.190	.267	.228	.300	.404	**.697**

6.1.2 Structural Model Testing

The structural model represents the relationships between constructs that were hypothesized in the research model (see Figure 1). PLS does not have well-established overall fit measures. Paths and coefficients of determination (R-squares) are two typical indicators that show overall model goodness of fit. Path coefficients are equivalent to standardized regression coefficients. A one-unit increase in an independent variable causes an increase in the dependent variable equal to the path coefficient. R-squares demonstrate how much the variance in endogenous variables constructs is explained by other constructs that were hypothesized to have an effect on them in a model.

6.1.2.1 Direct Effects

As shown in Figure 1, all three variables in the Media block (attention to news via traditional, online, and social media) had significant effects on offline political discussion. They jointly explained 7.7% of offline political talk, 9.6% of news elaboration, and 9.3% of online political discussion. It was found that in general attention to media news had a positive association with deliberation behaviors. Attention to traditional news was found to be a significant predictor of offline political talk ($\beta = .21$, $p < .001$), news elaboration ($\beta = .22$, p

< .001), and online political talk (β = .13, p < .01). Attention to news via Internet portals or online newspapers was a significantly positive predictor of offline political talk (β = .10, p < .05) and online political talk (β = .07, p < .05). Attention to news via social media had a positive influence on offline political talk (β = .07, p < .05), news elaboration (β = .14, p < .001), and online political talk (β = .22, p < .001).

News attention was also found to have a significant relationship with political efficacy: traditional news attention, β = .15, p < .001; social media news attention, β = .11, p = .002. Overall, news attention failed to achieve a significantly positive relationship with political participation. Traditional news attention was not significantly related to offline and online political participation (β = .01, p = .73; β = .02, p = .64, respectively). Online news attention also failed to predict offline and online political participation. News attention via social media had a significant association with online political participation (β = .18, p < .001) but not with offline participation.

All three variables in the Deliberation block were significantly linked to political efficacy: offline political talk, β = .10, p < .01; news elaboration, β = .37, p < .001; and online political talk, β = .07, p < .05. The three variables in the Deliberation block and the same number of variables in the Media block explained 28.1% of political efficacy. The deliberation variables had significant relationships with political participation. Political talk was significantly associated with participatory behaviors. Offline political talk had a significant influence on offline participation (β = .12, p < .001) and online participation (β = .14, p < .001). Similarly, online political talk had a significant relationship with offline and online political participation (β = .17, p < .001; β = .22, p < .001, respectively). News elaboration had a positive link to online participation (β = .09, p < .05), but not to offline participation. These results imply that the

interpersonal deliberation behavior (political talk) is more powerful than the intrapersonal deliberation behavior (news elaboration) in motivating news consumers to engage in political activities. Lastly, political efficacy successfully predicted a significant portion of offline and online political participation ($\beta = .09$, $p < .05$; $\beta = .13$, $p < .01$, respectively).

Overall, the results of path coefficients indicate that the hypothesized model is solid and well-supported. Figure 1 shows the explained variance for each construct in the model. Approximately, 60.3% of the variance in political participation is explained by the model (offline participation, 25.4%; online participation, 34.9%). Thus, the hypothesized model presented in Figure 1 represents the best theoretical predictions of the relationships between the variables of interest to this study.



Figure 1 Direct Relations in the Hypothesized Model (Wave 1)

6.1.2.2 Indirect Effects

A commonly used approach for testing mediating effects is the Sobel (1982) test. This test hypothesizes that the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable is indirect owing to the influence of a third variable (a mediator). As a result, when the mediator is included in a model with the independent variable, the effect of the independent variable is diminished while that of the mediator remains significant (Helm, Eggert, & Garnefeld, 2010). However, this test relies on distributional assumptions, which usually do not hold for the indirect effect. Furthermore, the Sobel test requires unstandardized path coefficients as input for the test statistics. In addition, it lacks statistical power, when it deals with small sample sizes.

When testing mediation effects, it looks better to follow the bootstrapping method proposed by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008). Bootstrapping works well in both simple and

multiple mediation models. Bootstrapping makes no assumptions about the shape of the variables' distribution or the sampling distribution of the statistics. As a result, this technique can be applied to the analysis of small sample sizes. This approach is therefore suitable to PLS. In addition, bootstrapping shows higher statistical power compared with the Sobel test.

Many studies about mediation have relied on the assumption that the direct effect should be significant if the mediator is not included in the model. For instance, Baron and Kenny (1986) suggested that a variable functions as a mediator when it meets three conditions: (1) the independent variable is significantly related to the dependent variable, (2) the mediator has a significant association with the dependent variable, and (3) when the mediator is included in the model, the previous significant relation between the independent variable and dependent variable should change significantly.

Recently, Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, and Petty (2011) raised a question to such an approach. After testing various simulations, they found that additional significant indirect effects can exist even if the initial direct effect is not significant. They argued that mediation analyses should be based on theories rather than on the requirement for a significant relationship between the exogenous variable and the endogenous variable. If there is a theoretical rationale to predict the presence of an indirect effect or multiple indirect effects, studies need to examine these effects regardless of the significance of the total or direct effect. Rucker et al. (2011) concluded that an examination of the significance of indirect effects and effect sizes accompanying those effects is crucial in judging the mediation effect.

When the mediator is included in an analysis, the indirect effect must be significant to prove a mediating effect. If so, the mediator absorbs some of the direct effect. For instance, in a PLS path model without the mediator variable, a positive direct effect would become smaller or

insignificant after the inclusion of the mediator variable. The question is how much the mediator variable absorbs. The *variance accounted for* (VAF) determines the size of the indirect effect in relation to the total effect (indirect effect + direct effect). VAF is calculated by the following formula:

VAF = $(p_{12} * p_{23})/(p_{12} * p_{23} + p_{13})$.

Where, p_{ij} is the standardized SEM coefficient between variable *i* and variable *j*.

VAF indicates how the variance of the dependent variable is directly explained by the independent variable and how much of the target construct's variance is explained by indirect relationship via the mediator. If the indirect effect is significant without absorbing any of the exogenous latent variable's effect on the endogenous variable, the VAF is low. This occurs when the direct effect is large and declines only very slightly after a mediator variable with a significant but very small indirect effect is included. If the VAF is less than 20%, one can say that *no mediation* exists. In contrast, when the VAF is over 80%, one can assume a *full mediation*. A situation in which the VAF is larger than 20% and less than 80% is usually called as a *partial mediation* (Hair et al., 2012).

Generally, the confidence interval generated by bootstrapping is used as a criterion to check whether the indirect effect significantly differs from zero. If zero is not in the confidence intervals, the mediating effect is significant. This study calculated 95% percentile confidence intervals. As shown in Table 16, zero is not contained in any confidence interval that tests the mediation. These results lend support to the claim that political efficacy mediates the impact of news attention on political outcomes.

To test mediating effects between variables, a series of bootstrapping for each model

(number of bootstrap samples is 200) was performed. To begin with, the indirect effect of political efficacy between three news channels and two types of political participation was examined. It was found that political efficacy did not mediate the relationship between attention to traditional news and political participation. The indirect effect between online news attention and online participation through political efficacy ($t = 3.00$, $p = .003$) was positive and significant. The VAF was 21.9%, indicating a partial mediation. Political efficacy also partially mediated the relationships between attention to social media news and offline participation ($t = 3.27$, $p = .001$, VAF = 26.5%) and between attention to social media news and online participation ($t = 3.81$, $p < .001$, VAF = 26.1%).

Political efficacy was found to mediate the association between the deliberation and participation behavior. The indirect impact of political efficacy between offline political talk and offline participation was significantly positive ($t = 3.49$, $p = .003$, VAF = 25.0%). Political efficacy mediated the relationship between offline political talk and online political participation ($t = 3.05$, $p = .003$, VAF = 25.8%). The mediating effects of political efficacy between online political talk and political participation both offline and online were found to be significant ($t = 3.05$, $p = .003$, VAF = 20.6%; $t = 2.87$, $p = .005$, VAF = 22.8% respectively). Political efficacy also mediated the effect of news elaboration on offline participation ($t = 3.77$, $p < .001$, VAF = 83.0%) and online participation ($t = 3.84$, $p < .001$, VAF = 42.8%). It is noteworthy that political efficacy fully mediated the relationship between news elaboration and offline political participation. This result suggests that without political efficacy there would be little significant association between news elaboration and offline participation. Political efficacy did not mediate the relationships between online political talk and political participation.

The mediation analyses found that the deliberation variables mediated the relationships

between the media variables and political efficacy. Online talk (t = 5.69, p < .001, VAF = 21.1%) and news elaboration (t = 6.27, p < .001, VAF = 37.1%) significantly mediated the impact of traditional news attention on political efficacy. Similarly, offline political talk (t = 2.96, p = .003, VAF = 23.8%), news elaboration (t = 6.00, p < .001, VAF = 37.6%), and online political talk (t = 3.33, p = .001, VAF = 22.8%) mediated the relationship between news attention via social media and political efficacy. All three deliberation variables were found to mediate the impact of online news attention on political efficacy: offline political talk, t = 3.33, p = .001, VAF = 44.8%; news elaboration, t = 4.49, p < .001, VAF = 58.3%; online political talk t = 3.69, p < .001, VAF = 44.3%.

This study also investigated whether deliberation behaviors and political efficacy jointly mediate the relationships between the Media variables and political participation (a multi-step mediation). When the dependent variable was offline participation, deliberation behaviors and political efficacy did not function as mediators. In contrast, three deliberation behaviors and political efficacy significantly mediated the relationship between attention to online news and online participation. As shown in Table 17, the indirect effect of offline talk and political efficacy between online news and online participation was significant and positive, t = 2.91, p = .004. News elaboration and efficacy (t = 3.19, p = .002) and offline talk and efficacy (t = 3.24, p = .001) also played a significant mediating role between the above two variables.

In addition, three deliberation behaviors and political efficacy significantly mediated the relationship between attention to social media news and online participation: offline talk + efficacy, t = 2.89, p = .004; news elaboration + efficacy, t = 3.25, p = .001, online talk + efficacy, t = 3.15, p = .002, respectively. These outcomes suggest that the dataset of Wave 1, to a considerable extent, fits into the S – R – O – R mediation framework.

The current study also examined whether political efficacy played a mediating role in the model in which all variables in the same block are aggregated. To this end, the three variables in the Media block (traditional news, online news, social media news) were consolidated into one variable. The same procedure was applied to the three variables in the Deliberation block (offline political talk, news elaboration, online political talk) and two variables in the Participation block (offline and online participation). In the 'aggregated Media – political efficacy – aggregated Participation' model, political efficacy was found to mediate the relationship between the Media and the Participation, $t = 2.17$, $p = .032$, VAF = 30.2%. In the 'aggregated Deliberation – political efficacy – aggregated Participation' model, political efficacy was found to significantly mediate the relationship between the two variables, $t = 2.04$, $p = .043$, VAF = 20.8%. Furthermore, the aggregated Deliberation and political efficacy jointly mediated the effect of the aggregated Media on the aggregated Participation, $t = 3.17$, $p = .002$. Thus, the hypothesized two-step mediation model was well supported by the Wave 1 dataset.

Additionally, this study also tested whether the hypothesized model in this study holds in different media environments because the direct and mediation effects of political communication might vary depending on each specific type of medium (McLeod et al., 1999). To this end, except the three variables in the Media block, all the variables in the same block were collapsed into one. The bootstrapping results revealed that the hypothesized mediation model worked well in online news and social media news environments. In other words, deliberation behaviors and political efficacy jointly mediated the relationship between online news and political participation ($t = 2.47$, $p = .014$) and the relationship between social media news and participation ($t = 3.45$, $p < .001$). However, the hypothesized model did not turn out to be true in the traditional news situation, $t = 1.96$, $p = .051$.

