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Inflammatory and Conciliatory Rhetoric in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Content Analysis of How Three Newspapers Covered Two Provocative Events

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INFLAMMATORY AND CONCILIATORY RHETORIC IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF HOW THREE NEWSPAPERS COVERED TWO PROVOCATIVE EVENTS

by

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A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy

College of Mass Communication and Media Arts
In the Graduate School
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IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A CONTENT ANALYSIS
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A Dissertation Submitted in Partial
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in the field of Mass Communication and Media Arts

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OLIVER R. WITTE, for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in MASS COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA ARTS, presented on June 12, 2013, at Southern Illinois University Carbondale.

TITLE: INFLAMMATORY AND CONCILIATORY RHETORIC IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF HOW THREE NEWSPAPERS COVERED TWO PROVOCATIVE EVENTS

MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Dennis T. Lowry

This study focuses on contrasting responses to two highly provocative acts from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — i.e., Ariel Sharon’s controversial visit to the Temple Mount in February 2000, and a Palestinian terrorist cell’s suicide bombing of a nightclub in Tel Aviv in 2005.

Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000 led to the second intifada — the bloodiest outbreak of violence in the conflict’s recent history. However, what followed the suicide attack in Tel Aviv in 2005 were several weeks of restraint from both sides. This study positions media texts as antecedents and consequents to these two key focal points in history and examines their content.

The central method for the study is quantitative content analysis. Three newspapers were selected primarily for their ability to set the public agenda: English editions of the Israeli Haaretz and Jerusalem Post, and the Palestinian Al-Quds, translated into English from its original Arabic.

The corpus for the study comprised 820 news and opinion articles about Arab-Israeli relations from four weeks — i.e., two weeks of articles from either side of Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount and two weeks of articles from either side of the suicide bombing.

Media texts were coded for two operationally defined constructs — inflammatory words (IW) and conciliatory words (CW). Inflammatory words were fighting words symptomatic of violent and aggressive behavior. Conciliatory words were related to pacification, symptomatic of
appeasing, and passive behavior. Built-in dictionaries of Diction (Version 6.14.5), a software program, were used to confirm the validity of the two principal constructs.

Results confirmed the newspapers’ propensity to focus on violent news and also suggested that media content is likely to be shaped and influenced by acts of violence on the ground. Results also supported speech-act theory and indicated that inflammatory or violent texts in the media perform the functions of agenda-setting or news-framing and potentially cultivate violent behavior among readers. The constructs of inflammatory and conciliatory words and their application in constructing a practical Threat Index are among the key contributions of this study.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTERS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 – Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Conflict</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urgency of the Need for Conciliation</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of Rhetoric</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contrasting Responses</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview of the Study</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 – Literature Review and Hypotheses</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetoric and Violence: Speech-Act Theory</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence and the Media: Audience Effects</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Effects: Cultivation Theory</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reciprocal Effects: Agenda-Setting</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaping Public Opinion: Framing</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrating Theories and Explanations</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Index</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypotheses and Research Question</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 3 – Method ................................................................. 47
The Three Newspapers ............................................................. 49
The Four Weeks ........................................................................ 52
Operational Definitions .............................................................. 53
Coding System ........................................................................ 55
Dictionaries .............................................................................. 57
Translation Issues ...................................................................... 59
Machine Translation ................................................................. 63
Intercoder Reliability ................................................................. 66
Convergent Validity ................................................................. 67
Pilot Study ................................................................................ 70
Summary .................................................................................. 72

CHAPTER 4 – Results ............................................................... 73
Intercoder Reliability Findings .................................................. 73
Descriptive Findings ................................................................. 74
Threat Index .............................................................................. 77
Tests of Hypotheses and Research Question ................................ 78
Inflammatory Words Minus Conciliatory Words Equal Threat Index .. 82
Convergent Validity Findings ................................................... 83
Summary .................................................................................. 85

CHAPTER 5 – Discussion .......................................................... 87
Audience Effects ................................................................. 89
Unexpected Findings .......................................................... 90
Implications ........................................................................... 91
Contributions of the Study .................................................... 93
Limitations and Directions for Future Study .......................... 95
Rival Hypotheses ................................................................... 98
Conclusion .............................................................................. 99
REFERENCES ......................................................................... 101
APPENDICES
  Appendix A -- Definitions .................................................. 161
  Appendix B -- Timeline ...................................................... 201
  Appendix C -- Documentary History ..................................... 212
  Appendix D -- United Nations Resolutions .......................... 508
  Appendix E -- Graphic history of the Conflict ....................... 549
  Appendix F -- What the Tanakh Says About -- .................... 585
  Appendix G -- What the Quran and Hadiths Says About -- ....... 611
  Appendix H -- Assassinations, Massacres, and Riots ................ 647
  Appendix I -- Pertinent (and Impertinent) Quotations ............ 655
  Appendix J -- Style Guide .................................................. 670
  Appendix K -- Dictionaries ................................................ 675
  Appendix L -- Codebook .................................................... 707
  Appendix M -- Final-Status Issues ....................................... 709
VITA ...................................................................................... 775
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 3 – Extent to Which the 3 Newspapers Use Similar Language to Report Provocations</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.1 – Percentage of Inflammatory and Conciliatory Words in 3 Newspapers Per Week</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 4.2 – Net Inflammatory Rate and Threat Index in the 3 Newspapers Per Week</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table M.1 – How Key People Identified Final-Status Issues (The New York Times)</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table M.2 -- How Key People Identified Final-Status Issues (Ross)</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1 – Israel in the Middle East</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2 – War and Peace Index Shows Cyclical Pattern</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

*When it comes to discussing the Middle East, people go temporarily insane, so if you are planning to talk to an audience of more than two, you’d better have mastered the subject.*

--Friedman (1989), p. 6

For a little country about the size of the U.S. state of New Jersey and the population of the state of Virginia, with no natural resources to speak of and not even much water or fertile land, Israel consumes more than its share of the world’s attention. Some 350 news organizations from around the world have stationed staff members in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and that is just during “normal” times (Friedman, 1989, p. 426). Another 700 journalists descended on Israel during the first intifada (an Arabic word meaning “uprising”) from 1987-1991, according to the Israel Government Press Office. Friedman calculated that this was equivalent to 36,000 foreign correspondents invading Washington, D.C.

The dispute they are covering is between Zionists – Jews who believe that God has promised them a homeland they call Israel – and Muslims, whose descendants have lived on this land they call Palestine since it was conquered by Arabs in 638 A.D. The map in Figure 1 shows the contested land, which is bounded generally by the Jordan River, Mediterranean Sea, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt. Both sides claim Jerusalem as holy and as their capital, and they are unwilling to share it. Both believe that God has blessed to their sovereignty a 35-acre site near the center of Jerusalem and known to the world as the Temple Mount (for mountain). Some of their prophets and holy sites are identical. Feeding the conflict is the conviction by zealots on each side that surrendering one inch of ground anywhere is a combination of apostasy and treason.
Figure 1. This map shows the relationship of Israel (in light pink) to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights (with dashed lines) and to surrounding countries and the Mediterranean Sea. 

This study refers to the region as Palestine until 1948 and thereafter as Israel when referring to the land it has annexed, and as Palestine when referring to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, while recognizing that there never has been an independent country called Palestine. Previous to 1948, the region was ruled by the Ottoman Turks from 1516 and by Great Britain from 1917. To call the region the “Holy Land” is too poisoned with irony to be a useful term.

The West Bank, including East Jerusalem, has about the same population as Nevada (2.7 million) in an area about the size and shape of Delaware. The Gaza Strip, separated from the West Bank by about 20 miles, jams as many people as there are in Idaho (1.7 million) into a space about a quarter the size of Rhode Island (CIA World Factbook, 2010b). Israel, using biblical names, calls the part of the West Bank north of Jerusalem as Samaria and the part south of Jerusalem as Judea.

**Significance of the Conflict**

No other region of the world so thoroughly dominates public discourse as the Middle East (Pipes, 2004). As of May 14, 2009, Amazon listed 277,825 books with Israel in the title, 90,387 books with Palestine in the title, and 12,366 with both Israel and Palestine in the title. By contrast, Amazon listed 217,918 books with India in the title, 24,939 with Pakistan in the title, and 22,631 with both India and Pakistan in the title.

The United Nations probably has given more attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict than to any other issue (Tomeh, 1975). George J. Tomeh, the former Syrian ambassador to the United Nations, took three volumes to compile the 164 General Assembly resolutions, 81 Security Council resolutions and 81 other resolutions that had been adopted by the United Nations regarding Israel between just 1947 and 1974.
“The Middle East,” observed Edward Said (1979a, p. 124-125), a spokesman in the United States for Palestinian causes, “is more heavily armed, more politically mobilized for war than any other region of the world. … There is oil, there are markets, there are geopolitical interests, there are nuclear options at stake.” Said noted the irony that peace\(^1\) overtures since 1973 have resulted in a shift from the killing of Arabs by Israelis to the killing of Arabs by Arabs, mostly due to disagreements over negotiations. “The Arab world has come around to the idea of peace with Israel, and yet never has there been more inter-Arab violence,” he said. “The Palestinian cause is highest on every Arab government’s agenda, but the number of Palestinian dead at Arab government hands is appallingly high” (p. 170). Shalev (1991, p. 72) was shocked at the internal violence that accompanied the first intifada. “The first wave of lynch-liquidations in villages occurred a year after the uprising began,” he said. “By the end of June 1989, about 90 Arabs had been murdered by fellow Arabs” for suspicion of collaboration, moral-religious reasons or to settle personal accounts.

Historian and authority on political violence Walter Laqueur (1976, p. 70) observed, “A massacre or a mass execution in a Third World country will rate at most a few paragraphs. However, if ten schoolgirls burn a tire in Bethlehem, all hell will break loose, for in Israel there is one of the heaviest concentrations of newspapermen on earth.”

The ombudsman for the Washington Post, reacting to complaints that the newspaper was making Israel look bad by overplaying violence there, did a hard count and discovered that the Post had published some 300,000 words on hostilities between Israel and its occupied territory

---

\(^1\)“Peace,” as defined by the United Nations, “is not only the absence of conflict, but requires a positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation” (Culture of Peace, 1999).
Palestine between mid-December 1986 and Mid-May 1987 during the first intifada (Harwood, 1988, p. C-6).

“Even for The Post,” Harwood said, “that is quite a quantity of verbiage.” The newspaper was publishing an average of two articles a day – nearly a quarter of them starting on the front page. This is remarkable, Harwood said, because he rated the intifada a “relatively low-grade civil conflict.” Fewer than 200, almost all Palestinian civilians, had died during the period he studied. By contrast, Harwood said, Syria killed between 5,000 and 30,000 of its unarmed dissidents in just nine days in the city of Hama six years before – and the media of the world hardly noticed. More recently, he said, 65 Shiites were killed in a single day in one of Lebanon’s sporadic civil wars, and all it warranted was a 600-word story on page 15.

Why the difference? Harwood proposed two reasons: Both foreign and domestic media hold Israel to a higher standard than its enemies, and not all life is equally valued. Palestinian deaths, for example, ran inside; Israeli deaths ran outside. Other reasons might include Israel’s openness, which makes stories and gruesome pictures easier to get than in, say, Syria, and the world’s fascination with the stubborn intractability of the Arab-Israeli conflict, more than 30 years into its second century. An advocacy organization, Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, calculated that network news shows frame Israeli violence as retaliation nine times more often than Palestinian violence (In U.S. Media, 2002). The breadth and durability of the conflict is all the more amazing considering that American public attention rarely remains focused on any single issue for long. McCombs & Zhu (1995), for example, found that the duration of the typical public issue was 18.5 months.

**Urgency of the Need for Conciliation**

“The plight of the Palestinians has been a root cause of unrest and conflict in the region,”
significance of the conflict as extending far beyond the Middle East. He said, “From time to
time, and we are all witnesses to that, the tension in this area turns into open armed conflict.
Every time that happens, the fate of the whole world is in jeopardy” (Gromyko, 1973, December
21, p. 5).

The conflict has gained new urgency with the prospect that Iran might be on the verge of
developing a nuclear weapon. Nuclear weapons and the will to use them would give Iran the
ability to do what Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq previously tried to do and failed – which was not
just to defeat Israel in battle but to wipe out the fledgling country and kill or expel all the Jews in
it. If Israel also has nuclear weapons and responds in kind (or strikes first), the world could be
drawn into World War III – this time, a nuclear war.

Even this dissertation does not have space enough to reproduce the massive number of (in
alphabetic order): accords, agreements, armistices, annulments, appeals, borders, cease-fires,
claims, communiqués, compromises, conventions, correspondences, covenants, declarations,
formulas, hudnas, impasses, initiatives, inquiries, letters, liberations, lines, mandates, maps,
memorandums, parameters, plans, proposals, protocols, petitions, points, reports,
recommendations, recognitions, resolutions, roadmaps, studies, steps, speeches, statements,
summits, solutions, schedules, talks, treaties, truces, timelines, understandings and White Papers
that were prepared by:

Anonymous sources, commissions, committees, cabinet secretaries, congresses,
conferences, heads of state, missions, negotiators, presidents, prime ministers and summits, none
of which succeeded in stopping the:

Abductions, actions, assassinations, attritions, atrocities, attacks, barriers, captures,
casualties, catastrophes, check-points, conflicts, conquests, colonizations, defeats, dead, disputes, expulsions, fences, homicide bombings, incarcerations, intifadas, invasions, humiliations, killings, martyr operations, murders, massacres, migrations, Nakbas, offensives, occupations, operations, partitions, targeted killings, suicide bombings, rapes, refugees, reprisals, revenge, riots, revolts, settlements, terror, uprisings, violence, wars, wounded, wrongs and walls because the peace proposals were alleged to be:

Too vague, too detailed, too general, too specific, too official, too unofficial, too public, too private, too secret, too open, too direct, too bilateral, too multilateral, too third-party, too hosted, too sudden, too delayed, too inflexible, too flexible, too premature or too late.

**Significance of the Study**

The significance of the study is related to the significance of the conflict. Previous description has shown the durability of the conflict and what is at stake in it for the belligerents and for rest of the world. It is a conflict that is sensitive to words as bombs or as balm.

Part of what keeps the conflict alive is the rhetoric that the Israelis and Palestinians use to express their anger, frustration and, yes, their yearnings for peace and stability. Terrorism, after all, is a rhetorical statement, intended to send a message of hate and desperation.

What a review of the background makes clear is that the level of the conflict rises and falls with the passage of time. Periods of calm are punctuated by periods of violence. Terrorism, says Laqueur (1976, March, p. 69), occurs in cycles Although it might not be possible to identify the cycle’s causes, which are enormously complex, it is possible to assess the public mood through a close examination of the rhetoric used in reporting and commenting on the conflict in local newspapers. The assumption is that violent words and violent actions, like conciliatory words and conciliatory actions, are mutually reinforcing. Armed with a better understanding of
the public mood, political leaders can avoid taking steps that might inflame a situation or, conversely, can seek to calm the situation.

A useful tool to track the cycles might be an index with which to track the public mood and highlight a newspaper’s role in promoting violence or promoting conciliation through the language it uses. The purpose of this study is to develop such an index and to examine its usefulness to anticipate an outbreak of violence or, despite a provocation, to see opportunities for peace in even the grimmest of situations.

Newspapers provide a reliable source of data about how language might influence the course of history. Indeed, newspaper content has been found useful in hundreds – perhaps thousands – of previous studies in mass communication (e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 1998; Krippendorff, 2004). Newspapers both influence and reflect public opinion. The language they use provides a range of clues about what constitutes mainstream public discourse. Newspapers both inform public opinion and are informed by public opinion.

The intent of this study is not to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict but rather to anticipate its ebb and flow based on a study of how major, local daily newspapers use both inflammatory and conciliatory language in their news, features and opinion accounts. By comparing the rhetoric used by major, respected, local newspapers in this study to report two provocative events – one leading to violence, the other to calm – political leaders will be able to respond more perceptively to provocations.

Comparing the frequency of inflammatory words against conciliatory words regarding Israeli-Palestinian relations produced an index indicating the level of the risk that events might spin out of control into physical violence. Golan (2008, p. 2) said the conflict has been going on
for so long and so bitterly that the goal of conflict resolution might be more productively approached as conflict management. Former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres put it a little differently: “If a problem has no solution, it may not be a problem, but a fact -- not to be solved, but to be coped with over time” (Peres, n.d.). The insight has come to be known as Peres’s Law.

Developing tools to manage the conflict clearly would benefit the cause of peace. Both intifadas, most of the riots and at least one of the wars caught one or both participants by surprise. Seemingly minor incidents – e.g., a traffic accident in the case of the first intifada – keep blowing up into major confrontations. If political leaders could anticipate trouble, such as a brewing intifada, or avoid over-reacting, as in the tendency to see every provocation as requiring revenge, it might provide time for cooler heads to deal with the supposedly intractable issues.

In other words, this study is intended to demonstrate social validity, which is a kind of external validity (Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 1998). “This social validity,” they say, “will depend on the social significance of the content that content analysis can explore, and the degree to which the content analysis categories created by researchers have relevance and meaning beyond an academic audience” (p. 137).

The Role of Rhetoric

Words are weapons in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the targets range from a narrow constituency to a world-wide audience. Between 1947 and 2009, the United Nations has adopted more than a thousand resolutions relating to Israel and Palestine. Scholars remark on the war of words and link violent words with violent acts.

Authorities like Entine (2007) take notice that the Middle East is uniquely sensitive to rhetoric and ascribe exceptional power to words. Rowland and Theye (2006) are among the
many who assert that terrorism is a rhetorical act, designed not to defeat the enemy but to send a message—a message of frustration, of anger and of despair.

In the narrative that follows, note the emphasis on two loaded words: martyr and saboteur. They describe the same person—a suicide bomber—but with opposite characterizations, the one with honor and the other with contempt. They are loaded with meaning more powerful than bullets. Peace will have a chance when both words are de-emphasized.

**Contrasting Responses**

This study is based on the language used by three local daily newspapers for one week before and one week after two contrasting events. The newspapers selected for the study are Al-Quds, the largest independent Palestinian newspaper, published in East Jerusalem; the Jerusalem Post, originally left-wing, then right-wing, and since 2004 “complex centrist” as it describes itself; and Haaretz, liberal, secular, politically left, published in Tel Aviv, Israel.

Jerusalem Post was selected because it is published exclusively in English. Haaretz publishes both English and Hebrew editions. Al-Quds publishes only in Arabic. Stories relevant to Israeli-Palestinian relations were translated into English.

The first event studied here was the visit of Ariel Sharon, leader of the opposition Likud political party in Israel, to the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000, accompanied by an armed guard. The decision to visit the Temple Mount appears to have been motivated primarily by internal Israeli politics. Sharon was running for prime minister at the time and the visit reinforced his tough image, which was popular with Israeli voters at the time. His visit was approved by both Israeli and Palestinian authorities, although a minority of officials cautioned against it.

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2 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6176691.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6176691.stm)
4 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4969714.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4969714.stm)
The other event was a suicide bombing by a Palestinian, Abdullah Saeed Badran, 21, on the evening of February 25, 2005, outside a nightclub in Tel Aviv, Israel. Badran, from the West Bank town of Tulkarem, detonated an explosive device he was wearing, killing five Israelis and wounding more than 50.

The responses could not have been more different. Badran’s suicide bombing did not break the truce in effect at the time, whereas Sharon’s visit sparked the second intifada. Normally, the usual Palestinian militant organizations would have vied with each other to claim “credit” for the suicide bombing. Instead, they were at pains to disclaim responsibility. Indeed, they condemned the act, blaming it on a rogue cell that they said was operating independently.

The Bahrain Tribune (2005, March 3) said, “Last Friday’s suicide bombing in Tel Aviv was one of the very few operations and suicide bombings that was not claimed by any organisation, perhaps the only one in the last 10 years. Moreover, it was an operation for which all Palestinian and non-Palestinian parties denied being responsible and was condemned by almost all Palestinian organisations.”

Equally stunning, the Israelis did not retaliate. They “turned the other cheek,” so to speak – also a response almost without precedent.

Why the difference between the reaction to Sharon in 2000 and to Badran in 2005? Shortly before Sharon’s visit, the Camp David summit had failed, dashing hopes for a settlement. As high as the hopes had been, so crushing was the disappointment. Anger and cynicism reigned, although these emotions were not obvious to most authorities at the time.

Conditions were different in 2005. Sharon had announced plans for a unilateral withdrawal of all troops and settlements from the Gaza Strip. Both sides wanted it to happen and feared any move that would delay or disrupt the move. When Badran upset the calm, both sides
took immediate steps to prevent the event from spinning out of control, and the withdrawal proceeded on schedule later that year. The informal truce that had been declared earlier that month held, and the window of opportunity for peace following the death of Yasser Arafat, president of the Palestinian Authority, on November 11, 2004, remained open.

In the suicide bombing, the leaders’ assessment of the public mood was correct, and provocation did not lead to conflict. In the case of Sharon, the assessment was tragically wrong. To avoid such miscalculations, leaders and the public need a means to take the rhetorical temperature of the situation quickly and to react appropriately, based on current, quantifiable data.

This study uses content analysis to compare rhetoric used by the three newspapers – Haaretz, Jerusalem Post, and Al-Quds – to report on Israeli-Palestinian relations for one week before and one week after each event. Most previous studies in English have focused on how media outside the region have reported on the conflict. Other unusual aspects include separating inflammatory from conciliatory rhetoric and examining how they are balanced.

**Overview of the Study**

The following chapter summarizes literature about the key theories regarding rhetoric and violence, including speech-act, cultivation, audience effects, media effects, agenda-setting and framing, and applies them to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The chapter includes with a review of literature related to the construction of indexes intended to indicate the likelihood of violence and proposes five hypotheses based on the theories previously described.

Chapter 3 explains the method used to construct the index that was developed for the present study. The index is based on a content analysis of the language used by the three newspapers to report responses to the visit of Israeli politician Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount
in 2000 and the suicide bombing of a night club in Tel Aviv in 2005. The first event was followed by the violence of the second intifada; the second was followed by calm. The analysis compares inflammatory language and conciliatory language during those time periods to determine if a connection can be found between the rhetoric employed by the newspapers and violence followed.

Chapter 4 presents the findings of the content analysis and relates these findings to the proposed research question. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the implications of the study and suggests directions for future research.

There are many ways to tell the story of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The appendices provide several viewpoints: Appendix A (Definitions) contains a detailed discussion of terms such as “terrorist.” Appendix B (Timeline) provides a conventional way to view the history: through a chronological list of the dates of important events. An official look at the conflict may be found in Appendix C (Documentary History). Each document begins with an italic precede pointing out its significance and its key elements. In most cases, documents are reproduced in their entirety to provide context for specific contentious sentences or paragraphs that are shown in bold type.

Note especially the contrasting speeches by Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon to the United Nations. They provide eloquent summaries of the Palestinian and Israeli positions. Appendix C also includes the official covenants of Fatah, Hezbollah, and Hamas -- the dominant political factions active in and around Palestine. Even a quick review of documents by the British, starting with the McMahon correspondence (1915-1916), reveals their duplicity and why both Arabs and Jews came to mistrust them. The seemingly endless list of ineffective peace proposals shows the range of what has been tried and provides background to their futility. The documents also trace the birth of an uneasy rapport between Arabs and Israelis.
Appendix D (United Nations Resolutions) provides an international perspective on the conflict. The state of Israel was created by General Assembly Resolution 181; if it had been accepted by both sides, the Levant today would look quite different. Ross (2004) calls Resolution 194 “the Palestinian bible” on refugees (p. 724), even though the resolution never uses the magic words “right of return.” Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 are cited in almost every negotiation, and the interpretation of No. 3379 is of interest as the only General Assembly resolution that was rescinded. It explains in part why Israel does not trust the United Nations.

No history of the region would be complete without maps. The history of the Middle East is a war of maps as well as of weapons and words. Appendix E (Graphic History of the Conflict) shows how the maps of Israel/Palestine kept getting redrawn with the ebb and flow of conflict. Israel might be the only country in the world without internationally recognized boundaries, so the drawing of lines on maps takes on an urgency that is unusual – perhaps unique -- in modern world politics. The maps illustrate the fluidity of the situation.

Complicating everything are two exclusionary religions and cultures: Judaism and Islam. Inasmuch as religion plays such a pivotal role in Arab-Israeli relations, it is important to examine the guidance they take from their holy books. Appendix F quotes selected verses from an English translation of the Tanakh (also known as the Jewish Bible or as the “Old Testament”); Appendix G quotes selected verses from an English translation of the Quran and the Hadiths. Contrast the generally pacific tone of these scriptures with a sampling of the crimes that have been committed in the name of Allah/Yahweh/God, summarized in Appendix H (Assassinations, Massacres, and Riots).

Appendix I (Pertinent (and Impertinent) Quotations) captures some of the most memorable insights by the powerful and the powerless. The purpose of this appendix is not to
tell jokes but to illuminate in trenchant language the hopes, the angers and the frustrations at all levels.

Appendix J (a Style Guide) is intended not only to permit consistency in mundane matters such as spelling and nomenclature but more particularly to avoid a charge of bias. For example, referring to the PLO as the Palestinian (instead of Palestine) Liberation Organization might be a simple mistake or it might mask an intent to delegitimize Palestine as a future state. Terminology is not a trivial issue, considering the significance attached to words and names in the Middle East.

Appendix K contains the dictionaries of words judged to be inflammatory or conciliatory. All the words were drawn from articles published in Haaretz, Jerusalem Post or Al-Quds about Arab-Israeli relations during the four weeks of the study period. The codebook with instructions to coders appears in Appendix L.

One of the newspapers in the present study, Al-Quds, is published only in Arabic, raising questions about methods of translation that Chapter 3 deals with briefly. The so-called “final status” issues – the ones believed to be intractable as of May 2013 – are summarized in Appendix M.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

This chapter examines the template of Austin’s (1975) speech-act theory in order to understand the relationship between violent rhetoric and violent actions. Further, concepts from cultivation theory, audience effects, agenda-setting and framing are summoned to illustrate the relationship between violence, media and the public. Applied and theoretical indices that measure violence are reviewed to underscore the utility of developing a threat index based on conflict and violence discourses in the media. Lastly, based on the theoretical underpinnings discussed in the chapter, hypotheses of the study are proposed.

Rhetoric and Violence: Speech-Act Theory

The ability of violent words to incite violent action – or, less commonly, the ability of pacific words to reduce tensions – has been the subject of considerable research. Especially productive for the present study has been the domain of speech-act theory. Developed by J.L. Austin (1975), speech-act theory foregrounds the connection between violent rhetoric, whether spoken or written, and violent acts. It has been applied in several areas, notably psychology, court decisions and common sense.

Austin maintained that the word itself is an action because it can effect change. Mundane examples include making a promise or declaring a couple married. Austin called them speech acts because they make something happen. More substantive examples include hate speech. Feminists and anti-racists have used speech-act theory to argue that some speech acts should be suppressed because of the harm they cause. Speech acts can become fighting words and thus are central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This study connects the language used by three local newspapers with violence in one case and conciliation in another.
The difficulty of making peace between Israelis and Palestinians is hampered by what New York Times correspondent Ethan Bronner described as a “war of language” (Bronner, 2009a, WK1,4). “The very words they use mean opposite things to each other,” he said. In describing his frustration as a reporter trying to be fair, Bronner provided a glimpse into the essence of the gulf that Ben-Gurion described in 1919: “One side says that after thousands of years of oppression, the Jewish nation has returned to its rightful home. It came in peace and offered its hand to its neighbors numerous times, only to be met with a sword” (p. WK1,4).

Rubbish, says the other side. “There is no ‘Jewish nation,’ only members of a religion. A group of European colonists came here, stole and pillaged, throwing hundreds of thousands off their land and destroying their villages and homes. A country born in sin, Israel has built up an aggressive military with help from Washington in grips of a powerful Jewish lobby.” Then both sides play the victim in an attempt to draw sympathy and support from the world community (Bronner, p. WK 1,4). Peters (1984, pp. 392-293) gives a longer version of each side’s narrative. Gamson (1992) proposes one of the briefest frames: Arab intransigence vs. Israeli expansionism.

The significance of the written word derives partly from its scarcity. As Said (1979a, p. 40) observed, articles by Israelis about Israel are easy to find in public circulation, but articles by Arabs about Arabs are rare. When a representative Arab view is put forward it is either by a Western expert or it is a quasi-official “statement,” he said. This is particularly true when sources cited by the rare critic of Israel are Israeli. Said, an Arab-American professor of English at Columbia University, might have added that much of the existing commentary about Palestinians was written by expatriates like himself.

CNN, because of its broad coverage, is a particularly sensitive rhetorical battleground. Fisk (2001) reported an “intense internal debate over the use of words” such as mild euphemisms
like “targeted killings” instead of “assassinations” and provocative descriptors such as “terrorists” (p. 1). The Palestinian Human Rights Monitor (War of Words, 2005) spoke of a “war of words” as each side sought to frame the news in terms favorable to it. A more complete list may be found under euphemisms in Appendix A (Definitions). Rhetoric, detached from physical acts, is what keeps the conflict going (Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997).

When the Israeli Fogel family of five was killed on March 11, 2011, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility. Israel accused the Palestinian Authority of indirect responsibility, incitement it sponsored in Palestinian school textbooks, in mosques and in Palestinian news media, which created an “atmosphere of terrorism” (Kershner, 2011a, p. A6).

The idea of linking words and acts is not new. Dehumanizing rhetoric, said Chafee (1941), justifies inhuman acts. “The repetition of insulting words and threats of violence in individual rhetoric becomes acceptable for use in the mass media, which, in turn, desensitizes the entire community,” Chafee said. “A threat, like a lie, if repeated often enough in public discourse, becomes generally acceptable, and the violent word becomes handmaiden to the violent act.” The words, he said, are criminal not because of their ideas but because of their immediate consequences. Echoing Tsesis (2002), Chafee said “Insults are punished like a threatening gesture, since they are liable to provoke a fight” (pp. 149-150).

In the Middle East, said Lewis (2004b), every word is studied for hints of meaning. Jewish assassin Yigal Amir confessed that he shot Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 because right-wing rhetoric created a divisive political climate (Friedman, 2008, p. 5). Authorities like Entine (2007) consider the Middle East uniquely sensitive to rhetoric, in that words have exceptional power. Certain figures of speech such as irony are not appreciated in Arabic and might provoke an aggressive response. Members of the U.S. military assigned to
Arabic-speaking countries are cautioned that words have special meaning to Arabs and are respected by the literate and the illiterate alike (Arab Cultural Awareness, 2006, p. 23).

Rowland and Theye (2008, March) said political violence, by its nature, is a rhetorical act (p. 52), that is designed, said Richardson (2006, p. 4) “not to defeat the enemy but to send a message.” The more often insulting words are repeated, the easier it becomes to treat them uncompassionately without incurring much opposition (MacKinnon, 1993).

Mishal & Aharoni (1994) experienced something of an epiphany as they were studying clandestine leaflets – the original social medium -- distributed by Palestinians during the first intifada. Gradually, the researchers said they came to realize that behind the youngsters and stones were words that dictated the way of life, determined the borders of the permissible, brought protesters into the streets, and guided them in what to do, when and how. “If one wants to know the why and wherefore of the intifada’s eruption, what the Palestinians think and what they are fighting for, how they operate and how they perceive Israel, the United States, and the Arab world, one should read the written words,” Mishal and Aharoni said (p. xiv). “The underground leaflets are the documents by which the Palestinians go forth and to which they return.” One poignant flier addressed Israelis: “Our struggle with you is a contest of faith, existence, and life” (p. 31).

Two words symbolize the issue of rhetoric in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: shaheed in Arabic and saboteur in Hebrew. To Palestinians, a suicide bomber is shaheed, which is a step more revered than martyr. Israelis prefer the term saboteur, which is a step more humiliating than terrorist because it denotes a common criminal engaged in senseless violence. Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, raised eyebrows among both Palestinians and Israelis when he picked up the Israeli connotation to describe the Tel Aviv bomber. Al-Quds
quoted Abbas, who used the Arabic word for saboteur – *mokkharib* -- and it does use *terrorist* and *saboteur* when they occur in foreign reports but otherwise not in local reports and commentaries.

The two words – *shaheed* and *saboteur* -- bear watching. As long as suicide bombers are holy martyrs in the Palestinian media and saboteurs in the Hebrew media, the prospects for rapprochement are likely to be dim. The cumulative repetition of aggressive words can indicate forthcoming violence, just as the cumulative repetition of conciliatory words can signal a longing for peace.

The connection between violent rhetoric and aggressive acts is enshrined in both scientific literature and common sense. Simply labeling violent actors as “terrorists” or as “freedom fighters” encourages the cycle of violence. They become socially constructed – and legitimated – symbols, which then become stimuli with learned meanings. Mead (1934) showed that the labels applied to people shape how they think and act. To turn a phrase about Eliza Doolittle in George Bernard Shaw’s play *Pygmalion*, the difference between a terrorist and a freedom fighter is not what they do but how they are treated. A similar point was developed by Korn (2004) who said language could desensitize as well as inflame. The wide use of the neutral phrase “killed in clashes” in Israeli newspapers to refer to Palestinian deaths, he said, “legitimated the high number of civilian casualties and contributed to the construction of the uprising as an armed conflict justifiably oppressed by military means” (p. 247).

Thus, drawing on the notion of frames by psychologist Kenneth Burke, Mackin (1998) pointed out that rhetoric can work two ways: in the frame of acceptance or in the frame of rejection. The point is subtle and deserves emphasis: Mackin was suggesting that it is insufficient to look solely at inflammatory rhetoric; the scholar also should consider conciliatory rhetoric to
gain a full understanding of the forces at work in forming public opinion and influencing public policy. This study accepts his challenge and seeks to show how the two forces are balanced in Haaretz, Jerusalem Post and Al-Quds during the four weeks under examination.

This study builds on Mackin’s suggestion and more precisely on speech act theory as expanded by Sorial (2009), who applied it to religious sermons preaching violent jihad or glorifying acts of terrorism. The title of Sorial’s article is “Can saying make it so?” His conclusion was yes, given a source in a position of authority and a fertile context.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1624 called on states to “prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts.” Tsesis (2002) stated the point succinctly: “The more often insulting words about minorities are repeated, the easier it becomes to treat them uncompassionately without incurring much resistance.” He drew an analogy of a fist fight that begins with verbal taunts and proceeds to blows (p. 138).

When Joan Lefkow, a U.S. district judge testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in 2005, she was talking about violence against judges, but with a few ellipses, her comments could apply to Arab-Israeli relations. She said: “In this age of mass communication, harsh rhetoric is truly dangerous. Even though we cannot prove a cause-and-effect relationship between rhetorical attacks … and violent acts of vengeance … the fostering of disrespect … can only encourage those who are on the fringe to exact revenge” (Coen, 2005, May 19, p. 6).

Nobel Prize winner Mario Vargas Llosa put it this way: “Words are acts. Through writing, one can change history” (Parker, 2007, June 23, p. A11). Wittgenstein (1953) and Sorial (2009) also argued that violent language is symptomatic of violent action. Varis (1986) pointed out the military metaphors embedded in ordinary reporting: “war on poverty,” “fighting cancer,” and even “war to end war.” Their common use, Varis said, “softens the horrors and makes the
horrible seem heroic” (p. 131). Euphemisms have the same effect, he said. For example, the United States no longer has a War Department; now it is called the Defense Department, which makes its activities more socially acceptable.

Varis deplored the paucity of research into the connection between violent rhetoric and violent acts (p. 39). The Handbook of Violence Risk Assessment (Otto & Douglas, Eds., 2010) makes precisely that kind of connection in the field of forensic mental health. Language is examined for clues about a subject’s inclination to violence. The purpose is to prevent recidivism in prison inmates and mental patients. “Our ability to identify persons at greater risk for violence has improved significantly,” the editors said. “In the past 30 years, a large number of violence risk assessment tools have been developed to predict recidivism” (p. ix-x).

The problem with speech act theory is that it does not provide a causal link between advocacy and action, nor does it explain why some incitements have the intended effect and others do not. Nevertheless, it might be sufficient to sound an alarm if a correlation can be demonstrated. Occasional false alarms might be a small price to pay for the opportunity to respond in time to head off a threat of physical violence. If, as Whorf (1941) proposed, language affects thought and thought affects behavior, it is reasonable to assume that linguistic behavior could have non-linguistic consequences, and that provocative language used by reporters, editors and their sources in volatile situations might precede acts of violence and terrorism.

Pennebaker, Mehl and Niederhoffer (2003) marshal a considerable body of research that they summarized this way: “The words a person uses clearly have an impact on the listener or reader. Just as the words people choose when talking or writing may betray their thoughts and feelings, those words may be processed at a low or nonconscious level by the listener or reader” (p. 572).
Considerable use has been made of content analysis in psychology to predict aggression by individuals or groups. Smith (2008), for example, concluded that content analysis can reveal indicators of a group’s likelihood to commit acts of terrorism. She found evidence for her claim by comparing the rhetoric of pairs of radical groups -- one engaged in terrorism, the other not – as they pursued similar goals. Smith (2004) searched primarily documents that she considered “group manifestos” (p. 419) for clues that would explain their different approaches to achieving their goals.

The present study builds on her research and applies it to the Arab-Israeli conflict, currently one of the world’s most serious threats of nuclear war. Instead of focusing on official documents that she considered group manifestos, this study focuses on articles in local daily newspapers that reflect a more fluid mindset of individuals with a proven track record of willingness to pursue a variety of means, including terrorism, to achieve their goals. Instead of pairing different groups dedicated to similar causes, this study compares the same group – i.e., the community at large – at different points in time. The idea is that the public mood, especially in the Middle East, is volatile. The people can resort to violence or they can suffer with restraint, depending on circumstances. The database used here also differs from Smith in that it factors conciliatory words into the calculation. Peace will have a chance when conciliatory words exceed inflammatory words, at which point the ability to predict peace might be more valuable than the ability to predict outbreaks of political violence.

**Violence and the Media: Audience Effects**

This study contributes to an understanding of potential media effects as a two-way process, where what appears in newspapers influences their readers, and the mood of the public influences what newspapers consider mainstream enough to print. Audience effects are just as
important as media effects. This study examines the extent to which mainstream rhetoric, operationalized as inflammatory or conciliatory words appearing in newspapers, indicates mainstream action. Textbooks give rather little attention to audience effects. Baran and Davis (2003) gave them two pages in Mass Communication Theory and then only to focus generally on what people do with media, not so much on what they do to the media.

The previous discussion of shaheed and mohareb puts a human face on the theory of audience effects. The Tel Aviv suicide bombing was denounced by Palestinian officials and terrorist organizations alike. Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority even used the slanderous word mohareb in the Israeli meaning of vicious and random destruction. In progress at the time were a truce, a release of Palestinian prisoners and Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and the bomber, Abdullah Saeed Badran, a member of what was described as a “rogue cell,” nearly upset the delicate gestures toward conciliation. Yet when Al-Quds reported on the bombing, Badran was labeled shaheed and described as a kind of sainted hero. Why? The reason has to do with audience expectations. The newspaper’s readers had been conditioned to understand suicide bombers as shaheeds. To label Badran as a rogue would have been unthinkable and perhaps exposed the editor of Al-Quds as some combination of traitor and heretic.

Reporting on political violence and suicide bombing resurrects long-standing questions about whether newspapers guide public opinion, follow public opinion, reflect public opinion or merely repeat what opinion leaders say. Mass-society theories attribute an influential but often negative role to newspapers. Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet (1944) found limited effects. Later studies position the media in a two-way flow that mirrors what is going on in society (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; Walker & Whittaker, 1990). Implicit in this study is the assumption that
newspapers influence public opinion and are influenced by it in about equal measures (Entman, 2004). As Hall (1980) said, “The audience is both the source and the receiver of the message” (p. 130). The evidence can be found in studies that relate media to terrorism.

Several commentators have put forward the notion of a dependent connection between terrorists like Badran, the Tel Aviv suicide bomber, or provocateurs like Sharon and the media. Former ABC news anchor Ted Koppel (1984) foregrounded the connection:

Let me put forward the proposition that the media, particularly television, and terrorists need each other, and they have what is fundamentally a symbiotic relationship. Without television, terrorism becomes rather like the philosopher’s tree falling in a forest: no one hears it fall and therefore it has no reason for being.

And television without terrorism, while not deprived of all interesting things in the world, is nonetheless deprived of one of the most interesting (p. 497).

Laqueur (1976) agreed, focusing on terrorism as propaganda and violence as a rhetorical act: “The media are the terrorist’s best friend. The terrorist’s act by itself is nothing. Publicity is all.” (p. 104). Tsesis (2002) suggested a parallel between the rhetoric of terrorism and hate speech, which can lead to the terrorism of genocide. Terrorism, like genocide, denies the right of its target to exist, he said. Korn (2004) argued that the Middle Eastern media are complicit in the amplification of crime by focusing on the effects rather than on the causes of violence, which would make sense of the violence. Instead, terrorism usually is portrayed as senseless, irrational or fanatic. Wolfsfeld (2003) blamed the media for prolonging conflicts. “While the news media make an extremely important contribution to the cause of war, they contribute almost nothing to the establishment of peace” (p. 9).
The connection between rhetoric and terrorism has been less well-studied, in part because of the difficulty in defining terrorism. The *Wall Street Journal*, quoting a U.N. panel in 2004, said, “Lack of agreement on a clear and well-known definition undermines the normative and moral stance against terrorism and has stained the United Nations’ image” (Henninger, 2005, June 17, p. A14). This study uses the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary: “The use or threat of violence to intimidate or cause panic, esp. as a means of affecting political conduct” (Garner, ed., 2009, p. 1611).

In a critical study of Palestinian coverage of the Israeli operation Defensive Shield into the Jenin refugee camp in 2002, Dajani (2003) urged newspapers (1) to banish highly emotional terms such as massacre, catastrophe, hell and disaster from headlines to avoid harmful ripple effects resulting in tragic consequences. Editors and reporters should anticipate that such terms have the power to intensify public fear, cause panic and possibly prompt flight or violent revenge and (2) to filter and tone down stories of high drama and violence that might cause public anger and concern.

Some evidence suggests that the political climate has changed to become more receptive to messages of reconciliation. Public opinion polls before and after the election of Mahmoud Abbas as president of the Palestinian Authority show contrasting and evolving views about prospects for peace. In a poll taken in 2000 by the Palestinian Birzeit University, 60% of Palestinians did not believe that peaceful coexistence was possible, and 80% supported military attacks against Israel (Birzeit, 2000). A follow-up poll taken jointly in March 2005 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and Hebrew University showed that support for reconciliation among Israelis had increased and stood at 84% compared to 80% in June 2004. More important was the consistent, across-the-board increase in support for a list of specific
reconciliation steps (Shamir & Shikaki, 2005). In the center’s December 2009 poll, 65% of Palestinians said they supported the peace process and 64% supported a two-state solution (PSR – Survey Research Unit, 2009). In contrast to the negative tone of studies that relate media effects and violence, Doxtader (2003) took a positive approach in a study titled Reconciliation – a Rhetorical Concept/ion [pun and solidus original]. Doxtader contended that reconciliation is also a rhetorical concept, that it transcends violence and that it summons understanding. Reconciliation’s promise, he said, demands significant faith in the work of words.

**Media Effects: Cultivation Theory**

According to Weimann (1992), concepts such as cultivation theory and reconstruction of reality (framing), and agenda-setting may serve as theoretical templates to study specific effects in the realm of mass-mediated political violence. Cultivation theory, proposed by George Gerbner (1971), is the only popular theory in mass communication studies that exclusively establishes a relationship between media and violence. Gerbner found that the amount of prime-time television dramas that people watched correlated with their assessment of the risk that they might become a victim of violent crime. In other words, heavy viewers thought the world was more dangerous than light viewers and more dangerous than could be documented by reference to FBI or police statistics. The implication was that television played a powerful role in shaping public attitudes toward social issues.

Gerbner’s team concluded that television had cultivated a television-oriented world view that had become more real to heavy viewers than objective reality. Viewers mistook the television world for the real world. Children were believed to be especially susceptible to the enculturing effects of television. “The more television children watch, the more accepting they are of aggressive behavior” (Pearl, 1987, p. 111). Gerbner’s project had two parts: an annual
content analysis of the amount and character of violent acts in one fall week of prime-time TV programs and a survey of television viewers to assess their opinion of the extent of crime in America.

The Gerbner team put it this way: “Heavy viewers revealed a significantly higher sense of personal risk, of law-enforcement, and of mistrust and suspicion than did light viewers in the same demographic groups, exposed to the same real risks of life. The results also showed that TV’s independent contributions to the cultivation of these conceptions of a ‘mean world’ and other aspects of social reality are not significantly altered by sex, age, education, income, newspaper reading, and church attendance” – only by their time watching television (Gerbner et al., 1977, spring, p. 171).

Although cultivation theory is useful as a guide to understanding how the media shape meaning and as a model for constructing a violence index, it has limitations as theory. Gerbner’s content analyses were not intended to be theoretical (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). “They were numerical accounts of how much of several kinds of violence were being shown on the television screen. The conclusions were that it was a lot” (p. 262).

DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach (1989) called Gerbner’s central proposition – that television portrayals influence opinions – “time honored” (p. 262), although attempts to establish the connection with theory provoked vigorous debate. Critics said Gerbner’s research showed only that it affects beliefs, and some scholars challenged even that (Doob & MacDonald, 1979). Critics pointed out further that the evidence that television affects attitudes is based on survey research, which has limitations of its own (DeFleur & Rokeach, 1989).

Attempts to extend cultivation theory from beliefs to the commission of violence ignited the most controversy. Were people who watched more than the usual amount of televised
violence more likely to commit violent acts than people who watched less televised violence? In other words, were people who saw violent acts as normal more likely to commit violent acts? Was the connection between watching television and misperceiving the risk of suffering violence correlational or causal?

The strongest criticism of the theory came from television network executives, who were sensitive to the issue, since Congress had been investigating the effect of televised violence on children. The executives were at pains to deny a causal connection (Wurtzel & Lometti, 1987). They challenged Gerbner’s definition of violence and how to measure it, the arbitrary nature of some aspects, the brevity of the sampling period (one week of prime-time programs), the complexity of the formula used to calculate the exposure to televised violence, and a lack of sensitivity to contextual factors such as comedy, natural disasters such as hurricanes, and the use of violence as a teaching tool (Wurtzel & Lometti, 1987; Blank, 1977). Pearl (1987) was bolder: “Most of the researchers look at the totality of evidence and conclude, as did the surgeon general’s advisory committee, that the convergence of findings supports the conclusion of a causal relationship between television violence and later aggressive behavior” (pp. 107-108).

Gerbner and his team responded with detailed rebuttals. Here’s how they expressed the relationships that they found: “Measures of content should not presume effects. Rather, content measures facilitate the effective investigation of effects” (Gerbner, Gross, Jackson-Beeck, Jeffries-Fox, & Signorielli, 1977, summer, p. 298). Cultivation analysis – the third component of the Violence Profile – demonstrated that televised violence did indeed have an effect, namely that heavy television watchers saw the world differently from less frequent viewers (p. 155). However, Gerbner also conceded that the public “often jumps to unwarranted conclusions. One such conclusion is that the major or only ‘meaningful’ effect of exposure to television violence is
the instigation of aggression” (p. 299). Still, he said, “there appears to be a justifiable fear that viewing televised violence will make people, children in particular, somewhat more likely to commit acts of violence themselves” (Gerbner, Gross, Signorielli, Morgan & Jackson-Beeck, 1979, p. 178).

Kunkel et al. (2004) said the influence of televised violence “reaches far beyond the issues Gerbner examined” (p. 285). Indeed, they said, “the research literature assessing the effects of television violence on attitudes and behaviors provides a compelling case that such depictions contribute to many antisocial impacts … These include, among others, increased acceptance of violence as an appropriate means of conflict resolution … desensitization to the harms experienced by victims of violence … and an increased likelihood of subsequent aggressive behavior” (p. 285). Pearl (1987) said his review of the literature led him to conclude that the sheer amount of television viewing, regardless of when and what they watched, was the best predictor of aggression (p. 108). Gerber’s research had focused on drama programs aired during “prime time” (early evening) when children were more likely to be watching.

Cultivation theory clearly indicates a relationship between media and the audiences — wherein violence in the media affects audiences’ perceptions and behavior. However, the theory is insufficient to offer a comprehensive template for this study. For instance, the theory is heavily focused on television viewing, while this study uses newspapers as its media of analysis. Second, cultivation theory largely examines violence in a communal and cultural context. However, violence measured in this study is primarily political in nature. Although cultivation theory demonstrates the impact violence in the media have on audiences, it does not take into account the possible affects audiences or public (e.g. viewership rating) have on the television content produced.
Reciprocal Effects: Agenda-Setting

One theory that better explains the mass media and public relationship is agenda-setting. McCombs and Shaw (1972) justify research into agenda-setting as a better approach to understanding media effects. Numerous studies in agenda-setting have showcased the significant capacity of media to set the public-agenda.

Newspapers were selected as the media for analysis for one main reason: their agenda-setting capacity. Despite increased media diversity, newspapers continue to be primary agenda-setters for both the public and for other media outlets (McCombs, 2012) — especially on issues such as national security and foreign affairs (Du, 2012). Specifically, studies also indicate newspapers as public and inter-media agenda-setters both in Israel (Sheafer & Weimann, 2005) and in Palestine (Nossek & Rinnawi, 2003). One reason, perhaps, that newspapers retain a substantial agenda-setting power is because newspaper reporters and editors have access to higher-level governmental, defense and bureaucratic sources — especially when compared to access for website or blog writers. Further, in the Middle East, especially in the West Bank and Gaza, newspapers have greater reach and penetration and circulate more broadly among opinion leaders, the educated elite and ordinary citizens. Therefore, newspapers retain a greater capacity to set the public agenda. Therefore, newspapers were selected as an appropriate media for analysis in this study.

Haaretz and Jerusalem Post and Al-Quds are agenda-setters both within their communities and, because they publish editions in English, within the international press covering the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Slater (2007) called Haaretz the “Israeli equivalent of the New York Times” (p. 86). Haaretz and the Times were the “most influential daily newspapers” in their countries. The
Times, Slater said, does not merely report the news; it also defines what is news and how it is likely to be understood. Slater cited the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as an example of Haaretz’s power to set not just the agenda but also the fact: “Had this solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not been repeatedly advocated by the Israeli left, particularly in the pages of Israel’s most prestigious newspaper [Haaretz], this evolution would likely not have occurred” (p. 87-88).

Frenkel (1993) ascribed similar influence to Jerusalem Post. Frenkel described the relationship between the press – especially the Post -- and the political system in Israel. Extended examples described the role of the newspaper in support of and opposition to various governments and political parties since 1932. Al-Quds’ influence is documented most clearly in polls taken by the Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre (JMCC, 2011), a Palestinian-oriented resource for news and information about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Palestinian politics. The center asked about newspapers most recently in Poll No. 65 in 2008, when 56.3% of respondents said they read a newspaper at least once a week. Of those, 67% said they read Al-Quds. Al-Ayyam came in second at 17.1%. No other newspaper scored in double digits. Poll No. 61 in 2007 asked of newspaper readers, “Which newspaper do you trust its news the most?” The question was open-ended – i.e., no names were provided – and 52.7% cited Al-Quds, 19.8% cited Al-Ayyam and no other newspaper scored in double digits. Similar results were obtained in nine previous polls that checked on newspaper readership and preferences. It was clear that Al-Quds was pre-eminent in the Palestinian community. The polls were consistently based on 1,200 residents over the age of 18 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They were interviewed face-to-face in randomly selected homes. The subjects inside each home were also selected randomly according to Kish tables, a method of selecting members of a household to be interviewed. The margin of error was 3% at the 95% confidence level (Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, 2011).
Also, while the evidence is not always empathetic, agenda-setting framework has also documented several instances when public mood or sentiment can potentially set the media’s agenda. In other words, agenda-setting theory indicates that effects between media’s agenda and public’s agenda are reciprocal. Also, the uses of newspapers to assess the public mood are well-supported in the agenda-setting literature.

For instance, Fan and McAvoy (1989) used content analysis of Associated Press stories to predict the results of polls about a wide range of issues, such as whether U.S. troops should be sent to Lebanon (1983-1984), whether inflation was more important than unemployment (1977-1980), if the economic climate was improving (1981-1984), and the preferred candidate in the Democratic primary (1983-1984). “Therefore,” Fan and McAvoy concluded, “AP stories were considered a reasonable representative of the bulk of the mass media” (p. 161).

Palestinian Media Watch (Marcus, 2000) argued that local Arab media created a climate that contributed to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada—i.e., news media set public agenda for violence. Further support for the expectation that audiences do, in fact, influence what and how journalists report the news comes from a classic study by De sola Pool and Shulman (1959). They asked student reporters to image a receptive audience and a hostile audience. The stories the journalists wrote came out significantly different—i.e., public mood set the agenda for media practitioners. Riffe, Lacy, & Fico (2005) examined the general question whether text that is produced is an antecedent, mediator or a consequence to contextual variables. They concluded that: “the content is itself the consequence of a variety of other antecedent conditions or processes that may have led to or shaped its construction” (p. 10). As an example, they cited suicide notes. The people who were successful are obviously dead, but their notes can be searched for clues about what led them to commit the act and thus, by implication, the notes can
help therapists identify similar inclinations in living people so they can get timely help. While some literature prioritizes media agendas and a few other studies give greater significance to public agendas, most other studies actually confirm the reciprocal relationship between the two.

McCombs and Shaw (1972) found that the relationship is correlational -- not causal. The study asserted that readers could recognize the priorities set by the news media, internalize them, and act on them -- such as by voting. They found a strong correlation between the media and the public agendas, which supported the hypothesis that the public identifies with the issues that the media present as important. Lang and Lang (1983) also assumed a reciprocal agenda-building relationship among the public, the media, and public officials. They showed that each group influenced the others and, in turn, were influenced by them. Johnson and Wanta (1996) got a similar result using path analysis to examine the relationship among the public, the media, and the Nixon administration on the issue of drug abuse. The sequence went like this: Real-world events set the agenda-building process in motion, then the media increased coverage, and finally the president reacted to the public’s concern. A comparable sequence among Palestinians might be a perception of abuse by Israelis prompting incendiary sermons by imams, inciting riots, which then would be covered by the media. Influence is not necessarily a matter of either/or.

Equally plausible is both/and -- i.e., that the media and the public influence each other. Therefore, the language used in independent newspapers of general circulation can be reasonable gauges of the mood of the public—whether it is hostile or pacific or optimistic or pessimistic. Whether articles in the newspaper caused the intifada or were caused by the intifada is beyond the scope of this investigation. It is sufficient to demonstrate that the level of the rhetoric shapes the level of the violence or the level of violence shapes the level of rhetoric. Kellert (1985), among many
others, has also rightly argued that newspaper articles “can be relatively good indicators of generally held views and interests” (p. 20).

**Shaping Public Opinion: Framing**

While agenda-setting suggests that media have the ability to tell the public *what to think about*, Framing, a theory brought into the realm of mass communication studies by Entman (1991), essentially strengthens the arguments in favor of strong media effects by highlighting media’s capacity to construct frames for the public to build opinions of *what and how to think*.

Framing, according to Entman (2004), denotes “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (p.417). Further, the frame can be distinguished from the rest of the news by its ability to trigger support for or opposition to different sides of the political discourse. According to Entman (1991), the essence of issue framing from the media is sizing, or in other words:

- magnifying or shrinking elements of the depicted reality to make them more or less salient. The frame of a news portrait can be enlarged so that media reports may penetrate the consciousness of a mass public that is minimally aware of most specific issues and events. Or the frame can be shrunk to miniaturize an event, diminishing the amount, prominence and duration of the coverage (p. 8).

As Hamilton (2007) maintains, news frames have the ability to shape the way audiences interpret and construct meaning about an issue. News frames affect the perceived legitimacy of issues, individuals and particular groups and thus influence the outcome of public debates. Thus two important characteristics of media framing, in the context of political violence, are to define and characterize violence and assign responsibility to individuals and groups that are cause-and-
effect to violence. Framing studies have positioned media text both as a dependent and
independent variable — i.e., news frames are affected by antecedents including public agendas
and viewer ratings and news frames also can act as predictors influencing audiences and public
agendas (Dell’Orto, Dong, Moore & Schneeweis, 2004; Scheufele, 2000; Tewskbury and
Scheufele, 2009).

For instance, Reiner (1997) found two effects of media framing: the amplification of
crime and violent behavior and the creation of anxiety and fear of crime. In a study of media
effects on panic, Young (1971) showed that framing of violence can allow for audiences to
develop stereotypes or memory frames and thus allow for the construction of violence based on
news frames rather than on actual crimes. DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach (1989) approached the
connections from the perspective of cultural norms. They argued that news frames affect
behavior indirectly by defining cultural norms. In other words, a steady flow of articles about
violence, terrorism, oppression, fear, retaliation and revenge make them acceptable, even
glamorous, and serve as guides to behavioral norms.

**Integrating Theories and Explanations**

Numerous studies have focused on the connection between media rhetoric and violence
in the Middle East, making use of the templates of speech-act theory, cultivation theory, agenda-
setting and framing to support their observations and outcomes. Smith (2008) analyzed
statements by Hamas and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in July 2000 for affiliation
motive imagery, and concluded that “Approximately two months after these statements were
made, the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount set off”
demonstrations that eventually led to terrorism on the part of Hamas because fearful people were
more easily manipulated, they might be persuaded to act violently (Signorielli, 1990) — i.e., the
findings in the context of the conflict confirm assertions of the speech-act theory which considers violent rhetoric as symptomatic of violent actions. Further, Leets and Bowers (1999) quote U.S. President Bill Clinton, who said that loud and angry voices, by their very words, leave the impression that violence is acceptable — an argument that is part of speech-act theory. While this study does not claim that words or rhetoric alone can cause outcomes, it does accept the assumption that words — inflammatory or conciliatory — are precursors and potential forecasters of actions that follow.

The Israeli agency Palestinian Media Watch charged that Palestinian media fed the rising passions with “unprecedented levels” of violence and hate (Marcus, 2000, September 11). Marcus found support for his explanation in the work of researchers such as Cantril, Gaudet and Hertzog (1940). Like other theorists in the first half of the 20th century, they accepted the “powerful media” theory and credited the mass media, especially broadcast, with the ability to captivate, to mesmerize, and even to incite a collective response — i.e., the power to set the agenda.

Rival hypotheses abound. The Mitchell Report (Mitchell, 2001) concluded that Sharon’s visit on September 28 did not cause the intifada but said the visit was “poorly timed” and “provocative.” It was what Dearing and Rogers (1996) called a “trigger event” (p. 91). Trigger events, they said, were “more important than real-world indicators in putting an issue on the agenda. … but real-world indicators are usually dry statistics … unless they are illustrated by a tragic event or a personal tragedy” (p. 91). Violence erupted the day after the Sharon visit, and the intifada was on.

On the other hand, the suicide bombing -- a direct provocation -- was not followed by further violence, despite the deaths of five young Israelis and the wounding of 50 more (Singer,
Benn, Harel and Regular, 2005, February 27, p. 1). The main Palestinian militant organizations disclaimed responsibility and the Israelis declined to retaliate. Both responses were unique in Israeli-Palestinian relations, and the suicide bombing ultimately was attributed to a rogue cell of Palestinian militants who were acting independently. One reason for this unprecedented restraint was Israeli’s plan to withdraw unilaterally its military and civilian outposts from the Gaza Strip. Both sides wanted the transfer of authority to proceed and were determined not to let an event even as provocative as a suicide bombing stand in the way. Another reason was an Israeli agreement to release Palestinians from Israeli jails. The Palestinian Authority did not want to give the Israelis a reason to terminate the release program.

More pertinently, Elmasry, Shamy, Manning, Mills and Auter (2013), within the context of framing, compared Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya coverage of Israel-Palestine relations during periods with a high rate of violence in 2008/2009 and a year later, during a period of calm. Findings from the study indicate that both Arabic television networks used framing techniques to make Palestinian perspectives salient over Israeli. Further, the networks regularly described Palestinian casualties and showed images of Palestinian grief, provided more voice to Palestinian sources, and personalized Palestinian deaths—thus constructed Palestinians as victims of Israeli aggression. These frames performed the function of public opinion shapers and were also shaped by popular public sentiments in Gaza and the West Bank.

**Threat Index**

Thomas L. Friedman, who writes for the New York Times, has won three Pulitzer Prizes. In 2005, he was elected to the Pulitzer Prize board. He has been the Times bureau chief in both Beirut and Jerusalem. His first Pulitzer was for international reporting from Lebanon. His second was for international reporting from Israel. The third was for commentary. Few reporters know
their beats as well as Friedman knew his. When he gives advice, readers of the Times pay
attention. Friedman exerted his influence in an OpEd column in the issue of July 26, 2000,
admonishing both Israelis and Palestinians to get on with negotiations. “Guys,” he said, “here’s
some free advice: The days of the intifada are over.”

The second (al-Aqsa) intifada began two months later. Free advice, even from an
observer as expert as Friedman, often is worth every penny it cost. The point is that leaders
needed a more precise instrument to monitor the mood of the public and head off trouble, or at
least to avoid inflaming the situation.

Most Israeli and Palestinian political leaders were no more prescient. As Ross (2004) tells
the story, negotiators for both sides were meeting in Washington, D.C., at the end of September
when Sharon announced that he would visit the Temple Mount on September 28. The day
before, Arafat asked Erekat to ask Ross to urge Sharon to limit or to postpone the visit. Ross
asked Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israeli minister of internal security and one of the negotiators, to pass
along the request to Sharon. Ben-Ami declined because he said Israeli intelligence assessed that
there was no great risk of violence. Shortly afterward, Ross overheard Ben-Ami on the phone
approving Sharon’s visit, asking only that Sharon not be allowed to enter the mosques. The next
day, the 28th, none of the negotiators mentioned the visit, although it had been completed before
their meeting began that day. “On the 28th,” Ross said, “when Sharon went to the Haram,
everything was quiet [among the negotiators].” Little did they know that the next day, “all hell
was to break loose” (p. 728-729).

Had they understood how volatile the situation was, they might have prevented the
Sharon provocation. Whether the second intifada could have been avoided if Sharon had stayed
away has been hotly debated -- several theories have been advanced as to the intifada’s cause and its trigger – but at least the theory that Sharon was to blame could have been ruled out.

The point is that the political leaders needed a quantifiable tool to help them assess the risk of an impending conflagration. One such tool might be an index that could pull together available data into a convenient value that could be used to assess changes in the public mood, helping to avoid or to limit a second intifada or to avoid over-reacting to a provocation such as a suicide bombing.

Indexes that track trends are ubiquitous. There is an index to measure almost everything quantifiably, including consumer prices, wages, weather, the stock market, interest rates, consumer confidence, inflation and even body mass (an individual’s weight divided by the square of the height). Indexes are useful because they combine measures of related aspects of complex phenomena. They serve as benchmarks against which individual values can be compared to provide a quick, convenient answer to the question “Compared to what?” Is a certain value unusually high? Especially low? Within a normal range? Should I worry? How much should I worry? An index will provide answers at a glance. “The usefulness of an index lies in its ability to reduce a large amount of data to a simple number that can be used to make cross-sectional and trend comparisons” (Signorielli, Gerbner & Morgan, 1995, p. 281).

The War and Peace Index by Tel Aviv University is an example of a conflict-relevant index that has been developed to gauge the public mood in Israel. It has been produced since 1994 by Tamar Hermann and Ephraim Yaar under the auspices of the university’s Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution. The index is based on a monthly telephone survey of 600 adult Israelis, including Arab citizens and Jewish settlers residing outside the Green Line (Peace Index, 2011, July 10).
The index shown in Figure 2 is composed of scores on two questions that have been asked consistently: 1. What is your position on holding peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority? 2. Do you believe or not believe that negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority will lead to peace between Israel and the Palestinians in the coming years?

Replies are aggregated on a scale of 100 to zero. Higher scores indicate support for negotiation and belief in its potential. The peak score was 65.7 in November 1994, presumably influenced by the prospect that the Oslo Accords would lead to an agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. The trough, 36, came in July 2005 as the suicide attacks of the second intifada soured the public mood.

The poll has a sampling error of 4.5%. Figure 2 shows the amount of volatility since 2000. Gaps indicate months in which the poll was not conducted.

**Figure 2.** War and Peace Index Shows Cyclical Pattern

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*Figure 2.* Optimism and pessimism about negotiations was about evenly split.

Although the War and Peace Index provides a useful barometer of the mood in Israel, it does not include Palestinians. Scoring of the answers, especially to Question 1, is not obvious. Finally, the questions do not provide a direct link to a propensity for violence. A respondent could favor both violence and negotiations. A scale of some kind would be helpful to gauge the strength of the opinions.
Pearce and Littlejohn (1997) did not set out to construct an index to track the level of the violence threat. They were more interested in understanding the sources of moral conflict so it could be managed in a way that would allow free expression while at the same time avoiding open, violent clashes. Their method included an examination of the rhetoric used by disputants in two venues: when they addressed groups that agreed with them and when they addressed the other side or third parties. The present study borrows their idea and compares rhetoric used by those who would indulge violence and those who conciliate. “Communication,” they said, “is not one aspect of conflict. We see it as the essence of all forms of conflict” (p. x). “The question of when frustration spills over from diatribe to violence is complicated, and we do not presume to be able to predict when violence will result” (p. 118). Nor does the present study, but it is intended to attempt to provide a way to measure the risk and interpret the public’s acceptance of violence or yearning for calm.

The idea of studying rhetoric to forecast the social weather goes back to Tenney (1912), who realized that “What is needed is the continuous analysis of a large number of journals” that could provide clues to changes in social conditions (Tenney, 1912).

A metric that is more relevant to the present study is the media’s Violence Index, developed by a team of George Gerbner, Larry Gross and others between 1967 and 1993 (Signorielli, Gerbner & Morgan, 1995, p. 282). They developed what has come to be known as cultivation theory. The Violence Index is composed of three sets of data: the prevalence, rate, and role of violence (Pearl, 1987, p. 114). Prevalence is the percentage of programs in a particular sample that contain violence. Rate is the frequency of violent acts. Role is how the perpetrators and the victims are portrayed – e.g., as heroes or villains, as men or women. The

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5 The Violence Index is part of a larger project called the Violence Profile. Its other part is the Risk Ratio.
researchers count the number of violent incidents, the proportion of leading characters engaged in violence, the proportion of programs during the survey period that contain violence, the rate of violence per program and per hour, and the proportion of all leading characters involved in killings.

Specifically, the formula is $VI = (%P) + 2(R/P) + 2(R/H) + %V + %K$. Gerbner, Gross, Jackson-Beeck, Jeffries-Fox and Signorielli (1977) make this more detailed explanation of their formula: “The Violence Index is composed of (1) the percent of programs containing any violence, plus (2) the rate of violent episodes per program, plus (3) the rate of violent episodes per hour, plus (4) the percent of major characters involved in any violence, plus (5) the percent of major characters involved in any killing. … The only ‘weighting’ is that we double two rates (2 and 3) in order to raise the low numerical values of these ratios …” [emphasis original]. The unit of analysis was the violent incident involving a perpetrator, an act and a target. Gerbner (1987, p. 153) computed a Violence Index of 203.6 for 1967, which he said was the highest on record to date.

However, as useful as cultivation theory was in understanding enculturation (how our viewpoints are shaped by mass media), it has limitations for the present study. Violence risk assessment is concentrated on television; the present study analyzes rhetoric in the newspapers. Gerbner and associates validated their process through surveys; the present study relies on historical outcomes to support its findings.

Gerbner and associates met with mixed success in connecting violence on television with beliefs and less success in connecting exaggerated opinions about violence in the world with violent acts. Gerbner did not attempt to show that the people they surveyed committed more violent acts than the general populace. The present study, on the other hand, does seek
correlation between harsh language in newspapers and harsh acts. Newspapers are a suitable medium for study because of their reach, readership and coverage. They have adopted the name intifada for the violence that began with Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount because the word means uprising – in other words, originating with the general populace in a bottom-up flow of reaction.

Perhaps most important, the violence from which the Gerbner team constructed its index was built on dramatic narratives; at some level, the viewers who were surveyed were aware that the events they were watching on their television set were fictional. Even if they thought what they were watching was real, at least it wasn’t happening to them. Not so with Palestinians and Israelis. The suicide bombings, the clashes between police and demonstrators, the casualties, even the weapons – if only stones – were all too real, and the events were happening to them, by them, or to people they knew. While the literature in media and political studies indicate several threat index scales, none of them appear suitable for this study. Therefore, the study will develop its own threat index or likelihood of violence measure in the next chapter.

**Hypotheses and Research Question**

The initial research question explores whether the two Israeli newspapers, Haaretz and Jerusalem Post, can be studied in tandem or whether their rhetoric differs so much that they must be studied separately. To answer that question, the two newspapers were compared according to two criteria (their use of inflammatory and their use of conciliatory rhetoric) and over two time periods (during the week before and after September 28, 2000, and during the week before and the week after February 24, 2005) when reporting and commenting on issues affecting Arab-Israeli relations. The answer also provides clues to the degree of unity within Israeli public opinion.
RQ: In the four weeks of publications, does the proportion of inflammatory words in Haaretz differ significantly from the proportion of inflammatory words in Jerusalem Post?

Based on the above literature review, the following five hypotheses are proposed:

H1: The proportion of inflammatory words for the week before Sharon’s visit in 2000 will be higher for Al-Quds than for either Haaretz or the Jerusalem Post.

H2: The proportion of inflammatory words in all three newspapers will be higher for the week after Sharon’s visit than for the week before.

H3: The proportion of inflammatory words for the week prior to the Tel Aviv suicide bombing in 2005 will be higher for Al-Quds than for Haaretz or the Jerusalem Post.

H4: The proportion of inflammatory words in all three newspapers will be higher for the week after the suicide bombing than for the week before the attack.

The central argument of this study is that conflict discourses in the mass media such as newspapers not only influence the mood on the street but also reflect it. A close reading of the local mass media (three newspapers, in this study) can help leaders anticipate the outbreak of violence so they can take steps to halt or at least to moderate hostilities. Similarly, conciliatory words in a newspaper can potentially signal relative calm on the ground. The basic equation is inflammatory language minus conciliatory language equals net inflammatory, also referred to as the Threat Index. Thus, the theoretical argument is that the Threat Index can potentially signal the outbreak of violence -- or of peace.

Statistical support for this viewpoint is sought in the comparison of language in the weeks surrounding two provocative events: Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000 and a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in February 2005. The Sharon event was followed by the second intifada, that lasted for years and resulted in the death or wounding of thousands of
Palestinians and Israelis. To re-emphasize, the term *intifada*, meaning *uprising*, implies that the violence originated from the Palestinian street. On the other hand, the suicide bombing was followed by several weeks of relative calm and restraint on both sides. Thus in compliance with the central theoretical argument of this study, it was hypothesized that in all three newspapers, the rhetorical threat will be higher for the two weeks on either side of Sharon’s 2000 visit than for the two weeks on either side of the Tel Aviv bombing in 2005:

H5: In all three newspapers – Haaretz, Jerusalem Post and Al-Quds – the Threat Index from the week before and after September 28, 2000, will be higher than the Threat Index from the week before and the week after February 25, 2005.

**Summary**

This chapter has examined the theories that address the relationship between violent rhetoric and violent action – namely speech-act, cultivation, agenda-setting and framing. A review was conducted to identify a potential Threat Index that can be adopted for the study. The study will develop its own index in the next chapter. Finally, five hypotheses were proposed to test the relationship between inflammatory and conciliatory rhetoric in the newspapers and how they interact with two major provocations: Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount and the suicide bombing of a Tel Aviv nightclub. The next chapter identifies content analysis as a central method for this study and explains the reliability and validity tests that were conducted. This blueprint will be applied to investigate the study’s hypotheses.
CHAPTER 3
METHOD

This chapter offers a methodological road map for the study. A justification is provided for the use of quantitative content analysis as a central method for the study. Reasoning also is offered for the choice of media for the analysis. The composition of the data corpus is explained, constructs are operationally defined, and coding practices are described. Procedures for intercoder reliability and convergent validity are also explained.

The central method used for the study was quantitative content analysis. It concerns the “frequency of occurrence of given content characteristics” — i.e., “the number of times one or more content characteristics occur is regarded as relevant for purposes of inference” (George, 1959; p. 144). In fact, “making specific inferences from text to their contexts is now the defining feature of content analysis” (Krippendorff & Bock, 2009, p. 3). Neuendorf (2002) defines content analysis more broadly as a:

summarizing, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the scientific method (including attention to objectivity-intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, replicability, and hypothesis testing) and is not limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are created or presented (p.10).

Critics of quantitative content analysis have argued that the method puts too much emphasis on comparative frequencies, fails to capture contextual meanings, is not applicable to manifest causal effects, and puts precision ahead of problem significance (Riffe, Lacy & Fico, 2005). Despite a few warranted and other largely unwarranted criticisms, content analysis has
become a formidable tool for researchers in the fields of communication and media studies. For instance, Riffe and Freitag (1997) in their analysis of 25 years (1971-1995) of articles published in *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* found that nearly 500 articles had used content analysis as a central methodology. They also found a statistically significant increase in use of the method from one year to another. Thus, clearly, the method has become a norm in communication studies, and also for research projects for theses, dissertations and journals. Improved warehousing, archiving and access to media content also have been attributed as important reasons for increased use of the method (Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken, 2002).

However, there are a number of other reasons why this study has identified quantitative content analysis as a central method for investigation. First, its nonreactive and nonintrusive measurement technique has allowed this project to make inferences without having to labor for interviews from transmitters or receivers of content. Second, this study is interested in examining archival texts — i.e., while content remains significant for its importance in history, the lifecycle of its production and consumption has expired. In such circumstances, content analysis is an applicable method since text has the capacity to outlive its producers and consumers. Third, the method allowed for the distillation of large amounts of information into quantifiable, measurable and interpretable observations. Finally, this study used quantitative content analysis as a primary method of analysis because of the method’s unreserved compliance with the study’s theoretical framework (e.g. concepts of news framing) and direct capability to answer proposed hypotheses (i.e., diagnosis of news frames that are interrupted and influenced by historical events).

Support for the present study’s narrow focus on the rhetoric of terrorism and conciliation can be found in standard textbooks (e.g., Weber, 1990). Some investigators have constructed an impressive list of dictionaries, whereas “others have constructed a set of content categories on
the basis of a single concept,” said Weber (1990, p. 24), citing McClelland (1965) and Stone, Dunphy, Smith, and Ogilvie (1966). “This approach offers several advantages. It permits the intensive and detailed analysis of a single theoretical construction. It also provides an explicit rationale not only for what is retained, but also for what is excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, single-concept coding schemes often have high validity and reliability” (p. 24).

The Three Newspapers

The data universe for the study consists of news, features, and opinion articles related to the Israel-Palestinian conflict from three major newspapers from the region. Newspapers were selected as the media for analysis for their agenda-setting capacity. On a more practical level, archives and back issues of newspapers are more easily retrievable than content from other forms of media, especially outside the United States. Specifically, the Palestinian newspaper Al-Quds was selected from the West Bank and Gaza and the Jerusalem Post and Haaretz were selected to represent a wide range of voices, views and opinions in Israel.

Jerusalem Post and Haaretz are at opposite ends of the Israeli political spectrum – Jerusalem Post at the right and Haaretz at the left. “Right” in the context of Israeli politics means that it is nationalistic and disinclined to compromise with the Palestinians. “Left” means that it is secular and more inclined to compromise with the Palestinians (Tal, 1995).

Jerusalem Post was selected for this study because it is the only Israeli daily newspaper published exclusively in English. The British Broadcasting Corporation said Jerusalem Post takes a “tougher line” on security and the Palestinian territories (The Press in Israel, 2006). Tal (1995) put its circulation at 15,000 daily and 40,000 on the weekend, but added, “Its influence exceeds its numbers since it is read by the diplomatic community in Israel and [by] all foreign journalists posted here.” An international edition circulates 40,000 more copies, mainly to Jewish

Haaretz was selected because it is the only Israeli daily newspaper that provides an official English translation of what was published originally in Hebrew. The headline for a story in the Nation (Glain, 2007) described Haaretz as “Israel’s liberal beacon.” The story identified Haaretz as “pro-peace” and said Haaretz was opposed to the occupation of the West Bank and what it called the “incarceration” of Gaza, to discrimination against Israel’s Arabs, and to the 2006 Lebanon war. Zertal (2005) added “pluralistic” to the description for Haaretz (p. 218). The British Broadcasting Corporation described Haaretz as moderate on security and foreign policy issues (The Press in Israel, 2006). A profile in the New Yorker magazine described Haaretz as “easily the most liberal newspaper in Israel” (Remnick, 2011, p. 46). The Web site of the Jewish

\(^6\) Obtaining accurate circulation statistics for print media in Israel is difficult, especially for the periods of this study (in 2000 and 2005). Unlike advertisers in the United States, advertisers in Israel do not insist that newspapers use independent, third-party agencies to audit their circulations. Consequently, claims and estimates vary widely, and it is unclear whether they mean copies printed, copies sold (newsstand or subscription) or pass-along readers. The Advertisers Association of Israel has proposed that publishers of large newspapers allow an independent auditor to verify circulation figures, but “the feeling in the industry is that Maariv and Yedioth Ahronoth [Israel’s largest newspapers] will not agree to let an outsider examine their circulation records, fearing that they will lose revenues” (Tsoref, 2007). Talma Biro, general manager of the advertiser association, confirmed Tsoref’s supposition. “Globes, Calcalist and Yedioth Ahronoth wouldn’t join the auditing so that there is no point in continuing with the matter,” Biro said (personal communication, November 27, 2011).
Virtual Library put its circulation at 50,000 on weekdays and 60,000 on weekends (Tal, 1995) – a far cry from Israel’s largest newspaper, Yediot Aharonot, which was said to circulate 400,000 copies on weekdays and 750,000 on Friday, which is the weekend edition in Israel (Torstrick, 2004, p. 71). Torstrick said Haaretz was more influential than its circulation numbers would suggest because “it is read by the Israeli intelligentsia -- equivalent to the New York Times in the United States (p. 71). Also like the New York Times, it considered itself the newspaper of record for Israel (Tal, 1995). Tal said Haaretz typically took an opposition point of view. Tal quoted Menachem Begin as saying, only partly in jest, “The last government that Haaretz supported was the British mandate.”

Haaretz, the Web site said, took a traditional approach, eschewing sensationalism and printing a significant volume of foreign news. The prize of the newspaper was said to be its op-ed page, which was followed by the decision-makers of Israel. Only Haaretz and Yediot Aharonot were free of party dependence, according to the Jewish Virtual Library (Tal, 1995). Gentile (2010) put the circulation at 65,000 to 75,000 — but did not specify weekdays or weekends. Gentile said Haaretz was distinguished by in-depth reporting and commentary on business and politics. Haaretz itself claimed 65,000 paid subscriptions in 2007 and said it sold 72,000 copies daily and “close to” 100,000 copies on weekends (Haaretz Service, 2007). Glain (2007) said “65,000 Israelis take the paper in Hebrew and 15,000 or so read the English edition.”

Al-Quds was selected for this study because it is the only independent daily newspaper published in the West Bank or Gaza. It also is the largest and most respected of the three daily newspapers published in Arabic for Palestinians in the territories. The British Broadcasting Corporation in 2006 estimated its circulation at 20,000 (Palestinian Press, 2006). “Without

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Remnick (2011) attributed the quip to Golda Meir (p. 46). Both Begin and Meir were prime ministers of Israel.
strong official connections, it has traditionally been the most cautious” of the Palestinian dailies, said the BBC. “Although Al-Quds supports a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it did not voice strong opposition to Hamas before the January 2006 elections. … It is the only daily subject to Israeli censorship, owing to its location in East Jerusalem.” A higher circulation figure was cited by Nibal Thawabteh, director of the Media Development Center, Birzeit (West Bank) University: “According to its publishers, about 50,000 copies of Al Quds were distributed, but people who were familiar with the claims of Palestinian journalism questioned this claim, saying that the level of distribution did not exceed 30,000 copies” (Thawabteh, 2010, p. 74).