Table 16 Results of Single Mediation (Wave 1)

H	IV	Media-tor	DV	Indirect effect	*t* value	*p* value	Percentile 95% Confidence Interval	VAF
H9	**News**	**Efficacy**	**Participa-tion**					
	Online News	Efficacy	Online Participa-tion	.025	3.001	.003	[.009; .042]	21.94
	Social Media News	Efficacy	Offline Participa-tion	.031	3.272	.001	[.013; .050]	26.54
	Social Media News	Efficacy	Online Participa-tion	.028	3.809	.000	[.014; .046]	26.10
H10	**Delibera-tion**	**Efficacy**	**Participa-tion**					
H10-1	Offline Talk	Efficacy	Offline Participa-tion	.032	3.491	.000	[.014; .051]	25.03
H10-1	Offline Talk	Efficacy	Online Participa-tion	.036	3.054	.003	[.013; .058]	25.80
H10-1	Online Talk	Efficacy	Offline Participa-tion	.026	3.046	.003	[.010; .044]	20.64
H10-1	Online Talk	Efficacy	Online Participa-tion	.032	2.867	.005	[.011; .053]	22.80
H10-2	Elaborati on	Efficacy	Offline Participa-tion	.072	3.769	.000	[.034; .109]	82.96
H10-2	Elaborati on	Efficacy	Online Participa-tion	.085	3.835	.000	[.047; .129]	42.82
H11	**News**	**Talk**	**Participa-tion**					
	Online News	Offline Talk	Online Participa-tion	.021	2.461	.015	[.004; .040]	38.75
	Online News	Online Talk	Online Participa-tion	.048	4.110	.000	[.023; .070]	35.63

Table 16 (Continued)

H	IV	Media-tor	DV	Indirect effect	*t* value	*p* value	Percentile 95% Confidence Interval	VAF
	Social Media News	Offline Talk	Offline Participa-tion	.018	2.628	.009	[.005; .032]	36.74
	Social Media News	Offline Talk	Online Participa-tion	.030	2.838	.005	[.010; .050]	11.86
	Social Media News	Online Talk	Offline Participa-tion	.062	4.748	.000	[.036; .087]	76.05
	Social Media News	Online Talk	Online Participa-tion	.062	4.692	.000	[.034; .088]	28.70
H12	**News**	**Delibe-ration**	**Efficacy**					
	Tradition al News	Elabora-tion	Efficacy	.108	6.270	.000	[.074; .141]	37.13
	Tradition al News	Online Talk	Efficacy	.051	5.694	.000	[.034 .069]	21.12
	Online News	Offline Talk	Efficacy	.029	3.331	.001	[.012; .046]	44.78
	Online News	Elabora-tion	Efficacy	.082	4.494	.000	[.046; .117]	58.27
	Online News	Online Talk	Efficacy	.037	3.694	.000	[.017; .056]	44.34
	Social Media News	Offline Talk	Efficacy	.022	2.962	.003	[.007; .037]	23.84
	Social Media News	Elabora-tion	Efficacy	.092	5.995	.000	[.062; .122]	37.57
	Social Media News	Online Talk	Efficacy	.033	3.326	.001	[.014; .053]	22.84

Table 17 Results of Two-Step Mediation (Wave 1)

RQ2	IV	Mediator 1	Mediator 2	DV	Indire-ct Effect	*t* value	*p* value	Percentile 95% Confidence Interval
	Online News	Offline Talk	Efficacy	Online Participation	.006	2.911	.004	[.002; .011]
	Online News	Elaboration	Efficacy	Online Participation	.010	3.186	.002	[.004; .019]
	Online News	Online Talk	Efficacy	Online Participation	.006	3.245	.001	[.002; .010]
	Social Media	Offline Talk	Efficacy	Online Participation	.008	2.890	.004	[.004; .016]
	Social Media	Elaboration	Efficacy	Online Participation	.019	3.250	.001	[.007; .032]
	Social Media	Online Talk	Efficacy	Online Participation	.014	3.146	.002	[.005; .024]

Table 18 Results of Aggregated Model Mediation (Wave 1)

H	IV	Mediator 1	Mediator 2	DV	Indi-rect Effe-ct	*t* value	*p* value	Percentile 95% Confidence Interval
H9	Media	Efficacy		Partici-pation	.031	2.040	.043	[.001; .060]
H10	Delibera-tion	Efficacy		Partici-pation	.045	2.166	.032	[.004; .086]
H13	Media	Delibera-tion	Efficacy	Partici-pation	.032	3.168	.002	[.012; .052]
H13	Traditional News Group	Delibera-tion	Efficacy	Partici-pation	.006	1.962	.051	[.000; .012]
H13	Online News Group	Delibera-tion	Efficacy	Partici-pation	.015	2.466	.014	[.001; .009]
H13	Social News Group	Delibera-tion	Efficacy	Partici-pation	.023	3.446	.000	[.010; .035]

6.2 Wave 2 Results

6.2.1 Scale Validation in the Measurement Model

This section indicates the results of factor loadings, cross-loadings, composite reliability, correlation of constructs, and AVE for constructs for the second wave model. Table 19 provides the composite scale reliability for all multi-item constructs used in the second model. They all exceeded the recommended threshold of .7. As indicated in Table 21, the magnitude of the factor loadings of any item on its corresponding construct exceeded the magnitude of its cross-factor loadings. Table 20 shows correlation matrixes between constructs for the second model. The scores in the diagonal of each matrix were the square roots of the AVE, and they exceeded the values in each of the respective columns. The current study also calculated cross-loadings. All indicators showed higher loadings with their respective construct than with any other reflective construct (Table 21) except two items – "meeting members of an online political group" and engagement a collective action online. The two items were removed from the final analysis. Taken together, these results prove that the constructs have adequate convergent and discriminant validity for the hypothesized model in the 2nd wave.

Table 19 Assessment of the Convergent Validity (Wave 2)

	AVE	Composite Reliability
Traditional News	.587	.810
Online News	.608	.748
Social Media	.642	.782
Offline Talk	.549	.785
Online Talk	.564	.794
News Elaboration	.797	.887
Political Efficacy	.660	.852
Offline Participation	.722	.948
Online Participation	.519	.904

Table 20 Construct Correlations and Square Root of AVE (Wave 2)

	1.Traditi-onal News	2.On-line News	3.Soci-al Media	4.Off-line Talk	5.On-line Talk	6.News Elabora-tion	7.Politi-cal Effica-cy	8.Off-line Partici-pation	9.Online Participa-tion
1	**.766**								
2	.349	**.780**							
3	.240	.458	**.801**						
4	.212	.216	.249	**.741**					
5	.213	.245	.312	.456	**.751**				
6	.273	.216	.140	.158	.110	**.893**			
7	.231	.134	.268	.301	.204	.279	**.813**		
8	.019	.069	.076	.179	.198	.002	.160	**.850**	
9	.149	.203	.274	.292	.376	.134	.328	.709	**.721**

Note: Diagonal elements (shaded) are the square root of the variance shared between the constructs and their measures. Off diagonal elements are the correlations among constructs. For discriminant validity, diagonal elements should be larger than off-diagonal elements.

Table 21 Factor Loadings (bolded) and Cross-Loadings (Wave 2)

	Tradi-tional News	On-line News	Social Media	Off-line Talk	On-line Talk	News Elabo ration	Politi-cal Effi-cacy	Off-line Parti-cipati-on	Online Partici-pation
TV News	**.804**	.270	.222	.132	.155	.174	.213	.032	.152
Newspapers	**.741**	.183	.102	.165	.143	.214	.178	.013	.090
Radio News	**.753**	.343	.225	.188	.190	.237	.143	.000	.101
Internet Newspapers	.300	**.927**	.470	.203	.229	.201	.137	.125	.220
Portal News	.258	**.598**	.176	.124	.143	.126	.053	-.089	.053
Social Networking Sites Newsfeed	.175	.363	**.767**	.145	.279	.086	.130	.042	.261
Current Affairs Podcast Shows	.208	.371	**.835**	.248	.227	.135	.289	.078	.185
Off-Talk 1	.163	.170	.172	**.773**	.371	.142	.213	.195	.277
Off-Talk 2	.202	.185	.184	**.763**	.289	.102	.271	.091	.198
Off-Talk 3	.095	.119	.206	**.684**	.363	.103	.180	.103	.161
On-Talk 1	.124	.149	.205	.330	**.758**	.036	.122	.208	.340
On-Talk 2	.161	.191	.243	.357	**.668**	.060	.111	.054	.185
On-Talk 3	.197	.217	.262	.353	**.820**	.141	.213	.163	.303

Table 21 Continued

	Tradi-tional News	On-line News	Social Media	Off-line Talk	On-line Talk	News Elabo ration	Politi-cal Effi-cacy	Off-line Parti-cipati -on	Online Partici -pation
Elaboration 1	.234	.198	.133	.141	.102	**.910**	.271	.070	.169
Elaboration 2	.255	.186	.116	.141	.093	**.876**	.225	-.076	.063
Efficacy 1	.190	.115	.268	.293	.218	.299	**.883**	.175	.327
Efficacy 2	.143	.101	.184	.125	.110	.143	**.685**	.080	.205
Efficacy 3	.228	.112	.190	.280	.146	.206	**.856**	.115	.248
Off-Participation 1	.020	.065	.076	.170	.199	.032	.212	**.818**	.562
Off-Participation 2	-.053	.031	.056	.128	.150	.001	.126	**.885**	.633
Off-Participation 3	.065	.127	.109	.157	.234	.028	.144	**.823**	.604
Off-Participation 4	-.024	.014	.061	.120	.126	.004	.073	**.858**	.625
Off-Participation 5	.018	.064	.030	.195	.193	.002	.119	**.896**	.620
Off-Participation 6	.043	.031	.033	.131	.128	.008	.099	**.853**	.538
On-Participation 1	.164	.156	.223	.276	.304	.136	.292	.527	**.837**
On-Participation 2	.134	.175	.156	.150	.208	.139	.276	.136	**.871**
On-Participation 3	.159	.234	.267	.270	.384	.118	.282	.523	**.838**
On-Participation4	.092	.152	.225	.272	.320	.195	.272	.380	**.755**
On-Participation 5	.078	.123	.227	.198	.258	.090	.216	.621	**.785**
On-Participation 6	.067	.092	.070	.118	.150	.024	.151	.663	**.711**
On-Participation 7	.072	.080	.184	.172	.268	.079	.243	.393	**.658**

6.2.2 Structural Model Testing

6.2.2.1 Direct Effects

As shown in Figure 2, the three variables in the Media block jointly explained 9.3% of

offline political talk, 9.1% of news elaboration, and 12.3% of online political talk. It was found that attention to news had a positive association with deliberation behaviors. Attention to traditional news was a significant predictor of offline political talk (β = .14, $p < .01$), news elaboration (β = .22, $p < .001$), and online political talk (β = .12, $p < .05$). Attention to news via online media had a significantly positive relationship only with news elaboration, β = .13, $p < .05$. Considering that attention to online news in Wave 1 had a positive association with offline political talk (β = .10, $p < .05$) and online political talk (β = .07, $p < .05$), the impact of online news a little diminished in Wave 2. Attention to news via social media had a positive influence on offline political talk (β = .18, $p < .001$; β = .07, $p < .05$ in Wave 1) and online political talk (β = .24, $p < .001$; β = .21, $p < .001$ in Wave 1). The influence of social media news attention on political talk has increased considerably compared with that in the first survey.

Social media news attention (β = .19, $p < .001$), online news attention (β = .09, $p < .05$), and traditional news attention (β = .11, $p < .05$) were found to have significant relationships with political efficacy. Overall, the news attention variable had not a significantly positive relationship with political participation. Among the Media block, only news attention via social media was significantly associated with online participation (β = .11, $p < .01$). No significant associations were found between traditional news attention and participation and between online news attention and participation.

All three variables in the Deliberation block were significantly linked to perceived political efficacy: offline political talk, β = .20, $p < .001$; news elaboration, β = .21, $p < .001$; online political talk, β = .07, $p < .05$. The three variables in the Deliberation block and the same number of variables in the Media block explained 19.0% of political efficacy. Offline political talk had significant influence on political participation (offline participation, β = .17, $p < .001$; online

participation, β = .12, $p < .01$, respectively). Likewise, online political talk was found to have a significant association with offline political participation (β = .12, $p < .01$) and online political participation (β = .22, $p < .001$). Lastly, political efficacy successfully predicted a significant portion of offline and online political participation (β = .28, $p < .001$; β = .30, $p < .001$, respectively).

Overall, the results of direct path coefficients show that the hypothesized model receives substantial support. Figure 2 shows the explained variance for each of the constructs in the model. Approximately 54.6% of the variance in political participation is explained by the model (offline participation, 21.8%; online participation, 32.8%).



Figure 2 Direct Relations in the Hypothesized Model (Wave 2)

6.2.2.2 Indirect Effects

In order to test mediating effects between variables, a series of bootstrapping (number of bootstrap samples is 200) was run. First, the indirect effect of political efficacy between three news consumption types and two types of political participation was examined. Political efficacy did not mediate the relationship between attention to traditional news and participation. This result is similar to what was found in the first survey analysis. The indirect effects between online news attention and offline and online participation through political efficacy were positive and significant ($t = 2.56$, $p = .014$, VAF = 20.5%; $t = 2.43$, $p = .016$, VAF = 24.5%, respectively). Political efficacy also partially mediated the relationship between attention to social media news and offline and online participation ($t = 2.47$, $p = .015$, VAF = 30.5%; $t = 3.64$, $p < .001$, VAF = 23.0%, respectively).

In most cases, political efficacy was found to mediate the associations between deliberation behaviors and participatory behaviors. The indirect effects of political efficacy between offline political talk and offline and online participation were significantly positive ($t = 2.53$, $p = .014$, VAF = 31.4%; $t = 3.24$, $p = .001$, VAF = 63.5%, respectively). Political efficacy also mediated the effects of online talk on offline participation ($t = 3.07$, $p = .002$, VAF = 21.6%) and online participation ($t = 2.87$, $p = .006$, VAF = 20.5%). Political efficacy did not mediate the impacts of news elaboration on offline and online political participation.

The results demonstrate that Deliberation variables mediated the relationships between the Media variables and political efficacy. Offline talk ($t = 3.33$, $p = .001$, VAF = 24.3%) and news elaboration ($t = 4.04$, $p < .001$, VAF = 27.4%) successfully mediated the relationship between traditional news and political efficacy. Offline talk ($t = 3.61$, $p < .001$, VAF = 23.4%), online talk ($t = 2.19$, $p = .030$, VAF = 21.1%), and news elaboration ($t = 2.74$, $p = .007$, VAF = 22.3%) turned out to mediate the relationship between social media news attention and political efficacy.

Any of the three variables in the Deliberation block did not mediate the impact of online news attention on political efficacy.

The mediation analyses also tested whether deliberation behaviors and political efficacy jointly mediate the relationships between the Media block variables and political participation. When the dependent variable was offline participation, deliberation behaviors and political efficacy did not play the mediation role, which is the same as in the first survey analyses. But the three deliberation behaviors and political efficacy significantly mediated the relationship between attention to online news and online participation. As shown in Table 23, the indirect effect of offline talk and efficacy between online news and online participation was significant and positive, $t = 2.74$, $p = .007$. News elaboration and political efficacy ($t = 2.57$, $p = .011$) and offline political talk and political efficacy ($t = 2.39$, $p = .017$) also played a significant mediating role between the above two variables.