Unlike other Palestinian newspapers, Al-Quds is obviously hostile to the Israeli occupation, she said.

Al-Quds is clearly the pre-eminent newspaper in the Palestinian community, according to polls by the Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre (JMCC, 2011), a Palestinian-oriented resource for news and information about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Palestinian politics. Palestinians consistently ranked it as their best read and most trusted newspaper. The significance of this finding was that very few Palestinians read Israeli newspapers. They got their news, culture and opinion from numerous sources, of course, but it was clear that locally produced Arabic newspapers dominated print media and Al-Quds was the favorite.

**The Four Weeks**

This study focuses on two provocative events: Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem on September 28, 2000, and the suicide bombing of the Stage Club, a Tel Aviv nightclub, on the evening of February 25, 2005. In the first case, Sharon and his entourage were the provocateurs and the Palestinians saw themselves as victims and as defenders of the Muslim faith. Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount was followed by the second Intifada, called the Al-
Aqsa intifada because Sharon was believed to have desecrated the Al-Aqsa mosque by his presence on the plaza between it and the Dome of the Rock – the shrine on the opposite end of the plaza. Sharon’s visit incited one of the bloodiest outbreaks of violence in the conflict’s recent history.

The events of February 25, 2005, presented a reverse scenario. The suicide bombing killed five nightclub patrons and injured more than 50. In that case, Palestinians were instigators and Israelis were the victims. A fringe Palestinian terrorist group was blamed for the suicide bombing, which was condemned by Palestinian officials and terrorist organizations such as Islamic Jihad. Despite the provocation, Israel accepted the disclaimers and exercised unusual – some would say unprecedented – restraint. An atmosphere of relative calm prevailed.

The primary purpose of this study is to understand the role of rhetoric in the media when the media text positions itself as a precedent and/or as an antecedent to acts of violence — i.e., to understand if and how media rhetoric can potentially become precursors or predictors of acts of violence, and on the other hand, how acts of violence can influence and shape rhetoric in the media. Thus, this study has quantified the rhetoric in the three newspapers for: (1) the week before and the week after the Sharon visit to the Temple Mount (September 21 to October 5, 2000) and (2) the week before and the week after the Tel Aviv nightclub suicide bombing (February 18 to March 4, 2005).

**Operational Definitions**

Another goal of this study is to create a terrorism threat index that measures residual inflammatory words and conciliatory words that were published in the three newspapers. The unit of analysis is the word and the context unit is the article. Thus, the present study builds upon Rogers (2009) to obtain a “net inflammatory” score to assess the likelihood that mass violence
may be imminent. Since threat of violence in the context of past Arab-Israeli relations usually has resulted in violent acts, the net inflammatory score is referred to as a Threat Index. In this case, the Threat Index (TI) or net inflammatory score is the difference between inflammatory words (IW) and conciliatory words (CW) (i.e., TI = IW – CW).

More than one measure often is required to get at a concept (Neuendorf, 2002). “When two or more measures are combined mathematically into a single indicator, that indicator is called a scale or index [emphasis original]. Indexes are routinely used in text content analysis, and most standard and custom dictionaries are, in essence, indexes” (p. 137).

Inflammatory words are defined as those that are likely to increase tensions – i.e., words that are understood as “fighting words.” All words in this category relate to conflict, regardless of whether it manifests itself as a verbal confrontation, or it indicates incitement to violence or signals movement towards violent or armed conflict, damage and death (Baker, Gabrieltos & McEnery, 2012).

Words belonging to this category have predominantly negative meaning (e.g. extremist) and synonymous words for “inflammatory” include: instigative, angering, anarchic, demagogic, exciting, explosive, fiery, incendiary, inciting, inflaming, insurgent, intemperate, provocative, rabble-rousing, rabid, rebellious, revolutionary, riotous, and seditious (Inflammatory, 2013).

Similarly, words likely to ease tensions or indicate conflict resolution are defined as conciliatory. Words that are understood as “conciliatory” include mitigating, pleasing, appeasing, conciliating, conciliatory, disarming, mollifying, pacifying, peacemaking, placating, placatory, propitiatory, endearing, ingratiating, winning, winsome; peaceable, peaceful; nonbelligerent, unaggressive, unassertive; calming, comforting, lulling, quieting, relaxing, soothing, tranquilizing (also tranquillizing); obliging, satisfying; affable, agreeable, amiable, amicable,
benevolent, genial, gentle, good-natured, good-tempered, kind, kindly; passive, submissive, surrendering, yielding (Conciliatory, 2013).

**Coding System**

Poole and Folger (1981) defined a coding system as a “translation device that allows investigators to place utterances into theoretical categories” (p. 477). To be valid, they said, the coding system need not include every important variable at work in the interaction under investigation. However, it does have to code accurately those aspects of interaction that it is designed to code.

Computers brought an over-reaction to the quest for precision, Shapiro (1997) said. Computer dictionaries were supposed, in principle, to derive from theories, with words functioning as flowers that are observed by botanists. It doesn’t work, Shapiro maintained, because no theory of language was adequate to identify all the ways to say something.

Considering General Inquirer, the first major computer program for content analysis, Shapiro found the attempt to eliminate subjective judgments “very incomplete.” The difference between computers and coders, Shapiro said, was not that the former eliminates intuitive judgments of meaning but that “in constructing a dictionary it renders them wholesale.” Shapiro concluded, “The new division of labor between coder and analyst implies the use of concrete, inductive codes rather than abstract, theoretical codes … Working researchers engage in science, not science fiction, and to do such science requires, for the foreseeable future, the use of coders as human instruments” (pp. 234-241).

In a rare display of sarcasm, Shapiro (1997) criticized both what he saw as excessive efforts to turn human coders into what he called “surrogate scientists” and also what he saw as excessive faith in computers to eliminate subjective, intuitive judgments of meaning. “During the
heroic age of content analysis (that is, before computers),” he said, “extensive efforts were made by researchers to control the coder’s judgments, or to convince themselves and their colleagues that they had done so.” Codebooks were supposed to be “so detailed and so specific as to eliminate the influence of human judgment” (pp. 225-238).

Thus, while the present study specified operational definitions and measuring procedures, it also relied on coder judgments. Reliance on human judgment was especially necessary for the Arabic language newspaper, Al-Quds.

Specifically, coding for the present study was accomplished in two stages: The first required coders to read the three newspapers during the period of the study and to select articles that involve Israeli-Palestinian relations. If coders disagreed, the difference was resolved by reference to the dictionaries in Appendix K. If one of the words or phrases in the dictionary appeared in the article, the word or phrase was presumed to be relevant. Details are in Stage 1, Appendix L.

In the second stage, coders examined each word in each of the relevant articles and identified it as inflammatory, conciliatory or other. If it was inflammatory or conciliatory, the word was entered in the appropriate column of the coding sheet. Definitions and examples are in the instructions to coders in Appendix L. When all articles are coded, the percentage of disagreements is calculated and reported. Words still in dispute were retained if they appeared in one of the dictionaries in Appendix K; if a disputed word did not appear, it was deleted. A separate coding sheet was prepared for each article. Words or phrases were entered in the order in which they appeared in the newspaper. Coders were encouraged to propose adding to the dictionary inflammatory or conciliatory words that they found in relevant articles.
Neuendorf (2002) implied that data collection by computer will be recorded differently than by hand. “With computer text content analysis, you still need a codebook of sorts [emphasis added] – a full explanation of your dictionaries and method of applying them” (p. 50). Neuendorf seemed to imply that the construction of a coding scheme meant developing either a set of dictionaries or a codebook, depending on whether text or nontext analysis was contemplated (p. 118). Thus, since literature indicates that hand and computer methods pose differing pitfalls and benefits, this study used both human coders (for primary data collection) and computer-aided coding (for validity tests). Table 3 illustrates a coding sheet to record the frequencies for inflammatory words and conciliatory words.

Table 3
*Extent to Which the 3 Newspapers Use Similar Language to Report Provocations*

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**Dictionaries**

It is characteristic of content analysis that many words of text are distilled into a few categories (Weber, 1990). In the present study, words appearing in three local newspapers are examined for distillation into either of two content categories: inflammatory and conciliatory.
Separate dictionaries were created for each category. Appendix K shows the outcome of this process as applied to the three newspapers studied here during the week after the February 25, 2005, suicide bombing. This study expands the time period and applies it to include a contrasting event, the Sharon visit to the Temple Mount.

Words likely to increase tensions were defined as inflammatory – understood as “fighting words” -- and added to the inflammatory dictionary. Words likely to decrease tension were defined as conciliatory -- understood as “pacific words” -- and added to the conciliatory dictionary. The original dictionaries were created inductively for the pilot study (Witte, 2008) from articles about Israeli-Palestinian relations. The articles were published during the week after the Tel Aviv suicide bombing and confirmed by two coders. It was anticipated that the dictionaries would undergo further development with the addition of articles about the Sharon visit to the Temple Mount.

Creating a dictionary from scratch for a specific purpose was not unusual in the literature. “Off-the-shelf” dictionaries, scholars found, were not suitable for every situation. Some developers of computer programs do not even disclose the contents of their dictionaries. Grabe (1996), for example, found no dictionary suitable for her study of visual bias in elections, so she created her own and acknowledged frankly that it was subjective.

Examples of inflammatory words from the dictionary under development for this study included suicide, bomber, terrorist, martyr, killed, assassination, and any reference to the fence/wall or to the occupied territories/colonies. Some of the words reflected a religious zealotry that might not be relevant to terrorist acts in support of other, more politically motivated revolutions. Examples of conciliatory words included truce, peace, ceasefire, cooperation, negotiations, optimism and trust. Context became involved in negative and reverse constructions.
For example, violence was inflammatory when used as in “All they understand is violence” and conciliatory when used as in “We oppose violence” or “Violence only begets more violence.” A dictionary of words in each category, created initially for a pilot study (Witte, 2006) is reproduced in Appendix K. “By themselves,” Krippendorff (2009) said, “words may have many meanings, but in the context of coherent narratives [such as newspaper articles] they usually are unambiguous” (p. 44).

**Translation Issues**

Because Al-Quds is published only in Arabic, its articles relevant to Israeli-Palestinian relations had to be translated into English. The problems of developing dictionaries in English are multiplied when rules must be written to deal with two languages. Homographs are one of many examples.

Translation for this study was accomplished with what Brislin (1970) called the “friend” method – i.e., bilingual friends are pressed into service to produce English-language versions. Most studies stop that point. However, this study also employed a technique called back translation to assure that the “friend” method did indeed produce English versions that were the functional equivalent of the original Arabic.

Back translation involves translating an article from Arabic to English. A independent translator, with no knowledge of the original article, then translates the article from English back into Arabic. Finally, a third translator, independent of the first two, makes a subjective judgment about whether the two Arabic articles are “functionally equivalent.” For this study, professional translations services were employed to make the final judgment, based on an examination of a random sample of 10% of the relevant articles published by Al-Quds during the four weeks of the study.
The friend method was used because a review of the literature failed to reveal a translation method that was universally accepted. Translation methods in use fall into two broad approaches: a literal, word-for-word translation and an interpretive translation that tries to pay attention to the presumed intent of the author. The hazard of the literal approach is that it might produce a result that is unclear or unintelligible in the target language, whereas the interpretive approach might produce a result that relies too much on the imagination of the translator. English is particularly difficult to translate to another language because of the complexities of its huge vocabulary of homonyms, irony, sarcasm, metaphors, euphemisms, colloquialisms and similar nuances. Translating from another language to English is easier to get right (Darwish, 2010).


If the purpose is to translate questionnaires and tests, validation becomes a major issue. Did the translated instruments truly measure what the authors were trying to measure? Such questions are common topics in journals with exotic titles like Transcultural Psychiatry. Cultural differences pose problems that go beyond dictionary definitions, and literary works pose more difficult problems than scientific works. The point, according to Lopez, Figueroa, Connor and Maliski (2008) was that there are no universal translation standards. Darwish (2010) called it a “misconception” to assume that there is “one ideal translation that everyone must strive to achieve” (p. 50). Darwish also criticized what he called the “myth of objectivity,” which he said was as impossible to achieve in translation as in monolingual news reporting (p. 34).
Nevertheless, Sperber, Devellis, and Boehlecke (1994) said they believed the problems could be reduced to an acceptable minimum.

Brislin (1970) cited four translation techniques, two of which are relevant to newspaper accounts: back translation and what he called a “committee approach” (p. 187). (The other two techniques refer to the construction of tests and questionnaires.) Other authorities proposed alternative methods that included multiple forward translation (two or more translators each translate the item and compare their decisions); review by bilingual judges; and translation by computer program.

Back translation used to be the “gold standard” and still is to some scholars. Will the two Arabic files that resulted from the back translation be identical in a text of more than a couple of sentences? Rarely. Will they be “close enough”? The answer to that question calls for an opinion based on human judgment, which is difficult to quantify and still more difficult to validate scientifically.

Chiriboga, Yee and Jang (2005), among others (e.g., Kurtines & Szapocznik, 1995), said back translation “has long been seen as the gold standard” (p. 361). McArthur (2007) said most international business researchers used back translation to check on the validity of the first translation, but he added: “It is important to remember in using back translation that slavish devotion to the source document because it has been validated elsewhere is a pseudo-etic approach” (p. 32).

Hays, Anderson and Revicki (1993) favored back translation, although with qualifications. “It is well-known,” they said, “that absolute gold-standard measures do not exist” but it is often the case that quasi gold-standard criteria are available” (p. 442). Brislin (1979) left open the question: How good does translation have to be before it is usable? (p. 214).
Surprisingly, none of those techniques has been used frequently. A review of 80 articles involving translations in two major publications (*Journal of Social Psychology* and *Public Opinion Quarterly*) revealed that 61 gave little or no information about their translation methods (Prieto, 1992). Other articles vaguely credited only a bilingual friend (Brislin, 1970). Sperber (2004) said the “friend method” was still the simplest and perhaps the most common method to translate a questionnaire, although he said no method was fail-safe. Actually, the “bilingual friend” isn’t all bad because the friend might have the advantage of expertise in the subject area, Sperber (2004) said. Translators with both professional linguistic credentials and subject-matter expertise can be difficult to find. For example, Sperber (2004) said even expert, experienced translators might be incapable of translating medical material because they lacked a technical vocabulary. The issue is not whether the translation is “correct” – only whether it conveys the same understanding.

Successful use of back-translation was reported by Fink (1963), Warner and Campbell (1970) and Sinaiko (1963). Crystal (2004), on the other hand, criticized back translation. “Traditionally, it has been considered as a way to validate, approve, assure, guarantee, or prove that the translation is accurate, follows the original source text, and reflects their ideas accurately. We believe that back translation provides absolutely nothing syntactically or semantically, about the translation as an effective quality control procedure in translation” (p. 5). He did concede that technical documents seemed to be suitable for back translation because they were less likely to include humor, colloquialisms, ambiguities, cross-cultural issues and the like. He saw no need for back translation if the translation process was thorough and the quality control was good.
Beaton, Bombardier, Guillemin and Ferraz (2000) gave back translation a mixed review when used for a health questionnaire. They described back translation as a validity check that would highlight gross inconsistencies, conceptual errors and lack of clarity. On the other hand, they emphasized that “agreement between the back translation and the original source version does not guarantee a satisfactory forward translation because it could be incorrect; it simply assures a consistent translation” (p. 3188). They also noted that back translation was time consuming and expensive – an observation that this investigator can confirm.

Swaine-Verdier, Doward, Hagell, Thorsen and McKenna (2004), needing to translate a questionnaire, conceded that back translation was commonly believed to be the “gold standard” method of translation and had become a “very widely recommended methodology” (p. S27). Although they said they found no evidence to support that viewpoint, their review of the literature suggested that there was little alternative.

Cha, Kim and Erlen (2007) affirmed that back-translation was generally recommended for instrument validation for cross-cultural research. Asia Market Research Dot Com (2003) suggested a practical justification for using or not using back translation: “Due to its high cost, back translation is not overly common, but in very high risk/high return situations is well worth the investment,” according to the organization’s Web site.

**Machine Translation**

If back translation was declining in favor, interest in machine translation was increasing (Krippendorff, 2004). The former limitation was that most text was available only in hard copy. Converting it to digital format that could be read by a computer program was time-consuming and expensive. “Today … with more and more people interested in this wealth of digital data, there is a corresponding demand for … translation software” (p. 15).
A computer search revealed several programs that claim to be able to do colloquial translations by computer, including Drupal\(^8\), Babylon\(^9\), Across\(^10\), Google\(^11\) and IBM WebSphere\(^12\) Koehn (2005) said he and his colleagues had trained SMT [Statistical Machine Translation] systems for 110 language pairs (p. 79).

The problem with computer translation is that it typically works at the literal, word-for-word level. “Creating a translation machine has long been seen as one of the toughest challenges in artificial intelligence” (Helft, 2010, p. A1). Here is a brief example of back translation by Google involving Arabic and English. The sentence is the shahada – the Muslim testament of faith:

In Arabic, it reads (from right to left):

أشهد أن لا إله إلا الله، وأنشهد أن محمد رسول الله.

In English, Google translated the Arabic as: “I bear witness that there is no god but Allah; and I bear witness that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah,” which is precisely correct.

Feeding the English into Google Translate returned the Arabic as in the original.

Google does not claim to have perfected its translation software, but it shows promise. If the translations turned out to be “close enough,” they would save considerable time and expense to gain access to news and opinion from cultures that do not communicate in English. For more examples and in-depth analysis of issues involved in translating between Arabic and English, see A Journalist’s Guide to Live Direct and Unbiased News Translation (Darwish, 2010). Although

\(^8\) http://localize.drupal.org/translate/downloads?project=contentanalysis
\(^9\) http://translation.babylon.com/english/content%20analysis/
\(^10\) http://www.across.net/us/index.aspx?gclid=CLaz3fH996wCFeQCQAodJm3gRw
\(^11\) http://translate.google.com/?hl=en&tab=wT
\(^12\) http://www-01.ibm.com/software/pervasive/ws_translation_server/
Google Translate has demonstrated that it can provide suitable translations in some cases, sentences being translated from Arabic to English frequently break down into gibberish.

As of 2010, Google Translate was judged too inconsistent to be trusted and was not used for this study. Here's why: Koehn (2005), like others, emphasized the difficulty of assessing the quality of machine translations (MT), especially for monolingual speakers. When some journalists write about progress in computer translations, they resort to what Koehn called a “clever trick.” He said, “They use a MT system to translate a sentence from English into a foreign language, and then use a reverse MT system to translate the sentence back into English. They then judge the quality of the MT systems by how well the English sentence is preserved” (pp. 84-85). Koehn added that this method was inspired by what he called an urban legend:

“Someone fed an English-Russian system the Bible verse ‘The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak.’ The system translated the verse into Russian. When it translated the Russian back to English, the system returned ‘The vodka is good but the meat is rotten.’ ” Koehn’s conclusion: “Back translation does not only provide a false sense of the capabilities of MT systems, it is also a lazy and flawed method to compare systems. Back translation unfairly benefits from the ability to reverse errors, which only show up in the foreign language.”

Is this a fair criticism? Perhaps, but the “urban legend” is easy to check, at least with Google Translate, which renders the biblical version in Russian as: Дух бодр, но плоть слаба. After closing Google and relaunching its translation program, the Russian text was copied in. It returned the English text exactly as in the original. Nevertheless, a longer passage would need to be translated successfully in order to offer any confidence in the accuracy or equivalence of the back translation, and it is here that Google Translate faltered. It was not a matter of the accuracy or equivalence of the translation; some English sentences were garbled and meaningless.
Intercoder Reliability

Kaid and Wadsworth (1989) suggested that “levels of reliability should be assessed initially on a subsample of the total sample to be analyzed before proceeding with the actual coding” of the entire data corpus (p. 208). Further, they suggest that when a study involves a large sample size, a subsample of 5% to 7% would be sufficient to perform reliability tests. However, other studies consider a 10% subsample as a minimum requirement for robust determination of intercoder reliability (Lacy & Riffe, 1996; Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken, 2002). Therefore, a 10% random subsample from each of the three newspapers (Haaretz: 18; Jerusalem Post: 20; Al-Quds: 44) was selected and assigned to a team of two coders — the author of this study and another doctoral student in mass communications. It is not uncommon for content analysis studies to have the primary researcher as part of a team of two or more inter-content coders (Dearing, 1989; Young, 2004). Using a pre-constructed code book, which included coding instructions, operational definitions and a coding sheet, the two coders independently coded and recorded the inflammatory and conciliatory words in every article involving Arab-Israeli relations. Coders also gathered other generic information, including newspaper identification number, date of publication and headline. See Appendix L for more information on the codebook and the coding sheet.

Percent agreement — “also called simple agreement, percentage of agreement, raw percent agreement, or crude agreement — is the percentage of all coding decisions made by pairs of coders on which the coders agree. As with most indices, percent agreement takes values of .00 (no agreement) to 1.00 (perfect agreement)” (Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken 2002, p. 590). Further, calculating percent agreement is considered a valid practice especially when determining intercoder reliabilities for nominal data (Cohen, 1960). Therefore, following the
completion of coding of the subsample, percentage of agreement tests were conducted to
determine the intercoder reliability between the two coders for each of the three newspapers.

**Convergent Validity**

The validity of a measuring device is usually determined “by comparing the results of
measures obtained from it with those obtained from another device” (Janis 2009, p.358). Weber
(1990) suggests that validity can be strengthened by reference to other data, other coding
procedures and other classification schemes that produce substantive conclusions. This study
used Diction 6.14.5, with its in-built dictionaries (or classification schemes) for validity tests.
Hays, Anderson and Revicki (1993) call it convergent validity, which they define as referring to
“the extent to which different ways of measuring the same trait intercorrelate with one another”
(p. 442). The purpose of this undertaking was twofold. First, to identify built-in dictionaries in
Diction that theoretically correlate with the two user-defined dictionaries (“inflammatory words”
and “conciliatory words.”) Second, to test the central hypothesis of the study using dictionaries
from Diction (i.e., to determine whether external measuring devices would produce outcomes
similar to the ones produced using “inflammatory” and “conciliatory” dictionaries).

The computer program Diction was selected for the convergent validity test because its
dictionaries are copious, published and transparent; it is widely used by content-analysis
scholars; it is supported with a well-written manual and by e-mail; it is being actively developed
and updated; and it has a solid theoretical foundation.

Diction is a computer-aided textual analysis program developed by Hart (1984) and his
associates. Primarily, the software program detects verbal intelligence and tonal qualities in the
text, including residual feelings, psychological motifs, political attitudes and ideological biases
(Lowry, Eng, Katande & Subramanian, 2012). The program employs a series of dictionaries (a
catalog of 10,000 words) to analyze texts for five master variables (Activity, Optimism, Certainty, Realism, and Commonality), and 35 sub-variables (or dictionaries). Scores for the five master variables are calculated by adding and subtracting standardized scores of relevant sub-variables (e.g. Optimism = \([\text{Praise} + \text{Satisfaction} + \text{Inspiration}] – [\text{Blame} + \text{Hardship} + \text{Denial}]\)) (Hart & Carroll, 2010). Diction’s user manual provides conceptual definitions for all of its master variables and sub-variables. The five master variables were deemed not to conceptually align with the two user-defined variables of this study. Thus, Diction’s sub-variables were studied to locate the two built-in dictionaries that theoretically correlate with “inflammatory words,” and “conciliatory words.” It is not uncommon for studies to adopt Diction’s sub-variables for validity testing (see Hart & Scacco, 2013).

Studies in cultivation theory have shown that violent texts or inflammatory words in the media are strong predictors of aggression among individuals and groups (Gerber, Gross, Signorielli, Morgan & Jackson-Beeck, 1979; Pearl, 1987; Smith, 2008). Studies in behavioral psychology also suggest that “verbal aggression” or inflammatory words are predictors of violent behavior or forceful action (Downs, Kaid & Ragan, 1990; Infante & Wigley, 1986; Infante, Sabourin, Rudd, & Shannon, 1990). On the other hand, Diction defines “Aggression” — a sub-variable — as a dictionary of terms that are synonymous to “forceful action.” Further, “Aggression” is a sub-variable that denotes “physical energy (blast, crash, explode, collide), social domination (conquest, attacking, dictatorships, violation), and goal-directedness (crusade, commanded, challenging, overcome.)” Further, words associated with personal triumph (mastered, rambunctious, pushy), excess human energy (prod, poke, pound, shove), disassembly (dismantle, demolish, overturn, veto) and resistance (prevent, reduce, defend, curbed)” also signify Aggression (Hart & Carroll 2010, p.7.) Other synonyms for aggression in the user-
defined dictionary of “inflammatory words,” include *assailment, assault, blitz, blitzkrieg, encroachment, injury, invasion, offense, offensive, onset, onslaught, raid* (Thesaurus.com, 2013). Thus, among the 35 sub-variables, “Aggression” was deemed theoretically closest to “inflammatory words” and selected for validity testing. While Diction defines “Aggression” as “forceful action,” another sub-variable, “Passivity” is defined as “inactivity” or lack of action. Passivity, according to Diction, includes terms such as “appeasement,” “refrain,” “compliance,” “cessation,” and “inertness.” (Hart & Carroll 2010, p. 7.) While Diction positions “Passivity” as an activity antithetical to “Aggression,” this study puts “conciliatory words” as counter and oppositional to “inflammatory words.” Thus, the built-in dictionary “Passivity” was deemed as conceptually in agreement with the user-built dictionary of “conciliatory words.”

Data from all three newspapers were fed into Diction, and the hypotheses were tested based on built-in dictionaries for Aggression and for Passivity. Mean Aggression scores were calculated to test the first four hypotheses and a Net Aggression mean (Aggression – Passivity) was calculated to test the fifth hypothesis. A constant of 50 was added to Net Aggression score to eliminate negative numbers. Two-tailed t-tests were conducted to test the following five hypotheses:

H1a: For the week before Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000, Al-Quds will have higher Aggression score than Haaretz and Jerusalem Post.

H2a: In all three newspapers, Aggression scores will be higher in the week after Sharon’s visit to the Temple than the week before.

H3a: For the week before Tel Aviv bombing in 2005, Al-Quds will have higher Aggression score than Haaretz and Jerusalem Post.
H4a: In all three newspapers, Aggression scores will be higher for the week after the suicide bombing than for the week before.

H5a: In all three newspapers, the Net Aggression will be higher in the two weeks in 2000 than in the two weeks in 2005.

The ability to automate the Threat Index is important to the implementation of this study. It is unrealistic to expect anyone to routinely count some hundreds of thousands of words, as were examined here. If a computer-aided content analysis program can do the intellectual heavy lifting, the job of identifying the ratio of inflammatory and conciliatory words becomes practical.

**Pilot Study**

A limited pilot study (Witte, 2006) for this project was based on the aftermath of the Tel Aviv suicide bombing. The pilot study was unusual for focusing exclusively on Middle Eastern news outlets and for emphasizing conciliatory as well as inflammatory rhetoric. The content analysis was based on articles published in two Israeli daily newspapers (Haaretz and Jerusalem Post), one Palestinian newspaper (Al-Quds), seven Arabic newspapers published outside Israel in the Middle East and one independent Arab Web site (Al-Jazeera). The period covered was the week following a suicide bombing on February 25, 2005, outside a nightclub in Tel Aviv. The 11 publications used 52,191 words in 102 articles about the event. Articles in Israeli newspapers were longer (28,338 vs. 23,853 total words), but the stories in the Palestinian and Arab publications were more numerous (57 vs. 45 total stories).

An important contribution of the pilot study was the initial establishment of two dictionaries: one with inflammatory words and the other with conciliatory words that were used to describe people and events affecting Israeli-Palestinian relations. Articles about other subjects
(e.g., sports, business, society) and neutral words were not coded. The resulting dictionaries consisted of 346 words identified as inflammatory and 210 words identified as conciliatory.

The present study expanded on the pilot study by adding a contrasting event (Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000), extended the study period to include the week before each of the two events, limited the corpus to the three prominent local daily newspapers, and set a more ambitious goal – namely, the development of a terrorism threat-level index. The dictionaries, as supplemented with additional inflammatory and conciliatory words identified during research for the current study, are in Appendix K.

The initial decision on which words were inflammatory and which words were conciliatory was made subjectively by this investigator, a method accepted by Neuendorf (2002), who said, “Variables may be selected from theory, past research, researcher immersion in the message pool, and so on. … The researcher should keep in mind the fact that he or she can always construct custom dictionaries that meet his or her precise needs” (p. 127). An approach she credited was to let the dictionaries emerge from the data and to base them on actual word frequencies from the message sample (p. 129). This was the method followed for both the pilot study and for the present study.

Findings from the pilot study included: 1. A statistically significant difference was found in the amount of inflammatory and conciliatory language used by the two sides ($\chi^2 = 46.65; \text{df} = 1; p = <.05$). Both sides used more inflammatory language than conciliatory language, but the Israeli newspapers used significantly more inflammatory language than the Palestinian/Arab news organizations. This was expected because the Israelis in this case were the victims of a suicide bombing. Some families of the victims called for revenge. 2. The two Israeli newspapers did not differ significantly in the language they used to report on the suicide bombing during the
week following the event. 3. Al-Quds, the Palestinian newspaper, was significantly less inflammatory than the English-language versions of the seven other Arab daily newspapers published in the Middle East and Al-Jazeera. 4. The seven Arabic newspapers and Al-Jazeera differed in the percentage of inflammatory words compared to the total of inflammatory and conciliatory words, although the results should be interpreted cautiously because of a low number of examples in each.

Although the pilot study showed a preponderance of inflammatory rhetoric compared to conciliatory rhetoric, it could be argued that the surprise was that so much conciliatory rhetoric appeared in stories that were primarily about a suicide bombing and its aftermath. Of the total number of 3,292 words or phrases that were coded as inflammatory or conciliatory, one-third were conciliatory. A large number of the inflammatory words were unavoidable in even the most objective news accounts of the bombing because of the people killed and wounded, and reactions. It also was a fact that several months after the suicide bombing, the truce continued to hold, suggesting that there might be a connection between the conciliatory language following the suicide bombing and the durability of the truce.

The pilot study resulted in a paper that was accepted by the International Communication Association at its conference in Dresden, Germany (Witte, 2006).

**Summary**

This chapter has identified content analysis as a central method for this study. Further, the chapter illustrated the essentials of a content analysis study – including a coding manual, operational definitions and a coding questionnaire. The chapter explained how reliability and validity tests were conducted. This methodological blueprint will be applied to investigate the hypotheses of this study and the findings will be discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 4
RESULTS

This chapter will introduce the overall size and composition of the data corpus. Results from intercoder reliability tests will be discussed. Findings from the content analysis will conclude by showcasing descriptive statistics. Hypothesis test results will follow. Findings from the validity tests will appear in the last section of this chapter.

The data were collected from news and opinion articles in two Israeli newspapers (Haaretz and Jerusalem Post) and a Palestinian newspaper (Al-Quds). Further, data were retrieved from articles published in four different weeks (i.e., articles from a week before and a week after Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000, and articles from a week before and week after the suicide bombing in Tel Aviv on February 25, 2005).

Overall, the four weeks of data corpus included 74 newspaper issues (Haaretz: 23; Jerusalem Post: 23; Al-Quds: 28) and 820 news or opinion articles (Haaretz: 179; Jerusalem Post: 197; Al-Quds: 444). The two Israeli newspapers do not publish on their Sabbath at the end of every week nor on the holiday of Rosh Hashanah on October 1, 2000. That is why the sample comprises five fewer editions of Haaretz and Jerusalem Post when compared to Al-Quds. On a typical news day, Al-Quds published 16 articles related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In comparison, Haaretz and Jerusalem Post published about eight articles each. Five fewer days of publication and greater attention to the conflict by Al-Quds explain the two-to-one disparity in volume of coverage between the Palestinian newspaper and each of the two Israeli newspapers.

Intercoder Reliability Findings

For Haaretz, the proportion of agreement on inflammatory words was .86 and the proportion of agreement on conciliatory words was .82. For Jerusalem Post, the proportion of
agreement was .87 for inflammatory words and .84 for conciliatory words. For Al-Quds (in English translations), the proportion of agreement was .88 for inflammatory words and .85 for conciliatory words.

Popping (1988) and Riffe, Lacy, and Fico (1998) declared an agreement of .80 or higher acceptable, whereas Ellis (1994) considered .75 to .80 as the “widely accepted rule of thumb” (p.91). On the other hand, Frey, Botan and Kreps (2000) put the intercoder reliability cutoff mark at .70. While there is no consensus in the literature on what qualifies as an acceptable level of intercoder reliability, the agreement levels in this study are on par or even higher than the requirements suggested in several past methodological studies. Thus, the intercoder reliability findings were deemed satisfactory and the primary researcher proceeded with manual coding of all of the remaining news articles in the data corpus.

Descriptive Findings

In deference to the content-analysis program Diction, which sets a standard of 500 words as its textual norm, only the first 500 words in each relevant article were examined. Each word was placed in one of three categories: inflammatory, conciliatory, or other (neither inflammatory nor conciliatory). A total of 1,402 unique inflammatory terms were placed in one dictionary and 529 unique conciliatory terms were placed in a second dictionary. (See Appendix K.) Diction was used to perform convergent validity tests, which are discussed later in this chapter.

The data corpus consists of 297,380 words (Haaretz: 73,533; Jerusalem Post: 83,393; Al-Quds: 140,454), with a frequency of 17,019 words coded in the two dichotomous categories. All words not tagged as inflammatory or conciliatory were classified as other. Specifically, 12,438 words or 4.2% were inflammatory, and 4,581 or 1.5% were conciliatory words. While the remaining 94.2% of words were other; analysis focused on inflammatory and conciliatory words.
Descriptive statistics that emerged from this analysis showed that the amount of inflammatory rhetoric varied more than the amount of conciliatory rhetoric — a ratio of 10:1 for inflammatory language and 3:1 for conciliatory language — regardless of time period, medium or provocation. Further, it is worthy of note that all three newspapers — Al-Quds (Palestinian) and Haaretz and Jerusalem Post (Israeli) — used inflammatory words more than two and half times as often as conciliatory words in their news and opinion sections during each of the four weeks. In other words, offensive or fighting language was the norm for all three newspapers when focusing on the Israeli-Palestine conflict (see Table 4.1).

While the rhetoric was uniformly more inflammatory than conciliatory, inflammatory language escalated in the aftermath of a major provocation. For instance, in the week following Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000, the proportion of inflammatory discourse in the three newspapers increased significantly (Haaretz: from 2.06% to 4.56%; Jerusalem Post: from 2.01% to 4.65%; Al-Quds: from 3.60% to 6.50%; Overall: from 2.88% to 5.30%). Similarly, in 2005, all three newspapers together increased their inflammatory rhetoric following the Tel Aviv suicide bombing from 3.79% to 4.11%. Predictably, because Israelis were the victims of the suicide attack, Haaretz and Jerusalem Post, amplified the proportion of their inflammatory language in the week following the attack (Haaretz: from 2.79% to 4.02% and Jerusalem Post from 3.55% to 4.46%). In general, the Palestinian newspaper was consistently more inflammatory than the two Israeli newspapers (Haaretz: 3.76%; Jerusalem Post: 3.90%; Al-Quds: 4.57%). However, the three newspapers did not differ much in their use of conciliatory words (Haaretz: 1.50%; Jerusalem Post: 1.57%; Al-Quds: 1.54%). The rhetoric in Al-Quds was least

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13 Inflammatory words ranged from 203 published by Haaretz during the week before the Sharon visit to 2,192 published by Al-Quds during the week after the Sharon visit. Conciliatory words ranged from 193 published by Haaretz during the week before the Sharon visit to 583 published by Al-Quds during the week after the Tel Aviv suicide bombing.
inflammatory a week before and was most inflammatory a week after Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000 (before: 3.60%; after: 6.50%).

Table 4.1

*Percentage of Inflammatory and Conciliatory Words in 3 Newspapers Per Week*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sharon’s 2000 Visit to Temple Mount</th>
<th>Tel Aviv 2005 Suicide Bombing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Week Before</td>
<td>Week After</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haaretz (C)</td>
<td>1.96%</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haaretz (I)</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
<td>4.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haaretz (N)</td>
<td>9,872</td>
<td>30,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem Post (C)</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
<td>1.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem Post (I)</td>
<td>2.01%</td>
<td>4.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem Post (N)</td>
<td>14,256</td>
<td>28,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Quds (C)</td>
<td>1.94%</td>
<td>1.57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Quds (I)</td>
<td>3.60%</td>
<td>6.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Quds (N)</td>
<td>28,397</td>
<td>33,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall (C)</td>
<td>1.93%</td>
<td>1.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall (I)</td>
<td>2.88%</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall (O)</td>
<td>95.19%</td>
<td>93.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall (N)</td>
<td>52,525</td>
<td>92,247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C = Conciliatory; I = Inflammatory; O = Other; N = Total number of words per week.
Thus, it could be argued that Sharon’s visit to the shrine in the disputed city of Jerusalem was a cause for a major upswing of anger in Al-Quds and, by extension, among the Palestinian public. In 2005, on the other hand, Al-Quds’ inflammatory language abated in the week after the suicide bombings in Tel Aviv (before: 4.21%; after: 3.95%).

**Threat Index**

Table 4.2 illustrates net inflammatory rates in each of the newspapers for each of the four weeks (i.e., percent inflammatory minus percent conciliatory), along with the Threat Index (indicated by the column heading “TI”). The Threat Index is the difference in the net inflammatory rate between the week before and the week after for each year in each newspaper.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sharon’s 2000 Visit to Temple Mount</th>
<th>Tel Aviv 2005 Suicide Bombing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Week Before</td>
<td>Week After</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haaretz</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>3.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem Post</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>3.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Quds</td>
<td>1.66%</td>
<td>4.94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
<td>4.16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C = Conciliatory; I = Inflammatory

The net inflammatory rate in the Palestinian newspaper was higher than the net inflammatory in two Israeli newspapers in the weeks before (Al-Quds: 1.66%; Jerusalem Post: 0.13%; Haaretz: 0.10%) and after (Al-Quds: 4.94%; Jerusalem Post: 3.31%; Haaretz: 3.48%). Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000. The level of rhetorical threat in Al-Quds (2.98%) was also higher than the net inflammatory in the two newspapers (Haaretz: 0.75%; Jerusalem
Post: 1.98%) in the week before the Tel-Aviv bombing in 2005. However, there was not much
difference in the rhetorical threat in the three newspapers following the Tel-Aviv bombing in
2005 (Haaretz: 2.43%; Jerusalem Post: 2.80%; Al-Quds: 2.36). While the level of rhetorical
threat was consistently higher in Al-Quds, it was more volatile in Haaretz. For instance, the
newspaper swung more dramatically than the other two newspapers because of Sharon’s visit in
2000 (Haaretz: 3.38%; Jerusalem Post: 3.13%; Al-Quds: 1.59%) and also because of the Tel
Aviv bombing (Haaretz: 1.68%; Jerusalem Post: 0.82%; Al-Quds: -0.16%).

Tests of Hypotheses and Research Question

While the descriptive statistics suggested apparent shifts in the use of inflammatory
language, statistical tests were conducted to determine the significance of conflict language and
its implications in each of the three newspapers for each of the four weeks. The samples in the
data corpus are independent, the samples are of relatively large size and all the data in the sample
are nominal data — three qualifications essential for conducting a z-test of proportions rather
than chi-square tests on raw values or t-tests on mean values (D’Agostino, Chase and Belanger,
1988). Imitating Lowry and Shidler (1998), who also analyzed independent samples, z-tests were
performed to determine the significance of differences between two independent proportions.

The first task was to determine whether the data from the two Israeli newspapers could be
merged into a single category. The motive was to see whether rhetoric in the Palestinian
newspaper could be compared with overall rhetoric in the Israeli newspapers. If the two Israeli
newspapers exhibited significant differences in their coverage, then it would not be feasible to
merge them into a single meaningful category. However, if the differences were insignificant,
then it could be inferred that both Haaretz and Jerusalem Post spoke with a similar voice, and
data retrieved from the two newspapers could be merged into a single category.
RQ: In the four weeks of news coverage, did the proportion of inflammatory words in Haaretz significantly differ from the proportion of inflammatory words in Jerusalem Post?

In the two weeks of the year 2000 included in the analysis, the proportion of inflammatory words featured in Haaretz did not differ significantly from the proportion of inflammatory words used in Jerusalem Post. However, the proportions of inflammatory rhetoric featured in the two Israeli newspapers did differ significantly in the week before and in the week after the Tel Aviv bombing in 2005.

In the week before Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000, the analysis shows that 2.06% of the coded words in Haaretz and 2.01% in Jerusalem Post were inflammatory words. Therefore, for that week, the differences in the proportion of inflammatory words that appeared in the two newspapers were not significant (z = 0.271, p = .40).

The week following Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, inflammatory rhetoric escalated in both of the Israeli newspapers (Haaretz: 4.56%; Jerusalem Post: 4.65%). However, the proportion of inflammatory words in Haaretz did not differ significantly from the proportion of inflammatory words in Jerusalem Post (z = 0.52, p = .30). The Jerusalem Post (3.55%) was significantly more inflammatory than Haaretz (2.79%) in the week prior to the suicide attack (z = 3.73, p < .001).

Inflammatory rhetoric also dominated news reporting in the week after a suicide bomber struck a night club in Tel Aviv on Feb 25, 2005 (Haaretz: 4.02%; Jerusalem Post: 4.46%). Haaretz and Jerusalem Post also differed significantly in the rate at which they used inflammatory words in their news coverage: (z = 2.26, p < .05). Because there were sufficient differences in the tone the two newspapers applied to report and comment on the conflict, it was deemed important to preserve their unique voices and not to merge the two newspapers.
The announcement of Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in September 2000 was an act of provocation that angered Palestinians. While Sharon was the perpetrator, the Palestinians were the victims. Therefore, it was reasonable to make a theoretical assumption and test the following hypothesis:

H1: For the week before Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000, Al-Quds will have a higher proportion of inflammatory words than Haaretz and Jerusalem Post.

The analysis of data for the week prior to Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000 found support for H1. The proportion of inflammatory words in Al-Quds (3.60%) was significantly higher (z = 9.04, p < .0001) than the proportion of inflammatory words in Haaretz (2.06%) and also was significantly higher (z = 7.28, p < .0001) than the proportion of inflammatory words in Jerusalem Post (2.01%).

Since it is theoretically apparent that a provocation or an event that destabilizes the region would increase tension and lead to an increase in the proportion of inflammatory words in each of the newspaper, the following hypothesis was tested:

H2: In all three newspapers, the proportion of inflammatory words will be higher in the week after Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount than the week before.

The results supported H2. The proportion of inflammatory words in Al-Quds was significantly higher in the week after (6.50%) than the in the week before (3.60%) Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000 (z = 16.25, p < .0001). Also, the proportion of inflammatory words in Haaretz was significantly higher in the week after (4.56%) than the week before (2.06%) Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000 (z = 11.03, p < .0001). Similarly, the proportion of inflammatory words in Jerusalem Post was significantly higher in the week after (4.65%) than
the in the week before (2.01%) Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000 (z = 13.76, p < .0001).

On February 25, 2005, a Palestinian cell carried out a suicide attack outside a nightclub in Tel Aviv. Two key developments surfaced in the week before the attack. The Sharm el-Sheikh Agreement had called for the release of nearly 7,600 Palestinian detainees who were incarcerated in Israeli prisons. However, the Israeli government announced that it was willing to release only 900 prisoners. This sparked outrage among Palestinians. Second, despite the Israeli Central Court ruling it as illegal, the Israeli government approved a new route for the border fence that would prevent some Palestinians from accessing parts of their property. This move from Israel further exacerbated Palestinian frustration and anger. Thus it is reasonable to assume that this anger may also be evident in news and opinion articles in the Palestinian newspaper Al-Quds. Hence, the following hypothesis was proposed and tested:

H3: For the week before the Tel Aviv bombing in 2005, Al-Quds will have a higher proportion of inflammatory words than Haaretz and Jerusalem Post.

Analysis of data for the week before Tel Aviv suicide bombing in 2005 supported H3. The proportion of inflammatory words in Al-Quds (4.21%) was significantly higher (z = 7.06, p < .0001) than the proportion of inflammatory words in Haaretz (2.79%) and also was significantly higher (z = 3.48, p < .001) than the proportion of inflammatory words in Jerusalem Post (3.55%).

As stated previously, it is reasonable to make a theoretical assumption that a provocation or an event that destabilizes the region will further increase tension and lead to the rise of inflammatory words in each of the newspapers. Therefore, the following hypothesis was tested:
H4: In all three newspapers, the proportion of inflammatory words will be higher for the week after the suicide bombing than for the week before.

The analysis found support for H4 in the two Israeli newspapers. The proportion of inflammatory words in Haaretz was significantly higher in the week after (4.02%) than in the week before (2.79%) the suicide attack on a nightclub in Tel Aviv in 2005 \( z = 5.71, p < .0001 \). Similarly, the proportion of inflammatory words in Jerusalem Post was significantly higher in the week after (4.46%) than the in the week before (3.55%) the suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in 2000 \( z = 4.58, p < .0001 \). However, contrary to expectations, the proportion of inflammatory words in Al-Quds was significantly higher in the week before (4.21%) than the in the week after (3.95%) the suicide attack in Tel Aviv 2005. An independent Palestinian terrorist cell was found to be responsible for the suicide attack. That might be one reason why Al-Quds and Palestinian officials stifled their inflammatory language after the fact. Palestinians were the perpetrators and Israelis were the victims.

**Inflammatory Words Minus Conciliatory Words Equal Threat Index**

The central argument of this study is that conflict discourses in the mass media are not just reflectors but also precursors to the mood on the street. More specifically, inflammatory words in a newspaper can be potential indicators of violence in the street. Similarly, conciliatory words in a newspaper can potentially indicate relative calm on the ground. The earlier chapter expressed it as a mathematical equation: Inflammatory Words – Conciliatory Words = Net Inflammatory, also referred to as the threat level or Threat Index. Thus, the theoretical argument was that the net inflammatory or threat level featured in a newspaper can potentially signal the coming outbreak of violence. In September 2000, Ariel Sharon’s visit to the disputed Temple Mount was followed by an unprecedented outbreak of violence on all sides, including months
and years of violence, commonly known as the Al-Aqsa intifada. By contrast, in February 2005, a rogue Palestinian cell carried out a suicide attack in a nightclub in Tel Aviv. However, what followed were weeks of relative calm and restraint on both sides. Opinion polls from Jerusalem Media & Communication Center (2011) also illustrate differences in the public mood. Despite the suicide attack, public aspiration for conflict resolution and optimism for peace were much higher in February 2005 than in September/October of 2000. Thus, in accord with the central theoretical argument, the study hypothesized that, in all three newspapers, the rhetorical threat will be higher for the two weeks on either side of Sharon’s visit in September 2000 than for the two weeks on either side of the Tel Aviv bombing in February 2005. (See Table 4.2.) Therefore:

H5: In all three newspapers, the Threat Index for the two weeks in 2000 will be significantly higher than the Threat Index from the two weeks in 2005.

Analysis found strong support for H5. In Al-Quds, the Threat Index surrounding Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount was significantly much higher (3.26%), indicating the imminent outbreak of the intifada \((z = 24.61, p <.0001)\). On the other hand, the Threat Index surrounding the bombing in Tel Aviv was negative (-0.61%), indicating the relative calm and restraint that followed.

This was also the case for the two Israeli newspapers. Haaretz registered a Threat Index of 3.38% in 2000 and 1.68% in 2005 \((z = 14.40, p <.0001)\). Similarly, Jerusalem Post registered a Threat Index of 3.13% in 2000 and 0.82% in 2005 \((z = 23.83, p <.0001)\).

**Convergent Validity Findings**

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Diction version 6.14.5 was used to conduct validity tests using its built-in dictionary of Aggression words. The following five corresponding hypotheses were proposed for testing using Diction:
H1a: For the week before Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000, Al-Quds will have a higher Aggression score than Haaretz and Jerusalem Post.

H2a: In all three newspapers, Aggression scores will be higher in the week after Sharon’s visit to the Temple than the week before.

H3a: For the week before Tel Aviv bombing in 2005, Al-Quds will have higher Aggression score than Haaretz and Jerusalem Post.

H4a: In all three newspapers, Aggression scores will be higher for the week after the suicide bombing than for the week before.

H5a: In all three newspapers, the Net Aggression will be higher in the two weeks in 2000 than in the two weeks in 2005.

Mean Aggression scores for Al-Quds (4.92) and Haaretz (4.87) did not differ significantly from each other \[t = 1.15, \text{df} = 39,188, p (2\text{-tailed}) = .25\]. However, the mean Aggression score for Jerusalem Post (5.08) was significantly higher than Al-Quds \[t = 4.03, \text{df} = 42,946, p (2\text{-tailed}) < .0001\]. H1a was not supported.

In all three newspapers, Mean Aggression scores were significantly higher in the week after (9.03) than in the week before (4.95) Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount \[t = 149.56, \text{df} = 14,5184, p (2\text{-tailed}) < .0001\]. H2a was supported.

For the week before the Tel Aviv bombing in 2005, Haaretz (6.38) had a significantly higher Mean Aggression score than Al-Quds (4.86) \[t = 36.24, \text{df} = 54,918, p (2\text{-tailed}) < .0001\]. Jerusalem Post (9.00) also had a significantly higher mean Aggression score than Al-Quds \[t = 110.41, \text{df} = 67471, p (2\text{-tailed}) < .0001\]. H3a was not supported.

In all three newspapers, Mean Aggression scores were significantly higher in the week after the suicide bombing than the week before. H4a was supported.
For Al-Quds, the net Aggression scores (Aggression minus Passivity, see p. 69) for the year 2000 were significantly higher than for the year 2005 \( [t = 41.05, \text{df} = 143725, p \text{ (2-tailed)} < .0001] \). Further, for Haaretz \( [t = 6.70, \text{df} = 74765, p \text{ (2-tailed)} < .001] \) and in Jerusalem Post \( [t = 41.05, \text{df} = 143725, p \text{ (2-tailed)} < .0001] \). H5a was strongly supported. Net Aggression scores were significantly higher in 2000 than in 2005.

The analysis did not find support for H1a and H3a, but found support for H2a, H4a, and H5a. In the week prior to Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, Al-Quds had higher proportion of inflammatory words than Haaretz and Jerusalem Post. However, Al-Qud’s mean Aggression score for the week was similar to Haaretz and significantly lower than Jerusalem Post. Further, for the week before the Tel-Aviv bombing, the proportion of inflammatory words in Al-Quds was significantly higher than Haaretz and Jerusalem Post. However, the mean Aggression scores for Haaretz and Jerusalem Post were significantly higher than Al-Quds. Thus, in these two instances, convergent validity tests did not support the original findings. However, the H5a validity test concurred fully with the original findings on pivotal tenet of the study (H5). Mean Aggression scores and the Threat Index for the two weeks in 2000 were significantly higher than for the two weeks in 2005. Further, validity test for H2a fully concurred with original findings for H2 and findings from the validity test for H4a partially concurred with original findings for H4. While there were discrepancies in findings between internal and external measuring devices, it was concluded that “inflammatory words” and “conciliatory words”—the two central dictionaries of the study — weathered the validity tests.

**Summary**

As discussions in this chapter have illustrated, the data corpus had almost as many news articles and words from Al-Quds as from Haaretz and Jerusalem Post combined. There was not
much variance in the proportion of conciliatory words from one week to another or from one newspaper to another. However, inflammatory language varied greatly from week to week and from newspaper to newspaper. Tests of the research question and five hypotheses found that the two Israeli newspapers often differed from each other in their tone and the nature of conflict coverage. Further, the proportion of inflammatory words was especially higher in a week after a major provocation. Also, while the variability in inflammatory words was higher for Haaretz from one week to another, the rate of inflammatory language was consistently higher for Al-Quds across all four weeks.

More important, the central hypothesis of this study was supported. The analysis found that in all three newspapers, the Threat Index differential was significantly higher for the two weeks on either side of Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in 2000, than for the two weeks on the either side of the Tel Aviv nightclub bombing in 2005. The next chapter will explain these findings further and make possible historical, theoretical and methodological assertions. The chapter that follows will also feature major contributions and limitations of this study, and recommend possible roadmaps for future studies.
CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

This chapter revisits the findings from the previous chapter — and examines them in the historical, theoretical and methodological context. Further, the chapter also showcases key contributions and limitations of the study and concludes with highlights of possible directions for future studies.

As Shoemaker and Reese (1990) posit, content analysis studies typically fail to link “in any systematic way to either the forces that created the content or to its effects” (p. 649). Riffe and Freitag (1996), who examined 25 years of content analysis articles published in *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, found that 72% of the 486 studies failed to link the content studies either to their antecedents or to their consequences. This study does both, showcasing historical episodes and contextual forces of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that preceded and potentially shaped the content that was analyzed; also, the study places content in the role of a precursor — or a navigator — to understand how media text might have constructed reality and shaped historical events that followed. Hypotheses 2 and 4 argued that fighting words in the media are indicators of violence in a conflict zone. Hypothesis 5 posited that the Threat Index or net inflammatory language in the media can be quantified and can help to anticipate acts of violence. All three were supported by the data.

One of the key findings of this study was that Haaretz and Jerusalem Post — both Israeli newspapers — did not always employ the same language to cover the conflict. Their usage of inflammatory words differed significantly in the two weeks on either side of the Tel Aviv bombing in 2005. However, they did not differ significantly from each other in their use of inflammatory words in the two weeks on either side of Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount.
Variances between the two newspapers also were minor for the proportion of conciliatory words that appeared in their news and opinion articles.

The political orientation of the two publications may explain the variances. Haaretz is predominantly a left-wing newspaper, which is more likely to accept risks that favor compromise with the Palestinians. The Jerusalem Post, on the other hand, a right-wing publication, is less likely to support concessions for peace and more likely to emphasize issues such as security and defense of Israeli sovereignty. Such differentials are supported by the findings in 2005. However, in 2000, the climate was far more volatile, the peace process was in disarray and the security of Israel was at a greater risk. In this climate, when issues of national security are at stake, the two Israeli newspapers tended to speak in monolithic voices — an assertion also supported by conflict theory. This would lead to the supposition that Haaretz and Jerusalem Post would be more homogenous in their coverage during the two crisis weeks of 2000, and this was observed in the findings.

H1 and H3 predicted that Al-Quds, the Palestinian newspaper, would be more inflammatory than Haaretz and Jerusalem Post in the weeks prior to a major provocation. Analysis found support for both the hypotheses. This study, in the buildup to these two hypotheses, previously explained the reasoning for those predictions.

Al-Quds, as the only independent Palestinian newspaper, is perceived as a moderate media voice of Gaza and the West Bank. However, the newspaper is not free from censorship by both Palestinian and Israeli officials. These gatekeepers serve to regulate and shape news content. Thus, Al-Quds can be expected to reflect the views and opinions of the PLO and Hamas with a higher number of fighting words in its articles than could be expected in Haaretz and the Jerusalem Post.
Audience Effects

A more subtle influence is exerted by the street and its religious sensitivities, providing a strong example of audience effects. When Abdullah Saeed Badran, the suicide bomber, blew himself up outside the Tel Aviv nightclub in 2005, the act and its perpetrator were denounced in surprisingly strong language by Palestinian authorities and all the usual terrorist organizations. No less than Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, declared that Badran was *mokharreb* – a saboteur, in the Israeli epithet denoting senseless violence and destruction by a common criminal. Yet Al-Quds referred to him as *shaheed* – a holy martyr, assured of posthumous honors on earth and salvation and joy in the after-life. Polls showed a consistently high rate of approval for attacks against Israel. The street expected Badran to be glorified, and Al-Quds complied. Instead of calling Badran *mofajjer intihari* (Arabic for suicide bomber), Al-Quds used the euphemism *monaffeth al-amaleyyah al-tafjeeriyyah* (Arabic for “implementor of the bombing operation”) because suicide is prohibited in the Muslim culture.

The Arab-Israeli conflict provides as even stronger example of an audience effect: assassination. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was assassinated by Egyptians who disagreed with his agenda for peace; Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a Jew who wanted to send a message to Israeli leadership that conciliation was out of bounds.

A similar audience effect could be blamed for the failure of the 2000 Camp David summit. Negotiators were prepared to accept U.S. President Clinton’s compromise proposals. All that was necessary was the approval of Yasser Arafat. American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright pressed him – hard. Finally, in exasperation, Arafat asked her if she wanted to go to his funeral (Ross, 2004, p. 693). The point was that Arafat expected the outcome of his approval would not be peace but instead would be his death at the hands of an assassin.
While both Israeli and Palestinian civilians suffer because of the conflict, people in West Bank and Gaza live in deplorable conditions. Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territory is blamed for high rates of poverty and unemployment, and shortages of water, electricity, housing and other basic amenities, and constant harassment by Israelis, especially Israeli settlers. Anger, frustration and resentment simmer just below the surface in the streets of the West Bank and Gaza. This aggression and hostility from the street find their way into news and opinion pages of newspapers. Al-Quds relentlessly reported the latest provocations, and thus was consistently more inflammatory than Haaretz and Jerusalem Post.

**Unexpected Findings**

H2 and H4 predicted that the newspapers would showcase a greater proportion of fighting or violent words in the week after a major provocation than the week before. This assertion was supported partially. In 2000, following Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount, all three newspapers escalated their inflammatory rhetoric. However, in 2005, following the suicide bombing in a Tel Aviv nightclub, while the two Israeli newspapers amplified the use of fighting words, the Palestinian newspaper reduced its proportional use of inflammatory words.

There were reasons for this uncharacteristic decline in inflammatory words. First, a truce (*hudna*) was in place at the time. To break it would have embarrassed Abbas, who championed it. Second, the reason Abbas had negotiated the truce was to avoid giving Israel an excuse to stop releasing Palestinian prisoners. Their release had been agreed by Israeli as a confidence-building exercise and was unpopular in Israel, especially with Israeli victims of crimes for which the Palestinians had been convicted. Finally, even more controversial was the plan by Ariel Sharon, Israeli prime minister, to unilaterally remove Israeli troops and settlers from four outposts in the West Bank and the entire Gaza Strip – in effect, forever abandoning its claim to Gaza, which it
had conquered in the Six-Day War of 1967 and had ruled ever since. Palestinians wanted both the prisoner release and the withdrawal from Gaza to proceed and was at pains to avoid offending Israel – even toning down its usual rhetoric of opposition.

In 2000, on the other hand, all three newspapers covered the commencement of intifada by escalating hostile and inflammatory language in their news and opinion articles. The tendency of the media to expand their coverage and attention to violence is well documented in communication research. As Shinar (2003) notes, war and violence as subject matters are more marketable for the media than issues of peace and conciliation. The narrative of political violence is associated with visuals and images of action. Further, “it is associated with heroism and conflict, focuses on the emotional rather than on the rational and satisfies news-value demands: the present, the unusual, the dramatic, simplicity, action, personalization and results” (Shinar 2003, p.5). All three newspapers — following customary media tendencies — heavily focused on the escalation of violence that accompanied the commencement of the second (Al-Aqsa) intifada. This explains why there was more verbal aggression in the newspapers in the week after than the week before Sharon’s provocative visit in 2000, but not in the week after than the week before the Tel Aviv suicide bombing.

**Implications**

The central hypothesis of this study, H5, stated that words in the newspaper threat index differential in the two weeks on either of Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount will be higher than the threat index differential in the two weeks on either side of the Tel-Aviv bombing. It was fully supported and tests conducted using the computer program Diction added confirming evidence.

Hypothesis 5 said violent words in the media would be precursors to violent acts that follow. It is a vital finding that calls for more attention by conflict studies scholarship. Entman
(1993), a key proponent of media framing studies, argued that media often maximize some news frames and minimize others, constructing a social reality that mobilizes public support for one worldview and public rejection of another worldview. Several agenda-setting studies also have illustrated the ability of the media to prioritize one set of agendas for the public to think about, while obfuscating other agendas. The support for H5 also confirmed these theoretical views. In the rhetoric that followed Ariel Sharon’s 2000 visit to the Temple Mount, all three newspapers maximized the news canvas of “threat” in their news and opinion articles, thus setting the public agenda for the commencement of the second intifada — one of the bloodiest episodes in the conflict’s modern history.

Wolfsfeld (2003) and Sorial (2009) also support the findings of H5 and argue that violent language in the media is often a sign for the commencement or escalation of acts of violence. Further, Wolfsfeld (2003) bemoans, “while news media make an extremely important contribution to the cause of war, they contribute almost nothing to the establishment of peace.” By paying attention to the counter-effects of conciliatory language, this study lays a foundation for talk about peace to be tracked on the same level as talk about conflict.

As previously stated, conflict for the media is more marketable than peace. But for most other purposes do media exaggerate, act as catalyst or even create a climate of violence? Studies in propaganda theory offer a possible explanation. War and violence are not just profitable for high viewer ratings and advertising revenues, but certain conflicts are possibly beneficial for big corporates and media stakeholders who profit from the business of war. Further, inflammatory language and incitement in the media are known to help political regimes to create a climate of fear and apprehension among vulnerable citizenry — mechanisms often used by politicians to remain in power (e.g. Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe). In fact, both the Israeli right-wing
government and fundamentalists in Palestine have often relied on public perceptions of threat and insecurity to retain political power. Arafat, for example, has been accused of starting the Al-Aqsa intifada to strengthen his grip on power after the failed Camp David summit of 2000 – a failure that U.S. President Clinton blamed squarely on him.

**Contributions of the Study**

Cultivation theory terminates with beliefs and opinions about violence. This study extends cultivation theory to the actual commission of violent acts. Gerbner and associates constructed a Violence Profile, consisting of a Violence Index and Risk Ratio, based on language and incidents from prime-time television shows. This study constructed a Threat Index, based on language and incidents as reported in three local newspapers, and used it to evaluate a provocative act for its potential either to escalate into terrorism or to recede into calm. The Threat Index provides an active tool with which leaders on both sides of a conflict can anticipate and manage mass violence.

The use of local newspapers is a major strength of this study. Previous studies have relied on external media, such as *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*.

One problem with cultivation theory is that it is unidirectional: A vision of the world flows from the television shows to the audience and stops there. The present study assumes a two-way flow of influence, wherein readers are influenced by what they read in the newspaper and, in turn, influence how the newspaper frames its stories and the language it uses. This is the contribution of audience effects theory.

At some point, the television viewers interviewed by Gerbner and his associates must have realized that the shows they were watching were fiction, but at least the violence they saw on the screen was not happening to them. With the Palestinians and Israelis, the violence they
read about in the newspapers was happening to them or to people close to them, and it was all too real. They were being targeted because of who they were, not as innocent, unlucky bystanders. Readers thus became active participants in conflict, if only by the repetition of reading or speaking inflammatory or conciliatory words that could, just as well, be directed at them. This study presents these inflammatory and conciliatory words as acts that enable newspaper readers to accept violence and to endorse it and its perpetrators. According to speech act theory as employed here, words are actions and meaning is use. As Green (1987, p. ix) put it, “Language is the most powerful of human weapons.” People can change history by the language they use and the labels they apply. At a minimum, they can influence U.S. elections. Lowry, Hossain, Hong and Kang (2013) “analyzed the repeated uses of certain words by the [television] networks to make them potentially more salient to their audiences” (p. 7). The repetition of certain words, they found, can accumulate into frames of meaning that expose bias.

Previous studies measured valence in polar terms of positive/negative or optimism/pessimism. However, violent language might not be expressed in those terms. Thus two dictionaries, drawn inductively from articles in the three newspapers under consideration, are presented here to operationalize the language of violence and conciliation. Perhaps the most significant contribution to the literature is to provide a better understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by specifying precisely the language that the participants use to express their anger and their fears and their yearnings for peace and dignity. While this study does not establish causation, it does establish a relationship between violent words and violent acts, and it holds out the hope that one day the proportion of conciliatory words will exceed the proportion of violent words.
This study also presents a methodological evaluation of computerized content analysis with the program Diction as an alternative to counting words individually by hand. One of the strengths of computer-aided content analysis is absolute reliability. The custom dictionaries extend the usefulness of Diction to measure inflammatory and conciliatory words. Unlike some other content analyses, this study presents several tests of validity with the help of Diction software.

Limitations and Directions for Future Study

Expensive and time-consuming translations and back translations were required for Al-Quds, the Palestinian newspaper published exclusively in Arabic. Just obtaining back copies was a challenge, especially for English editions of the Israeli newspapers. Even for a multilingual scholar, back translations (or equivalent) of a random sample of texts are recommended to validate the accuracy of the translation into the language in which the study would be published. Google Translate was investigated as an option to human translation and judged to be unsatisfactory for newspaper articles at this time. Although human translation is not without its own potential for errors, it is more likely to be sensitive to nuances such as irony, humor and context. Research into machine translation is recognized for its rapid recent improvement, but more development will be needed for it to replace bilingual humans. It also is recognized that people who are equally proficient in more than one language are difficult to find, especially in difficult language pairs such as Arabic/English. Future research aimed at improving computer technology to reduce language barriers would contribute to cross-cultural understanding in this era of globalization.

More data points would be helpful. The four weeks of issues for this study offered scant reassurance that the results would be consistent over a longer time period. Future research should
take advantage of computer technology to expand the scope of subsequent investigations. More incidents from the Arab-Israeli conflict could be added to this study or the technique could be applied to conflicts in other parts of the world.

Although this study extends cultivation theory beyond opinions and beliefs, it does not establish causation. Despite the evidence assembled here, it still cannot be said with confidence that violent words cause violent acts; the language only suggests the possibility of future violence or calm. Future studies will need to apply different methods to cross-check results. The gold standard would be the ability to predict an outbreak of mass violence. However, even as honored a measure as the U.S. Index of Leading Economic Indicators gets it wrong sometimes. As the joke puts it, the LEI has predicted nine of the last five recessions. Although the present study marshals supporting evidence from surveys and related indexes, their timing was a less-than-perfect match. More research is recommended to establish methods that can corroborate more precisely the results of this study.

Of most significance, other mass media need to be added to the mix. Language used for radio, television, textbooks, plays, poems, songs, new media, social media and related communication channels should be investigated in future research. Textbooks are especially relevant because they condition young people when they are the most impressionable. The job would be overwhelming if done with hand counts, but supported by computer-aided content analysis software and a well-developed dictionary, the job is manageable.

Although months were devoted to developing the dictionaries of inflammatory and conciliatory words, much more research needs to be done. The present voice is added to that of many other scholars who have marveled at the time and effort required to develop and validate a dictionary. Attempts to use off-the-shelf, built-in dictionaries are useful if they were created for a
purpose that is identical to a present requirement. Attention should be given to reducing the size of the dictionary to the minimum necessary for consistent effectiveness. The feeling persists that the present dictionaries that were developed for this study include too many unnecessary or redundant words and not enough right words.

The role of politics remains one of the imponderable limitations of any study of national policy. Years after the second (Al-Aqsa) intifada, the roles of rivals Arafat and Sharon remain matters of debate. Did Arafat instigate the fighting, as Sharon alleged, to bolster his own standing after he failed to win statehood for Palestinians at the Camp David summit in 2000 and was, in fact, blamed for the collapse of the negotiations? Or did Sharon instigate the fighting, as Arafat alleged, by trampling on Muslim religious sensibilities in order to project a tough-guy image and thus win votes in his campaign for election as prime minister? Might both be true, at least to some extent? Political decisions, made by politicians for personal ends, can skew the interpretation of published data.

The present study was able to obtain support for the hypotheses it posed and for the conflict it studied. Whether similar results could be obtained for other conflicts is open to question. Until it has been tested more broadly, it is difficult to claim that either the template or its adaptation would enable leaders to distinguish reliably between signals that would warn of a coming intifada or caution against over-reaction to a false positive. Until the hypotheses have been tested in multiple conflicts in other parts of the world, their usefulness remains to be confirmed.

Censorship is an insidious limitation. Israeli newspapers are subject to military censorship and Palestinian newspapers are subject to censorship both by the Israeli military and by the Palestinian Authority (Alimi, 2007). Al-Quds also has been accused of self-censorship to
reflect the interests of media owners and distributors (Nossek & Rinnawi, 2003). Nevertheless, Reporters Without Borders ranks Israeli media as the freest in the Middle East (Falloon, 2007, 2007). Freedom House said it regards Israel as having a free press (Sussman, 2000). More research would be helpful to shine a light on the degree of current repression.

**Rival Hypotheses**

What caused the second intifada? Was it the failure of the Clinton summit? Was it Sharon’s provocative visit to the Temple Mount? Was it an accumulation of grievances by Palestinians against Israeli occupation? Was it planned from the top down or was it a spontaneous uprising as the Arabic name – intifada – would suggest? In other words, who set the agenda – the Palestinian leadership or the public mood and sentiment? Rival hypotheses abound and the argument continues.

For example, Yasser Arafat’s widow, Suha, told Dubai television in December 2012 that her late husband planned the intifada to show that he had not abandoned the Palestinian cause. Suha quoted her late husband as saying, “I might be martyred, but I shall bequeath our historic heritage to Zahwa [their daughter] and to the children of Palestine” (Suha Arafat, 2012).

Other observers argue vehemently to the contrary. Slater (2007), for one, called it a “myth” that Arafat seized upon the deadlock at Camp David and ordered a preplanned armed uprising. “The evidence strongly suggests that Arafat was caught by surprise by the intifada,” Slater said. The outbreak, he said, was directed not by Arafat but at Arafat for his failure to end the occupation and for the perceived corruption and ineffectiveness of his own Palestinian Authority. “Arafat,” Slater said, “was riding on the back of the tiger.” Although Arafat later seems to have gained some control over his Fatah fighters, Slater concluded that the explosion was spontaneous – a reflection of public mood and sentiment.
Accepting Slater’s argument, the present study was based on a simple count of words that were defined inductively as inflammatory or conciliatory (or “other”) and confirmed by a count of words defined in a generic dictionary as aggressive or passive (or “other”). The frequency with which a word is repeated enhances its impact. However, words differ in their degree of intensity. Sometimes a single explosive word can arouse more emotion than a quantity of more ordinary words. Weighting words according to their power to provoke or to calm is beyond the scope of this study, but it is conceded that further research into the relative strength of words would add precision to the Threat Index.

Finally, it is clear that leaders, whether in government or in the mass media, can be guided – even limited – by public opinion, or they can ignore conventional wisdom and influence news coverage by what they do (or don’t do). The influence of audience effects can travel both ways, especially when the weapons of choice include words, not always bullets.

Conclusion

This study makes major contributions both to theory and to practice. It contributes to mass communication theory by extending cultivation analysis beyond opinion to address its precursors and its consequences and beyond television to newspapers. This study also emphasizes a little-studied field of audience effects (on the medium) as a supplement and balance to media effects (on the audience). By its emphasis on the language of conflict and conciliation, the study contributes to speech act theory.

This study also contributes to practice by providing a Threat Index -- a promising tool to anticipate conflict and possibly manage it. The Threat Index by itself marks an advance by responding to the call from critics to give equal emphasis to peace initiatives, and not just conflict indicators. Future scholarship will have the benefit of a preliminary dictionary of
violence and conciliation. Previous studies have shown that the development of a dictionary for a specific purpose is a difficult but important component of content analysis – especially computerized content analysis.

This study had summoned additional scholarship to understand media behavior in conflict zones. The substantive finding of this dissertation indicates that media texts are not just chronicles and indicators of violent acts, but also are catalysts and predictors of violent behavior. While political, intellectual and emotional forces affect media texts, content in the media also retains the capacity to affect sociopolitical conditions within which they operate. While, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, media thus far have contributed to the approval of terrorism, the study also eludes to the potential power of media to become arbiters, brokers and preservers of peace. The study holds out hope that media in the region will come to execute their role as peacemakers.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A -- Definitions

“Définissez les termes, vous dis-je, oujamais nous ne nous entendrons” (Voltaire, 1764, freely translated by Allport (1940), as “If you would converse with me, first define your terms.”
“Toute définition est périlleuse.” [Definitions are dangerous.] (Maliacas, 2007.)

Words are among the sharpest weapons in the Arab-Israeli conflict as both sides seek to valorize themselves and demonize their opponents. Abused words include terrorism, massacre, retaliation, slaughter, Nazi, Holocaust, occupier, colonist, expulsion, transfer, torture, racist, and Zionist. Careless, vague and indiscriminate use of such words inflates the statistics and risks numbing participants to the very real abuses committed in the pursuit of otherwise noble causes.

The following definitions attempt more than the establishment of a vocabulary. The most controversial terms include a discussion of their nuances and provide background as to their range of meanings. The definition of Jew (below) is an example of the various shades of meaning.

1967 war = Also called the Six-Day War. In response to perceived threats from Egypt and Syria, Israel launched a pre-emptive strike, seizing the entire Sinai Peninsula (again) and the Gaza Strip (again) from Egypt, the West Bank and the rest of Jerusalem from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria. Arabic East Jerusalem was annexed to Israel, although administration of the Temple Mount was ceded to the Arab Waqf (foundation). Others were referred to as “occupied territories” under Israeli control. Shipler (2002) placed the West Bank and the Temple Mount of East Jerusalem in Jewish hands for the first time in 2,000 years – a mixed blessing because with the land came millions of Arab Muslims (p. 142). The new alignment made it clear to the Palestinians that they, not their brethren in other Arab countries, would have to carry the fight for self-rule. For the Arab countries, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza become political sticks with which to beat Israel as sympathies of the world shifted from the Israelis to the stateless and persecuted Palestinians.

Abbas, Mahmoud = Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Elected president of the Palestine Authority on the ticket of the Fatah political party. Nickname is Abu Mazen.

abrogate = To annul or to abolish by formal or official means. See Quran Surah 2:106. The Arabic word is mansukh.

Abu (or Abou) = Part of an Arabic name meaning father of. See ibn.
**Abu Mazen** = See Abbas.

**adhan** = Muslim call to prayer (Gladstone, 2012).

**AFP** = Agence France-Presse, the French news agency.

**Al-Aqsa mosque** = “The mosque completed in the 8th century atop the Haram Al-Sharif, or Noble Sanctuary, in the old city of Jerusalem; Arabs also use Al-Aqsa to refer to the whole area, which also contains the Dome of the Rock shrine. To Jews, the area is known as the Temple Mount, the site of the ancient Jewish temples” (Associates Press Stylebook: Christian, Jacobsen and Minthorn, Eds., 2009). The mosque was built about 720 A.D. See *Old City of Jerusalem*. The Arabic *Aqsa* translates as *farthest or remote* (Quran 17:1).

**al-Aqsa intifada** (2000-2005) = A spontaneous uprising by Palestinians against Israeli occupation. Possible triggers include failure of the Camp David summit earlier that year and Ariel Sharon’s visit in force to the Temple Mount. It ended with the Sharm el-Sheikh summit.

**al-fajr** = The Muslim day’s first call to prayer, before sunrise (Gladstone 2012).

**Al-harb ala al-erhab** = Arabic for the war on terror, frequently preceded with the phrase “ma yosamma” or the “so-called.”

**alim** = singular of ulama in Arabic.

**алиyah** (Hebrew) = To *make aliyah* is immigrate to Israel. Literally, to go up.

**Allah** = “The Arabic word for God” (Christian et al. (2009, p. 11). It is not intended to be a name for God. It *is* God.

**Allahu akbar** = “The Arabic phrase for *God is great*” (Christian et al., 2009, p. 11). Also: “God is greatest” (Mackey 2009). Also “God is greater” (Oliver & Steinberg, 1993, p. 10).

**Al-Quds** = Arabic name for Jerusalem; also the name of an independent daily newspaper published in Arabic in Jerusalem. Literally, *the holy*.

**амир** = See emir.

**annexation** = Jordan annexed the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1950 and became the only Arab nation to offer its refugees citizenship and passports. Jordan ceded its claims in 1988. Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967 and the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria in 1981. The annexations have not been generally recognized by the international community.

**anti-Semitism** = Prejudice against Jews (Lewis, 1986). He distinguished between anti-Semitism and black racism (p. 62). The ultimate purpose of the anti-Semite is “to eliminate, to destroy, and in the final stage physically to exterminate his victim. The black hater … purpose is
to dominate and humiliate, to use and exploit; certainly not to destroy. ... There are no pogroms, and there are no extermination camps.” Lewis (p. 20) and Said (1979, p. 59) agreed that criticism of Israel or Zionism does not necessary imply anti-Semitism. “It is not necessary to assume that Arab hostility to Israel is a result of anti-Semitism; there are other adequate reasons by which it can be explained.” Arab anti-Semitism, said Lewis (1998, p. 43) is primarily religious. Key anti-Semitic references cited by Lewis (1986, p. 199) included Canon Rohling’s Talmud Jew and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

April Understanding (1996) = Ended military conflict between Hezbollah (Lebanon) and Israel.

Arab = Literally, “dry” (Durant, 1950, p. 155.) For ease of reference, an Arab is defined as anyone who adopts the Arabic language (Arab cultural awareness, 2006, January; Mortimer, 1982, p. 231). But note that some Christians and even some Jews spoke Arabic as their first language. “In the 1931 census, at least 23 different languages were reported in use by ‘Moslems’ and most of those plus an additional 28 were in used by ‘Christians’ ” (Peters, 1984, p. 226). More a social term than an ethnic description (Peters, 1984, p. 142). Arabs living in the occupied territories have fewer privileges than Arabs who are citizens of Israel, who have fewer privileges than Jewish citizens. The term Arab -- as a place or as a people -- appears some 46 times in the Bible, from Deuteronomy to Galatians. Pan-Arabism indicates the desire to form a single union of all Arabic-speaking people. “For the moment,” said Lewis (1998, p. 141), “the Arab world remains a mosaic of separate nation-states, linked by language, culture, religion, and history, but not forming a political bloc and with no real desire for a closer union.” The attitude is seen most clearly in Palestine, where no country (except Jordan) was willing to accept the refugees from Arab-Israeli conflicts as citizens. Peters (1984) challenged the connection between language and ethnicity, claiming that the Omayyads were the only dynasty of Arab stock; the rest bonded on the basis of language and religion.

Arabic = the language of the Quran, of Muslim prayer, and of the law (Shariah). Spoken by Palestinians and in all countries surrounding Israel. One of two official languages of Israel (with Hebrew).

Arab nationalism = “The idea that the Arabs are a people linked by special bonds of language and history (and, it might be added, religion)” (Khalidi, 1991, p. vii).

Arab Revolt = A name given to several events, including 1916-1918 against the Ottoman Empire and 1936-1939 against the British (also called the Great Revolt).

Arafat, Yasser = Born 1929, died 2004. Chairman of the PLO, president of the Palestinian National Authority and a founder of the Fatah political party, which he led. Arafat was replaced by Mahmoud Abbas as head of the Palestine Liberation Organization and by Rawhi Fattuh as acting president of the Palestinian Authority.

ard = Arabic for land (Oliver & Steinberg, 1993, p. 16).

Ashkenazim = Derived from the Hebrew word for German (Entine, 2007, p. 20). Originally applied to Jews from Germany and Poland; later applied to Jews from Christian Europe, especially Poland and Russia. See Sephardim. Morris (1986) finds no difference between Ashkenazim and Sephardim in doctrine and almost no differences in law. Entine (2007, p. 203) argued that genetic evidence shows that most Ashkenazi Jews are not converts.

Assalamu alaikum = Arabic greeting, usually translated as “Peace be upon you.”

assassinations = Targeted murder of a public figure, done secretly for political purposes.

ayah = Arabic for a verse in the Quran. Literally, a sign. The plural is ayat.

ayan = Palestinian notables (Morris, 2004, p. 21).