In addition, the three deliberation behaviors and political efficacy significantly mediated the relationship between attention to social media news and online participation: offline talk + efficacy, $t = 2.29$, $p = .023$; news elaboration + efficacy, $t = 2.09$, $p = .037$, online talk + efficacy, $t = 2.57$, $p = .011$, respectively. This suggests that the dataset of the second survey fits well the hypothesized two-step mediation model of the current study.

The present research also tested whether political efficacy plays a mediating role in the model in which all variables in the same block are aggregated. In the ‘aggregated Media – political efficacy – aggregated Participation’ model, efficacy was found to significantly mediate the relationship between the Media and the Participation, $t = 2.97$, $p = .003$, VAF = 20.8%. In the ‘aggregated Deliberation – political efficacy – aggregated Participation’ model, efficacy was found to significantly mediate the relationship between the two variables, $t = 2.79$, $p = .006$, VAF

= 50.4%. Furthermore, the aggregated Deliberation and political efficacy jointly played a significant mediating role between the aggregated Media and the aggregated Participation. In the 'aggregated Media – aggregated Deliberation – political efficacy – aggregated Participation' model, the aggregated Deliberation and political efficacy jointly mediated the relationship between the Media and the Participation, $t = 3.48$, $p < .001$. Thus, the hypothesized two-step mediation model was well supported by the second survey findings.

Additionally, this study also tested whether the hypothesized model in this study holds in different media environment. To this end, except the three variables in the Media block, all other variables in the same block were collapsed into one. The bootstrapping results revealed that the hypothesized mediation model proved to be true in online news and social media news conditions. In other words, deliberation behaviors and political efficacy successfully mediated the relationships between online news and political participation ($t = 3.36$, $p < .001$) and between social media news and participation ($t = 3.16$, $p = .002$). But the hypothesized model did not receive support under the traditional news condition.

Table 22 Results of Single Mediation (Wave 2)

H	IV	Mediator	DV	Indir-ect Effe-ct	*t* value	*p* value	Percentile 95% Confidence Intervals	VAF
H9	**News**	**Efficacy**	**Participation**					
	Online News	Efficacy	Offline Participation	.028	2.557	.014	[.005; .041]	24.52
	Online News	Efficacy	Online Participation	.024	2.435	.016	[.005; .044]	20.50
	Social Media News	Efficacy	Offline Participation	.025	2.472	.015	[.004; .047]	30.54

Table 22 Continued

H	IV	Mediator	DV	Indir-ect Effe-ct	*t* value	*p* value	Percentile 95% Confidence Intervals	VAF
H9	**News**	**Efficacy**	**Participation**					
	Social Media News	Efficacy	Online Participation	.038	3.641	.000	[.015; .059]	22.97
H10	**Deliberation**	**Efficacy**	**Participation**					
H10-1	Offline Talk	Efficacy	Offline Participation	.029	2.530	.014	[.004; .044]	31.37
H10-1	Offline Talk	Efficacy	Online Participation	.041	3.243	.001	[.016; .067]	63.52
H10-1	Online talk	Efficacy	Offline Participation	.027	2.871	.010	[.001; .055]	20.46
H10-1	Online talk	Efficacy	Online Participation	.028	3.073	.002	[.012; .048]	21.60
H11	**News**	**Talk**	**Participation**					
	Online News	Offline Talk	Online Participation	.023	2.463	.015	[.005; .042]	20.01
	Online News	Online Talk	Online Participation	.045	3.005	.003	[.017; .073]	35.61
	Social Media	Offline Talk	Online Participation	.020	2.161	.031	[.002; .039]	30.83
	Social Media	Online Talk	Online Participation	.022	3.378	.000	[.009; .034]	26.35
H12	**News**	**Delibera-tion**	**Efficacy**					
	Traditional News	Offline Talk	Efficacy	.054	3.334	.001	[.022; .085]	24.31
	Traditional News	Elabora-tion	Efficacy	.064	4.040	.000	[.033; .095]	27.37
	Traditional News	Online Talk	Efficacy	.036	2.368	.019	[.006; .066]	24.87
	Social Media	Offline Talk	Efficacy	.067	3.608	.000	[.031; .104]	23.43
	Social Media	Elabora-tion	Efficacy	.036	2.744	.007	[.010; .063]	22.34
	Social Media	Online Talk	Efficacy	.042	2.189	.030	[.004; .080]	21.13

Table 23 Results of Two-Step Mediation (Wave 2)

RQ2	IV	Mediator1	Mediator 2	DV	Indirect Effect	*t* value	*p* value	Percentile 95% Confidence Intervals
	Online News	Offline Talk	Efficacy	Online Participation	.011	2.743	.007	[.004; .017]
	Online News	Elaboration	Efficacy	Online Participation	.010	2.570	.011	[.003; .018]
	Online News	Online Talk	Efficacy	Online Participation	.017	2.385	.017	[.003; .029]
	Social Media	Offline Talk	Efficacy	Online Participation	.011	2.284	.023	[.002; .019]
	Social Media	Elaboration	Efficacy	Online Participation	.005	2.093	.037	[.001; .009]
	Social Media	Online Talk	Efficacy	Online Participation	.009	2.573	.011	[.002; .017]

Table 24 Results of Aggregated Model Mediation (Wave 2)

H	IV	Mediator 1	Mediator 2	DV	Indirect Effect	*t* value	*p* value	Percentile 95% Confidence Intervals
H9	Media	Efficacy		Participa-tion	.057	2.787	.006	[.017 .098]
H10	Delibera-tion	Efficacy		Participa-tion	.068	2.970	.003	[.023; .115]
H13	Media	Delibera-tion	Efficacy	Participa-tion	.043	3.481	.000	[.019; .068]
H13	Online News Group	Delibera-tion	Efficacy	Participa-tion	.034	3.364	.000	[.014; .052]
H13	Social News Group	Delibera-tion	Efficacy	Participa-tion	.032	3.164	.002	[.012; .052]

6.3 Auto-Regressive Model

6.3.1 Direct Effects

Figure 3 represents the results of the PLS estimates of the synchronous auto-regressive

model of the relationships among Wave 2 measures of news attention, deliberation, political efficacy, and political participation when accounting for the causal influence of each variable on itself over time. As stated earlier, an autoregressive term of each variable was put in as an exogenous variable. Thus, in each structural regression equation, the gamma coefficients (γ) indicate the stability of the variable over time, and beta coefficients (β) tell the influence of predictor variables on the outcome variable beyond the impact of prior levels of the outcome variable on itself (Shah et al., 2005). As shown in Figure 3, the gamma coefficients ranged from .27 to .97, indicating that past behavior in terms of news attention, deliberation, political efficacy, and political participation is a strong predictor of current behavior. Stability was highest for attention to online news (.97) and social media news (.97) and lowest for offline political talk (.27).

As for the endogenous relationships, results of this model are comparable to those of the previous two synchronous models. Wave 2 online news attention (β = .32, p <.001) and social media news attention (β = .27, p < .001) were significant predictors of Wave 2 offline political talk, even after controlling for prior levels of these variables (online news attention, γ = .97, p < .001; social media news attention, γ = .97, p < .001; offline political talk, γ = .27, p < .001). The estimates of change in online news attention (β = .26, p < .001) and social media news attention (β = .29, p < .001) were positively associated with online political talk, even when accounting for the lagged effect of online political talk (γ = .32, p < .001).

Unexplained variance in Wave 2 measures of traditional news attention and online news attention had no significant relationship with political efficacy. In contrast, unexplained variance in social media news attention had a significantly positive association with Wave 2 political efficacy (β = .26, p < .001), even when accounting for the strong effect of past political efficacy

($\gamma = .45$, $p < .001$). Notably, no significant direct effects of news attention on offline and online political participation were found in this synchronous auto-regressive model.

Unexplained variance in Wave 2 measure of offline political talk had a positive influence on Wave 2 political efficacy ($\beta = .16$, $p < .001$), even when accounting for the strong effect of past political efficacy ($\gamma = .45$, $p < .001$). Unexplained variance in Wave 2 measure of online political talk had a positive influence on Wave 2 political efficacy ($\beta = .20$, $p < .001$), even when accounting for the strong effect of past political efficacy ($\gamma = .45$, $p < .001$). Unexplained variance in Wave 2 measures of news elaboration also had a significant link to political efficacy ($\beta = .14$, $p < .01$).

Unexplained variance in Wave 2 measures of offline political talk has a positive influence on Wave 2 offline political participation ($\beta = .29$, $p < .001$), even when accounting for the strong effect of past political participation ($\gamma = .60$, $p < .001$). However, unexplained variance in Wave 2 measures of news elaboration and online political talk had no significant relationship with offline political participation. This model accounted for 47.2% of variance in offline political participation.

The estimate of change in online political talk has a positive influence on Wave 2 online political participation ($\beta = .25$, $p < .001$), even when accounting for the strong effect of past political participation ($\gamma = .58$, $p < .001$). The estimates of change in offline political talk and news elaboration failed to predict online political participation. This model accounted for 57.7% of variance in online political participation.

Unexplained variance in Wave 2 measures of political efficacy had a positive influence on Wave 2 offline political participation ($\beta = .20$, $p < .001$), even when accounting for the strong effect of past political participation ($\gamma = .60$, $p < .001$). Unexplained variance in Wave 2 measures

of political efficacy had a positive impact on Wave 2 online political participation (β = .33, *p* < .001), even when accounting for the strong effect of past political participation (γ = .58, *p* < .001).



Figure 3 Direct Relations of the Hypothesized Model (Auto-regressive model)

6.3.2 Indirect Effects

To test mediating effects between variables in the autoregressive model, a series of bootstrapping for each model (number of bootstrap samples is 200) was run. Unlike in the cross-sectional analyses, political efficacy mediated the impact of traditional news attention on offline and online participation (*t* = 1.97, *p* = .049, VAF = 51.0%; *t* = 3.48, *p* < .001, VAF = 72.3%, respectively). Political efficacy also mediated the relationships between online news attention and offline participation and between online news and online participation (*t* = 2.13, *p* = .042,

VAF = 53.2%; $t = 3.34$, $p = .001$, VAF = 67.3%, respectively). Political efficacy also partially mediated the effect of social media news attention on online participation ($t = 3.56$, $p < .001$, VAF = 67.5%).

Political efficacy was found to mediate the associations between deliberation behaviors and participatory behaviors. The indirect effect between offline political talk and online participation through political efficacy was significantly positive ($t = 3.20$, $p = .002$, VAF = 37.1%). Political efficacy mediated the effect of online talk on online participation ($t = 2.58$, $p = .011$, VAF = 27.0%). It also mediated the impact of news elaboration on offline political participation ($t = 2.00$, $p = .046$, VAF = 89.7%).

The results show that Deliberation variables mediate the relationships between the Media variables and political participation. Offline political talk ($t = 2.73$, $p = .007$, VAF = 92.6%) and online political talk ($t = 2.93$, $p = .004$, VAF = 52.1%) significantly mediated the relationship between online news attention and online political participation. Offline political talk ($t = 2.55$, $p = .012$, VAF = 62.8%) and online political talk ($t = 2.98$, $p = .003$, VAF = 60.4%) also significantly mediated the relationship between social media news attention and online political participation. Additionally, offline political talk significantly mediated the impact of social media news attention on offline political participation, $t = 2.07$, $p = .040$, VAF = 61.2%.

The results demonstrate that Deliberation variables mediate the relationships between the Media variables and political efficacy. Offline political talk ($t = 3.87$, $p < .001$, VAF = 43.8%), news elaboration ($t = 2.66$, $p = .008$, VAF = 49.26%), and online political talk ($t = 4.89$, $p < .001$, VAF = 49.4%) significantly mediated the relationship between traditional news attention and political efficacy. Offline talk ($t = 3.53$, $p < .001$, VAF = 45.5%) and online talk ($t = 2.83$, $p = .005$, VAF = 48.7%) significantly mediated the relationship between online news and efficacy.

Offline talk (t = 3.14, p = .002, VAF = 28.2%) and online talk (t = 2.89, p = .004, VAF = 27.4%) significantly mediated the relationship between social media news and political efficacy.

The tests also investigated whether deliberation behaviors and political efficacy together mediate the relationships between the Media variables and two types of participation. As shown in Table 27, the indirect effect of news elaboration and political efficacy between traditional news attention and offline participation was significant and positive, t = 1.99, p = .048. All three Deliberation variables and political efficacy jointly mediated the relationship between traditional news attention and online political participation (offline talk + efficacy, t = 3.13, p = .002; news elaboration + efficacy, t = 3.12, p = .002; online talk + efficacy, t = 3.42, p < .001).

The indirect effect of the three Deliberation variables plus political efficacy between online news attention and offline participation was not found. However, all three Deliberation variables and political efficacy jointly mediated the relationship between online news attention and online political participation (offline talk + efficacy, t = 2.98, p = .003; news elaboration + efficacy, t = 2.89, p = .005; online talk + efficacy, t = 2.80, p = .006).

The indirect effect of the three Deliberation variables plus political efficacy between online news attention and offline participation was not found. However, all three Deliberation variables and political efficacy jointly mediated the relationship between social media news attention and online political participation (offline talk + efficacy, t = 3.06, p = .003; news elaboration + efficacy, t = 3.10, p = .002; online talk + efficacy, t = 3.02, p = .003).