Balfour Declaration of 1917 = Committed the British government to: 1. “view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,” and that 2. “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. Issued by Lord Arthur James Balfour, in his capacity as British foreign minister, in a letter to Baron Lionel Walter Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community. See Appendix D for the complete text.

bantustan = An offensive term referring to any of the black homelands in South Africa. PLO Chairman Arafat characterized the Palestinian state that the Israelis were willing to cede as “less than a bantustan” (Sontag, 2001, p. A10).

Bar-Lev Line = Israeli defensive position in the Sinai during the War of Attrition. Named after the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces.

bat = Hebrew for daughter of.

Beit Al-Makdes = Rarely used religious name for Jerusalem in Arabic. Also written Beit Al-Mahdes. See Page 1, Oct. 4, 2000, issue of Al-Quds for use by Arafat resorting to Muslim terms because he was addressing a delegation from Arab nations. Beit literally means house; Makdes means holy.

ben = Hebrew for son of.

Bernadotte peace proposal = Included two independent states, the right of refugees to return to their original homes and U.N. administration of Jerusalem. See Appendix C for the complete text and Appendix H, Annex 6, for a map illustrating Bernadotte’s proposal.
**Bible** – See Tanakh.

**bida** = Arabic for innovation or departure from precedent, but it has come to mean heresy (Durant, 1950). See *sunna*.

**bin** = Arabic for *son of*.

**Blue Line** = Identifies the line to which Israel withdrew after invading Lebanon in 2000. It is not quite the same as the Green Line, which marked the armistice line of Israel’s 1948 war for independence. See *Purple Line*, *Green Line*, *Red Lines* and *Bar-Lev Line*.

**border fence** = A network of barriers between Israel and the West Bank border along the 1949 armistice line or “Green Line.” Intended to protect Israelis from terrorist attacks. Palestinians refer to it as a wall, playing up the image of an apartheid wall, although only 5 percent of the barrier is a wall (Ross, 2004). Construction began in 2003. When completed, the barrier will extend for about 500 miles, of which 64% had been built or was under construction as of July 2010 (Baird, 2010). A similar separation fence was constructed between Israel and the Gaza Strip but it was less controversial. Opponents refer to it as the apartheid wall or segregation wall.

**buqra** = Arabic for tomorrow. Often used dismissively.

**Buraq** = In Muslim tradition, the winged steed that conveyed the Prophet Muhammad during an overnight journey from Mecca to Jerusalem in the seventh century.

**Buraq Wall** = In Muslim tradition, the place where the Prophet Muhammad tethered the winged steed that brought him from Mecca to Jerusalem in the seventh century. Known to Jews as the Western Wall or as the Wailing Wall or Kotel. See *Western Wall*.

**burqa** = Full-body robe worn by some Muslim women.

**caliph** = Successor to Muhammad in Sunni Islam. Chosen by consensus of the umma (worldwide community of believers). Sometimes used interchangeably with imam. The Sunnis and the Shiites split over succession to the office of caliph. The origin of the dispute was political – who should be the head of state, and by what right -- not religious (Lewis, 1998, p. 126).

**Camp David accords** (1978) = Of the two accords, the second was the more significant because it set the basis for the peace treaty the following year between Egypt and Israel. The first set of accords, which were not implemented, accepted Security Council Resolution 242 and provided for autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza. Jerusalem was not mentioned.

**Camp David summit** (2000) = Involved Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and U.S. President William J. Clinton. Notable for the scope and the detail of the negotiations. Arafat and Barak agreed to continue negotiations on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The summit failed to produce agreement on
territory, Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, refugees and the right of return, and Israeli security concerns. Although details were not announced officially, Israel’s Barak was said (Sontag, 2000) to have offered control of 88% to 95% of the West Bank, 100% of the Gaza Strip, creation of a Palestinian state in those areas, removal of isolated settlements, some exchange of land, Palestinian control over East Jerusalem including most of the Old City and religious sovereignty over the Temple Mount. Arafat rejected the deal, but did not propose alternatives, causing Clinton to blame Arafat for the failure of the summit (Ross, 2004).

**Church of the Holy Sepulchre** = Believed to have been built on the site of the death and resurrection of Jesus in the Old City of Jerusalem, and thus holy to Christians.

**Churchill White Paper** of 1922 = Reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration, adding that “the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded ‘in Palestine.’”

**conciliation** = To overcome distrust or animosity; to appease; to regain or try to regain peaceful relations. Used interchangeably with reconciliation. One form of conflict resolution.

**country** = Similar to nation, but emphasizing unity based on similarity of place.


**Dar al-Sulh** = the House of Truce. (Lewis, 1993, p. 50).

**darura** = Arabic for the doctrine of necessity (Lewis, 1993, p. 45).

**dhull** = Arabic for poor, humble and degraded. “The word most commonly used of the Jews” (Lewis, 1973, p. 165).

**midrash** = A rabbinical interpretation of ancient Jewish texts (Entine, 2007, p. 17)

**dhimmi** = A non-Muslim in a Muslim territory. Refers primarily to Christians and Jews. The concept obliges the state to protect non-Muslims’ life, property and freedom of worship in return for loyalty and payment of a poll tax known as the *jizya* (Morris, 2001, p. 9). Dhimmis are exempt from military service and payment of the zakat (alms – one of the five pillars of Islam). The rights and obligations were defined by the Pact of Umar, who was one of Muhammad’s successors (Morris, 2001, p. 9). Enforcement of dhimmi rules was subject to the ruling authority (Yeor, 1996, p. 38-39). Applied mostly or exclusively to Jews (Peters, 1984).

**dhimmitude** = A neologism used by Bat Yeor (1996), pseudonym of author Gisele Littman, to describe the subservience and humiliation of Jews in Arab Muslim countries.
**Dome of the Rock** = A shrine on the Temple Mount in East Jerusalem. The third-holiest site in Islam. Highly visible due to its gold dome, which shelters a “scarred outcrop of limestone … At the direction of God, the Bible recounts, Israelite King David built an altar on or near the rock about 1000 B.C. His ambition to erect a Temple to the Lord was fulfilled by his son, King Solomon” (Johns, facing p. 24). “The first surviving monument of Islam … above the Holy Rock where David’s alter stood and from where the Prophet made his famous night journey to heaven” (Holt, Lambton & Lewis, 1970, Vol. 2, p. 704). Jewish tradition holds that Abraham, in obedience to God's command, was prepared to sacrifice his son Isaac on this rock. Muslim tradition agrees, except that the son was Ishmael. (See 2 Chronicles 3:1 in the Tanakh in Appendix E and Sura 37:102-110 in the Quran in Appendix F.)

**diyi** = Arabic for blood money; compensation (Norton, 1987).

**Druze** = a Muslim sect (Said, 1994, p. 102). Some members have made peace with Israel.

**dunam** = An Ottoman unit of land area; equal to about a quarter of an acre.

**effendi** = Turkish title of respect; a notable; a large Arab landowner (Morris, 2001). An Arab landlord (Peters, 1984).


**Eretz Yisrael** = Literally, Hebrew for the Land of Israel. Connotation includes Samaria and Judea (the Palestinian West Bank) and all the territory once ruled by Kings David and Solomon, including land on the east bank of the Jordan River, now in the state of Jordan. See Israel.

**erhab** = Arabic for terror; specifically, intimidating or frightening.

**ethnicity** = A vague term with an evolving definition. Lewis (1998, p. 17) suggests: “a cultural identity within a nationality,” such as Scots and Welsh, but then cites exceptions, such as Bretons and Basques. Lewis (1998, p. 59) notes that in all but a few European states, the name of the country is also the name of the principal or only language and the dominant or only ethnic group. Banks (1996, p. 151) observes that ethnic groups “invariably stress common ancestry or endogamy.” The U.S. Census Bureau distinguishes between race and ethnicity. It asks respondents to identify themselves by race and, separately, by membership in one of two ethnicities -- either “Hispanic or Latino” or “not Hispanic or Latino.” In Egypt, for example, Egyptian would designate a nationality, Arab an ethnicity, and Muslim a religious affiliation. Arab leaders have long attempted to forge pan-Arab bonds that would transcend nationality, but they have faltered. The identity card that all Israelis are required to carry contains a line “clearly intended to mean ethnic nationality, the usual answers … being Jewish or Arab” (Lewis, 1998, p. 81).
**euphemisms** = A polite word for an impolite idea. Examples include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expression</th>
<th>Euphemism</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>apartheid wall</td>
<td>border fence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assassination</td>
<td>targeted killing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>colonist</td>
<td>settler, Israeli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concentration camp</td>
<td>refugee camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expulsion</td>
<td>transfer of population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>illegal squatter</td>
<td>settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>murdered</td>
<td>killed in clashes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occupied territories</td>
<td>administered territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>politicide</td>
<td>transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>settlements</td>
<td>colonies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suicide bomber</td>
<td>shahid, holy martyr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>terrorist</td>
<td>extremist, militant, freedom fighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transfer (of population)</td>
<td>ethnic cleansing (itself a euphemism), eviction, deportation, evacuation, apartheid, forced exodus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violence</td>
<td>resistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**exercitive** = A speech act that determines what is possible in a given realm. Refers to the giving of a decision in favor of or against a course of action, or advocacy of it. A decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgment that it is so. Examples: actions of appointing, ordering, proclaiming, and recommending. Unlike verdictives (which see), the uttering of an exercitive brings about a state of affairs. Example: A priest pronounced a couple married; a judge sentences a person found guilty; a employer says “You’re fired!” The utterance instantly makes it so. Austin (1975), p. 142, 151, 154. See **verdictive**.

**Faisal-Weizmann Agreement** (1919) = Between Chaim Weizmann, who would become president of the World Zionist Organization, representing Jews, and Emir Faisal, son of the King of the Hejaz, representing Arabs. Faisal agreed to a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and Weizmann agreed to support an independent Arab nation in the Arab territories of the Middle East. Muslim holy places were to be under Muslim control. The agreement did not survive the year because the British and French had previously struck their own secret deal in the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, which divided the Middle East between them, placing both Arab unity and Arab independence out of reach. Muslih (1988, p. 121-122) “Its main significance lies in the evidence it presents regarding Faysal’s desire to promote Arab-Jewish cooperation so long as that did not compromise Arab independence. … Faysal believed that through cooperation with the Jews he would avoid becoming too indebted to the French and would even ‘squeeze them’ out of Syria.” The French ousted Faysal from Syria in 1920.

**Fatah** = The dominant political party in the Palestine Liberation Organization. Led by Mahmoud Abbas. Controls the West Bank government. “A secular Palestinian party and former guerrilla movement founded [in 1965] by Yasser Arafat (Christian et al., 2009, p. 105). Said (1979, p. 161) concluded that “Fatah … is the most likely Palestinian political group ever to be able to come to a responsible political settlement with its enemies. … Fatah and Arafat, in particular, are pragmatic.” Primarily a military group, not a political party, “commit[ted] to armed struggle” See Fatah Constitution in Appendix C.
**fataja** = Arabic for to open or to liberate.

**fatwa** = a Muslim religious ruling or verdict on matters ranging from family law to jihad. “An authoritative interpretation of religious responsibility (Norton, 1987, p. 113). A New York Times story (Goldberg, 2000) about Haqqania, a Pakistan madrasa, said it had issued upward of 100,000 fatwas. The most famous fatwa was issued by the Iranian government against author Salman Rushdie. Compare responsa in Judaism. Used as a summons to a holy war (Peters, 1984).

**Fayyad, Salam** = Prime minister of the Palestinian National Authority since 2007.


**fellahin** = Arab peasants (Peters, 1984).

**fence** = See border fence.

**First Temple** = See temple.


**fitra** = Arabic for the doctrine that all people are born Muslims, but some are corrupted by their parents.

**Franj** = Frank, French or, colloquially, all Westerners (Lewis, 1986, p. 17).

**fundamentalist** = In an interview with Elizabeth Wasserman, Lewis (2004, April 15) points out the “absurdity” of referring to Islamists as "fundamentalists." "Fundamentalist" is an American expression denoting belief in the literal divine origin of scripture – something that all Muslims, militant or otherwise, believe about the Quran (Lewis, 2004, pp. 308-309).

**Galilee** = Northern Israel. Bordered on the north by Lebanon, on the west by the Mediterranean Sea and on the east by the Golan Heights.

**Gaza Strip** = One of the Muslim territories occupied by Israel. 140 square miles in a rectangular shape bounded by Israel, Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea. See map in Appendix H. Population: 1.5 million – 70% below the poverty line, 40% unemployment. Israel unilaterally removed its troops and settlers in 2005 but still controls access. Hamas won legislative elections in 2006 and ousted Fatah in violent clashes in 2007 (CIA World Factbook, 2010; Cooper and Bronner, 2010).
**Gazi** = Arabic for warrior for the faith.

**Gemara** = A Jewish holy book. The second part of the Talmud. Mainly a commentary on the Mishna, which is the first part.

**Geneva accord** (2003) = An unofficial document produced by Israeli and Palestinian opposition leaders. It called for Palestinians to give up the demand for the return of refugees, Israel to cede East Jerusalem including the Temple Mount but not its Western Wall. About half of the settlers in the West Bank would have to leave, and access to holy places would be policed by an international committee. Officials from both Israel and Palestine denounced the accord, but it remains in the background.


**Golan Heights** = Strategic region of about 690 square miles, rising from sea level to 9,000 feet northeast of the Sea of Galilee, near Damascus, the capital of Syria. Bounded by Syria on the east, Israel on the west, Lebanon on the north and Jordan on the south. Seized by Israel in the 1967 war. See a map in Appendix H. Permanent status remains to be determined.

**Great Revolt of 1936-1939** = See Arab Revolt.


**Gush Emunim** = Literally, the Bloc of the Faithful. The messianic Jewish settler movement. “To give up the land of Israel would be to reject the mandate of God and turn one’s back on the redemptive revolution” (Friedman, 1989).

**Hadiths** = Reports of what the Prophet Muhammad said and did, as recorded by his associates. Second in authority to the Quran, the Hadiths have the force of law in Islam. The Hadiths compiled by Imam al-Bukhari (died 870) and Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj (died 875) are considered the most authentic. For a more detailed discussion, see Appendix F.


**Haggadah** = Traditional Jewish literature, especially the nonlegal part of the Talmud. Tells the story of the Israelites escape from slavery in Egypt.
**Halakhah** = The totality of Jewish law, based on a hierarchy, under which the older the source, the greater its authority. Compare Shariah in Islam.

**halal** = Permitted under Islamic law. For example, meat that has been slaughtered according to Islamic law would be *halal* (De la Baume, 2010).


**Haniyeh, Ismail** = Appointed prime minister of the Palestinian National Authority in 2006. Dismissed from office in 2007 but continues to function in the Gaza Strip. A senior political leader of Hamas.

**haram** = Arabic for *forbidden* (Gettleman and Ibrahim, 2010) or *off-limits*.

**Haram al-Sharif** = “Arabic for Noble Sanctuary, the Arabic name for the walled, elevated area in Jerusalem’s Old City that was the site of the ancient Jewish Temples. Better known as the Temple Mount [which see], the area now housing the centuries-old Dome of the Rock shrine [at the center of the plaza]; and Al-Aqsa mosque [at the southern end]. Muslims believe Prophet Muhammad made his night journey to heaven from the site” (Christian et al., 2009). Note: *Al-* does not precede *Haram*; the *al* that precedes *Sharif* is lowercase. Note also the lowercase “m” in reference to the “Al-Aqsa mosque.” But when referring to a specific church, AP style is to capitalize church (which see). Also written *al-haram ash-sharif* (Oliver & Steinberg, 1993, p. 17).

**Har haBayit** = Hebrew for the Temple Mount (which see).


**Hatikvah** = Israel’s national anthem.

**Hebrew** = 1. One of two official languages of Israel (with Arabic). Also the sacred language of Judaism worldwide. Member of a Semitic language group that includes Aramaic and Arabic. Its development is supervised the Academy of the Hebrew Language in Jerusalem. 2. An
Israelite; a Jew; a descendant of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Lewis (1986, p. 52) remarked that the word Hebrew does not occur in the Old Testament as the name of a language. The language spoken by the Israelites was called either “Jewish” or “the language of Canaan” (Isaiah 19:18). See Israelite and Jew.

Hejaz = Territory west of the Red Sea in modern Saudi Arabia. Contains Islam’s holiest cities: Mecca, where the Prophet Mohammad was born, and Medina, where he died.

heredim = Hebrew for the religiously ultra-Orthodox. Literally, “those in awe of God” (Kershner, 2010, Dec. 29). They make up 10 percent of Israel’s population of 7.5 million, but are increasing.


hijab = Headscarf worn by Muslim women, sometimes with a veil covering the face except for the eyes.

hijra = Arabic for breaking off, migration or flight. Refers to the emigration of the Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina in 622. The Muslim lunar calendar – the hijra – dates from that event.


Holocaust = The systematic mass murder of some 5 million to 6 million Jews by the Germans during World War II. Those who escaped or survived accounted for the largest immigration surge in the history of Israel. Further, Mahler (2004, p. 34) said the Jews drew two lessons from the experience: “First, that nothing is ever ‘too horrible to happen,’ and second, that Israel must never again be in a position in which it must depend upon others for its very survival.” Sympathy for the suffering to which the Jews were subjected produced international support for the establishment of Israel as a Jewish homeland. Palestinians object that they are being asked to surrender land that is theirs by inheritance in compensation for atrocities committed by other people in other places. Israel’s fixation on security is explained in part by memories of the Holocaust, although it is only one of numerous massacres suffered by Jews since biblical times. Lewis (1986) cites Bohdan Khmelnitky beginning in 1648 and the Russian pogroms beginning in 1881, among others. Lewis (1986, p. 203) sums up the attitude of some Muslims to the Holocaust as “not our affair, not our fault and not to be remedied at our expense.”
holy sites = Jerusalem, Nablus (where God confirmed his covenant with Abraham), Hebron (south of Jerusalem, where Abraham and his family were buried), and Bethlehem (Rachel’s tomb).

Holy Land = Refer generally to the territory included in the original Palestinian mandate; more recently, Israel and its occupied territories: West Jerusalem, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. See Palestine and Israel.

Holy of Holies = The part of the Jewish temple containing the Ark of the Covenant. Entry is forbidden to all except for the high priest on Yom Kippur. Since its exact location is not known, Orthodox rabbis forbid Jews from praying anywhere on the Temple Mount.

Hope Simpson Report of 1930 = Recommended limiting Jewish immigration because of agricultural land was insufficient to support a larger population.

hudna = Arabic for truce.

hurriya = Arabic for freedom.

ibn (or bin) = Part of an Arabic name meaning son of. See abu.

IDF = Israel Defense Forces: The Israeli army, navy and air force.

ijma = Arabic for the doctrine of consensus (Lewis, 1993, p. 45).

illocutionary = A complete speech act; an utterance in which the speaker informs, asserts, demands, promises, vows or suggests; issued in the course of the doing of an action; the aim of the speaker. Austin (1975), p. 109. 114

imam = “Used by some sects [mostly Sunni Muslims] as a title for the prayer leader at a mosque. Among the Shiites, it usually has a more exalted connotation” (Christian et al., 2009). Engineer (2000), a Shiite, maintains that after the Prophet, the imam is at the top of the religious hierarchy, “believed to be m’asum, i.e. infallible. … He is a perfect man.” See caliph.

inshallah = Arabic for “if it be the will of God.” Commonly added to expressions of intent.

Istiqlal = One of the powerful Palestinian/Arabic/Muslim parties under the British mandate. See Nashashibi.

inalienable = That which cannot be given away or taken away. Synonymous with unalienable, which is the word used in the American Declaration of Independence. Commonly used with statements supporting Palestinian rights.
**intifada** = “An Arabic term for Palestinian uprisings against Israel” (Christian et al., 2009). Literally, “shaking off.” The first intifada lasted from 1987 to about 1991; the second, called the Al-Aqsa intifada, from 2000 to about 2005. Both appear to have arisen from spontaneous protests by Palestinian youths against Israeli domination. The specific events that triggered the start and the end of the uprisings remain debated. The commonly postulated causes were trivial incidents against a background of populist Muslim discontent. Friedman (1989, p. 373) finds significance in the Arabs decision to call their action as intifada rather than as thawra, the Arabic word for revolt. The first intifada, he said, marked the culmination of the process of transforming the West Bankers and Gazans from Jordanized and Egyptianized Palestinians into a Palestinian people with a newfound sense of solidarity. The second intifada, called the Al-Aqsa intifada, left 900 Israelis dead after three years (Ross, 2004, p. 777).


**Ishmael** = In both Jewish and Muslim tradition, the son of Abraham by his servant Hagar and the half-brother of Isaac, who was the father of Jacob, renamed Israel by God. Ishmael also is the father-in-law of Jacob’s brother Esau. Muslims believe that Ishmael is the forebear of the Arabs and ancestor of the Prophet Muhammad.

**Islam** = Arabic for surrender [to God]; those who have made their peace with God (Durant, 1950, p. 167). Fiercely monotheistic, strongly evangelical. Based on the teachings of the Quran, which is considered to be the verbatim word of God (Allah), and on the sayings and examples of the prophet Muhammad as collected from his companions in the volumes of the Hadiths. *Islam* identifies both a system of belief and an entire civilization. “Followers are called Muslims. Their holy book is the Quran, which according to Islamic belief was revealed by Allah (God) to the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century in Mecca and Medina. The place of worship is a mosque. … It is the religion of more than 1 billion people in the world, making it the second largest faith after Christianity. Although Arabic is the language of the Quran and Muslim prayers, not all Arabs are Muslims and not all Muslims are Arabs … The adjective is Islamic” (Christian et al., 2009, p. 144). Lewis (1998, p. 27) emphasizes that all-embracing role of religion in internal and external affairs, resulting in an exclusivity with rough parallels in Judaism. In classic Islam, religion and government are inseparable. Islam, said Lewis (1998, p. 50) constitutes the main claim to allegiance (over state and family). The two major divisions of Islam are Sunni, which predominate in Palestine, and Shiite. The language of the Quran and the states bordering Israel is Arabic. Of the 1+ billion Muslims worldwide, more than 200,000 are Arabs (Arab cultural awareness, 2006). Lewis (1998, p. 141) sees some inconclusive interest in forming a pan-Islamic state, but it has been subordinate to nationalist self-preservation. See *pillars* and *Arab*.

**Islamic** = The adjective referring to Islam (Christian et al., 2009).
Islamic Resistant Movement = Hamas (Christian et al., 2009).

Islamist = An advocate of the philosophy that the Quran should rule all aspects of life.

Israel = The Jewish state, bordered by the Mediterranean Sea on the west, Jordan on the east, Lebanon on the north and Egypt on the southwest. Declared independence in 1948. Parliamentary democracy. About the size and shape of New Jersey. Terrain includes a low coastal plain, Negev desert in the south, central mountains and Jordan Rift Valley. About 15% of the land is arable. See maps in Appendix H. Population of 7.7 million includes 1.6 million Muslim citizens. Population includes 300,000 settlers in the West Bank, 193,000 in East Jerusalem and 19,000 in the Golan Heights (Klinger, 2011). Despite British efforts to restrain or prevent the sale of land to Jews during the mandatory period, they owned about 6.6% of Palestine by the end of 1947 (Said, 1979, p. 98). The figure understates the significance of the landholding because it was concentrated in the most productive regions. More land was added to Israeli rolls by confiscating property from absentee landlords – mostly Arab families who had fled as refugees. Four major wars, one war of attrition, two Lebanese wars, two intifadas and numerous lesser conflicts have left Israel in control of the West Bank of the Jordan River and East Jerusalem (from Jordan), the Gaza Strip (from Egypt) and the Golan Heights (from Syria and Lebanon). Official languages: Hebrew and Arabic. Capital: Jerusalem. Prime minister, elected in 2009: Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud party). Its citizens are Israelis (CIA World Factbook, 2010; Bell, 2010). Eretz Israel translates as the Land of Israel; Medinat Israel as the State of Israel. “To most Jews, Israel was a blood link that had persisted through crises of history, an idea as much as a country, a historic mission and a national identity” (Entine, 2007, p. 242).

Israeli = Biblical name for the descendants of Isaac’s son Jacob, whom God renamed Israel. See Hebrew and Jew.

Israel Defense Forces = Consists of the army, navy and air force.

IZL = See Irgun Zvai Leumi.

Jerusalem = Hebrew for City of Peace. In Arabic, the city is called al-Quds Ash-Sharif, meaning the holy, in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence (See Appendix C). About 35 miles east of the Mediterranean Sea. One of the world’s oldest cities. First occupied about 6,000 years ago. Captured by King David, who made it his capital about 1000 B.C. Destroyed and rebuilt eight times. Captured by Muslim Arabs in 638 A.D., by the Christian Crusaders in 1099, by the Muslim general Saladin in 1187, by the Turkish Ottomans in 1915, by the British in 1917. Made the capital of Israel when it declared independence in 1948. Palestinians have announced their intention to make it the capital of their future state. The holiest city in Judaism, the third-holiest city in Islam, and sacred also to Christians. The “Old City” is traditionally divided into four sections, or quarters: Armenian, Christian, Jewish and Muslim. Population: about 750,000. Divided in 1948 by Israel’s war of independence into East and West Jerusalem. East Jerusalem was annexed in 1950 by Jordan and in 1967 by Israel. The old walled city lies within East Jerusalem, which was captured by Israel in the 1967 war. The United Nations Security Council repeatedly condemned the Israeli annexation, especially in Resolution 478 (See Appendix D).
Jerusalem, Zion, and Israel are synonymous in Jewish prayer (Davis & Decter, 1982, p. 159). See Old City of Jerusalem.

**Jew** = The definition is controversial, even in Israel. According to rabbinic law, a Jew is anyone whose mother is a Jew. “He remains legally a Jew even after conversion to another religion. … Clearly, this is not a purely religious definition, since Jewishness can be acquired by inheritance” (Lewis, 1986, p. 19). At its most restrictive, the definition comprises only those who descended from Abraham and Sarah. Reform Judaism accepts anyone whose parent is a Jew.

“Equally clearly, it is not a racial definition; for the racist, fathers are no less important than mothers, and racial identity cannot be acquired by conversion or forfeited by apostasy” (Lewis, 1986, p. 19). Converts under the rules of Halakhah are accepted but discouraged.

The definition acquires practical significance under Israel’s Law of Return, which grants automatic citizenship to anyone who claims to be a Jew. Subsequent amendments and court cases add complexity.

Nazi Germany defined Jews as a race, which retains its identity regardless of language or religion. Arabs maintain that Judaism is a religion, and Jews are citizens of the country in which they were born or have been residing (Arafat, 1974).

Religion, culture, parentage, ethnicity, race, politics, DNA and citizenship overlap in varying degrees. Some Jews who are not religiously observant prefer to define themselves culturally or ethnically. Ethnic types include Ashkenazim (from Christian Europe) and Sephardim (sometimes called “Oriental”) from Muslim countries, especially Spain and Portugal. Most differences between Ashkenazim and Sephardim are cultural and economic.

Under the laws of Israel, DNA alone cannot determine who is a Jew (Entine, 2007). To Entine, ancestry is destiny (p. 18). Key words are exceptionalism and chosenness (Entine, 2007, p. 19). “Throughout the Greek empire, Jews gradually became known by their unique devotion to One God and their ancestry connection to Abraham rather than as citizens of a particular nation” (Entine, 2007, p. 114). “As it stands today, Jewishness is a function of religion and ancestry, shaped by faith, politics, and culture (Entine, 2007, p. 348). See Judaism, Arab, Israelite and Hebrew.

**Jewish Agency** = Recognized by the British as the official representative of the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine. Established in 1929 to facilitate the immigration of Jews to Palestine and, after 1948, to Israel.

**Jezreel Valley** = Israel’s largest valley. A vast and fertile plain, also called Plain of Esdraelon and Valley of Armageddon. It lies at the base of the Mount Carmel range in the north of Israel (Miller, 2004).

**jihad** = Literally, struggle in Arabic. A complex notion that includes the duty to spread Allah’s truth to nonbelievers (Lewis, 1986, p. 13). It includes both violence (war to advance or to protect the cause of Allah) and nonviolence (self-improvement). “Often understood both within the Muslim tradition and beyond it as warfare against infidels” (Landau-Tasseron, 2003, p. 35). “Holy War against infidels” (Holt, Lambton & Lewis, 1970, p. 908). Jihad for just cause is an obligation of all Muslims (Quran, 2:216). A key element of debate is who may call for a militant jihad. The New York Times (Mekhenne t, 2010) quotes German imam Hesham Shashaaz: “It
must be the head of state or caliphate who announces jihad.” Brandon (2002, Sept. 11, p. 8) said, “For most Muslims it means striving for spiritual good,” as in a personal or inner struggle (Arab cultural awareness, p. 46). “The word jihad is derived from the verb jahada which means: “he exerted himself.” Thus literally, jihad means exertion, striving; but in juridico-religious sense, it signifies the exertion of one's power to the utmost of one's capacity in the cause of Allah. Self-improvement probably is not what an Arabic crowd has in mind when calling for jihad at the funeral of a leader killed by an Israeli targeted assassination. The Christmas suicide bomber in Sweden made a recording before his death, apologizing for misleading his family into thinking he was traveled to the Middle East on business, whereas he really went, he said, “for jihad” (Mackey, 2010). And Colleen R. LaRose, who was charged with trying to recruit Islamic terrorists to kill a cartoonist, used the pseudonym JihadJane (Burns and Somaiya, 2010, Dec. 13, p. A6, A12). See Appendix F for quotations from the Quran regarding jihad. In Arabic, jihad is written:

جهاد

jilbab = “Ankle-length button-down overcoat” worn by some Muslim women ( Slackman and Bronner, 2010, July 14, p. A9).

jizya = A tax by the Muslim state on infidel males of military age.

Jordan River = Boundary between Israel and Jordan. Rises near Mount Herman in Lebanon and flows south for 70 miles through the Sea of Galilee, emptying into the Dead Sea. Largest river in Israel. About 30 yards across and 2 to 10 feet deep. At least 60 fords cross river. The river valley averages about six miles wide but widens to 15 miles in the plain of Jericho north of the Dead Sea (Miller, 2004, p. 222).

Judah = Great-grandson of Abraham. Also the name for the Southern Kingdom, which formed after the death of King Solomon. The capital of the Kingdom of Judah was Jerusalem. See Northern Kingdom, Samaria and Judea. ( Berlin & Brettler, 2004, p. 2132.) The term Jew is derived from Judah, the leading tribe in the Southern Kingdom.

Judaism = A mixture of religion, ancestry, law, custom, culture, ethnicity, way of life, and tradition in different proportions among different Jews. Firmly monotheistic, relying on God’s covenant with Abraham and his successors. Not at all evangelistic. Denominations include Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, Reconstructionism and Hasidism. The Ultra-Orthodox, non-Zionist Jews, known in Hebrew as Haredim, want a Jewish state, run by Jewish law; the secular Zionists, who build the new state of Israel, want a state for Jews (Friedman, 1989, p. 300, quoting Rabbi Nota Schiller). “The term ‘Judaism’ does not appear in any Hebrew text until the eleventh century CE” when it was used to signify a way of life, not a religion (Lewis, 1998, p. 86). Genetics has … reaffirmed the cultural history of the Jewish people as originating in the Middle East, the central narrative of Judaism (Entine, 2007, p. 350).

Judea = The Roman name for the territory of Judah ( Berlin & Brettler, 2004). Used by the modern state of Israel to refer to the West Bank south of Jerusalem. See Samaria and Judah.
**Kaaba** = The sacred shrine at Mecca toward which Muslims turn when they pray (NY Times Stylebook). Literally, square, from which English derives *cube* (Durant 1950). Embedded in the Kaaba is the Black Stone, believed to have been sent from heaven. Muslims believe it was built by the first man, Adam, and rebuilt by Abraham and Ishmael. “Moslem scholars interpret it as symbolizing that part of Abraham’s progeny (Ishmael and his offspring) which, rejected by Israel, became, they think, the founders of the Quraish tribe” (Durant, 1950, p. 161). The Kaaba stands near the center of the Masjid al-Haram (Sacred Mosque).

**Keffiyeh** = The distinctive black and white or red and white scarf worn by Arab men. Worn distinctively by Yasser Arafat.

**Khartoum resolution of 1967** = Arab heads of state, reacting defiantly to their defeat in the 1967 war, vowed no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel. Their statement became known as the “Three Nos.” Morris (2001, p. 346) blamed the Arab rejectionism in part on Israel’s “unwillingness or inability to consider withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza as part of any peace settlement. It was another missed opportunity for peace.

**Kibbutz** = An Israeli communal farm. Most property is owned in common. See *moshavot*.

**King-Crane Commission (1919)** = Opposed making Palestine a Jewish commonwealth and recommends limiting Jewish immigration. Appendix C has the full text.

**Kotel** = Jewish prayer plaza in front of the Western Wall of the Temple Mount.

**Knesset** = Israel’s unicameral parliament. It has 120 members. The leading political parties are Kadima, centrist, formed to support Ariel Sharon’s plan to withdraw unilaterally from Gaza, 28 seats; Likud, right-wing, 27; Israel Beiteinu, which takes a hard line toward peace, 15; Labor, center-left, 13; Shas, ultra-orthodox religious, 4; six others, 22.

**Lebanon war (first)** = 1982. Israel invaded southern Lebanon in response to terror attacks emanating from there.

**Lebanon war (second)** = 2006. Israel returned to Lebanon to attack Hezbollah, which had abducted two Israeli soldiers.

**Left-wing parties** (Israeli politics) = Distinguished by their willingness to compromise with the Palestinians, to make territorial concessions for peace, and to agree to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Labor Alignment [the left] viewed the West Bank and Gaza in terms of security and advocated selective settlement; the Likud [the right] agreed and added historic rights, seeing the West Bank as a vital target for settlement (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 14).

**Lehi** = Smallest and most radical of the three Zionist paramilitary groups operating in the last years of the British mandate in Palestine. Also called the Stern Gang or Stern Group.

**Levant** = A vague term for the land east of the Mediterranean Sea.

**Lausanne protocol** = A 1923 agreement between Turkey and Greek to exchange populations. Turkish adherents of the Greek Orthodox religion were sent to Greece, and Greek adherents to Islam were sent to Turkey. The protocol sometimes is cited as a model for how a two-state solution might be implemented in the Holy Land (Lewis, 1998).

**lines** = See separate entries for Red Line, Green Line, Blue Line, Purple and Bar-Lev Line.

**MacDonald White Paper** = See White Paper.


**mandate** = A kind of license to govern a foreign territory; a system formalized by the League of Nations for the winners in World War I to administer conquered territories (in effect, to rule them as colonies), including Palestine under Article 22A.

**Mamluks** = Turkish slaves used by sultans as soldiers; repelled Crusaders and Mongols (Viorst, 2007, p. 16).

**mandatory Palestine** = The territory east of the Mediterranean Sea. Conquered by Britain in World War I. When the war ended, the League of Nations appointed Britain to administer the territory.

**Mapai** = An acronym for the “Labor Party of the Land of Israel” (Meir, 1975, p. 194).

**Maronites** = The largest Christian group in Lebanon. It is Roman Catholic with ties to France.

**masjid** = Arabic, usually translated as mosque, but the word “implies much more than the recognizable building where Muslims pray … any place a Muslim prays is a masjid, in the literal sense – a place of prostration” (Stacey, 2009).

**mashreq** = Includes present-day Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine – the Arab core (Viorst, 2007, p. 8 and 33).

**massacre** = The indiscriminate killing of three or more people, who usually are unsuspecting, helpless and unresisting.

muezzin = Arabic for crier (Morris, 2001, p. 112). The one who summons the faithful to prayer from one of a mosque’s minarets.


disengagement agreement (1974) = Ended open warfare between Syria and Israel, but fell short of a peace treaty.


mizrah = Jewish direction of prayer – from afar, toward Israel; in Israel, toward Jerusalem; in Jerusalem, toward the Temple; in the temple, toward the Holy of Holies. See qibla.

moshavot = A form of rural settlement in Israel. Unlike a kibbutz, most property is privately owned. See kibbutz.

Mossad = Israel’s external secret service, similar to the CIA in the United States. Officially, the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations. Israel’s foreign intelligence service (Morris, 2001, p. 106).

Muhammad = Born 570 A.D., died 632 A.D. The chief prophet and central figure of the Islamic religion (Christian et al., 2009). Prophet Muhammad (Christian et al., 2009). The name means “highly praised” (Durant, p. 162).

Muslims = “The preferred term to describe adherents of Islam” (Christian et al.). Arabic for the surrendering ones – i.e., those who have made their peace with God (Durant, 1950, p. 167. “One who surrenders himself to the will of God” Not Muhammadans.

Moslems = See Muslims.

Mount Zion = The largest of the several hills on which Jerusalem was built, now occupied by the Domition Church near the Armenian Quarter of the Old City. See Zion and Zionism. A valley used to separate Mount Zion from Mount Moriah, but it has been filled with rubble.

mufti = a Muslim cleric who is authorized to issue fatwas. A scholar who interprets Islamic law (Viorst, 2007, p. 74).

mujahedeen = Arabic for holy warriers; Muslim fighters (Sahih Bukhari, Volume 4, Book 52, Number 44). Singular: mujahid. The root of the word (j-h-d) is the same as for jihad. The prefix “mu” means “one who …”
**mukhabarat** = Arabic for security agents (Norton, 1987); secret police (Oliver & Steinberg, p. 3).

**mukhtar** = Arabic village chief (Wasserstein, 1978, p. 102)

**mullah** = An Islamic leader or teacher; often a general title of respect for a learned man. Learned exponent of Muslim doctrine and law (Durant, 1950, p. 332).

**Muslim Brothers** = “The largest and most influential Islamic fundamentalist organization in the West Bank. Israel refrained from taking action against the Muslim Brothers, viewing it as a religious movement” (Shalev, 1991, p. 27).

**Nashashibi** = One of the powerful Palestinian/Arabic/Muslim clans in mandatory Palestine.

**nation** = similar to country, but emphasizing unity based on similarity of its people (e.g., religion, ethnicity, language) but connoting also sovereignty and territory, as in United Nations and National Bank, and thus synonymous with state. Lewis (1998, p. 24) takes note of arguments that equate nationalism with racism because they might usurp allegiance to Allah and Shariah law, which transcend national boundaries, but he also defines nation as “a group of people held together by a common language, belief in a common descent and in a shared history and language” (Lewis, 1998, p. 81).

**Negev** = Desert region in the south of Israel, covered by a layer of fertile loam that requires irrigation to be productive.

**Nebi Musa** = Arabic for Prophet Moses. Also the name of a religious festival celebrated annually near Easter by Palestinian Muslims with a pilgrimage to his tomb near Jericho. The Palestinian National Authority has jurisdiction over the tomb.

**nidaat** = Arabic for leaflets (Oliver & Steinberg, 1993, p. 4).

**niqab** = the face veil worn by some Arabic women. Only the eyes are left visible.

**Noble Sanctuary** = See Temple Mount.

**Northern Kingdom** = The diminished Kingdom of Israel, which split in two after the death of King Solomon. See Samaria and Southern Kingdom.

**Old City of Jerusalem** = “The walled part of the city” (Christian et al., 2009). Constituted all of Jerusalem until the 1860s. About 0.4 of a square mile within the modern city of Jerusalem. It contains sites holy to three religions: the Western Wall for Jews, Haram al-Sharif for Muslims, and Church of the Holy Sepulchre for Christians. See Jerusalem. Divided roughly into four sections, or quarters: Muslim, Christian, Jewish and Armenian. Maps in Appendix H show the relationship of the Old City to the New City. See Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosque.
Old Yishuv = The pre-Zionist residents of Palestine. Almost exclusively Orthodox Jews. Literally, the old settlement (Morris, 2001).

olim = Hebrew for immigrants. Singular: oleh.

one-state solution = A proposal to combine Israel and the occupied territories into a single state. Unacceptable to Israel, which would be outvoted by Muslims and thus lose its character as a Jewish state. See two states.

oral tradition (of Judaism) = Midrash, Talmud (Mishnah and Gemara), Haggadah, Halakhah, and Responsa. See Torah.

Ordinance of Omar = Omar was the second caliph after Abu Bakr, who succeeded Muhammad (Durant, 1950, p. 252). His ordinance (law) restricted non-Muslims’ clothing, transportation, places of worship and schools. They also were required to pay a head tax, a land tax and to entertain traveling Muslims.

Orthodox Christians = Mostly Syrian, Greek and Armenians.

Oslo accords = Officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements or simply Declaration of Principles or DOP. Secretly negotiated between Israel and the PLO. Granted self-government to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and Jericho on the West Bank. The first direct, face-to-face agreements between Israel and the PLO. Intended to form the framework for future negotiations and relationships between Israel and Palestine. Provided for the creation of a Palestinian National Authority to administer territory under its control. Provided for Israeli to withdrawal from parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Although the accords ultimately failed to produce peace, they did bring the first intifada to an end.

Ottoman = “The last and greatest of the Islamic empires” (Lewis, 1973, p. 183). A Turkish dynasty founded by the first sultan, Osman, at the end of the 13th century. Conquered most of the Muslim world and beyond, reaching as far as the gates of Vienna in 1529 and again in 1683, before finally losing to the British in 1917.

Pale of Settlement = Where Jews were required to live in the Russian empire. The origin of early immigrants to Israel. (Pale means boundary line.)

Palestine = One of several names for the coastal region west of the Mediterranean Sea, south of Lebanon and east of Egypt. Its name in Arabic is Filastin (Said, 1979). Entine (2007, p. 114) credits the name to Greek influence around the time of Alexander. Historically, it was an administrative region, never an independent country by that name. See map from the Ottoman era in Appendix H. Arabs ruled the land for only a few decades (Peters, 1984, p. 150). Even Saladin, who recaptured Jerusalem from the Crusaders in 1187 and permitted the Jews to return there, was a Kurd, not an Arab.
The narrowest definition of Palestine today would comprise the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The broadest would add Israel, all of Jerusalem and even Jordan, which was part of the original British mandate called Palestine. It previously was part of the Ottoman Empire and fell to Great Britain in World War I.

Lewis (1986, p. 169) said the name Palestine was bestowed on the region by the Romans and “retained for a time by the Arab conquerors to designate an administrative subdivision of their Syrian province. But that name had disappeared in the country even before the arrival of the Crusaders nine centuries ago. It … was commonly applied by European Christians to what they had previously called the Holy Land. … This use was, however, in the main confined to Christians and to a very small group of westernized Muslims. The name was not used officially, and had no precise territorial definition until it was adopted by the British to designate the area which they acquired by conquest at the end of World War I and ruled under mandate from the League of Nations. It was therefore not as a Palestinian nation that the Arabs of Ottoman Palestine objected … since the very concept of such a nation was unknown at the time.” Lewis (1986) said Christendom knew Palestine as the Holy Land but its inhabitants did not. The League of Nations awarded Britain a mandate to administer the territory consisting of present-day Israel, the occupied territories and Jordan. Great Britain granted independence to Jordan in 1928.

Muslim Arabs living in the region today seek a single state (to be called Palestine) in the region that is now controlled by Israel or, failing that, a separate state in what is now the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza. “Palestinian self-determination has come to rest by and large on the need for an independent state on a liberated part of the original territory of Palestine” (Said, 1979, p. 125).

One hurdle facing a separate state would be how to connect the West Bank and Gaza, which are separated physically by about 25 miles across Israeli territory and separated politically by opposing regimes – the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. I will use the name Palestine to refer to the land claimed by Arabs and Jews before the creation of Israel; afterward, to refer to the West Bank and Gaza Strip -- claimed by Arab Muslims but controlled by Israel.

Said (1979a, p. 9) credits Israel Zangwill with coining what he calls the “Zionist slogan” for Palestine: “A land without people, for a people without land.” But what Zangwill wrote, in 1901 in the British journal New Liberal Review, was “Palestine is a country without a people; the Jews are a people without a country” (Lewis, 1986, p. 175). The missing article -- a -- in Said’s quotation is significant. Zangwill had visited Palestine and knew that it was inhabited, however sparsely. He meant that no resident people or ethnic group identified itself with any specific nationality. The residents at the time thought of themselves as Arabs, Greeks, Jews or whatever in the Ottoman Empire. Morris (2004a, p. 42) adds: “At least down to the 1920s or 1930s, the Arabs of Palestine did not see themselves and were not considered by anyone else as a distinct ‘people.’ They were seen as ‘Arabs’ or, more specifically, as ‘southern Syrian Arabs.’ ”

Said (1979a, p. 117) disagrees: “True, Palestine had been part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of World War I, and true also that in any accepted since it had not been independent. Its inhabitants referred to themselves as Palestinians, however.”

The epithet [“land without people"] was used more often by the opponents of Zionism than by its proponents, because the land, although sparsely populated, obviously was neither unpopulated nor ungoverned (Lewis, 1986, p. 175).

(See map of Palestine under Ottoman rule in Appendix H, Annex 2.) See also Palestine, West Bank, Gaza, one-state solution, and two-state solution.
The Palestine National Council declared independence in 1988 (Ibrahim, 1988). The PLO said it would declare a state in 2000 but postponed the action (Sontag, 2000). “Israel was and remains unwilling officially to speak of ‘Palestine’ because of the territorial implications” (Golan, 2008, p. 158). Instead, Israel uses the term “Palestinian,” even going to far as to refer to the Palestine Liberation Organization (the correct name) as the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The official Israeli position is that there was no country called Palestine when settlements were built. Israel considers Judea and Samaria (the “West Bank”) as disputed and not part of any country (except perhaps Israel). The intent is to get around Articles 49 and 149 of the Geneva Convention, which prohibit the appropriation of property and building settlements on the land of a defeated country. The Geneva Convention is not clear about the status of occupied territory that is not claimed by any country.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) = Not Palestinian Liberation Organization (Christian, 2009). Founded by the Arab League in 1964 to create an Arab Muslim state in all of Palestine including Israel through armed struggle. (See Palestinian National Charter.) Palestine National Council, its legislative body, adopted a covenant, later translated as charter, calling for the eradication of Israel -- a declaration never formally withdrawn -- the right of refugees to return to their pre-war homes, and self-determination for Palestine. Recognized by Israel in 1994 as the representative of the Palestinian people. Composed of most militant Palestinian organizations, notably Fatah and Hamas. Expelled from Jordan in 1970 and from Lebanon in 1982. Relocated from Tunis to Gaza in 1994.

“Perhaps the tragic flaw in its makeup as a liberation movement of exiles,” according to Said (1979, p. 134), was its lack of a native territory on which to operate. “It has not to this day resolved the question of whether it is really a national independence or a national liberation movement.” On p. 158, Said defines liberation in terms of revolution and independence in terms of statecraft. “Within the whole problem of Palestinian identity they were in conflict,” he said. To the extent that its goal of self-determination meant a state on part of Palestine, the PLO ran a quasi-state (unsuccessfully) within Jordan and Lebanon. “At times,” Said complained (1979, p. 162), “these debates consume more energy than fighting Zionism.” But Said saw the presence of “values, ideas, open debate” (p. 165) as sources of strength. It was the PLO that was recognized internationally (including by the United States and Israel) as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Yasser Arafat was chairman of the PLO’s executive committee. Mahmoud Abbas, as chairman, is in charge of peace efforts with Israel (Bronner, 2011).

Palestinian National Authority = Palestinian Authority for short. The interim administrative agency established in 1994 under the Oslo accords to govern in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A subsidiary of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Exercises limited jurisdiction over parts of the West Bank. (Hamas has exercised limited jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip since 2007.) Separate from but connected with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Mahmoud Abbas was elected president in 2005 (CIA World Factbook, 2010). Golan (2008, p. 53) pointed out a subtle difference between the PA and the PLO: The PA represents only Palestinians in the occupied territories, whereas the PLO theoretically represents all Palestinians wherever they are.
Palestinian National Charter = The constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Also called the Palestinian National Covenant. Both names refer to the same document as amended. Does the current version call for the “liquidation” of Israel? It is unclear.

Palestinian National Council (PNC) = The law-making arm of the PLO. Normally meets biennially. Elects the executive committee, which represents the PLO between council sessions. Said (1979, p. 178) calls it the Palestinian parliament in exile. Arafat (1988) calls it the “the highest legislative authority in the Palestinian body politic.”

Palestinian Legislative Council = The legislature of the Palestinian National Authority. Hamas defeated Fatah in 2006. Ismail Haniya, leader of Hamas, becomes the new prime minister.

Paris Peace Conference (1919) = The allies divided up the spoils of WWI, including the Arab provinces in the Ottoman Empire. Formalized the award to Great Britain of a mandate to govern Palestine and east to the Persian Gulf.

Passfield White Paper of 1930 = Extended restrictions on Jewish immigration and criticized Jewish organizations that limited hiring to Jews. Resulted from the Hope Simpson Commission. Jewish opposition led to some backtracking.

Peel Commission Report of 1937 = Recommended abolition of the Palestine Mandate and partition of Palestine into two separate states, except for a strip between Jaffa and Jerusalem that would remain under the British mandate and international supervision. The mandate, Peel said, was unworkable because its policy of assuring a national home for the Jews in Palestine was incompatible with its obligations toward the Arabs. The Peel Report was similarly unworkable because it called for a transfer of populations between the Jewish and Arab states. Peel justified the partition on the theory that the Arabs and Jews had an equal right to land, and that the Arabs could be persuaded (or forced) to renounce their claims to a part of Palestine. The problem, in Arab eyes, became one of self-preservation, Antonius said. The British government accepted the recommendations, but the Arabs rejected them, effectively shelving the report. Antonius (1939, p. 401) quotes from the report: “The British Government have never accepted the Arab cause.”


Phalange = English name for the nationalist Lebanese Social Democrats, a political party. Also known as the Kataeb Party. Affiliated with the Gemayel family. Allied with the Maronite Christians. Infamous for its massacre of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps near Beirut in 1982, one of a series of reprisals.

Pillars of Islam = the shahada (profession of the faith: “There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger”), salah (formal prayer five times a day, preceded by ritual washing), sawm (fasting, especially during Ramadan), zakat (charity) and the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca).
pogrom = Russian for racial persecution, typically by mobs (Dowty, 2008, p. 3). Usually applied specifically to Jews.

political divisions (Israel) = Left (more inclined to compromise with Palestinians) vs. Right (less inclined); Ashkenazim (of German and Eastern European origin) vs. Sephardim (generally of Spanish, African and Middle Eastern origin); religious vs. non-religious.

political divisions (Palestine) = Fatah, which controls the West Bank (more inclined to recognize Israel’s right to exist); and Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip (disinclined).

political parties (Israel) = The legislature (Knesset) is unicameral, with 120 members. Elections are closed list, meaning that citizens vote for their preferred party, rather than for individual candidates. Results of the 2009 election: Kadima, 28 members; Likud, 27; Yisrael Beiteinu, 15; Labor, 13; Shas, 11, United Torah Judaism, 5; Arab, 4; five others, 17. Kadima, considered center-left, was formed to support Ariel Sharon’s unilateral disengagement plan. The right-wing Likud is the party of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Yisrael Beiteinu (literally Israel is Our Home), described as ultra-nationalist, takes a hard line toward the peace process. Labor, formerly dominant, generally takes a center-left position. Shas is an ultra-orthodox religious party. United Torah Judaism, an alliance of two ultra-orthodox parties, supports the status quo and opposes a Palestinian state. The United Arab List supports the creation of a Palestinian state.

Prophet Muhammad = See Muhammad.

Purple Line = A north-south line on the eastern boundary of the Golan Heights established as the cease-fire line after the 1967 (Six-Day) war. The U.N. Truce Supervision Organization used purple to mark the border between Israel and Syria.

qadis = Arabic for religious judges (Morris, 2001, p. 103).

Qassam Brigades = (Izz al Din Qassam Brigades.) The military wing of Hamas. The power behind most of the attacks attributed to Hamas.

qibla = Muslim direction of prayer. Originally Jerusalem, later changed to Mecca. See mizrah.

qist = Arabic for balance. The Quran reinforces the need for qist (Husain, 2010, p. A17).

quartet = An informal grouping of the United States, United Nations, Russia and the European Union. Formed to encourage Israelis and Palestinians to make peace.

Qubbat al-Sakhra = See Dome of the Rock.
**Quraish** = Prophet Muhammad’s tribe. The “alleged descendants of Abraham and Ishmael” (Durant, 1950, p. 161).

**Quran** = The Muslim holy book (Christian et al., 2009). Literally: a recitation, reading or discourse; applied to the whole or any section of their sacred scriptures. “Muslims believe that its text comprises the words of Allah dictated to the Prophet Muhammad through the Angel Gabriel” (Siegal and Connolly, 1999, p. 183). “The most influential book ever produced by a single hand” (Durant, 1950, p. 175). Its 114 suras (chapters) are arranged in order of decreasing length (after the first).

**qutan** = Arabic for “herd or pack and is used exclusively when speaking of animals; used in graffiti and leaflets to refer to Jewish settlers (Oliver & Steinberg, 1993, p. 19).

**quwa** = Appears often in graffiti with the meaning of power, as in “The power of logic is not an alternative for the logic of power, a slogan of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In the plural, quwat, the connotation extends to forces, as in “The Popular Strike Forces,” a reference to shabab who are responsible for the eradication of error. (Oliver & Steinberg, 1993, p. 22.)

**race** = A controversial term with a history. Lewis (1986) said the British used the term to distinguish between the English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish (what today we would call *ethnic*). The Nazis used the term to distinguish between Aryans (mainly north Europeans – e.g., Germans and Nordics) and Semites (by which they meant Jews). In America, the term came to be used primarily to distinguish between blacks and whites. The United Nations at one point equated Zionism with racism, but the accusation was withdrawn years later.

**Ramadan** = Islam’s month of fasting from sunrise to sunset, ending with the Islamic holiday of Eid al-Fitr,(Christian et al., pp. 96 and 235). “The four-week period during which Muslims are expected to abstain from food, drink, smoking, and sex from dawn to dusk as a means to achieve purity, faith, and introspection (Entine, 2007).

**rasool** = Prophet; messenger (of God).

**reconciliation** = To restore peaceful relations between parties that previously were in conflict.

**Red Lines** = Marked the separations between the positions of Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai (Morris, 2001, p. 470). See Green Line, Blue Line and Bar-Lev Line.

**refugee** = Palestine refugees are “people whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict.” … The descendants of the original Palestine refugees are also eligible for registration (“Palestine refugees, 2010”). UN General Assembly Resolution 63/92 (see Appendix D) expanded the definition to include “persons displaced as a result of the June 1967 and subsequent hostilities” (i.e., from Israel’s invasions of Lebanon).
religion = One of the three primary sources of identity, especially in the Middle East (Lewis, 1998). Examples: Muslim, Jewish, and Christian. The other primary sources are blood (e.g., family, clan, tribe, nation) and place (e.g., neighborhood, village, province, state). For many, said Lewis (1998, p. 7), “religion is the only loyalty that transcends local and immediate bonds.”

Responsa = Rulings by religious or legal authorities. Applies to Roman, Catholic, Judaic and Muslim jurisprudence. Compare with fatwa in Islam.

right-wing parties (Israeli politics) = Less willing than left-wing parties to compromise with the Palestinians, to make territorial concessions for peace, and to agree to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

riot = Spontaneous, wanton violence by an anonymous mob of at least three people displaying anger or protest for a common purpose; often a wildly emotional escalation of what began as a public demonstration.

road map (2003) = Proposed by President Bush on behalf of the United States, United Nations, European Union and Russia. The essence was an endorsement of a two-state solution guided by a plan for incremental progress leading to comprehensive resolution and peace.

Royal Commission of Inquiry = See Peel Commission.

sabra = A Jew who was born in Israel.

Sanhedrin = The highest Jewish governing body at the time of Jesus.

Samaria = The Northern Kingdom, after the Kingdom of Israel split following the death of King Solomon. Also the name used by Israel to refer to the northern part of the West Bank, north of Jerusalem. See Judea. In biblical times, “the Samaritans regarded themselves as descended from the Jewish remnant after the deportation [by Assyria in 722 B.C.], but the returning exiles from the Southern Kingdom (after the Babylonian exile) did not regard them as Jews, seeing them as descendants of foreigners who had been settled there after the Jewish population had been removed. … The Samaritans maintained worship … and the Torah (but not the rest of the Bible)” (Berlin and Brettler, Eds., 2004, p. 2138).

San Remo conference (1920) = Clinched the deal that the British and French struck in the Sykes-Pico Agreement to divide the Arab lands formerly ruled by the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain would administer Palestine (and Transjordan and Iraq) under a mandate later formalized by the League of Nations. A rider was added to oblige Great Britain to apply the Balfour Declaration in its administration of Palestine. The French got the mandate for Syria and Lebanon. The Arabs reacted bitterly to what they saw as a breach of faith, denial of their
independence and rejection of their goal of political and economic unity (Antonius, 1939, p. 305-306).

Sea of Galilee = Near the Golan Heights. The largest freshwater lake in Israel. The Jordan River flows through it from north to south. Also known as the Sea of Chinnereth, Lake of Gennesaret, Lake Kinnereth, Sea of Tiberias and Tiberias Lake. See map in Appendix H.

security barrier = See border fence.

Semite = Insofar as the term is intended to identify a racial or ethnic type, it is a myth (Lewis, 1986). The Semites were originally an ethnic group with some degree of racial homogeneity, but never a race (Lewis, 1986, p. 50). “Neither the Jews nor the Arabs described themselves as Semites” (Lewis 1998, p. 44). The term properly relates to a family of languages. For example, Hebrew, Aramaic and Arabic are similar enough to be grouped as Semitic, a word coined in 1781 by German philologist August Ludwig Schlozer. The word itself is intended to signify descent from Shem, a son of biblical Noah. In 1861, another German philologist, Max Muller, warned that confusing the history of languages with the history of races would “falsify everything” (Lewis, 1998, p. 46). Similarity of language does not necessarily imply similarity of race or ethnicity. Sanskrit resembles Germans in important ways, but that does not mean that Indians who speak Sanskrit are related to northern Europeans who speak German. Even more improbable are attempts to identify speakers of Semitic languages as descendants of the biblical Noah (Lewis, 1986, Chapter 2). Lewis (p. 50) added that the Semites originated in the north Arabian desert and migrated to neighboring countries. According to the Quran, brothers Isaac and Ishmael were the ancestors of the Jews and the Arabs, respectively. But insofar as kinship exists, it does not necessarily make for mutual affection.

Sephardim = From the Hebrew word Sefarad, meaning Spain. Originally applied to Jews from Spain and Portugal; later, applied generally to Jews from the Middle East, North Africa and other Muslim lands. Sometimes used to refer (imprecisely) to Oriental Jews. “They and their descendants now form a majority of the total Jewish population of Israel, and they have begun, perceptibly, to penetrate the upper reaches of the political and military establishment” (Morris, 1986, p. 79). See Ashkenazi. Morris (1986) finds no difference between Sephardim and Ashkenazim in doctrine and almost no difference in law. Ross (2004, p. 601) describes Israel’s Shas as the Sephardic religious party. It had 17 seats in the Knesset during the Camp David summit of 2000 and had joined the ruling coalition.

Settlements = Israeli civilian villages built on West Bank land captured by Israeli during the 1967 war. Occupants are called settlers. Zuckerman (2010, p. A17) calls settlement a “loaded word” that should not be applied to most Jerusalem neighborhoods that are home to Jews, because Israel has annexed East Jerusalem, putting the entire city under Israeli civil law. Israel removed its settlements from the Sinai in 1982 under terms of its peace treaty with Egypt and unilaterally removed its settlements from the Gaza Strip in 2005.

shabab = “young guys,” in the vanguard of the Palestinian uprising (Oliver & Steinberg, 1993, p. 1).
shahada = Literally, Arabic for testimony or bearing witness. The Muslim profession of the faith, consisting of two statements: "There is no God but Allah" and "Muhammad is the Messenger (prophet) of Allah." (La ilaha illal Iah; Muhammadur rasul Allah.) Also translated as martyrdom. See Pillars of Islam.

sharif = A title signifying descent from the Prophet Muhammad (Viorst, 2007, p. 27).

Shariah = Islamic law (Christian et al., 2009). Usually translated as “the path that leads to God.” According to Chaudhry (2003) the sources of Islamic law are, in order of precedence, the Quran, the Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet Muhammad), ijma (precedent, consensus of the community), and – in Sunni Islam --qiyas (the views of Muslim scholars and jurists). Shiites prefer aql (intellect) as their fourth source. Governs all aspects of civil, personal and religious life for all people, whether Muslim or not. “The revealed Holy Law of Islam, derived in theory from the Quran, the Hadith, consensus of the ulama and analogic reasoning” (Holt, Lambton, Lewis, 1970, p. 908). The body of law that fuses secularism with religion, proving Muslims with a pervasive guide to life.

shaheed = Arabic for holy martyr. One who gives his life for Allah. “Suicide bomber” (Davidson, 2003, March 9, p. 18).

sharif = An honorary Arabic title indicating descent from the Prophet Muhammad.

Sharm el-Sheikh memorandum (1999) = Its purpose was to implement Oslo II and other agreements, and to resume final status negotiations. Israel agreed to withdraw control from an additional 11% of the West Bank, to release some prisoners, to open safe passages between the West Bank and Gaza, and to provide for a port to be built in Gaza. The memorandum also set a timetable for final status talks. Both sides also agreed to do nothing that would change the status of the West Bank and Gaza, and to take action against any threat or act of terrorism. Sharm el-Sheikh is a city at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula.


Shaw Commission report of 1930 = Recommended that the British do more to protect the rights of the Palestinian Arabs, especially with regard to Jewish immigration. See the follow-up Hope Simpson Report of 1930 and Passfield White Paper of 1930.

sheik = Title for an Arabic religious or tribal leader. Also used as a term of respect.

sheikh = See sheik.

shekhinah = Hebrew for the dwelling of God among men (Wasserstein, 1978, p. 223). Rabbis assert that God never deserted the spot where his temple had been. This belief is behind the Jews’ fierce devotion to the Temple Mount and leads them to oppose any solution that might restrict their right to worship at the Western Wall, which is all that remains of the ancient temple.
Shema Yisrael = The most famous and universal of Jewish prayers: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord is our God, the Lord is one.” In Hebrew: “Shema Yisrael adonoi elohenu, adonoi ehad.” Compare to the Muslim profession of faith (shahada).

Shiite = The second-largest sect within Islam (Christian et al., 2009). Iran is the only nation with an overwhelming Shiite majority (Christian et al., 2009). Iraq and Lebanon have large Shiite communities in proportion to their total populations. Hezbollah, Iran’s client party in Lebanon, also is Shiite. Shiite is Arabic for party – i.e., the party of Ali – and refers to those who believed that Ali, who was related to the Prophet Muhammad, and his progeny should be caliph and thus head of the community of believers. See caliph.

Shin Bet = The Israeli internal secret service, known in English as Israel Security Agency (ISA). See Mossad.

shiarat = graffiti. Generally less accountable but more representative of Palestinian opinion than the leaflets. (Oliver & Steinberg, 1993, p. 1.)

shirk = Arabic for the unforgivable sin, which is allowing anyone or anything to be on the same level as God.

Six-Day war = See 1967 war.

souk = An Arab market (Entine, 2007).

Southern Kingdom = The Kingdom of Judah with its capital at Jerusalem. Formed after the Kingdom of Israel divided in two after the death of King Solomon. See Judah, Judea and Northern Kingdom.

state = The entity that collects taxes, raises armies, enforces laws and dispenses benefits; the primary determinant of identity in the modern world. Ideally in Islam, there would be but one universal state, ruled by a caliph. “The traditional Islamic state may have been autocratic; it was not despotic [because …] it was limited in principle by the Holy Law which, being of divine origin, precedes and rules the state. … In traditional Islamic societies, there were many well-entrenched interests and intermediate powers which imposed effective limits on the ability of the state to control its subjects. These included, in all times and places, the military and religious establishments” (Lewis, 1998, p. 99-100). With the collapse of the last universal Islamic state -- the Ottoman Empire -- the dream of pan-Arabism faded. Attempts to affiliate even two Arab states (e.g., Egypt and Syria) proved difficult and temporary. Morris (1998, p. 103) attributes the failures more to barriers internal to the Arab world than to external forces. For example, Jordan conferred citizenship on its Palestinian refugees, but they remained stateless aliens in the other states. Israel confronts the problem of combining a religious identity with democratic pluralism.

Supreme Muslim Council = The most important institution of quasi-government in the Arab community during colonial rule (Wasserstein, 1978, p. 131).
Sykes-Picot agreement = A secret compact between Great Britain, France and Russia to divide the Arab provinces ruled by the Ottoman Empire after its anticipated defeat in World War I. Forget all the other agreements, correspondence, declarations, communications and reports; Sykes-Picot was the document in which the Allies meant what they said, and set the motivations for decades of bloodshed. “The ulterior motives of the two Powers stood revealed in all their sordid nakedness. The disillusion was complete, but alongside of it there were created a feeling of contempt for the Powers of the West and a wave of hot resentment which presently turned to despair and vented itself in the wild upheavals that followed” (Antonius, 1939, p. 358). The text of the agreement is in Appendix C.

Suez crisis of 1956 = Also called Operation Kadesh by the Israelis. Egypt had blockaded Israel’s access to the Red Sea and to the Suez Canal, which Egypt had nationalized. Backed by Britain and France, Israel attacked Egypt and occupied the Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal. Pressure from the United States and the USSR forced the Allies to withdraw. Egypt and France failed to gain control of the entire canal, but Israel did obtain navigation rights to the Red Sea and to a U.N. buffer between Israel and Egypt.

Sufism = A mystical form of Islam.

suicide terrorism = The act of killing oneself to kill others. Less often called homicide bombing and genocide bombing. The act also is called isshahad, which is Arabic for martyrdom operation; the bomber is called a shahid, (plural shuhada) an Arabic word that means witness but usually translated as holy martyr, so as to honor the person who gave his life to testify to his faith in Allah while engaging in jihad (usually translated as holy war in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict). Religion is neither a prerequisite nor a major factor in suicide terrorism (Bjorgo, 2005). Bjorgo did find significant correlations with belief in civil liberties, group psychology, youth, single, male, self-sacrifice, failure of the political process, despair, hopelessness, lack of regime legitimacy and effectiveness, joblessness, middle-class academic background, sympathetic population and powerlessness. See terrorism.

sunnah = Arabic for path. Stories about the way the Prophet Muhammad lived. Second in authority to the Quran itself. The normal custom of the early Islamic community. The source of Islamic jurisprudence. “Everything that the Prophet did that was related to us by his Companions” (al-Muala, 2009). “Hadiths, or traditions, make up the sunnah” (Smart & Hecht, 1984, p. 128). “The true path is the doctrine and practice of the ancestors, as preserved and recorded by tradition” (Lewis, 1973, p. 294). See bida.

Sunní = The largest sect in Islam, comprising about 85% to 90% of all Muslims. Most Palestinian Muslims are Sunni (Christian et al., 2009, p. 144). Sunnis do not have a formal clergy. Literally, the “tradition.” See caliph.

sura = A chapter in the Quran, arranged in approximate order of decreasing length (after the first).

Taba summit (2001) = Came closer to reaching a settlement on permanent status issues than any previous peace effort. Talks were discontinued due to the coming elections in Israel.
Ariel Sharon won the election and refused to resume negotiations. Taba is in east central Sinai, next to the southern tip of Israel on the Gulf of Aqaba.

**tahrif** = Arabic for the doctrine that the Jewish and Christian bibles have become corrupted and are no longer the accurate revelation of God.

**taliban** = Arabic for *students*.

**Talmud** = A series of Jewish holy books with rabbinical commentaries on Mishna laws. There are two Talmuds, produced by different groups of Jewish scholars: the Babylonian Talmud, which is the more esteemed, and the Palestinian Talmud. The Mishna and the Gemarah constitute the Talmud. In common language, the terms Gemara and Talmud are used interchangeably.

**Tanakh** = The Hebrew Bible. What Christians call the Old Testament. Comprises the Torah (the first five books of Moses), Neviim (the prophets) and the Ketuvim (writings). “A collection of texts and books assembled over a long period of time” (Smart & Hecht, 1984, p. 125).

**tawhid** = Islam’s essential doctrine: one God.

**tel** = *Tall* in Arabic. Mound or ruin marking the site of an ancient city, built up by successive settlements (National Geographic, 2009, November).

**temple** = The First Temple, built by Solomon, David’s son, in Jerusalem about 960 B.C. and demolished by Babylonian King Nebuchadnezzar in 586 B.C. Rebuilt by Zerubbabel about 515 B.C. as the Second Temple. Demolished, rebuilt and enlarged by King Herod the Great about 19 B.C. Destroyed by Roman troops under Titus in 70 A.D. All that remains of Herod’s temple is the retaining wall on its western side. The area is called the Temple Mount because it stands on Mount Moriah. It is now occupied by the Al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock, both Muslim shrines.

**Temple Mount** = Known to Muslims as Haram al-Sharif, or the Noble Sanctuary. The holiest site in Judaism and the third-holiest site in Islam (Morris, 2001, p. 111). “The walled, elevated area in Jerusalem’s Old City that was the site of the First and Second Jewish Temples. It now houses the centuries-old Dome of the Rock shrine and Al-Aqsa mosque. Muslims believe Prophet Muhammad made his night journey to heaven from the site” (Christian et al., 2009). The Quran (17:1) refers to the site as the “farthest mosque (or sanctuary).” Seized in the 1967 war by Israel, which ceded administrative control to the Waqf (Supreme Muslim Council). The chief rabbis of Israel forbid Jews to visit the Temple Mount or to pray there because they are ceremonially unclean and might accidentally tread on the sacred place where the Holy of Holies stood in the temple (Bennet, 2003, p. A1). "Orthodox Jewish religious authorities differ on the location of the Holy of Holies, Bennet said, “but they generally agree that Jews should not visit the Temple Mount, to avoid accidentally stepping on sacred ground." The Temple Mount was closed to non-Muslims after September 2000, when Ariel Sharon, then a candidate for the post of prime minister, paid a visit there in the company of police (Bennet, 2003, p. A1). That visit, and
the riots that ensued, provided what Palestinians consider the provocation and Israelis consider the pretext for the Palestinians' uprising, the al-Aqsa intifada. Al-Aqsa is the name of a mosque on the 40-acre plaza called the Temple Mount, which is framed by stone walls built by Herod the Great in the decades before Jesus. Part of the walls on the western side are all that remains. “In reality the whole area of the Noble Sanctuary is considered Al-Aqsa mosque, the entire precincts inviolable according to Islamic law” (al-Aqsa Mosque, n.d.). See Western Wall. “Palestinian officials have often denied claims of Jewish heritage in Jerusalem, arguing that there is no evidence that the plateau was the site of ancient temples” (Kershner, 2010, Nov. 26, p. A4).

**territories** = Israeli term for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Short for “occupied territories.”

**terrorism** = “There is no single, universally accepted definition of terrorism” (FBI Policy and Guidelines, 2000/2001). The most simplistic definition is political violence (Ismail, 2007). Black’s Law Dictionary defines terrorism as “The use or threat of violence to intimidate or cause panic, esp. as a means of affecting political conduct” (Garner, Ed., 1999).

The United States *Code of Federal Regulations* defines terrorism as “…the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Code of Federal Regulations 2011).

The U.S. Congressional Research Service said most definitions include but are not limited to the following elements: “The calculated use of violence or the threat of violence against civilians and civil operations to achieve political goals through fear, intimidation, or coercion. It usually involves a criminal act, often symbolic in nature and intending to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims” (Hamas, 1993).

Noonan (2010) quoted former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who defined terrorism as “the calculated use of violence – and the threat of it – to achieve political ends.”

The United Nations has tried repeatedly to define and eliminate terrorism. One attempt -- General Assembly Resolution 42/159 -- is reproduced in Appendix D. Citing the difficulty in formulating a consensus definition, *The Wall Street Journal* (2005) quoted a U.N. panel, which said in 2004: “Lack of agreement on a clear and well-known definition undermines the normative and moral stance against terrorism and has stained the United Nations’ image” (Henninger, 2005, June 17).

Most definitions of terrorism focus on the international aspect, suggesting that acts of violence against one’s own people should be treated as crimes rather than as terrorism. The distinction is rejected by Palestinians, who accuse Israel of “state-sponsored terrorism” against them. Palestinians also accuse the Israelis of incitement by overusing the term “terrorism” to describe popular, civilian demonstrations (War of words 2005).

The FBI distinguishes between international terrorism and domestic terrorism, which it defines as the “unlawful use, or threatened use, of violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the US or its territories, without foreign direction, committed against persons or property, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Mefford, 2002). The FBI also recognizes a subcategory of domestic terrorist that it calls eco-terrorism, as practiced by the Animal Liberation Front and Earth Liberation Front (Jarboe, 2002).
Stohl (in Bjorgo, 2005) offers useful insights by comparing definitions used by the U.S. Department of State before and after 1983. The newer definition eliminates references to states that repress their own people violently.

“Terrorism involves the deliberate killing and injuring of randomly selected noncombatants for political ends. It seeks to promote a political outcome by spreading terror and demoralization throughout a population” (Mitchell, 2001). “Terrorism is theatre” (le Carre, 1983, p. 438).

Is terrorism ever justified? Part of the reason for the difficulty in formulating a consensus definition might be the lingering intuition that terrorism, in some circumstances, might be necessary. Laqueur (1976, March, p. 104), an American historian and authority on political violence, said, “Terrorism is morally justified whenever there is no other remedy for an intolerable situation.” Laqueur (1976, November, p. 72) makes the disquieting observation that injustice and terrorism are inversely related; thus, terrorism works best in a democracy, worst in a totalitarian dictatorship. “Terrorism succeeds only against nonterrorists, namely groups or governments which refrain from responding to indiscriminate murder with equally indiscriminate repression” (Laqueur, 1976, March). He likened terrorism to blackmail, the connection being that appeasement is equally ineffective for the same reasons (Laqueur, 1976, November, p. 74).

Bjorgo (2005, p. 2) rejected the notion of any single cause for terrorism. It is, he said, “premeditated use of violence against (at least temporarily) non-combatants in order to achieve a psychological effect of fear on others than immediate targets. Noting a few definitions claiming that armed struggle for just purposes is legitimate, Bjorgo found a consensus that terrorism is primarily an extremism of means, not of ends. He provides a bookful of definitions in Root Causes of Terrorism.

Krishnaswami (2000) quotes Pakistan’s military leader, Gen. Pervez Musharraf: “Islam does not preach terrorism... Islam believes in jihad, a fight in the path of God,” Krishnaswami quotes Musharraf. “Wherever Muslims are being victimised or killed, Islam asks all Muslims to come to their aid.” As an example of acceptable jihad, Musharraf cited Kashmir because it is a freedom struggle. “To call those activities terrorism is not correct.”

Shipler (2002, p. 108) concluded: “Terrorism is not an aberration produced by demented personalities. It is an integral part of an existing subculture, encouraged and supported and approved by the mainstream of the society that forms the terrorist’s reference points. … Some of his side may regard him with disgust, but to key elements of his culture he is noble and heroic.”

terrorist = Arafat (1974) said the difference between a revolutionary and a terrorist lies in the reason for which they fight. Terrorists, he said, are “those who fight against the just causes, those who wage war to occupy, colonize and oppress other people. … The justice of the cause determines the right to struggle.”

Were the early Jewish leaders terrorists when they blew up the King David Hotel, killing Jews, Arabs and British occupants alike? Lewis (1986) said no. He distinguished between terrorist tactics adopted by some Jewish organizations in the 1940s and modern terrorism. The former, he said, was directed at the adversary (usually the British) and the latter is directed at the media. Commonly suggested substitute for terrorist: militant.

“Let me put forward the proposition that the media, particularly television, and terrorists need one another, that they have what is fundamentally a symbiotic relationship” (Koppel, 1984, October, p. 47). Perhaps the main difference between a terrorist and a freedom fighter is not what they do but how they are treated by their communities.
thawra = Arabic for revolution (Said, 1994, p. 314) or revolt (Morris, 2001, p. 129).

Torah = The first five books of the Hebrew Scriptures. The word of God as revealed to Moses. Part of the Tanakh. The Torah also is known as the Chumash or the Pentateuch. Can also mean the entire body of Jewish written and oral law.

torture = “The infliction of suffering on a person to obtain from that person, or from another person, confessions or information” (Geneva Convention, August 12, 1949).

two-state solution = A proposal to create a Muslim state called Palestine from the territories occupied by Israel (West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Originally accepted by Israel and rejected by the Palestinians, who failed to see Israel’s claim to any of their land. Current status is subject to negotiation. See Palestine and one state.


umala = Arabic for Palestinians who collaborate with Israeli authorities. Palestinians regard umala as their greatest enemies. The word has come to include political and religious nonconformists, drug dealers, heretics and all kinds of social misfits. “They are murdered on the order of about one every other day in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oliver & Steinberg, 1993, p. 19).

umma = Arabic for a community of believers; the Arabic nation (Hamid, 2010, p. A17).

unf = Arabic for violence. (Oliver & Steinberg, 1993, p. 19.)

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees = The U.N. agency created to help refugees who lived in Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948 and who lost their homes as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict.

United Nations resolutions = See Appendix D.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) = Calls for a negotiated peace treaty and “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” and “termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” Most peace plans since 1967 have incorporated its provisions. Text is in Appendix D.

UNRWA = See United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

verdictive = A speech act that involves the authoritative delivery of a fact or finding about some matter, such as the delivery of a verdict by a jury, umpire or arbitrator. Verdictives need not be final or definitive judgments. Often they are estimates or appraisals based on how the person with the authority to deliver the verdict sees the world. Example: a referee calls a player off side, thereby disallowing the goal that has just scored. A viewer might come to the same conclusion and utter the words “off side” but without the authority to make a difference. See exercitive speech acts. Austin (1975), p. 88, 154.

vilayet = Turkish term for a province or administrative region. Palestine was in the vilayets of Damascus (Syria) and Beirut (Lebanon).

wadi = Arabic for valley or dry riverbed.

WAFA = Palestinian news agency.

Wailing Wall = See Western Wall. “The Wailing Wall is only a small part of the retaining wall of the Temple and it was the Western Wall that the Israelis would have to have” (Ross, 2004, p. 716).

city = See border fence, Western Wall, Wailing Wall, Haram al-Sharif, Jerusalem Old City of Jerusalem and Temple Mount.

Waqt = The Muslim trust that administers the mosques and other holy places, including the Temple Mount (Shipler, 2002, p. 165). [Hamas] “holds that the soil of Palestine is Islamic Waqt” (Shalev, 1991, p. 26).

war crime = See Article 147, International Humanitarian Law. (Geneva Convention, August 12, 1949).

war of attrition (1967-1970) = A limited conflict in which Egypt tried to wear down the Israeli defenses, to regain the Sinai and to mitigate the extent of its defeat in the 1967 war.

war of independence (1948) = When Great Britain left Palestine, Israel declared independence under the authority of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181. Five Arab armies from Middle Eastern states attacked and were defeated in what Palestinians call the Nakba (catastrophe). The war left Jordan in control of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and all of the Old City, and Egypt in control of the Gaza Strip. When the war began, Israel controlled less than 7 percent of Palestine; by the time an armistice was signed, Israel occupied 80 percent of the land and more than 500,000 Palestinians became refugees (Entine, 2007, p. 249).


watan = Arabic for home or homeland.
**West Bank** = Landlocked territory west of the Jordan River between Jenin in the north, Quaql in the west, and Hebron in the south with a carve-out for Jerusalem and its approaches from the west. Captured by Jordan in Israel’s 1948 war of independence, annexed by Jordan in 1950, captured by Israel in the 1967 war and ceded by Jordan in 1988. Israel annexed East Jerusalem (but not the rest of the West Bank) in 1967. Most of the world considers the West Bank including East Jerusalem as “occupied territory” and does not recognize the annexations by either Jordan or Israel. The West Bank covers 2,300 square miles (about the size and shape of Delaware). Estimates of the Arab population including East Jerusalem range from of 2.5 million (about as many as Nevada) to 1.5 million plus 350,000 Israeli settlers. The CIA World Factbook (“Middle East: West Bank,” 2010) puts the population at 2.5 million Arabs and Israeli settlers, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. About a third of the Palestinians living in the West Bank are refugees or descendants of refugees. Only 17% of the land is fertile. Israel calls the West Bank by its biblical names: Samaria (north of Jerusalem) and Judea (from Jerusalem south). Jews consider it the “heart of the ancient Jewish kingdom” (Friedman, 1984). See the map in Appendix H. See Gaza, Jerusalem, and Palestine.

**Western Wall** = A retaining wall on the western side of the Temple Mount is all that remains of the Second Temple rebuilt by King Herod about 19 B.C. and demolished by the Romans in 70 A.D. along with the rest of Jerusalem. The holiest remaining part of the holiest city in Judaism (Morris, 2001, p. 111). The last relic of the Jews’ ancient sanctuary and of their national glory (Wasserstein, pp. 222-223). Jews were excluded from 1948-1967, when Jordan controlled it. Now used by Jews as a place for national rejoicing and prayer. Called al-Buraq by Muslims, who consider the wall sacred as the place where the Prophet Muhammad tethered his horse, Buraq, while he ascended into heaven and back. Buraq is believed to have carried Muhammad between Mecca and Jerusalem (Morris, 2001, p. 112).

**White Paper of 1939** = A statement of British policy that abandoned the two-state solution proposed by the Peel Commission was replaced it with a one-state solution under which Palestine would be ruled by Arabs and Jews in proportion to their population. The paper limited Jewish immigration and land purchases. Also called the MacDonald White Paper after its author to distinguish between other relevant White Papers such as by Churchill (1922) and Passfield (1930). Shalev (1991) describes the MacDonald White Paper as a political victory for the Palestinians, although it was overtaken to some extent by World War II, which erupted four months later.

**Wye River (Md.) memorandum (1998)** = An example of what happens when the United States leans on the two sides to make more promises than they were prepared to keep. The first step – transfer of about 9% of Palestinian territory from full Israeli control to partial or full control by the Palestinian Authority – was accomplished, but then the agreement fell apart. Morris (2001) called it a “dead letter, and its implementation was completely suspended” (p. 649).


**Yisrael** = See Israel.

Yom Kippur = The Jewish Day of Atonement. Occurs in September or October. The holiest day in Judaism. Work is prohibited and fasting (including water) is commanded. Most of the day is spent in prayer in the synagogue.

Yom Kippur War = A coalition of Arab states, led by Egypt and Syria, mounted a surprise attack against Israel on Yom Kippur in 1973, catching Israel off-guard. Israel recovered in time to repulse the attacks and even to advance across the Nile River within 63 miles of Cairo. The war was a political victory for Egypt, due to its early success, which boosted Arab morale. Israel was forced to acknowledge that it was vulnerable and Arab countries were forced to acknowledge that Israel could not be defeated militarily. No significant permanent territorial changes resulted.

Yishuv = Hebrew for the Jewish community in Palestine (Morris, 2004, p. 7).

Zion = Refers to Jerusalem and by extension to biblical Israel. See Mount Zion.

Zionism = The ideology that Jews are entitled to their own country in the Holy Land. Lewis (1986) credited Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian Jew working as a journalist in Vienna, as the founder. Lewis dated the history of Zionism from the publication of Herzl’s booklet The Jewish State in 1896. The word Zionism was used first in an article by Nathan Birnbaum in 1886 (Wasserstein (1978, p. 5).

Zionists blame the persecution of the Jews on their perpetual minority status and believe that only in a Jewish homeland, ruled by a Jewish state, would they be able to achieve true emancipation and the safety to assert their chosen-ness.

Zionism is defined by shared religion, culture and history (Davis & Decter, 1982). Modern Zionism supports the independence and development of Israel. Halevi (2010) adds: “For Israel’s founders, Zionism wasn’t only about returning the Jews to their homeland but to the community of nations,” which implies international acceptance – which, by and large, has not been achieved. Some Jews, including Orthodox Jews in Israel, oppose Zionism on religious grounds. The term Zionism is offensive to Arabs who contend that they should govern all of original Palestine because they made up (and still make up) the majority of its population.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379 in 1975 branded Zionism as racism. The resolution was rescinded in 1991 by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 46/86 – the first and (as of 2009) the only time the U.N. has revoked a resolution (United Nations, 1991). The full text of both resolutions is in Appendix D.

In his speech to the United Nations, Arafat (1974) distinguished between Judaism and Zionism. He said, “Our revolution has not been motivated by racial or religious factors. Its target has never been the Jew, as a person, but racist Zionism, and undisguised aggression. … Our revolution has not been motivated by racial or religious factors. Its target has never been the Jew, as a person, but racist Zionism. and undisguised aggression” The full text of Arafat’s speech is in Appendix C.
Lewis (1986, p. 18) found two other meanings of Zionism in use: “As used by many Arab writers and spokesmen, a Zionist was one who did not share their belief that Israel must be destroyed in order to achieve justice in the Middle East. [and] In some Soviet, Arab, and latterly also other Islamic polemical writings, ‘Zionist’ simply means ‘Jew.’ ”

Said (1979) described Zionism as an exercise in Western imperialism and colonialism. Some authorities (e.g. Wasserstein, 1978, p. 141) distinguish between political and spiritual Zionism. Antonius (1939) distinguishes between religious Zionism, which he defines as cultural, and political Zionism, which he defines as nationalistic, with the temporal power of a state government, specifically in Palestine. He makes it clear that his objection is to the latter form.

Today, as before, Zionism usually means political Zionism, although there remains an undercurrent of support among Jews for a cultural Zionism that does not require the existence of the state of Israel as their homeland (Freedman, 2010, p. A14). The Palestinian National Charter defines Zionism as “a colonialist movement, aggressive and expansionist in its goal, racist in its configuration, and fascist in its means and aims … an illegal movement.” See Jew and Israel.

Zionist = References to all Israelis as Zionists fails to distinguish between different Zionist movements, the settlers movement, religious extremists and the general public (War of words, 2005). Gilbert (2002) saw the Jews’ longing for security in their own country as centuries-old: “Zionists believed that Jews would always be persecuted until they had a state of their own, and that the best place for this state was Palestine, their historic home” (p. 5).

“Zionist entity” = Israel, in Palestinian rhetoric. Also called the “racist entity” (Arafat, 1974) and “alien Zionist entity” (Muslih, 1988, p. 3).
Appendix B -- Timeline

Wars, invasions and riots are shown in red bold, documents in black bold, and United Nations resolutions in blue bold. Text and discussion of the documents are in Appendix C. Text and discussion of the U.N. resolutions are in Appendix D.

2100 BC Abraham is born (Miller, 2004, pp. 8-10).

1440/1200 BC Moses leads Hebrews out of Egypt (Miller, 2004, pp. 8).

1440 BC Thutmose III of Egypt invades what is now Israel (Miller, 2004, pp. 8-10).

1210 BC First mention of Israel in history: Egyptian King Merneptah says, ‘Israel is laid waste’ (Miller, 2004, pp. 8-10).

1000 BC David proclaimed king by elders of all 12 tribes assembled in Hebron. For the first time in Israel’s history, the 12 tribes are united (Miller, 2004, p. 86).

930 BC Israel splits in two: Judah in south, Israel in north (Miller, 2004, pp. 8-10).

722 BC Assyrians conquer Israel Northern Kingdom, deport all but the poorest, and repopulate the land with Assyrian settlers (Miller, 2004, p. 174).

586 BC Judah (S. Kingdom) falls to Babylon, levels Jerusalem, exiles residents.

332 BC Alexander the Great captures the region.

320 BC Egypt gains control.

198 BC Seleucids of Syria take control.

165 BC Jews regain independence.

37 BC Rome appoints Herod the Great king of the Jews (Miller, 2004, pp. 8-10).

70 A.D. Rome destroys Jerusalem and temple (Miller, 2004, pp. 8-10).

632 The Prophet Muhammad dies.
Arabs conquer Jerusalem; begin arriving in force (Entine, 2007, p. 244).

Dome of the Rock completed.

Seljuk Turks gain control.

Crusaders conquer Jerusalem.

Saladin reconquer Jerusalem.

Ottoman Empire defeats Marmelukes, gains Palestine (Morris, 2001, p. 7).

Napoleon invades Palestine unsuccessfully.

First wave of Jewish immigrants arrives from Eastern Europe and Yemen.

Nathan Birnbaum calls for the establishment of a Jewish homeland; coins the term Zionism to signify yearning for a Jewish homeland.

Theodore Herzl becomes the leading exponent of political Zionism with the English translation of his Der Judenstaat (The State of the Jews).

Herzl convenes the First Zionist Congress.

Jewish National Fund is empowered to purchase land and hold it in trust for the people (eventually the state), thus assuring that it will remain under Jewish control. Arab land, by contrast, was under individual ownership (Said, 1979).

Significant Jewish land purchases begin (Said, 1979).

World War I.

McMahon Correspondence.

Arab Revolt: Arabs join Britain in attacking the Ottoman Empire.

Sykes-Picot Agreement (officially, the Anglo-Franco-Russian Agreement).

Balfour Declaration. Britain favors a “national home” in Palestine for Jews.

British and Arabs capture Palestine. Ottoman Empire collapses.
1917  The Bolsheviks seize power in Russia and publish the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

1918  **Wilson’s 14 Points** speech promises self-rule to Arabs.

1918  The British reassure the Arabs in a telegram from Sir Reginald Wingate.

1918  **Declaration to the Seven (Arabs)** by the British government.

1918  **Anglo-French Declaration.**

1918  Turkish armistice leaves Palestine a “disaster zone” (Wasserstein, 1978, p. 1, 21).

1918  First organized Arab opposition to Balfour Declaration (Wasserstein, 1978, p. 34).

1918  **Faisal-Weizmann Agreement.**

1919  Paris Peace Conference formalizes mandates for the Middle East.

1919  Resolutions of the General Syrian Congress.

1919  **King-Crane Commission opposes making Palestine a Jewish commonwealth.**

1919  **French evict Faisal from Damascus, ending dreams of joint Syria-Palestine**


1920  San Remo Peace Conference.

1920  **First Arab riot** (Wasserstein, 1978, p. 72). **British suspend immigration.**

1921  **Second Arab riot** (Hadawi, 1989, p. 51; Wasserstein, 1978, p. 89).

1922  **Palestine mandate.** The League entrusts to Great Britain legislative and

administrative power over Palestine (including present-day Jordan, Israel and

the Occupied Territories.

1922  **Churchill White Paper.**

1922  **Joint Resolution 73 by U.S. Congress.**

1928  Hassan al-Banna founds the Muslim Brotherhood (Viorst, 2007, p. 86).

1929  **Third Arab riot against growth of the Jewish community** (Hadawi, 1989).
1930 Shaw Commission report recommends partition. Jews accept; Arabs refuse.

1930 **Hope Simpson report on immigration**; recommends restrictions on Jews.

1930 Passfield White Paper.

1931 **MacDonald letter**.

1936 Arab Higher Committee established (Morris, 1936).

1936-1939 **Arabs rebel vs. British immigration policies** (Stein, 1984; Khalidi, 2006).

1937 **Peel Commission report**. Recommends partition of Palestine (Reich, 2008).

1937 The advent of terrorism by Jews (Morris, 2001, p. 147).

1938 Americans strike oil in Saudi Arabia.

1939 **MacDonald White Paper**.

1939 St. James (London) Conference.

1939-1945 **World War II. 6 million Jews die in the Holocaust**.

1945 Arab League founded in Cairo.


1946 Jewish terrorists blow up the King David Hotel.

1947 **Partition of Palestine: UNGA Resolution 181. Jews accept; Arabs reject**.

1948 The British surrender their mandate and withdraw.

1948 Israel declares independence. It owned 6% of land with a third of the population.

1948 Five armies from neighboring Arab states invade the new Israel. Jordan
seizes what today is known as the West Bank and part of Jerusalem. Egypt
seizes what today is known as the Gaza Strip. Israel calls it the War of
Independence; the Arabs call it *naqbah* (the catastrophe). Israel survives
and makes small territorial gains.
1948  Hundreds of thousands of Arabs flee, some voluntarily, some driven out. Deir Yassin, an Arab village, becomes a symbol when its residents are massacred by Israelis. Arabs who do not flee become Israeli citizens with most, but not all, of the rights that Jews have. Hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees flee from Arab countries to Israel.

1948  **Bernadotte peace proposals.**

1948  **Return of refugees: UNGA Resolution 194.**

1949  U.N. Conciliation Commission convenes the Lausanne (Switzerland) Conference.

1949  Rhodes talks lead to a General Armistice Agreement at the military status quo.

1949  **Israel admitted to the United Nations: UNGA Resolution 273.**

1950  Jordan annexes East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

1951  Jordan’s King Abdullah assassinated in Jerusalem.

1956  **Suez crisis. Nasser nationalizes the Suez Canal. Israel, Britain and France attack Egypt. Israel occupies most of the Sinai, but withdraws under pressure from U.S. and U.S.S.R.**

1964  Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) founded.

1964  **Palestinian National Charter.** Amended in 1968.

1964/1965  **Fatah Constitution.**

1967  Egypt’s Nasser blockades Israeli shipping through the Red Sea.


1967  **Land for peace: UNSC Resolution 242.**

1967  Khartoum resolution, known for its “Three Nos.”
1967  First settlements established by Israelis in the West Bank.


1969  Yasir Arafat elected chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, which exercises most political power.

1969  Rogers Plan.

1969  UN Relief and Works Agency: UNGA Resolution 2535.

1970  Black September: Jordan evicts the PLO to Lebanon (Morris, 2004).

1970  Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, dies of a heart attack, and is succeeded by Anwar al-Sadat, who agrees to a cease-fire, ending the war of attrition with no gains by either Egypt or Israel.

1971  UN Security Council Resolution 298 re-affirms the principle that “acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible.” Jerusalem is cited.

1971  Jarring memorandum.

1973  Call for negotiations: UNSC Resolution 338.

1973  Yom Kippur War. Also called Ramadan War, October War, Middle East War and Arab-Israeli War.


1974  UN force separates Israel and Syria along the eastern edge of the Golan Heights.

1974  Arab League declares the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Jordan’s King Hussein abandons his claim to speak for the Palestinians.
1974 Rabat Conference designates the PLO as the only representative of the Palestinian people.

1974 United Nations recognizes the PLO. UNGA Resolution 3236.

1974 Observer status granted to the PLO: UNGA Resolution 3237.

1974 Phased Plan. (See Appendix C, Annex 20.)

1974 Speech by Yasser Arafat to the U.N. General Assembly.

1975 Sinai II accords.

1975 Saunders statement.

1975 Yarif-Shemtov formula for negotiations.

1975 Committee on the Exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people: UNGA Resolution 3376.

1975 UNGA Resolution 3379 equates Zionism with racism.


1977 Anwar Sadat, the president of Egypt, accepts an invitation to visit Israel.

1977 Special unit on Palestinian rights. UNGA Resolution 32/40 B.

1978 Camp David accords: Jimmy Carter brokers peace between Israel and Egypt.

1978 Lebanon invasion: Litani Operation.

1978 UNSC Res. 425 puts a peacekeeping buffer between Israel and Lebanon.

1979 Egypt and Israel sign a peace treaty – the first between an Arab country and Israel. Israel agrees to withdraw its troops and settlers from the Sinai. The treaty inaugurates application of the principle of “land for peace.”

1980 Venice Declaration: Europe’s answer to the Camp David accords.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>UNSC Res. 478 on acquisition of territory censures Israel on East Jerusalem.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Egyptian President Sadat assassinated by Egyptian soldiers who opposed his agreements with Israel.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Peace between Egypt and Israel: UNGA Resolution 36/120 F.</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>Israel, in effect, annexes the Golan Heights, which it captured in the 1967 war.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Israel invades southern Lebanon. Christian Phalangists, Israel’s allies, massacre Arab refugees in Sabra and Shatilla camps. Israel does not intervene. The PLO, driven out of Lebanon, relocates to Tunis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Reagan Plan. (See Appendix C, Annex 25.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Fez Initiative (Fahd Plan). (See Appendix C, Annex 26.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Hamas founded as an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Measures to prevent international terrorism: UNGA Resolution 42/159.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Hamas covenant. (See Appendix C, Annex 28.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Palestine Declaration of Independence, to no (immediate) effect.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Jordan cedes to the PLO its claim to the West Bank (Reich, 1996, p. 398; Morris, 2001, p. 605).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Arafat speeches. He says he accepts UN Resolutions 242 and 338, recognizes Israel’s right to exist and renounces terrorism. U.S. opens dialogue with PLO.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
1988 Most countries, including the U.S. and Israel, recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. U.S. opens a dialogue with PLO.

1988 Stockholm declaration.

1989 Suicide attacks begin.

1991 **UNGA Resolution 46/86 rescinds UNGA Resolution 3379.**


1993 **Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government.**

1993 Israel recognizes the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Arafat issues a press release stating that the PLO recognizes Israel’s right to exist. The PLO accepts U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and rejects violence and terrorism.

1993 PLO and Arafat allowed to relocate from Tunis.

1993 Israel-Jordan Common Agenda sets the framework for negotiations for peace.

1993 Hamas, a radical Muslim organization backed by Iran, begins suicide bombings in April, stalling the peace process (Merari, 2005).

1993 **Middle East peace process sets neutral tone. UNGA Resolution 48/58.**

1994 Gaza-Jericho (“Cairo”) Agreement leads to establishment of the Palestinian Authority and “land for peace” (Gaza, 2011).

1994 The PLO relocates from Tunis to Ramallah on the West Bank.

1994 Limited self-rule granted to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

1994 Jordan and Israel conclude a peace treaty in October.

1995  Israel’s prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, assassinated by a radical Jewish student who opposed his agreements with Egypt.

1996  April Understanding ends war between Hezbollah (in Lebanon) and Israel.


1999  Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline.


2000  Israel withdraws unilaterally from Lebanon; Hezbollah claims victory.

2000  Clinton Parameters. (See Appendix C, Annex 34.)

2001  Mitchell Report. (See Appendix C, Annex 35.)

2001  Tenet workplan.

2001  Taba summit, also called Taba talks and Taba conference on final status.

2001  Israel elects Ariel Sharon as prime minister.

2002  Zinni proposal.

2002  UNSC Resolution 1397 calls for two-state solution to Arab-Israeli conflict.

2002  Arab peace initiative. (See Appendix C, Annex 36.)

2002  U.S. President Bush’s Rose Garden speeches. (See Appendix C, Annex 37.)

2003  Road map to peace proposed by Bush and Quartet; Israel accepts two-state solution (Bennet, 2003, May 26).

2003  A truce (hudna, in Arabic) is declared, but it – and the road map -- collapse.

2004  Arafat dies.

2005  Israel unilaterally withdraws all 9,000 settlers and troops from the Gaza Strip.

2005  Speech by Ariel Sharon to the U.N. General Assembly.

2005  Mahmoud Abbas elected president of the Palestinian National Authority.

2005  Sharm el-Sheikh summit.

2006  Hamas defeats Fatah in voting for the Palestinian Legislative Council.

2007  Hamas routs Fatah in a brief civil war and seizes control of the Gaza Strip.
Appendix C -- Documentary History

Contents

The documentary history of the Arab-Israeli conflict goes back to 1915. It is a fascinating tale of treachery and deceit, of promises made and promises broken, of good faith and of bad faith. It is a tale of two peoples struggling to be born as independent nations – one succeeding and the still struggling to find its destiny. Referring to the Balfour Declaration, novelist Arthur Koestler (1949) said, “In this document, one nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third” (p. 4). He might have added, “Even more extraordinary is the fact this is third country (Palestine) was part of the empire of a fourth (the Ottomans).”

1915    Annex 1 -- McMahon Correspondence
1916    Annex 2 -- Sykes-Picot Agreement
1917    Annex 3 -- Balfour Declaration
1918    Annex 4 -- Wilson’s 14 Points (January)
1918    Annex 5 -- Declaration to the Seven (Arabs) (June)
1918    Annex 6 -- Anglo-French Declaration (November)
1919    Annex 7 -- Faisal-Weismann Agreement (January)
1922    Annex 8 -- King-Crane Commission (conducted in 1919, released in 1922)
1922    Annex 9 -- Churchill White Paper
1922    Annex 10 -- Palestine Mandate
1922    Annex 11 -- Joint Resolution 73 by U.S. Congress
1930    Annex 12 -- Hope Simpson Report on Immigration
1931    Annex 13 -- Macdonald Letter
1937    Annex 14 -- Peel Commission Report
1939  Annex 15 -- Macdonald White Paper
1948  Annex 16 -- Bernadotte Peace Proposals
1964  Annex 18 -- Fatah Constitution
1971  Annex 19 – Jarring Memorandum
1974  Annex 20 -- Phased Plan, Palestine Liberation Organization
1974  Annex 21 -- Speech by Yasser Arafat to the U.N. General Assembly
1975  Annex 22 -- Saunders Statement
1980  Annex 23 -- Venice Declaration
1980  Annex 24 -- Basic Law (Israel)
1982  Annex 25 -- Reagan Plan
1982  Annex 26 -- Fez Initiative (Fahd Plan)
1988  Annex 28 -- Hamas Covenant
1988  Annex 29 -- Palestine Declaration of Independence
1988  Annex 30 -- Stockholm Declaration (December)
1988  Annex 31 -- Arafat Speeches
1993  Annex 32 -- Letters of Mutual Recognition (Oslo I)

Annex 33 -- Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements
2000  Annex 34 – Clinton Parameters
2001  Annex 35 -- Mitchell Report
2002  Annex 36 -- Arab Peace Initiative (Saudi Peace Plan)
2002  Annex 37 -- U.S. President Bush’s Rose Garden Speeches
2003  Annex 38 -- Road Map to Peace


2005  Annex 40 -- Speech by Ariel Sharon to the U.N. General Assembly
This exchange of letters was between Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, British high commissioner in Egypt, and Hussein (spelled Husain by McMahon) ibn Ali, the Arab leader and spokesman. Hussein’s son Abdullah initiated the correspondence because relations between the Arabs and the Ottoman Empire, which ruled most of the Middle East at the time, were strained at best. Although the Ottomans were Muslim, they were not Arabs, and they spoke Turkish, not Arabic. In World War I, the Ottomans aligned with the German Empire.

Abdullah is addressed by the courtesy title of amir (emir), indicating nobility or authority. Hussein is addressed by the courtesy title of sharif, an honorary Arabic title indicating descent from the Prophet Muhammad.

Hussein’s purpose was to explore the possibility of Arab involvement in World War I on the side of Great Britain. Hussein wanted assurances that the British would support the Arabic cause of independence and solidarity after the end of the war. The British wanted Arab help in fighting the Turks. The Arabs thought they had a deal, and so they trusted the British.

Meanwhile, the British were making other, contradictory promises, almost simultaneously. Observe the close timing:

**January 1916:** The British, through McMahon, promise independence to the Arabs. [See their correspondence, below.]

**April-May 1916:** The British, French and Russians decide in the secret Sykes-Picot agreement to divide up the Ottoman Empire among themselves. See Appendix C, 1916, for the complete text.
November 1917: The British in the Balfour Declaration promise the Jews a homeland in Palestine. See Appendix C, 1917, for the complete text.

February 1918: The British repeat their promises to Hussein in the Wingate telegram.

June 1918: The British repeat their promises once more in the Declaration to the Seven (Arab leaders). See Appendix C, June 1918, for the complete text.

The McMahon promises were effective for Great Britain. Hussein and most Arabs allied with Great Britain against the Turkish Ottoman Empire, a client of Germany and ruler of much of the Middle East. The Arabs under Hussein’s son, Faisal, and the British defeated the Turks and occupied most of the Levant including Palestine. But instead of independence, the British (and French) turned the Levant into colonies. By the time the Arabs realized the duplicity it was too late.

The complete McMahon correspondence consists of 10 letters. The critical letter is the fourth (see below, emphasis added). All 10 letters were written in Arabic. The translation shown here is by George Antonius (1939). He translates only eight for publication in his book The Arab Awakening because the last two letters are routine. To read Nos. 9 and 10 – by another translator – go to http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/hussmac1.html#4. The commentary that follows is from Antonius (1939), pp. 164-183.

Letter No. 1, Antonius (1939) said, stressed Husain’s central objective of Arab independence and stated the Arab terms for intervention on the side of Great Britain. The letter enumerated the conditions on which Husain was prepared to ally with the British. Clause 1 lay out with great specificity the boundaries of the pan-Arab nation, including Palestine, which he demanded that Great Britain recognize as independent. (It was then governed by Britain’s enemy, Turkey.)
Antonious describes Letter No. 2 as evasive, insincere, foolish, inconsistent and uninformed about Ottoman politics.

Husain shows his irritation over “highly decorated phrases” in Letter No. 3, although he indulges in his own literary artifices. But there is no ambiguity in asserting that the result of their negotiations will “depend solely upon whether you will reject or admit the proposed frontiers” as laid out in the first clause of Letter No. 1. Yes or no?

Letter No. 4, Antonius said, “may perhaps be regarded as the most important international document in the history of the Arab national movement. It contains the pledges which brought the Arabs into the War, openly on the side of the Allies. In the years that followed the War, it became an outstanding bone of contention; and, down to the present day, is still invoked as the main piece of evidence on which the Arabs accuse Great Britain of having broken faith with them” (p. 169). The accusation is arguable because it had so much competition from other broken promises.

The sticking point is the British intent to exclude from its promise of independence “portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.”

In Letter No. 5, Husain accepts most of the British exclusions, but not that one.

In Letter No. 6, McMahon “maintains his reservation of the coastal regions of northern Syria” (p. 173), but changes the explanation to avoid infringing on French interests. The letter concludes with a pledge that Great Britain will not conclude peace without providing for Arab freedom.

Letter No. 7 puts Husain in a bind. He cannot allow any part of Syria to be excluded from a pledge of independence, so he leaves it open until the war ends. It was a decision that would cloud British-Arab-Israeli relations for decades. “We shall deem it our duty ... to claim from you
Bairut and its coastal regions which we will overlook for the moment on account of France” (p. 425). Husain adds: “Any concession designed to give France or any other Power possession of a single square foot of territory in those parts is quite out of the question.”

In summary, the letters explicitly commit the British to “recognize and uphold Arab independence in a certain area” (p. 176). The argument is over what area was included. “The Arab view is that Palestine did fall within the area of promised Arab independence. The British Government maintain the contrary” (p. 176).

In retrospect, it appears that the British meant to exclude Lebanon, which the French coveted. It lies directly west of the city of Damascus. But Palestine is southwest, and thus arguably included. If the British meant the Vilayet of Syria, of which Damascus was the capital, then Palestine is clearly west and thus excluded.

Antonius argues for the meaning of city, because two other places enumerated by McMahon – Homs and Hama – also are cities, not provinces. “Supposing,” Antonius says (p. 178) “that the phrase had said: the districts of New York, Newark, New Brunswick and Trenton, would anyone read the word districts as equivalent to states?”

On balance, Morris (2001) concludes, the wording of the promise includes Palestine, but not Lebanon, in the area promised for Arab rule. For further debate of the issue, go to http://israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.answers.php?questionID=000499

Text of McMahon Correspondence
(Covering Letter to No. 1)
The Amir Abdulla to Mr. Ronald Storrs
July 14, 1915
Complimentary titles.
I send my affectionate regard and respects to your esteemed self, and trust that you will ensure, as you know how to, the acceptance of the enclosed note which contains our proposals and conditions.
In this connexion, I wish to give you and your Government my assurance that you need have no anxiety about the intentions of our people, for they realize how closely their interests are bound to those of your Government. Do not trouble to send aeroplanes or warships to distribute news and reports as in the past: our minds are now made up.

What we would request is that you should make it possible for the Egyptian Government to resume the consignment of the bounty of grain for the poor of Mecca and Madina, which was stopped last year. He arrival of this year’s grain, together with last year’s, would be valuable here for the promotion of our mutual interest. To a person of your quick understanding, this hint will suffice.

I beg of you not to send us any communications until you hear that our plans have matured, except for the reply to this letter and its enclosure, which should only be sent through the bearer. Perhaps you will think fit to give him a written warrant to enable him to pass through to you whenever we think it necessary to send him. He is dependable.

Compliments.

Letter No. 1, from Hussein to McMahon
July 14, 1915

Complimentary titles.

Whereas the entire Arab nation without exception is determined to assert its right to live, gain its freedom and administer its own affairs in name and in fact;

And whereas the Arabs believe it to be in Great Britain’s interest to lend them assistance and support in the fulfillment of their steadfast and legitimate aims to the exclusion of all other aims;

And whereas it is similarly to the advantage of the Arabs, in view of their geographical position and their economic interest, and in view of the well-known attitude of the Government of Great Britain, to prefer British assistance to any other;

For these reasons, the Arab nation has decided to approach the Government of Great Britain with a request for the approval through one of their representatives if they think fit, of the following basic provisions which, as time presses, have not been made to include matters of relatively smaller importance, since such matters can wait until the time comes for their consideration: --

1. Great Britain recognizes the independence of the Arab countries which are founded: on the north, by the line Mersin-Adana-Midiat-Jazirat (ibn Umar) – Amadia to the Persian frontier; on the east, by the Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf; on the south, by the Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden whose status will remain as at present); on the west, by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin.

2. Great Britain will agree to the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate for Islam.

3. The Sharifian Arab Government undertakes, other things being equal, to grant Great Britain preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries.

4. With a view to ensuring the stability of Arab independence and the efficacy of the promised preference in economic enterprises, the two contracting parties undertake, in the event of any foreign state attacking either of them, to come to each other’s assistance with all the resources of their military and naval forces; it being understood that peace will be concluded only when both parties concur.
In the event of one of the two parties embarking upon a war of offence, the other party will adopt an attitude of neutrality, but, if invited to join, will agree to confer with the other party as to the conditions of joint action.

5. Great Britain agrees to the abolition of Capitulations in the Arab countries, and undertakes to assist the Sharifian Government in summoning an international congress to decree their abolition.

6. Clauses 3 and 4 of the present Agreement are to remain in force for a period of fifteen years. Should either party desire an extension, due notice of one year before the expiry of that period will have to be given.

Therefore, since the entire Arab nation is (God be praised!) united in its resolve to pursue its noble aim to the end, at whatever cost, it requests the Government of Great Britain to return an answer, whether negatively or in the affirmative within thirty days of the receipt of this message, in default of which it reserves its right to complete freedom of action, just as we will consider ourselves absolved from the letter and the spirit of the declaration which we made earlier through Ali Effendi.

Compliments.

Letter No. 2, from McMahon to Husain
Cairo, August 30, 1915
Complimentary titles.

We have the honour to tender the gratitude due to you for the sentiments of sincere friendship for England which you display, and it pleases us, moreover, to learn that Your Lordship and your people are at one in believing that Arab interests are in harmony with British interests, and vice-versa.

In earnest of this, we hereby confirm to you the declaration of Lord Kitchener as communicated to you through Ali Efendi, in which was manifested our desire for the independence of the Arab countries and their inhabitants, and our readiness to approve an Arab caliphate upon its proclamation.

We now declare once more that the Government of Great Britain would welcome the reversion of the caliphate to a true Arab born of the blessed stock of the Prophet.

As for the question of frontiers and boundaries, negotiations would appear to be premature and a waste of time on details at this stage, with the War in progress and the Turks in effective occupation of the greater part of those regions. All the more so as a party of Arabs inhabiting those very regions have, to our amazement and sorrow, overlooked and neglected this valuable and incomparable opportunity; and, instead of coming to our aid, have lent their assistance to the Germans and the Turks; to that new despoiler, the German, and to that tyrannical oppressor, the Turk.

Nevertheless, we are fully prepared to dispatch to Your Lordship whatever quantities of grain and other charitable gifts may be owed by Egypt to the Holy Land of Arabia and the noble Arable. Those will be forwarded, on a sign from Your Lordship, to whatever locality you may indicate.

We have made the necessary arrangement for facilitating the journeys of your messenger to us.

Compliments.

Letter No. 3, from Hussein to McMahon
September 9, 1915
Complimentary titles.

We received your note of the 19th Shawwal [August 30] with gratification, and have given it the fullest consideration, notwithstanding the obscurity and the signs of lukewarmth and hesitancy we descried in it in regard to our essential clause. We find it necessary to affirm to Your Excellency our sentiments of amity with Great Britain and our readiness to ensure her a favoured place in all circumstances and in every manner, for in their way can the true interests of our co-religionists best be served.

Your Excellency will suffer me to say, in explanation of what I mean by lukewarmth and hesitancy, that your statements in regard to the question of frontiers and boundaries – namely that to discuss them at this stage were unprofitable and could only result in a waste of time since those regions are still occupied by their sovereign government, and so forth – reflect what I might almost describe as reluctance or something akin to reluctance, on your part.

The fact is that the proposed frontiers and boundaries represent not the suggestions of one individual whose claim might well await the conclusion of the War, but the demands of our people who believe that those frontiers form the minimum necessary to the establishment of the new order for which they are striving. This they are determined to obtain; and they have decided to discuss that matter, in the first resort, with the Power in whom they place their greatest confidence and reliance, and whom they regard as the pivot of justice, namely Great Britain.

In this, they are moved by considerations of the reciprocity of interests, the requirements of territorial organization, and the wishes of the populations concerned; and also by their desire to see the foundations of their future life settled beforehand, so as to avoid finding themselves, when their new life is being established and organized, in opposition to or conflict with Great Britain or one of her allies – which God forbid! It should be noted that, in drawing up their proposed delimitation, they have not outstepped the bounds of the regions inhabited by their race.

For our aim, O respected Minister, is to ensure that the conditions which are essential to our future shall be secured on a foundation of reality, and not on highly-decorated phrases and titles. As for the caliphate, God have mercy on its soul and comfort the Moslems for their loss!

I am confident that Your Excellency will realize beyond all doubt that I have had nothing to do with the proposing of those boundaries, which include only populations of our race, and that they were proposed by our people who regard them as being, to put it briefly, vitally and economically essential – as indeed they are.

In conclusion, we believe in all sincerity that your loyalty will prevail, whether you are satisfied with us or displeased; and that you will not wish to seize upon the fact that some of our people are still with the utmost zeal furthering Ottoman designs, as stated in your letter under reference, as an excuse for treating our aspirations with such lukewarmth and hesitancy. I think Your Excellency is above denying that our demands are fundamental, nay, that they are the very substance and essence of our existence, be it from the material, the spiritual or the moral point of view. Up to this very moment, I have been endeavouring, in person and with all my powers, to enforce the prescriptions of our Sacred Law in my country and in all that concerns me in relation to the rest of the empire, until God issue His decree.

For these reasons, and the better to set your mind at ease, I may state that the people of all those countries, including those of whom you say that they are zealously furthering German and Ottoman designs, are awaiting the result of the present negotiations, which depend solely upon whether you reject or admit the proposed frontiers, and upon whether or not you will help us to secure their spiritual and other rights against evil and danger. Please communicate to us the
decision of the British Government on this point, for our guidance as to what suits their policy, and as to what steps it behoves us to take. For the rest, it is God Who decrees the past and the future, He ordains all things, exalted be His Name!

With regard to our request for the dispatch of the people’s bounty, with the customary purses from the Ministry of Auqaf and all that is usual to send with the Pilgrimage convoy, I had in view that their dispatch would be a means of substantiating the terms of your proclamations to the world, and more particularly the Moslem world, in which you states that your hostility was solely directed against the usurpers of the caliphate and, hence, of the rights of all Moslems. To say nothing of the fact that the said bounty comes from specific endowments which have nothing to do with politics. If you decide to send them, let the bounty due on account of the past two years be consigned in a special steamer to Jedda as usual in the name of the people, and let the skipper or the special officers who is usually charged year by year with the duty of delivery communicate with the authorities at Jedda on arrival at the port, and ask for the competent official who is to take delivery of the grain against the proper receipt to be signed by the receiving officer. It should be noted that only the signature of that officer may be accepted, and the skipper or special officer should be instructed that if any obstruction is attempted, he should threaten to return his cargo to the port of departure. The consignment is to be formally received by the committee known as the “Committee for dealing with the People’s Bounty.”

If you should wish to reply to this note, let the reply be sent by the bearer.

Compliments.

Letter No. 4, from McMahon to Hussein
Cairo, October 24, 1915
Complimentary titles.

I have, with gratification and pleasure, received your note of the 29th Shawwal, 1333, and its tokens of sincere friendship have filled me with satisfaction and contentment.

I regret to find that you inferred from my last note that my attitude towards the questions of frontiers and boundaries was one of hesitancy and lukewarmth. Such was in no wise the intention of my note. All I meant was that I considered that the time had not yet come in which that questions could be discussed in a conclusive manner.

But, having realized from your last note that you considered the question important, vital and urgent, I hastened to communicate to the Government of Great Britain the purport of your note. It gives me the greatest pleasure to convey to you, on their behalf, the following declarations which, I have no doubt, you will receive with satisfaction and acceptance.

The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on their account be excepted from the proposed delimitation.

Subject to that modification, and without prejudice to the treaties concluded between us and certain Arab Chiefs, we accept that delimitation.

As for the regions lying within the proposed frontiers, in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France, I am authorized to give you the following pledges on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, and to reply as follows to your note:

(1) That, subject to the modifications stated above, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca;
(2) That Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression, and will recognize the obligation of preserving them from aggression;

(3) That, when circumstances permit, Great Britain will help the Arabs with her advice and assist them in the establishment of governments to suit those diverse regions;

(4) That it is understood that the Arabs have already decided to seek the councils and advice of Great Britain exclusively; and that such European advisers and officials as may be needed to establish a sound system of administration shall be British;

(5) That, as regards to the two vilayets of Baghdad and of Basra, the Arabs recognize that the fact of Great Britain’s established position and interest there will call for the setting up of special administrative arrangements to protect those regions from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of their inhabitants, and to safeguard our mutual economic interest.

I am confident that this declaration will convince you, beyond all doubt, of Great Britain’s sympathy with the aspirations of her friends the Arabs; and that it will result in a lasting and solid alliance with them, of which one of the immediate consequences will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the liberation of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which has weighed on them all these long years.

I have confined myself in this note to vital questions of primary importance. If there are any other matters in your notes, which have been overlooked, we can revert to them at some suitable time in the future.

I have heard with great satisfaction and pleasure that the Sacred Kiswa and the charitable gifts which had gone with it, had arrived safely and that, thanks to your wise directions and arrangements, they were landed without trouble or damage in spite of the risks and difficulties created by the present deplorable war. We pray Almighty God that He may bring a lasting peace and freedom to mankind.

I am sending this note with your faithful messenger, Shaikh Muhammad ibn Aref ibn Uraifan, who will lay before you certain interesting matters which, as they are of secondary importance, I have abstained from mentioning in this note.

Compliments.

**Letter No. 5, from Hussein to McMahon**

November 5, 1915

Complimentary titles.

With great gratification have we received your note of the 15th Zul-Heja [October 24] to which we would reply as follows.

First, in order to facilitate agreement and serve the cause of Islam by the removal of possible sources of hardship and tribulation, and in earnest of the particular esteem in which we hold Great Britain, we no longer insist on the inclusion of the districts of Mersin and Adana in the Arab Kingdom. As for the vilayets of Aleppo and Bairut and their western maritime coasts, there are purely Arab provinces in which the Moslem is indistinguishable from the Christian, for they are both the descendants of one forefather. And we Moslems intend, in those provinces, to follow the precepts laid down by the Commander of the Faithful, Umar ibn al-Khattab (God have mercy upon him!), and the caliphs who came after him, when he enjoined upon the Moslems to treat the Christians on a footing with themselves, saying: they are to enjoy the same rights and bear the same obligations as ourselves. They will have, moreover, their denominational privileges, as far as the public interest allows.
Secondly, since the provinces of Iraq were part of the former Arab Empire, and indeed were the seat of government in the days of the Caliph Ali ibn Abu-Taleb (God’s favour be upon him!) and of all the caliphs after him; and since it was in those very provinces (and more particularly in Basra which as the first centre of Arab culture) that the civilization of the Arabs and the expansion of their power flourished – a fact that gives them in the eyes of all Arabs, both far and near, the precious significance of an unforgettable heritage; for these reasons, we should find it impossible to persuade or compel the Arab nation to renounced that honourable association. On the other hand, since the safeguard referred to in your clause 5 concerning Great Britain’s interests are naturally secured – for the safeguarding of British interests with which are bound up our own is one of our main concerns -- we should be willing, in our desire to facilitate agreement, to allow those parts which are now occupied by British troops to remain so occupied for a period to be determined by negotiations, without prejudice to the rights of either party or injury to the natural wealth and resources of those parts. It being provided that, during the period of the occupation, the Arab Kingdom shall received suitable pecuniary assistance towards the burden of expenditure which a nascent kingdom inevitably has to bear; and that the agreements in force with certain Chiefs in those parts will be respected.

Thirdly, your advocacy of speedy action seems to us to entail risks as well as advantages. In the first place, premature action might give rise among those Moslems who do not as yet appreciate the realities of the situation, to the criticism that, by proclaiming a revolt, we are seeing the disruption of Islam. In the second place, we have to consider what our position would be against Turkey who is aided by all the might of Germany. In the event of one of the Entente Powers weakening to the extent of being compelled to make peace with the Central Powers: what attitude would Great Britain and her remaining allies adopt to preclude the possibility of the Arab nation being left alone to face Turkey and her allies? We would have had no anxiety had the conflict lain between us and the Turks alone. These aspects of the question have to be considered, especially as, if we were to enter the War in an informal way, it might be contended by some of the belligerents that they have a right, in concluding the peace, to interfere in our affairs.

Fourthly, the Arabs firmly believe that, after the War, the German-ridden Turks will try to give them constant provocation, in religious as well as temporal matters, and to wreak the utmost vengeance upon them. On their side, the Arabs have resolved and vowed to fight the Turks and continue fighting them until not one of them (save for women and children) remains in any of the Arab countries. Our present deliberation is on account of the considerations stated above.

Fifthly, the moment the Arabs feel confident that, when the time comes for the conclusion of peace in Europe, Great Britain and her allies will not leave them in the lurch face to face with Turkey and Germany, but that they intend to help them and advocate their case effectively in the peace negotiations, from that moment will Arab participation in the War undoubtedly serve the general Arab interest.

Sixthly, our previous communication dated the 29th Shawwal, 1333, makes it superfluous for us to reply to clauses 3 and 4 of your letter, relating to forms of administration, advisers and officials, especially as it is clear from Your Excellency’s declarations that there will be no interference in our internal affairs.

Seventhly, we request a clear and final reply, in the shortest possible time, to the questions and problems set forth above, so that the necessary action may be taken with the least possible delay. In our desire to secure agreement which should be satisfactory to both sides, we
have gone to the furthest lengths of concession. For we know that the outcome of this war for us can only be either to achieve victory, which will secure to the Arabs a life worthy of their ancient glory, or to find destruction in the attempt. Were it not for the determination shown by the Arabs to realize their aspirations, I would have elected to retire to some mountain-top. But they pressed me to lead the movement to its goal.

Compliments.

Letter No. 6, from McMahon to Hussein
Cairo, December 13, 1915
Complimentary titles.

Your note of the 27th Zul-Hejja, 1333, has reached me, and I was glad to find that you consent to the exclusion of the vilayets of Mersin and Adana from the boundaries of the Arab countries.

I have also received with utmost pleasure and satisfaction your assurances that the Arabs are resolved on following the precepts of the Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab (the blessing of God be upon him!) and of the other early caliphs, which guarantee equal rights and privileges to all creeds alike.

Your statement that the Arabs are prepared to recognize and respect all our treaties with other Arab Chiefs is of course taken to apply to all territories to be included within the frontiers of the Arab Kingdom, for Great Britain cannot repudiate agreements already concluded between her and those Chiefs.

As for the two vilayets of Aleppo and Bairut, the Government of Great Britain have fully understood your statement in that respect and noted with the greatest care. But as the interests of their ally France are involved in those two provinces, the question calls for careful consideration. We shall communicate again with you on this subject, at the appropriate time.

The Government of Great Britain, as I have previously informed you, are prepared to give all the guarantees and assistance in their power to the Arab Kingdom. But their interests in the Vilayet of Baghdad necessitate a friendly and stable administration, such as you have outlined. The proper safeguarding of those interests calls for fuller and more detailed consideration than the present situation and the speed with which these negotiations are being conducted permit.

We fully approve your desire to proceed warily, and do not wish to impel you to hasty action which might obstruct the success of your objectives. But, at the same time, we deem it imperative that you should turn your endeavours to uniting the Arab peoples to our joint cause and to urging them to abstain from aiding our enemies in any manner whatsoever. On the success of your endeavours, and on the efficacy of the measures which, when the time comes, the Arabs will find it possible to take in aid of our cause, will the strength and permanence of our agreement depend.

In these circumstances, the Government of Great Britain have authorized me to declare to your Lordship that you may rest confident that Great Britain does not intend to conclude any peace whatsoever, of which the freedom of the Arab peoples and their liberation from German and Turkish domination do not form an essential condition.

In token of our good faith, and as a contribution to your endeavours in our joint cause, I am sending the sum of £20,000 with your trusted messenger.

Compliments.
Letter No. 7, from Hussein to McMahon
January 1, 1916
Complimentary titles.

I have received your note of the 9th Safar, 1334 [December 13, 1915], with the bearer of this, and noted its contents which have filled me with the utmost satisfaction and gratification, inasmuch as they set my mind at rest over one point, namely the arrival of Muhammad Sharif al-Faruqi and his interview with you. You will not have satisfied yourself that our attitude was not prompted by personal desires, which would have been foolish, but was the rest of the decisions taken and the desires expressed by our people; and that our role in the matter was confined to conveying and putting into effect those desires and decisions, thus merely discharging a duty with which our people had invested us. It is, in my view, most important that your Excellency should realize that.

As for your statements concerning Iraq and the compensation to be paid during the period of occupation, I would illustrate the friendly sentiments animating us towards Great Britain and the confidence we repose in her, both in word and in deed, in the spirit as well as the letter, by leaving the assessment of the compensation to her wisdom and sense of fair play.

With regard to the northern parts and their coastal regions, we have already stated, in our previous note, the utmost that it was possible for us to modify. We made those modifications solely in order to achieve the ends which, Almighty God willing, we desire to attain. In that same spirit, we have felt bound to steer clear of that which might have impaired the alliance between Great Britain and France and their concord during the calamities of the present war. On the other hand – and this Your Excellency must clearly understand – we shall deem it our duty, at the earliest opportunity after the conclusion of the War, to claim from you Bairut and its coastal regions which we will overlook for the moment on account of France.

I find it superfluous to point out that this arrangement also serves Great Britain’s interests best; that it safeguard them as fully – if not more – as it secures our rights; and that no other arrangement is possible by which it could fall to Great Britain to achieve the aim, which she has at heart, of seeing her friends in contentment and happiness. All the more so as the proximity of the French to us would be a source of difficulties and dispute such as would render the establishment of peaceful conditions impossible. To say nothing of the fact that the people of Bairut are resolutely opposed to such a dismemberment, and would drive us to take a stand which might cause concern and trouble to Great Britain on a scale not far short of her present preoccupations, owing to what we firmly believe to be the community, and indeed the identity, of your interests and our own, and to be the only explanation of our unwillingness to deal with anyone else but Great Britain in these negotiations.

Thus any concession designed to give France or any other Power possession of a single square foot of territory in those parts is quite out of the question. In proclaiming this, I place all my reliance on the declaration which concluded your note, and this reliance is such that, at our death, it shall be inherited by those who live after us.

Your Excellency may rest assured, and Great Britain may rest assured, that we shall adhere to our resolve to which reference has already been made, and which was made known to Storrs – that able and accomplished man – two years ago. We are only waiting for an opportunity in consonance with our situation. It appears to be drawing nearer, and the hand of destiny seems to be driving it towards us in timely and unmistakable fashion, as though to provide us and those who think like us with weapons for meeting the criticism and facing the responsibilities in store.
Your statement that you do not wish to impel us to hasty action which might obstruct the success of your objectives renders further explanation superfluous, except that we shall have to let you know in due course our requirements in the way of arms, ammunition and so forth.

Compliments.

Letter No. 8, from McMahon to Hussein
Cairo, January 30, 1916

Complimentary titles.

With great pleasure and satisfaction have we received your note of the 25th Safar, 1334, from the hand of your faithful messenger who never fails to give us your oral messages as well. We fully realize and appreciate the motives which animate you in the momentous issue with which we are concerned, and we do not question the fact that you are working for the good of the Arab nation without any ulterior motive whatsoever.

We have noted what you say with regard to the Vilayet of Baghdad, and we shall examine the matter with the utmost care after the defeat of the enemy, when the time comes for the conclusion of peace.

As for the northern regions, we note with great satisfaction your desire to avoid anything that might impair the alliance between Great Britain and France. It has not escaped you that it is our firm determination not to allow anything, however small, to stand in the way of our ending this war in complete victory. Moreover, when victory is attained, the friendship between Great Britain and France will be stronger and closer than ever, cemented as it will have been by the shedding of British and French blood – the blood of those who have fallen fighting side by side in the cause of right and freedom.

The Arab countries are now associated in that noble aim which can be attained by uniting our forces and acting in unison. We pray God that success may bind us to each other in a lasting friendship which shall bring profit and contentment to us all.

We are very glad to hear that you are endeavouring to gain all the Arab tribes over to our joint cause, and to prevent them from giving any assistance to our enemies. We leave it to your discretion to choose the most suitable opportunity for the initiation of more decisive measures.

You will doubtless inform us, through the bearer of this note, of the ways in which we can help you. You may rest assured that all your requests will always be carefully considered and most expeditiously dealt with.

You will surely have heard that Sayyed Ahmad al-Sharif, the Sanusi, has lent an ear to the intrigues of our enemies and started hostilities against us, and you will doubtless be sorry to hear that he has so far lost sight of Arab interests that he has thrown in his lot with our enemies. He has now fallen a victim to his own misguided ways, and met with adversity at every turn. This may yet convince him of his error and lead him back into the path of reason and of peace, out of pity for his poor followers whom he is guiding to destruction.

Your faithful messenger who carries this note to you will give you all our news.

Compliments.
This agreement was negotiated by Mark Sykes, a British soldier, politician and diplomat, and François Marie Denis George-Picot, a French diplomat. Sykes was trusted by both Jews and Arabs (Antonius, 1939).

Antonius’s criticism of the McMahon correspondence was mild compared to his denunciation of Sykes-Picot, which he called “shocking,” “absurd,” “deceptive,” “stupidity,” “duplicity,” “dishonest” and “a startling piece of double-dealing” (Antonius, 1939, p. 248-254). Most seriously, he called it a “breach of faith.”

Keep in mind that the purpose of the McMahon correspondence had been to persuade Hussein to ally with Great Britain and to lead an Arab revolt against the Turks, who were allied with Germany in World War I. But the British also had to keep their ally France happy, and France wanted Syria and Lebanon. France even had eyes for Palestine. The British had their own plans for Palestine and territory to the east – in part because of their strategic value as an overland route to its colony India, in part because of its proximity to the Suez Canal, and in part because they were intent on promising it to the Jews as a homeland. The Russians were involved because they were allied against Germany, at least during the first part of the war, and because they wanted Istanbul and the straits connecting the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

The solution was to strike a separate deal with France and promise the French what they wanted, even if it was at odds with what was being pledged to the Arabs and to the Jews. France would get sole control over Lebanon and Syria and joint control with Britain over Palestine. And Britain would get sole control of all the land between Palestine and the Persian Gulf.
Britain understood the duplicity of this arrangement and arranged for it to be kept secret -- until the Bolshevik revolution of November 1917, which happened inconveniently just as the British and Arab troops were about to take Jerusalem and Palestine. The Bolsheviks published the secret agreement, and Turkey made sure Husain saw it. Zionist leaders heard about it “through an accidental leakage” (Antonius, 1939, p. 266).

**Results:** Loyally, Hussein asked clarification, and the British lied – “deliberate equivocation” in Antonius’s euphemism – pretending that the documents Hussein saw “do not constitute an actually concluded agreement but consist of records of provisional exchanges and conversations,” as the British put it in a telegraph to Hussein, quoted by Antonius (p. 257) in his translation from the original Arabic. Hussein, still trusting the British, let it pass.

The British Zionists learned that the agreement called for the internationalization of Palestine, “protested angrily, feeling that they, too, were being duped” (p. 267), but were similarly placated. The British later got exclusive rights to Palestine by promising the French a substantial share of oil from Mosul (Antonius, 1939, p. 282).

Had the British (and French) dealt forthrightly with the agreement, it might have escaped the worst of the censures. The plan states that the parties were prepared to recognize an independent Arab State, although subsequent events cast doubt on their sincerity. Antonius (p. 248-250) based his objections on the divisions that blocked unification, on the degrees of control that bore no relation to the stage of development in the divided areas, and on the limitations to Arab sovereignty. He called them “errors in judgment” (p. 249). More serious, he said, was the breach of faith. “Worse still,” Antonius said, “the fact of its conclusion was dishonestly concealed from him” (p. 249). Britain did not want to take the risk that Husain might blow up the accord and withdraw or switch sides.
Text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement

Source: http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Sykes-Picot_Agreement

It is accordingly understood between the French and British Governments---

1. That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.

2. That in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.

3. That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca.

4. That Great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (A) for area (B). His Majesty's Government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third Power without the previous consent of the French Government.

5. That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British Empire, and that there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British goods; that there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the blue area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the red area, or (B) area, or area (A); and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect against British goods on any railway or against British goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and protectorates, and there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (A), or area (B), and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against French goods on any railway, or against French goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

6. That in area (A) the Baghdad Railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (B) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad with Aleppo via the Euphrates Valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two Governments.
7. That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (B), and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times.

It is to be understood by both Governments that this railway is to facilitate the connexion of Baghdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only make the project unfeasible, that the French Government shall be prepared to consider that the line in question may also traverse the polygon Banias-Keis Marib-Salkhab Tell Otsda-Mesmie before reaching area (B).

8. For a period of twenty years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the whole of the blue and red areas, as well as in areas (A) and (B), and no increase in the rates of duty or conversion from ad valorem to specific rates shall be made except by agreement between the two Powers.

There shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above-mentioned areas. The customs duties leviable on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port of entry and handed over to the administration of the area of destination.

9. It shall be agreed that the French Government will at no time enter into any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third Power, except the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States without the previous agreement of His Majesty's Government, who, on their part, will give a similar undertaking to the French Government regarding the red area.

10. The British and French Governments, as the protectors of the Arab State, shall agree that they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third Power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a third Power installing a naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the Red Sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression.

11. The negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States shall be continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two Powers.

12. It is agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab territories will be considered by the two Governments.
This letter changed the course of history in the Middle East -- even in the world. It was written by Arthur James Balfour, British foreign secretary, to Walter Rothschild, a wealthy, politically active Zionist and former member of the British Parliament. Balfour previously was British prime minister; Rothschild’s grandfather was the first Jewish member of the British House of Commons and his father was the first Jewish member of the House of Lords.

Both Balfour and Rothschild understood the significance of what they were doing. Balfour made clear in the first sentence that he was proclaiming official policy (1948: Lest we forget).

**Results:** The letter committed the British government to mutually exclusive goals: favoring a Jewish homeland without prejudicing the civil and religious rights of the Arabs.

“Jewish homeland,” as Balfour knew, was a euphemism for a Jewish state. But because the Jewish state would be on land where Arab Muslims had lived for centuries, they considered the very act of dispossessing them automatically prejudicial to their rights. By attempting to balance both Jewish and Arab objectives, the declaration wound up infuriating both sides.

Note the precise wording, with the critical article underlined and italicized for visibility: “... the establishment in Palestine of a national home ...” not as “the” national home (emphasis added) for the Jews.

The letter was issued after months of negotiations between the British government and British Zionists (Antonius 1939, p. 262-263). The motivation for the declaration has been debated. The basis of the bargain, Antonius said, was that the British would support the Zionists in their national aspirations and the Zionists would support the establishment of a purely British
The secret Sykes-Picot Agreement identified Palestine for combined British-French rule. Although the British and French were allies in World War I, they were ancient enemies and did not trust each other when it came to the Suez Canal. The British felt the need for a buffer between the canal and Syria, which the French were to hold. British fears aligned with Zionist aspirations to control Palestine. Muslih (1988) said Balfour persuaded his colleagues that supporting Zionism would help Britain win World War I by drawing in the U.S.

Arab aspirations did not get much respect. See earlier, contradictory promises of self-rule made by the British in the McMahon Correspondence (Appendix C, 1915).

Koestler (1949, p. 4) called the Balfour Declaration one of the most improbable political statements of all time. “In this document,” Koestler famously said, “one nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third.” Even more remarkable, the third country was still part of a fourth country, Turkey.

The declaration provided a basis for the League of Nations’ Palestine Mandate, which provided a basis for Zionist claims to Palestine. Morris (2001, p. 23) dates Arab-Jewish hostility from 1917.

Text of Balfour Declaration

Sources:
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/mideast.asp
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/balfour.htm

Foreign Office,
November 2nd, 1917.

Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur James Balfour
Appendix C, Annex 4 -- Wilson’s 14 Points
From a speech by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson to Congress on January 8, 1918

All Arabs and especially Palestinians cheered when they read this speech because it provided political support for them as they sought freedom from oppression by the Ottoman Turks and later from oppression by the British. The key points are shown below in bold type (emphasis added).

Article 1 was important to the Arabs because they had been victimized repeatedly by secret agreements and secret correspondence that contradicted oral assurances. Article 5 gave them hope for self-government. Article 12 promised self-determination. The final article seemed to put an international guarantee on their rights, despite their small size and inexperience.

**Result:** Wilson died shortly after delivering this speech, and his successors did not press Britain and France, which opposed these principles, to deliver on their promises.

The following quotation omits the first 10 and the last seven paragraphs of Wilson’s speech. For the complete speech, see the Congressional Record or the referenced Web site. The speech was delivered 10 months before the end of World War I.

**Text of Wilson’s Fourteen Points**

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The programme of the world's peace, therefore, is our programme; and that programme, the only possible programme, as we see it, is this:
1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.
10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development.

11. Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

12. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

13. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.
Appendix C, Annex 5 -- Declaration to the Seven (Arabs)
16 June 1918

This statement by the British government responded to a request ("memorial") for a clear and comprehensive definition of British policy vis-à-vis Arab independence. The request was issued by seven prominent Arabs who had compared the McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the Balfour Declaration and were profoundly troubled.

**Result:** Antonius (1939, p. 271) called the Declaration to the Seven by far the most important statement of policy made public by the British regarding the Arab revolt. The declaration confirmed in plainer language previous pledges to support freedom and independence for Palestine, based on the consent of its population (which was predominantly Arab).

The timing was important. It came after publication of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration but before the end of the war with the Turks. Britain still needed the support of the Arabs to complete its victory. For that purpose, the declaration was successful. The true intent of the Great Powers (England and France) did not become evident until later.

**Text of the Declaration to the Seven**

*Sources: Antonius (1939, p. 433-434).*


His Majesty's Government have considered the memorial of the Seven with great care. They fully appreciate the reasons for the desire of its authors to retain their anonymity, but the fact that the memorial is anonymous has in no way detracted from the value which His Majesty's Government assign to that document.

The territories mentioned in the memorial fall into four categories:

(i) Territories which were free and independent before the outbreak of the War;
(ii) Territories liberated from Turkish rule by the action of the Arabs themselves;
(iii) Territories liberated from Turkish rule by the action of the Allied armies;
(iv) Territories still under Turkish rule.
With regard to the first two categories [the independent states of the Arabian Peninsula and the Hejaz], His Majesty's Government recognize the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs inhabiting those territories, and support them in their struggle for freedom.

With regard to the territories occupied by the Allied armies [at the time this statement was issued, this included most of Iraq and southern Palestine], His Majesty's Government invite the attention of the memorialists to the proclamations issued by the commander-in-chief on the occasion of the capture of Baghdad [March 19, 1917] and the capture of Jerusalem [December 9, 1917]. These proclamations define the policy of His Majesty's Government toward the inhabitants of those regions, which is that the future governments of those territories should be based upon the principle of consent of the governed. This policy will always be that of His Majesty's Government.

With regard to the territories in the fourth category [the hitherto unliberated parts of Iraq and Syria], it is the desire of His Majesty's Government that the oppressed peoples in those territories should obtain their freedom and independence. His Majesty's Government will continue to work for the achievement of that object. They are fully aware of the difficulties and perils which threaten those who are striving for the [liberation? Antonius marked the word as obscure in the Arabic source] of the inhabitants of those territories.

In spite of those obstacles, however, His Majesty's Government believe that the difficulties can be overcome, and they are prepared to give every support to those who are striving to overcome them. They are ready to consider any scheme of cooperation which does not conflict with the military operations in hand or with the political principles proclaimed by His Majesty's Government and their allies.
Antonius (1939, p. 274-275) provided this background: Several days before allied troops marched into Beirut, Lebanon, local partisans proclaimed independence and raised the Arab flag over the city. The French objected and persuaded General Edmund Allenby, commander of the combined army, to order the flag removed.

**Result:** “The ebullition caused by this incident was hardly lessened when it became known that Bairut and the other ports of the Syrian littoral were to be placed under French occupation ... A wave of suspicion and apprehension at the hidden motives of the Allied Governments swept the country” (p. 275). The declaration was issued to keep the Arab troops from an “explosion.” The strategy worked, Antonius said, and within a few days the crisis eased.

The strategy worked because the Anglo-French Declaration, like the Declaration to the Seven, said Britain and France were dedicated to Arab liberation, independence and self-government – and because the Arabs believed them. Note the tone of the declaration, which “ends with a self-righteous paragraph in which the two Powers stress the purity of their motives and depict themselves as aspiring only to be the disinterested mentors of the future self-determined and self-governing Arab States” (p. 274).

The Arabs were ill-prepared for the shock awaiting them at the Peace Conference, but not before one more humiliation.

The reference to Syria, Antonius said in a footnote, denoted the territory from the Taurus mountain range [in southern Turkey] to Egypt.
Text of Anglo-French Declaration

Source: Antonius (1939, pp. 435-436)

The goal envisaged by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.

In pursuit of those intentions, France and Great Britain agree to further and assist in the establishment of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia which have already been liberated by the Allies, as well as in those territories which they are engaged in securing and recognizing these as soon as they are actually established.

Far from wishing to impose on the populations of those regions any particular institutions they are only concerned to ensure by their support and by adequate assistance the regular working of Governments and administrations freely chosen by the populations themselves; to secure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by promoting and encouraging local initiative; to foster the spread of education; and to put an end to the dissensions which Turkish policy has for so long exploited. Such is the task which the two Allied Powers wish to undertake in the liberated territories.
The Arab delegation at the World War I peace conference was headed by Emir Faisal, son of King (formerly Sharif) Hussein. The British pressed Faisal to accept Jewish immigration in return for Arab independence (Antonius, 1939, p. 283; Muslih, 1988, p. 121). Fearful of the French, who did not conceal their contempt for him, Faisal “allowed himself to be persuaded that his chances of neutralizing the hostility of the French would be greater if he could see his way to meeting Great Britain’s wishes to the fullest possible extent” (Antonius, 1939, p. 283).

The British advised the Arabs to cultivate the Zionist movement as a powerful ally that would be “subject to the limitations imposed by a proper regard for the welfare and the political and economic rights of the existing population” (Antonius, 1939, p. 285). Thus reassured, Faisal signed an informal agreement to support dense Jewish settlement in Palestine. In return, the Zionist movement would assist in the development of the vast Arab nation that Faisal hoped to establish.

**Result:** Faisal made his consent conditional on Britain fulfilling its pledge of Arab independence. The condition was added in Arabic in Faisal’s handwriting at the end of the document, and Antonius (1939) said, “Since the condition which he attached was not fulfilled, the Agreement never acquired validity” (p. 286-287). The Arabs never considered the agreement in force because the British and French stuck to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the Middle East into their own spheres of influence.

The Faisal-Weizmann agreement is relevant today primarily to indicate how much Faisal was willing to compromise as long as it did not jeopardize Arab independence (Muslih, 1988, p.
Faisal believed [incorrectly] that by cooperating with the Jews he could avoid domination by the hated French in Syria.

The key points are shown below in bold [emphasis added]. In Article IV, Faisal consents to “immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale.” Within a few months, Faisal declared the agreement broken.

Chaim Weizmann, who represented the Jews, would become president of the World Zionist Organization.

Text of the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement
Source: Antonius (1939, p. 437-439).

His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, representing and acting on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of Hejaz, and Dr. Chaim Weizmann, representing and acting on behalf of the Zionist Organization, mindful of the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people, and realising that the surest means of working out the consummation of their natural aspirations is through the closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab State and Palestine, and being desirous further of confirming the good understanding which exists between them, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Article I
The Arab State and Palestine in all their relations and undertakings shall be controlled by the most cordial goodwill and understanding and to this end Arab and Jewish duly accredited agents shall be established and maintained in the respective territories.

Article II
Immediately following the completion of the deliberations of the Peace Conference, the definite boundaries between the Arab State and Palestine shall be determined by a Commission to be agreed upon by the parties hereto.

Article III
In the establishment of the Constitution and Administration of Palestine, all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's Declaration of the 2nd of November, 1917.

Article IV
All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights and shall be assisted in forwarding their economic development.
Article V
No regulation or law shall be made prohibiting or interfering in any way with the free exercise of religion; and further, the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall ever be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Article VI
The Mohammedan Holy Places shall be under Mohammedan control.

Article VII
The Zionist Organization proposes to send to Palestine a Commission of experts to make a survey of the economic possibilities of the country, and to report upon the best means for its development. The Zionist Organization will place the aforementioned Commission at the disposal of the Arab State for the purpose of a survey of the economic possibilities of the Arab State and to report upon the best means for its development. The Zionist Organization will use its best efforts to assist the Arab State in providing the means for developing the natural resources and economic possibilities thereof.

Article VIII
The parties hereto agree to act in complete accord and harmony on all matters embraced herein before the Peace Congress.

Article IX
Any matters of dispute which may arise between the contracting parties shall be referred to the British Government for arbitration.

Given under our hand at London, England, the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and nineteen.

[Faisal appended to the typed document the following hand-written statement]:
[Translation]
Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in my [forthcoming] Memorandum dated the 4th of January, 1919, to the Foreign Office of the Government of Great Britain, I shall concur in the above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made [sc. in relation to the demands in the Memorandum] I shall not be then bound by a single word of the present Agreement which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity, and I shall not be answerable in any way whatsoever.

Feisal Ibn-Hussein (in Arabic)
Chaim Weizmann
Appendix C, Annex 8 -- King-Crane Commission
August 28, 1919, Released in 1922

The Allies kept promising to set up indigenous governments that would rule with the consent of the governed. Emir Faisal, representing his father, King (formerly Sharif) Hussein, at the Paris Peace Conference, called their bluff: Faisal proposed an independent commission to ascertain definitively how the populace wished to be governed.

Reaction to Faisal’s proposal was predictable: The French were hostile, the British were lukewarm, the Italians were indifferent, and the Zionists were apprehensive (Antonius, 1939, p. 286-294). A commission representing the four powers never materialized. Only President Woodrow Wilson, representing the United States, accepted the challenge, and it ultimately had to proceed alone. Wilson appointed Henry C. King, president of Oberlin College, and Charles R. Crane, a wealthy Chicago businessman, to head the American inquiry. Their conclusions, based on six weeks of research on site in Syria and Palestine, were published in a document known as the King-Crane Report.

Key provisions are shown below in bold type. They include consolidation of Syria and Palestine, a brief period of nation-building by the United States or Great Britain (but not by France), and a constitutional monarchy with Faisal as king. They opposed making Palestine a Jewish commonwealth.

Result: The report was ignored. “In the three years that elapsed before it became public, Great Britain and France had devised and imposed a ‘settlement’ of their own making” (Antonius, 1939, p. 298).

The text quoted below shows only Part III—Recommendations and covers only Syria (including Palestine). The complete report is posted on the referenced Web site.
Text of King-Crane Commission recommendations

Source: http://www.gwpda.org/1918p/kncr.htm

The commissioners make to the Peace Conference the following recommendations for the treatment of Syria:

We recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with our Instructions, that whatever foreign administration (whether of one or more Powers) is brought into Syria, should come in, not at all as a colonizing Power in the old sense of that term, but as a Mandatory under the League of Nations with the clear consciousness that ‘the well-being and development’, or the Syrian people form for it a 'sacred trust'.

(1) To this end the Mandate should have a limited term, the time of expiration to be determined by the League of Nations, in the light of all the facts as brought out from year to year, in the annual reports of the Mandatory to the League or in other ways.

(2) The mandatory Administration should have, however, a period and power sufficient to ensure the success of the new state; and especially to make possible carrying through important educational and economic undertakings, essential to secure founding of the State.

(3) The mandatory Administration should be characterized from the beginning by a strong and vital educational emphasis in clear recognition of the imperative necessity of education for the citizens of a democratic state, and for the development of a sound national spirit. This systematic cultivation of national spirit is particularly required in a country like Syria, which has only recently come to self-consciousness.

(4) The Mandatory should definitely seek, from the beginning of its trusteeship, to train the Syrian people to independent self-government as rapidly as conditions allow, by setting up all the institutions of a democratic state, and by sharing with them increasingly the work of administration, and so forming gradually an intelligent citizenship, interested unselfishly in the progress of the country, and forming at the same time a large group of disciplined civil servants.

(5) The period of ‘tutelage' should not be unduly prolonged, but independent self-government should be granted as soon as it can safely be done; remembering that the primary business of governments is not the accomplishment of certain things, but the development of citizens.

(6) It is peculiarly the duty of the Mandatory in a country like Syria, and in this modern age, to see that complete religious liberty is ensured, both in the constitution and in the practice of the state, and that a jealous care is exercised for the rights of all minorities. Nothing is more vital than this for the enduring success of the new Arab State.

(7) In the economic development of Syria, a dangerous amount of indebtedness on the part of the new state should be avoided, as well as any entanglements financially with the affairs of the Mandatory Power. On the other hand, the legitimate established privileges of foreigners, such as rights to maintain schools, commercial concessions, etc., should be preserved, but subject to review and modification under the authority of the League of Nations in the interest of Syria. The Mandatory Power should not take advantage of its position to force a monopolistic control at
any point to the detriment either of Syria or of other nations; but it should seek to bring the new State as rapidly as possible to economic independence as well as to political independence.

Whatever is done concerning the further recommendations of the Commission, the fulfillment of at least the conditions now: named should be assured, if the Peace Conference and the League of Nations are true to the policy of mandatories already embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This should effectively guard the most essential interests of Syria, however the machinery of administration is finally organized. The Damascus Congress betrayed in many ways their intense fear that their country would become, though under some other name, simply a colonial possession of some other Power. That fear must be completely allayed.

B. We recommend, in the second place, that the unity of Syria preserved, in accordance with the earnest petition of the great majority of the people of Syria.

(1) The territory concerned is too limited, the population too small, and the economic, geographic, racial and language unit too manifest, to make the setting up of independent States within its boundaries desirable, if such division can possibly be avoided. The country is very largely Arab in language, culture, traditions, and customs.

(2) This recommendation is in line with important “general considerations” already urged, and with the principles of the League of Nations, as well as in answer to the desires of the majority of the population concerned.

(3) The precise boundaries of Syria should be determined by a special commission on boundaries, after the Syrian territory has been in general allotted. The Commissioners believe, however, that the claim of the Damascus Conference to include Cilicia in Syria is not justified, either historically or by commercial or language relations. The line between the Arabic-speaking and the Turkish-speaking populations would quite certainly class Cilicia with Asia Minor, rather than with Syria. Syria, too, has no such need of further seacoast as the large interior sections of Asia Minor.

(4) In standing thus for the recognition of the unity of Syria, natural desires of regions like the Lebanon, which have already had a measure of independence, should not be forgotten. It will make for real unity, undoubtedly, to give a large measure of local autonomy, and especially in the case of strongly unified groups. Even the “Damascus Program” which presses so earnestly the unity of Syria, itself urges a government “on broad decentralization principles.”

Lebanon has achieved a considerable degree of prosperity and autonomy within the Turkish Empire. She certainly should not find her legitimate aspirations less possible within a Syrian national State. On the contrary, it may be confidently expected that both her economic and political relations with the rest of Syria would be better if she were a constituent member of the State rather than entirely independent of it.

As a predominantly Christian country, too, Lebanon naturally fears Moslem domination in a unified Syria. But against such domination she would have a four-fold safeguard: her own large autonomy; the presence of a strong mandatory for the considerable period in which the constitution and practice of the new State would be forming; the oversight of the League of Nations, with its insistence upon religious liberty and the rights of minorities; the certainty that the Arab Government would feel the necessity of such a state, if it were to commend itself to the League of Nations. Moreover, there would be less danger of a reactionary Moslem attitude, if
Christians were present in the State in considerable numbers, rather than largely segregated outside the State, as experience of the relations of different religious faiths in India suggests.

As a predominantly Christian country, it is also to be noted that Lebanon would be in a position to exert a stronger and more helpful influence if she were within the Syrian State, feeling its problems and needs, and sharing all its life, instead of outside it, absorbed simply in her own narrow concerns. For the sake of the larger interests, both of Lebanon and of Syria, then, the unity of Syria is to be urged. It is certain that many of the more thoughtful Lebanese themselves hold this view. A similar statement might be made for Palestine; though, as the Holy Land for Jews and Christians and Moslems alike, its situation is unique, and might more readily justify unique treatment, if such treatment were justified anywhere. This will be discussed more particularly in connection with the recommendation concerning Zionism.

C. We recommend, in the third place, that Syria be placed under one mandatory Power, as the natural way to secure real and efficient unity.

(1) To divide the administration of the provinces of Syria among several mandatories, even if existing national unity were recognized; or to attempt a joint mandatory of the whole on the commission plan: -- neither of these courses would be naturally suggested as the best way to secure and promote the unity of the new State, or even the general unity of the whole people. It is conceivable that circumstances might drive the Peace Conference to some such form of divided mandate; but it is not a solution to be voluntarily chosen, from the point of view of the larger interests of the people, as considerations already urged indicate.

(2) It is not to be forgotten, either, that, however they are handled politically, the people of Syria are there, forced to get on together in some fashion. They are obliged to live with one another - the Arabs of the East and the people of the coast, the Moslems and the Christians. Will they be helped or hindered, in establishing tolerable and finally cordial relations, by a single mandatory? No doubt the quick mechanical solution of the problem of difficult relations is to split the people up into little independent fragments. And sometimes, undoubtedly, as in the case of the Turks and Armenians, the relations are so intolerable as to make some division imperative and inevitable. But in general, to attempt complete separation only accentuates the differences and increases the antagonism. The whole lesson of the modern social consciousness points to the necessity of understanding “the other half,” as it can be understood only by close and living relations. Granting reasonable local autonomy to reduce friction among groups, a single mandatory ought to form a constant and increasingly effective help to unity of feeling throughout the State, and ought to steadily improve group relations.

The people of Syria, in our hearings, have themselves often insisted that, so far as unpleasant relations have hitherto prevailed among various groups, it has been very largely due to the direct instigation of the Turkish Government. When justice is done impartially to all; when it becomes plain that the aim of the common government is the service of all classes alike, not their exploitation, then can decent human relations be secured -- a foundation which could not be obtained by dividing men off from one another in antagonistic groups.

The Commissioners urge, therefore, for the largest future good of all groups and regions alike, the placing of the whole of Syria under a single Mandate.
D. We recommend, in the fourth place, that Amir Faisal be made head of the new united Syrian State.

(1) This is expressly and unanimously asked for by the representative Damascus Congress in the name of the Syrian people, and there seems to be no reason to doubt that the great majority of the population of Syria sincerely desire to have Amir Faisal as ruler.

(2) A constitutional monarchy along democratic lines, seems naturally adapted to the Arabs, with their long training under tribal conditions, and with their traditional respect for their Chiefs. They seem to need, more than most people, a king as the personal symbol of the power of the State. Amir Faisal has come, too, naturally into his present place of power, and there is no one else who could well replace him. He has the great advantage of being the son of the Sharif of Mecca, and as such honored throughout the Moslem world. He was one of the prominent Arab leaders who assumed responsibility for the Arab uprising against the Turks, and so shared in the complete deliverance of the Arabic-speaking portions of the Turkish Empire. He was consequently hailed by the Damascus Congress as having merited their full confidence and entire reliance. He was taken up and supported by the British as the most promising candidate for the headship of the new Arab State - an Arab of the Arabs, but with a position of wide appeal through his Sharifian connection, and through his broad sympathies with the best in the Occident. His relations with the Arabs to the east of Syria are friendly, and his kingdom would not be threatened from that side. He undoubtedly does not make so strong an appeal to the Christians of the West Coast, as to the Arabs of the East; but no man can be named who would have a stronger general appeal. He is tolerant and wise, skilful in dealing with men, winning in manner, a man of sincerity, insight and power. Whether he has the full strength needed for his difficult task it is too early to say; but certainly no other Arab leader combines so many elements of power as he; and he will have invaluable help throughout the mandatory period.

The Peace Conference may take genuine satisfaction in the fact that an Arab of such qualities is available for the headship of this new state in the Near East.

ZIONISM

E. We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification of the extreme Zionist program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State.

(1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds predisposed in its favor, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled with the force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians have driven them to the recommendation here made.

(2) The Commission was abundantly supplied with literature on the Zionist program by the Zionist Commission to Palestine; heard in conferences much concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims; and personally saw something of what had been accomplished. They found much to approve in the aspirations and plans of the Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the devotion of many of the colonists, and for their success, by modern methods, in overcoming great natural obstacles.

(3) The Commission recognized also that definite encouragement had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour’s often-quoted statement, in its approval by other representatives of the Allies. If, however, the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to
-- favoring “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,” “it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine” -- it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist program must be greatly modified.

For “a national home for the Jewish people” is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the “civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conferences with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.

In his address of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the following principle as one of the four great “ends for which the associated peoples of the world were fighting”: “The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.” If that principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine -- nearly nine-tenths of the whole -- are emphatically against the entire Zionist program. The tables show that there was no one thing upon which the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the people's rights, though it kept within the forms of law.

It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist program is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria, as our conferences clearly showed. More than 72 per cent -- 1,350 in all -- of all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist program. Only two requests -- those for a united Syria and for independence -- had a larger support. This general feeling was duly voiced by the General Syrian Congress in the seventh, eighth and tenth resolutions of the statement. (Already quoted in the report.)

The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally thought that a force of not less than 50,000 soldiers would be required even to initiate the program. That of itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist program, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria. Decisions requiring armies to carry out are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a “right” to Palestine, based on an occupation of 2,000 years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.

There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely Jewish State, however gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out of the fact that Palestine is the Holy Land for Jews, Christians, and
Moslems alike. Millions of Christians and Moslems all over the world are quite as much concerned as the Jews with conditions in Palestine, especially with those conditions which touch upon religious feeling and rights. The relations in these matters in Palestine are most delicate and difficult. With the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole.