These outcomes suggest that the dataset of the second survey, even after controlling for prior levels of the variables, supports the hypothesized two-step mediation model.

Table 25 Results of Single Mediation (Auto-Regressive Model)

	IV	Mediator	DV	Indire-ct Effect	*t* value	*p* value	Percentile 95% Confidence Interval	VAF
H9	**News**	**Efficacy**	**Participa-tion**					
	Traditional News	Efficacy	Offline Participa-tion	.037	1.972	.049	[.000; .073]	50.98
	Traditional News	Efficacy	Online Participa-tion	.059	3.480	.000	[.026; .087]	72.27
	Online News	Efficacy	Offline Participa-tion	.072	2.132	.042	[.002; .141]	53.20
	Online News	Efficacy	Online Participa-tion	.085	3.335	.001	[.035; .134]	67.30
	Social Media News	Efficacy	Online Participa-tion	.085	3.556	.000	[.037; .129]	67.53
H10	**Deliberati on**	**Efficacy**	**Participa-tion**					
H10-1	Offline Talk	Efficacy	Online Participa-tion	.066	3.200	.002	[.026; .105]	37.07
H10-1	Online Talk	Efficacy	Online Participa-tion	.056	2.579	.010	[.013; .092]	26.96
H10-2	Elabora-tion	Efficacy	Offline Participa-tion	.070	2.004	.046	[.002; .139]	89.71
H11	**News**	**Delibe-ration**	**Participa-tion**					
	Online News	Offline Talk	Online Participa-tion	.147	2.722	.007	[.043; .251]	62.58
	Online News	Online Talk	Online Participa-tion	.166	2.926	.004	[.055; .278]	52.06
	Social News	Offline Talk	Offline Participa-tion	.155	2.072	.040	[.008; .301]	62.21

Table 25 Continued

	IV	Mediator	DV	Indire-ct Effect	*t* value	*p* value	Percentile 95% Confidence Interval	VAF
	Social News	Offline Talk	Online Participa-tion	.112	2.547	.012	[.029; .194]	62.80
	Social News	Online Talk	Online Participa-tion	.135	2.979	.003	[.046; .224]	60.41
H12	**News**	**Delibe-ration**	**Efficacy**					
H12-1	Traditional News	Offline Talk	Efficacy	.088	3.865	.000	[.044; .133]	43.78
H12-1	Traditional News	Online Talk	Efficacy	.102	4.885	.000	[.061; .143]	49.35
H12-1	Online News	Offline Talk	Efficacy	.152	3.534	.000	[.068; .236]	45.49
H12-1	Online News	Online Talk	Efficacy	.160	2.829	.005	[.049; .271]	48.65
H12-1	Social Media News	Offline Talk	Efficacy	.100	3.143	.002	[.038; .163]	28.15
H12-1	Social Media News	Online Talk	Efficacy	.097	2.890	.004	[.031; .163]	27.38
H12-2	Traditional News	Elabora-tion	Efficacy	.168	2.660	.008	[.044; .291]	49.26

Table 26 Results of Two-Step Mediation (Auto-Regressive Model)

RQ2	IV	Mediator 1	Mediator 2	DV	Indirect Effect	*t* value	*p* value	Percentile 95% Confidence Interval
	Traditional News	Elaboration	Efficacy	Offline Partici-pation	.045	1.990	.048	[.000; .089]
	Traditional News	Offline Talk	Efficacy	Online Partici-pation	.023	3.125	.002	[.008; .040]
	Traditional News	Elaboration	Efficacy	Online Partici-pation	.064	3.117	.002	[.024; .100]
	Traditional News	Online Talk	Efficacy	Online Partici-pation	.026	3.420	.000	[.012; .040]
	Online News	Offline Talk	Efficacy	Online Partici-pation	.048	2.976	.003	[.019; .075]
	Online News	Elaboration	Efficacy	Online Partici-pation	.079	2.885	.005	[.026; .131]
	Online News	Online Talk	Efficacy	Online Partici-pation	.053	2.803	.006	[.016; .089]
	Social News	Offline Talk	Efficacy	Online Partici-pation	.040	3.057	.003	[.017; .060]
	Social News	Elaboration	Efficacy	Online Partici-pation	.083	3.102	.002	[.031; .134]
	Social News	Online Talk	Efficacy	Online Partici-pation	.044	3.015	.003	[.016; .069]

6.4 Comparison of Path Coefficients

The current study compared the strength of causal links between variables in order to examine the changing role of certain variables over time during the election. The hypotheses on

the impact of time on the research model were tested by statistically comparing corresponding path coefficients in both the Wave 1 and the Wave 2 models. The statistical comparison was carried out using the formula below, which was developed by Keil, Tan, Wei, Saarinen, Tuunainen, and Wassenaar (2000). Table 4 summarizes the comparison results.

$$S_{pooled} = \sqrt{[(N_1 - 1)/(N_1 + N_2 - 2)] * SE_1^2 + [(N_2 - 1)/(N_1 + N_2 - 2)] * SE_2^2}$$

$$T = (PC_1 - PC_2)/ (S_{pooled} * \sqrt{(1/N_1 + 1/N_2)}$$

where S_{pooled} = pooled estimator for the variance; t = t-statistic with N1 + N2 − 2 degrees of freedom; N_i = sample size of dataset for model i; SE_i = standard error of path in structural model of model i; PC_i = path coefficient in structural model of model i.

The paths from news attention to deliberation behaviors yielded mixed results. The path coefficients from traditional news attention to two deliberation behaviors (offline and online political talk) were found to become statistically weaker during the election period, $t = 28.86$, $p < .001$; $t = 2.25$, $p = .024$, respectively. The path coefficient from traditional news attention to news elaboration was higher in the second wave, $t = 2.16$, $p = .031$. The path coefficients from online news attention to online political talk and news elaboration became statistically stronger over time, $t = 8.14$, $p < .001$; $t = 21.34$, $p < .001$, respectively. The path coefficient from online news attention to offline political talk was stronger in Wave 1 than in Wave 2, $t = 8.54$, $p < .001$. The path coefficients from social news attention to offline and online political talk were found to

become statistically stronger over time ($t = 41.21$, $p < .001$; $t = 8.25$, $p < .001$, respectively). But, the relationship between social news attention and news elaboration in the second survey was weaker than the corresponding coefficient in the first survey, $t = 43.30$, $p < .001$.

The relationship between news attention and political efficacy was found to become significantly stronger over the two time points (online news attention, $t = 20.58$, $p < .001$; social news attention, $t = 37.35$, $p < .001$, respectively). The path coefficients from traditional and online news attention to political efficacy were stronger in the first survey than in the second survey, $t = 14.80$, $p < .001$. This indicates that there is a significant difference in political efficacy between news consumers via traditional media and those via online or social media. The relationship between offline political talk and political efficacy became stronger over time, $t = 37.86$, $p < .001$. The path coefficient from news elaboration to political efficacy was higher in Wave 1 ($\beta = .37$) than in Wave 2 ($\beta = .21$), $t = 66.70$, $p < .001$.

The relationship between news attention and political participation was found to be significantly stronger over the two time points only when the exogenous variable was online news attention: online news attention – offline participation, $t = 13.60$, $p < .001$; online news attention – online participation, $t = 9.93$, $p < .001$, respectively. The path coefficients from traditional and social news attention to political participation were stronger in the first survey than in the second survey: traditional news – offline participation, $t = 34.34$, $p < .001$; traditional news – online participation, $t = 11.51$, $p < .001$; social media news – offline participation, $t = 12.97$, $p < .001$; social media news – online participation, $t = 18.29$, $p < .001$.

The relationships between the Deliberation variables and political participation were stronger in the first survey than in the second survey in some cases: offline talk – online participation, $t = 20.23$, $p < .001$; online talk – offline participation, $t = 15.26$, $p < .001$; news

elaboration – online participation, $t = 14.57$, $p < .001$. In contrast, the strength of the relationships between offline talk and offline participation, between online political talk and online political participation, and between news elaboration and offline participation became stronger over time ($t = 19.50$, $p < .001$; $t = 12.06$, $p < .001$; $t = 7.67$, $p < .001$, respectively).

As expected, over time political efficacy statistically significantly increased the level of political participation, supporting H1. The path coefficients from political efficacy and offline and online participation in the second wave were significantly higher than the corresponding coefficients in the first wave ($t = 35.40$, $p < .001$; $t = 28.14$, $p < .001$, respectively).

Table 27 Path Comparisons between the Wave 1 and the Wave 2 Models

Path	Wave 1 Model (β)	Wave 2 Model (β)	*t* value	*p* value	Comparison
Traditional News → Offline Talk	.214	.139	28.859	$p < .001$	$1^{st} > 2^{nd}$
Traditional News → Online Talk	.129	.123	2.255	0.024	$1^{st} > 2^{nd}$
Traditional News → Elaboration	.217	.222	2.164	0.031	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**
Traditional News → Efficacy	.146	.111	14.795	$p < .001$	$1^{st} > 2^{nd}$
Traditional News → Offline Participation	.014	-.085	34.340	$p < .001$	$1^{st} > 2^{nd}$
Traditional News → Online Participation	.017	-.013	11.509	$p < .001$	$1^{st} > 2^{nd}$
Online News → Offline Talk	.095	.065	8.544	$P < .001$	$1^{st} > 2^{nd}$
Online News → Online Talk	.069	.092	8.135	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**
Online News → Elaboration	.054	.125	21.340	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**
Online News → Efficacy	.032	.088	20.577	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**
Online News → Offline Participation	.005	.042	13.598	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**
Online News → Online Participation	.028	.057	9.927	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**

Table 27 Continued

Path	Wave 1 Model (β)	Wave 2 Model (β)	*t* value	*p* value	Comparison
Social Media News → Offline Talk	.069	.176	41.212	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**
Social Media News → Online Talk	.214	.241	8.248	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**
Social Media News → Elaboration	.135	.029	43.302	$p < .001$	$1^{st} > 2^{nd}$
Social Media News → Efficacy	.107	.194	37.353	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**
Social Media News → Offline Participation	.031	.012	12.967	$p < .001$	$1^{st} > 2^{nd}$
Social Media News → Online Participation	.175	.107	18.293	$p < .001$	$1^{st} > 2^{nd}$
Offline Talk → Efficacy	.103	.204	37.864	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**
Offline Talk → Offline Participation	.118	.168	19.495	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**
Offline Talk → Online Participation	.135	.075	20.225	$p < .001$	$1^{st} > 2^{nd}$
Online Talk → Political Efficacy	.074	.072	1.814	ns	$1^{st} = 2^{nd}$
Online Talk → Offline Participation	.174	.123	15.258	$p < .001$	$1^{st} > 2^{nd}$
Online Talk → Online Participation	.201	.223	12.058	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**
Elaboration → Efficacy	.372	.206	66.696	$p < .001$	$1^{st} > 2^{nd}$
Elaboration → Offline Participation	.026	.051	7.671	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**
Elaboration → Online Participation	.059	.016	14.573	$p < .001$	$1^{st} > 2^{nd}$
Efficacy → Offline Participation	.087	.275	35.398	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**
Efficacy → Online Participation	.133	.301	28.137	$p < .001$	**$1^{st} < 2^{nd}$**

6.5 Results of Importance-Performance Matrix Analysis (IPMA)

An advantage of PLS is that it allows researchers to calculate latent variable scores. A basic PLS analysis identifies the relative importance of constructs in the structural model by extracting

estimates of the direct, indirect, and total relationships. Importance-Performance Matrix Analysis (IPMA) extends these PLS results with another dimension, which includes the actual performance of each construct. IPMA is particularly useful in obtaining the findings of a PLS analysis via latent variable scores (Slack, 1994; Volckner, Sattler, Hennig-Thurau, & Ringle, 2010). IPMA adds an additional dimension to the analysis that considers average values of the latent variables. For an endogenous latent variable, IPMA finds the total effects (performance) in the structural model. In this process, IPMA determines which variable shows relatively high importance or performance.

The first step in an IPMA test is to identify a target construct and to calculate the total effects and the performance values. The importance of a latent variable is calculated from the variables' total effect (Slack, 1994). The next step is to obtain the performance values of the latent variables in the PLS path model. To make the results comparable across different scales, a performance scale ranging from 0 to 100 is used: 0 represents the lowest and 100 the highest performance. Lastly, in order to acquire index values, rescaling the latent variables is required based on the following computations: Subtract the minimum possible value of the latent variable's scale from an estimated data point and divide this data by the difference between the minimum and maximum data points of the latent variable's scale (Anderson & Fornell, 2000; Hock et al., 2010; Tenenhaus et al., 2005):

$Y_i^{rescaled}$ = (Y_i – Minscale [Y])/ (Maxscale [Y] – Minscale [Y])*100

Y_{ij} represents the *i*th data point (i.e., i = 3 with respect to the latent variable score of the third observation in the data set) of a specific latent variable in the PLS path model. This procedure results in rescaled latent variable scores on a scale of 0 to 100. The mean value of these rescaled

scores of each latent variable produces the index value of their performance. A higher value means a latent variable's better performance.

The IPMA results reveal that news elaboration is most important in explaining offline and online political participation (Table 28 and Table 29). However, its performance score is much lower than the average of the other constructs. Political efficacy and news elaboration are similar in terms of importance. But political efficacy shows considerably higher performance scores than news elaboration in both Wave 1 and Wave 2. Social media news attention, on the other hand, is of low importance even though it has relatively high performance. Consequently, we can say that efforts to improve offline political participation in both Wave 1 and Wave 2 should focus on how to heighten the performance ability of the news elaboration construct. The results also indicate that social media and political efficacy play a more significant role in motivating citizens to engage in political processes than other constructs that were considered in this study.