The reason is this: The places which are most sacred to Christians -- those having to do with Jesus -- and which are also sacred to Moslems, are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible, under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians to feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody of Jews. There are still other places about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact, from this point of view, the Moslems, just because the sacred places of all three religions are sacred to them, have made very naturally much more satisfactory custodians of the holy places than the Jews could be. It must be believed that the precise meaning in this respect of the complete Jewish occupation of Palestine has not been fully sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist program. For it would intensify, with a certainty like fate, the anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions of the world which look to Palestine as “the Holy Land.”

In view of all these considerations, and with a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.

There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country, the holy places being cared for by an international and Inter-religious Commission, somewhat as at present, under the oversight and approval of the Mandatory and of the League of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have representation upon this Commission.

The recommendations now made lead naturally to the necessity of recommending what power shall undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.

(1) The considerations already dealt with suggest the qualifications ideally to be desired in the Mandatory Power: First of all, it should be freely desired by the people. It should be willing to enter heartily into the spirit of the mandatory system, and its possible gift to the world, and so be willing to withdraw after a reasonable period, and not seek selfishly to exploit the country. It should have a passion for democracy, for the education of the common people and for the development of the national spirit. It needs unlimited sympathy and patience in what is practically certain to be a rather thankless task; for no Power can go in honestly to face actual conditions (like land-ownership, for example) and seek to correct these conditions, without making many enemies. It should have experience in dealing with less developed peoples, and abundant resources in men and money.

(2) Probably no Power combines all these qualifications, certainly not in equal degree. But there is hardly one of these qualifications that has not been more or less definitely indicated in our conference with the Syrian people and they certainly suggest a new stage in the development of the self-sacrificing spirit in the relations of peoples to one another. The Power that undertakes the single Mandate for all Syria, in the spirit of these qualifications, will have the
possibility of greatly serving not only Syria but the world, and of exalting at the same time its own national life. For it would be working in direct line with the high aims of the Allies in the War, and give proof that those high aims had not been abandoned. And that would mean very much just now, in enabling the nations to keep their faith in one another and their own highest ideals.

(3) The Resolutions of the Peace Conference of January 30, 1919, quoted in our instructions, expressly state for regions to be “completely severed from the Turkish Empire,” that “the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory Power.” Our survey left no room for doubt of the choice of the majority of the Syrian people. Although it was not known whether America would take a Mandate at all; and although the Commission could not only give no assurances upon that point, but had rather to discourage expectation; nevertheless, upon the face of the returns, America was the first choice of 1,152 of the petitions presented -- more than 60 per cent -- while no other Power had as much as 15 per cent for first choice.

And the conferences showed that the people knew the grounds upon which they registered their choice for America. They declared that their choice was due to knowledge of America’s record; the unselfish aims with which she had come into the War; the faith in her felt by multitudes of Syrians who had been in America; the spirit revealed in American educational institutions in Syria, especially the College in Bairut, with its well-known and constant encouragement of Syrian national sentiment; their belief that America had no territorial or colonial ambitions, and would willingly withdraw when the Syrian State was well established as her treatment both of Cuba and the Philippines seemed to them to illustrate; her genuinely democratic spirit; and her ample resources.

From the point of view of the desires of the “people concerned,” the Mandate should clearly go to America.

(4) From the point of view of qualifications, too, already stated as needed in the Mandatory for Syria, America, as first choice of the people, probably need not fear careful testing, point by point, by the standard involved in our discussion of qualifications; though she has much less experience in such work than Great Britain, and is likely to show less patience; and though her definite connections with Syria have been less numerous and close than those of France. She would have at least the great qualification of fervent belief in the new mandatory system of the League of Nations, as indicating the proper relations which a strong nation should take toward a weaker one. And, though she would undertake the Mandate with reluctance, she could probably be brought to see how logically the taking of such responsibility follows from the purposes with which she entered the war, and from her advocacy of the League of Nations.

(5) There is the further consideration that America could probably come into the Syrian situation, in the beginning at least, with less friction than any other Power. The great majority of Syrian people, as has been seen, favor her coming, rather than that of any other Power. Both the British and the French would find it easier to yield their respective claims to America than to each other. She would have no rival imperial interests to press. She would have abundant resources for the development of the sound prosperity of Syria; and this would inevitably benefit in a secondary way the nations which have had closest connection with Syria, and so help to keep relations among the Allies cordial. No other Power probably would be more welcome as a neighbor to the British with their large interests in Egypt, Arabia and Iraq; or to the Arabs and
Syrians in these regions; or to the French with their long-established and many-sided interests in Beirut and the Lebanon.

(6) The objections to recommending at once a single American Mandate for all Syria are:
First of all, that it is not certain that the American people would be willing to take the Mandate -- that it is not certain that the British or French would be willing to withdraw, and would cordially welcome America's coming, a situation which might prove steadily harassing to an American administration; that the vague but large encouragement given to the Zionist aims might prove particularly embarrassing to America, on account of her large influential Jewish population -- and that, if America were to take any mandate at all, and were to take but one mandate, it is probable that an Asia Minor Mandate would be more natural and important. For there is a task there of such peculiar and world-wide significance as to appeal to the best in America, and demand the utmost from her, and as certainly to justify her in breaking with her established policy concerning mixing in the affairs of the eastern hemisphere. The Commissioners believe, moreover, that no other Power could come into Asia Minor, with hands so free to give impartial justice to all the peoples concerned.

To these objections, as a whole, it is to be said that they are all of such a kind that they may resolve themselves; and that they only form the sort of obstacles that must be expected in so large and significant an undertaking. In any case they do not relieve the Commissioners from the duty of recommending the course which, in their honest judgment, is the best course, and the one for which the whole situation calls.

The Commissioners, therefore, recommend, as involved in the logic of the facts, that the United States of America be asked to undertake the single Mandate for all Syria.

If for any reason the mandate for Syria is not given to America, then the Commissioners recommend, in harmony with the express request of the majority of the Syrian people, that the mandate be given to Great Britain. The tables show that there were 1,073 petitions in all Syria for Great Britain as mandatory; if America did not take the Mandate. This is very greatly in excess of any similar expression for the French.

On the contrary -- for whatever reason -- more than 60 per cent of all the petitions presented to the Commission directly and strongly protested against any French Mandate. Without going into discussion of the reasons for this situation, the Commissioners are reluctantly compelled to believe that this situation itself makes it impossible to recommend a single French mandate for all Syria.

The feeling of the Arabs of the East is particularly strong against the French. And there is grave reason to believe that the attempt to enforce a French Mandate would precipitate war between the Arabs and the French, and force upon Great Britain a dangerous alternative. The Commissioners may perhaps be allowed to say that this conclusion is contrary to their own earlier hope, that - because of France's long and intimate relations with Syria, because, of her unprecedented sacrifices in the War, and because the British Empire seemed certain to receive far greater accesions of territory from the War - it might seem possible to recommend that France be given the entire Mandate for Syria. But the longer the Commission remained in Syria, the more clear it became that that course could not be taken.

The Commissioners recommend, therefore, if America cannot take the mandate for all Syria, that it be given to Great Britain; because of the choice of the people concerned; because
she is already on the ground and with much of the necessary work in hand; because of her trained administrators; because of her long and generally successful experience in dealing with less developed peoples; and because she has so many of the qualifications needed in a mandatory power, as we have already considered them.

We should hardly be doing justice, however, to our sense of responsibility to the Syrian people, if we did not frankly add some at least of the reasons and misgivings, variously expressed and implied in our conferences, which led to the preference for an American Mandate over a British Mandate. The people repeatedly showed honest fear that in British hands the mandatory power would become simply a colonizing power of the old kind; that Great Britain would find it difficult to give up the colonial theory, especially in the case of a people thought inferior; that she would favor a Civil Service and pension budget too expensive for a poor people; that the interests of Syria would be subordinated to the supposed needs of the Empire; that there would be, after all, too much exploitation of the country for Britain's benefit; that she would never be ready to withdraw and give the country real independence; that she did not really believe in universal education, and would not provide adequately for it; and that she already had more territory in her possession -- in spite of her fine colonial record -- than was good either for herself or for the world.

These misgivings of the Syrian people unquestionably largely explain their demand for “absolute independence,” for a period of “assistance” of only twenty years, their protest against Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations etc. They all mean that whatever Power the Peace Conference shall send into Syria, should go in as a true mandatory under the League of Nations, and for a limited term. Anything else would be a betrayal of the Syrian people.

It needs to be emphasized, too, that under a true mandatory for Syria, all the legitimate interests of all the nations in Syria would be safeguarded. In particular, there is no reason why any tie that France has had with Syria in the past should be severed or even weakened under the control of another mandatory power, or in an independent Syria.

There remains only to be added that, if France feels so intensely concerning her present claims in Syria as to threaten all cordial relations among the Allies, it is of course possible to give her a mandate over the Lebanon (not enlarged) separated from the rest of Syria, as is desired by considerable groups in that region. For reasons already given, the Commissioners cannot recommend this course, but it is a possible arrangement.

II. The report upon Mesopotamia

(Section omitted.)

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES R. CRANE
HENRY C. KING
Appendix C, Annex 9 — Churchill White Paper
June 3, 1922

The White Paper of 1922 is best known by its author, Winston Churchill, who was the British colonial secretary at the time. It was intended to reaffirm British policy as stated in the Balfour Declaration. The key sentence is shown in bold (emphasis added). The need for reaffirmation offers a clue to the increasing controversy regarding the commitment first stated by Balfour and contradicted in the McMahon correspondence, the Sykes-Picot agreement, the Anglo-French Declaration, the Declaration to the Seven and related statements.

Result: The White Paper was accepted reluctantly by the Zionists and rejected by the Arabs (Reich 1995, p. 31). It laid the foundation for British policy in Palestine for almost a decade (Wasserstein, 1978, p. 118).

Text of the Churchill White Paper of 1922
Source: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1922.asp

The Secretary of State for the Colonies has given renewed consideration to the existing political situation in Palestine, with a very earnest desire to arrive at a settlement of the outstanding questions which have given rise to uncertainty and unrest among certain sections of the population. After consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine [Sir Herbert Samuel] the following statement has been drawn up. It summarizes the essential parts of the correspondence that has already taken place between the Secretary of State and a delegation from the Moslem Christian Society of Palestine, which has been for some time in England, and it states the further conclusions which have since been reached.

The tension which has prevailed from time to time in Palestine is mainly due to apprehensions, which are entertained both by sections of the Arab and by sections of the Jewish population. These apprehensions, so far as the Arabs are concerned are partly based upon exaggerated interpretations of the meaning of the Balfour Declaration favouring the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, made on behalf of His Majesty's Government on 2nd November, 1917.

Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become "as Jewish as England is English." His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable
and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language, or culture in Palestine. **They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded 'in Palestine.'** In this connection it has been observed with satisfaction that at a meeting of the Zionist Congress, the supreme governing body of the Zionist Organization, held at Carlsbad in September, 1921, a resolution was passed expressing as the official statement of Zionist aims "the determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing community, the upbuilding of which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development."

It is also necessary to point out that the Zionist Commission in Palestine, now termed the Palestine Zionist Executive, has not desired to possess, and does not possess, any share in the general administration of the country. Nor does the special position assigned to the Zionist Organization in Article IV of the Draft Mandate for Palestine imply any such functions. That special position relates to the measures to be taken in Palestine affecting the Jewish population, and contemplates that the organization may assist in the general development of the country, but does not entitle it to share in any degree in its government.

Further, it is contemplated that the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and it has never been intended that they, or any section of them, should possess any other juridical status. So far as the Jewish population of Palestine are concerned it appears that some among them are apprehensive that His Majesty's Government may depart from the policy embodied in the Declaration of 1917. It is necessary, therefore, once more to affirm that these fears are unfounded, and that that Declaration, re-affirmed by the Conference of the Principle Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sevres, is not susceptible of change.

During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organization for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew Press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious, and social organizations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact "national" characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on the sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should
be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient
historic connection.

This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Declaration of
1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply
anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to
the Jews.

For the fulfilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be
able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to
exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals.
It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine
as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their
employment. Hitherto the immigration has fulfilled these conditions. The number of immigrants
since the British occupation has been about 25,000.

It is necessary also to ensure that persons who are politically undesirable be excluded from
Palestine, and every precaution has been and will be taken by the Administration to that end.

It is intended that a special committee should be established in Palestine, consisting entirely of
members of the new Legislative Council elected by the people, to confer with the administration
upon matters relating to the regulation of immigration. Should any difference of opinion arise
between this committee and the Administration, the matter will be referred to His Majesty's
Government, who will give it special consideration. In addition, under Article 81 of the draft
Palestine Order in Council, any religious community or considerable section of the population of
Palestine will have a general right to appeal, through the High Commissioner and the Secretary
of State, to the League of Nations on any matter on which they may consider that the terms of the
Mandate are not being fulfilled by the Government of Palestine.

With reference to the Constitution which it is now intended to establish in Palestine, the draft of
which has already been published, it is desirable to make certain points clear. In the first place, it
is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that during the war His Majesty's
Government gave an undertaking that an independent national government should be at once
established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated the 24th October,
1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sharif
of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as conveying the
promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within
the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the
same letter, which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to
the west of the District of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's
Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent Sanjak of Jerusalem. The
whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir. Henry McMahon's pledge.

Nevertheless, it is the intention of His Majesty's government to foster the establishment of a full
measure of self government in Palestine. But they are of the opinion that, in the special
circumstances of that country, this should be accomplished by gradual stages and not suddenly.
The first step was taken when, on the institution of a Civil Administration, the nominated Advisory Council, which now exists, was established. It was stated at the time by the High Commissioner that this was the first step in the development of self governing institutions, and it is now proposed to take a second step by the establishment of a Legislative Council containing a large proportion of members elected on a wide franchise. It was proposed in the published draft that three of the members of this Council should be non official persons nominated by the High Commissioner, but representations having been made in opposition to this provision, based on cogent considerations, the Secretary of State is prepared to omit it. The legislative Council would then consist of the High Commissioner as President and twelve elected and ten official members.

The Secretary of State is of the opinion that before a further measure of self government is extended to Palestine and the Assembly placed in control over the Executive, it would be wise to allow some time to elapse. During this period the institutions of the country will have become well established; its financial credit will be based on firm foundations, and the Palestinian officials will have been enabled to gain experience of sound methods of government. After a few years the situation will be again reviewed, and if the experience of the working of the constitution now to be established so warranted, a larger share of authority would then be extended to the elected representatives of the people.

The Secretary of State would point out that already the present administration has transferred to a Supreme Council elected by the Moslem community of Palestine the entire control of Moslem Religious endowments (Waqfs), and of the Moslem religious Courts. To this Council the Administration has also voluntarily restored considerable revenues derived from ancient endowments which have been sequestrated by the Turkish Government. The Education Department is also advised by a committee representative of all sections of the population, and the Department of Commerce and Industry has the benefit of the co-operation of the Chambers of Commerce which have been established in the principal centres. It is the intention of the Administration to associate in an increased degree similar representative committees with the various Departments of the Government.

The Secretary of State believes that a policy upon these lines, coupled with the maintenance of the fullest religious liberty in Palestine and with scrupulous regard for the rights of each community with reference to its Holy Places, cannot but commend itself to the various sections of the population, and that upon this basis may be built up that a spirit of cooperation upon which the future progress and prosperity of the Holy Land must largely depend.
Appendix C, Annex 10 – Palestine Mandate
League of Nations: July 24, 1922

This document, adopted in 1922 to take effect in 1923, confirmed and formalized British rule in the southern part of Ottoman Syria. The mandate was based on accords reached at San Remo in 1920 and, previously, in the Sykes-Picot agreement. The mandate included all of Palestine and Transjordan south of what is now Syria and Lebanon, west of Iraq and Arabia and east of Egypt. Later in 1922, the league approved Britain’s request to split the mandate at the Jordan River between Palestine and Transjordan. The objective, as the wording makes clear, was to administer parts of the defeated Ottoman Empire until the parts were able to govern themselves.

The first four paragraphs of Article 22 of the covenant of the League of Nations (mentioned in the first paragraph) are reproduced at the end of the text of the Palestine Mandate.

Paragraph 2 (emphasis added) of the preamble repeats the assurances of the Balfour Declaration. The following paragraph reinforces Paragraph 2, and Article 6 obligates Britain to “facilitate” Jewish immigration and to “encourage” close settlement by Jews.

Result: Arabs read the document differently, emphasizing the directive in Paragraph 2 that says Britain should do nothing to prejudice their civil and religious rights. Obviously, Arabs who are evicted from their homes and country have had their position prejudiced. The two interpretations are contradictory and attempts by the British to fulfill them simultaneously were doomed from the start. Paragraph 3 adds, by implication, economic rights and says nothing about a state, only a home.
Text of the Palestine Mandate

Source: Yale Law School: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/palmanda.htm

The Council of the League of Nations:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations [reproduced below], to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League Of Nations; confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:

ARTICLE 1.

The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

ART. 2.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.
ART. 3.
The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

ART. 4.
An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

ART. 5.
The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign Power.

ART. 6.
The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

ART. 7.
The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

ART. 8.
The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately reestablished in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

ART. 9.
The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights. Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of
Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ART. 10.

Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

ART. 11.

The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

ART. 12.

The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

ART. 13.

All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

ART. 14.

A special commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without Council approval.
ART. 15.

The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

ART. 16.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

ART. 17.

The Administration of Palestine may on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

ART. 18.

The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

ART. 19.

The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Palestine to any general
international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.

ART. 20.

The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

ART. 21.

The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations.

(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A. D.

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Department.

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent Department.

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

ART. 22.

English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.
ART. 23.

The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

ART. 24.

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

ART. 25.

In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

ART. 26.

The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

ART. 27.

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

ART. 28.

In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

Done at London the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.
Covenant of the League of Nations

Article 22

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
The U.S. government showed its solidarity with Great Britain and the Jews by passing a resolution endorsing the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. The wording generally tracks the Balfour Declaration but adds protections for Christians – in place of Balfour’s “all other non-Jewish communities” – and for holy places and religious buildings and sites (emphasis added).

**Result:** President Warren Harding signed the resolution on Sept. 21, 1922.

**Text of Joint Resolution 73**

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected” (Joint Resolution 73, 1922, p. 1012).
Appendix C, Annex 12 -- Hope Simpson Report on Immigration
October 1, 1930

The Shaw Commission recommended the creation of this report to address concerns over how Great Britain, as the mandatory authority in Palestine, was handling the issues of immigration, land sales and settlements, which were perceived to be among the primary causes of violence by Arabs. Although the report is better known by the name of its chairman, it is officially called the Palestine Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development.

Result: The report is too long to reproduce here completely, but it is important enough to quote at length – both for its influence on British policy development – most immediately on the Passfield White Paper, which was issued simultaneously -- and for its analysis (sometimes mistaken, sometimes contradictory) of tensions at the time, particularly as it describes the Arab point of view. Key points are shown in bold (emphasis added).

The most significant point is the recommendation to restrict Jewish immigration because Palestine was believed to have insufficient agricultural land to sustain it. The report also is noteworthy for observing that Arab immigration and the end of the Ottoman military draft were factors in Arab unemployment. The full report is posted on the Unispal Web site cited below.

The Palestine Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development (Hope Simpson)
Source: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/E3ED8720F8707C9385256D19004F057C

Government responsibility towards Arab cultivators. The Jewish authorities have nothing with which to reproach themselves in the matter of the Sursock lands. They paid high prices for the land, and in addition they paid to certain of the occupants of those lands a considerable amount of money which they were not legally bound to pay. It was not their business, but the business of the Government to see to it that the position of the Arabs was not adversely affected by the transaction. In Article 6 of the Mandate it is the duty of the Administration of Palestine to ensure that the rights and position of the Arabs are not prejudiced by Jewish immigration. It is doubtful whether, in the matter of the Sursock lands, this Article of the Mandate received sufficient consideration.

…
The effect of the Zionist colonisation policy on the Arab. Actually the result of the purchase of land in Palestine by the Jewish National Fund has been that land has been extraterritorialised. It ceases to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage either now or at any time in the future. Not only can he never hope to lease or to cultivate it, but, by the stringent provisions of the lease of the Jewish National Fund, he is deprived for ever from employment on that land. Nor can anyone help him by purchasing the land and restoring it to common use. The land is in mortmain and inalienable. It is for this reason that Arabs discount the professions of friendship and good will on the part of the Zionists in view of the policy which the Zionist Organisation deliberately adopted.

The present position, precluding any employment of Arabs in the Zionist colonies, is undesirable, from the point of view both of justice and of the good government of the country. As long as these provisions exist in the Constitution of the Zionist Organisation, in the lease of the Keren Kayemeth and in the agreement of the Keren Hayesod it cannot be regarded as desirable that large areas of land should be transferred to the Jewish National Fund. It is impossible to view with equanimity the extension of an enclave in Palestine from which all Arabs are excluded. The Arab population already regards the transfer of lands to Zionist hands with dismay and alarm. These cannot be dismissed as baseless in the light of the Zionist policy which is described above.

Arab unemployment. At the same time there can be no doubt that there is at the present time serious unemployment among Arab craftsmen and among Arab labourers. For this unemployment there are several causes. Motor transport, largely in the hands of the Jews, is driving the camel and the donkey off the roads, and with them the Arab camel driver and the Arab donkeyman. The motor car, again largely owned and driven by Jews, is displacing the horse-drawn vehicle and its Arab driver. The increased use of cement, reinforced concrete and silicate brick, all manufactured by Jews, is replacing dressed stone for constructional purposes, and so displacing a large number of stonedressers and stonemasons, nearly all of whom are Arabs. The Arab quarrymen are also being displaced.

But probably the most serious cause of additional unemployment is the cessation of conscription for the army, prevalent under the Turkish Government. The young men now remain in the villages. Formerly they were despatched to the Yemen or to Anatolia, and … many, indeed the majority, of them, failed to return.

Employment of Arabs in Jewish concerns. One of the Executive of the Jewish Labour Federation put the case quite clearly. He said, "We would not initiate the work if we were compelled to employ Arab labour. The Zionist object in development is to employ Jews. Unless Jews can be employed we fail in our object." The principle underlying this statement is logical and comprehensible. The Jews do not spend their capital in the development of Palestine in order that Arab unemployment should be overcome. Nevertheless, by the Government, Palestine must be treated as an entity and there must be no discrimination between the races which it contains. If there is unemployment, whether Jewish or Arab, it is clearly the duty of the Government to prevent immigration if such immigration will intensify that unemployment or prevent its cure.
In the case of the fellah, … He goes to any spot where he thinks he can find work. Many have left the country altogether. Emigration of a similar nature is understood to be common both in Syria and in Iraq.

Prevention of illicit immigration. Finally, in closing the front door, steps should be taken to ensure that the backdoor should not be kept open for would-be immigrants into Palestine. The Chief Immigration Officer has brought to notice that illicit immigration through Syria and across the northern frontier of Palestine is material. This question has already been discussed. It may be a difficult matter to ensure against this illicit immigration, but steps to this end must be taken if the suggested policy is adopted, as also to prevent unemployment lists being swollen by immigrants from TransJordania.
The Arab riots of 1929 caused the British government to renege on its obligations under the Palestine Mandate. As recommended in the Hope-Simpson report, Britain responded to the riots with the Passfield White Paper of 1930 -- the first British attempt to limit Jewish immigration.

**Result:** Zionists objected to the Passfield White Paper so strenuously that the British backed off in this letter from Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald to Chaim Weizmann, spokesman for the Jewish community. The letter did not exactly rescind the Passfield White Paper; it simply denied that the British government ever intended to halt immigration. (See highlighted paragraph, emphasis added). In fact, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased in subsequent years.

**Text of the Macdonald Letter**

*Source: http://www.zionism-israel.com/macdonald_letter_text_1931.htm*

Dear Dr. Weizmann:
In order to remove certain misconceptions and misunderstandings which have arisen as to the policy of his Majesty’s Government with regard to Palestine, as set forth in the White Paper of October, 1930, and which were the subject of a debate in the House of Commons on Nov. 17, and also to meet certain criticisms put forward by the Jewish Agency, I have pleasure in forwarding you the following statement of our position, which will fall to be read as the authoritative interpretation of the White Paper on the matters with which this letter deals.

It has been said that the policy of his Majesty’s Government involves a serious departure from the obligations of the mandate as hitherto understood; that it misconceives the mandatory obligations, and that it foreshadows a policy which is inconsistent with the obligations of the mandatory to the Jewish people.

His Majesty’s Government did not regard it as necessary to quote in extenso the declarations of policy which have been previously made, but attention is drawn to the fact that, not only does the White Paper of 1930 refer to and endorse the White Paper of 1922, which has been accepted by the Jewish Agency, but it recognizes that the undertaking of the mandate is an undertaking to the Jewish people and not only to the Jewish population of Palestine. The White Paper places in the
foreground of its statement my speech in the House of Commons on the 3rd of April, 1930, in
which I announced, in words that could not have been made more plain, that it was the intention
of his Majesty’s Government to continue to administer Palestine in accordance with the terms of
the mandate as approved by the Council of the League of Nations. That position has been
reaffirmed and again made plain by my speech in the House of Commons on the 17th of
November. In my speech on the 3rd of April, I used the following language:

**His Majesty’s Government will continue to administer Palestine in accordance with the
terms of the mandate as approved by the Council of the League of Nations. This is an
international obligation from which there can be no question of receding.**

Under the terms of the mandate his Majesty’s Government are responsible for promoting the
establishment of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing
shall be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

A double undertaking is involved, to the Jewish people on the one hand and to the non-Jewish
population of Palestine on the other; and it is the firm resolve of his Majesty’s Government to
give effect, in equal measure, to both parts of the declaration and to do equal justice to all
sections of the population of Palestine. That is the duty from which they will not shrink and to
discharge of which they will apply all the resources at their command.

That declaration is in conformity not only with the articles but also with the preamble of the
mandate, which is hereby explicitly reaffirmed.

In carrying out the policy of the mandate the mandatory cannot ignore the existence of the
differing interests and viewpoints. These, indeed, are not in themselves irreconcilable, but they
can only be reconciled if there is a proper realization that the full solution of the problem
depends upon an understanding between the Jews and the Arabs. Until that is reached,
considerations of balance must inevitably enter into the definition of policy.

A good deal of criticism has been directed to the White Paper upon the assertion that it contains
injurious allegations against the Jewish people and Jewish labor organizations. Any such
intention on the part of his Majesty’s Government is expressly disavowed. It is recognized that
the Jewish Agency have all along given willing cooperation in carrying out the policy of the
mandate and that the constructive work done by the Jewish people in Palestine has had beneficial
effects on the development and well-being of the country as a whole. His Majesty’s Government
also recognizes the value of the services of labor and trades union organizations in Palestine, to
which they desire to give every encouragement.

A question has arisen as to the meaning to be attached to the words “safeguarding the civil and
religious rights of all inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race and religion” occurring in
Article II, and the words “insuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population
are not prejudiced” occurring in Article VI of the mandate. The words “safeguarding the civil
and religious rights” occurring in Article II cannot be read as meaning that the civil and religious
rights of individual citizens are unalterable. In the case of Suleiman Murra, to which reference
has been made, the Privy Council, in construing these words of Article II said “It does not mean … that all the civil rights of every inhabitant of Palestine which existed at the date of the mandate are to remain unaltered throughout its duration; for if that were to be a condition of the mandatory jurisdiction, no effective legislation would be possible.” The words, accordingly, must be read in another sense, and the key to the true purpose and meaning of the sentence is to be found in the concluding words of the article, “irrespective of race and religion.” These words indicate that in respect of civil and religious rights the mandatory is not to discriminate between persons on the ground of religion or race, and this protective provision applies equally to Jews, Arabs and all sections of the population.

The words “rights and position of other sections of the population,” occurring in Article VI, plainly refer to the non-Jewish community. These rights and position are not TO BE prejudiced; that is, are not to be impaired or made worse. The effect of the policy of immigration and settlement on the economic position of the non-Jewish community cannot be excluded from consideration. But the words are not to be read as implying that existing economic conditions in Palestine should be crystallized. On the contrary, the obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land remains a positive obligation of the mandate and it can be fulfilled without prejudice to the rights and position of other sections of the population of Palestine.

We may proceed to the contention that the mandate has been interpreted in a manner highly prejudicial to Jewish interests in the vital matters of land settlement and immigration. It has been said that the policy of the White Paper would place an embargo on immigration and would suspend, if not indeed terminate, the close settlement of the Jews on the land, which is a primary purpose of the mandate. In support of this contention particular stress has been laid upon the passage referring to State lands in the White Paper, which says that “it would not be possible to make available for Jewish settlement in view of their actual occupation by Arab cultivation and of the importance of making available suitable land on which to place the Arab cultivators who are now landless.”

The language of this passage needs to be read in the light of the policy as a whole. It is desirable to make it clear that the landless Arabs, to whom it was intended to refer in the passage quoted, were such Arabs as can be shown to have been displaced from the lands which they occupied in consequence of the land passing into Jewish hands, and who have not obtained other holdings on which they establish themselves, or other equally satisfactory occupation. The number of such displaced Arabs must be a matter for careful inquiry. It is to landless Arabs within this category that his Majesty’s Government feels itself under an obligation to facilitate their settlement upon the land. The recognition of this obligation in no way detracts from the larger purposes of development which his Majesty’s Government regards as the most effectual means of furthering the establishment of a national home for the Jews …

Further, the statement of policy of his Majesty’s Government did not imply a prohibition of acquisition of additional lands by Jews. It contains no such prohibition, nor is any such intended. What it does contemplate is such temporary control of land disposition and transfers as may be necessary not to impair the harmony and effectiveness of the scheme of land settlement to be
undertaken. His Majesty’s Government feels bound to point out that it alone of the governments which have been responsible for the administration of Palestine since the acceptance of the mandate has declared its definite intention to initiate an active policy of development, which it is believed will result in a substantial and lasting benefit to both Jews and Arabs.

Cognate to this question is the control of immigration. It must first of all be pointed out that such control is not in any sense a departure from previous policy. From 1920 onward, when the original immigration ordinance came into force, regulations for the control of immigration have been issued from time to time, directed to prevent illicit entry and to define and facilitate authorized entry. The right of regulation has at no time been challenged.

But the intention of his Majesty’s Government appears to have been represented as being that “no further immigration of Jews is to be permitted as long as it might prevent any Arab from obtaining employment.” His Majesty’s Government never proposed to pursue such a policy. They were concerned to state that, in the regulation of Jewish immigration, the following principles should apply: viz., that “it is essential to insure that the immigrants should not be burden on the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment.” (See Appendix C, Churchill White Paper, 1922.)

In one aspect, his Majesty’s Government have to be mindful of their obligations to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land; in the other aspect, they have to be equally mindful of their duty to insure that no prejudice results to the rights and position of the non-Jewish community. It is because of this apparent conflict of obligation that his Majesty’s Government have felt bound to emphasize the necessity of the proper application of the absorptive principle.

That principle is vital to any scheme of development, the primary purpose of which must be the settlement both of Jews and of displaced Arabs on the land. It is for that reason that his Majesty’s Government have insisted, and are compelled to insist, that government immigration regulations must be properly applied. The considerations relevant to the limits of absorptive capacity are purely economic considerations.

His Majesty’s Government did not prescribe and do not contemplate any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish immigration in any of its categories. The practice of sanctioning a labor schedule of wage-earning immigrants will continue. In each case consideration will be given to anticipated labor requirements for works which, being dependent upon Jewish or mainly Jewish capital, would not be or would not have been undertaken unless Jewish labor was available. With regard to public and municipal works failing to be financed out of public funds, the claim of Jewish labor to a due share of the employment available, taking into account Jewish contributions to public revenue, shall be taken into consideration. As regards others kinds of employment, it will be necessary in each case to take into account the factors bearing upon the demand for labor, including the factor of unemployment among both the Jews and the Arabs.

Immigrants with prospects of employment other than employment of a purely ephemeral character will not be excluded on the sole ground that the employment cannot be guaranteed to be of unlimited duration.
In determining the extent to which immigration at any time may be permitted it is necessary also to have regard to the declared policy of the Jewish Agency to the effect that “in all the works or undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency it shall be deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labor shall be employed.” His Majesty’s Government do not in any way challenge the right of the Agency to formulate or approve and endorse this policy. The principle of preferential, and indeed exclusive, employment of Jewish labor by Jewish organizations is a principle which the Jewish Agency are entitled to affirm. But it must be pointed out that if in consequence of this policy Arab labor is displaced or existing unemployment becomes aggravated, that is a factor in the situation to which the mandatory is bound to have regard.

His Majesty’s Government desire to say, finally, as they have repeatedly and unequivocally affirmed, that the obligations imposed upon the mandatory by its acceptance of the mandate are solemn international obligations from which there is not now, nor has there been at any time, an intention to depart. To the tasks imposed by the mandate, his Majesty’s Government have set their hand, and they will not withdraw it. But if their efforts are to be successful, there is need for cooperation, confidence, readiness on all sides to appreciate the difficulties and complexities of the problem, and, above all, there must be a full and unqualified recognition that no solution can be satisfactory or permanent which is not based upon justice, both to the Jewish people and to the non-Jewish communities of Palestine.

Ramsay Macdonald
Appendix C, Annex 14 -- Peel Commission Report
July 7, 1937

The British government convened the Palestine Royal Commission, also called the Peel Commission after its chairman, to find a way to stop the periodic flares of violence by Arabs in Palestine. The commission was charged with discovering the underlying causes for the riots that broke out in April 1936 and to find out if either the Arabs or the Jews had any legitimate grievances in the way the mandate was being administered. If any grievances were found to be legitimate, the commission was asked to recommend what to do about them.

The most controversial findings and recommendations are highlighted below in bold [emphasis added]. They include: 1. Arab protests regarding Jewish land purchases were unfounded. 2. Division of Palestine between Arabs and Jews, with a forced relocation of Arabs into Arab territory and Jews into Jewish territory. A corridor from Jerusalem to the sea would remain under mandatory administration. 3. The mandate was unworkable so long as both Arabs and Jews insisted on controlling the same territory.

Result: The report failed. The Arabs refused to relinquish any part of Palestine, all of which they viewed as theirs and as “sacred Muslim soil” (Morris, 2001, p. 138, and Meir, 1975, p. 126). The Zionists accepted the report, although a large minority was as reluctant as the Arabs to surrender any part of the “Land of Israel” (Morris, 2001, p. 143). Britain repudiated the Peel recommendations, in part because of the population transfer proposal. If the Arabs had accepted the division, they could have had a Palestinian state as early as 1937.

The text below reproduces only the Peel report’s summary. The full report runs to 404 pages. Even the summary is lengthy, but it’s worth reading for its comprehensive description of the problem and its “out-of-the-box” thinking about solutions.
PART I: THE PROBLEM

Chapter I. - The Historical Background

A brief account of ancient Jewish times in Palestine, of the Arab conquest and occupation, of the dispersion of the Jews and the development of the Jewish Problem, and the growth and meaning of Zionism.

Chapter II. - The War and the Mandate

In order to obtain Arab support in the War, the British Government promised the Sherif of Mecca in 1915 that, in the event of an Allied victory, the greater part of the Arab provinces of the Turkish Empire would become independent. The Arabs understood that Palestine would be included in the sphere of independence.

In order to obtain the support of World Jewry, the British Government in 1917 issued the Balfour Declaration. The Jews understood that, if the experiment of establishing a Jewish National Home succeeded and a sufficient number of Jews went to Palestine, the National Home might develop in course of time into a Jewish State.

At the end of the War, the Mandate System was accepted by the Allied and Associated Powers as the vehicle for the execution of the policy of the Balfour Declaration, and, after a period of delay, the Mandate for Palestine was approved by the League of Nations and the United States. The Mandate itself is mainly concerned with specific obligations of equal weight--positive obligations as to the establishment of the National Home, negative obligations as to safeguarding the rights of the Arabs. The Mandate also involves the general obligation, implicit in every Mandate, to fulfil the primary purpose of the Mandate System as expressed in the first paragraph of Article 22 of the Covenant.

This means that the well-being and development" of the people concerned are the first charge on the Mandatory, and implies that they will in due course be enabled to stand by themselves.

The association of the policy of the Balfour Declaration with the Mandate System implied the belief that Arab hostility to the former would presently be overcome, owing to the economic advantages which Jewish immigration was expected to bring to Palestine as a whole.

Chapter III. - Palestine from 1920 to 1936

During the first years of the Civil Administration, which was set up in 1920, a beginning was made on the one hand with the provision of public services, which mainly affected the Arab majority of the population, and on the other hand with the establishment of the Jewish National Home. There were outbreaks of disorder in 1920 and 1921, but in 1925 it was thought that the prospects of ultimate harmony between the Arabs and the Jews seemed so favourable that the forces for maintaining order were substantially reduced.

These hopes proved unfounded because, although Palestine as a whole became more prosperous,
the causes of the outbreaks of 1920 and 1921, namely, the demand of the Arabs for national independence and their antagonism to the National Home, remained unmodified and were indeed accentuated by the "external factors," namely, the pressure of the Jews of Europe on Palestine and the development of Arab nationalism in neighbouring countries.

These same causes brought about the outbreaks of 1929 and 1933. By 1936 the external factors had been intensified by—

(1) the sufferings of the Jews in Germany and Poland, resulting in a great increase of Jewish immigration into Palestine; and
(2) the prospect of Syria and the Lebanon soon obtaining the same independence as Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Egypt was also on the eve of independence.

Chapter IV. - The Disturbances of 1936
These disturbances (which are briefly summarized) were similar in character to the four previous outbreaks, although more serious and prolonged. As in 1933, it was not only the Jews who were attacked, but the Palestine Government. A new feature was the part played by the Rulers of the neighbouring Arab States in bringing about the end of the strike.

The underlying causes of the disturbances of 1936 were—

(1) The desire of the Arabs for national independence;
(2) their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home.

These two causes were the same as those of all the previous outbreaks and have always been inextricably linked together. Of several subsidiary factors, the more important were—

(1) the advance of Arab nationalism outside Palestine;
(2) the increased immigration of Jews since 1933;
(3) the opportunity enjoyed by the Jews for influencing public opinion in Britain;
(4) Arab distrust in the sincerity of the British Government;
(5) Arab alarm at the continued Jewish purchase of land;
(6) the general uncertainty as to the ultimate intentions of the Mandatory Power.

Chapter V. - The Present Situation
The Jewish National Home is no longer an experiment. The growth of its population has been accompanied by political, social and economic developments along the lines laid down at the outset. The chief novelty is the urban and industrial development. The contrast between the modern democratic and primarily European character of the National Home and that of the Arab world around it is striking. The temper of the Home is strongly nationalist. There can be no question of fusion or assimilation between Jewish and Arab cultures. The National Home cannot be half-national.

Crown Colony government is not suitable for such a highly educated, democratic community as the National Home and fosters an unhealthy irresponsibility.

The National Home is bent on forcing the pace of its development, not only because of the desire of the Jews to escape from Europe, but because of anxiety as to the future in Palestine.
The Arab population shows a remarkable increase since 1920, and it has had some share in the increased prosperity of Palestine. Many Arab landowners have benefited from the sale of land and the profitable investment of the purchase money. The *fellaheen* are better off on the whole than they were in 1920. This Arab progress has been partly due to the import of Jewish capital into Palestine and other factors associated with the growth of the National Home. In particular, the Arabs have benefited from social services which could not have been provided on the existing scale without the revenue obtained from the Jews.

Such economic advantage, however, as the Arabs have gained from Jewish immigration will decrease if the political breach between the races continues to widen.

Arab nationalism is as intense a force as Jewish. The Arab leaders' demand for national self-government and the shutting down of the Jewish National Home has remained unchanged since 1929. Like Jewish nationalism, Arab nationalism is stimulated by the educational system and by the growth of the Youth Movement. It has also been greatly encouraged by the recent Anglo-Egyptian and Franco-Syrian Treaties.

The gulf between the races is thus already wide and will continue to widen if the present Mandate is maintained.

The position of the Palestine Government between the two antagonistic communities is unenviable. There are two rival bodies -- the Arab Higher Committee allied with the Supreme Moslem Council on the one hand, and the Jewish Agency allied with the Va'ad Leumi on the other -- who make a stronger appeal to the natural loyalty of the Arab and the Jews than does the Government of Palestine. The sincere attempts of the Government to treat the two races impartially have not improved the relations between them. Nor has the policy of conciliating Arab opposition been successful. The events of last year proved that conciliation is useless.

The evidence submitted by the Arab and Jewish leaders respectively was directly conflicting and gave no hope of compromise.

The only solution of the problem put forward by the Arab Higher Committee was the immediate establishment of all independent Arab Government, which would deal with the 400,000 Jews now in Palestine as it thought fit. To that it is replied that belief in British good faith would not be strengthened anywhere in the world if the National Home were now surrendered to Arab rule. The Jewish Agency and the Va'ad Leumi asserted that the problem would be solved if the Mandate were firmly applied in full accordance with Jewish claims: thus there should be no new restriction on immigration nor anything to prevent the Jewish population becoming in course of time a majority in Palestine. To that it is replied that such a policy could only be maintained by force and that neither British public opinion nor that of World Jewry is likely to commit itself to the recurrent use of force unless it is convinced that there is no other means by which justice can be done.

PART II: THE OPERATION OF THE MANDATE
The Commission exhaustively considered what might be done in one field after another in
execution of the Mandate to improve the prospects of peace. The results of this enquiry are embodied in Part II of the Report. The problems confronting the various branches of the Mandatory Administration are described, and the grievances of the Arabs and Jews under each head discussed. The principal findings of the Commission are as follows:

**Chapter VI. - Administration**

The Palestinian officers in the Government Service work well in normal times, but in times of trouble they are unreliable. There should be no hesitation in dispensing with the services of those whose loyalty or impartiality is uncertain.

As regards British officers, the cadre is too small to admit of a Civil Service for Palestine alone and the Administration must continue to draw on the Colonial Service, but the ordinary period of service in Palestine should be not less than seven years. Officers should be carefully selected and given a preliminary course of instruction.

The Commission recognise the difficulties of the British Administration, driven from the first to work at high pressure with no opportunity for calm reflection. There is over-centralization and insufficient liaison between Headquarters Departments and the District Administration.

The grievances and claims of the Arabs and Jews as regards the Courts cannot be reconciled and reflect the racial antagonism pervading the whole Administration. The difficulty of providing a judicial system suitable to the needs of the mixed peoples of Palestine is enhanced by the existence of three official languages, three weekly days of rest, three sets of official holidays and three systems of law. As regards Jewish suspicions as to the conduct of criminal prosecutions, the Commission point to the difficulties of the Legal Department in a land where perjury is common and evidence in many cases, particularly in times of crisis, unobtainable, and conclude that the animosity between the two races, particularly in times of crisis, has shown its influence to the detriment of the work of a British Senior Government Department. The appointment of a British Senior Government Advocate is recommended.

The Jaffa-Haifa road should be completed as speedily as possible.

Further expert enquiry is necessary before deciding whether a second deep-water port is required. It would be best to build such a port, if at all, at the junction of Jaffa and Tel Aviv, equally accessible from each.

There is no branch of the Administration with which the Jewish Agency does not concern itself but the Agency is not open to criticism on this ground. Article 4 of the Mandate entitles it to advise and co-operate with the Government in almost anything that may affect the interests of the Jewish population. It constitutes a kind of parallel government existing side by side with the Mandatory Government and its privileged position intensifies Arab antagonism.

The Arab Higher Committee was to a large extent responsible for maintaining and protecting the strike last year. The Mufti of Jerusalem as President must bear his due share of responsibility. It is unfortunate that since 1929 no action has been practicable to regulate the question of elections for the Supreme Moslem Council and the position of its President. The functions which the Mufti
has collected in his person and his use of them have led to the development of an Arab imperium in imperio. He may be described as the head of a third parallel government. The Commission discuss a proposal for an enlarged Arab Agency, consisting of representatives of neighbouring Arab countries as well as of the Arabs in Palestine, to balance the Jewish Agency. If the present Mandate system continues some such scheme will have to be considered.

Chapter VII. - Public Security

Although expenditure on public security rose from £265,000 in 1923 to over £862,000 in 1935-36 (and £2,230,000 in 1936-37, the year of the disturbance) it is evident that the elementary duty of providing public security has not been discharged. Should disorders break out again of such a nature as to require the intervention of the Military, there should be no hesitation in enforcing martial law throughout the country under undivided military control. In such an event disarmament should be enforced and an effective frontier organisation established for stopping smuggling, illegal immigration and gun running. In the absence of disarmament the supernumerary police for the defence of Jewish Settlements should be continued as a disciplined force.

The collection of intelligence was unsatisfactory during the strike. The majority of Palestinian officers in the Criminal investigation Department are thoroughly devoted and loyal, but the junior ranks, like the majority of the District police, though useful in times of peace, are unreliable in time of trouble. It would be highly dangerous to expose the Arab police of Palestine to another strain of the same kind as that which they endured last summer.

In "mixed" areas British District Officers should be appointed.

Central and local police reserves are necessary. A large mobile mounted force is also essential, whether in the form of a Gendarmerie or by increasing the British Mounted Police.

After the 1929 disturbances, though 27 capital sentences were confirmed, only three murderers suffered the extreme penalty. In 1936 there were 260 reported cases of murder, 67 convictions and no death sentences. The prompt and adequate punishment of crime is a vital factor in the maintenance of law and order.

Collective fines totalling over £60,000 were imposed during the years 1929-36: only £18,000 has been collected up to date. If collective fines are to have a deterrent effect they should be limited to a sum that can be realized, and a body of punitive police should be quartered on the town or village until the fine has been paid.

The penalties provided by the Press ordinance and the action taken under it are insufficient. An Ordinance should be adopted providing for a cash deposit which can be confiscated and for imprisonment as well as payment of a fine; also, in case of a repetition of the offence, for forfeiture of the press.

Police barracks and married quarters are urgently necessary in certain towns.

The entire cost of the measures proposed could not be met from the revenues of Palestine.
Grants-in-aid from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be required on a generous scale. The immediate effect of these measures would be to widen the gulf that separates the Arab from the Jew, with repercussions spreading far beyond the borders of Palestine.

Chapter VIII. - Financial and Fiscal Questions
Until recent years the public finances allowed no great scope for development in the social services. The accumulation of a considerable surplus was a feature of the four years beginning 1932, and there were grounds for a conservative attitude towards this development. The conclusion that the existence of a large surplus reflects undue parsimony is not borne out by close analysis, since the entire surplus is found to be so heavily mortgaged that it is little more than a reasonable provision for existing commitments.

If the inward flow of capital, which is the most singular feature of the economy of Palestine, were to be arrested, there is no reason why the removal of exceptional advantages should result in penury, though there might be some reduction in the standard of living until the new economy was established. In the event of a prolonged period of economic stagnation the danger of an exodus of capital cannot be altogether excluded.

It is not possible in the absence of adequate statistics to measure the truth of the Arab complaint that industrial protection chiefly benefits the Jews and that its burdens are chiefly borne by the Arabs. It is hoped that the new Department of Statistics may soon enquire into the incidence of taxation and that new duties will be considered in relation to the whole burden of taxation and not merely as affecting the particular industry.

There is no question as to the need of increasing the export trade and finding markets for the ever increasing citrus output. After examining various possible expedients for overcoming the difficulties which result from the non-discrimination in tariff policy required by Article 18 of the Mandate, the Commission conclude that the provisions of Article 18 are out of date. Without an amendment of that Article Palestine must continue to suffer from the restrictions which hamper international trade, and negotiations should be opened without delay to put the trade of Palestine on a fairer basis.

Chapter IX. - The Land
A summary of land legislation enacted during the Civil Administration shows the efforts made to fulfil the Mandatory obligation in this matter. The Commission point to serious difficulties in connection with the legislation proposed by the Palestine Government for the protection of small owners. The Palestine Order in Council and, if necessary, the Mandate should be amended to permit of legislation empowering the High Commissioner to prohibit the transfer of land in any stated area to Jews, so that the obligation to safeguard the right and position of the Arabs may be carried out. Until survey and settlement are complete, the Commission would welcome the prohibition of the sale of isolated and comparatively small plots of land to Jews. They would prefer larger schemes for the rearrangement of proprietorship under Government supervision. They favour the proposal for the creation of special Public Utility Companies to undertake such development schemes subject to certain conditions.
An expert Committee should be appointed to draw up a Land Code.

Recommendations are made with a view to the expediting of settlement (the need for which is paramount) and to the improvement of settlement procedure.

The present system of Land Courts is contributory to delay. Until survey and settlement are complete there should be two or three Land Courts separate from the District Courts and each under a single British Judge.

Up till now the Arab cultivator has benefited on the whole both from the work of the British Administration and the presence of Jews in the country, but the greatest care must now be exercised to see that in the event of further sales of land by Arabs to Jews the rights of any Arab tenants or cultivators are preserved. Thus, alienation of land should only be allowed where it is possible to replace extensive by intensive cultivation. In the hill districts there can be no expectation of finding accommodation for any large increase in the rural population. At present, and for many years to come, the Mandatory Power should not attempt to facilitate the close settlement of the Jews in the hill districts generally.

The shortage of land is due less to purchase by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population. The Arab claims that the Jews have obtained too large a proportion of good land cannot be maintained. Much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamps and uncultivated when it was bought.

Legislation vesting surface water in the High Commissioner is essential. An increase in staff and equipment for exploratory investigations with a view to increasing irrigation is recommended. The scheme for the development of the Huleh district is commended.

The Commission fully realize the desirability of afforestation on a large scale of a long term forest policy, but, having regard to their conclusion as to the scarcity of land in the hills for the agricultural population, they cannot recommend a policy involving expropriation of cultivators on a large scale until other cultivable land or suitable employment on the land can be found for them. In the aggregate, however, a large amount of land is fit for afforestation but not for cultivation, and the Commission endorse a policy of afforestation of steep hillsides to prevent erosion the prevention of grazing on land fit for afforestation, and, where practicable, the establishment of village forests for the benefit of neighbouring cultivators.

Chapter X. - Immigration

The problem of immigration has been aggravated by three factors:-- (1) the drastic restrictions imposed on immigration in the United States, (2) the advent of the National Socialist Government in Germany, and (3) the increasing economic pressure on the Jews in Poland.

The continuous impact of a highly intelligent and enterprising race backed by large financial resources on a comparatively poor, indigenous community, on a different cultural level, may produce in time serious reactions. The principle of economic absorptive capacity, meaning that considerations of economic capacity and these alone should determine immigration, is at present inadequate and ignores factors in the situation which wise statesmanship cannot disregard.
Political, social and psychological factors should be taken into account. **His Majesty's Government should lay down a political high level of Jewish immigration. This high level should be fixed for the next five years at 12,000 per annum.** The High Commissioner should be given discretion to admit immigrants up to this maximum figure, but subject always to the economic absorptive capacity of the country.

Among other alterations in the immigration regulations the Commission recommend that the Administration should have direct control over the immigrants coming in under Category A(i) (persons with £1,000 capital), and any person who desires to enter Palestine under this category should convince the Immigration authority not only that he is in possession of £1,000, but also that there is room in Palestine for additional members in the profession, trade or business which he proposes to pursue.

The definition of dependency should be revised so as to fall under two heads, (1) near relatives who, dependency being presumed, would have a right to come in, and (2) other relatives, in respect of whom the Immigration authority would have to be satisfied that they can be maintained by the immigrant or permanent resident concerned, as long as they remain dependent for maintenance.

The final allocation of immigration certificates as determined by the Jewish Agency should be submitted by the High Commissioner for approval.

Greater use should be made of the machinery of the District Administration in making enquiries in connection with the preparation of the half-yearly Labour Schedules. The housing situation is an economic consideration to which greater regard should be given when considering absorptive capacity.

In so far as immigration has been the major factor in bringing the Jewish National Home to its present stage of development, the Mandatory has fully implemented this obligation to facilitate the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine, as in evidenced by the existence of a Jewish population of 400,000 persons. But this does not mean that the National Rome should be crystallized at its present size. The Commission cannot accept the view that the Mandatory, facilitated the establishment of a National Home, would be justified in shutting its doors. Its economic life depends to a large extent on further immigration and a large amount of capital has been invested in it on the assumption that immigration would continue.

Restrictions on Jewish immigration will not solve the Palestine problem. The National Home seems already too big to the Arabs and, whatever its size, it bars the to their attainment of national independence.

**Chapter XI. - Trans-Jordan**

The articles of the Mandate concerning the National Home do not apply to Trans-Jordan and the possibility of enlarging the National Home by Jewish immigration into Trans-Jordan rests on the assumption of concord between Arabs and Jews. Arab antagonism to Jewish immigration is at least as bitter in Trans-Jordan as it is in Palestine. The Government of Trans-Jordan would refuse to encourage Jewish immigration in the teeth of popular resistance.
Chapter XII. - Health

The Jewish grievances are summed up as complaints that not enough money has been spent, by the Mandatory Government to assist the medical services established by the Jews from their own resources. What is given to one service must be taken from another, and it is not always remembered that Palestine, despite the economic development of the National Home is still a relatively poor country. The whole question illustrates the difficulty of providing services in one State for two distinct communities with two very different standards of living.

Chapter XIII. - Public Works and Services

If it be assumed that the distribution of posts as between the two races should be proportional to the size of their respective populations, the Government have fairly maintained this proportion in the Civil Service generally, although the rapid expansion of the Jewish community has made this extremely difficult.

In Palestine, where there are different rates of pay for Arab and Jewish unskilled labourers, and also frequent fluctuations in wage rates, it is practically impossible to maintain employment on public works on any fixed proportion between the races.

The Commission make no recommendation with regard to the employment of Jews and non-Jews in Government Departments and on public works and services. They refer to the difficulties created by the antagonism between the two races, the differences in their standard of living and rates of wages and the additional complication of three different Holy Days, and state that they are satisfied that the Government have taken a broad view in dealing with the situation and that there is no foundation for the suggestion that the Government attitude towards the employment of Jews is unsympathetic.

Chapter XIV. - The Christians

The religious stake of the Christians in the Holy Places is just as great as that of the Jews or Moslems. The Christians of the world cannot be indifferent to the justice and well-being of their co-religionists in the Holy Land.

A memorandum setting out the grievances of the Arab Orthodox Community and complaining of the laissez-faire attitude of the Government was received too late for examination in detail, but it is pointed out that the Financial Commission appointed under the Orthodox Patriarchate Ordinance of 1928 has carried out an effective reform of the Patriarchate's finances and that the reorganization of the internal affairs of the Patriarchate, including the establishment of a Mixed Council, has been discussed between the Government, the Patriarchate and the Laity and is at present under consideration by the Government.

The Commission refer to the question of Sunday work by Christian officials resulting from the strict observance of the Jewish Sabbath, and are disposed to agree with the view that the existing state of affairs throws too much work on Christians officials and impairs the spiritual influence of the Christian Church.

In political matters the Christian Arabs have thrown in their lot with their Moslem brethren.
Chapter XV. - Nationality Law and Acquisition of Palestinian Citizenship

As regards the grievances of the Arabs (stated to number about 40,000) who left Palestine before the War intending eventually to return but have been unable to obtain Palestinian citizenship, the Commission suggest that at least those who are able to establish an unbroken personal connection with Palestine and who are prepared to give a definite formal assurance of their intention to return, should be admitted to Palestinian citizenship.

As regards Jews, the existing legislation implements the obligation of the Mandate on this subject. The Jews have not availed themselves readily of the opportunity afforded them of becoming Palestinian citizens, and this is accounted for by the fact that their chief interest is in the Jewish Community itself. Allegiance to Palestine and to the Government are minor considerations to many of them.

The Commission do not agree with those who criticise the restriction of the municipal franchise to Palestinian citizens. It is most desirable that all persons who intend to reside permanently in the country should become Palestinian citizens, and this qualification for voting is a direct inducement, to them to do so.

Chapter XVI. - Education

It seems unfortunate that the Administration has been unable to do more for education. It is not only the intrinsic value of education that should be considered. Any efforts to raise the material standards of life among the fellaheen can only be successful if they have received sufficient mental training to profit from technical instruction. Considering, the inadequacy of the existing provision for Arab education, the Administration should regard its claims on the revenue as second in importance only to those of public security.

Worse than the insufficiency of Arab schools, however is the nationalist character of the education provided in the schools of both communities and for that the Commission can see no remedy at all. The ideal system of education would be a single bi-national system for both races. But that is virtually impossible under the Mandate, which prescribes the right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language." The existing Arab and Jewish school systems are definitely widening and will continue to widen the gulf between the two races.

Wherever practicable, e.g. in new technical or trade schools, mixed education should be promoted.

As regards the Jews' claim for a larger grant for their system of education, the Commission consider that, until much more has been spent on the development of Arab education, so as to place it on a level with that of the Jews, it is unjustifiable to increase the grant to the latter, however desirable it might be in other circumstances. The extent to which the Jews have taxed themselves for education is one of the best features of the National Home; and such "self-help" deserves all support; but it should not be given by altering the present proportion between the grant to the Jews and the amount spent on the Arabs; it should result from an increase in the total expenditure on education.
The contrast between the Arab and Jewish systems of education is most striking at the top. The Jews have a university of high quality. The Arabs have none and the young intelligenzia of the country are unable to complete their education without the cost and inconvenience of going abroad. In any further discussion of the project of a British University in the Near East the possibility should be carefully considered of locating it in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem or Haifa.

Chapter XVII. - Local Government

The present system of rural self-government (through local Councils) falls short (1) in a lack of flexibility, (2) in undue centralization. An attempt should be made to strengthen those few local councils which still exist in the Arab rural areas, but the Commission do not favour an attempt at present to revivify councils which have broken down or to create new ones unless there is a genuine demand for them. There can be little really effective extension of village self-government until the provision of primary education has had more time to take effect.

The deficiencies of the present system of municipal government are (1) a lack of initiative on the part of the more backward municipalities, and (2) the limitations set to initiative on the part of the more progressive municipalities by an Ordinance which subjects them all to the same measure of Government control and centralized administration. The limitation of power and responsibility largely accounts for the lack of interest shown by the townspeople in most municipal councils.

Tel Aviv has unique problems of its own caused by its phenomenal growth during the last five years. The objectives which the people of Tel Aviv have set before them in the way of social services are in themselves admirable, and the ratepayers have shown a commendable readiness to bear high rates for their realization. The town has been faced with, and to a considerable extent surmounted, exceptional difficulties without seriously impairing its financial position.

The more important local councils and all the municipalities should be reclassified by means of a new Ordinance into groups according to their respective size and importance. The degree of power and independence could then be varied to suit each class. For the first class of municipality the powers provided under the existing Ordinance are inadequate and should be extended.

The services of an expert authority on local government should be obtained to assist in drafting the new Ordinance and in improving and co-ordinating the relations between Government and the municipalities, particularly in the larger towns, with special reference to the need of removing the causes of the present delay in approving municipal budgets.

The need of Tel Aviv for a substantial loan should be promptly and sympathetically reconsidered.

The normal constitutional relationship between the central and local authorities is impossible in Palestine.
Chapter XVIII. - Self-Governing Institutions

Such hopes as may have been entertained in 1922 of any quick advance towards self-government have become less tenable. The bar to it—Arab antagonism to the National Home—so far from weakening, has grown stronger.

The Jewish leaders might acquiesce in the establishment of a Legislative Council on the basis of parity, but the Commission are convinced that parity is not a practicable solution of the problem. It is difficult to believe that so artificial a device would operate effectively or last long, and in any case the Arab leaders would not accept it.

The Commission do not recommend that any attempt be made to revive the proposal of a Legislative Council, but since it is desirable that the Government should have some regular and effective means of sounding public opinion on its policy, the Commission would welcome an enlargement of the Advisory Council by the addition of Unofficial Members, who might be in a majority and might be elected, who could make representations by way of resolution, but who would not be empowered to pass or reject the budget or other legislative measures. Again, the Arabs are unlikely to accept such a proposal.

The Arabs of Palestine, it has been admitted, are as fit to govern themselves as the Arabs of Iraq or Syria. The Jews of Palestine are as fit to govern themselves as any organized and educated community in Europe. Yet, associated as they are under the Mandate, self-government is impracticable for both peoples. The Mandate cannot be fully implemented nor can it honourably terminate in the independence of an undivided Palestine unless the conflict between Arab and Jew can be composed.

Chapter XIX. - Conclusion and Recommendations

The Commission recapitulate the conclusions set out in this part of the Report, and summarize the Arab and Jewish grievances and their own recommendations for the removal of such as are legitimate. They add, however, that these are not the recommendations which their terms of reference require. They will not, that is to say, remove the grievances nor prevent their recurrence. They are the best palliatives the Commission can devise for the disease from which Palestine is suffering, but they are only palliatives. They cannot cure the trouble. The disease is so deep-rooted that in the Commissioners' firm conviction the only hope of a cure lies in a surgical operation.

PART III: THE POSSIBILITY OF A LASTING SETTLEMENT

Chapter XX. - The Force of Circumstances

The problem of Palestine is briefly restated.

Under the stress of the World War the British Government made promises to Arabs and Jews in order to obtain their support. On the strength of those promises both parties formed certain expectations.

The application to Palestine of the Mandate System in general and of the specific Mandate in particular implies the belief that the obligations thus undertaken towards the Arabs and the Jews respectively would prove in course of time to be mutually compatible owing to the conciliatory
effect on the Palestinian Arabs of the material prosperity which Jewish immigration would bring in Palestine as a whole. **That belief has not been justified, and there seems to be no hope of its being justified in the future.**

But the British people cannot on that account repudiate their obligations, and, apart from obligations, the existing circumstances in Palestine would still require the most strenuous efforts on the part of the Government which is responsible for the welfare of the country.

The existing circumstances are summarized as follows.

**An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country. There is no common ground between them. Their national aspirations are incompatible.** The Arabs desire to revive the traditions of the Arab golden age. The Jews desire to show what they can achieve when restored to the land in which the Jewish nation was born. **Neither of the two national ideals permits of combination in the service of a single State.**

The conflict has grown steadily more bitter since 1920 and the process will continue. Conditions inside Palestine especially the systems of education, are strengthening the national sentiment of the two peoples. The bigger and more prosperous they grow the greater will be their political ambitions, and the conflict is aggravated by the uncertainty of the future. **“Who in the end will govern Palestine?” it is asked.** Meanwhile, the external factors will continue to operate with increasing force. On the one hand in less than three years' time Syria and the Lebanon will attain their national sovereignty, and the claim of the Palestinian Arabs to share in the freedom of all Asiatic Arabia will thus be fortified. On the other hand the hardships and anxieties of the Jews in Europe are not likely to grow less and the appeal to the good faith and humanity of the British people will lose none of its force.

Meanwhile, the Government of Palestine, which is at present an **unsuitable form** for governing educated Arabs and democratic Jews, cannot develop into a system of self-government as it has elsewhere, because there is no such system which could ensure justice both to the Arabs and to the Jews. Government therefore remains unrepresentative and unable to dispel the conflicting grievances of the two dissatisfied and irresponsible communities it governs.

In these circumstances peace can only be maintained in Palestine under the Mandate by repression. This means the maintenance of security services at so high a cost that the services directed to "the well-being and development" of the population cannot be expanded and may even have to be curtailed. The moral objections to repression are self-evident. Nor need the undesirable reactions of it on opinion outside Palestine be emphasized. Moreover, **repression will not solve the problem. It will exacerbate the quarrel.** It will not help towards the establishment of a single self-governing Palestine. It is not easy to pursue the dark path of repression without seeing daylight at the end of it.

The British people will not flinch from the task of continuing to govern Palestine under the Mandate if they are in honour bound to do so, but they would be justified in asking if there is no other way in which their duty can be done.
Nor would Britain wish to repudiate her obligations. The trouble is that they have proved irreconcilable, and this conflict is the more unfortunate because each of the obligations taken separately accords with British sentiment and British interest. The development of self-government in the Arab world on the one hand is in accordance with British principles, and British public opinion is wholly sympathetic with Arab aspirations towards a new age of unity and prosperity in the Arab world. British interest similarly has always been bound up with the peace of the Middle East and British statesmanship can show an almost unbroken record of friendship with the Arabs. There is a strong British tradition, on the other hand, of friendship with the Jewish people, and it is in the British interest to retain as far as may be the confidence of the Jewish people.

The continuance of the present system means the gradual alienation of two peoples who are traditionally the friends of Britain.

The problem cannot be solved by giving either the Arabs or the Jews all they want. The answer to the question which of them in the end will govern Palestine must be Neither. No fair-minded statesman can think it right either that 400,000 Jews, whose entry into Palestine has been facilitated by the British Government and approved by the League of Nations, should be handed over to Arab rule, or that, if the Jews should become a majority, a million Arabs should be handed over to their rule. But while neither race can fairly rule all Palestine, each race might justly rule part of it.

The idea of Partition has doubtless been thought of before as a solution of the problem, but it has probably been discarded as being impracticable. The difficulties are certainly very great, but when they are closely examined they do not seem so insuperable as the difficulties inherent in the continuance of the Mandate or in any other alternative arrangement. Partition offers a chance of ultimate peace. No other plan does.

Chapter XXI. - Cantonisation

The political division of Palestine could be effected in a less thorough manner than by Partition. It could be divided like Federal States into provinces and cantons, which would be self-governing in such matters as immigration and land sales as well as social services. The Mandatory Government would remain as a central or federal government controlling such matters as foreign relations, defence, customs and the like.

Cantonisation is attractive at first sight because it seems to solve the three major problems of land, immigration and self-government, but there are obvious weaknesses in it. First, the working of federal systems depends on sufficient community of interest or tradition to maintain harmony between the Central Government and the cantons. In Palestine both Arabs and Jews would regard the Central Government as an alien and interfering body. Secondly, the financial relations between the Central Government and the cantons would revive the existing quarrel between Arabs and Jews as to the distribution of a surplus of federal revenue or as to the contributions of the cantons towards a federal deficit. Unrestricted Jewish immigration into the Jewish canton might lead to a demand for the expansion of federal services at the expense of the Arab canton. Thirdly, the costly task of maintaining law and order would still rest mainly on the Central
Government. Fourthly, Cantonisation like Partition cannot avoid leaving a minority of each race in the area controlled by the other. The solution of this problem requires such bold measures as can only be contemplated if there is a prospect of final peace. Partition opens up such a prospect. Cantonisation does not. Lastly, Cantonisation does not settle the question of national self-government. Neither the Arabs nor the Jews would feel their political aspirations were satisfied with purely cantonal self-government.

Cantonisation, in sum, presents most, if not all, of the difficulties presented by Partition without Partition's one supreme advantage--the possibilities it offers of eventual peace.

**Chapter XXII. - A Plan of Partition**

While the Commission would not be expected to embark on the further protracted inquiry which would be needed for working out a scheme of Partition in full detail, it would be idle to put forward the principle of Partition and not to give it any concrete shape. Clearly it must be shown that an actual plan can be devised which meets the main requirements of the case.

1. **A Treaty System**

The Mandate for Palestine should terminate and be replaced by a Treaty System in accordance with the precedent set in Iraq and Syria.

A new Mandate for the Holy Places should be instituted to fulfil the purposes defined in Section 2 below.

Treaties of alliance should be negotiated by the Mandatory with the Government of Trans-Jordan and representatives of the Arabs of Palestine on the one hand and with the Zionist Organisation on the other. These Treaties would declare that, within as short a period as may be convenient, two sovereign independent States would be established--the one an Arab State consisting of Trans-Jordan united with that part of Palestine which lies to the east and south of a frontier such as we suggest in Section 3 below; the other a Jewish State consisting of that part of Palestine which lies to the north and west of that frontier.

The Mandatory would undertake to support any requests for admission to the League of Nations which the Governments of the Arab and the Jewish States might make.

The Treaties would include strict guarantees for the protection of minorities in each State, and the financial and other provisions to which reference will be made in subsequent Sections.

Military conventions would be attached to the Treaties, dealing with the maintenance of naval, military and air forces, the upkeep and use of ports, roads and railways, the security of the oil pipe line and so forth.

2. **The Holy Places**

The Partition of Palestine is subject to the overriding necessity of keeping the sanctity of Jerusalem and Bethlehem inviolate and of ensuring free and safe access to them for all the world. That, in the fullest sense of the mandatory phrase, is "a sacred trust of civilization"--a trust on behalf not merely of the peoples of Palestine but of multitudes in other lands to whom those
places, one or both, are Holy Places.

A new Mandate, therefore, should be framed with the execution of this trust as its primary purpose. An enclave should be demarcated extending from a point north of Jerusalem to a point south of Bethlehem, and access to the sea should be provided by a corridor extending to the north of the main road and to the south of the railway, including the towns Lydda and Ramle, and terminating at Jaffa.

The protection of the Holy Places is a permanent trust, unique in its character and purpose, and not contemplated by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In order to avoid misunderstanding, it might frankly be stated that this trust will only terminate if and when the League of Nations and the United States desire it to do so, and that, while it would be the trustee's duty to promote the well-being and development of the local population concerned, it is not intended that in course of time they should stand by themselves as a wholly self-governing community.

Guarantees as to the rights of the Holy Places and free access thereto (as provided in Article 13 of the existing Mandate), as to transit across the mandated area, and as to non-discrimination in fiscal, economic and other matters should be maintained in accordance with the principles of the Mandate System. But the policy of the Balfour Declaration would not apply; and no question would arise of balancing Arab against Jewish claims or vice versa. All the inhabitants of the territory would stand on an equal footing. The only official language would be that of the Mandatory Administration. Good and just government without regard for sectional interests would be its basic principle.

It would accord with Christian sentiment in the world at large if Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) were also covered by this Mandate. The Mandatory should be entrusted with the administration of Nazareth and with full powers to safeguard the sanctity of the waters and shores of Lake Tiberias.

The Mandatory should similarly be charged with the protection of religious endowments and of such buildings, monuments and places in the Arab and Jewish States as are sacred to the Jews and the Arabs respectively.

For the upkeep of the Mandatory Government, a certain revenue should be obtainable, especially from the large and growing urban population in its charge, both by way of customs duties and by direct taxation; but it might prove insufficient for the normal cost of the administration. In that event, it is suggested that, in all the circumstances, Parliament would be willing to vote the money needed to make good the deficit.

3. The Frontier
The natural principle for the Partition of Palestine is to separate land and settled from the areas in which the Jews have acquired land and settled from those which are who are wholly or mainly occupied by Arabs. This offers a fair and practicable basis for Partition, provided that in accordance with the spirit of British obligations, (1) a reasonable allowance is made within the boundaries of the Jewish State for the growth of population and colonization, and (2) reasonable
compensation is given to the Arab State for the loss of land and revenue.

Any proposal for Partition would be futile if it gave no indication, however rough, as to how the most vital question in the whole matter might be determined, i.e., the frontier. As a solution of the problem, which seems both practicable and just, a rough line is proposed below. A Frontier Commission should be appointed to demarcate the precise frontier.

Starting from Ras an Naqura, it follows the existing northern and eastern frontier of Palestine to Lake Tiberias and crosses the Lake to the outflow of the River Jordan, whence it continues down the river to a point a little north of Beisan. It then cuts across the Beisan Plain and runs along the southern edge of the Valley of Jezreel and across the Plain of Esdraelon to a point near Megiddo, whence it crosses the Carmel ridge in the neighbourhood of the Megiddo road. Having thus reached the Maritime Plain, the line runs southwards down its eastern edge, curving west to avoid Tulkarm, until it reaches the Jerusalem-Jaffa corridor near Lydda. South of the Corridor it continues down the edge of the Plain to a point about 10 miles south of Rehovot, when it turns west to the sea.

The observations and recommendations are made with regard to the proposed frontier and to questions arising from it:

(i) No frontier can be drawn which separates all Arabs and Arab-owned land from all Jews and Jewish-owned land.

(ii) The Jews have purchased substantial blocks of land in the Gaza Plain and near Beersheba and obtained options for the purchase of other blocks in this area. The proposed frontier would prevent the utilization of those lands for the southward expansion of the Jewish National Home. On the other hand, the Jewish lands in Galilee, and in particular the Huleh basin (which offers a notable opportunity for development and colonization), would be in the Jewish Area.

(iii) The proposed frontier necessitates the inclusion in the Jewish Area of the Galilee highlands between Safad and the Plain of Acre. This is the part of Palestine in which the Jews have retained a foothold almost if not entirely without a break from the beginning of the Diaspora to the present day, and the sentiment of all Jewry is deeply attached to the "holy cities" of Safad and Tiberias. Until quite recently, moreover the Jews in Galilee have lived on friendly terms with their Arab neighbours; and throughout the series of disturbances the fellaheen of Galilee have shown themselves less amenable to political incitement than those of Samaria and Judaea where the centres of Arab nationalism are located. At the "mixed" towns of Tiberias, Safad, Haifa, and Acre there have been varying degrees of friction since the "disturbances" of last year. It would greatly promote the successful operation of Partition in its early stages, and in particular help to ensure the execution of the Treaty guarantees for the protection of minorities, if those four towns were kept for a period under Mandatory administration.

(iv) Jaffa is an essentially Arab town and should form part of the Arab State. The question of its communication with the latter presents no difficulty, since transit through the Jaffa-Jerusalem Corridor would be open to all. The Corridor, on the other hand, requires its own access to the sea, and for this purpose a narrow belt of land should be acquired and cleared on the north and south sides of the town.

(v) While the Mediterranean would be accessible to the Arab State at Jaffa and at Gaza, in the interests of Arab trade and industry the Arab State should also have access for commercial
purposes to Haifa, the only existing deep-water port on the coast. The Jewish Treaty should therefore provide for the free transit of goods in bond between the Arab State and Haifa.

The Arab Treaty, similarly, should provide for the free transit of goods in bond over the railway between the Jewish State and the Egyptian frontier.

The same principle applies to the question of access for commercial purposes to the Red Sea. The use of that exit to the East might prove in course of time of great advantage to both Arab and Jewish trade and industry, and, having regard to those possibilities, an enclave on the north-west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba should be retained under Mandatory administration, and the Arab Treaty should provide for the free transit of goods between the Jewish State and this enclave.

The Treaties should provide for similar facilities for the transit of goods between the Mandated Area and Haifa, the frontier and the Gulf of Aqaba.

4. Inter-State Subvention
The Jews contribute more *per capita* to the revenues of Palestine than the Arabs, and the Government has thereby been enabled to maintain public services for the Arabs at a higher level than would otherwise have been possible. Partition would mean, on the one hand, that the Arab Area would no longer profit from the taxable capacity of the Jewish Area. On the other hand, (1) the Jews would acquire a new right of sovereignty in the Jewish Area; (2) that Area, as we have defined it, would be larger than the existing area of Jewish land and settlement; (3) the Jews would be freed from their present liability for helping to promote the welfare of Arabs outside that Area. It is suggested, therefore, that the Jewish State should pay a subvention to the Arab State when Partition comes into effect. There have been recent precedents for equitable financial arrangements of this kind in those connected with the separation of Sind from Bombay and of Burma from the Indian Empire, and in accordance with those precedents a Finance Commission should be appointed to consider and report as to what the amount of the subvention should be.

The Finance Commission should also, consider and report on the proportion in which the Public Debt of Palestine, which now amounts to about £4,500,000, should be divided between the Arab and the Jewish States, and other financial questions. The Commission should also deal with telegraph and telephone systems in the event of Partition.

5. British Subvention
The Inter-State Subvention would adjust the financial balance in Palestine; but the plan involves the inclusion of Trans-Jordan in the Arab State. The taxable capacity of Trans-Jordan is very low and its revenues have never sufficed to meet the cost of its administration. From 1921 to the present day it has received grants-in-aid from the United Kingdom, which have amounted to a total sum of £1,253,000 or an average of about £78,000 a year. Grants have also been made towards the cost of the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force, and loans to the amount of £60,000 have been provided for earthquake-relief and the distribution of seed.

The Mandate for Trans-Jordan ought not to be relinquished without securing, as far as possible, that the standard of administration should not fall too low through lack of funds to maintain it; and in this matter the British people might fairly be asked to do their part in facilitating a settlement. The continuance of the present Mandate would almost inevitably involve a recurrent and increasing charge on the British Treasury. If peace can be promoted by Partition, money
spent on helping to bring it about and making it more effective for its purpose would surely be well spent. And apart from any such considerations the British people would, it is believed, agree to a capital payment in lieu of their present annual liability with a view to honouring their obligations and making peace in Palestine.

In the event of the Treaty system coming into force, Parliament should be asked to make a grant of £2,000,000 to the Arab State.

6. Tariffs and Ports
The Arab and Jewish States, being sovereign independent States, would determine their own tariffs. Subject to the terms of the Mandate, the same would apply to the Mandatory Government.

The tariff-policies of the Arab and Jewish States are likely to conflict, and it would greatly ease the position and promote the interests of both the Arab and Jewish States if they could agree to impose identical customs-duties on as many articles as possible, and if the Mandatory Government, likewise, could assimilate its customs-duties as far as might be with those of one or both of the two States.

It should be an essential part of the proposed Treaty System that a commercial convention should be concluded with a view to establishing a common tariff over the widest possible range of imported articles and to facilitating the freest possible interchange of goods between the three territories concerned.

7. Nationality
All persons domiciled in the Mandated Area (including Haifa, Acre, Tiberias, Safad and the enclave on the Gulf of Aqaba, as long as they remain under Mandatory administration) who now possess the status of British protected persons would retain it; but apart from this all Palestinians would become the nationals of the States in which they are domiciled.

8. Civil Services
it seems probable that, in the event of Partition, the services of the Arab and Jewish officials in the pre-existing Mandatory Administration would to a large extent be required by the Governments of the Arab and Jewish States respectively, whereas the number of British officials would be substantially reduced. The rights of all of them, including rights to pensions or gratuities, must be fully honoured in accordance with Article 28 of the existing Mandate. This matter should be dealt with by the Finance Commission.

9. Industrial Concessions
In the event of Partition agreements entered into by the Government of Palestine for the development and security of industries (e.g., the agreement with the Palestine Potash Company) should be taken over and carried out by the Governments of the Arab and Jewish States. Guarantees to that effect should be given in the Treaties. The security of the Electric Power Station at Jisr el Majami should be similarly guaranteed.
10. Exchange of Land and Population

If Partition is to be effective in promoting a final settlement it must mean more than drawing a frontier and establishing two States. Sooner or later there should be a transfer of land and, as far as possible, an exchange of population.

The Treaties should provide that, if Arab owners of land in the Jewish State or Jewish owners of land in the Arab State should wish to sell their land and any plantations or crops thereon, the Government of the State concerned should be responsible for the purchase of such land, plantations and crops at a price to be fixed, if requires, by the Mandatory Administration. For this purpose a loan should, if required, be guaranteed for a reasonable amount.

The political aspect of the land problem is still more important. Owing to the fact that there has been no census since 1931 it is impossible to calculate with any precision the distribution of population between the Arab and Jewish areas; but, according to an approximate estimate, in the area allocated to the Jewish State (excluding the urban districts to be retained for a period under Mandatory Administration) there are now about 225,000 Arabs. In the area allocated to the Arab State there are only about 1,250 Jews; but there are about 125,000 Jews as against 85,000 Arabs in Jerusalem and Haifa. The existence of these minorities clearly constitutes the most serious hindrance to the smooth and successful operation of Partition. If the settlement is to be clean and final, the question must be boldly faced and firmly dealt with. It calls for the highest statesmanship on the part of all concerned.

A precedent is afforded by the exchange effected between the Greek and Turkish populations on the morrow of the Greco-Turkish War of 1922. A convention was signed by the Greek and Turkish Governments, providing that, under the supervision of the League of Nations, Greek nationals of the Orthodox religion living in Turkey should be compulsorily removed to Greece, and Turkish nationals of the Moslem religion living in Greece to Turkey. The numbers involved were high—no less than some 1,300,000 Greeks and some 400,000 Turks. But so vigorously and effectively was the task accomplished that within about eighteen months from the spring of 1923 the whole exchange was completed. The courage of the Greek and Turkish statesmen concerned has been justified by the result. Before the operation the Greek and Turkish minorities had been a constant irritant. Now Greco-Turkish relations are friendlier than they have ever been before.

In Northern Greece a surplus of cultivable land was available or could rapidly be made available for the settlement of the Greeks evacuated from Turkey. In Palestine there is at present no such surplus. Room exists or could soon be provided within the proposed boundaries of the Jewish State for the Jews now living in the Arab area. It is the far greater number of Arab who constitute the major problem; and, while some of them could be re-settled on the land vacated by the Jews, far more land would be required for the re-settlement of all of them. Such information as is available justifies the hope that the execution of large-scale plans for irrigation, water-storage, and development in Trans-Jordan, Beersheba and the Jordan Valley would make provision for a much larger population than exists there at the present time.

Those areas, therefore, should be surveyed and an estimate made of the practical possibilities of irrigation and development as quickly as possible. If, as a result, it is clear that a substantial amount of land could be made available for the re-settlement of Arabs living in the Jewish area,
the most strenuous efforts should be made to obtain an agreement for the transfer of land and population. In view of the present antagonism between the races and of the manifest advantage to both of them for reducing the opportunities of future friction to the utmost, it is to be hoped that the Arab and the Jewish leaders might show the same high statesmanship as that of the Turks and the Greeks and make the same bold decision for the sake of peace.

The cost of the proposed irrigation and development scheme would be heavier than the Arab State could be expected to bear. Here again the British people it is suggested, would be willing to help to bring about a settlement; and if an arrangement could be made for the transfer, voluntary or otherwise, of land and population, Parliament should be asked to make a grant to meet the cost of the aforesaid scheme.

If it should be agreed to terminate the Mandate and establish a Treaty System on a basis of Partition, there would be a period of transition before the new regime came into force, and during this period the existing Mandate would continue to be the governing instrument of the Palestine Administration. But the recommendations made in Part II of the Report as to what should be done tinder the existing Mandate presupposed its continuance for an indefinite time and would not apply to so changed a situation as the prospect of Partition would bring about.

The following are recommendations for the period of transition:

1. **Land.**--Steps should be taken to prohibit the purchase of land by Jews within the Arab Area (i.e., the area of the projected Arab State) or by Arabs within the Jewish Area (i.e., the area of the projected Jewish State).

   The settlement of the plain-lands of the Jewish Area should be completed within two years.

2. **Immigration.**--Instead of the political "high-level" there should be a territorial restriction on Jewish immigration. No Jewish immigration into the Arab Area should be permitted. Since it would therefore not affect the Arab Area and since the Jewish State would soon become responsible for its results, the volume of Jewish immigration should be determined by the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine less the Arab Area.

3. **Trade.**--Negotiations should be opened without delay to secure the amendment of Article 18 of the Mandate and to place the external trade of Palestine upon a fairer basis.

4. **Advisory Council.**--The Advisory Council should, if possible, be enlarged by the nomination of Arab and Jewish representatives; but, if either party refused to serve, the Council should continue as at present.

5. **Local Government.**--The municipal system should be reformed on expert advice.

6. **Education.**--A vigorous effort should be made to increase the number of Arab schools. The "mixed schools" situated in the area to be administered under the new Mandate should be given every support, and the possibility of a British University should be considered, since those institutions might play an important part after Partition in helping to bring about an ultimate reconciliation of the races.

**Chapter X. - Conclusion**

Considering the attitude which both the Arab and the Jewish representatives adopted in giving evidence, the Commission think it improbable that either party will be satisfied at first sight with the proposals submitted for the adjustment of their rival claims. For Partition means that neither will get all it wants. It means that the Arabs must acquiesce in the exclusion from their
sovereignty of a piece of territory, long occupied and once ruled by them. It means that the Jews must be content with less than the Land of Israel they once ruled and have hoped to rule again. But it seems possible that on reflection both parties will come to realize that the drawbacks of Partition are outweighed by its advantages. For, if it offers neither party all it wants, it offers each what it wants most, namely freedom and security.

The advantages to the Arabs of Partition on the lines we have proposed may be summarized as follows:

(i) They obtain their national independence and can co-operate on an equal footing with the Arabs of the neighbouring countries in the cause of Arab unity and progress.

(ii) They are finally delivered from the fear of being swamped by the Jews, and from the possibility of ultimate subjection to Jewish rule.

(iii) In particular, the final limitation of the Jewish National Home within a fixed frontier and the enactment of a new Mandate for the protection of the Holy Places, solemnly guaranteed by the League of Nations, removes all anxiety lest the Holy Places should ever come under Jewish control.

(iv) As a set-off to the loss of territory the Arabs regard as theirs, the Arab State will receive a subvention from the Jewish State. It will also, in view of the backwardness of Trans-Jordan, obtain a grant of £2,000,000 from the British Treasury; and, if an agreement can be reached as to the exchange of land and population, a further grant will be made for the conversion, as far as may prove possible, of uncultivable land in the Arab State into productive land from which the cultivators and the State alike will profit.

The advantages of Partition to the Jews may be summarized as follows:

(i) Partition secures the establishment of the Jewish National Home and relieves it from the possibility of its being subjected in the future to Arab rule.

(ii) Partition enables the Jews in the fullest sense to call their National Home their own; for it converts it into a Jewish State. Its citizens will be able to admit as many Jews into it as they themselves believe can be absorbed. They will attain the primary objective of Zionism—a Jewish nation, planted in Palestine, giving its nationals the same status in the world as other nations give theirs. They will cease at last to live a minority life.
The White Paper of 1939 is better known as the Macdonald White Paper (after its author) to distinguish it from other White Papers such as by Churchill (1922) and Passfield (1930). Macdonald abandoned the Balfour Declaration and the two-state solution proposed by the Peel Commission and replaced it with a one-state solution under which Palestine would be ruled by Arabs and Jews in proportion to their population. The paper severely limited Jewish immigration and land purchases. Shalev (1991) describes the Macdonald White Paper as a political victory for the Palestinians, although it was overtaken to some extent by World War II four months later.

The 1939 White Paper gave the Arabs almost everything they wanted: 1. A limit to – and eventual termination of – Jewish immigration (although not Arab immigration). 2. Final fulfillment of old promises for self-determination – with a deadline. 3. A ban on Jews’ purchasing land in almost all of Palestine. Even so, the Arabs rejected the plan because it did not end Jewish immigration immediately – causing Jewish leader Abba Eban to quip that the Arabs “never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity” (Morris, 2001, p. 158).

Result: The White Paper alienated the Jews but otherwise had little effect. It stopped neither land purchases nor immigration, although it complicated both. The Arab revolt, which started in 1936 and launched the series of commissions, conferences and White Papers, failed (Morris, 2001, p. 159), and the start of World War II thrust a new set of realities on the parties.

Key passages are shown in bold (emphasis added.)

Text of White Paper of 1939 (the Macdonald White Paper)
Sources: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1939.asp
In the statement on Palestine, issued on 9 November, 1938, His Majesty's Government announced their intention to invite representatives of the Arabs of Palestine, of certain neighboring countries and of the Jewish Agency to confer with them in London regarding future policy. It was their sincere hope that, as a result of full, free and frank discussions, some understanding might be reached. Conferences recently took place with Arab and Jewish delegations, lasting for a period of several weeks, and served the purpose of a complete exchange of views between British Ministers and the Arab and Jewish representatives. In the light of the discussions as well as of the situation in Palestine and of the Reports of the Royal Commission and the Partition Commission, certain proposals were formulated by His Majesty's Government and were laid before the Arab and Jewish Delegations as the basis of an agreed settlement. Neither the Arab nor the Jewish delegation felt able to accept these proposals, and the conferences therefore did not result in an agreement. Accordingly His Majesty's Government are free to formulate their own policy, and after careful consideration they have decided to adhere generally to the proposals which were finally submitted to and discussed with the Arab and Jewish delegations.

The Mandate for Palestine, the terms of which were confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922, has governed the policy of successive British Governments for nearly 20 years. It embodies the Balfour Declaration and imposes on the Mandatory four main obligations. These obligations are set out in Article 2, 6 and 13 of the Mandate. There is no dispute regarding the interpretation of one of these obligations, that touching the protection of and access to the Holy Places and religious building or sites. The other three main obligations are generally as follows:

To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish People. To facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency, close settlement by Jews on the Land.

To safeguard the civil and religious rights of all inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race and religion, and, whilst facilitating Jewish immigration and settlement, to ensure that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced.

To place the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the development of self governing institutions.

The Royal Commission and previous commissions of Enquiry have drawn attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions in the Mandate, such as the expression 'a national home for the Jewish people', and they have found in this ambiguity and the resulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental cause of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews. His Majesty's Government are convinced that in the interests of the peace and well being of the whole people of Palestine a clear definition of policy and objectives is essential. The proposal of partition recommended by the Royal Commission would have afforded such clarity, but the establishment of self supporting independent Arab and Jewish States within Palestine has been found to be impracticable. It has therefore been necessary for His Majesty's Government to devise an alternative policy which will, consistent with their obligations to Arabs and Jews, meet
the needs of the situation in Palestine. Their views and proposals are set forth below under three heads, Section I, "The Constitution", Section II. Immigration and Section III. Land.

**Section I. "The Constitution"**

It has been urged that the expression "a national home for the Jewish people" offered a prospect that Palestine might in due course become a Jewish State or Commonwealth. His Majesty's Government do not wish to contest the view, which was expressed by the Royal Commission, that the Zionist leaders at the time of the issue of the Balfour Declaration recognised that an ultimate Jewish State was not precluded by the terms of the Declaration. But, with the Royal Commission, His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country. That Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish State might be held to be implied in the passage from the Command Paper of 1922 which reads as follows

"Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that `Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated .... the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the (Balfour) Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded IN PALESTINE."

But this statement has not removed doubts, and **His Majesty's Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State.** They would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their will.

The nature of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was further described in the Command Paper of 1922 as follows

"During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community now numbering 80,000, of whom about one fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. **This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact 'national' characteristics.** When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a
centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connection."

His Majesty's Government adhere to this interpretation of the (Balfour) Declaration of 1917 and regard it as an authoritative and comprehensive description of the character of the Jewish National Home in Palestine. It envisaged the further development of the existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world. Evidence that His Majesty's Government have been carrying out their obligation in this respect is to be found in the facts that, since the statement of 1922 was published, more than 300,000 Jews have immigrated to Palestine, and that the population of the National Home has risen to some 450,000, or approaching a third of the entire population of the country. Nor has the Jewish community failed to take full advantage of the opportunities given to it. The growth of the Jewish National Home and its achievements in many fields are a remarkable constructive effort which must command the admiration of the world and must be, in particular, a source of pride to the Jewish people.

In the recent discussions the Arab delegations have repeated the contention that Palestine was included within the area in which Sir Henry McMahon, on behalf of the British Government, in October, 1915, undertook to recognise and support Arab independence. The validity of this claim, based on the terms of the correspondence which passed between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca, was thoroughly and carefully investigated by the British and Arab representatives during the recent conferences in London. Their report, which has been published, states that both the Arab and the British representatives endeavoured to understand the point of view of the other party but that they were unable to reach agreement upon an interpretation of the correspondence. There is no need to summarize here the arguments presented by each side. His Majesty's Government regret the misunderstandings which have arisen as regards some of the phrases used. For their part they can only adhere, for the reasons given by their representatives in the Report, to the view that the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was excluded from Sir Henry McMahon's pledge, and they therefore cannot agree that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State.

His Majesty's Government are charged as the Mandatory authority "to secure the development of self governing institutions" in Palestine. Apart from this specific obligation, they would regard it as contrary to the whole spirit of the Mandate system that the population of Palestine should remain forever under Mandatory tutelage. It is proper that the people of the country should as early as possible enjoy the rights of self-government which are exercised by the people of neighbouring countries. His Majesty's Government are unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which government in Palestine will eventually take, but their objective is self-government, and they desire to see established ultimately an independent Palestine State. It should be a State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are shared.
The establishment of an independent State and the complete relinquishment of Mandatory control in Palestine would require such relations between the Arabs and the Jews as would make good government possible. Moreover, the growth of self governing institutions in Palestine, as in other countries, must be an evolutionary process. A transitional period will be required before independence is achieved, throughout which ultimate responsibility for the Government of the country will be retained by His Majesty's Government as the Mandatory authority, while the people of the country are taking an increasing share in the Government, and understanding and cooperation amongst them are growing. It will be the constant endeavour of His Majesty's Government to promote good relations between the Arabs and the Jews.

In the light of these considerations His Majesty's Government make the following declaration of their intentions regarding the future government of Palestine:

The objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within 10 years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future. The proposal for the establishment of the independent State would involve consultation with the Council of the League of Nations with a view to the termination of the Mandate.

The independent State should be one in which Arabs and Jews share government in such a way as to ensure that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded.

The establishment of the independent State will be preceded by a transitional period throughout which His Majesty's Government will retain responsibility for the country. During the transitional period the people of Palestine will be given an increasing part in the government of their country. Both sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate in the machinery of government, and the process will be carried on whether or not they both avail themselves of it.

As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently restored in Palestine steps will be taken to carry out this policy of giving the people of Palestine an increasing part in the government of their country, the objective being to place Palestinians in charge of all the Departments of Government, with the assistance of British advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited to serve as heads of Departments approximately in proportion to their respective populations. The number of Palestinians in charge of Departments will be increased as circumstances permit until all heads of Departments are Palestinians, exercising the administrative and advisory functions which are presently performed by British officials. When that stage is reached consideration will be given to the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers with a consequential change in the status and functions of the Palestinian heads of Departments.

His Majesty's Government make no proposals at this stage regarding the establishment of an elective legislature. Nevertheless they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional development, and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself in favour of such a development, they will be prepared, provided that local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery.
At the end of five years from the restoration of peace and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of Palestine and of His Majesty's Government will be set up to review the working of the constitutional arrangements during the transitional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding the constitution of independent Palestine State.

His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that in the treaty contemplated by sub-paragraph (6) adequate provision has been made for:

**the security of, and freedom of access to the Holy Places**, and protection of the interests and property of the various religious bodies.

the protection of the different communities in Palestine in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty's Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home.

such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty's Government in the light of the circumstances then existing. His Majesty's Government will also require to be satisfied that the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preservation of which they are at present responsible, are adequately safeguarded.

His Majesty's Government will do everything in their power to create conditions which will enable the independent Palestine State to come into being within 10 years. If, at the end of 10 years, it appears to His Majesty's Government that, contrary to their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the establishment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and the neighbouring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement. If His Majesty's Government come to the conclusion that postponement is unavoidable, they will invite the co-operation of these parties in framing plans for the future with a view to achieving the desired objective at the earliest possible date.

During the transitional period steps will be taken to increase the powers and responsibilities of municipal corporations and local councils.

**Section II. Immigration**

Under Article 6 of the Mandate, the Administration of Palestine, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," is required to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions." Beyond this, the extent to which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to be permitted is nowhere defined in the Mandate. But in the Command Paper of 1922 [the Churchill White Paper] it was laid down that for the fulfilment of the policy of establishing a Jewish National Home:

"it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment."
In practice, from that date onwards until recent times, the economic absorptive capacity of the country has been treated as the sole limiting factor, and in the letter which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, sent to Dr. Weizmann in February 1931 it was laid down as a matter of policy that economic absorptive capacity was the sole criterion. This interpretation has been supported by resolutions of the Permanent Mandates Commissioner. But His Majesty's Government do not read either the Statement of Policy of 1922 or the letter of 1931 as implying that the Mandate requires them, for all time and in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the country's economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in the Mandate or in subsequent Statements of Policy to support the view that the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely. **If immigration has an adverse effect on the economic position in the country, it should clearly be restricted; and equally, if it has a seriously damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a factor that should not be ignored.** Although it is not difficult to contend that the large number of Jewish immigrants who have been admitted so far have been absorbed economically, the fear of the Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the Jewish population is in a position to dominate them has produced consequences which are extremely grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the peace and prosperity of Palestine. The lamentable disturbances of the past three years are only the latest and most sustained manifestation of this intense Arab apprehension. The methods employed by Arab terrorists against fellow Arabs and Jews alike must receive unqualified condemnation. But it cannot be denied that fear of indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread amongst the Arab population and that this fear has made possible disturbances which have given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the Palestine exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplorable between citizens of the same country. If in these circumstances immigration is continued up to the economic absorptive capacity of the country, regardless of all other considerations, a fatal enmity between the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in Palestine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples in the Near and Middle East. His Majesty's Government cannot take the view that either their obligations under the Mandate, or considerations of common sense and justice, require that they should ignore these circumstances in framing immigration policy.

In the view of the Royal Commission the association of the policy of the Balfour Declaration with the mandate system implied the belief that Arab hostility to the former would sooner or later be overcome. It has been the hope of British Governments ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that in time the Arab population, recognizing the advantages to be derived from Jewish settlement and development in Palestine, would become reconciled to the further growth of the Jewish National Home. This hope has not been fulfilled. The alternatives before His Majesty's Government are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish National Home indefinitely by immigration, against the strongly expressed will of the Arab people of the country; or (ii) to permit further expansion of the Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arabs are prepared to acquiesce in it. The former policy means rule by force. Apart from other considerations, such a policy seems to His Majesty's Government to be contrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their specific obligations to the Arabs in the Palestine Mandate. Moreover, the relations between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine must be based sooner or later on mutual tolerance and
goodwill; the peace, security and progress of the Jewish National Home itself requires this. Therefore His Majesty's Government, after earnest consideration, and taking into account the extent to which the growth of the Jewish National Home has been facilitated over the last twenty years, have decided that the time has come to adopt in principle the second of the alternatives referred to above.

It has been urged that all further Jewish immigration into Palestine should be stopped forthwith. His Majesty's Government cannot accept such a proposal. It would damage the whole of the financial and economic system of Palestine and thus effect adversely the interests of Arabs and Jews alike. Moreover, in the view of His Majesty's Government, abruptly to stop further immigration would be unjust to the Jewish National Home. But, above all, His Majesty's Government are conscious of the present unhappy plight of large numbers of Jews who seek refuge from certain European countries, and they believe that Palestine can and should make a further contribution to the solution of this pressing world problem. In all these circumstances, they believe that they will be acting consistently with their Mandatory obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and in the manner best calculated to serve the interests of the whole people of Palestine, by adopting the following proposals regarding immigration:

Jewish immigration during the next five years will be at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring the Jewish population up to approximately one third of the total population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would, subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted as follows:

For each of the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed on the understanding that a shortage one year may be added to the quotas for subsequent years, within the five year period, if economic absorptive capacity permits.

In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that adequate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special consideration being given to refugee children and dependents.

The existing machinery for ascertaining economic absorptive capacity will be retained, and the High Commissioner will have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab representatives will be consulted.

After the period of five years, no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it.

His Majesty's Government are determined to check illegal immigration, and further preventive measures are being adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite
these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.

His Majesty's Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over five years which is now contemplated has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population.

Section III. Land

The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article 6 of the Mandate, "while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced," to encourage "close settlement by Jews on the land," and no restriction has been imposed hitherto on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews. The Reports of several expert Commissions have indicted that, owing to the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no room for further transfers of Arab land, whilst in some other areas such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances, the High Commissioner will be given general powers to prohibit and regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the publication of this statement of policy and the High Commissioner will retain them throughout the transitional period.

The policy of the Government will be directed towards the development of the land and the improvement, where possible, of methods of cultivation. In the light of such development it will be open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the "rights and position" of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or restriction of the transfer of land.

In framing these proposals His Majesty's Government have sincerely endeavoured to act in strict accordance with their obligations under the Mandate to both the Arabs and the Jews. The vagueness of the phrases employed in some instances to describe these obligations has led to controversy and has made the task of interpretation difficult. His Majesty's Government cannot hope to satisfy the partisans of one party or the other in such controversy as the Mandate has aroused. Their purpose is to be just as between the two people in Palestine whose destinies in that country have been affected by the great events of recent years, and who, since they live side by side, must learn to practice mutual tolerance, goodwill and co operation. In looking to the future, His Majesty's Government are not blind to the fact that some events of the past make the task of creating these relations difficult; but they are encouraged by the knowledge that as many times and in many places in Palestine during recent years the Arab and Jewish inhabitants have lived in friendship together. Each community has much to contribute to the welfare of their common land, and each must earnestly desire peace in which to assist in increasing the well being of the whole people of the country. The responsibility which falls on them, no less than upon His Majesty's Government, to co-operate together to ensure peace is all the more solemn because their country is revered by many millions of Moslems, Jews and Christians throughout the world who pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people.
Appendix C, Annex 16 -- Bernadotte Peace Proposals
16 September 1948

Swedish diplomat Folke Bernadotte was famous for rescuing thousands of Jews from Nazi concentration camps during World War II. The United Nations chose him to mediate the first Arab-Israeli war – Israel’s war of independence -- which was in full swing during the summer of 1948. Bernadotte proposed two independent states, permission for refugees to return to their original homes and U.N. administration of Jerusalem – all of which were violently opposed by radical Israelis. The League of Arab States didn’t like it any better, steadfastly opposing the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

Result: Bernadotte was murdered Sept. 17 by members of the Lehi, a militant Zionist group also known as the Stern Gang. The Arab states and the new Israeli government rejected his suggestions, and his proposals were defeated in the United Nations.

The assassination was not the new state’s proudest achievement. One of the Lehi leaders who plotted the assassination was a future prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir.

Bernadotte’s previous proposals, which had called for a unitary state, were not accepted and have been suppressed. The complete text of his second proposals, submitted the day before his assassination, is too lengthy to reproduce here but it is available online at http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/AB14D4AAFC4E1BB985256204004F55FA. A map showing the boundaries he proposed for the two states is reproduced in Appendix H, Annex 6.

The text reproduced here shows Bernadotte’s premises and conclusions. Some of them were remarkably durable in subsequent peace plans.

Extract of Text of Bernadotte Peace Proposals

Seven basic premises:
The following seven basic premises form the basis for my conclusions:
1. Peace must return to Palestine and every feasible measure should be taken to ensure that hostilities will not be resumed and that harmonious relations between Arab and Jew will ultimately be restored.

2. A Jewish State called Israel exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming that it will not continue to do so.

3. The boundaries of this new State must finally be fixed either by formal agreement between the parties concerned or failing that, by the United Nations.

4. Adherence to the principle of geographical homogeneity and integration, which should be the major objective of the boundary arrangements, should apply equally to Arab and Jewish territories, whose frontiers should not therefore, be rigidly controlled by the territorial arrangements envisaged in the resolution of 29 November.

5. The right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes, should be affirmed and made effective, with assurance of adequate compensation for the property of those who may choose not to return.

6. The City of Jerusalem, because of its religious and international significance and the complexity of interests involved, should be accorded special and separate treatment.

7. International responsibility should be expressed where desirable and necessary in the form of international guarantees, as a means of allaying existing fears, and particularly with regard to boundaries and human rights.

Specific conclusions:
The following conclusions broadly outlined, would, in my view, considering all the circumstances, provide a reasonable, equitable and workable basis for settlement: …

1. The existing indefinite truce should be superseded by a formal peace, or at the minimum, armistice, …

2. The frontiers between the Arab and Jewish territories, in the absence of agreement between Arabs and Jews, should be established by the United Nations. …

3. The Negev … should be defined as Arab territory.

4. The frontier should run from Faluja north northeast to Ramleh and Lydda (both of which places would be in Arab territory) …

5. Galilee should be defined as Jewish territory. …

6. Haifa … should be declared a free port, …[and] the airport of Lydda should be declared a free airport …

7. The City of Jerusalem, which should be understood as covering the area defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November, should be treated separately and should be placed under effective United Nations control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and sites and free access to them and for religious freedom. …

8. The United Nations should establish a Palestine conciliation commission.

9. The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations conciliation commission …
Appendix C, Annex 17 -- Palestinian National Charter
1964, Amended in 1968

This is a translation of the official charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization, as enacted in 1964, amended in 1968 and published in Hadawi (1989), Appendix C, p. 310-312. It also is called the PLO Covenant.

Result: Israel contends that 30 of the 33 articles explicitly or implicitly deny Israel’s right to exist. The Palestine National Council in 1996 announced it had canceled the articles calling for the elimination of Israel. Other letters and statements also have been published or proclaimed renouncing these articles, but it is not known whether the articles have been formally revised or deleted, and no new charter has been published.

The most inflammatory statements are flagged in bold (emphasis added). The action is in Article 15, which calls for Arabs to “liquidate the Zionist presence in Palestine.” The term “Zionist presence” means the state of Israel. Note also Articles 9 (“liberate”) and 22 (“racialist”). Compare this document to the Palestine Declaration of Independence of 1988.

Text of the Palestinian National Charter

Sources:
Avalon Project at Yale Law School
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/plocov.htm
http://www.netaxs.com/~iris/plochart.htm

1. This Charter shall be known as "the Palestine National Charter." Articles of the Charter:

   Article 1. Palestine, the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people, is an inseparable part of the greater Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are a part of the Arab Nation.

   Article 2. Palestine, within the frontiers that existed under the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.
Article 3. The Palestinian Arab people alone have legitimate rights to their homeland, and shall exercise the right of self-determination after the liberation of their homeland, in keeping with their wishes and entirely of their own accord.

Article 4. The Palestinian identity is an authentic, intrinsic and indissoluble quality that is transmitted from father to son. Neither the Zionist occupation nor the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people as a result of the afflictions they have suffered can efface this Palestinian identity.

Article 5. Palestinians are Arab citizens who were normally resident in Palestine until 1947. This includes both those who were forced to leave or who stayed in Palestine. Anyone born to a Palestinian father after that date, whether inside or outside Palestine, is a Palestinian.

Article 6. Jews who were normally resident in Palestine up to the beginning of the Zionist invasion are Palestinians.

Article 7. Palestinian identity, and material, spiritual and historical links with Palestine are immutable realities. It is a national obligation to provide every Palestinian with a revolutionary Arab upbringing, and to instil in him a profound spiritual and material familiarity with his homeland and a readiness both for armed struggle and for the sacrifice of his material possessions and his life, for the recovery of his homeland. All available educational means and means of guidance must be enlisted to that end, until liberation is achieved.

Article 8. The Palestinian people is at the stage of national struggle for the liberation of its homeland. For that reason, differences between Palestinian national forces must give way to the fundamental difference that exists between Zionism and imperialism on the one hand and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On that basis, the Palestinian masses, both as organizations and as individuals, whether in the homeland or in such places as they now live as refugees, constitute a single national front working for the recovery and liberation of Palestine through armed struggle.

Article 9. Armed struggle is the only way of liberating Palestine, and is thus strategic, not tactical. The Palestinian Arab people hereby affirm their unwavering determination to carry on the armed struggle and to press on toward popular revolution for the liberation of and return to their homeland. They also affirm their right to a normal life in their homeland, to the exercise of their right of self-determination therein and to sovereignty over it.

Article 10. Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular war of liberation. This requires that commando action should be escalated, expanded and protected and that all the resources of the Palestinian masses and all scientific potentials available to them should be mobilized and organized to play their part in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires solidarity in national struggle among the different groups within the Palestinian people and between that people and the Arab masses, to ensure the continuity of the escalation and victory of the revolution.

Article 11. Palestinians shall have three slogans: national unity, national mobilization and liberation.
Article 12. The Palestinian Arab-people believe in Arab unity. To fulfil their role in the achievement of that objective, they must, at the present stage in their national struggle, retain their Palestinian identity and all that it involves, work for increased awareness of it and oppose all measures liable to weaken or dissolve it.

Article 13. Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are complementary objectives; each leads to the achievement of the other. Arab unity will lead to the liberation of Palestine, and the liberation of Palestine will lead to Arab unity. To work for one is to work for both.

Article 14. The destiny of the Arab nation, indeed the continued existence of the Arabs, depends on the fate of the Palestinian cause. This interrelationship is the point of departure of the Arab endeavour to liberate Palestine. The Palestinian people are the vanguard of the movement to achieve this sacred national objective.

Article 15. The liberation of Palestine is a national obligation for the Arabs. It is their duty to repel the Zionist and imperialist invasion of the greater Arab homeland and to liquidate the Zionist presence in Palestine. The full responsibility for this belongs to the peoples and governments of the Arab nation and to the Palestinian people first and foremost. For this reason, the task of the Arab nation is to enlist all the military, human, moral and material resources at its command to play an effective part, along with the Palestinian people, in the liberation of Palestine. Moreover, it is the task of the Arab nation, particularly at the present stage of the Palestinian armed revolution, to offer the Palestinian people all possible aid, material and manpower support, and to place at their disposal all the means and opportunities that will enable them to continue to perform their role as the vanguard of their armed revolution until the liberation of their homeland is achieved.

Article 16. On the spiritual place, the liberation of Palestine will establish in the Holy Land an atmosphere of peace and tranquility in which all religious institutions will be safeguarded and freedom of worship and the right of visit guaranteed to all without discrimination or distinction of race, color, language or creed. For this reason, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the world for support.

Article 17. On the human plane, the liberation of Palestine will restore to the Palestinians their dignity, integrity and freedom. For this reason, the Palestinian Arab people look to all those who believe in the dignity and freedom of man for support.

Article 18. On the international plane, the liberation of Palestine is a defensive measure dictated by the requirements of self-defence. This is why the Palestinian people, who seek to win the friendship of all peoples, look for the support of all freedom, justice and peace-loving countries in restoring the legitimate state of affairs in Palestine, establishing security and peace in it and enabling its people to exercise national sovereignty and freedom.

Article 19. The partition of Palestine, which took place in 1947, and the establishment of Israel, are fundamentally invalid, however long they last, for they contravene the will of the people of Palestine and their natural right to their homeland and
contradict the principles of the United Nations Charter, foremost among which is the right of self-determination.

Article 20. The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate Instrument, and all their consequences, are hereby declared null and void. The claim of historical or spiritual links between the Jews and Palestine is neither in conformity with historical fact nor does it satisfy the requirements for statehood. Judaism is a revealed religion; it is not a separate nationality, nor are the Jews a single people with a separate identity; they are citizens of their respective countries.

Article 21. The Palestinian Arab people, expressing themselves through the Palestinian armed revolution, reject all alternatives to the total liberation of Palestine. They also reject all proposals for the liquidation or internationalization of the Palestine problem.

Article 22. Zionism is a political movement that is organically linked with world imperialism and is opposed to all liberation movements or movements for progress in the world. The Zionist movement is essentially fanatical and racialist; its objectives involve aggression, expansion and the establishment of colonial settlements, and its methods are those of the Fascists and the Nazis. Israel acts as cat's paw for the Zionist movement, a geographic and manpower base for world imperialism and a springboard for its thrust into the Arab homeland to frustrate the aspirations of the Arab nation to liberation, unity and progress. Israel is a constant threat to peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Inasmuch as the liberation of Palestine will eliminate the Zionist and imperialist presence in that country and bring peace to the Middle East, the Palestinian people look for support to all liberals and to all forces of good, peace and progress in the world, and call on them, whatever their political convictions, for all possible aid and support in their just and legitimate struggle to liberate their homeland.

Article 23. The demands of peace and security and the exigencies of right and justice require that all nations should regard Zionism as an illegal movement and outlaw it and its activities, out of consideration for the ties of friendship between peoples and for the loyalty of citizens to their homelands.

Article 24. The Palestinian Arab people believe in justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity and the right of peoples to enjoy them.

Article 25. In pursuance of the objectives set out in this charter, the Palestine Liberation Organization shall perform its proper role in the liberation of Palestine to the full.

Article 26. The Palestine Liberation Organization, as the representative of the forces of the Palestinian revolution, is responsible for the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people to regain, its homeland, liberate it, return to it and exercise the right of self-determination in it. This responsibility extends to all military, political and financial matters, and all else that the Palestinian issue requires in the Arab and international spheres.

Article 28. The Palestinian Arab people hereby affirm the authenticity and independence of their national revolution and reject all forms of interference, tutelage or dependency.
Article 29. The Palestinian Arab people have the legitimate and prior right to liberate and recover their homeland, and shall define their attitude to all countries and forces in accordance with the attitude adopted by such countries and forces to the cause of the Palestinian people and with the extent of their support for that people in their revolution to achieve their objectives.

Article 30. Those who fight or bear arms in the battle of liberation form the nucleus of the popular army which will shield the achievements of the Palestinian Arab people.

Article 31. The Organization shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance and an anthem, to be decided in accordance with appropriate regulations.

Article 32. Regulations, to be known as Basic Regulations for the Palestine Liberation Organization, shall be appended to this Charter. These regulations shall define the structure of the Organization, its bodies and institutions, and the powers, duties and obligations of each of them, in accordance with this Charter.

Article 33. This Charter may only be amended with a majority of two thirds of the total number of members of the National Assembly of the Palestine Liberation Organization at a special meeting called for that purpose.
Appendix C, Annex 18 -- Fatah Constitution
(1964?)

Fatah, the dominant political party in the Palestine Liberation Organization, controls the West Bank. The party was founded by the late Yasser Arafat. The Fatah constitution calls for the destruction of Israel, the eradication of Zionism and a single, secular state that Arabs would head.

Result: Afif Safieh, a Fatah member and head of the PLO mission in the United States, dismissed the document as obsolete, since the Palestinian National Council in 1988 accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which endorsed a two-state solution (Guttman, 2007). Nevertheless, see also the Phased Plan (1974, Annex 20) in this appendix. It suggests that any move toward accommodation with Israel is only a temporary tactic.

The creation date, 1964, was proposed and challenged by Fata (http://www.mideastweb.org/fateh.htm), but it does not propose an alternative. 1964 would put the creation of the constitution at a time when Jordan controlled the West Bank and Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip – i.e., three years before Israel seized the two territories during the 1967 war. A likely date would be 1965, which usually is given as the date of the founding of Fatah.
The translation here appeared on Fatah’s English language Web site until 2007, when the site was closed (Hollander, 2007). The Fatah Web site at http://www.fateh.ps/ is in Arabic.

Text of the Fatah Constitution

Source: http://www.middleeastfacts.com/middle-east/the-fatah-constitution.php

Dear brother, comrade of the struggle:
This movement is a patriotic and historical responsibility which we all must shoulder honestly... And let's inspire all those who are faithful to Palestine with this concerted, patriotic deed... We all must confront critical times, and tolerate mishaps patiently... We all must sacrifice ourselves, our effort and time; these are the weapons of honest patriots.

Don't, therefore, dear brother bring your march to a halt!
Proceed in your march, armed with the patriots' resolution, the true believers' determination, and the fighters' patience... Our people are in need of every second after our case has taken that long... Let's not forget for a while that our enemy is strong, and that the fight is fierceful and long... Consequently, determination, patience, confidentiality, commitment, and abiding by the revolution's goals and principles keep our march unremittingly steady and makes our road to victory much shorter.

Proceed, then my brother, forward... to the revolution.
Long live Palestine, a free Arab state.

Introduction to the Constitution

The significance of this constitution stems from its being an application of the principles of our struggle, the pedestal of the Movement. It is also an expression of the Movement's conception of its relationships with other movements and organisations, as it is the disciplinary framework which dictates and organises the relationships among its members in a way that maintains its path and the revolution's future.

This constitution revolves around the following principles:

1. The armed revolution we are waging has been set into orbit by the principle that it is a public revolution, and not one of a distinguished class, and that the public is capable of practising struggle efficiently and conscientiously. The public is also the true protector of the revolutionary organisation. This organisation has satisfied the intimate relationship between the revolution and the public via the hierarchical structure of the Movement in which the public constitutes its solid, wide base.

With this view of the public's role in mind, the role of the organised base in the Movement is crystallised. The Movement is in close contact with the public, sharing their cares and worries and inspired by their aspirations. The public is, therefore, the sole source of authorities and the sole, honest guardian of the Movement. It is also the only party authorised to take decisive
decisions, and to elect the leadership at all levels. This takes place through direct election at varying levels due to maintaining secrecy, and because of the state of geographical dispersion suffered by our Palestinian people.

2. The elected leadership assumes its responsibilities on the basis of the democratic centrality principle which warrants commitment of the lower ranks to the higher ranks' decisions. The leadership is, in turn, held accountable to its conferences and councils. Higher leaderships assume a pivotal responsibility which embodies the utter unity of the organisation in different districts and institutions.

3. The Movement encourages freedom of expression and criticism within the disciplinary frameworks. This is a sacred right for all members, and no authority can deny them it. Any view or criticism within the disciplinary principles should not be taken as an indictment against a member afterwards. Free expression is the only guarantee to prevent the leaderships from committing mistakes or going astray, and it is the only effective method to convey the public opinion via the different bases to the Movement's leaderships.

4. The Movement firmly believes in self-criticism by all members in general and by those in authority in particular. This is important in order to attain the goal of free criticism and expression, to put an end to continual erring, and to spell out readiness to benefit from public and self-criticism. By so doing, the Movement's experience will be very much developed and its path will be made much clearer.

5. In its determination on liberation and bringing about historical social changes, the Movement attempts to launch the revolutionary moral values which are on a bar with our struggle, and to create the feeling of human dignity. To this effect, the Movement tries to liberate the individual from all social ills, especially the discrimination women face, the thing that hinders their potentials and effective contributions at all disciplinary levels. This entails that the relationships among members be objective and based on the Movement's principles and constitutions. Relationships based on personal interests have no place whatsoever. The Movement, consequently, treats all members on equal footing as far as their essential obligations are concerned, and it offers equal opportunity to all faithful and active members to occupy leading positions. And while it is keen on maintaining its path, it is keen as well to get an utmost benefit from its experiences to enrich its ideology and develop its infrastructure.

6. Through its struggle, the Movement endeavours to mobilise the public in order to gain the necessary support. This task should be handled by its members. It, therefore, spares no effort to make its members set examples for others to attract the public and consolidate their faith in and loyalty to the revolutionary organisation. As a result, the member has to lead a revolutionary and exemplary life which is based on loyalty, discipline, credibility, modesty, self-denial and altruism. At the same time, he must demonstrate the highest degree of pride, rejection of reality and conformity to the Movement's principles.

The Essential Principles of the Constitution

1. "FATEH" is a national, revolutionary movement and its membership is top confidential.
2. The Revolution is for all the people who actively participate in it, and the Movement is its leading revolutionary organisation, and hence it is the organisational force and its sole proprietor which has the right to direct its orientation.

3. The Movement constitutes one unified body which has one leadership. The rights, obligations and responsibilities are equally distributed among its members according to the Movement's principles and laws.

4. Collective leadership is the sole method of the Movement. This implies the following:

a. Democracy is the basis of discussion, investigation and decision-taking at all organisational levels.

b. Democratic centrality is the basis of handling responsibilities, and this involves concerted work, thinking and political participation in the Movement.

c. Criticism and self-criticism are the basis of rectification, and punishment is not an end in itself but a means for assessment and development.

d. The minority must conform to the majority's view, and those in lower ranks have to abide by the decisions of those in higher ranks in order to achieve discipline and unified organisation which should have a unified vision, ideology and practice.

e. The Movement firmly believes in sacred membership and freedom of the individual, and rejects vengeance, as it firmly believes in the right of any citizen to participate in the Revolution and totally rejects nullifying this right unless it can be a hazard that threatens the Movement's process and security.

CHAPTER ONE
Principles... Goals.... Methods
The Movement's Essential Principles

Article (1) Palestine is part of the Arab World, and the Palestinian people are part of the Arab Nation, and their struggle is part of its struggle.

Article (2) The Palestinian people have an independent identity. They are the sole authority that decides their own destiny, and they have complete sovereignty on all their lands.

Article (3) The Palestinian Revolution plays a leading role in liberating Palestine.

Article (4) The Palestinian struggle is part and parcel of the world-wide struggle against Zionism, colonialism and international imperialism.

Article (5) Liberating Palestine is a national obligation which necessities the materialistic and human support of the Arab Nation.
Article (6) UN projects, accords and reso [c.q.], or those of any individual cowhich [c.q.] undermine the Palestinian people's right in their homeland are illegal and rejected.

Article (7) The Zionist Movement is racial, colonial and aggressive in ideology, goals, organisation and method.

Article (8) The Israeli existence in Palestine is a Zionist invasion with a colonial expansive base, and it is a natural ally to colonialism and international imperialism.

Article (9) Liberating Palestine and protecting its holy places is an Arab, religious and human obligation.

Article (10) Palestinian National Liberation Movement, "FATEH", is an independent national revolutionary movement representing the revolutionary vanguard of the Palestinian people.

Article (11) The crowds which participate in the revolution and liberation are the proprietors of the Palestinian land.

**Goals**

Article (12) Complete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence.

Article (13) Establishing an independent democratic state with complete sovereignty on all Palestinian lands, and Jerusalem is its capital city, and protecting the citizens' legal and equal rights without any racial or religious discrimination.

Article (14) Setting up a progressive society that warrants people's rights and their public freedom.

Article (15) Active participation in achieving the Arab Nation's goals in liberation and building an independent, progressive and united Arab society.

Article (16) Backing up all oppressed people in their struggle for liberation and self-determination in order to build a just, international peace.

**Method**

Article (17) Armed public revolution is the inevitable method to liberating Palestine.

Article (18) Entire dependence on the Palestinian people which is the pedestal forefront and on the Arab Nation as a partner in the fight, and realising actual interaction between the Arab Nation and the Palestinian people by involving the Arab people in the fight through a united Arab front.

**Article (19) Armed struggle is a strategy and not a tactic, and the Palestinian Arab People's armed revolution is a decisive factor in the liberation fight and in uprooting the Zionist**
existence, and this struggle will not cease unless the Zionist state is demolished and Palestine is completely liberated.

Article (20) Achieving mutual understanding with all the national forces participating in the armed struggle to attain the national unity.

Article (21) Revealing the revolutionary nature of the Palestinian identity at the international level, and this does not contradict the everlasting unity between the Arab Nation and the Palestinian people.

**Article (22) Opposing any political solution offered as an alternative to demolishing the Zionist occupation in Palestine, as well as any project intended to liquidate the Palestinian case or impose any international mandate on its people.**

Article (23) Maintaining relations with Arab countries with the objective of developing the positive aspects in their attitudes with the proviso that the armed struggle is not negatively affected.

Article (24) Maintaining relations with all liberal forces supporting our just struggle in order to resist together Zionism and imperialism.

**Article (25) Convincing concerned countries in the world to prevent Jewish immigration to Palestine as a method of solving the problem.**

Article (26) Avoiding attempts to exploit the Palestinian case in any Arab or international problems and considering the case above all contentions.

Article (27) "FATEH" does not interfere with local Arab affairs and hence, does not tolerate such interference or obstructing its struggle by any party.

## CHAPTER TWO

**Organisational Rules and Principles**

Commitment ... Discipline ... Centrality... Democracy...

Public and Self-Criticism

In its organisational work, the Movement depends on the following rules and principles:

First: Commitment. This means:
Article (28)

Second: Discipline. This means:
Article (29)

Third: Central Democracy: This means
Article (30)
a. Central planning, leadership and surveillance, but not central execution, freedom of discussion and the right of participating in making decisions and recommendations within the organisational frameworks.

b. Realising democratic centrality by adopting the following organisational methods:
   1. Electing leaderships through the conferences outlined in article: 42, items: d and e; article: 52; article: 65, item: e; article: 83, item: d,
   2. Practising collective leadership,
   3. Adherence of the minority to the majority's view,
   4. Adherence of lower-ranking members to the higher-ranking members' decisions,
   5. Freedom of discussion and right of participation within the organisational frameworks,
   6. Submitting reports to the electors about the leaderships' activities at every session, and
   7. Periodic reporting to higher units about all the activities carried out by lower units.

Fourth: Public and Self-Criticism:

Article (31) This is one of the cornerstones according to which the revolutionary practices are evaluated in order to emphasise their positive results and circumvent their negative effects. This equally warrants the Movement's faultless process and the practice of public and self-criticism by all members and leaderships within the organisational frameworks.

Fifth: Organisational rules and principles are realised by the following methods:

Article (32) 1. When convened, the Movement's conferences (General Conference, District Conference, Region Conference) are the highest leading authority, each according to its speciality and jurisdictions outlined in the constitution. And they have the sole authority to elect the leading committees, plan their activities, and observe and question their practices.
   2. Practising collective leadership via the committees' work, for each committee from top to bottom has to undertake its tasks on the basis of its being a complementary unit collaborating with other units in assuming its responsibilities, and that all issues must be rationally discussed through the committees and units and that all decisions must be taken in light of the legal majority.
   3. The leaderships should conform to the conferences and the lower ranks to the higher ranks.
   4. Achieving equality among members by their adherence to the Movement's essential constitution, regulations and decisions, and considering competence, faithfulness and sacrifice as the criteria for judging members and climbing the organisational ladder.

CHAPTER THREE
Membership

Articles 33-36

Rights of Membership

Article (37) The Movement's member has the following rights:
   a-c.
   d. To have complete freedom of criticism, objection, protest, discussion, negotiation and inquiry only within the organisational sessions,
e. To criticise and cross-question any leading member within the organisational hierarchy.

f-j.

Obligations of Membership

Article (38) The Movement's member has to undertake the following obligations:

a-h.

i. Practising public and self-criticism, and playing an active role in the organisational sessions and in the public and organisational work,

j-p

Articles 39-73.

CHAPTER FOUR

Areas

Articles 93-104

CHAPTER FIVE

The Movement Leading Organisations

Articles 74-92

CHAPTER SIX

The Movement Base Organisations

Articles 105-108

CHAPTER SEVEN

Penalties

Article (109) The organisational penalties aim at:

a. Upgrading the members' morals, and

b. Securing the Movement's integrity and getting rid of corruption.

Article (110) The organisational penalties are:

a-g.

Article (111) The organisational violations are four types:

First: Firing or firing with slander and this applies to:

1-3

Second: Freezing or demoting rank, and this applies to:

1. Violating commitment, and this is realised by:
   a. Violating the Movement political line,
   b. Violating the Movement political program, and
   c. Reluctance to adhere to the Movement's decisions.

2. Violating the membership protection rule,

3. Violating the members' equality rule,

4. Violating the freedom of expression rule, and

5. Violating discipline, and this is applicable to:
   a. Violating the constitution,
b. Disrespect of leading authorities' decisions,
c. Rejection of orders execution,
d. Discussing organisational issues outside the units,
e. Disrespect of hierarchy, and
f. Offending the public.

[6 is missing from the version posted on the Web site.]

7-10

Third: Rebuke or warning, and this applies to:
1. Ceasing to participate in organisational activities without an acceptable excuse for at most two regular meetings and this period extends for one month, and
2. Refusal to practice self-criticism when deemed necessary by the respective unit.

Fourth: Drawing attention or Rebuke, and this applies to:
1-3

Articles 112 to 120.

CHAPTER EIGHT
General Stipulations

Articles 121 to 124

Article (125) Each member has to do some minimal military training and to be completely qualified to undertake his tasks.

Articles 126 to 130.
Appendix C, Annex 19 – Jarring Memorandum
Aide-Memoire of February 8, 1971

The U.N. secretary-general in 1967 asked Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring to seek a peaceful conclusion to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and to negotiate the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242. Jarring's report called for Israel to withdraw behind pre-1967 boundaries, for freedom of maritime navigation, and for the United Arab Republic (UAR, briefly comprising Egypt and Syria) to accept a peace agreement (bold emphasis added in the source document).

Result: The familiar deadlock. Israel insisted on direct negotiations and offered territorial concessions only as part of a lasting peace. Israel took note that Jarring avoided the words "peace treaty" with Israel. The UAR (primarily Egypt) refused to negotiate and insisted that Israel withdraw from the Sinai as a pre-condition for talks. Israel flatly refused.

Jarring became an early practitioner of shuttle diplomacy in unsuccessful attempts to find a basis for peace, but he came closer than was realized at the time. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan outlined a possible interim separation of forces agreement in September and showed it to U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger in December. Kissinger, in turn, discussed it with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who proposed both an interim agreement and negotiation of peace with Jarring's help in a speech to the Egyptian parliament on Feb. 4.

Israel, failing to comprehend the significance of Sadat's overture, rejected it (Morris, 2001, p. 388). It was one more in a series of dismal "missed opportunities" for peace. Jarring's role was taken over by U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers.
Text of The Jarring Memorandum

I have been following with a mixture of restrained optimism and growing concern the resumed discussions under my auspices for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Middle East question. My restrained optimism arises from the fact that in my view the parties are seriously divining their positions and wish to move forward to a permanent peace.

My growing concern is that each side unyieldingly insists that the other make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions to be included in a final peace agreement. There is, as I see it, a serious risk that we shall find ourselves in the same deadlock that existed during the first three years of my mission.

I therefore feel that I should at this stage make clear my views on what I believe to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which the parties have agreed to carry out in all its parts.

I have come to the conclusion that the only possibility to break the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings -- which seems to me to be the real cause of the present immobility -- is for me to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seem to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them.

It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee question.

Specifically, I wish to request the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic to make to me at this stage the following prior commitments simultaneously and on condition that the other party makes its commitments and subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem.

Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine on the understanding that satisfactory arrangements are made for:

(a) Establishing demilitarized zones;
(b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm el Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran;
(c) Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal,
The UAR would give a commitment to **enter into a peace agreement** with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, undertakings and acknowledgements covering the following subjects:

(a) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;
(b) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.
(c) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other’s right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
(d) Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that act of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are not committed from within their respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party;
(e) Non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs.

In making the above-mentioned suggestion I am conscious that I am requesting both sides to make serious commitments but I am convinced that the present situation requires me to take this step.
Appendix C, Annex 20 -- Phased Plan, Palestine Liberation Organization
June 9, 1974

Also called the Two-Step or Two-Stage Plan (Reich, 1996), this document was adopted by the Palestine Liberation Organization in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. It can be viewed as Israel’s worst nightmare (then) or as an indication of how far the PLO has come in its objectives and its attitude toward peace (now).

Reduced to its essentials, the first phase is to create a Palestinian state (Articles 2 and 4, emphasis added). The second phase is to destroy Israel (Article 8, emphasis added).

Result: Elements of the Phased Plan remain relevant today in the Hamas charter. Some Israelis suspect that the original plan remains in effect as the goal of some Palestinians.

Text of the Phased Plan
Adopted at the 12th session of the Palestinian National Council

Sources:  http://www.iris.org.il/plophase.htm
          http://israel-arab_conflict.tripod.com/phasedplan.htm
          http://www.mefacts.com/cached.asp?x_id=10220

The Palestinian National Council:

On the basis of the Palestinian National Charter and the Political Programme drawn up at the eleventh session, held from January 6-12, 1973; and from its belief that it is impossible for a permanent and just peace to be established in the area unless our Palestinian people recover all their national rights and, first and foremost, their rights to return and to self-determination on the whole of the soil of their homeland; and in the light of a study of the new political circumstances that have come into existence in the period between the Council's last and present sessions, resolves the following:

1. To reaffirm the Palestine Liberation Organization's previous attitude to Resolution 242, which obliterates the national right of our people and deals with the cause of our people as a problem of refugees. The Council therefore refuses to have anything to do with this resolution at any level, Arab or international, including the Geneva Conference.

2. The Liberation Organization will employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory
that is liberated. This will require further changes being effected in the balance of power in favour of our people and their struggle.

3. The Liberation Organization will struggle against any proposal for a Palestinian entity the price of which is recognition, peace, secure frontiers, renunciation of national rights and the deprival of our people of their right to return and their right to self-determination on the soil of their homeland.

4. Any step taken towards liberation is a step towards the realization of the Liberation Organization's strategy of establishing the democratic Palestinian state specified in the resolutions of previous Palestinian National Councils.

5. Struggle along with the Jordanian national forces to establish a Jordanian-Palestinian national front whose aim will be to set up in Jordan a democratic national authority in close contact with the Palestinian entity that is established through the struggle.

6. The Liberation Organization will struggle to establish unity in struggle between the two peoples and between all the forces of the Arab liberation movement that are in agreement on this programme.

7. In the light of this programme, the Liberation Organization will struggle to strengthen national unity and to raise it to the level where it will be able to perform its national duties and tasks.

8. Once it is established, the Palestinian national authority will strive to achieve a union of the confrontation countries, with the aim of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory, and as a step along the road to comprehensive Arab unity.

9. The Liberation Organization will strive to strengthen its solidarity with the socialist countries, and with forces of liberation and progress throughout the world, with the aim of frustration all the schemes of Zionism, reaction and imperialism.

10. In light of this programme, the leadership of the revolution will determine the tactics which will serve and make possible the realization of these objectives.

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization will make every effort to implement this programme, and should a situation arise affecting the destiny and the future of the Palestinian people, the National Assembly will be convened in extraordinary session.
Appendix C, Annex 21 -- Speech by Yasser Arafat to the U.N. General Assembly  
13 November 1974

This is the famous “olive branch” speech. See the penultimate paragraph (No. 82). The speech was the most comprehensive statement of the Palestinian cause to date. The first two numbered paragraphs have been deleted because they are introductions. The president to whom Mr. Arafat refers is Abdelaziz Bouteflika, representing Algeria. He was the president of the General Assembly at the time Arafat spoke. See also Arafat’s 1988 speeches in Switzerland.

Text of Speech by Yasser Arafat  
(interpretation from Arabic)  
Source: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Yasser_Arafat%27s_1974_UN_General_Assembly_speech

3. In the name of the people of Palestine and the leader of its national struggle, the Palestine Liberation Organization, I take this opportunity to extend to you, Mr. President, my warmest congratulations on your election to the presidency of the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly. We have, of course, long known you to be a sincere and devoted defender of the cause of freedom, justice and peace. We have known you also to be in the vanguard of the freedom fighters in their heroic Algerian war of national liberation. Today Algeria has attained a distinguished position in the world community and has assumed its responsibilities both in the national and in the international fields, thus earning the support and esteem of all the countries of the world.

4. I also avail myself of this opportunity to extend my sincerest appreciation to Mr. Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the great efforts he has made and is still making to enable us to assume our responsibilities in the smoothest possible way.

5. In the name of the people of Palestine I take this opportunity to congratulate three States that have recently been admitted to membership in the United Nations after obtaining their national independence: Guinea-Bissau, Bangladesh and Grenada. I extend our best wishes to the leaders of those Member States and wish them progress and success.

6. Mr. President, I thank you for having invited the PLO to participate in this plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly. I am grateful to all those representatives of States of the United Nations who contributed to the decision to introduce the question of Palestine as a separate item on the agenda of this Assembly. That decision made possible the Assembly's resolution inviting us to address it on the question of Palestine.

7. This is a very important occasion. The question of Palestine is being re-examined by the United Nations, and we consider that step to be a victory for the world Organizations as much as a victory for the cause of our people. It indicates anew that the United Nations of today is not the
United Nations of the past, just as today's world is not yesterday's world. Today's United Nations represents 138 nations, a number that more clearly reflects the will of the international community. Thus today's United Nations is more nearly capable of implementing the principles embodied in its Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as being more truly empowered to support causes of peace and justice.

8. Our peoples are now beginning to feel that change. Along with them, the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America also feel the change. As a result, the United Nations acquires greater esteem both in our people's view and in the view of other peoples. Our hope is thereby strengthened that the United Nations can contribute actively to the pursuit and triumph of the causes of peace, justice, freedom and independence. Our resolve to build a new world is fortified—a world free of colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism in each of its instances, including zionism.

9. Our world aspires to peace, justice, equality and freedom. It wishes that oppressed nations, bent under the weight of imperialism, might gain their freedom and their right to self-determination. It hopes to place the relations between nations on a basis of equality, peaceful coexistence, mutual respect for each other's internal affairs, secure national sovereignty, independence and territorial unity on the basis of justice and mutual benefit. This world resolves that the economic ties binding it together should be grounded in justice, parity and mutual interest. It aspires finally to direct its human resources against the scourge of poverty, famine, disease and natural calamity, toward the development of productive scientific and technical capabilities to enhance human wealth—all this in the hope of reducing the disparity between the developing and the developed countries. But all such aspirations cannot be realized in a world that is at present ruled over by tension, injustice, oppression, racial discrimination and exploitation, a world also threatened with unending economic disasters, war and crisis.

10. Great numbers of peoples, including those of Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Palestine, among many others, are still victims of oppression and violence. Their areas of the world are gripped by armed struggles provoked by imperialism and racial discrimination, both merely forms of aggression and terror. Those are instances of oppressed peoples compelled by intolerable circumstances into confrontation with such oppression. But wherever that confrontation occurs it is legitimate and just.

11. It is imperative that the international community should support these peoples in their struggles, in the furtherance of their rightful causes and the attainment of their right to self-determination.

12. In Indo-China, the peoples are still exposed to aggression. They remain subjected to conspiracies preventing them from attaining peace and realizing their goals. Although peoples everywhere have welcomed the agreements on peace reached in Laos and South Viet Nam, no one can say that genuine peace has been achieved, nor that those forces responsible in the first place for aggression have now desisted from their attacks on Viet Nam. The same can be said of the present military aggression against the people of Cambodia. It is therefore incumbent on the international community to support these oppressed peoples, and also to condemn the oppressors for their designs against peace. Moreover, despite the positive stand taken by the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea with regard to a peaceful, just solution of the Korean question, there is as yet no settlement of that question.

13. A few months ago the problem of Cyprus erupted violently before us. All peoples everywhere shared in the suffering of the Cypriots. We ask that the United Nations continue its efforts to reach a just solution in Cyprus, thereby sparing the Cypriots further war and ensuring peace and independence for them instead. Undoubtedly, however, consideration of the question of Cyprus belongs within that of Middle Eastern problems as well as of Mediterranean problems.

14. In their efforts to replace an outmoded but still dominant world economic system with a new, more logically rational one, the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America must nevertheless face implacable attacks on these efforts. These countries have expressed their views at the sixth special session of the General Assembly on raw materials and development. Thus the plundering, the exploitation, the siphoning-off of the wealth of impoverished peoples must be terminated forthwith. There must be no deterring of these peoples' efforts to develop and control their wealth. Furthermore, there is a grave necessity for arriving at fair prices for raw materials from these countries.

15. In addition, these countries continue to be hampered in the attainment of their primary objectives formulated at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at Caracas, at the World Population Conference at Bucharest and at the World Food Conference in Rome.

The United Nations should therefore bend every effort to achieve a radical alteration of the world economic system, making it possible for developing countries to develop. The United Nations must shoulder the responsibility for fighting inflation, now borne most heavily by the developing countries, especially the oil-producing countries. The United Nations must firmly condemn any threats made against these countries simply because they demand their just rights.

16. The world-wide armaments race shows no sign of abating. As a consequence, the entire world is threatened with the dispersion of its wealth and the utter waste of its energies. Armed violence is made more likely everywhere. We expect the United Nations to devote itself single-mindedly to curbing the unlimited acquisition of arms; to preventing even the possibility of nuclear destruction; to reducing the vast sums spent on military technology; to converting expenditure on war into projects for development, for increasing production, and for benefiting common humanity.

17. And still, the highest tension exists in our part of the world. There the Zionist entity clings tenaciously to occupied Arab territory; zionism persists in its aggressions against us and our territory. New military preparations are feverishly being made. These anticipate another, fifth war of aggression to be launched against us. Such signs bear the closest possible watching, since there is a grave likelihood that this war would forebode nuclear destruction and cataclysmic annihilation.

18. The world is in need of tremendous efforts if its aspirations to peace, freedom, justice, equality and development are to be realized, if its struggle is to be victorious over colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism in all its forms, including zionism. Only by such efforts
can actual form be given to the aspirations of all peoples, including the aspirations of peoples whose States oppose such efforts. It is this road that leads to the fulfilment of those principles emphasized by the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Were the status quo simply to be maintained, however, the world would instead be exposed to prolonged armed conflict, in addition to economic, human and natural calamity.

19. Despite abiding world crises, despite even the gloomy powers of backwardness and disastrous wrong, we live in a time of glorious change. An old world order is crumbling before our eyes, as imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism, the chief form of which is zionism, ineluctably perish. We are privileged to be able to witness a great wave of history bearing peoples forward into a new world that they have created. In that world just causes will triumph. Of that we are confident.

20. The question of Palestine belongs in this perspective of emergence and struggle. Palestine is crucial amongst those just causes fought for unstintingly by masses labouring under imperialism and aggression. It cannot be, and is not, lost on me today, as I stand here before the General Assembly, that if I have been given the opportunity to address the General Assembly, so too must the opportunity be given to all liberation movements fighting against racism and imperialism. In their names, in the name of every human being struggling for freedom and self-determination, I call upon the General Assembly urgently to give their just causes the same full attention the General Assembly has so rightly given to our cause. Such recognitions once made, there will be a secure foundation thereafter for the preservation of universal peace. For only with such peace will a new world order endure in which peoples can live free of oppression, fear, terror and the suppression of their rights. As I said earlier, this is the true perspective in which to set the question of Palestine. I shall now do so for the General Assembly, keeping firmly in mind both the perspective and the goal of a coming world order.

21. Even as today we address the General Assembly from what is before all else an international rostrum, we are also expressing our faith in political and diplomatic struggle as complements, as enhancements of our armed struggle. Furthermore, we express our appreciation of the role the United Nations is capable of playing in settling problems of international scope. But this capability, I said a moment ago, became real only once the United Nations had accommodated itself to the living actuality of aspiring peoples, towards which an Organization of so truly international a dimension owes unique obligations.

22. In addressing the General Assembly today, our people proclaims its faith in the future, unencumbered either by past tragedies or present limitations. If, as we discuss the present, we enlist the past in our service, we do so only to light up our journey into the future alongside other movements of national liberation. If we return now to the historical roots of our cause we do so because present at this very moment in our midst are those who, while they occupy our homes, as their cattle graze in our pastures, and as their hands pluck the fruit of our trees, claim at the same time that we are disembodied spirits, fictions without presence, without traditions or future. We speak of our roots also because until recently some people have regarded -- and continued to regard -- our problem as merely a problem of refugees. They have portrayed the Middle East question as little more than a border dispute between the Arab States and the Zionist entity. They have imagined that our people claims rights not rightfully its own and fights neither with logic
nor valid motive, with a simple wish only to disturb the peace and to terrorize wantonly. For
there are amongst you -- and here I refer to the United States of America and others like it --
those who supply our enemy freely with planes and bombs and with every variety of murderous
weapon. They take hostile positions against us, deliberately distorting the true essence of the
problem. All this is done not only at our expense, but at the expense of the American people, and
of the friendship we continue to hope can be cemented between us and this great people, whose
history of struggle for the sake of freedom we honour and salute.

23. I cannot now forgo this opportunity to appeal from this rostrum directly to the American
people, asking it to give its support to our heroic and fighting people. I ask it whole-heartedly to
endorse right and justice, to recall George Washington to mind, heroic Washington whose
purpose was his nation's freedom and independence, Abraham Lincoln, champion of the destitute
and the wretched, and also Woodrow Wilson, whose doctrine of Fourteen Points remains
subscribed to and venerated by our people. I ask the American people whether the
demonstrations of hostility and enmity taking place outside this great hall reflect the true intent
of America's will. What crime, I ask you plainly, has our people committed against the American
people? Why do you fight us so? Does such unwarranted belligerence really serve your interests?
Does it serve the interests of the American masses? No, definitely not. I can only hope that the
American people will remember that their friendship with the whole Arab nation is too great, too
abiding and too rewarding for any such demonstrations to harm it.

24. In any event, as our discussion of the question of Palestine focuses upon historical roots, we
do so because we believe that any question now exercising the world's concern must be viewed
radically, in the true root sense of that word if a real solution is ever to be grasped. We propose
this radical approach as an antidote to an approach to international issues that obscures historical
origins behind ignorance, denial, and a slavish obeisance to the present.

25. The roots of the Palestinian question reach back into the closing years of the nineteenth
century, in other words, to that period we call the era of colonialism and settlement as we know it
today. This is precisely the period during which zionism as a scheme was born; its aim was the
conquest of Palestine by European immigrants, just as settlers colonized, and indeed raided, most
of Africa. This is the period during which, pouring forth out of the west, colonialism spread into
the furthest reaches of Africa, Asia and Latin America, building colonies, everywhere cruelly
exploiting, oppressing, plundering the peoples of those three continents. This period persists into
the present. Marked evidence of its totally reprehensible presence can be readily perceived in the
racism practised both in South Africa and in Palestine.

26. Just as colonialism and its demagogues dignified their conquests, their plunder and limitless
attacks upon the natives of Africa with appeals to a "civilizing and modernizing" mission, so too
did waves of Zionist immigrants disguise their purposes as they conquered Palestine. Just as
colonialism as a system and colonialists as its instrument used religion, colour, race and language
to justify the African's exploitation and his cruel subjugation by terror and discrimination, so too
were these methods employed as Palestine was usurped and its people hounded from their
national homeland.
27. Just as colonialism heedlessly used the wretched, the poor, the exploited as mere inert matter with which to build and to carry out settler colonialism, so too were destitute, oppressed European Jews employed on behalf of world imperialism and of the Zionist leaders. European Jews were transformed into the instruments of aggression -- they became the elements of settler colonialism intimately allied to racial discrimination.

28. Zionist theology was utilized against our Palestinian people: the purpose was not only the establishment of Western-style settler colonialism but also the severing of Jews from their various homelands and subsequently their estrangement from their nations. Zionism is an ideology that is imperialist, colonialist, racist; it is profoundly reactionary and discriminatory; it is united with anti-Semitism in its retrograde tenets and is, when all is said and done, another side of the same base coin. For when what is proposed is that adherents of the Jewish faith, regardless of their national residence, should neither owe allegiance to their national residence nor live on equal footing with its other, non-Jewish citizens -- when that is proposed we hear anti-Semitism being proposed. When it is proposed that the only solution for the Jewish problem is that Jews must alienate themselves from communities or nations of which they have been a historical part, when it is proposed that Jews solve the Jewish problem by immigrating to and forcibly settling the land of another people -- when this occurs, exactly the same position is being advocated as the one urged by anti-Semites against Jews.

29. Thus, for instance, we can understand the close connexion between Cecil Rhodes, who promoted settler colonialism in south-east Africa, and Theodor Herzl, who had settler colonialist designs upon Palestine. Having received a certificate of good settler colonialist conduct from Rhodes, Herzl then turned around and presented this certificate to the British Government, hoping thus to secure a formal resolution supporting Zionist policy. In exchange, the Zionists promised Britain an imperialist base on Palestinian soil so that imperial interests could be safeguarded at one of their chief strategic points.

30. So the Zionist movement allied itself directly with world colonialism in a common raid on our land. Allow me now to present a selection of historical truths about this alliance.

31. The Jewish invasion of Palestine began in 1881. Before the first large wave of immigrants started arriving, Palestine had a population of half a million; most of the population was either Muslim or Christian, and only 20,000 were Jewish. Every segment of the population enjoyed the religious tolerance characteristic of our civilization.

32. Palestine was then a verdant land, inhabited mainly by an Arab people in the course of building its life and dynamically enriching its indigenous culture.

33. Between 1882 and 1917 the Zionist movement settled approximately 50,000 European Jews in our homeland. To do that it resorted to trickery and deceit in order to implant them in our midst. Its success in getting Britain to issue the Balfour Declaration once again demonstrated the alliance between zionism and imperialism. Furthermore, by promising to the Zionist movement what was not its to give, Britain showed how oppressive was the rule of imperialism. As it was constituted then, the League of Nations abandoned our Arab people, and Wilson's pledges and promises came to nought. In the guise of a Mandate, British imperialism was cruelly and directly
imposed upon us. The Mandate issued by the League of Nations was to enable the Zionist invaders to consolidate their gains in our homeland.

34. Over a period of 30 years after the Balfour Declaration, the Zionist movement, together with its colonial ally, succeeded in bringing about the immigration of more European Jews and the usurpation of the lands of the Arabs of Palestine. Thus, in 1947 the Jewish population of Palestine was approximately 600,000, owning less than 6 per cent of the fertile lands of Palestine, while the Arab population of Palestine numbered approximately 1,250,000.

35. As a result of the collusion between the Mandatory Power and the Zionist movement and with the support of some countries, this General Assembly early in its history approved a recommendation to partition our Palestinian homeland. This took place in an atmosphere poisoned with questionable actions and strong pressure. The General Assembly partitioned what it had no right to divide -- an indivisible homeland. When we rejected that decision, our position corresponded to that of the natural mother who refused to permit King Solomon to cut her son in two when the unnatural mother claimed the child for herself and agreed to his dismemberment. Furthermore, even though the partition resolution granted the colonialist settlers 54 per cent of the land of Palestine, their dissatisfaction with the decision prompted them to wage a war of terror against the civilian Arab population. They occupied 81 per cent of the total area of Palestine, uprooting a million Arabs. Thus, they occupied 524 Arab towns and villages, of which they destroyed 385, completely obliterating them in the process. Having done so, they built their own settlements and colonies on the ruins of our farms and our groves. The roots of the Palestine question lie here. Its causes do not stem from any conflict between two religions or two nationalisms. Neither is it a border conflict between neighboring States. It is the cause of people deprived of its homeland, dispersed and uprooted, and living mostly in exile and in refugee camps.

36. With support from imperialist and colonialist Powers, the Zionist entity managed to get itself accepted as a Member of the United Nations. It further succeeded in getting the Palestine question deleted from the agenda of the United Nations and in deceiving world public opinion by presenting our cause as a problem of refugees in need either of charity from do-gooders, or settlement in a land not theirs.

37. Not satisfied with all this, the racist entity, founded on the imperialist-colonialist concept, turned itself into a base of imperialism and into an arsenal of weapons. This enabled it to assume its role of subjugating the Arab people and of committing aggression against them, in order to satisfy its ambitions for further expansion on Palestinian and other Arab lands. In addition to the many instances of aggression committed by this entity against the Arab States, it has launched two large-scale wars, in 1956 and 1967, thus endangering world peace and security.

38. As a result of Zionist aggression in June 1967, the enemy occupied Egyptian Sinai as far as the Suez Canal. The enemy occupied Syria's Golan Heights, in addition to all Palestinian land west of the Jordan. All these developments have led to the creation in our area of what has come to be known as the "Middle East problem". The situation has been rendered more serious by the enemy's persistence in maintaining its unlawful occupation and in further consolidating it, thus establishing a beachhead for world imperialism's thrust against our Arab nation. All Security
Council decisions and appeals to world public opinion for withdrawal from the lands occupied in June 1967 have been ignored. Despite all the peaceful efforts on the international level, the enemy has not been deterred from its expansionist policy. The only alternative open before our Arab nations, chiefly Egypt and Syria, was to expend exhaustive efforts in preparing forcefully to resist that barbarous armed invasion -- and this in order to liberate Arab lands and to restore the rights of the Palestinian people, after all other peaceful means had failed.

39. Under these circumstances, the fourth war broke out in October 1973, bringing home to the Zionist enemy the bankruptcy of its policy of occupation, expansion and its reliance on the concept of military might. Despite all this, the leaders of the Zionist entity are far from having learned any lesson from their experience. They are making preparations for the fifth war, resorting once more to the language of military superiority, aggression, terrorism, subjugation and, finally, always to war in their dealings with the Arabs.

40. It pains our people greatly to witness the propagation of the myth that its homeland was a desert until it was made to bloom by the toil of foreign settlers, that it was a land without a people, and that the colonialist entity caused no harm to any human being. No: such lies must be exposed from this rostrum, for the world must know that Palestine was the cradle of the most ancient cultures and civilizations. Its Arab people were engaged in farming and building, spreading culture throughout the land for thousands of years, setting an example in the practice of freedom of worship, acting as faithful guardians of the holy places of all religions. As a son of Jerusalem, I treasure for myself and my people beautiful memories and vivid images of the religious brotherhood that was the hallmark of our Holy City before it succumbed to catastrophe. Our people continued to pursue this enlightened policy until the establishment of the State of Israel and their dispersion. This did not deter our people from pursuing their humanitarian role on Palestinian soil. Nor will they permit their land to become a launching pad for aggression or a racist camp predicated on the destruction of civilization, cultures, progress and peace. Our people cannot but maintain the heritage of their ancestors in resisting the invaders, in assuming the privileged task of defending their native land, their Arab nationhood, their culture and civilization, and in safeguarding the cradle of monotheistic religions.

41. By contrast, we need only mention briefly some Israeli stands: its support of the Secret Army Organization in Algeria, its bolstering of the settler-colonialists in Africa -- whether in the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Azania or South Africa -- and its backing of South Viet Nam against the Vietnamese revolution. In addition, one can mention Israel's continuing support of imperialists and racists everywhere, its obstructionist stand in the Committee of Twenty-four, its refusal to cast its vote in support of independence for the African States, and its opposition to the demands of many Asian, African and Latin American nations, and several other States in the conferences on raw materials, population, the law of the sea, and food. All these facts offer further proof of the character of the enemy that has usurped our land. They justify the honourable struggle we are waging against it. As we defend a vision of the future, our enemy upholds the myths of the past.

42. The enemy we face has a long record of hostility even towards the Jews themselves, for there is within the Zionist entity a built-in racism against Oriental Jews. While we were vociferously condemning the massacres of Jews under Nazi rule, Zionist leadership appeared more interested
at that time in exploiting them as best it could in order to realize its goal of immigration into Palestine.

43. If the immigration of Jews to Palestine had had as its objective the goal of enabling them to live side by side with us, enjoying the same rights and assuming the same duties, we would have opened our doors to them, as far as our homeland's capacity for absorption permitted. Such was the case with the thousands of Armenians and Circassians who still live among us in equality as brethren and citizens. But that the goal of this immigration should be to usurp our homeland, disperse our people, and turn us into second-class citizens -- this is what no one can conceivably demand that we acquiesce in or submit to. Therefore, since its inception, our evolution has not been motivated by racial or religious factors. Its target has never been the Jew, as a person, but racist zionism and undisguised aggression. In this sense, ours is also a revolution for the Jew, as a human being, as well. We are struggling so that Jews, Christians and Muslims may live in equality, enjoying the same rights and assuming the same duties, free from racial or religious discrimination.

44. We do distinguish between Judaism and zionism. While we maintain our opposition to the colonialist Zionist movement, we respect the Jewish faith. Today, almost one century after the rise of the Zionist movement, we wish to warn of its increasing danger to the Jews of the world, to our Arab people and to world peace and security. For zionism encourages the Jew to emigrate out of his homeland and grants him an artificially-created nationality. The Zionists proceed with their terrorist activities even though these have proved ineffective. The phenomenon of constant emigration from Israel, which is bound to grow as the bastions of colonialism and racism in the world fall, is an example of the inevitability of the failure of such activities.

45. We urge the people and Governments of the world to stand firm against Zionist attempts at encouraging world Jewry to emigrate from their countries and to usurp our land. We urge them as well firmly to oppose any discrimination against any human being as to religion, race, or colour.

46. Why should our Arab Palestinian people pay the price of such discrimination in the world? Why should our people be responsible for the problems of Jewish immigration, if such problems exist in the minds of some people? Why do not the supporters of these problems open their own countries, which can absorb and help these immigrants?

47. Those who call us terrorists wish to prevent world public opinion from discovering the truth about us and from seeing the justice on our faces. They seek to hide the terrorism and tyranny of their acts, and our own posture of self-defence.

48. The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists cannot possibly be called terrorist, otherwise the American people in their struggle for liberation from the British colonialists would have been terrorists; the European resistance against the Nazis would be terrorism, the struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples would also be terrorism, and many of you who are in this Assembly hall were considered terrorists. This is actually a just and proper struggle.
As to those who fight against the just causes, those who wage war to occupy, colonize and oppress other people, those are the terrorists. Those are the people whose actions should be condemned, who should be called war criminals: for the justice of the cause determines the right to struggle.

49. Zionist terrorism which was waged against the Palestinian people to evict it from its country and usurp its land is registered in your official documents. Thousands of our people were assassinated in their villages and towns; tens of thousands of others were forced at gunpoint to leave their homes and the lands of their fathers. Time and time again our children, women and aged were evicted and had to wander in the deserts and climb mountains without any food or water. No one in 1948 witnessed the catastrophe that befell the inhabitants of hundreds of villages and towns -- in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle and Galilee -- no one who has been a witness to that catastrophe will ever forget the experience, even though the mass black-out has succeeded in hiding these horrors as it has hidden the traces of 385 Palestinian villages and towns destroyed at the time and erased from the map. The destruction of 19,000 houses during the past seven years, which is equivalent to the complete destruction of 200 more Palestinian villages, and the great number of maimed as a result of the treatment they were subjected to in Israeli prisons cannot be hidden by any black-out.

50. Their terrorism fed on hatred and this hatred was even directed against the olive tree in my country, which has been a proud symbol and which reminded them of the indigenous inhabitants of the land, a living reminder that the land is Palestinian. Thus they sought to destroy it. How can one describe the statement by Golda Meir which expressed her disquiet about "the Palestinian children born every day"? They see in the Palestinian child, in the Palestinian tree, an enemy that should be exterminated. For tens of years Zionists have been harrassing our people's cultural, political, social and artistic leaders, terrorizing them and assassinating them. They have stolen our cultural heritage, our popular folklore and have claimed it as theirs. Their terrorism even reached our sacred places in our beloved and peaceful Jerusalem. They have endeavoured to de-Arabize it and make it lose its Muslim and Christian character by evicting its inhabitants and annexing it.

51. I must mention the fire of the Al Aqsa Mosque and the disfiguration of many of the monuments which are both historic and religious in character. Jerusalem, with its religious history and its spiritual values, bears witness to the future. It is proof of our eternal presence, of our civilization, of our human values. It is therefore not surprising that under its sky the three religions were born and that under that sky these three religions shine in order to enlighten mankind so that it might express the tribulations and hopes of humanity, and that it might mark out the road of the future with its hopes.

52. The small number of Palestinian Arabs who were not uprooted by the Zionists in 1948 are at present refugees in their own homeland. Israeli law treats them as second-class citizens -- and even as third-class citizens since Oriental Jews are second-class citizens -- and they have been subject to all forms of racial discrimination and terrorism after confiscation of their land and property. They have been victims of bloody massacres such as that of Kfar Kassim; they have been expelled from their villages and denied the right to return, as in the case of the inhabitants consecrated by the United Nations Charter and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
of Ikrit and Kfar Birim. For 26 years, our population has been living under martial law and was
denied freedom of movement without prior permission from the Israeli military governor, this at
a time when an Israeli law was promulgated granting citizenship to any Jew anywhere who
wanted to emigrate to our homeland. Moreover, another Israeli law stipulated that Palestinians
who were not present in their villages or towns at the time of the occupation were not entitled to
Israeli citizenship.

53. The record of Israeli rulers is replete with acts of terror perpetrated on those of our people
who remained under occupation in Sinai and the Golan Heights. The criminal bombardment
of the Bahr-al-Bakar School and the Abou Zaabal factory are but two such unforgettable acts of
terrorism. The total destruction of the Syrian city of Quneitra is yet another tangible instance of
systematic terrorism. If a record of Zionist terrorism in South Lebanon were to be compiled, the
enormity of its acts would shock even the most hardened: piracy, bombardments, scorched-earth
policy, destruction of hundreds of homes, eviction of civilians and the kidnapping of Lebanese
citizens. This clearly constitutes a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and is in preparation for the
diversion of the Litani River waters.

54. Need one remind this Assembly of the numerous resolutions adopted by it condemning
Israeli aggressions committed against Arab countries, Israeli violations of human rights and the
articles of the Geneva Conventions, as well as the resolutions pertaining to the annexation of the
city of Jerusalem and its restoration to its former status?

55. The only description for these acts is that they are acts of barbarism and terrorism. And yet,
the Zionist racists and colonialists have the temerity to describe the just struggle of our people as
terror. Could there be a more flagrant distortion of truth than this? We ask those who usurped our
land, who are committing murderous acts of terrorism against our people and are practising
racial discrimination more extensively than the racists of South Africa, we ask them to keep in
mind the General Assembly resolution that called for the one-year suspension of the membership
of the Government of South Africa from the United Nations. Such is the inevitable fate of every
racist country that adopts the law of the jungle, usurps the homeland of others and persists in
oppression.