Table 28 Total Effects and Index Values for the IPMA of Political Participation (Wave 1)

	Offline Political Participation		Online Political Participation	
	Importance (Total Effects)	Performance (Index Values)	Importance (Total Effects)	Performance (Index Values)
Traditional News Attention	37.341	.155	37.341	.157
Online News Attention	51.363	.046	51.363	.071
Social Media News Attention	22.180	**.210**	22.180	**.297**
Offline Political Talk	21.524	.200	21.524	.168
News Elaboration	**64.657**	.130	**64.657**	.185
Online Political Talk	20.850	.157	20.850	.218
Political Efficacy	56.526	**.276**	56.526	**.265**

Table 29 Total Effects and Index Values for the IPMA of Political Participation (Wave 2)

	Offline Political Participation		Online Political Participation	
	Importance (Total Effects)	Performance (Index Values)	Importance (Total Effects)	Performance (Index Values)
Traditional News Attention	27.512	.077	27.512	.114
Online News Attention	52.563	.073	52.563	.090
Social Media News Attention	22.368	**.175**	22.368	**.265**
Offline Political Talk	28.309	.222	28.309	.178
News Elaboration	**66.345**	.042	**66.345**	.090
Online Political Talk	20.110	.129	20.110	.240
Political Efficacy	59.784	**.283**	59.784	**.299**

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION

7.1 Discussion about Major Findings

7.1.1 Direct Impacts of News Consumption on Political Attitudes

Information is central to the formation of public opinion and in democratic processes. Information is at the heart of attitude formation (Lavine, 2002; McGraw, 2000, 2003). People tend to combine the evaluative implications of new information to their memory as they encounter the information. Newly added information helps people to make a rational judgment on a certain issue (Zaller, 1992; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). But many parts of the mechanisms that explain how new information works in people's perceptions and attitudes are still uncertain.

The current study finds that news plays a pivotal role in shaping citizens' political perceptions and behaviors. Attention to news stories via traditional, online, and social media was found to have a positive link to deliberative behaviors, such as interpersonal political discussion and reflection on news in all three models tested in this study. This result is consistent with previous studies. There is a consensus that the media constitute the most important source of political information and channel of communication. The number of people who experience politics directly is limited, and even those who are politically active gain most of their political information through either traditional mass media or new media, such as online news sites and social media. Mediated political information and experiences in turn permeate interpersonal discussions (Stromback & Shehata, 2010).

As discussed earlier, news media are good sources of information that people use to engage

in political conversation. News provides people with conversational topics of the day and motivates people to get involved in talking with others. As Anderson, Dardenne, and Killenberg (1994) properly argued, “News is what people talk about, and news makes people talk” (p. 37). In other words, news consumption tends to lead people to more vibrant engagement in discussions with others.

The present study also finds that attention to news in general is positively associated with political efficacy. In the Wave 1 model, traditional and social media news had a positive link to political efficacy and all three types of news attention were positively related to political efficacy in the Wave 2 model. In the auto-regressive model, social media news attention had a significant link to political efficacy although traditional and online news attention did not. Iyengar (1991) found that newspapers “thematic” presentation of news encouraged people to reason public issues and, as a result, increased the sense of whether they have a voice in politics. Norris (1998) also found that watching television news has a positive association with political efficacy. The current study confirms that there is also a positive link between information seeking through online or social media and political efficacy.

However, information seeking via the media did not result in political participation in this study. Only news attention via social media in Wave 1 was found to have a positive association with online participation. The impact of news consumption via the Internet on political participation has been mixed in previous studies. Some studies reported a positive relationship between the two variables (i.e., Chadwick, 2006). For instance, consumption of public affairs content through television and newspapers was found to increase political participation (Chaffee & Kanihan, 1997; Lemert et al., 1977). In contrast, some studies showed pessimistic results (i.e., Bimber, 1998). The findings of the current study do not support the claim that there exists a

positive link between news consumption and political participation.

It should be noted that the absence of direct relationship between news attention and participation does not mean that the two constructs have no relation between each other. As Rucker et al. (2011) documented in their study, it is possible that the two variables have an indirect relationship. It other words, it is necessary to examine and to examine mediating variables that might intervene in the relationship between news attention and participation. In the current research, offline and online political talk, news elaboration, and political efficacy was regarded as possible mediators. The indirect influences of aforementioned three mediating variables are discussed in detail in the subsection 7.4.

7.1.2 Direct Impacts of Deliberation on Political Attitudes

The findings reveal that deliberation variables significantly affect political efficacy. This result resonates with previous findings. People who talk with other people about information gained from the media tend to learn about other ways of thinking about the information, and eventually develop a better understanding about the information (Scheufele, 2001). Several studies have shown that political discussion is positively related to political efficacy (Fishkin, 1999; Min, 2007). Lin (2003) said, "[C]itizens who engage in interpersonal discussion about politics with a greater number of fellow citizens are more likely to have confidence in their ability to make sense of and to get involved in the political process" (p. 9).

Elaboration concerns more in-depth and effortful mental efforts to make sense of what people acquire from the media (Eveland, 2002). Through elaboration, news consumers sort and reorganize information in personally meaningful ways (Graber, 1988). Elaboration goes beyond mere attention to media content. It reflects people's efforts to cope with the vast amount of news items according to their interests and needs. Research consistently shows that elaboration is

positively associated with political interest and involvement in public events (Eveland, 2001, 2002; Kosicki & McLeod, 1989). In general, the more one elaborates on political news stories, the more efficacious one feels about the political process. This is in part because as one exercises enough mental efforts about political information, one is more likely to have higher confidence in handling political situations that otherwise would be complex or intimidating (Bandura, 1977). In other words, active reflection on media content may help audiences understand the political world in easier and simpler ways.

7.1.3 Impacts of Political Efficacy on Participation

As a central concept of the current study, political efficacy was found to have a positive association with both offline and online political participation in all the three models. The result confirms that political efficacy is a determinant factor that directly influences citizens' engagement in the political process.

Political efficacy not only directly triggers political engagement, but also exercises a mediating role between news consumption and participation and between deliberation and participation. Theoretically, this study integrates one important concept in social psychology that has been overlooked in communication research – political efficacy – into the conceptual model structured as the O (Orientation) – S (Media Stimulus) – O (Orientation) – R (Response) framework. In other words, this study provides original insight for understanding political communication as a mediated process by political efficacy. It attempts to demonstrate the importance of understanding political communication as a continuous process involving political-psychological variables.

The findings reveal that political efficacy mediates the effects of both mass and interpersonal communication on political participation. Political efficacy mediated the

relationships between traditional news attention and offline participation in the auto-regressive model and between social media news attention and offline participation in the Wave 1 model. In all three models, online and social media news attention had positive relationships with online political participation with political efficacy mediating the relationships.

The results of this study illustrate how political efficacy plays a big role in political communication, as Nisbet and Scheufele (2004) appropriately documented in their study. Considering that all three types of news attention did not have significant direct relationships with political participation, the findings of the current study can make a contribution to the understanding of the mechanism of how news affects participation: news consumption influences citizens' self-competence about politics (political efficacy) and the competence in turn motivates citizens to engage in the political process.

Political efficacy was also found to play a mediating role between deliberation and political participation. In the Wave 1 model, the impacts of all three deliberation variables on political participation were found to be significant. In the Wave 2 model, political efficacy played a mediating role between online political talk and offline participation, between offline talk and online participation, and between online talk and online participation. In the auto-regressive model, three relationships (news elaboration – offline participation, offline talk – online participation, and online talk – online participation) were mediated by political efficacy.

Additionally, this study tested an aggregated model where different dimensions comprising each major construct were combined into one; Traditional, online, and social media news attention were collapsed into one News Attention variable, offline and online political talk and news elaboration were collapsed into one Deliberation variable, and offline and online political participation were collapsed into one Participation variable. The results show that political

efficacy mediates the relationships between News Attention and Participation and between Deliberation and Participation.

This study's findings suggest that political efficacy should be considered important in measuring the impact of political talk on citizen engagement in the political process. Although many previous studies focused on the direct impact of political talk on political participation, the relationship between political talk and participation is more complex than scholars have thought. Frequent talk about politics tends to increase the level of understanding of political issues which have been raised in the interpersonal discussion. For example, during a political campaign, political discussion brings a better understanding about election issues. Such an improved understanding often leads to the increase in people's feeling that they are able to process political information more effectively. As a result, they engage more willingly in the election process (Kaid et al., 2007). Therefore, it is logical to view that people who frequently talk about politics will be more likely to feel competent about their political beliefs or behaviors. Such increased competence in turn stimulates people to get involved in the political process. The findings of the current research showcase how political efficacy plays an indirect but pivotal role in encouraging citizens who consume news and talks about it to participate in political processes.

7.1.4 Indirect Impacts of Deliberation and Political Efficacy on Political Participation

Findings reveal that news elaboration and political efficacy jointly mediate the relationship between news attention and political participation. In the Wave 1 model, the influence of online and social media news attention on political participation was mediated by political talk (both offline and online) and political efficacy. News elaboration also was found to mediate the relationships between online news attention and participation and between social media news attention and participation. The results in the Wave 2 model showed the same results as those in

the Wave 1 model. In the auto-regressive model, the effect of traditional news attention on political participation was mediated by news elaboration. Traditional, online, and social media news attention influenced online political participation through the combined effects of the three deliberation variables and political efficacy in the auto-regressive model.

Additionally, this study tested three models where offline talk, online talk, and news elaboration were collapsed into one Deliberation variable and offline and online political participation were collapsed into one Participation variable. The results demonstrate that online and social media news attention impacted political participation through the joint role of deliberation and political efficacy in both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 models. However, traditional news attention failed to support the hypothesized model. Lastly, the current study combined all three categories of news attention into one and then examined how the aggregated news attention variable relates to the three deliberation variables and two participation variables. The finding suggests that deliberation and political efficacy jointly mediate the relationship between news attention and political participation in both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 models. Thus, the hypothesized theoretical framework in the current study was fully supported.

Table 30 Comparison of Direct Relations among the Three Models

	Hypothesis	Wave 1 model	Wave 2 model	Auto-Regressive model
H	**News → Deliberation**			
1-1	Traditional News → Offline Talk	O	O	X
1-2	Traditional News → Online Talk	O	O	X
2-1	Online News → Offline Talk	O	O	O
2-2	Online News → Online Talk	O	X	O
3-1	Social Media News → Offline Talk	O	O	O
3-2	Social Media News → Online Talk	O	O	O
4-1	Traditional News → Elaboration	O	O	O
4-2	Online News → Elaboration	X	O	O
4-3	Social Media News → Elaboration	O	X	O
RQ1	**News → Efficacy**			
	Traditional News → Efficacy	O	O	X
	Online News → Efficacy	X	O	X
	Social Media News → Efficacy	O	O	O
H5	**News → Participation**			
5-1	Traditional News → Offline Participation	X	X	X
5-2	Traditional News → Online Participation	X	X	X
5-3	Online News → Offline Participation	X	X	X
5-4	Online News → Online Participation	X	X	X
5-5	Social Media News → Offline Participation	X	X	X
5-6	Social Media News → Online Participation	O	X	X
H6	**Deliberation → Efficacy**			
6-1	Offline Talk → Efficacy	O	O	O
6-2	Online Talk → Efficacy	O	X	O
6-3	Elaboration → Efficacy	O	O	X
H7	**Deliberation → Participation**			
7-1	Offline Talk → Offline Participation	O	X	O
7-2	Offline Talk → Online Participation	O	X	X
7-3	Online Talk → Offline Participation	O	O	X
7-4	Online Talk → Online Participation	O	O	O
H8	**Efficacy → Participation**			
8-1	Efficacy → Offline Participation	O	O	O
8-2	Efficacy → Online Participation	O	O	O

Note: “O” indicates the hypothesis was supported. “X” indicates that the hypothesis was not supported.