56. For the past 30 years, our people have had to struggle against British occupation and Zionist
invasion, both of which had one intention, namely, the usurpation of our land. Six major revolts
and tens of popular uprisings were staged to foil these attempts, so that our homeland might
remain ours. Over 30,000 martyrs, the equivalent in comparative terms of 6 million Americans,
died in the process.

57. When the majority of the Palestinian people was uprooted from its homeland in 1948, the
Palestinian struggle for self-determination continued under the most difficult conditions. We
tried every possible means to continue our political struggle to attain our national rights, but to
no avail. Meanwhile, we had to struggle for sheer existence. Even in exile we educated our
children. This was all a part of trying to survive.

58. The Palestinian people produced thousands of physicians, lawyers, teachers and scientists
who actively participated in the development of the Arab countries bordering on their usurped
homeland. They utilized their income to assist the young and aged amongst their people who remained in the refugee camps. They educated their younger sisters and brothers, supported their parents and cared for their children. All along, the Palestinian dreamt of return. Neither the Palestinian's allegiance to Palestine nor his determination to return waned; nothing could persuade him to relinquish his Palestinian identity or to forsake his homeland. The passage of time did not make him forget, as some hoped he would. When our people lost faith in the international community, which persisted in ignoring its rights, and when it became obvious that the Palestinians would not recuperate one inch of Palestine through exclusively political means, our people had no choice but to resort to armed struggle. Into that struggle it poured its material and human resources. We bravely faced the most vicious acts of Israeli terrorism, which were aimed at diverting our struggle and arresting it.

59. In the past 10 years of our struggle, thousands of martyrs and twice as many wounded, maimed and imprisoned were offered in sacrifice, all in an effort to resist the imminent threat of liquidation, to regain our right to self-determination and our undisputed right to return to our homeland. With the utmost dignity and the most admirable revolutionary spirit, our Palestinian people has not lost its spirit in Israeli prisons and concentration camps or when faced with all forms of harassment and intimidation. It struggles for sheer existence and it continues to strive to preserve the Arab character of its land. Thus it resists oppression, tyranny and terrorism in their ugliest forms.

60. It is through our popular armed struggle that our political leadership and our national institutions finally crystallized and a national liberation movement, comprising all the Palestinian factions, organizations and capabilities, materialized in the PLO.

61. Through our militant Palestine national liberation movement, our people's struggle matured and grew enough to accommodate political and social struggle in addition to armed struggle. The PLO was a major factor in creating a new Palestinian individual, qualified to shape the future of our Palestine, not merely content with mobilizing the Palestinians for the challenges of the present.

62. The PLO can be proud of having a large number of cultural and educational activities, even while engaged in armed struggle, and at a time when it faced increasingly vicious blows of Zionist terrorism. We established institutes for scientific research, agricultural development and social welfare, as well as centres for the revival of our cultural heritage and the preservation of our folklore. Many Palestinian poets, artists and writers have enriched Arab culture in particular, and world culture generally. Their profoundly humane works have won the admiration of all those familiar with them. In contrast to that, our enemy has been systematically destroying our culture and disseminating racist, imperialist ideologies; in short, everything that impedes progress, justice, democracy and peace.

63. The PLO has earned its legitimacy because of the sacrifice inherent in its pioneering role, and also because of its dedicated leadership of the struggle. It has also been granted this legitimacy by the Palestinian masses, which in harmony with it have chosen it to lead the struggle according to its directives. The PLO has also gained its legitimacy by representing every faction, union or group as well as every Palestinian talent, either in the National Council or in people's institutions.
This legitimacy was further strengthened by the support of the entire Arab nation, and it was consecrated during the last Arab Summit Conference, which reiterated the right of the PLO, in its capacity as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, to establish an independent national State on all liberated Palestinian territory.

64. Moreover, the legitimacy of the PLO was intensified as a result of fraternal support given by other liberation movements and by friendly, like-minded nations that stood by our side, encouraging and aiding us in our struggle to secure our national rights.

65. Here I must also warmly convey the gratitude of our revolutionary fighters and that of our people to the non-aligned countries, the socialist countries, the Islamic countries, the African countries and friendly European countries, as well as all our other friends in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

66. The PLO represents the Palestinian people, legitimately and uniquely. Because of this, the PLO expresses the wishes and hopes of its people. Because of this, too, it brings these very wishes and hopes before you, urging you not to shirk the momentous historic responsibility towards our just cause.

67. For many years now our people has been exposed to the ravages of war, destruction and dispersion. It has paid in the blood of its sons that which cannot ever be compensated. It has borne the burdens of occupation, dispersion, eviction and terror more uninterruptedly than any other people. And yet all this has made our people neither vindictive nor vengeful. Nor has it caused us to resort to the racism of our enemies. Nor have we lost the true method by which friend and foe are distinguished.

68. For we deplore all those crimes committed against the Jews; we also deplore all the real discrimination suffered by them because of their faith.

69. I am a rebel and freedom is my cause. I know well that many of you present here today once stood in exactly the same resistance position as I now occupy and from which I must fight. You once had to convert dreams into reality by your struggle. Therefore you must now share my dream. I think this is exactly why I can ask you now to help, as together we bring out our dream into a bright reality, our common dream for a peaceful future in Palestine's sacred land.

70. As he stood in an Israeli military court, the Jewish revolutionary, Ahud Adif, said: "I am no terrorist; I believe that a democratic State should exist on this land." Adif now languishes in a Zionist prison among his co-believers. To him and his colleagues I send my heartfelt good wishes.

71. And before those same courts there stands today a brave prince of the church, Bishop Capucci. Lifting his fingers to form the same victory sign used by our freedom-fighters, he said: "What I have done, I have done that all men may live on this land of peace in peace." This princely priest will doubtless share Adif's grim fate. To him we send our salutations and greetings.
72. Why therefore should I not dream and hope? For is not revolution the making real of dreams and hopes? So let us work together that my dream may be fulfilled, that I may return with my people out of exile, there in Palestine to live with this Jewish freedom-fighter and his partners, with this Arab priest and his brothers, in one democratic State where Christian, Jew and Muslim live in justice, equality and fraternity.

73. Is this not a noble dream worthy of my struggle alongside all lovers of freedom everywhere? For the most admirable dimension of this dream is that it is Palestinian, a dream from out of the land of peace, the land of martyrdom and heroism, and the land of history, too.

74. Let us remember that the Jews of Europe and the United States have been known to lead the struggles for secularism and the separation of Church and State. They have also been known to fight against discrimination on religious grounds. How can they then refuse this humane paradigm for the Holy Land? How then can they continue to support the most fanatic, discriminatory and closed of nations in its policy?

75. In my formal capacity as Chairman of the PLO and leader of the Palestinian revolution I proclaim before you that when we speak of our common hopes for the Palestine of tomorrow we include in our perspective all Jews now living in Palestine who choose to live with us there in peace and without discrimination.

76. In my formal capacity as Chairman of the PLO and leader of the Palestinian revolution I call upon Jews to turn away one by one from the illusory promises made to them by Zionist ideology and Israeli leadership. They are offering Jews perpetual bloodshed, endless war and continuous thraldom.

77. We invite them to emerge from their moral isolation into a more open realm of free choice, far from their present leadership's efforts to implant in them a Masada complex.

78. We offer them the most generous solution, that we might live together in a framework of just peace in our democratic Palestine.

79. In my formal capacity as Chairman of the PLO I announce here that we do not wish one drop of either Arab or Jewish blood to be shed; neither do we delight in the continuation of killing, which would end once a just peace, based on our people's rights, hopes and aspirations had been finally established.

80. In my formal capacity as Chairman of the PLO and leader of the Palestinian revolution I appeal to you to accompany our people in its struggle to attain its right to self-determination. This right is consecrated in the United Nations Charter and has been repeatedly confirmed in resolutions adopted by this august body since the drafting of the Charter. I appeal to you, further, to aid our people's return to its homeland from an involuntary exile imposed upon it by force of arms, by tyranny, by oppression, so that we may regain our property, our land, and thereafter live in our national homeland, free and sovereign, enjoying all the privileges of nationhood. Only then can we pour all our resources into the mainstream of human civilization. Only then can Palestinian creativity be concentrated on the service of humanity. Only then will our Jerusalem
resume its historic role as a peaceful shrine for all religions.

81. I appeal to you to enable our people to establish national independent sovereignty over its own land.

82. Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.

83. War flares up in Palestine, and yet it is in Palestine that peace will be born.
Appendix C, Annex 22 -- Saunders Statement
November 12, 1975

Relations in the Middle East are so sensitive and the parties are so on edge, that even the tiniest perceived movement becomes exaggerated. A raised eyebrow is interpreted as an earthquake. The parties know this, of course, and play the game to their advantage or to their fears. The party wishing to send a message could deny the eyebrow (or even the earthquake) but the message is sent and received. The Saunders Statement shows how the U.S., the PLO and the Israelis played the game to advance the peace process to their advantage.

Harold H. Saunders, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, was invited to testify before the House Subcommittee on International Relations. His written statement is reproduced below.

The statement should be read in the context of increasing worldwide pressure on behalf of the Palestinians. Crushing Israeli victories in 1967 and 1973 wars had shifted sympathies from the Israelis to the Palestinians. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat created a sensation with his famous “olive branch” speech to the United Nations in 1974. The General Assembly subsequently passed Resolution 3236, which recognized the rights of Palestinians, and Resolution 3237, which granted observer status to the PLO. The General Assembly in December 1975 was poised to pass Resolution 3379, which condemned Zionism as racism. Israel and the United States were becoming increasingly isolated. The U.S. wanted to start a peace process, despite openly hostile relations between Israel and the PLO.

Lee Hamilton, D-Ind., chairman of the Subcommittee on International Relations, called the Saunders statement “probably the most important policy statement on the Palestine issue that has occurred” (U.S. House of Representatives, The Palestinian Issue, 1975, Nov. 12, p.
Buheiry (1978) called it “one of the most comprehensive statements ever made by any US Administration on the Palestine question” (p. 28). Neff (1994, pp. 70, 72) identified it as the “first extensive U.S. statement on the Palestinians since they lost their land in 1948.” Saunders himself described the statement as the longest made (by the U.S.) on Palestinians (Stern, 1993).

The statement remained remarkably current into the decade of 2010. The language has been refined but the issues that stood in the way of peace remain distressingly similar.

What set the Middle East a-buzz at the time was a part of one paragraph, highlighted below in bold (emphasis added): “In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict. Final resolution of the problems arising from the partition of Palestine, the establishment of the State of Israel, and Arab opposition to those events will not be possible until agreement is reached defining a just and permanent status for the Arab peoples who consider themselves Palestinians.”

When a story about the statement appeared in an Israeli newspaper, the Israeli cabinet condemned the statement and said “the Arabs felt that it must have been great,” Saunders recalled later in an interview (Stern, 1993). “… caused a stir of concern,” was how the New York Times put it (Gwertzman, 1975).

The statement set Washington a-buzz, and the New York Times pressed U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for whether the U.S. intended to signal a change in policy. Kissinger’s answer: “This was a paper delivered by a Deputy Assistant Secretary to a subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, which was a somewhat academic exercise explaining in a purely theoretical manner several aspects of the Palestinian problem as Mr. Saunders saw them. I have stated our position on the Palestinian question. The United States will not deal with the P.L.O., will not consider dealing with the P.L.O. until the P.L.O. accepts the existence of the
state of Israel and Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. That has been our position, remains our position, and if we were to change that position it would not be announced by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State before a subcommittee of the Congress. It would be announced at the Presidential or my level and only after the full-

The Times story drops the quotation there, but it is reasonable to surmise that he said something like, “... only after the fullest consultation with the Israeli government,” based on a previously unpublished memorandum of agreement between the United States and Israel (U.S.-Israel Pact on Geneva, 1975, Sept. 18). The conclusion, stated in the Times headline, was that Kissinger was denying speculation that U.S. policy toward the PLO had changed.

In other words, no change in policy, as the Times headline concluded. Saunders was just a low-level bureaucrat kissing off Congress with a theoretical exercise, right?

Wrong. In fact, Kissinger not only had read Saunders statement in advance, he had edited it and cleared it, as Saunders was to tell Stern (1993): “He [Kissinger] made some changes which we incorporated. That meant that the Secretary of State had approved my statement” (Stern, 1993).

Result: So there was a change – an eyebrow’s amount, perhaps, but still a hint of an invitation to the PLO to mend its ways and join the peace party. But to make sure no one missed the main point – that the U.S. would not deal with the PLO so long as it does not recognize Israel’s right to exist and does not accept UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 – Congress added this clarification: “... and renounces the use of terrorism” (Codification of Policy, Public Law 99-83). That set the bar that PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat would not clear until 1988 in Geneva.
Summing up, Neff (1994) said the statement and surrounding “uproar” marked a turning point, even though it did not presage an immediate shift in U.S. policy. “After this, for the first time,” he said, “U.S. analysts began identifying Palestinians as a people” (pp. 70, 72).

Text of the Saunders Statement

Sources:

Web: http://www.mideastweb.org/saunders.htm

The Saunders Statement (Buheiry, 1978):

Transcript of the Saunders interview: http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004sau01)

Mr. Chairman, a just and durable peace in the Middle East is a central objective of the United States. Both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have stated firmly on numerous occasions that the United States is determined to make every feasible effort to maintain the momentum of practical progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

We have also repeatedly stated that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiation of an Arab-Israeli peace. In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict. Final resolution of the problems arising from the partition of Palestine, the establishment of the State of Israel, and Arab opposition to those events will not be possible until agreement is reached defining a just and permanent status for the Arab peoples who consider themselves Palestinians. . . .

The U.S. has provided some $620 million in assistance -- about sixty-two percent of the total international support ($1 billion) for the Palestinian refugees over the past quarter of a century.

Today, however, we recognize that, in addition to meeting the human needs and responding to legitimate personal claims of the refugees, there is another interest that must be taken into account. It is a fact that many of the three million or so people who call themselves Palestinians today increasingly regard themselves as having their own identity as a people and desire a voice in determining their political status. As with any people in this situation, there are differences among themselves, but the Palestinians collectively are a political factor which must be dealt with if there is to be a peace between Israel and its neighbors.

The statement is often made in the Arab world that there will not be peace until the "rights of the Palestinians" are fulfilled, but there is no agreed definition of what is meant and a variety of viewpoints have been expressed on what the ultimate objectives of the Palestinians are:
Some Palestinian elements hold to the objective of a binational secular state in the area of the former mandate of Palestine. Realization of this objective would mean the end of the present state of Israel, a member of the United Nations, and its submergence in some larger entity. Some would be willing to accept merely as a first step toward this goal the establishment of a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank of the Jordan River and Gaza.

Other elements of Palestinian opinion appear willing accept an independent Palestinian state comprising the West Bank and Gaza, based on acceptance of Israel's right as an independent state within roughly its pre-1967 borders.

Some Palestinians and other Arabs envisage as a solution a unification of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan. A variation of this which has been suggested would be the reconstitution of the country as a federated state, with the West Bank becoming an autonomous Palestinian province.

Still others, including many Israelis, feel that with the West Bank returned to Jordan, and with the resulting existence of two communities -- Palestinian and Jordanian -- within Jordan, opportunities would be created thereby for the Palestinians to find self-expression.

In the case of a solution which would rejoin the West Bank to Jordan or a solution involving a West Bank/Gaza state, there would still arise the property claims of those Palestinians who before 1948 resided in areas that became the State of Israel. These claims have been acknowledged as a serious problem by the international community ever since the adoption by the United Nations of Resolution 194 on this subject in 1948, a resolution which the United Nations reaffirmed and which the United States has supported. A solution will be further complicated by the property claims against Arab states of the many Jews from those states who moved to Israel in its early years after achieving statehood.

In addition to property claims, some believe they should have the option of returning to their original homes under any settlement.

Other Arab leaders, while pressing the importance of Palestinian involvement in a settlement, have taken the position that the definition of Palestinian interests is something for the Palestinian people themselves to sort out, and the view has been expressed by responsible Arab leaders that realization of Palestinian rights need not be inconsistent with the existence of Israel.

No one, therefore, seems in a position today to say exactly what Palestinian objectives are. . . . What is needed as a first step is a diplomatic process which will help bring forth a reasonable definition of Palestinian interests -- a position from which negotiations on a solution of the Palestinian aspects of the problem might begin. The issue is not whether Palestinian interests should be expressed in a final settlement, but how. There will be no peace unless an answer is found.

Another requirement is the development of a framework for negotiations—a statement of the objectives and the terms of reference. The framework for the negotiations that have taken place thus far and the agreements they have produced involving Israel, Syria, and Egypt, has been
provided by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In accepting that framework, all of the parties to the negotiation have accepted that the objective of the negotiations is peace between them based on mutual recognition, territorial integrity, political independence, the right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders, and the resolution of the specific issues which comprise the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The major problem that must be resolved in establishing a framework for bringing issues of concern to the Palestinians into negotiation, therefore, is to find a common basis for the negotiation that Palestinians and Israelis can both accept. This could be achieved by common acceptance of the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions, although they do not deal with the political aspect of the Palestinian problem.

A particularly difficult aspect of the problem is the question of who negotiates for the Palestinians. It has been our belief that Jordan would be a logical negotiator for the Palestinian-related issues. The Rabat Summit, however, recognized the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." . . .

However, the PLO does not accept the United Nations Security Council resolutions, does not recognize the existence of Israel, and has not stated its readiness to negotiate peace with Israel; Israel does not recognize the PLO or the idea of a separate Palestinian entity. Thus we do not at this point have the framework for a negotiation involving the PLO. We cannot envision or urge a negotiation between two parties as long as one professes to hold the objective of eliminating the other -- rather than the objective of negotiating peace with it.

There is one other aspect to this problem. Elements of PLO have used terrorism to gain attention for their cause. Some Americans as well as many Israelis and others have been killed by Palestinian terrorists. The international community cannot condone such practices, and it seems to us that there must be some assurance if Palestinians are drawn into that negotiating process that these practices will be curbed.

This is the problem which we now face. If the progress toward peace which has now begun is to continue, a solution to this question must be found. We have not devised an American solution, nor would it be appropriate for us to do so. This is the responsibility of the parties and the purpose of the negotiating process. But we have not closed our minds to any reasonable solution which can contribute to progress toward our overriding objective in the Middle East—an Arab-Israeli peace. The step-by-step approach to negotiations which we have pursued has been based partly on the understanding that issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict take time to mature. It is obvious that thinking on the Palestinian aspects of the problem must evolve on all sides. As it does, what is not possible today may become possible.

Our consultations on how to move the peace forward will recognize the need to deal with this subject. Secretary Kissinger has said, "We are prepared work with all the parties toward a solution of all the issues yet remaining -- including the issue of the future of the Palestinians.” We will do so because the issues of concern to the Palestinians are important in themselves and because the Arab governments participating in the negotiations have made clear that progress in the overall negotiations will depend in part on progress on issues of concern to the Palestinians.
We are prepared to consider any reasonable proposal from any quarter, and we will expect other parties to the negotiation to be equally open-minded.
This is the European Community’s answer to the Camp David Accords two years earlier. Nine members of the European Community offered to play a role in bringing together the Israelis and Palestinians in the search for a peaceful solution. The key points are shown in bold (emphasis added).

The Venice Declaration was as utopian as any externally generated solution. The thought that Israel might be swayed by an international guarantee of its border was ridiculed by Menachem Begin: “In the whole world, there is no guarantee that can guarantee a guarantee” (quoted in Morris, 2001, p. 446). Moreover, the expectation that a renunciation of the use of force could curb the aggressive instincts of any of the parties was unrealistic.

Result: Israel rejected the declaration in part because the European Community insisted that the PLO be included. The PLO at the time was refusing to recognize Israel and was calling for its destruction. In later years, Israel has hinted that it might be prepared to negotiate the status of Jerusalem, but it has never been willing to agree in advance that its annexation of East Jerusalem was illegal.

Text of Venice Declaration
Source: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/FEF015E8B1A1E5A685256D810059D922

1. The Heads of State and Government and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs held a comprehensive exchange of views on all aspects of the present situation in the Middle East, including the state of negotiations resulting from the agreements signed between Egypt and Israel in March 1979. They agreed that growing tensions affecting this region constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever.

2. The nine member states of the European Community consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way towards peace.
3. In this regard, the nine countries of the Community base themselves on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the positions which they have expressed on several occasions, notably in their declarations of 29 June 1977, 19 September 1978, 26 March and 18 June 1979, as well as in the speech made on their behalf on 25 September 1979 by the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 34th United Nations General Assembly.

4. On the bases thus set out, the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all States in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

5. All of the countries in the area are entitled to live in peace within secure, recognised and guaranteed borders. The necessary guarantees for a peace settlement should be provided by the United Nations by a decision of the Security Council and, if necessary, on the basis of other mutually agreed procedures. The Nine declare that they are prepared to participate within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, including (guarantees) on the ground.

6. A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination.

7. The achievement of these objectives requires the involvement and support of all the parties concerned in the peace settlement which the Nine are endeavouring to promote in keeping with the principles formulated in the declaration referred to above. These principles are binding on all the parties concerned, and thus on the Palestinian people, and on the PLO, which will have to be associated with the negotiations.

8. The Nine recognise the special importance of the role played by the question of Jerusalem for all the parties concerned. The Nine stress that they will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access for everyone to the Holy Places.

9. The Nine stress the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has done for part of Sinai. They are deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law.

10. Concerned as they are to put an end to violence, the Nine consider that only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, and constitute a basic element for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.
11. The Nine have decided to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned. The objective of these contacts would be to ascertain the position of the various parties with respect to the principles set out in this declaration and in the light of the results of this consultation process to determine the form which an initiative on their part could take.
Appendix C, Annex 24 -- Basic Law (Israel)
Jerusalem, Capital of Israel
July 30, 1980

Of all the issues separating Israelis and Palestinians, Jerusalem might be the most sensitive. The 2000 Camp David summit, for example, broke down primarily over this issue, as the participants acknowledged (Perlez, 2000; Failure, 2000; Joint Statement, 2000; Ross, 2004).

Israel annexed East Jerusalem after seizing it from Jordan in the 1967 war and put the exclamation point on its intentions in 1980 with what Israel called its “basic law” (also known as the Jerusalem law). The smoking gun is the first sentence, shown in bold type (emphasis added), declaring the city “complete and united.” Giving up any part of the city would require Israel to change the law, not just negotiate an agreement. Flexibility would have to rely on the fact that the law does not specify the city’s boundaries, especially those of East Jerusalem, which have varied over the years. What has not varied is the Temple Mount, and this is the critical terrain.

Result: Barely a month after Israel passed the basic law, the United Nations pounced with Security Council Resolution 478 (see Appendix D for the complete text), which recalled Resolution 476, which recalled numerous previous censures of Israel’s land policies. None of this is new – neither the Basic Law, which changed nothing, nor the additional censure, which was abundantly clear from previous censure resolutions – but it does double-underscore the sensitivity of Jerusalem.

Text of Basic Law (Israel)

Jerusalem, Capital of Israel:
1. Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel.
Seat of the President, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court:

2. Jerusalem is the seat of the President of the State, the Knesset, the Government and the Supreme Court.

Protection of Holy Places:

3. The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings towards those places.

Development of Jerusalem:

4. (a) The Government shall provide for the development and prosperity of Jerusalem and the well-being of its inhabitants by allocating special funds, including a special annual grant to the Municipality of Jerusalem (Capital City Grant) with the approval of the Finance Committee of the Knesset.
(b) Jerusalem shall be given special priority in the activities of the authorities of the State so as to further its development in economic and other matters.
(c) The Government shall set up a special body or special bodies for the implementation of this section.

/s/ Menachem Begin, Prime Minister; Yitzchak Navon, President of the State
Appendix C, Annex 25 -- Reagan Plan
September 3, 1982

U.S. President Ronald Reagan presented this plan during the euphoria surrounding the successful evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, Lebanon, to Tunis. The hope was that its departure presented a new opportunity for peace. How wrong he was.

Hadawi (1989) called it “no plan at all, but merely proposals serving one side of the conflict,” by which he meant the Israeli side (p. 323). Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who had not been consulted in its preparation, recalled his reaction: “It was the saddest day of my life” (The Reagan Plan, 1982).

The plan was fair in the sense that it infuriated both Arabs and Israelis. Each side focused on parts it didn’t like, not on the favorable parts. For example, the Reagan Plan called for full autonomy for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see emphasis added) -- a huge victory for the Palestinians. But they objected because Reagan made no reference to refugees. The Israelis, instead of applauding the statement that the United States would not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, attacked the offer of full autonomy for Palestine.

Other unsuccessful attempts by Reagan to influence a settlement included a proposal to freeze Israeli settlements and to keep Jerusalem undivided pending final-status negotiations.

Result: Although the plan was shelved, it marked a step forward in that it aimed at a comprehensive solution. Despite the negative reactions, it laid the groundwork for the recognition that neither side would be able to get both peace and everything on its list of demands. As long as both sides held out for everything, neither would get anything more than the status quo.
For a rebuttal by Israel, see Cabinet Resolution on the Reagan Plan:

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1982-1984/68%20Cabinet%20Resolution%20on%20the%20Reagan%20Plan-
%202%20Septem


Text of Reagan Plan

Sources:  http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/reaganplan.html

Today has been a day that should make all of us proud. It marked the end of the successful evacuation of the P.L.O. from Beirut, Lebanon. This peaceful step could never have been taken without the good offices of the United States and, especially, the truly heroic work of a great American diplomat, Philip Habib. Thanks to his efforts I am happy to announce that the U.S. Marine contingent helping to supervise the evacuation has accomplished its mission.

Our young men should be out of Lebanon within two weeks. They, too, have served the cause of peace with distinction and we can all be very proud of them.

But the situation in Lebanon is only part of the overall problem of the conflict in the Middle East. So, over the past two weeks, while events in Beirut dominated the front page, America was engaged in a quiet, behind-the-scenes effort to lay the groundwork for a broader peace in the region.

For once, there were no premature leaks as U.S. diplomatic missions traveled to Mid-East capitals and I met here at home with a wide range of experts to map out an American peace initiative for the long-suffering peoples of the Middle East, Arab and Israeli alike.

It seemed to me that, with the agreement in Lebanon, we had an opportunity for a more far-reaching peace effort in the region - and I was determined to seize that moment. In the words of the scripture, the time had come to "follow after the things which make for peace."

Tonight, I want to report to you on the steps we have taken, and the prospects they can open up for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

America has long been committed to bringing peace to this troubled region. For more than a generation, successive U.S. administrations have endeavored to develop a fair and workable process that could lead to a true and lasting Arab-Israeli peace. Our involvement in the search for
Mid-East peace is not a matter of preference; it is a moral imperative. The strategic importance of the region to the U.S. is well known.

But our policy is motivated by more than strategic interests. We also have an irreversible commitment to the survival and territorial integrity of friendly states. Nor can we ignore the fact that the wellbeing of much of the world's economy is tied to stability in the strife-torn Middle East. Finally, our traditional humanitarian concerns dictate a continuing effort to peacefully resolve conflicts.

When our administration assumed office in January 1981, I decided that the general framework for our Middle East policy should follow the broad guidelines laid down by my predecessors.

There were two basic issues we had to address: First, there was the strategic threat Lebanese to rebuild their war-torn country. We owe it to ourselves and to posterity, to move quickly, to build upon this achievement. A stable and revived Lebanon is essential to all our hopes for peace in the region. The people of Lebanon deserve the best efforts of the international community to turn the nightmares of the past several years into a new dawn of hope.

But the opportunities for peace in the Middle East do not begin and end in Lebanon. As we help Lebanon rebuild, we must also move to resolve the root causes of conflict between the Arabs and Israelis.

This war in Lebanon has demonstrated many things, but two consequences are key to the peace process:

First, the military losses of the P.L.O. have not diminished the yearning of the Palestinian people for a just solution of their claims; and second, while Israel's military success in Lebanon have demonstrated that its armed forces are second to none in the region, they alone cannot bring just and lasting peace to Israel and her neighbors.

The question now is how to reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. And that answer can only come at the negotiating table. Each party must recognize that the outcome must be acceptable to all and that true peace will require compromises by all.

So, tonight, I am calling for a fresh start. This is the moment for all those directly concerned to get involved in - or lend their support to - a workable basis for peace. The Camp David agreement remains the foundation of our policy. Its language provides all parties with the leeway they need for successful negotiations.

I call on Israel to make clear that the security for which she yearns can only be achieved through genuine peace, a peace requiring magnanimity, vision and courage.

I call on the Palestinian people to recognize that their own political aspirations are inextricably bound to recognition of Israel's right to a secure future.
And I call on the Arab states to accept the reality of Israel -- and the reality that peace and justice are to be gained only through hard, fair, direct negotiations.

In making these calls upon others, I recognize that the United States has a special responsibility. No other nation is in a position to deal with the key parties to the conflict on the basis of trust and reliability.

The time has come for a new realism on the part of all the peoples of the Middle East. The State of Israel is an accomplished fact; it deserves unchallenged legitimacy within the community of nations. But Israel's legitimacy has thus far been recognized by too few countries, and has been denied by every Arab state except Egypt. Israel exists; it has a right to exist in peace behind secure and defensible borders, and it has a right to demand of its neighbors that they recognize those facts.

I have personally followed and supported Israel's heroic struggle for survival, ever since the founding of the State of Israel 34 years ago. In the pre-1967 borders Israel was barely 10 miles wide at its narrowest point. The bulk of Israel's population lived within artillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am not about to ask Israel to live that way again.

The war in Lebanon has demonstrated another reality in the region. The departure of the Palestinians from Beirut dramatizes more than ever the homelessness of the Palestinian people. Palestinians feel strongly that their cause is more than a question of refugees. I agree.

The Camp David agreement recognized that fact when it spoke of "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements." For peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. Only through broader participation in the peace process - most immediately by Jordan and by the Palestinians - will Israel be able to rest confident in the knowledge that its security and integrity will be respected by its neighbors. Only through the process of negotiation can all the nations of the Middle East achieve a secure peace.

These, then, are our general goals. What are the specific new American positions and why are we taking them?

In the Camp David talks thus far, both Israel and Egypt have felt free to express openly their views as to what the outcome should be. Understandably, their views have differed on many points.

The United States has thus far sought to play the role of mediator; we have avoided public comment on the key issues. We have always recognized - and continue to recognize - that only the voluntary agreement of those parties most directly involved in the conflict can provide an enduring solution. But it has become evident to me that some clearer sense of America's position on the key issues is necessary to encourage wider support for the peace process.

First, as outlined in the Camp David accords, there must be a period of time during which the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will have full autonomy over their own
affairs. Due consideration must be given to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of the territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

The purpose of the five-year period of transition which would begin after free elections for a self-governing Palestinian authority is to prove to the Palestinians that they can run their own affairs, and that such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat to Israel's security.

The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transition period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs and a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.

I want to make the American position clearly understood: the purpose of this transition period is the peaceful and orderly transfer of domestic authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, such a transfer must not interfere with Israel's security requirements.

Beyond the transition period, as we look to the future of the West Bank and Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved by the formation of an independent Palestinian state in those territories. Nor is it achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza.

So the United States will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel.

There is, however, another way to peace. The final status of these lands must, of course, be reached through the give-and-take of negotiations; but it is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace.

We base our approach squarely on the principle that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through the negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace. This exchange is enshrined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which is, in turn, incorporated in all its parts in the Camp David agreements. U.N. Resolution 242 remains wholly valid as the foundation-stone of America's Middle East peace effort.

It is the United States' position that -- in return for peace -- the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza.

When the border is negotiated between Jordan and Israel, our view on the extent to which Israel should be asked to give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of true peace and normalization and the security arrangements offered in return.
Finally, we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations.

In the course of the negotiations to come, the United States will support positions that seem to us fair and reasonable compromises and likely to promote a sound agreement. We will also put forward our own detailed proposals when we believe they can be helpful. And, make no mistake, the United States will oppose any proposal - from any party and at any point in the negotiating process - that threatens the security of Israel. America's commitment to the security of Israel is ironclad. And I might add, so is mine.

During the past few days, our ambassadors in Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have presented to their host countries the proposal in full detail that I have outlined here tonight.

I am convinced that these proposals can bring justice, bring security and bring durability to an Arab-Israeli peace.

The United States will stand by these principles with total dedication. They are fully consistent with Israel's security requirements and the aspirations of the Palestinians. We will work hard to broaden participation at the peace table as envisaged by the Camp David Accords. And I fervently hope that the Palestinians and Jordan, with the support of their Arab colleagues, will accept this opportunity.

Tragic turmoil in the Middle East runs back to the dawn of history. In our modern day, conflict after conflict has taken its brutal toll there. In an age of nuclear challenge and economic interdependence, such conflicts are a threat to all the people of the world, not just the Middle East itself. It is time for us all - in the Middle East and around the world - to call a halt to conflict, hatred and prejudice; it is time for us all to launch a common effort for reconstruction, peace and progress.

It has often been said -- and regrettably too often been true -- that the story of the search for peace and justice in the Middle East is a tragedy of opportunities missed.

In the aftermath of the settlement in Lebanon we now face an opportunity for a broader peace. This time we must not let it slip from our grasp. We must look beyond the difficulties and obstacles of the present and move with fairness and resolve toward a brighter future. We owe it to ourselves -- and to posterity -- to do no less. For if we miss this chance to make a fresh start, we may look back on this moment from some later vantage point and realize how much that failure cost us all.

These, then, are the principles upon which American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict will be based. I have made a personal commitment to see that they endure and, God willing, that they will come to be seen by all reasonable, compassionate people as fair, achievable and in the interests of all who wish to see peace in the Middle East. Tonight, on the eve of what can be the dawning of new hope for the people of the troubled Middle East - and for all the world's people who dream of a just and peaceful future - I ask you, my fellow Americans, for your support and your prayers in this great undertaking.
Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel in 1979 put pressure on other Arab states to respond. Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Fahd drafted a peace plan in 1981, but it met with resistance from some Arab countries because it implicitly recognized Israel (Shazly, 1986).

The Arab Summit Conference, meeting at Fez, Morocco, in 1982, adopted a version of the Fahd Plan called the Fez Initiative. Although it didn’t quite propose peace treaties, it floated several ideas that have been incorporated into subsequent peace plans. The central offer was normal relations between Israel and all Arab states in exchange for complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.

Ambiguous wording, of course, is the secret to getting broad approval, and the Fahd plan was full of roadside bombs. Consider No. 7, for example (emphasis added), which calls for “guarantees of peace between all States of the region.” Does that include Israel? And if it does, does it mean the Jewish state of Israel or the Israel after the Palestinian refugees had exercised their “inalienable right of return”? And what about that new word: imprescriptible? Does No. 4 grant the PLO the right to define it, considering that the PLO at the time was insisting that its goal was the destruction of Israel?

For a comparison of the Fahd plan with the Fez initiative, see Remembering (2007).

Result: No one was fully satisfied with the Fahd Plan or its Fez variation, and they wound up on the pile with the other rejected proposals. The Saudis would not try again until 2002. Nevertheless, the initiative was a huge step forward from the 1967 Khartoum Resolution, famous for its “three no’s” statement of Arab policy.
Text of the Fez initiative (Fahd plan)

Source: http://www.mideastweb.org/fahd_fez_plan.htm

1. The withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories occupied by it in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem;

2. The dismantling of the settlements established by Israel in the Arab territories since 1967;

3. The guaranteeing of freedom of worship and performance of religious rites for all religions in the Holy Places;

4. The reaffirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the exercise of their inalienable and *impresscriptible* national rights, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole and legitimate representative, and the indemnification of those who do not desire to return;

5. The placing of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under the supervision of the United Nations for a transitional period not exceeding a few months;

6. The establishment of an independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital;

7. The establishment by the United Nations Security Council of guarantees of peace between all States of the region, including the independent Palestinian State;

8. The guaranteeing by the Security Council of the implementation of these principles.
Originally published in Arabic on February 16, 1985, in the Beirut newspaper al-Safir

Two translations of the Hezbollah Program are presented here. Both versions have been edited, presumably by the translators, although no explanations were given for the editing decisions.

An attempt has been made here to match the two translations. The longer version, in the left-hand column, is from Norton (1987, pp. 167-187).

The version in the right-hand column is from the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), based in Israel. This is the translation referenced by the U.S. State Department in Foreign Terrorist Organizations, CRS Report for Congress (Cronin, 2004, pp. 34-36). CRS is an abbreviation for Congressional Research Service, which is part of the Library of Congress. A footnote cites http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm. The link is broken, but it probably refers to http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/4/Default.aspx as the source of the ICT translation. The ICT version closes with a section – “The Necessity for the Destruction of Israel” -- that was omitted in the version published in Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 48, Fall 1988, pp. 111-116. A note explains the addition. “It should be emphasized,” the note says, “that none of Hizballah’s Web sites have published the full text of the organization’s program.”

The spelling, parentheses, brackets and punctuation are original; the bold type and underlines were added to emphasize controversial parts of the program.

Despite heavy editing, the ICT version captures Hezbollah’s key objectives: to liberate Jerusalem, to destroy Israel, to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon, and to fight the U.S.

Cronin (2004) said Hezbollah was established in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics who were inspired by the Iranian revolution (p. 34). Hezbollah has participated in Lebanon’s
political system since 1992, and holds seats in its parliament. Iran provides financial aid; Syria provides diplomatic support.

The name of the party has been transliterated in several spellings. The most common are Hezbollah, which is AP and New York Times style. Other spellings include Hezballah; and Hizballah. The name means Party of God: Hezb (party) + Allah (God). Cronin said Islamic Jihad is an alias for Hezbollah. The United States has labeled Palestinian Islamic Jihad as a terrorist organization (Cronin, 2004). The Hezbollah document is variously called its charter, covenant, program, and manifesto. Cronin uses manifesto.

**Text of Translation From Norton**

Open letter addressed by Hizb Allah to the downtrodden in Lebanon and in the world February 16, 1985.

“In the name of God, the merciful and the compassionate: Those who put their trust in God, His prophet, and the faithful are God’s party and they shall prevail. God almighty is always true.”

**Dedication**

To the torch that burned bright, lit for the downtrodden in Lebanon the path to free and honorable life and burned with the blaze of this innocent blood the tyranny and myth of the Zionist entity:

To the pioneer who was faithful to his kinsmen, who offered them the model for jihad and who did not spare his own life until he died a martyr in supporting them and a witness to the injustice of the world arrogance and its insolence;

To the symbol of the triumphant Islamic resistance and of the splendid uprising through which our kinsmen are still recording their most magnificent Husaini [Shiite] epics in the South and in Western al-Biqqa;

To him who scattered America’s dreams in Lebanon and who resisted the Israeli occupation, carrying the banner of action under the patronage
of Abd Allah Khomeini, the leader jurisprudent whom he always liked to describe as the amir [prince] of the Muslims;

To paramount martyr Raghib Harb, may God be pleased with him, on whose anniversary we present this open letter to the downtrodden in the world, including in its lines the revolutionary Islamic political line embodied by the happy martyr and his brothers so that it may act as a clear path and guide to all the strugglers in Lebanon. We beseech God, may He be praised, to grant us steadfastness, to strength us, and to give us victory over the tyrants.

God’s peace, mercy, and blessings be with you.

Hizb Allah

In the name of God, the compassionate and the merciful:

Say, “the truth is from your Lord”; let him who will, believe and let him who will, reject [it]; for the wrongdoers we have prepared a fire whose [smoke and flames], like the walls and roof of a tent, will hem them in; if they implore relief, they will be granted water like melted brass that will scald their faces. How dreadful the drink! How uncomfortable a couch to recline on!

God is always true.

Who are We and What is Our Identity?
Free downtrodden men,

We are the sons of Hizb Allah’s nation in Lebanon. We greet you and address the entire world through you: notables, institutions, parties, organizations and political, humanitarian, and information associations. We exclude nobody because we are eager for all to hear our voice, understand our word, comprehend our projections, and study our plan.

We, the sons of Hizb Allah’s nation, consider ourself a part of the Islamic nation in the world, which is facing the most tyrannical arrogant assault from both the east and the West – an assault intended to deprive this nation of the

[The version published in the Jerusalem Quarterly (1988) begins here.]
content of the message with which God has blessed it so that it may be the best nation known to the world, a nation that encourages virtue and discourages vice and that believes in God. The assault is also aimed at usurping this nation’s wealth and resources, at exploiting the capabilities and skills of its sons, and at controlling all its affairs.

We the sons of Hizb Allah’s nation, whose vanguard God has given victory in Iran and which has established the nucleus of the world’s central Islamic state, abide by the orders of a single wise and just command currently embodied in the supreme Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini, the rightly guided imam who combines all the qualities of the total imam, who has detonated the Muslim’s revolution, and who is bringing about the glorious Islamic renaissance.

Therefore, we in Lebanon are not a closed organizational party nor a narrow political framework. Rather, we are a nation tied to the Muslims in every part of the world by a strong ideological and political bond, namely Islam, whose message God completed at the hands of the last of His prophets, Muhammad, may God’s peace and prayers be upon him and upon his kinsmen. God has established Islam as a religion for the world to follow, saying in the venerable Quran: “Today I have perfected your religion for you, and I have completed My blessing upon you, and I have approved Islam.”

Therefore, what befalls the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Philippines, or elsewhere befalls the body of our Islamic nation of which we are an indivisible part and we move to confront it out of a religious duty primarily and in the light of a general political visualization decided by the leader jurisprudent.

The main sources of our culture are the venerable Quran, the infallible Sunna, and the decisions and religious opinions made by the jurisprudent, who is the authority on tradition among us. The sources are clear, uncomplicated,

By virtue of the above, we do not constitute an organized and closed party in Lebanon, nor are we a tight political cadre. We are an umma linked to the Muslims of the whole world by the solid doctrinal and religious connection of Islam, whose message God wanted to be fulfilled by the Seal of the Prophets, i.e., Muhammad. This is why whatever touches or strikes the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and elsewhere reverberates throughout the whole Muslim umma of which we are an integral part. Our behavior is dictated to us by legal principles laid down by the light of an overall political conception defined by the leading jurist (wilayat al-faqih).

As for our culture, it is based on the Holy Koran, the Sunna and the legal rulings of the faqih who is our source of imitation (marja’ al-taqlid). Our culture is crystal clear. It is not complicated and is accessible to all.
and accessible to all without exception and they need no theorization or philosophy. All they need is abidance and application.

As to its military power, nobody can imagine its dimensions because we do not have a military agency separate from the other parts of our body. Each of us is a combat soldier when the call of jihad demands it and each of us undertakes his task in the battle in accordance with his lawful assignment within the framework of action under the guardianship of the leader jurisprudent. God is behind us, supporting us with His care, putting fear in our enemies’ hearts, and giving us His dear and resounding victory against them.

Arrogant World Is in Agreement on Fighting Us Free downtrodden men,

The countries of the tyrannical arrogant world in the West and the East have agreed to fight us and have been instigating their agents against us, trying to distort our reputation and to fabricate lies against us in a malicious attempt to drive a wedge between us and good and downtrodden men and in an endeavor to dwarf and deface the most important major accomplishments we have made at the level of our confrontation with the United States and its allies.

Through its local agents, the United States has tried to give people the impression that those who have put an end to its arrogance in Lebanon, who drove it out humiliated and frustrate, and who crushed its plot against the downtrodden in this country are no more than a handful of fanatics and terrorists who are only concerned with blowing up drinking, gambling, and entertainment spots and other such activities.

But we are confident that such insinuations will never deceive our nation because the entire world knows that whoever thinks of confronting the United States and world arrogance does not resort to such peripheral acts that preoccupy them with the tail and make them forget the head.

ICT Translation

No one can imagine the importance of our military potential as our military apparatus is not separate from our overall social fabric. Each of us is a fighting soldier. And when it becomes necessary to carry out the Holy War, each of us takes up his assignment in the fight in accordance with the injunctions of the Law, and that in the framework of the mission carried out under the tutelage of the Commanding Jurist.

Our Fight
The US has tried, through its local agents, to persuade the people that those who crushed their arrogance in Lebanon and frustrated their conspiracy against the oppressed (mustad’afin) were nothing but a bunch of fanatic terrorists whose sole aim is to dynamite bars and destroy slot machines. Such suggestions cannot and will not mislead our umma, for the whole world knows that whoever wishes to oppose the US, that arrogant superpower, cannot indulge in marginal acts which may make it deviate from its major objective. We combat abomination and we shall tear out its very roots, its primary roots, which are the US. All attempts made to drive us into marginal actions will fail, especially as our determination to fight the US is solid.
American behind All Our Catastrophes

We are moving in the direction of fighting the roots of vice and the first root of vice is America. All the endeavors to drag us into marginal action will be futile when compared with the confrontation with the United States. Imam Khomeini, the leader, has repeatedly stressed that America is the reason for all our catastrophes and the source of all malice. By fighting it, we are only exercising our legitimate right to defend our Islam and the dignity of our nation.

We declare frankly and clearly that we are a nation that fears only God and that does not accept tyranny, aggression, and humiliation. American and its allies and the Zionist entity that has usurped the sacred Islamic land of Palestine have engaged and continue to engage in constant aggression against us and are working constantly to humiliate us. Therefore, we are in a state of constant and escalating preparedness to repel the aggression and to defend our religion, existence, and dignity.

They have attacked our country, destroyed our villages, massacred our children, violated our sanctuaries, and installed over our heads criminal henchmen who have perpetrated terrible massacres against our nation. They are still supporting these butchers who are Israel’s allies and preventing us from determining our destiny with our free will.

Their bombs fell on our kinsmen like rain during the Zionist invasion of our country and the Beirut blockade. Their planes raided our civilians, children, women, and wounded day and night whereas the areas of the agent Phalangists remained safe from the enemy’s bombardment and a center for directing and guiding the enemy forces.

We appealed to the world’s conscience but heard nothing from it and found no trace of it.

This conscience that we missed in the days of tribulation is the same conscience that was mobilized and alerted when the criminal
Phalangists were blockaded in the city of Zahle in al-Bïqa and when the allies of Israel in Dair al-Qamar, in al-Shuf, were besieged. We were horrified and then realized that his world conscience stirs only at the request of the strong and in response to the interests of arrogance.

The Israelis and Phalangists massacred several thousands of our fathers, children, women, and brothers in Sabra and Chatila in a single night but no practical renunciation or condemnation was expressed by any international organization or authority against this heinous massacre that was perpetrated in coordination with the NATO forces, who, only a few days, rather hours, earlier, had departed from the camps that the defeated [Palestinians] agreed to put under the protection of the wolf in response to the maneuver of Philip Habib, the U.S. fox.

Those criminal attacks came only to reaffirm our firm belief that “you will find that those most hostile to the faithful are the Jew and the idolators.”

We Have No Alternative to Confrontation

Thus, we have seen that aggression can be repelled only with sacrifices and dignity gained only with the sacrifice of blood, and that freedom is not given but regained with the sacrifice of both heart and soul.

We have opted for religion, freedom, and dignity over humiliation and constant submission to America and its allies and to Zionism and their Phalangist allies. We have risen to liberate our country, to drive the imperialists and the invaders out of it, and to determine our fate by our own hands.

We could not endure more than we have endured. Our tragedy is more than ten years old and all we have seen so far are the covetous, hypocritical, and incapable.

Zionist-Phalange Coordination

Nearly 100,000 is the number of the victims

In a single night the Israelis and Phalangists executed thousands of our sons, women and children in Sabra and Shatilla. No international organization protested or denounced this ferocious massacre in an effective manner, a massacre perpetrated with the tacit accord of America’s European allies, which had retreated a few days, maybe even a few hours earlier, from the Palestinian camps. The Lebanese defeatists accepted putting the camps under the protection of that crafty fox, the US envoy Philip Habib.

We have no alternative but to confront aggression by sacrifice. The coordination between the Phalangists and Israel continues and develops. A hundred thousand victims - this is the approximate balance sheet of crimes committed by them and by the US against us. Almost half a million Muslims were forced to leave their homes. Their quarters were virtually totally destroyed in Nab’a, my own Beirut suburb, as well as in Burj Hammud, Dekonaneh, Tel Zaatar, Sinbay, Ghawarina and Jubeil — all in areas controlled today by the ‘Lebanese Forces’. The Zionist occupation then launched its usurpatory invasion of Lebanon in full and open collusion with the Phalanges. The latter condemned all attempts to resist the invading forces. They participated in the implementation of certain Israeli plans in order to accomplish its Lebanese dream and acceded to all Israeli requests in order to gain power.
of the crimes perpetrated against us by America, Israel, and the Phalange.

Nearly one half million Muslims have been displaced and their quarters of al-Naba, Burj Hammud, al-Dikwana, Tall al-Zatar, Sibniya, al-Ghawarina and in Jabail have been almost totally destroyed. Our kinsmen staying in Jabail are still exposed to the tragedy without a single international organization moving to rescue them.

The Zionist occupation continues to usurp the lands of the Muslims, extending over more than one-third of Lebanon’s area in prior coordination and full agreement with the Phalange, who have denounced the attempts to confront the invading forces and have taken part in implementing some of Israel’s schemes so as to complete Israel’s plan and to give it what it wishes in return for its leading them to power.

Thus, butcher Bashir al-Jumayyil had attained the presidency with the help of Israel, of the Arab oil countries, and of the Muslim deputies who are subservient to the Phalange. He gained this presidency in the wake of a skillful maneuver to beautify his image in a surgery room called the Salvation Committee – a committee that is not more than an American-Israeli bridge over which the Phalange crossed to oppress the downtrodden.

But our people were not willing to endure this humiliation and they wiped out the dreams of the Zionists and their allies. But America persisted in its rashness and brought Amin Al-Jumayyil to succeed his brother. Amin’s first accomplishment was to destroy the homes of the evacuees, to attack the Muslim’s mosques, to order the army to demolish the quarters of the downtrodden on the heads of their occupants, to enlist the help of NATO forces against us, and to conclude the ill-Fated May 17 accord that turned Lebanon into an Israeli protectorate and an American colony.

And this is, in fact, what happened. Bashir Jumayyil, that butcher, seized power with the help also of OPEC countries and the Jumayyil family. Bashir tried to improve his ugly image by joining the six-member Committee of Public Safety presided over by former President Elias Sarkis, which was nothing but an American-Israeli bridge borrowed by the Phalangists in order to control the oppressed.

Our people could not tolerate humiliation any more. It destroyed the oppressors, the invaders and their lackeys. But the US persisted in its folly and installed Amin Jumayyil to replace his brother. Some of his first so-called achievements were to destroy the homes of refugees and other displaced persons, attack mosques, and order the army to bombard the southern suburbs of Beirut, where the oppressed people resided. He invited European troops to help him against us and signed the May 17th, [1984] accord with Israel making Lebanon an American protectorate.
Our Basic Enemies

Our people could not withstand all this treason and decided to confront the imams of infidelity of America, France, and Israel. The first punishment against these forces was carried out on April 18 and the second on October 29, 1983. By that time, a real war had started against the Israeli occupation forces, rising to the level of destroying two main centers of the enemy’s military rulers. Our people also escalated their popular and military Islamic resistance to the point where they forced the enemy to make its decision on phased withdrawal — a decision that Israel was compelled to adopt for the first time in the history of the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict.

For the sake of the truth, we declare that the sons of Hizb Allah’s nation have come to know well their basic enemies in the area: Israel, America, France, and the Phalange.

Our Objectives in Lebanon

Our sons are now in a state of ever-escalating confrontation against these enemies until the following objectives are achieved:

Israel’s final departure from Lebanon as a prelude to its final obliteration from existence and the liberation of venerable Jerusalem from the talons of Occupation.

The final departure of America, France, and their allies from Lebanon and the termination of the influence of any imperialist power in the country.

Submission by the Phalange to just rule and their trial for the crimes they have committed against both Muslims and Christians with the encouragement of America and Israel.

Giving all our people the opportunity to determine their fate and to choose with full freedom the system of government they want, keeping in mind that we do not hide our commitment to the rule of Islam and that we urge to choose the Islamic system that alone guarantees justice and dignity for all and prevents any new imperialist attempt to infiltrate our country.

Our Objectives

Let us put it truthfully: the sons of Hizballah know who are their major enemies in the Middle East — the Phalanges, Israel, France and the US. The sons of our umma are now in a state of growing confrontation with them, and will remain so until the realization of the following three objectives:

(a) to expel the Americans, the French and their allies definitely from Lebanon, putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land;

(b) to submit the Phalanges to a just power and bring them all to justice for the crimes they have perpetrated against Muslims and Christians;

(c) to permit all the sons of our people to determine their future and to choose in all the liberty the form of government they desire. We call upon all of them to pick the option of Islamic government which, alone, is capable of guaranteeing justice and liberty for all. Only an Islamic regime can stop any further tentative attempts of imperialistic infiltration into our country.
Friends

These are our objectives in Lebanon and these our enemies. As for our friends, they are all the world’s downtrodden peoples and all those who fight our enemies and who are eager not to harm us, be they individuals, parties or organizations. We especially address this letter to them to say:

O partisans and organized people, wherever you are in Lebanon and whatever your ideas, we agree with you on major and important goals embodied in the need to topple the American domination of the country, to expel the Zionist occupation that bears down heavily on the people’s lives, and to strike all the Phalangist endeavors to control government and administrative affairs, even though we may disagree with you on the methods and the level of confrontation.

Come, let us rise above quarreling over minor issues and let us open wide the doors of competition for achieving the major goals. It is not important that a certain party control the street. What is important is that the masses interact with this party.

It is not important that many military parades be held for the citizens. What is important is to increase the operations against Israel.

It is not important that we draft statements and call for conferences. What is important is that we turn Lebanon into a graveyard for American schemes.

You carry ideas that do not stem from Islam. This should not prevent cooperation between us for these objectives, especially since we feel that the motives urging you to engage in the struggle are fundamentally Islamic motives emanating from the injustice inflicted upon you by tyranny and the oppression exercised against you by it. Though formed through non-Islamic ideas, these motives must inevitably revert to their essence when you find that revolutionary Islam is the force leading the struggle and confronting oppression and arrogance.

However, we shall accept no provocation,
instigation, or aggression from you against our security or our dignity, we are obliged with you to deal with any problem with the good word first, and we are eager not to let you obstruct our movement toward our objectives.

You will find us eager to open up to you. You will also find that our relationship with you will grow stronger the closer our ideas move toward each other, the more we feel that your decisionmaking is independent, and the more the interest of Islam and the Muslims dictates that this relationship be bolstered and developed.

O downtrodden partisans,
You have sought what is right but have missed it, and those who seek what is right and miss it are not like those who seek what is false and hit it.

Therefore, we extend our hand to you and tell you sincerely: “O our people, answer God’s summoner” and “Respond to God and the Messenger when He calls you unto that which will give you life.”

We Are Committed to Islam But We Do Not Impose It by Force

O free, downtrodden people,

We are a nation committed to the message of Islam and a nation that wishes the downtrodden and all people to study this divine message because I will bring about justice, people, and serenity in the world.

God, may He be praised, says, “Let there be no compulsion in religion; Right stands out clearly from wrong; whoever rejects evil and believes in God has grasped the most trustworthy handhold, that never breaks. And God hears and knows all things. God is the Protector of those who have faith; from the depths of darkness He will lead them forth into light. O those who reject faith, the patrons are the evil ones; from light they will leave them forth into the depths of darkness. They will be companions of the fire, to dwell therein [forever].”

Therefore, we do not wish to impose Islam on

We are an umma which adheres to the message of Islam. We want all the oppressed to be able to study the divine message in order to bring justice, peace and tranquility to the world. This is why we don’t want to impose Islam upon anybody, as much as we that others impose upon us their convictions and their political systems. We don’t want Islam to reign in Lebanon by force as is the case with the Maronites today. This is the minimum that we can accept in order to be able to accede by legal means to realize our ambitions, to save Lebanon from its dependence upon East and West, to put an end to foreign occupation and to adopt a regime freely wanted by the people of Lebanon.
anybody and we hate to see others impose on us their convictions and their systems. We do not want Islam to rule in Lebanon by force, as the political Maronism is ruling at present.

But we stress that we are convinced of Islam as a faith, system, thought, and rule and we urge all to recognize it and to resort to its law. We also urged them to adopt it and abide by its teachings at the individual, political, and social levels.

If our people get the opportunity to choose Lebanon’s system of government freely, they will favor no alternative to Islam.

Therefore, we urge adoption of the Islamic system on the basis of free and direct selection by the people, not the basis of forceful imposition, as some people imagine.

We declare that we aspire to see Lebanon as an indivisible part of the political map opposed to America, world arrogance, and world Zionism and to see Lebanon ruled by Islam and its just leadership.

This is the aspiration of a nation, not of a party, and the choice of a people, not of a gang.

Our Minimum Aspiration in Lebanon
Therefore, the minimum we shall accept in terms of achieving this aspiration, which we are lawfully charged to achieve, is:

Rescuing Lebanon from subservience to either the West or the East, expelling the Zionist occupation from its territories finally and adopting a system that the people establish of their free will and choice.

Why Do We Confront the Existing Regime?
This is our visualization and these are our projections of what we want in Lebanon. In the light of this visualization and these projections, we confront the existing regime due to two main considerations:

1. Because it is a protégé of world arrogance and a part of the political map that is hostile to Islam.

2. Because it is a fundamentally oppressive...
structure that no reform or patchwork improvement would do any good and that must be changed from the roots “and whosoever judges not according to what God has sent down, they are the evildoers.”

Our Position toward Opposition

We determine our stance vis-à-vis any opposition to the Lebanese regime in light of the two above-mentioned considerations.

We consider any opposition moving within red lines imposed by the arrogant forces a superficial opposition that will ultimately agree with the existing regime.

Any opposition moving within the sphere of protecting and safe-guarding the constitution currently in force and not committed to making fundamental changes in the system’s roots is also a superficial opposition that will not achieve the interests of the oppressed masses.

Moreover, any opposition moving within the positions where the regime wants it to move is an imaginary opposition that serves only the regime.

On the other hand, we are not at all interested in any projection for political reform within the framework of the rotten sectarian system, just exactly as we are not interested in the formation of any cabinet or the participation of any figure in any ministry representing a part of the oppressive regime.

We consider that all opposition in Lebanon voiced in the name of reform can only profit, ultimately, the present system. All such opposition which operates within the framework of the conservation and safeguarding of the present constitution without demanding changes at the level of the very foundation of the regime is, hence, an opposition of pure formality which cannot satisfy the interests of the oppressed masses. Likewise, any opposition which confronts the present regime but within the limits fixed by it, is an illusory opposition which renders a great service to the Jumayyil system.

Moreover, we cannot be concerned by any proposition of political reform which accepts the rotten system actually in effect.

We could not care less about the creation of this or that governmental coalition or about the participation of this or that political personality in some ministerial post, which is but a part of this unjust regime.

The politics followed by the chiefs of political Maronism through the ‘Lebanese Front’ and the ‘Lebanese Forces’ cannot guarantee peace and tranquillity for the Christians of Lebanon, whereas it is predicated upon ‘asabiyya (narrow-minded particularism), on confessional privileges and on the alliance with colonialism. The Lebanese crisis has proven that confessional privileges are one of the principal causes of the great explosion which ravaged the country. It also proved that outside help was of no use to the Christians of Lebanon, just when they need it most. The bell tolled for the fanatic Christians to rid themselves of denominational allegiance and
Words to Christians in Lebanon
O honorable, downtrodden men,
We wish to address through you a few words to the Christians in Lebanon, especially to the Maronites:

The policy followed by the leaders of political Maronism through the “Lebanese Front” and the “Lebanese Forces” is incapable of achieving peace and stability for the Christians in Lebanon because it is a policy founded on bigotry, sectarian privileges, and alliance with imperialism and Israel.

The Lebanese tragedy has proven that the sectarian privileges are one of the main causes of the big explosion that has brought about the collapse of the country and that the alliance with America, France, and Israel did the Christians no good when they needed the support of these forces.

Moreover, the time has come for the fanatical Christians to come out of the tunnel of sectarian loyalty and of the illusions of monopolizing privileges at the expense of others. It is time for them to respond to the divine call and to resort to reason instead of arms and to conviction instead of sect.

We are confident that Christ, God’s prophet, peace be upon him, is innocent of the massacres perpetrated by the Phalange in his name and yours and innocent of the stupid policy adopted by your leaders to oppress you and oppress us.

Muhammad, God’s prophet, peace and mercy be upon him, is also innocent of those who are counted as Muslims and who do not observe God’s law and who do not seek to apply God’s rules to you and to us.

If you reconsider your calculations and you realize that your interest lies in what you decide with your own free will and now in what is
imposed on you with iron and fire, then we will renew our call to you in response to God’s words: “Say, ‘O people of the Book! Come to common terms as between us and you; that we worship none but God; that we associate no partners with him; that we erect not, from among ourselves, lords and patrons other than God.’ If then they turn back, say ‘Bear witness that we [at least] are Muslims.’”

O Christians of Lebanon,

If you find it too much for the Muslims to share with you some government affairs, then God also finds it an excess for us to do so because the Muslims would be taking part in a government that is unjust to you and to us and that is not founded on the basis of the Sharia that was completed by the last of the prophets.

If you want justice, then who is more just than God, who has revealed from heaven the message of Islam alongside the prophets so that they may rule among men justly and may give each his due right?

If somebody has misled you, exaggerated matters for you, and made you afraid of reactions on our part to the crimes the Phalange have committed against us, then this is completely unjustifiable because peaceful Christians are still living among us without being disturbed by anybody.

If we are fighting the Phalange, it is because they are blocking your view of the truth, they turn you away from the way of God, and they desire on the earth improper deviation and they have waxed proud with great insolence.

We wish you well and we call you to Islam so that you may enjoy this world and the hereafter. If you refuse, then all we want of you is to uphold your covenants with the Muslims and not to participate in aggression against them.

O Christians,

Free your thoughts of the residues of hateful sectarianism, liberate your minds from the shackle of fanaticism and insularity, and open your ears to our invitation to you to join Islam.

We don’t wish you evil. We call upon you to embrace Islam so that you can be happy in this world and the next. If you refuse to adhere to Islam, maintain your ties with the Muslims and don’t take part in any activity against them. Free yourselves from the consequences of hateful confessionalism. Banish from your hearts all fanaticism and parochialism. Open your hearts to our Call (da’wa) which we address to you. Open yourselves up to Islam where you’ll find
because in it lies your salvation and happiness and your good in this world and in the hereafter.

We extend this invitation of ours to all the downtrodden non-Muslims. As for those who belong to Islam denominationally, we urge them to observe it practically and to rise above fanaticism that is hateful to the religion.

We assure all that this is the age of the victory of Islam and of right and of the defeat of infidelity and falsehood. Join with right before the day comes when the unjust bites his own hand and says: I wish I had followed the prophet’s path and I wish I had not taken so and so for a companion because he has misled me, and the devil always lets man down.

Our Story with World Arrogance

Honorable, downtrodden men,

As for our story with world arrogance, we shall sum it up for you in these words: we believe that the struggle of principles between the United States and the Soviet Union ended forever a long time ago. The two sides have failed to achieve happiness for mankind because the idea they have offered mankind, though assuming the different forms of capitalism and communism, agrees in material content and fails to deal with the problems of mankind.

Neither western capitalism nor eastern socialism has succeeded in establishing the rules of the just and serene society, nor have they been able to establish a balance between the individual and society or between human nature and public interest.

The two sides have mutually recognized this fact and have realized that there is no more place for ideological struggle between the two camps. They have both turned to struggle for influence and interest, hiding from public opinion behind the mask of disagreement on principles.

In the light of this understanding, we believe that the ideological struggle between the two camps has been folded forever and been replaced by the struggle for influence and interests

World Scene

We reject both the USSR and the US, both Capitalism and Communism, for both are incapable of laying the foundations for a just society.

With special vehemence we reject UNIFIL as they were sent by world arrogance to occupy areas evacuated by Israel and serve for the latter as a buffer zone. They should be treated much like the Zionists. All should know that the goals of the Phalangists regime do not carry any weight with the Combatants of the Holy War, i.e., the Islamic resistance. This is the quagmire which awaits all foreign intervention.

There, then, are our conceptions and our objectives which serve as our basis and inspire our march. Those who accept them should know that all rights belong to Allah and He bestows them. Those who reject them, we’ll be patient with them, till Allah decides between us and the people of injustice.

[The version published in the Jerusalem Quarterly ends here.]
between the countries of the arrogant world that are led today by America and the Soviet Union. Consequently, the oppressed countries have become the struggle’s bone of contention and the oppressed peoples have become its fuel.

While we consider the struggle between the two superpowers a natural outcome of the material content that motivates each of them, we cannot agree to have this struggle conducted at the expense of the interests of the downtrodden and the expense of their wealth and rights.

Therefore, we stand against any western or eastern imperialist intervention in the affairs of the oppressed and of their countries and we confront every ambition and intervention in our affairs.

While denouncing America’s crimes in Vietnam, Iran, Nicaragua, Grenada, Palestine, Lebanon, and other countries, we also denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the intervention in Iran’s affairs, the support for Iraqi aggression, and so forth.

In Lebanon and in the Palestine area, we are mainly concerned with confronting America because it is the party with the greatest influence among the countries of world arrogance, and also with confronting Israel, the ulcerous growth of world Zionism. Therefore, we are concerned with confronting America’s allies in NATO who have gotten embroiled in helping America against the area’s peoples. We warn the countries that have not gotten involved yet against being dragged into serving American interests at the expense of our nation’s freedom and interests.

**Israel Must Be Wiped Out of Existence**

As for Israel, we consider it the American spearhead in our Islamic world. It is a usurping enemy that must be fought until the usurped right is returned to its owners.

This enemy poses a great danger to our future generations and to the destiny of our nation, especially since it embraces a settlement-oriented and expansionist idea that it has already begun to

**The Necessity for the Destruction of Israel**

We see in Israel the vanguard of the United States in our Islamic world. It is the hated enemy that must be fought until the hated ones get what they deserve. This enemy is the greatest danger to our future generations and to the destiny of our lands, particularly as it glorifies the ideas of settlement and expansion, initiated in Palestine,
apply in occupied Palestine and it is extending and expanding to build Greater Israel, from the Euphrates to the Nile.

Our struggle with usurping Israel emanates from an ideological and historical awareness that this Zionist entity is aggressive in its origins and structure and is built on usurped land and at the expense of the rights of a Muslim people.

Therefore, our confrontation of this entity must end with its obliteration from existence. This is why we do not recognize any cease-fire agreement, any truce, or any separate or nonseparate peace treaty with it.

We condemn strongly all the plans for mediation between us and Israel and we consider the mediators a hostile party because their mediation will only serve to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation of Palestine.

Therefore, we reject the Camp David treaty, the [King] Fahd plan, the Fez plan, the Reagan plan, the Brezhnev plan, the French-Egyptian plan, and any plan including ever tacit recognition of the Zionist entity.

We underline in this regard our condemnation of all the deviant countries and organizations that chase after capitulationist solutions with the enemy breathlessly and that agree to “barter land for peace.” We consider this a betrayal of the Muslim Palestinian people’s blood and of the sacred Palestinian cause.

On the other hand, we view the recently voiced Jewish call for settlement in south Lebanon and the immigration of the Ethiopian Jews and others to occupied Palestine as part of the expansionist Israeli scheme in the Islamic world and as an actual indicator of the danger emanating from the recognition of or coexistence with this entity.

Escalating Islamic Resistance

When speaking of usurping Israel, we must pause before the phenomenon of Islamic resistance that sprang from the occupied Lebanese territories to impose a new historic and yearning outward to the extension of the Great Israel, from the Euphrates to the Nile.

Our primary assumption in our fight against Israel states that the Zionist entity is aggressive from its inception, and built on lands wrested from their owners, at the expense of the rights of the Muslim people.

Therefore our struggle will end only when this entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease fire, and no peace agreements, whether separate or consolidated.

We vigorously condemn all plans for negotiation with Israel, and regard all negotiators as enemies, for the reason that such negotiation is nothing but the recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation of Palestine. Therefore we oppose and reject the Camp David Agreements, the proposals of King Fahd, the Fez and Reagan plan, Brezhnev’s and the French-Egyptian proposals, and all other programs that include the recognition (even the implied recognition) of the Zionist entity.

ICT note: This paragraph did not appear in the original translation published by the Jerusalem Quarterly. It is possible that this omission is due to the fact that the source (al-Safir) for the translation did not include this text, which appears in the original Hizballah Program. The original Program was published on 16 February 1985. The organization’s spokesman, Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin read the Program at the al-Ouzai Mosque in west Beirut and afterwards it was published as an open letter “to all the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World”. It should be emphasised that none of Hizballah’s web sites have published the full text of the organization’s program, and they prefer to publish the 1996 electoral program which was intended for the specific propaganda campaign before the Lebanese Parliamentary elections in 1996.
cultural turn on the course of the struggle against the Zionist enemy.

The honorable Islamic resistance that has inscribed and continues to inscribe the most magnificent sagas against the Zionist invasion forces, that has destroyed by the faith of its strugglers and myth of invincible Israel, that has been able to place the usurping entity into a real dilemma as a result of the daily military, economic, and human attrition it inflicts on this entity, forcing its leaders to acknowledge the severe resistance they face at the hands of the Muslims …

This Islamic resistance must continue, grow, and escalate, with God’s help, and must receive from all Muslims in all parts of the world utter support, aid, backing, and participation so that we may be able to uproot this cancerous germ and obliterate it from existence.

While underlining the Islamic character of this resistance, we do so out of compatibility with its reality, which is clearly Islamic in motive, objective, course, and depth of confrontation. This does not at all negate its patriotism, but confirms it. On the contrary, if this resistance’s Islamic character were effaced, its patriotism would become extremely fragile.

**Appeal for Broad Islamic Participation**

We take this opportunity to address a warm appeal to all Muslims in the world, urging them to share with their brothers in Lebanon the honor of fighting the occupying Zionists, either directly or by supporting and assisting the strugglers, because **fighting Israel is the responsibility of all Muslims in all parts of the world** and not just the responsibility of the sons of Mount Amil and Western al-Biqa.

With the blood of its martyrs and the struggle of its heroes, the Islamic resistance has been able to force the enemy for the first time in the history of the conflict against it to make a decision to retreat and withdraw from Lebanon without any American or other influence. On the contrary, the
Norton Translation

Israeli withdrawal decision has revealed real American worry and has formed a historic turning point in the course of the struggle against the usurping Zionists.

Through their Islamic resistance, the strugglers – the women with rocks and boiling oil for their weapons, the children with the shouts and their bare fists for their weapons, the old men with their weak bodies and their thick sticks for their weapons, and the youth with their rifles and their firm and faithful will for their weapons – have all proven that if the nation is allowed to manage its affairs freely, it is capable of making miracles and of changing the imaginary fates.

Policy of Government Avariciousness and Treasonous Negotiation

Let us pause a little before the government parades that emerge seasonally in an attempt to mislead the people into believing that the government supports the resistance against the occupation to declare clearly:

Our people have come to loathe verbal and media support and to despise those who offer it. If some statements have been issued by some pillars of the existing regime, let nobody imagine that the masses are unaware of the fact that these statements do not represent the position of the entire regime, especially since the regime is not about to throw its army into battle to share the honor of liberation.

As for the [regime’s] financial support for the resistance, it is insignificant and it has not reached the strugglers in the form of weapons, munitions, combat costs, and so forth.

Our people reject the policy of avariciousness at the expense of the resistance. The day will come when all those who have traded in the blood of our heroic martyrs and who have glorified themselves at the expense of the strugglers’ wounds will be judged.

We cannot but stress that the policy of negotiating with the enemy is high treason
Norton Translation

against the resistance that the regime claims to support and aid and that the regime’s determination to enter into negotiations with the enemy was nothing but a plot aimed at recognizing the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation and giving it privileges for the crimes it has committed against the downtrodden in Lebanon.

International Forces and Suspect Role

The international forces that world arrogance is trying to deploy in the Muslims’ territories from which the enemy will withdraw so that they may form a security barrier obstructing the resistance movement and protecting the security of Israel and of its invasion forces are collusive and rejected forces. We may be forced to deal with them exactly as we deal with the Zionist invasion forces.

Let all know that the commitments of the imposed Phalangist regime as not in any way binding to the Islamic resistance strugglers. Other countries must think carefully before they get immersed in the swamp in which Israel has drowned.

Defeatist Arab Regimes

As for the Arab regimes falling over themselves for reconciliation with the Zionist enemy, they are decrepit regimes incapable of keeping up with the nation’s ambitions and aspirations and they cannot think of confronting the Zionist entity usurping Palestine because these regimes came into existence under a colonialist guardianship that played the major role in the creation of these eroded regimes.

Some reactionary rulers, especially in the oil countries, are not reluctant to turn their countries into military bases for America and Britain and are not ashamed to rely on foreign experts, appointing them to top official positions. They are implementing the policies set for them by the White House circles to smuggle their countries’ wealth and divide it among the imperialists by
various means.

Some of them claim to be protectors of the Islamic Sharia so that they may cover up their treason and may justify their submission to America’s will while at the same time considering the entry of a single revolutionary Islamic book into their country something banned and prohibited.

As a result of the defeatist policy followed by these reactionary regimes vis-à-vis Israel, the latter has been able to persuade many of them that it has become a fait accompli that cannot go unrecognized, not to mention the necessity of acknowledging the need to ensure its security.

This defeatist policy is what encouraged the buried al-Sadat to commit his high treason and proceed to conclude peace with Israel and sign the humiliation treaty with it.

The policy of defeatism is what is now governing the movement of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Jordan-Egypt axis, Iraq, and the Arafat organization.

The defeatist policy toward America is what is directing the position of the reactionary rulers toward the war of aggression imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran and is standing behind the boundless financial, economic, and military support for the agent Saddam out of the belief that the Zionized al-Tikriti regime can destroy the Islamic Revolution and can prevent the dissemination of its revolutionary blaze and concepts. This defeatist policy is what motivates the reactionary regimes to keep their people ignorant, to water down and dissolve their Islamic identify, and to suppress in their countries any Islamic movement opposed to America and its allies. It is also the policy that causes these regimes to fear the awakening of the downtrodden and to prevent their involvement in political affairs because of the big danger posed to the survival of these regimes by awareness on the part of peoples of the corruption of their governments and of their suspect ties and by sympathy from these peoples for the liberation
movements in all parts or the Islamic world and of the world generally.

We find in the reactionary Arab regimes a barrier blocking the development of the awareness and unity of the Islamic peoples and we consider these regimes responsible for obstructing the attempts to keep the wound open and the struggle continued against the Zionist enemy.

We have great hope in the Muslim peoples that clearly have begun to complain in most of the Islamic countries and have been able to infiltrate into the world of revolutions to learn from its experiences, especially from the triumphant Islamic Revolution. The day will come when all these brittle regimes will collapse under the blows of the oppressed, as the throne of the tyrant in Iran has already collapsed.

While waging a ferocious battle against America and Israel and their schemes in the area, we cannot but warn these regimes of working against the nation’s rising tide of resistance to imperialism and Zionism. These regimes must learn from the Islamic resistance in Lebanon great lessons in determination on fighting the enemy and defeating it.

We also warn these regimes against getting involved in new capitulationist plans and in aggressive schemes aimed against the young Islamic Revolution because such involvement will lead the leaders of these to the same fate faced by Anwar al-Sadat and by Nuri al-Said [last Iraqi prime minister under the monarchy] and others before them.

International Front for Oppressed

We address all the Arab and Islamic peoples to declare to them that the Muslims’ experience in Islamic Iran left no one any excuse since it proved beyond all doubt that bare chests motivated by faith are capable, with God’s help, of breaking the iron and oppression of tyrannical regimes.

Therefore, we urge the peoples to unite their
ranks, to chart their objectives, and to rise to break the shackle that curbs their will and to overthrow the agent governments that oppress them.

We strongly urge on all the oppressed of the world the need to form an international front that encompasses all their liberation movements so that they may establish full and comprehensive coordination among these movements in order to achieve effectiveness in their activity and to focus on their enemies’ weak points.

Considering that the imperialist world with all its states and regimes is uniting today in fighting the oppressed, then the oppressed must get together to confront the plots of the forces of arrogance in the world.

All the oppressed peoples, especially the Arab and Muslim peoples, must realize that Islam alone is capable of being the idea to resist aggression, since experiences have proven that all the positive ideologies have been folded forever in the interest of American-Soviet détente and other forms of détente.

It is time for us to realize that all the western ideas concerning man’s origin and nature cannot respond to man’s aspirations or rescue him from the darkness of misguidedness and ignorance. Only Islam can bring about man’s renaissance, progress, and creativity because “he lights with the oil of an olive tree that is neither eastern nor western, a tree whose oil burns, even if not touched by fire, to light the path. God leads to His light whomever He wishes.”

God Is with Unity of Muslims
O Muslim peoples,

[Beware the malicious imperialist sedition that seeks to divide your unity, to sow division among you, and to arouse Sunni and Shii sectarian fanaticism.]

Know that colonialism was able to control the wealth of the Muslims only after it divided and fragmented their ranks, instigating the Sunnis against the Shia and the Shia against the Sunnis,
entrusting this task afterward to its agents among the mediators of the countries, to evil ulama at times, and to leaders that colonialism imposed on the people.

God is with the unity of the Muslims and this unit is the rock on which the schemes of the arrogant are smashed and the hammer that crushes the plots of the oppressors.

Do not allow the policy of “divide and rule” to be practiced in your countries and fight this policy by rallying behind the venerable Quran:

“Hold fast, all together, by the rope that God [stretches out for you], and be not divided.”

“As for those who divide their religion and break up into sects …”

“Remember God’s favor on you; for you were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His grace, you became brothers; and you were on the brink of the pit of fire, and He saved you from it.”

O Ulama of Islam

As for you, O ulama of Islam, your responsibility is as big as the tragedies that have befallen the Muslims. You are best qualified to perform your duty of leading the nation toward Islam and of alerting it to the plots that is enemies are hatching in order to dominate this nation, plunder its wealth, and enslave it.

There is no doubt that you are aware that the Muslims look up to you in your capacity as bearers of the trust given by God’s prophet, may God’s peace and prayers be upon him, and as heirs of the prophets and the messengers. Be the hop and offer the good example by declaring what is right and by standing in the face of the oppressors and the tyrants. Be the model in rising above the frippery of this world’s life ornaments and by yearning for paradise and martyrdom for the sake of God.

You have in God’s prophet a good example of how he starved with the people and how he ate when they are, of how he led the faithful in prayer, and how he led them in the arenas of the jihad.
He was their refuge in their hard times, he warmed their lives with his instructions and solutions, and they followed him with confidence and assurance.

O Muslim Ulama,

Imam Khomeini, the leader, has stressed repeatedly the need to [rest of sentence indistinct]. If they find out that a shopowner is not upright, they say that so and so is not upright and if they find that a merchant cheats, they say that so and so is a cheat. But if they find, God forbid, that a religious alim is not upright, then they will say that religion is not right.

O Muslim Ulama,

Because of this and other things, your responsibility is very heavy. Ask for God’s help to perform this duty and beseech God, may He be praised, with the invocation Imam Ali, may God be pleased with him: “God, we do not ask you for a light burden but for strong backs.” You will then find out that the nation is most responsive to your appeals, instructions, and leadership.

Know that the imperialist is aware of the importance of your position in the nation and that they is why he has directed his strongest stags to the ears of the struggler ulama, hatching an infernal plot to concealee Imam Musa Al-Sadr when this imperialist felt that the imam was an insurmountable obstacle in the face of his aggressive schemes, killing the Islamic philosopher Shaikh Murtada Mathari, and executing Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, the great Islamic authority, when the imperialist felt the danger imam’ stance posed – a danger embodied in Imam Baqir’s words: “Fuse with Imam Khomeini as he has fused with Islam.” The imperialist is lurking for every possible alim performing his Islamic duty in the best manner possible.