Table 31 Comparison of Indirect Relations among the Three Models

	Hypothesis	Wave 1 model	Wave 2 model	Auto-Regressive model
H9	**News → Efficacy →Participation**			
	Traditional News → Efficacy → Offline Participation	X	X	O
	Online News → Efficacy → Offline Participation	X	O	O
	Social Media News → Efficacy → Offline Participation	O	O	X
	Traditional News → Efficacy → Online Participation	X	X	O
	Online News → Efficacy → Online Participation	O	O	O
	Social Media News → Efficacy → Online Participation	O	O	O
H10	**Deliberation → Efficacy → Participation**			
10-1	Offline Talk → Efficacy → Offline Participation	O	O	X
10-1	Online Talk → Efficacy → Offline Participation	O	O	X
10-1	Offline Talk → Efficacy → Online Participation	O	O	O
10-1	Online Talk → Efficacy → Online Participation	O	O	O
10-2	Elaboration → Efficacy → Offline Participation	O	X	O
10-2	Elaboration → Efficacy → Online Participation	O	X	X
H11	**News → Deliberation → Participation**			
	Traditional News → Offline Talk → Offline Participation	X	X	X
	Online News → Offline Talk → Offline Participation	X	X	X
	Social Media News → Offline Talk → Offline Participation	O	X	O
	Traditional News → Online Talk → Offline Participation	X	X	X
	Online News → Online Talk → Offline Participation	X	X	X

Table 31 Continued

	Hypothesis	Wave 1 model	Wave 2 model	Auto-Regressive model
	Social Media News → Online Talk → Offline Participation	O	X	X
	Traditional News → Offline Talk → Online Participation	X	X	X
	Online News → Offline Talk → Online Participation	O	O	O
	Social Media News → Offline Talk → Online Participation	O	O	O
	Traditional News → Online Talk → Online Participation	X	X	X
	Online News → Online Talk → Online Participation	O	O	O
	Social Media News → Online Talk → Online Participation	O	O	O
H12	News → Deliberation → Efficacy			
12-1	Traditional News → Offline Talk → Efficacy	X	O	O
12-1	Online News → Offline Talk → Efficacy	O	X	O
12-1	Social Media News → Offline Talk → Efficacy	O	O	O
12-1	Traditional News → Online Talk → Efficacy	O	O	O
12-1	Online News → Online Talk → Efficacy	O	X	O
12-1	Social Media News → Online Talk → Efficacy	O	O	O
12-2	Traditional News → Elaboration → Efficacy	O	O	O
12-2	Online News → Elaboration → Efficacy	O	X	X
12-2	Social Media News → Elaboration → Efficacy	O	O	X
RQ2	News → Deliberation → Efficacy → Participation			
	Traditional News → Offline Talk → Efficacy → Offline Participation	X	X	X
	Online News → Offline Talk → Efficacy → Offline Participation	X	X	X

Table 31 Continued

	Hypothesis	Wave 1 model	Wave 2 model	Auto-Regressive model
	Social Media News → Offline Talk → Efficacy → Offline Participation	X	X	X
	Traditional News → Online Talk → Efficacy → Offline Participation	X	X	X
	Online News → Online Talk → Efficacy → Offline Participation	X	X	X
	Social Media News → Online Talk → Efficacy → Offline Participation	X	X	X
	Traditional News → Elaboration → Efficacy → Offline Participation	X	X	O
	Online News → Elaboration → Efficacy → Offline Participation	X	X	X
	Social Media News → Elaboration → Efficacy → Offline Participation	X	X	X
	Traditional News → Offline Talk → Efficacy → Online Participation	X	X	O
	Online News → Offline Talk → Efficacy → Online Participation	O	O	O
	Social Media News → Offline Talk → Efficacy → Online Participation	O	O	O
	Traditional News → Online Talk → Efficacy → Online Participation	X	X	O
	Online News → Online Talk → Efficacy → Online Participation	O	O	O
	Social Media News → Online Talk → Efficacy → Online Participation	O	O	O
	Traditional News → Elaboration → Efficacy → Online Participation	X	X	O
	Online News → Elaboration → Efficacy → Online Participation	O	O	O
	Social Media News → Elaboration → Efficacy → Online Participation	O	O	O

Note: “O” indicates the hypothesis was supported. “X” indicates that the hypothesis was not supported.

Table 32 Comparison of Aggregated Models

	Hypothesis	Wave 1 model	Wave 2 model
H9	News → Efficacy →Participation	O	O
H10	Deliberation → Efficacy → Participation	O	O
H13	News → Deliberation → Efficacy → Participation	O	O
	Traditional News → Deliberation → Efficacy → Participation	X	X
	Online News → Deliberation → Efficacy → Participation	O	O
	Social Media News → Deliberation → Efficacy → Participation	O	O

Note: "O" indicates the hypothesis was supported. "X" indicates that the hypothesis was not supported.

7.1.5 Path Comparisons

The present research additionally investigated whether there was a significant difference in paths between the Wave 1 and Wave 2 models. Overall, the strength of paths from online and social media news attention to deliberation, political efficacy, and political participation were stronger in the Wave 2 model than in the Wave 1 model. In contrast, the strength of paths from traditional news attention to deliberation, political efficacy, and political participation were stronger in the Wave 1 model than in the Wave 2 model. The paths from deliberation variables to political efficacy and from deliberation variables to participation showed mixed results. The impact of political efficacy on offline and online political participation was found to be much stronger in the Wave 2 model than in the Wave 1 model. This finding shows additional support of the importance of political efficacy in political communication, especially during an election period.

7.2 Discussion about the Implications of the Study

The implications of the current study are four-fold: (1) this study successfully establishes a two-step mediation model; (2) it proves the key role of political efficacy in political engagement; (3) it confirms the importance of online and social media as new information sources; and (4) it proposes several practical implications to the democracy of South Korea.

7.2.1 Establishment of a Two-Step (Deliberation & Political Efficacy) Mediation Model

The analyses of the national panel data provide a range of important insights about the implications of the processes through which news consumption influences political engagement during an election period. This study, by examining the processes using three different models, finds a consistent pattern of information processing in political communication. The results, particularly the findings about mediating effects, provide considerable support for the theorized model of this study. Although minor differences exist across the three models, analyses revealed a consistent pattern of two-step mediation. That is, attention to media news stimulates citizen communication and intrapersonal reflection on news, and these deliberative behaviors in turn lead to the increase of political efficacy. In addition, political efficacy connects deliberative behaviors to political participation. Lastly, deliberation and political efficacy jointly mediate the relationship between news attention and political participation, proving the hypothesized model to be solid. Across the three models – two cross-sectional models and one auto-regressive model, informational media use encouraged citizen communication and reflective behavior on news, which in turn spurred political efficacy and participation. The findings suggest that the traditional S (Stimuli) – R (Response) approach is overly simplistic, and more complicated cognitive processes have to be considered when examining news effects on political participation in the digital age.

The study successfully establishes a new mediation model beyond previous communication mediation model (McLeod et al., 1994) and cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 2001; Eveland et al., 2003). The current study also makes a significant progress from the O – S – R – O – R framework. It does so by integrating news elaboration and political efficacy into the model and by offering a much fuller account of the theoretical rationale underlying the hypothesized model. The current study's findings deepen our understanding of the causal flow among information seeking, citizen communication, news elaboration, political efficacy, and political participation. This study also makes a significant contribution to the literature that deals with the impact of digital media on political participation by adding an innovative theoretical model to it.

In detail, the current study finds that interpersonal political discussion mediates the effect of news attention on political participation. This suggests that interpersonal discussion, as a deliberative behavior, can help individuals to make sense of the political information they obtain from news. Several studies have documented that informational media use can foster civic-oriented behaviors by triggering political discussion, which subsequently promotes citizens' participation in public affairs (Eveland, 2001; McLeod et al., 2001). However, few studies have examined how news attention influences interpersonal political discussion and political efficacy, and how these two variables jointly affect political participation in one integrated model. How people process news information and perceive their political competence is an important determinant in leading them into the political process. Furthermore, very few studies have examined the relationship between different information sources and political efficacy (Lin, 2003; Kaid et al., 2007). This study breaks down information sources (the main exogenous variable) into three categories – traditional, online, and social media news. And, it tests the

hypothesized model in the three different information-seeking situations. To date, little research has ever attempted to divide information sources into segmented categories.

What is also noteworthy in this study is that the hypothesized mediation effects were largely replicated across three well-fitted models – two cross-sectional models and one auto-regressive model. By employing an analytic strategy that examined the change in the variables over time (the auto-regressive model), the study demonstrates that the major constructs are interrelated not only at a single time point but also over time. The concurrent relationships observed in the cross-sectional model were largely replicated when the present study took advantage of the panel components of the design. When modeling changes, the structural equation models revealed a set of relationships that largely confirm the hypothesized framework. That the results are mostly the same across the three approaches lends substantial support to the suggested theoretical model of the current research.

7.2.2 The Crucial Role of Political Efficacy in Triggering Political Engagement

The outcomes of the current study advocate the idea that news effects are often indirect. The indirect process encompasses multiple steps, including information seeking, deliberative behaviors, and political efficacy. Thus, this study's findings make us revise the view that media-driven messages directly influence audiences. The findings also suggest that citizens are not simply passive audiences who are vulnerable to media inputs, but instead are active audiences who rework and rethink media content through their interpersonal and intrapersonal deliberation behaviors. Citizens not only take advantage of media content by paying attention to it, but also try to make sense of it in their own way through interpersonal conversation with others and reflection on the content. For example, through robust engagement in discussion, citizens can reflect and deliberate about a campaign, become informed, and make sense of issues and

candidates, all of which are necessary in encouraging them to engage in the election process.

However, it should be noted that deliberation behaviors may not be a sufficient condition that connects news consumption with political engagement. The current study demonstrates that the three deliberative behaviors – offline and online political conversation and individual reflective behavior on news content – did not necessarily have positive direct links to political participation. In the Wave 2 model and the auto-regressive model, half of the relationships between deliberative behaviors and political participation turned out to be non-significant. And, deliberation did not play an effective role in mediating news attention and political participation in all of the three models as shown in Table 34. These results suggest that interpersonal discussion and intrapersonal reflection are not enough to explain citizens' engagement in the political process.

Unlike the deliberation variables, political efficacy had a positive direct link to both offline and online participatory behaviors. Political efficacy also successfully mediated the relationships between news attention and participation and between deliberation and participation as shown in Table 34. Additionally, in the IPMA (Importance-Performance Matrix Analysis) results show that political efficacy had the biggest performance power in leading news consumers to offline and online political participation in both the Wave 1 and the Wave 2 models. These outcomes indicate that political efficacy is a more important factor than deliberative behaviors in determining whether citizens who pay attention to news eventually end up engaging in political processes.

Political efficacy also outperformed political trust, which is another important determinant of political engagement. Those who felt highly efficacious about their thoughts and behaviors were more likely to get involved in offline and online political events and cast their ballots in the election than people who had a higher level of trust toward politicians or political institutions, yet

had a lower level of political efficacy. This study's findings demonstrate how important a role political efficacy plays in the process of citizen engagement in political affairs.

All in all, the observed relationships speak to the central role of political efficacy in bridging news consumption to visible political participation. Although the analyses cannot determine political efficacy as a sole and decisive cause of political engagement, they certainly suggest that political efficacy exerts a considerable impact on the formation of democratic citizenship. This finding deserves attention both in well-democratized countries and in democratizing countries. As scholars (Cohen et al., 2001; Delli Carpini, 2004; Kenski & Stroud, 2006) advocate, political efficacy is one of the most important psychological constructs closely related to political participation in Western societies. However, the role of political efficacy as a motivator of political engagement has been less investigated in the East, especially in South Korea. As stated previously, politics is one of the common topics in everyday conversation in South Korea. Through diverse private meetings in restaurants, bars, and homes, South Korean voters spend considerable time talking about political issues because of their high interest in politics. However, at the same time, the level of frustration of South Koreans toward politicians, the government, and power elites is relatively high. Indeed, the results of descriptive statistics in this study show that the mean of political interest is 3.05 in Wave 1 and 3.09 in Wave 2, while the mean of political trust ranges from 1.80 (Wave 1) to 2.19 (Wave 2).

The high level of frustration among South Koreans stems in part from the serious conflict between political parties, frequent political corruption, and prevalent feeling of deprivation among the middle-class and the poor. Political frustration tends to prevent people from developing political efficacy. When people feel frustrated about politics, their feeling of competence about their behaviors is lowered. A high level of political interest may motivate

people to consume more political information, and active news-seeking in turn may facilitate conversation about political issues with others. Yet, information seeking and political conversation do not necessarily result in citizen engagement in political affairs if people don't feel efficacious enough to change their attitudes or behaviors toward politics. This study empirically confirms the importance of political efficacy in the process of citizen engagement in the democratic process in the new democracy of South Korea.

7.2.3 The Increasing Impact of Online/Social Media on Political Processes

Another intriguing finding in this study is the role played by social media. Information seeking via social media strongly influenced deliberation behaviors and political efficacy, often more so than traditional and online news media. News attention via social media had a positive link to offline and online political talk in all of the three models. News attention via social media also significantly affected news elaboration in the Wave 1 and the auto-regressive models. Social media news attention also was positively associated with political efficacy in all three models. In the Importance-Performance Matrix Analysis (IPMA), the performance scores of social media news attention was significantly higher compared with its importance scores. In the Wave 1 model, the performance ability of social media news attention proved to be the second most powerful in explaining offline and online political participation. In other words, social media news attention played a very important role in boosting political participation. Likewise, in the Wave 2 model, the performance ability of social media news attention proved to be the third biggest in explaining offline political participation and the second biggest in accounting for online political participation.

On the other hand, traditional news attention did not play an important role as much as online and social media news attention did. In the test of the hypothesized two-step mediation

model, traditional news attention failed to support the hypothesized framework. In the IPMA analysis, the importance and performance scores of traditional news attention were below average. The results imply that consumption of traditional media news lacks the potential to mobilize citizens into the democratic process.

A multitude of studies on news consumption have demonstrated that traditional media teeter on the edge of relevance for average citizens (Hussain, 2011). Some even blame traditional news media for alienating citizens from the public process (Soffer, 2009). Indeed, the public relies less on traditional news than ever before. Only 35% of Americans read the daily news, with their younger counterparts the least likely to do so (Paterson, 2007). The consumption of television and radio news use is similarly plummeting (Kohut & Remez, 2009). Perceived levels of trust and credibility in traditional media news parallel the general decline in news use, where only 18% of Americans believe that the press deals fairly with all sides, and only 29% think journalists get their facts straight (Kohut, 2009).

The same trend is observed in South Korea. The average newspaper readership and television viewership in South Korea has been falling every year during the last one decade. In 2005, 45% of adults said they read a newspaper regularly but the rate dipped to 34% in 2008 (Korea Press Foundation, 2009). Today, the newspaper's readership is surmised to be below 30%. The average viewership of three major network television's main news programs has dropped by .8% from 4.0% in 2008 to 3.2% in 2012 (Korea Press Foundation, 2012). The rate of decrease of viewership was the biggest among people in their 30s.

One possible reason for such a drastic decline in traditional news consumption may be the increasing competition in the media market because of the wide penetration of Internet media. But the increasing distrust toward the traditional news media seems to be a more important

reason. As mentioned in chapter 3, only 44% of South Koreans trust traditional media, such as television, and cable TV (Edelman, 2012). Only 20% of citizens trust newspapers. Such a low level of credibility for traditional media stems mainly from people's disappointment in the traditional media's malpractices in their coverage of news (Kim & Hamilton, 2006). In addition, a close connection between the traditional media and invested interest groups has fostered discontent among audiences (Chang, 2005). As a result, South Korean citizens are gradually turning away from traditional media and turning elsewhere to get political information.

On the other hand, digital media are gaining popularity, providing citizens a new way of getting political information. With a variety of available content, citizens are no longer forced to rely on traditional media to learn about public affairs. Online and social media are becoming important sources from which citizens learn about public issues (Kim et al., 2011). People do increasingly turn to the Internet, with 44% of Americans going to the Internet or mobile devices regularly for news (Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 2009). The Internet has also bypassed newspapers as the second most important source of national and international news (Kohut & Remez, 2008). In South Korea, as much as 98% of citizens said that they accessed the Internet to consume news (DMC Media, 2013). Research lends support for the idea that online media play a significant role in informing the audience about public affairs. OECD regarded South Korea as an example country where online news has already overtaken other forms of news (OECD, 2010).

Also, social media are becoming effective sources of political information. For example, voters are increasingly demanding direct and unfiltered political information from campaigns in many elections (Hussain, 2012). Social media, by permitting the exchange of views across diverse networks, tend to increase the opportunities for individuals to get involved in political

issues. Today, in South Korea, a multitude of social media, such as blogs, social networking services, podcasts, and social bookmarking sites, are being actively used. They are often regarded as politically transformative communication tools (KISDI, 2013). For instance, social media have brought a sea change in the ways individuals access political information by allowing them to bypass mainstream media (Anduiza, 2009). Social media have expanded the opportunities for citizens to express themselves and to interact with others in innovative ways (Dahlgren, 2008).

Mainly due to their great potential as a provider of open, horizontal, networked, and real-time exchange of information, social media have been widely used as tools of public expression and participation (Bennett, 2008). Especially, social media have shown their political power in almost every election since the late 2000s (Park & Kluver, 2009, Sams & Park, 2013). The 2011 Seoul mayoral election exemplifies how social media are an effective tool to trigger citizen engagement in election processes. The mayor of Seoul is one of the nation's high-profile political posts. The Seoul mayor seat was held by conservatives for the last decade. But in 2011, Park Won-soon, a political neophyte, who was supported by the majority, clinched the mayoral race. Surprisingly, he beat his ruling-party-backed competitor who worked as a former judge. Political pundits paid attention to the explosive use of social media, especially Twitter, as a new political mobilizer. Most new media described the election as a "Twitter election."

The popularity of current affairs podcast shows in South Korea is a good indication of how today's South Koreans desire different types of news content. Since early 2011, the number of current affairs podcast shows has skyrocketed. According to Podbbang (2014), a popular podcast show titled as *Nanun Ggomsuda* ("I am Petty-minded Creep") recorded about six million downloads per episode during the 2011 Seoul mayoral election. As of April 20, 2014, about 6,800 podcast shows are run. According to Park (in press), many podcast shows centered on

current affairs deal with news content that satirizes politicians and the establishment. The wide consumption of podcast shows in South Korea also reflects citizens' disillusionment toward manipulative and elite-oriented news coverage by mainstream media.

This study argues that, when properly specified, the impact of social media on political discussion and participation rivals the effects of newspaper or television hard news. It is certain that consumption of news via social media will continuously increase unless traditional media change their ways of news coverage and adopt technological merits. This study empirically shows that the wide use of social media in South Korea can result in fostering democratic attitudes and behaviors when people use them for the purpose of keeping abreast of news about current affairs (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012).

7.2.4 Practical Meanings to the Democracy of South Korea

The present study casts important insights into the democracy of South Korea in the digital age. The implications of this study's findings can be more clearly understood when we reflect on the unique history of contemporary South Korea. As reviewed previously, the civil society of South Korea has been under strict control by a succession of authoritarian regimes. Suppressive rule lasted for about three decades after the first military coup in 1961. Massive protests in 1987 provided momentum for the disruption of the long-lasting authoritarian control (Im, 1994). Although authoritarian rule collapsed, South Korean failed to make a successful transition to a solid democracy. Various attempts to implement social and political reform floundered mainly because of strong resistance from vested interest groups (Chang, 2005). In 1997, South Korea underwent its first transfer of governmental power between the ruling and opposition parties. However, the transfer failed to make changes in the existing political hegemony.

Traditional mainstream media posed another obstacle to the democracy of South Korea.

They blocked diverse voices from ordinary citizens (Kim, 2002). Mainstream media kept their old habits of the past, such as "infringement of editorial rights by media owners, oligopolistic dominance of newspaper market, and manipulation of public opinion" (Chang, 2005, p. 928). In this way, the media reinforced their autonomy and social influence. They even transformed themselves as independent political institutions, neglecting their role as news organizations (Park & Jang, 2001). In addition, the mainstream media allied with conservative political groups in holding back democratic progress in South Korea (Kang, 2005).

Therefore, the progress toward democracy in South Korea has been stuck in limbo even after the termination of the military rule. Political parties, the government, the power-elite group, and the media were reluctant to urge reform in the inchoate democracy. However, under the worst of conditions, democratic participation of the public did not vanish. The public made the momentum of change. Democracy-hungry citizens of South Korea started challenging the establishment and calling for reform. They desired the formation of a democratic public sphere (Chang, 2005).

The foundation that has provided the public of South Korea with a new consciousness about democracy is the Internet. People started setting up alternative venues for civic discourse and participation on the Internet. People actively leveraged the Internet to disseminate their opinions and to participate in reform movements (Han, 2007). As in many countries around the world, the use of the Internet in South Korea has shown great potential to empower citizens by providing them with an additional avenue of communication, organization, and participation (Park & Biddix, 2008).

Today in South Korea, citizen engagement in political affairs connected to digital media technologies shows signs that democracy is gradually advancing. Via online and social media,

people frequently intervene in political processes, including parliamentary and presidential elections. Today, more and more South Koreans rely on digital media to voice their opinions and concerns (Park, Lim, Sams, Nam, & Park, 2011). Digital media not only redistribute the content created by mainstream media but also create a good space for citizen-produced content (Min, 2007; Shumate & Dewitt, 2008). As a result, digital media are increasingly being used as a tool to enhance participatory democracy (Park & Kluver, 2009, Sams & Park, 2013). Dahlgren (2009) predicted that digital media including online and social media will transform democracy by allowing citizens to get involved in democratic processes in ways never before thought possible.

Despite the importance of online and social media in the democracy of South Korea, there has been little research on the mechanisms through which digital news consumers process news information and, as a result, engage in political activities. Few studies have focused on explaining the nuanced ways by which Internet use relates to civic participation in political actions. Studies on the potential of Internet in South Korea centered on examining the technological possibilities of online and social media (Han, 2007; Kim, 2006; Park & Yoon, 2013), content analyzing online messages (Choi, Lee, & Lee, 2004), or portraying political attitudes (Kim, 2005). Unlike previous studies in South Korea, the current study investigates the underlying mechanisms of political participation among news consumers in South Korea. This kind of work is important in that South Korea is a new but not yet established democracy (Lee & Glasure, 2007) and many South Koreans still have a high level of frustration and disillusionment toward politics (Kim & Cho, 2004).

The present study delineates the mechanisms by which South Koreans acquire information through digital media, discuss or elaborate on the information, feel competent for their activities, and finally decide to engage in actual processes of politics. The findings indicate that the Internet

provides an opportunity for South Korean citizens to create various online spaces for vibrant discussion about public issues. Use of news media has been linked to the increase in political discussion between acquaintances during the course of daily life. Such an impact appears to be greater when it comes to the Internet, which provides a variety of interactive communication methods and political information for users to engage in political discussion. Indeed, the Internet generated hundreds of political discussion forums and individual opinion outlets in South Korea (Kim & Cho, 2004). In particular, since the exercise of freedom of speech through the existing mass media was limited, the Internet has served as a new public forum that allows citizens to express political opinions and to organize political activities. As a result, the Korean public became exposed to diverse information and viewpoints about public issues that were not easily attainable in the past.

The trend toward increasing engagement in political discussion is causing a big change among South Koreans. Under authoritarian regimes, most South Koreans were deprived of their freedom of speech. Harsh suppression of expression and punishment for anti-governmental opinions forced citizens to censor themselves (Kang, 2005). This tendency lasted even after non-authoritarian regimes were established. But today, South Koreans are eager to express their opinions on controversial issues, especially political affairs through digital media. Therefore, this study's findings imply that the Internet can contribute to overcoming the legacy of the past authoritarian regimes by providing an alternative channel of political discourse.

However, involvement in political discussion is not enough to explain why South Koreans who consume news via online or social media are more likely to participate in political processes. Especially, it should be noted that a high level of political cynicism has thwarted South Koreans from engaging in political affairs for more than three decades (Lee & Glasure, 2007). How could

a considerable portion of South Koreans overcome their feeling of frustration and cynicism toward politicians and the governmental process? What triggered them to feel competent about their behaviors? On the surface, accumulated experiences of collective actions in recent South Korea may provide a plausible explanation to the above questions. For instance, during the 2002 World Cup, people voluntarily disseminated, shared, and organized information to encourage people to join gatherings at a main public square in Seoul, the capital of South Korean (Cho et al., 2004). During the 2002 presidential election, Internet users made a political miracle by supporting a political neophyte as their new president. From 2005, social media have been used actively by individual citizens for political mobilization (Chang & Bae, 2012).

However, collective experiences become possible when certain conditions are met. In other words, there should be motivations that urge citizens to discard political frustration and cynicism and then to encourage them to feel competent about possible changes (Castells, 2013). In order to explain anecdotal examples of citizen engagement, the present study concentrated on the concept of political efficacy. As explained in previous sections, political efficacy is a focal element in political engagement in both theoretical and practical terms. In the Western countries, political efficacy has been found to draw public attention to politics and to elicit citizen's active engagement in political affairs. Political efficacy tends to challenge citizens' political passiveness, and enhances their awareness of alternative roles as democratic citizens. Indeed, recent massive movements initiated by the general public attest to the fact that previously disparate, indifferent, and apolitical people are gradually becoming a formidable force in the democratic process mainly due to their increased sense of political efficacy (Park & Park, 2013). In recent several elections, those who were alienated from the political process began to regain political efficacy. Younger, less affluent, and progressive voters began to realize that they have the power to change the

existing political system (Chang & Bae, 2012). This is evidenced by increasing voter turnout for the first time in twenty five years since 1987 as indicated in Chapter 1. The current study empirically confirms the important role of political efficacy in the democratic process in South Korea.

Of course, there still exists a gap between the public's expectation of democracy and the reality in South Korean politics (Kim & Park, 2005). This discrepancy may keep causing political apathy and cynicism among some segments of the public. However, it seems to be true that the wide penetration of the Internet is producing a momentum to bring about substantial changes in the present democracy of South Korea. The digital environment is constantly creating new opportunities for South Koreans to get out of their frustration and to feel motivated to engage in reforming representative processes. Also, digital media technologies increasingly play a beneficial role in developing individuals' political efficacy and in encouraging citizens' voluntary involvement in political events. Democracy refers to a political system based on the voluntary participation of people (Todd & Taylor, 2004). Considering that the progress of democracy is largely measured by the public's participation in the democratic process, the findings of this study lend support to a positive viewpoint by suggesting a theoretical model that explains how information-seeking via online/social media and subsequent engagement in deliberative behaviors and heightened political efficacy play a crucial role in developing democratic attitudes and behaviors among the public of South Korea.

7.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

The present research has several limitations. The treatment of offline and online citizen communication and political efficacy as connectors between the information people consume and

the actions they take, may oversimplify a much more complex process that involves more diverse antecedent variables. For example, Tian (2011) suggests that extremity in political orientation, need for cognition, and need to evaluate as antecedent variables of political participation. As Shah et al. (2005) showed, the examination of diverse possible mediators preceding political participation is needed in following studies.

The current study cannot exclude the possibility that citizens' political engagement drives deliberate behavior and political efficacy, which in turn fosters information seeking via the media. Although this seems considerably less plausible than the suggested theoretical model when considering the treatment of information seeking as antecedent to these other variables is consistent with a large body of work (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; McLeod et al., 1996, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Zaller, 1992), it is necessary for future research to consider these other possibilities. Future studies need to continue to move beyond structural modeling of cross-sectional data toward analytic strategies that employ panel data and explore the possibility of alternate causal orderings among these variables. In this way, the understanding of media effects, especially social media effects, on contemporary political life can be more refined than before. The current study's model illustrates only part of the whole story concerning news consumption and citizens' political engagement.

Another potential weakness may be found in the fact that the current study focused attention on the testing of synchronous structural models rather than lagged models involving the effects of information-seeking, citizen communication, news elaboration, and political efficacy. Although this approach was borne out by the data, future research should continue to examine both lagged and synchronous models when examining these relationships. Ideally, future work will make use of multiwave panel data, allowing for a full specification of lagged models

involving more diverse sets of variables.

Notably, the data for this study were collected during the course of the 2012 presidential campaign, an intense political communication event. The election context likely intensified the current study's model, which focuses on the deliberation and political efficacy's joint impact on political engagement. Although the present study purposely chose to test the model to maximize the potential for change in the panel collection, the question of whether these relationships exist outside of an election context remains unanswered. Researchers interested in the role of information seeking, deliberation, and political efficacy in political life should attempt to replicate these findings outside of an election context to establish the generalizability of these results.

Lastly, a caution is needed in interpreting the current study. Although this study concludes that the wide use of digital media helps the development of participatory democracy of South Korea, readers should know that such a conclusion is conditional. For example, the positive relationship between digital media use and political participation is contingent on the assumption that people use the media for the purpose of seeking information on current affairs. It should be noted that the using the media for recreational or recreational purposes does not necessarily lead to the increase in democratic outcomes. Also, readers should know that this study centered on examining individual-level mechanism of political participation. Variables that directly relates to organizational, societal, or cultural elements of political participation were not included. Additionally, this study's main claim that digital media and active citizenship play a positive role in the democratic process should not be considered equivalent to a dogmatic preposition. Although popular support for democracy is one essential element that bolsters democracy, it loses its meaning when relevant reforms are conducted in the institutional system. In other words, in

order to further democratic consolidation, legal and political reforms should be made whenever needed by the public (Dahl, 1992; Dalton, 2004).

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Survey Questionnaire (Wave 1; September 16, 2012)

1.How old are you?

____

2.What is your gender?

a. Female
b. Male

3. How often during the last 3 months did you read or watch news from the following media?

	Regularly	Sometimes	Hardly ever	Never
Web-only news sites				
Portal news boxes				
Blogs				
Social networking sites				
Current affairs podcasts				
Local newspapers				
National newspapers				
News magazines				
Network TV evening news				
Network TV news magazine programs				
Local network TV evening news				
Radio news or news magazine programs				
Comprehensive Cable TV news				

4. During the last 3 months, how much attention did you pay to news from the following media?

	Very much	Much	Somewhat	A little	Nothing
Web-only news sites					
Portal news boxes					
Blogs					
Social networking sites					
Current affairs podcasts					
Local newspapers					
National newspapers					
News magazines					
Network TV evening news					
Network TV news magazine programs					
Local network TV evening news					

Radio news or news magazine programs					
Comprehensive Cable TV news					

*Please indicate your evaluation of the following media for the three points.

5. Online news media (OhmyNews, Dailian, etc.)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

6. Portal news (Daum, Naver, etc.)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

7. Conservative National newspapers (Chosun, Donga, etc.)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

8. Liberal National Newspapers (Hankyoreh, Kyunghyang, etc.)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

9. Network TV news (KBS, MBC, SBS)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

10. Network radio news

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

11. Comprehensive Cable TV news (TVChosun, ChannelA, jTBC, MaeKyungTV)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

12. Current affairs podcasts (Naggomsu, Bosu of Korea, etc.)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

13. Social Network sites (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

14. How much do you depend on the current affairs podcast shows for the following purposes?

	Strongly agree	Agree	neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
To decide how to vote					
To decide about important issues					
To judge candidates' qualities					
To see how politicians stand on issues					
To stay informed about my surroundings					

To be excited					
To be entertained					
As a habit					
To obtain information to discuss with others					

15. During the presidential election period, how much do you depend on mass media for the following purposes?

	Strongly agree	Agree	neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
To decide how to vote					
To decide about important issues					
To judge candidates' qualities					
To see how politicians stand on issues					
To stay informed about my surroundings					
To be excited					
To be entertained					
As a habit					
To obtain information to discuss with others					

16. How much do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
People like me don't have a say in government decisions					
I consider myself to be well-qualified to participate in politics					
I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country					
I don't thing public officials care much what people like me think					
I think I am as much as informed about politics and government as most people					
If public officials are not interested in hearing what the people think, there is no way to make them listen					

17. How much do you agree with the statements?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
I feel comfortable living with other people					
Most people are honest					
Most people would try to take advantage of me if they got the chance					
In general, people getting together in their own communities can solve their problems better than the government					
The people in government do not waste the money we pay in taxes					
Most of the people running for office are smart people who know what they are doing					
People running government are crooked					

18. How would you evaluate your interest in politics?

	Not at all	A little	Somewhat	interested	Very interested
Interest in local politics					
Interest in national politics					

19. Over the last month, how many total people would you say you have talked to about politics or current issues face-to-face? __

20. Over the last month, how often have you talked about politics or current issues face-to-face with the following people?

	Not at all	A little	Somewhat	Much	Very much
Family					
Friends					
Acquaintances					
Coworkers					
Strangers					
People who express views you agree with					

People who express views you disagree with					

21. Over the last month, how many people would you say you have talked to about politics or current issues via the Internet, such as emails and social networking sites? _____

22. Over the last month, how often have you talked about politics or current issues via the Internet, such as emails and social networking sites with the following people?

	Not at all	A little	Somewhat	Much	Very much
Family					
Friends					
Acquaintances					
Colleagues					
Strangers					
People who express views you agree with					
People who express views you disagree with					

23. For the following statements, please circle the number that best describes your feelings about that statement.

	Strongly agree	agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
I often find myself thinking about what I've encountered in the news					
I often try to relate what I encounter in the news to my own personal experience					

24. How often have you engaged in the following activities during the past three months?

	Regularly	Sometimes	Hardly ever	Never
Sent an e-mail to an editor of a newspaper/magazine				
Used e-mail to contact a politician				
Signed an online petition				
Commented news online				
Participated in online discussion forums				
Posted opinion on social networking sites				

Forwarded a link to political video or news to others				
Contacted members of a political group I joined online				
Joined collective action organized through an online political group				
Wrote a letter to an editor of a newspaper/magazine				
Displayed a campaign button, sticker, or sing				
Wrote a letter to a politician				
Signed a paper petition				
Attended a political meeting, rally, or speech				
Worked for a political party or candidate				
Contributed money to political campaign or candidates				
Volunteering for civic or political projects				

25. Which of the following best describes your political orientation?

a. very liberal b. liberal c. moderate d. conservative e. very conservative

26. Which party of the following do you support?

a. Sanuri b. Democratic United c. Unified Progressive d. Advancement & Unification e. Independent

27. Which candidate of the following are you going to vote for?

a. Park Keun-hye b. Ahn Chul-soo c. Moon Jae-in d. other candidate e. not likely to vote f. will never vote

* Please answer the following questions.

28. Which candidate promised the electorate that she/he would implement an action of a free education for all high school students right away?

a. Park Keun-hye b. Ahn Chul-soo c. Moon Jae-in d. I don’t know

29. Which candidate is the author of the book ‘Destiny’?

a. Park Keun-hye b. Ahn Chul-soo c. Moon Jae-in d. I don’t know

30. Among the following candidate who support the South Korea-US FTA?

a. Park Keun-hye b. Ahn Chul-soo c. Moon Jae-in d. I don't know

31. Recently which candidate attempted to visit the memorial hall of Chun Taeil, a labor activist during the 1970s?

a. Park Keun-hye b. Ahn Chul-soo c. Moon Jae-in d. I don't know

32. What is the highest level of education you've obtained?

a. Middle school or less
b. High school
c. Bachelor's degree
d. Master's degree
e. Doctoral degree

33. What was your total household income for 2011?

a. Less than $20,000
b. $20,001-$40,000
c. $40,001-$60,000
d. $60,001-$80,000
e. $80,000-$10,000
f. More than $10,000

Appendix 2.

Survey Questionnaire (Wave 2; December 10, 2012)

1.How old are you?

____

2.What is your gender?

c. Female

d. Male

3. How often during the last 3 months did you read or watch news from the following media?

	Regularly	Sometimes	Hardly ever	Never
Web-only news sites				
Portal news boxes				
Blogs				
Social networking sites				
Current affairs podcasts				
Local newspapers				
National newspapers				
News magazines				
Network TV evening news				
Network TV news magazine programs				
Local network TV evening news				
Radio news or news magazine programs				
Comprehensive Cable TV news				

4. During the last 3 months, how much attention did you pay to news from the following media?

	Very much	Much	Somewhat	A little	Nothing
Web-only news sites					
Portal news boxes					
Blogs					
Social networking sites					
Current affairs podcasts					
Local newspapers					
National newspapers					
News magazines					
Network TV evening news					
Network TV news magazine programs					
Local network TV evening news					
Radio news or news magazine					

programs					
Comprehensive Cable TV news					

*Please indicate your evaluation of the following media for the three points.

5. Online news media (Ohmynews, Dailian, etc.)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

6. Portal news (Daum, Naver, etc.)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

7. Conservative National newspapers (Chosun, Donga, etc.)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

8. Liberal National Newspapers (Hankyoreh, Kyunghyang, etc.)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

9. Network TV news (KBS, MBC, SBS)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

10. Network radio news

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

11. Comprehensive Cable TV news (TVChosun, ChannelA, jTBC, MaeKyungTV)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

12. Current affairs podcasts (Naggomsu, Bosu of Korea, etc.)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

13. Social Network sites (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Fair					
Accurate					
Trustworthy					

14. How much do you depend on the current affairs podcast shows for the following purposes?

	Strongly agree	Agree	neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
To decide how to vote					
To decide about important issues					
To judge candidates' qualities					
To see how politicians stand on issues					
To stay informed about my surroundings					
To be excited					
To be entertained					

As a habit					
To obtain information to discuss with others					

15. During the presidential election period, how much do you depend on mass media for the following purposes?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
To decide how to vote					
To decide about important issues					
To judge candidates' qualities					
To see how politicians stand on issues					
To stay informed about my surroundings					
To be excited					
To be entertained					
As a habit					
To obtain information to discuss with others					

16. How much do you agree with the following statements?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
People like me don't have a say in government decisions					
I consider myself to be well-qualified to participate in politics					
I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country					
I don't thing public officials care much what people like me think					
I think I am as much as informed about politics and government as most people					
If public officials are not interested in hearing what the people think, there is no way to make them listen					

17. How much do you agree with the statements?

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
I feel comfortable living with other people					
Most people are honest					
Most people would try to take advantage of me if they got the chance					
In general, people getting together in their own communities can solve their problems better than the government					
The people in government do not waste the money we pay in taxes					
Most of the people running for office are smart people who know what they are doing					
People running government are crooked					

18. How would you evaluate your interest in politics?

	Not at all	A little	Somewhat	interested	Very interested
Interest in local politics					
Interest in national politics					

19. Over the last month, how many total people would you say you have talked to about politics or current issues face-to-face? __

20. Over the last month, how often have you talked about politics or current issues face-to-face with the following people?

	Not at all	A little	Somewhat	Much	Very much
Family					
Friends					
Acquaintances					
Colleagues					
Strangers					
People who express views you agree with					

People who express views you disagree with					

21. Over the last month, how many people would you say you have talked to about politics or current issues via the Internet, such as emails and social networking sites? ____

22. Over the last month, how often have you talked about politics or current issues via the Internet, such as emails and social networking sites, with the following people?

	Not at all	A little	Somewhat	Much	Very much
Family					
Friends					
Acquaintances					
Colleagues					
Strangers					
People who express views you agree with					
People who express views you disagree with					

23. For the following statements, please circle the number that best describes your feelings about that statement.

	Strongly agree	agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
I often find myself thinking about what I've encountered in the news					
I often try to relate what I encounter in the news to my own personal experience					
It's difficult to related to different races					
Contacting with diverse viewpoints makes me interesting					
I don't spent time with non-friends					
I seek relationship with dissimilar people					

24. How often have you engaged in the following activities during the past three months?

	Regularly	Sometimes	Hardly ever	Never
Sent an e-mail to an editor of a newspaper/magazine				
Used e-mail to contact a politician				
Signed an online petition				
Commented news online				
Participated in online discussion forums				
Posted opinion on social networking sites				
Forwarded a link to political video or news to others				
Contacted members of a political group I joined online				
Joined collective action organized through an online political group				
Wrote a letter to an editor of a newspaper/magazine				
Displayed a campaign button, sticker, or sing				
Wrote a letter to a politician				
Signed a paper petition				
Attended a political meeting, rally, or speech				
Worked for a political party or candidate				
Contributed money to political campaign or candidates				
Volunteering for civic or political projects				

* Please answer the following questions.

25. Who is the candidate Kim Ji-ha recently proclaimed publicly that he would support

a. Park Keun-hye b. Moon Jae-in c. Lee Jung-hee d. I don’t know

26. Which candidate pledged that he would apply a half-tuition policy to all public university from the next year?

a. Park Keun-hye b. Moon Jae-in c. Lee Jung-hee d. I don’t know

27. Which election is not scheduled on the presidential election day?

a. Kyungnam governor election b. Superintendent of education of Seoul c. Anyang Mayoral election d. I don’t know

28. What minimum level of approval rating was required for a candidate to attend the 1st television debate?

a. 1% b. 3% c. 5% d. 7% e. 10% f. I don't know

29. Which of the following best describes your political orientation?

a. very conservative b. conservative c. moderate d. progressive e. very progressive

30. Which party of the following do you support?

a. Saenuri b. Democratic United c. Unified Progressive d. other parties e. Independent

31. Which candidate of the following are you going to vote for?

a. Park Keun-hye b. Moon Jae-in c. Lee Jung-hee d. other candidate

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Publications:

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