On the other hand, imperialism has been penetrating the Muslims with glib preachers who have no fear of God, who offer religious interpretation where there can be no interpretation, who sanction peace with Israel, prohibit fighting it, and justify the treason of the
oppressive rulers.

The imperialist would not have done all this if it were not for the importance of the religious ulama’s influence over the people.

Therefore, one of your most important responsibilities, O Muslim ulama, is to education the Muslims to abide by the dictates of Islam, to point out to them the political line they should follow, to lead them toward glory and honor, and to devote attention to the religious institutes so that they may graduate leaders faithful to God and eager to uphold religion and the nation.

Final Word Regarding International Organizations

Finally, a word must be said regarding international organizations and institutions, such as the United Nations, the Security Council, and others.

We note that these organizations are not podiums for the oppressed peoples generally and that they continue to be ineffective due to the domination of their decisions by the states of world arrogance, whether in terms of the implementation or the obstruction of such decisions.

The veto enjoyed by a number of states is nothing but a proof of the soundness of what we are saying.

Therefore, we do not expect anything to come out of these organizations would serve the interest of the oppressed and we urge all the self-respecting countries to adopt the plan to abolish the veto right enjoyed by the states of arrogance.

We also urge these countries to embrace the plan to expel Israel from the United Nations by virtue of its being a usurping and illegal entity, in addition to its being an entity hostile to mankind’s inclinations.

Free, downtrodden people,

These are our visualizations and objectives and these are the rules that govern our course. Those who accept us by accepting right, and God is the best friend of what is right. As for those who reject us, we will endure until God issues his judgment on us and on the oppressors.
Norton Translation

God’s peace, mercy, and blessings be upon you.
Hizb Allah.
Appendix C, Annex 28 -- Hamas Covenant
18 August 1988

The Islamic political party Hamas has governed the Gaza Strip since winning a majority of the seats in the Palestinian Parliament election in 2006 and taking control of the government in violent clashes with its rival, Fatah. Israel, the United States and the European Union among others classify Hamas as a terrorist organization. Hamas makes clear (emphasis added) its intent to eradicate Israel -- and perhaps all Jews -- in its covenant, issued in 1988. The covenant takes a hard-line position against peace negotiations or compromise (emphasis added) with Israel. The following translation is reproduced here as it appears on the Web site of the Avalon Project of the Yale University Law School.

Text of the Hamas covenant
Source: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp

In The Name Of The Most Merciful Allah

"Ye are the best nation that hath been raised up unto mankind: ye command that which is just, and ye forbid that which is unjust, and ye believe in Allah. And if they who have received the scriptures had believed, it had surely been the better for them: there are believers among them, but the greater part of them are transgressors. They shall not hurt you, unless with a slight hurt; and if they fight against you, they shall turn their backs to you, and they shall not be helped. They are smitten with vileness wheresoever they are found; unless they obtain security by entering into a treaty with Allah, and a treaty with men; and they draw on themselves indignation from Allah, and they are afflicted with poverty. This they suffer, because they disbelieved the signs of Allah, and slew the prophets unjustly; this, because they were rebellious, and transgressed." (Al-Imran - verses 109-111).

Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it" (The Martyr, Imam Hassan al-Banna, of blessed memory).

"The Islamic world is on fire. Each of us should pour some water, no matter how little, to extinguish whatever one can without waiting for the others." (Sheikh Amjad al-Zahawi, of blessed memory).

In The Name Of The Most Merciful Allah

Introduction

Praise be unto Allah, to whom we resort for help, and whose forgiveness, guidance and support we seek; Allah bless the Prophet and grant him salvation, his companions and supporters, and to those who carried out his message and adopted his laws - everlasting prayers
and salvation as long as the earth and heaven will last. Hereafter:

O People:

Out of the midst of troubles and the sea of suffering, out of the palpitations of faithful hearts and cleansed arms; out of the sense of duty, and in response to Allah's command, the call has gone out rallying people together and making them follow the ways of Allah, leading them to have determined will in order to fulfill their role in life, to overcome all obstacles, and surmount the difficulties on the way. Constant preparation has continued and so has the readiness to sacrifice life and all that is precious for the sake of Allah.

Thus it was that the nucleus (of the movement) was formed and started to pave its way through the tempestuous sea of hopes and expectations, of wishes and yearnings, of troubles and obstacles, of pain and challenges, both inside and outside.

When the idea was ripe, the seed grew and the plant struck root in the soil of reality, away from passing emotions, and hateful haste. The Islamic Resistance Movement emerged to carry out its role through striving for the sake of its Creator, its arms intertwined with those of all the fighters for the liberation of Palestine. The spirits of its fighters meet with the spirits of all the fighters who have sacrificed their lives on the soil of Palestine, ever since it was conquered by the companions of the Prophet, Allah bless him and grant him salvation, and until this day.

This Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), clarifies its picture, reveals its identity, outlines its stand, explains its aims, speaks about its hopes, and calls for its support, adoption and joining its ranks. Our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious. It needs all sincere efforts. It is a step that inevitably should be followed by other steps. The Movement is but one squadron that should be supported by more and more squadrons from this vast Arab and Islamic world, until the enemy is vanquished and Allah's victory is realised.

Thus we see them coming on the horizon "and you shall learn about it hereafter" "Allah hath written, Verily I will prevail, and my apostles: for Allah is strong and mighty." (The Dispute - verse 21).

"Say to them, This is my way: I invite you to Allah, by an evident demonstration; both I and he who followeth me; and, praise be unto Allah! I am not an idolator." (Joseph - verse 107). Hamas (means) strength and bravery -(according to) Al-Mua'jam al-Wasit: c1.

Definition of the Movement
I ideological Starting-Points

Article One:

The Islamic Resistance Movement: The Movement's programme is Islam. From it, it draws its ideas, ways of thinking and understanding of the universe, life and man. It resorts to it for judgement in all its conduct, and it is inspired by it for guidance of its steps.

The Islamic Resistance Movement's Relation With the Moslem Brotherhood Group:

Article Two:

The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine. Moslem Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times. It is characterised by its deep understanding, accurate comprehension and its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts of all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and judgement, the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, science of the occult and conversion to Islam.
Structure and Formation

Article Three:
The basic structure of the Islamic Resistance Movement consists of Moslems who have given their allegiance to Allah whom they truly worship, - "I have created the jinn and humans only for the purpose of worshipping" - who know their duty towards themselves, their families and country. In all that, they fear Allah and raise the banner of Jihad in the face of the oppressors, so that they would rid the land and the people of their uncleanliness, vileness and evils. "But we will oppose truth to vanity, and it shall confound the same; and behold, it shall vanish away." (Prophets - verse 18).

Article Four:
The Islamic Resistance Movement welcomes every Moslem who embraces its faith, ideology, follows its programme, keeps its secrets, and wants to belong to its ranks and carry out the duty. Allah will certainly reward such one.

Time and Place Extent of the Islamic Resistance Movement:

Article Five:
Time extent of the Islamic Resistance Movement: By adopting Islam as its way of life, the Movement goes back to the time of the birth of the Islamic message, of the righteous ancestor, for Allah is its target, the Prophet is its example and the Koran is its constitution. Its extent in place is anywhere that there are Moslems who embrace Islam as their way of life everywhere in the globe. This being so, it extends to the depth of the earth and reaches out to the heaven. "Dost thou not see how Allah putteth forth a parable; representing a good word, as a good tree, whose root is firmly fixed in the earth, and whose branches reach unto heaven; which bringeth forth its fruit in all seasons, by the will of its Lord? Allah propoundeth parables unto men, that they may be instructed." (Abraham - verses 24-25).

Characteristics and Independence:

Article Six:
The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinguished Palestinian movement, whose allegiance is to Allah, and whose way of life is Islam. It strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions can coexist in security and safety where their lives, possessions and rights are concerned. In the absence of Islam, strife will be rife, oppression spreads, evil prevails and schisms and wars will break out. How excellent was the Moslem poet, Mohamed Ikbal, when he wrote: "If faith is lost, there is no security and there is no life for him who does not adhere to religion. He who accepts life without religion, has taken annihilation as his companion for life."

The Universality of the Islamic Resistance Movement:

Article Seven:
As a result of the fact that those Moslems who adhere to the ways of the Islamic Resistance Movement spread all over the world, rally support for it and its stands, strive towards enhancing
its struggle, the Movement is a universal one. It is well-equipped for that because of the clarity of its ideology, the nobility of its aim and the loftiness of its objectives.

On this basis, the Movement should be viewed and evaluated, and its role be recognised. He who denies its right, evades supporting it and turns a blind eye to facts, whether intentionally or unintentionally, would awaken to see that events have overtaken him and with no logic to justify his attitude. One should certainly learn from past examples.

The injustice of next-of-kin is harder to bear than the smite of the Indian sword. "We have also sent down unto thee the book of the Koran with truth, confirming that scripture which was revealed before it; and preserving the same safe from corruption. Judge therefore between them according to that which Allah hath revealed; and follow not their desires, by swerving from the truth which hath come unto thee. Unto every of you have we given a law, and an open path; and if Allah had pleased, he had surely made you one people; but he hath thought it fit to give you different laws, that he might try you in that which he hath given you respectively. Therefore strive to excel each other in good works; unto Allah shall ye all return, and then will he declare unto you that concerning which ye have disagreed." (The Table, verse 48).

The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the links in the chain of the struggle against the Zionist invaders. It goes back to 1939, to the emergence of the martyr Izz al-Din al Kissam and his brethren the fighters, members of Moslem Brotherhood. It goes on to reach out and become one with another chain that includes the struggle of the Palestinians and Moslem Brotherhood in the 1948 war and the Jihad operations of the Moslem Brotherhood in 1968 and after.

Moreover, if the links have been distant from each other and if obstacles, placed by those who are the lackeys of Zionism in the way of the fighters obstructed the continuation of the struggle, the Islamic Resistance Movement aspires to the realisation of Allah's promise, no matter how long that should take. The Prophet, Allah bless him and grant him salvation, has said:

"The Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him. Only the Gharkad tree, (evidently a certain kind of tree) would not do that because it is one of the trees of the Jews." (related by al-Bukhari and Moslem).

The Slogan of the Islamic Resistance Movement: Article Eight: Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes.

Objectives Incentives and Objectives:

Article Nine: The Islamic Resistance Movement found itself at a time when Islam has disappeared from life. Thus rules shook, concepts were upset, values changed and evil people took control, oppression and darkness prevailed, cowards became like tigers: homelands were usurped, people were scattered and were caused to wander all over the world, the state of justice disappeared and the state of falsehood replaced it. Nothing remained in its right place. Thus, when Islam is absent from the arena, everything changes. From this state of affairs the incentives are drawn.
As for the objectives: They are the fighting against the false, defeating it and vanquishing it so that justice could prevail, homelands be retrieved and from its mosques would the voice of the mu'azen emerge declaring the establishment of the state of Islam, so that people and things would return each to their right places and Allah is our helper. "...and if Allah had not prevented men, the one by the other, verily the earth had been corrupted: but Allah is beneficient towards his creatures." (The Cow - verse 251).

Article Ten:

As the Islamic Resistance Movement paves its way, it will back the oppressed and support the wronged with all its might. It will spare no effort to bring about justice and defeat injustice, in word and deed, in this place and everywhere it can reach and have influence therein.

Strategies and Methods

Strategies of the Islamic Resistance Movement: Palestine Is Islamic Waqf:

Article Eleven:

The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up. Neither a single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king or president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organization nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to do that. Palestine is an Islamic Waqf land consecrated for Moslem generations until Judgement Day. This being so, who could claim to have the right to represent Moslem generations till Judgement Day?

This is the law governing the land of Palestine in the Islamic Sharia (law) and the same goes for any land the Moslems have conquered by force, because during the times of (Islamic) conquests, the Moslems consecrated these lands to Moslem generations till the Day of Judgement.

It happened like this: When the leaders of the Islamic armies conquered Syria and Iraq, they sent to the Caliph of the Moslems, Umar bin-el-Khatab, asking for his advice concerning the conquered land - whether they should divide it among the soldiers, or leave it for its owners, or what? After consultations and discussions between the Caliph of the Moslems, Omar bin-el-Khatab and companions of the Prophet, Allah bless him and grant him salvation, it was decided that the land should be left with its owners who could benefit by its fruit. As for the real ownership of the land and the land itself, it should be consecrated for Moslem generations till Judgement Day. Those who are on the land, are there only to benefit from its fruit. This Waqf remains as long as earth and heaven remain. Any procedure in contradiction to Islamic Sharia, where Palestine is concerned, is null and void.

"Verily, this is a certain truth. Wherefore praise the name of thy Lord, the great Allah." (The Inevitable - verse 95).

Homeland and Nationalism from the Point of View of the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine:

Article Twelve:

Nationalism, from the point of view of the Islamic Resistance Movement, is part of the religious creed. Nothing in nationalism is more significant or deeper than in the case when an enemy should tread Moslem land. Resisting and quelling the enemy become the individual duty of every Moslem, male or female. A woman can go out to fight the enemy without her husband's permission, and so does the slave: without his master's permission.
Nothing of the sort is to be found in any other regime. This is an undisputed fact. If other nationalist movements are connected with materialistic, human or regional causes, nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement has all these elements as well as the more important elements that give it soul and life. It is connected to the source of spirit and the granter of life, hoisting in the sky of the homeland the heavenly banner that joins earth and heaven with a strong bond.

If Moses comes and throws his staff, both witch and magic are annulled. "Now is the right direction manifestly distinguished from deceit: whoever therefore shall deny Tagut, and believe in Allah, he shall surely take hold with a strong handle, which shall not be broken; Allah is he who heareth and seeth." (The Cow - Verse 256).

Peaceful Solutions, Initiatives and International Conferences:

**Article Thirteen:**

Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Abusing any part of Palestine is abuse directed against part of religion. Nationalism of the Islamic Resistance Movement is part of its religion. Its members have been fed on that. For the sake of hoisting the banner of Allah over their homeland they fight. "Allah will be prominent, but most people do not know."

Now and then the call goes out for the convening of an international conference to look for ways of solving the (Palestinian) question. Some accept, others reject the idea, for this or other reason, with one stipulation or more for consent to convening the conference and participating in it. Knowing the parties constituting the conference, their past and present attitudes towards Moslem problems, the Islamic Resistance Movement does not consider these conferences capable of realising the demands, restoring the rights or doing justice to the oppressed. These conferences are only ways of setting the infidels in the land of the Moslems as arbitraters. When did the infidels do justice to the believers?

"But the Jews will not be pleased with thee, neither the Christians, until thou follow their religion; say, The direction of Allah is the true direction. And verily if thou follow their desires, after the knowledge which hath been given thee, thou shalt find no patron or protector against Allah." (The Cow - verse 120).

There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors. The Palestinian people know better than to consent to having their future, rights and fate toyed with. As in said in the honourable Hadith:

"The people of Syria are Allah's lash in His land. He wreaks His vengeance through them against whomsoever He wishes among His slaves It is unthinkable that those who are double-faced among them should prosper over the faithful. They will certainly die out of grief and desperation."

The Three Circles:

**Article Fourteen:**

The question of the liberation of Palestine is bound to three circles: the Palestinian circle, the Arab circle and the Islamic circle. Each of these circles has its role in the struggle against Zionism. Each has its duties, and it is a horrible mistake and a sign of deep ignorance to overlook any of these circles. Palestine is an Islamic land which has the first of the two kiblahs (direction to which Moslems turn in praying), the third of the holy (Islamic) sanctuaries, and the point of departure for Mohamed's midnight journey to the seven heavens (i.e. Jerusalem).
"Praise be unto him who transported his servant by night, from the sacred temple of Mecca to the farther temple of Jerusalem, the circuit of which we have blessed, that we might show him some of our signs; for Allah is he who heareth, and seeth." (The Night-Journey - verse 1).

Since this is the case, liberation of Palestine is then an individual duty for every Moslem wherever he may be. On this basis, the problem should be viewed. This should be realised by every Moslem.

The day the problem is dealt with on this basis, when the three circles mobilize their capabilities, the present state of affairs will change and the day of liberation will come nearer. "Verily ye are stronger than they, by reason of the terror cast into their breasts from Allah. This, because they are not people of prudence." (The Emigration - verse 13).

The Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine is an Individual Duty:

Article Fifteen:

The day that enemies usurp part of Moslem land, Jihad becomes the individual duty of every Moslem. In face of the Jews' usurpation of Palestine, it is compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised. To do this requires the diffusion of Islamic consciousness among the masses, both on the regional, Arab and Islamic levels. It is necessary to instill the spirit of Jihad in the heart of the nation so that they would confront the enemies and join the ranks of fighters.

It is necessary that scientists, educators and teachers, information and media people, as well as the educated masses, especially the youth and sheikhs of the Islamic movements, should take part in the operation of awakening (the masses). It is important that basic changes be made in the school curriculum, to cleanse it of the traces of ideological invasion that affected it as a result of the orientalists and missionaries who infiltrated the region following the defeat of the Crusaders at the hands of Salah el-Din (Saladin). The Crusaders realised that it was impossible to defeat the Moslems without first having ideological invasion pave the way by upsetting their thoughts, disfiguring their heritage and violating their ideals. Only then could they invade with soldiers. This, in its turn, paved the way for the imperialistic invasion that made Allenby declare on entering Jerusalem: "Only now have the Crusades ended." General Guru stood at Salah el-Din's grave and said: "We have returned, O Salah el-Din." Imperialism has helped towards the strengthening of ideological invasion, deepening, and still does, its roots. All this has paved the way towards the loss of Palestine.

It is necessary to instill in the minds of the Moslem generations that the Palestinian problem is a religious problem, and should be dealt with on this basis. Palestine contains Islamic holy sites. In it there is al-Aqsa Mosque which is bound to the great Mosque in Mecca in an inseparable bond as long as heaven and earth speak of Isra' (Mohammed's midnight journey to the seven heavens) and Mi'raj (Mohammed's ascension to the seven heavens from Jerusalem). "The bond of one day for the sake of Allah is better than the world and whatever there is on it. The place of one's whip in Paradise is far better than the world and whatever there is on it. A worshipper's going and coming in the service of Allah is better than the world and whatever there is on it." (As related by al-Bukhari, Moslem, al-Tarmdhi and Ibn Maja).

"I swear by the holder of Mohammed's soul that I would like to invade and be killed for the sake of Allah, then invade and be killed, and then invade again and be killed." (As related by al-Bukhari and Moslem).
The Education of the Generations:

Article Sixteen:

It is necessary to follow Islamic orientation in educating the Islamic generations in our region by teaching the religious duties, comprehensive study of the Koran, the study of the Prophet's Sunna (his sayings and doings), and learning about Islamic history and heritage from their authentic sources. This should be done by specialised and learned people, using a curriculum that would healthily form the thoughts and faith of the Moslem student. Side by side with this, a comprehensive study of the enemy, his human and financial capabilities, learning about his points of weakness and strength, and getting to know the forces supporting and helping him, should also be included. Also, it is important to be acquainted with the current events, to follow what is new and to study the analysis and commentaries made of these events. Planning for the present and future, studying every trend appearing, is a must so that the fighting Moslem would live knowing his aim, objective and his way in the midst of what is going on around him. "O my son, verily every matter, whether good or bad, though it be the weight of a grain of mustard-seed, and be hidden in a rock, or in the heavens, or in the earth, Allah will bring the same to light; for Allah is clear-sighted and knowing. O my son, be constant at prayer, and command that which is just, and forbid that which is evil: and be patient under the afflictions which shall befall thee; for this is a duty absolutely incumbent on all men. Distort not thy face out of contempt to men, neither walk in the earth with insolence; for Allah loveth no arrogant, vain-glorious person." (Lokman - verses 16-18).

The Role of the Moslem Woman:

Article Seventeen:

The Moslem woman has a role no less important than that of the moslem man in the battle of liberation. She is the maker of men. Her role in guiding and educating the new generations is great. The enemies have realised the importance of her role. They consider that if they are able to direct and bring her up the way they wish, far from Islam, they would have won the battle. That is why you find them giving these attempts constant attention through information campaigns, films, and the school curriculum, using for that purpose their lackeys who are infiltrated through Zionist organizations under various names and shapes, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, espionage groups and others, which are all nothing more than cells of subversion and saboteurs. These organizations have ample resources that enable them to play their role in societies for the purpose of achieving the Zionist targets and to deepen the concepts that would serve the enemy. These organizations operate in the absence of Islam and its estrangement among its people. The Islamic peoples should perform their role in confronting the conspiracies of these saboteurs. The day Islam is in control of guiding the affairs of life, these organizations, hostile to humanity and Islam, will be obliterated.

Article Eighteen:

Woman in the home of the fighting family, whether she is a mother or a sister, plays the most important role in looking after the family, rearing the children and embuing them with moral values and thoughts derived from Islam. She has to teach them to perform the religious duties in preparation for the role of fighting awaiting them. That is why it is necessary to pay great attention to schools and the curriculum followed in educating Moslem girls, so that they would grow up to be good mothers, aware of their role in the battle of liberation.

She has to be of sufficient knowledge and understanding where the performance of
housekeeping matters are concerned, because economy and avoidance of waste of the family budget, is one of the requirements for the ability to continue moving forward in the difficult conditions surrounding us. She should put before her eyes the fact that the money available to her is just like blood which should never flow except through the veins so that both children and grown-ups could continue to live.

"Verily, the Moslems of either sex, and the true believers of either sex, and the devout men, and the devout women, and the men of veracity, and the women of veracity, and the patient men, and the patient women, and the humble men, and the humble women, and the alms-givers of either sex who remember Allah frequently; for them hath Allah prepared forgiveness and a great reward." (The Confederates - verse 25).

The Role of Islamic Art in the Battle of Liberation:

Article Nineteen:

Art has regulations and measures by which it can be determined whether it is Islamic or pre-Islamic (Jahili) art. The issues of Islamic liberation are in need of Islamic art that would take the spirit high, without raising one side of human nature above the other, but rather raise all of them harmoniously and in equilibrium.

Man is a unique and wonderful creature, made out of a handful of clay and a breath from Allah. Islamic art addresses man on this basis, while pre-Islamic art addresses the body giving preference to the clay component in it.

The book, the article, the bulletin, the sermon, the thesis, the popular poem, the poetic ode, the song, the play and others, contain the characteristics of Islamic art, then these are among the requirements of ideological mobilization, renewed food for the journey and recreation for the soul. The road is long and suffering is plenty. The soul will be bored, but Islamic art renews the energies, resurrects the movement, arousing in them lofty meanings and proper conduct.

"Nothing can improve the self if it is in retreat except shifting from one mood to another." All this is utterly serious and no jest, for those who are fighters do not jest.

Social Mutual Responsibility:

Article Twenty:

Moslem society is a mutually responsible society. The Prophet, prayers and greetings be unto him, said: "Blessed are the generous, whether they were in town or on a journey, who have collected all that they had and shared it equally among themselves."

The Islamic spirit is what should prevail in every Moslem society. The society that confronts a vicious enemy which acts in a way similar to Nazism, making no differentiation between man and woman, between children and old people - such a society is entitled to this Islamic spirit. Our enemy relies on the methods of collective punishment. He has deprived people of their homeland and properties, pursued them in their places of exile and gathering, breaking bones, shooting at women, children and old people, with or without a reason. The enemy has opened detention camps where thousands and thousands of people are thrown and kept under sub-human conditions. Added to this, are the demolition of houses, rendering children orphans, meting cruel sentences against thousands of young people, and causing them to spend the best years of their lives in the dungeons of prisons.

In their Nazi treatment, the Jews made no exception for women or children. Their policy of striking fear in the heart is meant for all. They attack people where their breadwinning is concerned, extorting their money and threatening their honour. They deal with people as if they
were the worst war criminals. Deportation from the homeland is a kind of murder.

To counter these deeds, it is necessary that social mutual responsibility should prevail among the people. The enemy should be faced by the people as a single body which if one member of it should complain, the rest of the body would respond by feeling the same pains.

Article Twenty-One:

Mutual social responsibility means extending assistance, financial or moral, to all those who are in need and joining in the execution of some of the work. Members of the Islamic Resistance Movement should consider the interests of the masses as their own personal interests. They must spare no effort in achieving and preserving them. They must prevent any foul play with the future of the upcoming generations and anything that could cause loss to society. The masses are part of them and they are part of the masses. Their strength is theirs, and their future is theirs. Members of the Islamic Resistance Movement should share the people's joy and grief, adopt the demands of the public and whatever means by which they could be realised. The day that such a spirit prevails, brotherliness would deepen, cooperation, sympathy and unity will be enhanced and the ranks will be solidified to confront the enemies.

Supportive Forces Behind the Enemy:

Article Twenty-Two:

For a long time, the enemies have been planning, skillfully and with precision, for the achievement of what they have attained. They took into consideration the causes affecting the current of events. They strived to amass great and substantive material wealth which they devoted to the realisation of their dream. With their money, they took control of the world media, news agencies, the press, publishing houses, broadcasting stations, and others. With their money they stirred revolutions in various parts of the world with the purpose of achieving their interests and reaping the fruit therein. They were behind the French Revolution, the Communist revolution and most of the revolutions we heard and hear about, here and there. With their money they formed secret societies, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, the Lions and others in different parts of the world for the purpose of sabotaging societies and achieving Zionist interests. With their money they were able to control imperialistic countries and instigate them to colonize many countries in order to enable them to exploit their resources and spread corruption there.

You may speak as much as you want about regional and world wars. They were behind World War I, when they were able to destroy the Islamic Caliphate, making financial gains and controlling resources. They obtained the Balfour Declaration, formed the League of Nations through which they could rule the world. They were behind World War II, through which they made huge financial gains by trading in armaments, and paved the way for the establishment of their state. It was they who instigated the replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations and the Security Council to enable them to rule the world through them. There is no war going on anywhere, without having their finger in it.

"So often as they shall kindle a fire for war, Allah shall extinguish it; and they shall set their minds to act corruptly in the earth, but Allah loveth not the corrupt doers." (The Table-verse 64).

The imperialistic forces in the Capitalist West and Communist East, support the enemy with all their might, in money and in men. These forces take turns in doing that. The day Islam appears, the forces of infidelity would unite to challenge it, for the infidels are of one nation.

"O true believers, contract not an intimate friendship with any besides yourselves: they will not
fail to corrupt you. They wish for that which may cause you to perish: their hatred hath already appeared from out of their mouths; but what their breasts conceal is yet more inveterate. We have already shown you signs of their ill will towards you, if ye understand." (The Family of Imran - verse 118).

It is not in vain that the verse is ended with Allah's words "if ye understand."

Our Attitudes Towards:

A. Islamic Movements:

Article Twenty-Three:

The Islamic Resistance Movement views other Islamic movements with respect and appreciation. If it were at variance with them on one point or opinion, it is in agreement with them on other points and understandings. It considers these movements, if they reveal good intentions and dedication to Allah, that they fall into the category of those who are trying hard since they act within the Islamic circle. Each active person has his share.

The Islamic Resistance Movement considers all these movements as a fund for itself. It prays to Allah for guidance and directions for all and it spares no effort to keep the banner of unity raised, ever striving for its realisation in accordance with the Koran and the Prophet's directives.

"And cleave all of you unto the covenant of Allah, and depart not from it, and remember the favour of Allah towards you: since ye were enemies, and he reconciled your hearts, and ye became companions and brethren by his favour: and ye were on the brink of a pit of fire, and he delivered you thence. Allah declareth unto you his signs, that ye may be directed." (The Family of Imran - Verse 102).

Article Twenty-Four:

The Islamic Resistance Movement does not allow slandering or speaking ill of individuals or groups, for the believer does not indulge in such malpractices. It is necessary to differentiate between this behaviour and the stands taken by certain individuals and groups. Whenever those stands are erroneous, the Islamic Resistance Movement preserves the right to expound the error and to warn against it. It will strive to show the right path and to judge the case in question with objectivity. Wise conduct is indeed the target of the believer who follows it wherever he discerns it.

"Allah loveth not the speaking ill of anyone in public, unless he who is injured call for assistance; and Allah heareth and knoweth: whether ye publish a good action, or conceal it, or forgive evil, verily Allah is gracious and powerful." (Women - verses 147-148).

B. Nationalist Movements in the Palestinian Arena:

Article Twenty-Five:

The Islamic Resistance Movement respects these movements and appreciates their circumstances and the conditions surrounding and affecting them. It encourages them as long as they do not give their allegiance to the Communist East or the Crusading West. It confirms to all those who are integrated in it, or sympathetic towards it, that the Islamic Resistance Movement is a fighting movement that has a moral and enlightened look of life and the way it should cooperate with the other (movements). It detests opportunism and desires only the good of people, individuals and groups alike. It does not seek material gains, personal fame, nor does it look for a reward from others. It works with its own resources and whatever is at its disposal.
"and prepare for them whatever force you can", for the fulfilment of the duty, and the earning of Allah's favour. It has no other desire than that.

The Movement assures all the nationalist trends operating in the Palestinian arena for the liberation of Palestine, that it is there for their support and assistance. It will never be more than that, both in words and deeds, now and in the future. It is there to bring together and not to divide, to preserve and not to squander, to unify and not to throw asunder. It evaluates every good word, sincere effort and good offices. It closes the door in the face of side disagreements and does not lend an ear to rumours and slanders, while at the same time fully realising the right for self-defence.

Anything contrary or contradictory to these trends, is a lie disseminated by enemies or their lackeys for the purpose of sowing confusion, disrupting the ranks and occupy them with side issues.

"O true believers, if a wicked man come unto you with a tale, inquire strictly into the truth thereof; lest ye hurt people through ignorance, and afterwards repent of what ye have done."
(The Inner Apartments - verse 6).

Article Twenty-Six:

In viewing the Palestinian nationalist movements that give allegiance neither to the East nor the West, in this positive way, the Islamic Resistance Movement does not refrain from discussing new situations on the regional or international levels where the Palestinian question is concerned. It does that in such an objective manner revealing the extent of how much it is in harmony or contradiction with the national interests in the light of the Islamic point of view.

C. The Palestinian Liberation Organization:

Article Twenty-Seven:

The Palestinian Liberation Organization is the closest to the heart of the Islamic Resistance Movement. It contains the father and the brother, the next of kin and the friend. The Moslem does not estrange himself from his father, brother, next of kin or friend. Our homeland is one, our situation is one, our fate is one and the enemy is a joint enemy to all of us.

Because of the situations surrounding the formation of the Organization, of the ideological confusion prevailing in the Arab world as a result of the ideological invasion under whose influence the Arab world has fallen since the defeat of the Crusaders and which was, and still is, intensified through orientalists, missionaries and imperialists, the Organization adopted the idea of the secular state. And that is how we view it.

Secularism completely contradicts religious ideology. Attitudes, conduct and decisions stem from ideologies.

That is why, with all our appreciation for The Palestinian Liberation Organization - and what it can develop into - and without belittling its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are unable to exchange the present or future Islamic Palestine with the secular idea. The Islamic nature of Palestine is part of our religion and whoever takes his religion lightly is a loser.

"Who will be adverse to the religion of Abraham, but he whose mind is infatuated? (The Cow - verse 130).

The day The Palestinian Liberation Organization adopts Islam as its way of life, we will become its soldiers, and fuel for its fire that will burn the enemies.

Until such a day, and we pray to Allah that it will be soon, the Islamic Resistance
Movement's stand towards the PLO is that of the son towards his father, the brother towards his brother, and the relative to relative, suffers his pain and supports him in confronting the enemies, wishing him to be wise and well-guided.
"Stand by your brother, for he who is brotherless is like the fighter who goes to battle without arms. One's cousin is the wing one flies with - could the bird fly without wings?"

D. Arab and Islamic Countries:

Article Twenty-Eight:
The Zionist invasion is a vicious invasion. It does not refrain from resorting to all methods, using all evil and contemptible ways to achieve its end. It relies greatly in its infiltration and espionage operations on the secret organizations it gave rise to, such as the Freemasons, The Rotary and Lions clubs, and other sabotage groups. All these organizations, whether secret or open, work in the interest of Zionism and according to its instructions. They aim at undermining societies, destroying values, corrupting consciences, deteriorating character and annihilating Islam. It is behind the drug trade and alcoholism in all its kinds so as to facilitate its control and expansion.

Arab countries surrounding Israel are asked to open their borders before the fighters from among the Arab and Islamic nations so that they could consolidate their efforts with those of their Moslem brethren in Palestine.

As for the other Arab and Islamic countries, they are asked to facilitate the movement of the fighters from and to, and this is the least thing they could do.

We should not forget to remind every Moslem that when the Jews conquered the Holy City in 1967, they stood on the threshold of the Aqsa Mosque and proclaimed that "Mohammed is dead, and his descendants are all women."

Israel, Judaism and Jews challenge Islam and the Moslem people. "May the cowards never sleep."

E. Nationalist and Religious Groupings, Institutions, Intellectuals, The Arab and Islamic World:
The Islamic Resistance Movement hopes that all these groupings will side with it in all spheres, would support it, adopt its stand and solidify its activities and moves, work towards rallying support for it so that the Islamic people will be a base and a stay for it, supplying it with strategic depth an all human material and informative spheres, in time and in place. This should be done through the convening of solidarity conferences, the issuing of explanatory bulletins, favourable articles and booklets, enlightening the masses regarding the Palestinian issue, clarifying what confronts it and the conspiracies woven around it. They should mobilize the Islamic nations, ideologically, educationally and culturally, so that these peoples would be equipped to perform their role in the decisive battle of liberation, just as they did when they vanquished the Crusaders and the Tatars and saved human civilization. Indeed, that is not difficult for Allah.
"Allah hath written, Verily I will prevail, and my apostles: for Allah is strong and mighty." (The Dispute - verse 21).

Article Thirty:
Writers, intellectuals, media people, orators, educators and teachers, and all the various sectors in the Arab and Islamic world - all of them are called upon to perform their role, and to fulfill their duty, because of the ferocity of the Zionist offensive and the Zionist influence in
many countries exercised through financial and media control, as well as the consequences that all this lead to in the greater part of the world.

**Jihad is not confined to the carrying of arms and the confrontation of the enemy. The effective word, the good article, the useful book, support and solidarity - together with the presence of sincere purpose for the hoisting of Allah's banner higher and higher - all these are elements of the Jihad for Allah's sake.**

"Whosoever mobilises a fighter for the sake of Allah is himself a fighter. Whosoever supports the relatives of a fighter, he himself is a fighter." (related by al-Bukhari, Moslem, Abu-Dawood and al-Tarmadhi).

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F. Followers of Other Religions: The Islamic Resistance Movement Is A Humanistic Movement:

**Article Thirty-One:**

The Islamic Resistance Movement is a humanistic movement. It takes care of human rights and is guided by Islamic tolerance when dealing with the followers of other religions. It does not antagonize anyone of them except if it is antagonized by it or stands in its way to hamper its moves and waste its efforts.

Under the wing of Islam, it is possible for the followers of the three religions - Islam, Christianity and Judaism - to coexist in peace and quiet with each other. Peace and quiet would not be possible except under the wing of Islam. Past and present history are the best witness to that.

It is the duty of the followers of other religions to stop disputing the sovereignty of Islam in this region, because the day these followers should take over there will be nothing but carnage, displacement and terror. Everyone of them is at variance with his fellow-religionists, not to speak about followers of other religionists. Past and present history are full of examples to prove this fact.

"They will not fight against you in a body, except in fenced towns, or from behind walls. Their strength in war among themselves is great: thou thinkest them to be united; but their hearts are divide. This, because they are people who do not understand." (The Emigration - verse 14).

Islam confers upon everyone his legitimate rights. Islam prevents the incursion on other people's rights. The Zionist Nazi activities against our people will not last for long. "For the state of injustice lasts but one day, while the state of justice lasts till Doomsday."

"As to those who have not borne arms against you on account of religion, nor turned you out of your dwellings, Allah forbiddeth you not to deal kindly with them, and to behave justly towards them; for Allah loveth those who act justly." (The Tried - verse 8).

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The Attempt to Isolate the Palestinian People:

**Article Thirty-Two:**

World Zionism, together with imperialistic powers, try through a studied plan and an intelligent strategy to remove one Arab state after another from the circle of struggle against Zionism, in order to have it finally face the Palestinian people only. Egypt was, to a great extent, removed from the circle of the struggle, through the treacherous Camp David Agreement. They are trying to draw other Arab countries into similar agreements and to bring them outside the circle of struggle.

The Islamic Resistance Movement calls on Arab and Islamic nations to take up the line of serious and persevering action to prevent the success of this horrendous plan, to warn the people of the danger eminating from leaving the circle of struggle against Zionism. Today it is Palestine,
tomorrow it will be one country or another. The Zionist plan is limitless. After Palestine, the Zionists aspire to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates. When they will have digested the region they overtook, they will aspire to further expansion, and so on. Their plan is embodied in the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion", and their present conduct is the best proof of what we are saying.

Leaving the circle of struggle with Zionism is high treason, and cursed be he who does that. "for whoso shall turn his back unto them on that day, unless he turneth aside to fight, or retreateth to another party of the faithful, shall draw on himself the indignation of Allah, and his abode shall be hell; an ill journey shall it be thither." (The Spoils - verse 16). There is no way out except by concentrating all powers and energies to face this Nazi, vicious Tatar invasion. The alternative is loss of one's country, the dispersion of citizens, the spread of vice on earth and the destruction of religious values. Let every person know that he is responsible before Allah, for "the doer of the slightest good deed is rewarded in like, and the does of the slightest evil deed is also rewarded in like."

The Islamic Resistance Movement consider itself to be the spearhead of the circle of struggle with world Zionism and a step on the road. The Movement adds its efforts to the efforts of all those who are active in the Palestinian arena. Arab and Islamic Peoples should augment by further steps on their part; Islamic groupings all over the Arab world should also do the same, since all of these are the best-equipped for the future role in the fight with the warmongering Jews.

"..and we have put enmity and hatred between them, until the day of resurrection. So often as they shall kindle a fire of war, Allah shall extinguish it; and they shall set their minds to act corruptly in the earth, but Allah loveth not the corrupt doers." (The Table - verse 64). Article Thirty-Three:

The Islamic Resistance Movement, being based on the common coordinated and interdependent conceptions of the laws of the universe, and flowing in the stream of destiny in confronting and fighting the enemies in defence of the Moslems and Islamic civilization and sacred sites, the first among which is the Aqsa Mosque, urges the Arab and Islamic peoples, their governments, popular and official groupings, to fear Allah where their view of the Islamic Resistance Movement and their dealings with it are concerned. They should back and support it, as Allah wants them to, extending to it more and more funds till Allah's purpose is achieved when ranks will close up, fighters join other fighters and masses everywhere in the Islamic world will come forward in response to the call of duty while loudly proclaiming: Hail to Jihad. Their cry will reach the heavens and will go on being resounded until liberation is achieved, the invaders vanquished and Allah's victory comes about. "And Allah will certainly assist him who shall be on his side: for Allah is strong and mighty." (The Pilgrimage - verse 40).

The Testimony of History Across History in Confronting the Invaders:

Article Thirty-Four:

Palestine is the navel of the globe and the crossroad of the continents. Since the dawn of history, it has been the target of expansionists. The Prophet, Allah bless him and grant him salvation, had himself pointed to this fact in the noble Hadith in which he called on his honourable companion, Ma'adh ben-Jabal, saying: O Ma'ath, Allah throw open before you, when I am gone, Syria, from Al-Arish to the Euphrates. Its men, women and slaves will stay firmly
there till the Day of Judgement. Whoever of you should choose one of the Syrian shores, or the Holy Land, he will be in constant struggle till the Day of Judgement."

Expansionists have more than once put their eye on Palestine which they attacked with their armies to fulfill their designs on it. Thus it was that the Crusaders came with their armies, bringing with them their creed and carrying their Cross. They were able to defeat the Moslems for a while, but the Moslems were able to retrieve the land only when they stood under the wing of their religious banner, united their word, hallowed the name of Allah and surged out fighting under the leadership of Salah ed-Din al-Ayyubi. They fought for almost twenty years and at the end the Crusaders were defeated and Palestine was liberated.

"Say unto those who believe not, Ye shall be overcome, and thrown together into hell; an unhappy couch it shall be." (The Family of Imran - verse 12).

**This is the only way to liberate Palestine.** There is no doubt about the testimony of history. It is one of the laws of the universe and one of the rules of existence. **Nothing can overcome iron except iron.** Their false futile creed can only be defeated by the righteous Islamic creed. A creed could not be fought except by a creed, and in the last analysis, victory is for the just, for justice is certainly victorious.

"Our word hath formerly been given unto our servants the apostles; that they should certainly be assisted against the infidels, and that our armies should surely be the conquerors." (Those Who Rank Themselves - verses 171-172).

Article Thirty-Five:

The Islamic Resistance Movement views seriously the defeat of the Crusaders at the hands of Salah ed-Din al-Ayyubi and the rescuing of Palestine from their hands, as well as the defeat of the Tatars at Ein Galot, breaking their power at the hands of Qataz and Al-Dhaher Bivers and saving the Arab world from the Tatar onslaught which aimed at the destruction of every meaning of human civilization. The Movement draws lessons and examples from all this. The present Zionist onslaught has also been preceded by Crusading raids from the West and other Tatar raids from the East. Just as the Moslems faced those raids and planned fighting and defeating them, they should be able to confront the Zionist invasion and defeat it. This is indeed no problem for the Almighty Allah, provided that the intentions are pure, the determination is true and that Moslems have benefited from past experiences, rid themselves of the effects of ideological invasion and followed the customs of their ancestors.

The Islamic Resistance Movement is Composed of Soldiers:

Article Thirty-Six:

While paving its way, the Islamic Resistance Movement, emphasizes time and again to all the sons of our people, to the Arab and Islamic nations, that it does not seek personal fame, material gain, or social prominence. It does not aim to compete against any one from among our people, or take his place. Nothing of the sort at all. It will not act against any of the sons of Moslems or those who are peaceful towards it from among non-Moslems, be they here or anywhere else. It will only serve as a support for all groupings and organizations operating against the Zionist enemy and its lackeys.

The Islamic Resistance Movement adopts Islam as its way of life. Islam is its creed and religion. Whoever takes Islam as his way of life, be it an organization, a group, a country or any other body, the Islamic Resistance Movement considers itself as their soldiers and nothing more. We ask Allah to show us the right course, to make us an example to others and to judge between
us and our people with truth. "O Lord, do thou judge between us and our nation with truth; for thou art the best judge." (Al Araf - Verse 89).
Appendix C, Annex 29 -- Palestinian Declaration of Independence
by the Palestine National Council
November 15, 1988

At the time this declaration was adopted, it made no significant impact. The New York Times called it “symbolic” and “of no concrete significance” (Darwish, 2008, Aug. 11, p. B6). The Palestine of 1988 controlled no territory, lacked defined borders, and it had little of the political infrastructure of a state. Bolton (2010, Oct. 20) said the effort for independence “faded away” because of “Washington’s determined opposition within the U.N. system” (p. A19).

U.S. reaction to the declaration was described as “tepid” (Pear, 1988, Nov. 16, p. A10). State Department spokesman Charles E. Redman was dismissive: “Possibly implied or indirect recognition of Israel is not sufficient” (Sciolino, 1988, Nov. 17, p. A8).

Israel authorities at the time “derided” the declaration and rejected it “outright” (Tristam, n.d.). Nevertheless, Tristam praised the declaration as “an eloquent summation of history and principles from the Palestinian perspective” at that time.

Result: So the declaration is a dead letter? Hardly. It acquired new relevance in 2011 with the Palestinian Authority’s plan to ask the United Nations to recognize Palestine as a state. The authority’s plan said that the future Palestinian state would be based on the 1988 declaration (Segal, 2009, November 11). “Lest anyone believe that the 1988 declaration is ancient history, they should read the new [Palestinian Authority prime minister Salam] Fayyad Plan with more care,” Segal said. “It cites the 1988 declaration four times, identifying it has having articulated ‘the foundations of the Palestinian state.’ ”

Four references to Israel in the declaration (emphasis added in the text below) imply recognition of Israel’s right to exist, which would mean acceptance of a two-state solution. So does the reference to the United Nation’s partition plan of 1947 (see U.N. Resolution 181 in
Appendix D). One of the references even implies a recognition of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state: “two states, one Arab, one Jewish” (emphasis added). One of the sticking points in 2011 peace negotiations has been Israel’s demand that the Palestinians recognize not just Israel’s right to exist, but its right to exist as a **Jewish state**. Palestinian leadership refused.

A second document, a Political Communique, was released simultaneously by the Palestine National Council in Algiers. Both documents, reproduced below, were published in the Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter, 1989, pp. 213-223.

The journal identifies the first document as” the official translation ... as carried by WAFA from Algiers.” WAFA is the news agency of the Palestine National Authority.

The New York Times published only the communiqué, on Nov. 17, 1988, p. A8. The two translations of the communiqué differ somewhat. The Times said its version is “as rendered in an unofficial translation from the Arabic by the United States Government.” The journal identifies its translation as “official ... received from London.” WAFA is not mentioned.

The Times headline, “Excerpts From Palestine Statement,” is confusing. It covers two parts: The first is identified as an abstract (three paragraphs) and the second is identified as “Full Text.” Both parts are reproduced here exactly as they appeared in the Times, including the dateline, italic precede, and typos (Excerpts from Palestine Statement, 1988, November 17, 19, p. A8, p. A3).

Two days after publication, The New York Times ran a correction. The deleted word is shown below as crossed out and the added words are shown underlined. The Times blamed a transmission error.

The two documents appeared to take on a new life as part of the quest for the United Nations to recognize Palestine as a state. As a framework for peace, the declaration moved
beyond contentious resistance and established a basis for subsequent negotiations. Accepting Resolution 338 further establishes a willingness to negotiate with Israel on remaining points of disagreement, especially the declaration’s designation of Jerusalem as its capital (emphasis added).

Another milestone was the recognition in the preamble of the declaration that Palestine was “the land of three monotheistic faiths” (emphasis added), which conceded that the Jews also had a connection to the land. Previous arguments had insisted that the Jews were colonists and foreigners.

For further evidence of how far published Palestinian thinking had evolved, compare the Declaration of Independence of 1988 to the Palestinian National Charter (also called the PLO Covenant) from two decades before [see Appendix C, 1964/1968]. As Segal (2009) pointed out, the declaration “reverses the stance previously taken in the PLO Covenant [which] stated, ‘The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time’ [Article 19]. The declaration, by contrast, said the partition resolution ‘still provides those conditions of international legitimacy that ensures the right of the Palestinian people to sovereignty and national independence.’ In other words, the U.N. resolution that was previously condemned is now used as justification for independence.

The quotation that ends the declaration is from Sura 3, Verse 26, of the Quran. The closing blessing (Sadaqa Allahu al-Azim) is not in the Quran but is commonly used after reciting or quoting from it. It means “Almighty Allah has spoken the truth” (Is saying ‘Sadaqa Allahu al-Azeem’ after reciting from Quran bidah?, 2011, April 28). [“Bidah” in Arabic describes a forbidden innovation.]
Text of the Declaration of Palestinian Independence

http://middleeast.about.com/od/documents/a/me081115f.htm

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

Palestine, the land of the three monotheistic faiths, is where the Palestinian Arab people was born, on which it grew, developed and excelled. Thus the Palestinian Arab people ensured for itself an everlasting union between itself, its land, and its history.

Resolute throughout that history, the Palestinian Arab people forged its national identity, rising even to unimagined levels in its defense, as invasion, the design of others, and the appeal special to Palestine's ancient and luminous place on the eminence where powers and civilizations are joined. All this intervened thereby to deprive the people of its political independence. Yet the undying connection between Palestine and its people secured for the land its character, and for the people its national genius.

Nourished by an unfolding series of civilizations and cultures, inspired by a heritage rich in variety and kind, the Palestinian Arab people added to its stature by consolidating a union between itself and its patrimonial Land. The call went out from Temple, Church, and Mosque that to praise the Creator, to celebrate compassion and peace was indeed the message of Palestine. And in generation after generation, the Palestinian Arab people gave of itself unspARINGingly in the valiant battle for liberation and homeland. For what has been the unbroken chain of our people's rebellions but the heroic embodiment of our will for national independence. And so the people was sustained in the struggle to stay and to prevail.

When in the course of modern times a new order of values was declared with norms and values fair for all, it was the Palestinian Arab people that had been excluded from the destiny of all other peoples by a hostile array of local and foreign powers. Yet again had unaided justice been revealed as insufficient to drive the world's history along its preferred course.

And it was the Palestinian people, already wounded in its body, that was submitted to yet another type of occupation over which floated that falsehood that "Palestine was a land without people." This notion was foisted upon some in the world, whereas in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919) and in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the community of nations had recognized that all the Arab territories, including Palestine, of the formerly Ottoman provinces, were to have granted to them their freedom as provisionally independent nations.

Despite the historical injustice inflicted on the Palestinian Arab people resulting in their dispersion and depriving them of their right to self-determination, following upon U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947), which partitioned Palestine into two states, one Arab, one Jewish, yet it is this Resolution that still provides those conditions of international legitimacy that ensure the right of the Palestinian Arab people to sovereignty.

By stages, the occupation of Palestine and parts of other Arab territories by Israeli forces, the willed dispossession and expulsion from their ancestral homes of the majority of Palestine's civilian inhabitants, was achieved by organized terror; those Palestinians who remained, as a vestige subjugated in its homeland, were persecuted and forced to endure the destruction of their national life.
Thus were principles of international legitimacy violated. Thus were the Charter of the United Nations and its Resolutions disfigured, for they had recognized the Palestinian Arab people's national rights, including the right of Return, the right to independence, the right to sovereignty over territory and homeland.

In Palestine and on its perimeters, in exile distant and near, the Palestinian Arab people never faltered and never abandoned its conviction in its rights of Return and independence. Occupation, massacres and dispersion achieved no gain in the unabated Palestinian consciousness of self and political identity, as Palestinians went forward with their destiny, undeterred and unbowed. And from out of the long years of trial in ever-mounting struggle, the Palestinian political identity emerged further consolidated and confirmed. And the collective Palestinian national will forged for itself a political embodiment, the Palestine Liberation Organization, its sole, legitimate representative recognized by the world community as a whole, as well as by related regional and international institutions. Standing on the very rock of conviction in the Palestinian people's inalienable rights, and on the ground of Arab national consensus and of international legitimacy, the PLO led the campaigns of its great people, molded into unity and powerful resolve, one and indivisible in its triumphs, even as it suffered massacres and confinement within and without its home. And so Palestinian resistance was clarified and raised into the forefront of Arab and world awareness, as the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people achieved unique prominence among the world's liberation movements in the modern era.

The massive national uprising, the intifada, now intensifying in cumulative scope and power on occupied Palestinian territories, as well as the unflinching resistance of the refugee camps outside the homeland, have elevated awareness of the Palestinian truth and right into still higher realms of comprehension and actuality. Now at last the curtain has been dropped around a whole epoch of prevarication and negation. The Intifada has set siege to the mind of official Israel, which has for too long relied exclusively upon myth and terror to deny Palestinian existence altogether. Because of the intifada and its revolutionary irreversible impulse, the history of Palestine has therefore arrived at a decisive juncture.

Whereas the Palestinian people reaffirms most definitively its inalienable rights in the land of its patrimony:

Now by virtue of natural, historical and legal rights, and the sacrifices of successive generations who gave of themselves in defense of the freedom and independence of their homeland;

In pursuance of Resolutions adopted by Arab Summit Conferences and relying on the authority bestowed by international legitimacy as embodied in the Resolutions of the United Nations Organization since 1947;

And in exercise by the Palestinian Arab people of its rights to self-determination, political independence and sovereignty over its territory,

The Palestine National Council, in the name of God, and in the name of the Palestinian Arab people, hereby proclaims the establishment of the State of Palestine on our Palestinian territory with its capital Jerusalem (Al-Quds Ash-Sharif).

The State of Palestine is the state of Palestinians wherever they may be. The state is for them to enjoy in it their collective national and cultural identity, theirs to pursue in it a complete equality of rights. In it will be safeguarded their political and religious convictions and their human dignity by means of a parliamentary democratic system of governance, itself based on freedom of expression and the freedom to form parties. The rights of minorities will duly be respected by the majority, as minorities must abide by decisions of the majority. Governance will
be based on principles of social justice, equality and non-discrimination in public rights of men or women, on grounds of race, religion, color or sex, and the aegis of a constitution which ensures the rule of law and an independent judiciary. Thus shall these principles allow no departure from Palestine's age-old spiritual and civilizational heritage of tolerance and religious coexistence.

The State of Palestine is an Arab state, an integral and indivisible part of the Arab nation, at one with that nation in heritage and civilization, with it also in its aspiration for liberation, progress, democracy and unity. The State of Palestine affirms its obligation to abide by the Charter of the League of Arab States, whereby the coordination of the Arab states with each other shall be strengthened. It calls upon Arab compatriots to consolidate and enhance the reality of state, to mobilize potential, and to intensify efforts whose goal is to end Israeli occupation.

The State of Palestine proclaims its commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations, and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It proclaims its commitment as well to the principles and policies of the Non-Aligned Movement.

It further announces itself to be a peace-loving State, in adherence to the principles of peaceful co-existence. It will join with all states and peoples in order to assure a permanent peace based upon justice and the respect of rights so that humanity's potential for well-being may be assured, an earnest competition for excellence may be maintained, and in which confidence in the future will eliminate fear for those who are just and for whom justice is the only recourse.

In the context of its struggle for peace in the land of Love and Peace, the State of Palestine calls upon the United Nations to bear special responsibility for the Palestinian Arab people and its homeland. It calls upon all peace-and freedom-loving peoples and states to assist it in the attainment of its objectives, to provide it with security, to alleviate the tragedy of its people, and to help it terminate Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories.

The State of Palestine herewith declares that it believes in the settlement of regional and international disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with the U.N. Charter and resolutions. With prejudice to its natural right to defend its territorial integrity and independence, it therefore rejects the threat or use of force, violence and terrorism against its territorial integrity or political independence, as it also rejects their use against territorial integrity of other states.

Therefore, on this day unlike all others, November 15, 1988, as we stand at the threshold of a new dawn, in all honor and modesty we humbly bow to the sacred spirits of our fallen ones, Palestinian and Arab, by the purity of whose sacrifice for the homeland our sky has been illuminated and our Land given life. Our hearts are lifted up and irradiated by the light emanating from the much blessed intifada, from those who have endured and have fought the fight of the camps, of dispersion, of exile, from those who have borne the standard for freedom, our children, our aged, our youth, our prisoners, detainees and wounded, all those ties to our sacred soil are confirmed in camp, village, and town. We render special tribute to that brave Palestinian Woman, guardian of sustenance and Life, keeper of our people's perennial flame. To the souls of our sainted martyrs, the whole of our Palestinian Arab people that our struggle shall be continued until the occupation ends, and the foundation of our sovereignty and independence shall be fortified accordingly.

Therefore, we call upon our great people to rally to the banner of Palestine, to cherish and defend it, so that it may forever be the symbol of our freedom and dignity in that homeland, which is a homeland for the free, now and always.

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful:
"Say: 'O God, Master of the Kingdom, Thou givest the Kingdom to whom Thou wilt, and seizes the Kingdom from whom Thou wilt. Thou exalted whom Thou wilt, and Thou abasest whom Thou wilt; in Thy hand is the good; Thou are powerful over everything."
Sadaqa Allahu al-Azim

Text of political communiqué

as published by the New York Times on Nov. 17, 1988, p. A8
under the headline “Excerpts From Palestine Statement”

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 — Following are excerpts from the political resolution passed Monday in Algiers by the Palestine National Council, as rendered in an unofficial translation from the Arabic by the United States Government:

In the name of God the Almighty, the All Merciful - draft political statement on the Algerian land and with the Algerian people and President Chadli Bendjedid hosting it, the Palestine National Council held its 19th extraordinary session, the Intifada and Independence Session, and the session to the hero and Martyr Abu Jihad during the period of Nov. 12 to 15, 1988.

This session was crowned by the declaration of a Palestinian state on our Palestinian territory, as it could be considered as the normal culmination of the struggle of a daring and tenacious people, a struggle which has continued for more than 70 years and with immense sacrifices accepted by the people on its homeland, on its frontiers, and in all camps and places of dispersement. This session was distinguished by its focus on the Palestinian intifada, considered as the greatest event in the contemporary history of the revolution of the Palestinian people within and outside the occupied territories ... [ellipsis original in the Times].

Continuing the Uprising
Reinforcing the steadfastness of our people and our intifada and responding to our people within the occupied homeland and outside it, and in fidelity to the memory of our martyrs and our wounded, the P.N.C decides:

First: On the escalation and continuation of the intifada:

A. To provide all means for intensifying the intifada in every aspect and in every way;

B. To strengthen the support of popular institutions and organizations within the occupied Palestinian lands;

C. To reinforce and develop popular committees, organizations and union leaders to assure their effectiveness, including attack groups and the popular army;

D. To consolidate the national unity manifested by the intifada;
E. To intensify efforts at the international level for the release of detainees, for the return of those expelled, and for an end to repression and organized terrorism against our children, women and men as well as against our institutions;

F. To call on the United Nations to place occupied Palestinian territory under international supervision to protect our masses and end the Israeli occupation.

G. To call on the Palestinian people outside the homeland to intensify and increase their support to needy families within the occupied territories;

H. To call on the Arab nation and its peoples, forces, institutions, and governments to increase their political, financial and media support for the intifada;

I. To call on free men all over the world to stand beside our people and our revolution and to oppose the Israeli occupier, his repressive measures and his fascist militarily organized terrorism, which is carried out by forces of the occupation army and by armed, fanatic settlers, against our people, universities, schools, institutions, and our sacred places of worship, Christian as well as Moslem.

Rights of Palestinians
Second: In the political field proceeding from all the above, the Palestine National Council - on the basis of its responsibility toward our Palestinian people, its national rights, and its desire for peace on the basis of the declaration of independence issued on Nov. 15, 1988, and responding to a humanitarian desire to try to reinforce international detente and nuclear disarmament and the settlement of regional disputes by peaceful means - affirms the determination of the Palestine Liberation Organization to reach a comprehensive peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its essence, the Palestinian cause, within the framework of the United Nations charter, the principles and provisions of international legitimacy, the rules of international law, the resolutions of the United Nations (the latest being United Nations Security Council Resolutions 605, 607 and 608), and the resolutions of the Arab summits in a manner that assures the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return, exercise self-determination, and establish its independent national state on its national territory, and creates arrangements of security and peace for all the states of the region.

Working with U.N.
To implement this, the Palestine National Council affirms:

1. [as corrected] The necessity of holding and effective international conference concerning the Middle East issue and its essence, the Palestinian cause, under the auspices of the United Nations and with the participation of the permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council and all the parties to the struggle in the region, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on an equal footing, and by considering that the international conference will be held on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the assurance of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people and, first and foremost, their right to self-determination in application of the principles and provisions of the United Nations charter concerning the right of peoples to
self-determination and the inadmissibility of seizing the lands of others by force or military invasion, and in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations regarding the Palestinian cause and Arab territories that it has occupied since 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.

2. Israeli withdrawal from all the Palestinian and Arab territories that it has occupied since 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.

3. Annulment of all the measures of annexation and attachment and removal of the settlements that Israel has established in the Palestinian and Arab territories since the year 1967.

4. An effort to place the occupied Palestinian territories, including Arab Jerusalem, under the supervision of the United Nations for a limited period to protect our people, to create an atmosphere favorable to insuring the success of the proceedings of the International Conference, the attainment of a comprehensive peaceful solution, and the achievement of security and peace for all through mutual acceptance and satisfaction, and to enable the Palestinian state to exercise its effective authority over these territories.

5. Settlement of the issue of the Palestinian refugees in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations regarding this matter.

6. The guarantee of the right to worship and the exercise of religious rites at the holy places in Palestine for the followers of all religions.

7. The Security Council will draw up and guarantee the arrangements for security and peace among all the affected states in the region, including the Palestinian state.

The Palestine National Council confirms its previous resolutions concerning the privileged relationship between the two fraternal Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, and that the future relationship between the two states of Jordan and Palestine will be established on confederal bases and on the basis of the free and voluntary choice of the two fraternal peoples, consolidating the historical ties and common vital interests between them.

The Palestine National Council renews its commitment to the United Nations resolutions that affirm the right of peoples to resist foreign occupation, colonialism and racial discrimination and their right to struggle for their independence. It again declares its rejection of terror in all its forms, including state terror, confirming its commitment to its previous resolutions in this regard, to the resolution of the Arab Summit in Algiers in 1988, United Nations resolutions 42/159 of 1967 and 61/40 of 1985, and to what appeared in the Cairo declaration issued on Nov. 7, 1985 in this regard.

Importance of Territory
Third: in the Arab and International Fields the Palestine National Council affirms the importance of the unity of the territory, people, and institutions of Lebanon and of a firm stand against efforts to partition the territory and divide the fraternal people of Lebanon. It also affirms the importance of the Joint Arab effort to participate in solving the crisis of Lebanon, thus sharing in crystalizing and applying the solutions that will preserve its unity. The council also affirms the
importance of consecrating the right of Palestinian citizens in Lebanon to exercise their political and media rights and to enjoy security and protection, of working against all forms of conspiracy and aggression that target them and their right to work and live, and of the necessity of fulfilling all the conditions that will assure their self-defense and the achievement of their security and protection.

The Palestine National Council affirms as well its solidarity with the Lebanese Islamic Nationalist Forces in their struggle against the Israeli occupation and its agents in Southern Lebanon. It expresses its pride in the militant solidarity between the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples in confronting aggression and in ending the Israeli occupation of parts of the South.

The National Council expresses its deep pride in the support of the masses of our Arab Nation for the struggle of our Palestinian Arab people and for the Palestine Liberation Organization and the uprising of our people in the occupied homeland. It affirms the importance of reinforcing the relations of struggle among the forces, parties, and organizations of the Arab National Liberation movement in defense of the rights of the Arab Nation and its masses to liberation, progress, Democracy, and unity. The council calls for the adoption of all the measures that will reinforce the unity of struggle among all the parties of the Arab National Liberation Movement.

The Palestine National Council, in addressing its greetings and thanks to the Arab states for their support of the struggle of our people, calls upon them to honor the commitments decided at the Algiers Summit Conference in support of the struggle of the Palestinian people and its blessed uprising. The council, in addressing this wish, expresses its great confidence that the leaders of the Arab Nation will continue, as we have come to know them, to support and back Palestine and its people.

… [Ellipsis original in the Times.]

In closing, the Palestine National Council affirms its complete confidence that the just nature of the Palestinian cause and of the demands that the Palestinian people is fighting for will continue to enjoy more support from honorable and free men throughout the world. It also affirms its complete confidence in victory on the road to Jerusalem, the capital of our independent Palestinian state.

[The correction on Nov. 19, 1988, p. A3, begins: “Because of a transmission error, excerpts on Thursday from the political resolution by the Palestine National Council incorrectly rendered the first of seven points affirmed in the resolution. The corrected article reads: The new paragraph then is quoted as shown above.]
Appendix C, Annex 30 -- Stockholm Declaration

December 7, 1988

This well-intentioned effort to find a formula that would get the parties together failed -- and succeeded – both within a week.

The United States was having nothing to do with the PLO because it did not explicitly recognize Israel’s right to exist, and because it did not renounce terrorism. A delegation of American Jews met in Stockholm with a delegation of Palestinians led by Yasser Arafat. They issued a joint declaration that called for a two-state solution and the return of refugees to Israel.

**Result:** The United States, wanting to hear the concessions directly from Arafat, still was not satisfied and Israel gave the declaration no official attention. But the declaration was prologue. On Dec. 13 and 14, Arafat, speaking in Geneva, said the magic words. The United States declared it was satisfied, and a new chapter in Middle East history opened.

**Text of the Stockholm Declaration**

Source: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israel%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1984-1988/408%20PLO%20Statement-%20December%201988

The Palestinian National Council met in Algiers from November 12 to 15, 1988, and announced the declaration of independence which proclaimed the state of Palestine and issued a political statement.

The following explanation was given by the representatives of the PLO of certain important points in the Palestinian declaration of independence and the political statement adopted by the PNC in Algiers.

Affirming the principle incorporated in those UN resolutions which call for a two-state solution of Israel and Palestine, the PNC:

1. Agreed to enter into peace negotiations at an international conference under the auspices of the UN with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on equal footing with the other parties to the conflict; such an international conference is to be held on the basis of UN resolutions 242 and 338 and the right of the Palestinian people of self-determination, without the external
interference, as provided in the UN Charter, including the right to an independent state, which conference should resolve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects;

2. Established the independent state of Palestine and accepted the existence of Israel as a state in the region;

3. Declared its rejection and condemnation of terrorism in all its forms, including state terrorism;

4. Called for a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with international law and practices and relevant UN resolutions (including right of return or compensation).
Appendix C, Annex 31 -- Arafat Speeches
Geneva, December 13-14, 1988

Arafat delivered these speeches to the United Nations General Assembly in Geneva because U.S. President Ronald Regan refused him entry into the United States on the ground that he condones terrorism. So the General Assembly moved its meeting place to Switzerland for the occasion.

This speech is historic for explicitly citing Resolutions 242, 338 and 194. Resolution 242 mentions Israel and alludes to its right to exist in peace, Resolution 338 proposes direct negotiations, and reinforces Resolution 242.

Recognizing these resolutions was a major milestone on the road to peace. Arafat’s references to them have been marked in bold (emphasis added) below. What Arafat does not do in the General Assembly speech is to renounce terrorism or explicitly accept Israel’s right to exist. He condemns terrorism, but he does not renounce it. The United States had insisted that he explicitly renounce terrorism as a prerequisite for negotiations. He saved that for a press conference the next day, a transcript of which follows the transcript of his General Assembly speech. Emphasis has been added to key remarks from his press conference, including his first explicit statement accepting Israel’s right to exist.

The General Assembly speech is a stirring defense of the Palestinian position, especially the PLO’s interpretation of General Assembly Resolution 194 as granting a “right of return” to Palestinian refugees and the PLO’s definition of its operations against Israel as legitimate resistance, not terrorism. The speech also signals a willingness to compromise. See the offer to “settle the issue on the basis of possible, rather than absolute, justice” in the first of the paragraphs that has been marked in bold (emphasis added).
Resolution 194 has been troublesome for both Israelis and Palestinians. Israel accepted it “under its own interpretation” (Isseroff, n.d.) – in other words, with fingers crossed. Palestinians had objected to 194 because it refers only to “refugees” -- which might be taken to include Jewish refugees, not just Palestinian refugees – and only those who are willing to live at peace with their neighbors. “Until then,” says Isseroff (n.d.), “Arab Palestinians were officially not willing to live in peace with their neighbors. Arab governments are still unwilling to repatriate or compensate Jewish refugees, nor is such a solution contemplated in Palestinian peace proposals.”

Text of Yasser Arafat Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Geneva
December 13, 1988

Mr. President, Honorable Members:
It never occurred to me that my second meeting with this honorable assembly since 1974 would take place in the hospitable city of Geneva. I had thought that the new political positions and postures evolved by our Palestinian people in the course of the Algiers meeting of the Palestine National - Council (PNC), all of which have been made public and extremely well received internationally, would have necessitated my travel to the United Nations headquarters in New York to brief you on our resolutions and projections on the issue of peace in our homeland as formulated by our PNC, the highest legislative authority in the Palestinian body politic.

I am both proud and happy to meet with you today, here in Geneva, after an arbitrary American decision barred me from going to you there. I am proud because I am in your midst and you are the highest rostrum for the problems of justice and peace in the world. I am happy because I am in Geneva, where justice and neutrality are a guidepost and a constitution in a world where the arrogance of power drives some to lose their sense of neutrality and justice. The resolution passed by your esteemed assembly, with 154 member nations voting to move the session here, was not a victory over the American decision but an unprecedented landslide for the international consensus in favor of justice and Peace. It is proof that our people's just cause has become embedded in the fabric of the human conscious.

Our Palestinian people will never forget the position taken by this honorable assembly and these friendly States in support of right and justice and in defense of the values and principles for which the United Nations organization was established- This position will be a source of confidence and security to all peoples subjected to injustice, oppression, and occupation and struggling, like the Palestinian people, for freedom, dignity, and survival.
I extend deep gratitude to all nations, forces, and international organizations and personalities who backed our people and supported its national right—particularly our friends in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the socialist countries, the non-aligned States, the Islamic States, the African States, the States, the Latin American States, and other friendly States. I also thank Western European nations and Japan for their latest stands toward our people and I invite them to take further steps Positively to evolve their resolutions in order to open the way for Peace and a just settlement in our region the Middle East.

I reiterate our solidarity with and Support for the liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa in their struggle, and our support for the African frontline states against the aggression of the racist South African regime. I seize this opportunity to express my gratitude to those friendly states which took the initiative in supporting us, in endorsing our PNC resolutions, and in recognizing the State Of Palestine.

And I will not miss this opportunity to thank warmly His Excellency the of the United Nations, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, and his assistants for their relentless efforts to achieve humanity's aspirations for international detente and the settlement of its problems, particularly those related to the Palestine question. I also extend my thanks and appreciation to the chairman and members of the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People on their endeavors for Our people's cause, and I salute the nonaligned nations, “Committee of Nine on the Palestine Question” for all its constructive contributions to our people's cause.

And to you, Mr. President, my warm congratulations on the occasion of your election as president of this assembly. I have full confidence in your wisdom and insight. I also congratulate your predecessor on his skillful handling of the proceedings of the previous session. Lastly, I extend warm greetings and thanks to the Swiss government and People for making this meeting possible.

Mr President, Honorable Members

Fourteen Years ago on 13 November 1974, I received a gracious invitation from You to expound the Problem Of Our Palestinian People before this dignified assembly. Here I am returning to you after all these eventful years to see now Peoples taking their places in your midst, crowning thereby their victories in the battles for freedom and independence. To the representatives of these peoples, I extend the warm congratulations of our own. Let it be known that I return to you with a stronger voice, a firmer determination and a greater coincidence to reiterate my conviction that our struggle will bear fruit and that the State of Palestine, which we proclaimed at Our Palestine National Council, will take its place among you to join [hands with] You in consolidating the charter of this organization and the Universal Declaration of Human rights, in putting an end to the tragedies afflicting humanity, and in upholding the Principles of right, justice- Peace, and freedom for all.

Fourteen years ago, when you told us in the General Assembly hall- “Yes to Palestine and the people Palestine, yes to the Palestine Liberation Organization, yes to the inalienable national rights of the people of Palestine,” a few imagined that your resolutions would carry little weight,
failing to realize that these resolutions were among the springs that watered the olive branch I
carried that day. since then, we have watered it with blood, tears, and sweat, and it has turned
into into a tree with roots entrenched in the ground, and a stem reaching for the sky promising to
bear the fruits of victory over coercion, injustice, and occupation.

You gave us hope that freedom and justice would triumph and we gave you a generation of our
people that has dedicated its life to the realization of that dream. It is the generation of the
blessed intifadah, which today is wielding the homeland's Stones to defend the honor of this
homeland and be worthy of belonging to a people thirsting for freedom and independence

I bring you greetings from those heroic people, from our men and our women, from the masses
of our blessed intifadah, which now enters its second year with great momentum and painstaking
organization, using a civilized, democratic approach to weather and confront occupation,
coercion, tyranny and the barbaric crimes committed daily by the Israeli occupiers. Greetings to
you from our young men and women in the occupation forces' prisons and collective detention
centers. Greetings from the children of stones who are challenging occupation forces armed with
warplanes, tanks, and weapons -- an unarmed Palestinian David facing, a heavily armed Israeli
Goliath.

I said in concluding my address in our first encounter that as chairman of the Palestine Liberation
organization and leader of the Palestine revolution, I reaffirm that we do not wish to see a drop
of Jewish or Arab blood shed, that we do not want the continuation of the fighting for one extra
minute. I appealed to you then to spare us all these ordeals and sufferings and to speed up work
on the foundations of a just peace based on securing the rights, hopes, and aspirations of our
people and the equal rights of all peoples

I said that I was calling upon you to stand by the struggle of our People to exercise its right to
self-determination and to enable our people to return from the exile into which it was driven at
gunpoint. I solicited your help to end this injustice to which successive generations of our people
have been subjected over several decades so that they can live free and sovereign on their soil
and in their homeland, enjoying all their national and human rights. The last thing I said from
this rostrum, was that war breaks out from Palestine and that peace starts in Palestine.

The dream we entertained at the time was to establish a democratic State of Palestine in which
Muslims, Christians, and Jews would live with equal rights and obligations as one unified
community, like other peoples in this contemporary world.

We were shocked to hear Israeli officialdom interpret this Palestinian dream-inspired by the
spiritual heritage that illuminated Palestine and the civilizational and humanitarian values calling
for coexistence in a free democratic society-as a scheme to destroy and obliterate their entity.

Mr President:

**We had to draw the necessary conclusion regarding the gap between this reality and the
dream. We set out in the Palestine Liberation Organization to look for realistic and
attainable formulas that would settle the issue on the basis of possible, rather than**
absolute, justice while securing the rights of our people to freedom, sovereignty, and independence; ensuring for everyone peace, security, and stability; and sparing Palestine and the Middle East wars and battles that have been going on for forty years.

Didn't we, Mr. President, take the initiative of relying, on the charter and resolutions of the United Nations, the Declaration of Human Rights, and international legitimacy as the basis for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Did we not welcome the Vance-Gromyko communique of 1977 as a move that could form the basis of a proposed solution to this conflict? Did we not agree to participate in the Geneva conference on the basis of the American-Egyptian statement of 1977 to push forward the prospects of a settlement and peace in the region? Did we not endorse the Arab peace plan in Fez in 1982 and later the call for an international peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations and in keeping with its resolutions? Did we not underwrite the Brezhnev plan for peace in the Middle East? Did we not welcome and support the Venice declaration by the European Community as the basis for a just peace in the area? Did we not welcome and support the joint initiative of presidents Gorbachev and Mitterand on a preparatory committee for the international conference? Did we not welcome scores of political statements and initiatives put forward by African, Islamic, non-aligned, socialist, European, and other groups and states for the purpose of finding a peaceful settlement based on the principles of international legitimacy?

What has been the attitude of Israel on all this, even though not a single one of the aforementioned initiatives or plans or communiques lacks political balance or overlooks the claims and interests, of all the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Israel's response to all this has been the escalation of its settlement and annexation schemes; the fanning of the flames of conflict with more destruction, devastation, and bloodshed; and the expansion of the confrontation fronts to include brotherly Lebanon, which was invaded by the occupation troops in 1982, an invasion punctuated with slaughters and massacres perpetrated against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, including the Sabra and Shatila massacres. Until this moment, Israel continues to occupy parts of south Lebanon, and Lebanon faces daily raids as well as air, sea, and land attacks on its cities and villages and our camps in the south.

It is painful and regrettable that the American government alone should continue to back these aggressive and expansionist schemes as well as Israel's continued occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories, its crimes, and its iron-fist policy against our children and women. It is painful and regrettable, too, that the American government should continue refusing to recognize the right of six million Palestinians to self-determination, a right which is sacred to the American people and other peoples on this planet.

I remind them, of the position of President Wilson, author of the two universal principles of international relations, ie, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and the right of peoples to self-determination. I remind them, too, that when the Palestinian people were consulted by the King-Crane Commission in 1919, they chose the United States as the mandatory power. Circumstances having prevented that, the mandate was given to Britain. My
question to the American people is this: Is it fair that the Palestinian people should be deprived of what President Wilson prescribed?

The successive American administrations realize that the only birth certificate for the establishment of the State of Israel is Resolution 181, approved by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947, and endorsed at the time by the United States and the Soviet Union. It provides for the establishment of two states in Palestine, one Palestinian Arab and one Jewish.

How then does the American government explain its position which acknowledges and recognizes the half of the resolution that pertains to Israel and rejects the half pertaining to the Palestinian state? How does the United States government explain its lack of commitment to the execution of a resolution that it has endorsed on more than one occasion in your esteemed assembly, ie., (UNGA) Resolution 194, which provides for the right of the Palestinians to return to the homes and properties from which they were evicted and for compensation for those wishing not to exercise this right?

The United States government knows that neither the U.S. nor anyone else has the right to apportion international legitimacy and fragment the provisions of international law.

Mr President:

The uninterrupted struggle of our people for its rights has been going on for several decades during which it has offered hundreds of thousands of martyrs and wounded and endured all kinds of tragedies. On the contrary, its adherence to its Palestinian homeland and national identity has grown stronger.

The leaders of Israel, in their intoxication, deluded themselves into believing that, after our exodus from Beirut, the Palestine Liberation Organization would be thrown into the sea. Little did they expect our march into exile to turn into a procession of return to the homeland, to the field of battle, to occupied Palestine. The result was the heroic popular intifadah within our occupied land, the intifadah which is there to stay until the fulfillment of our goals of freedom and national independence.

I take pride, Mr President, in being one of the sons of these population [sic], whose men, women, and children are writing with their blood an outstanding epic of national resistance and who are performing legendary miracles daily to sustain their intifadah and make it grow until it can impose its will and prove that fight can prevail over might We salute with deep pride our people of the intifadah as the authors of a unique democratic revolutionary experiment.

Thiers is the faith that could not be crushed by Israel's military machine; that could not be killed by any kind of ammunition; that could not be shaken by the burial of people alive, the breaking of bones, the inducement of miscarriages, or the usurpation of water resources; and that could not be deterred by detention, internment, exile, deportation, collective punishment, the demolition of homes, the closure of universities, schools, trade unions, associations, institutions, and newspapers; or the laying of siege to camps, villages, and towns. Those brutal reprisals have
only served to strengthen that faith, spreading it to every household and giving it roots in every inch of our national soil.

A people with such a heritage and such a history is invincible. All the forces of tyranny and terror cannot sway its deep-rooted faith in its right to its homeland and in such values as justice, peace, love, coexistence, and tolerance. The rifle of the revolutionary has protected us from liquidation and the destruction of our national identity in the arenas of hot confrontation. We are fully confident of our ability to protect our green (olive) branch in the arenas of political confrontation-

The worldwide embrace of our just cause, pressing for the realization of peace based on justice, demonstrates clearly that the world has unequivocally identified the predator and the prey, the aggressor and the victim, the struggler for freedom and peace and the terrorist. The day-to-day practices of the occupation army and the gangs of fanatic armed settlers against our people, women and children, have unveiled the ugly face of Israeli occupation and exposed its true aggressive nature-

This growing worldwide awareness, has reached Jewish groups within Israel itself and outside. Their eyes have been opened to the reality of the problem and the essence of the conflict, particularly since they have witnessed the inhuman, day-to-day Israeli practices that undermine the tolerant spirit of Judaism itself.

It has become difficult, if not impossible, for a Jew to reject racial persecution and uphold freedom and human rights while remaining silent about Israel's crimes against Palestinian human rights, the Palestinian people, and the Palestinian homeland, particularly the ugly day-to-day practices of the occupiers gangs of settlers.

We distinguish, Mr. President, between the Jewish citizen whom the Israeli ruling circles have continuously sought to disinform and mislead and the Practices of the leaders of Israel. We realize that there are within and outside Israel courageous and honorable Jewish people who do not condone the Israeli governments policy of repression, massacres, expansion, settlement and expulsion and who recognize the equal rights of our people to life, freedom, and independence. On behalf of the Palestinian people, I thank them for their courageous and honorable stance.

Our people does not want a right which is not its own or which has vested in it by international legitimacy and international law. It does not seek its freedom at the expense of anyone else's freedom, nor does it want a destiny which negates the destiny of another people. Our people refuses to be better or worse than any other people. Our people wants to be the equal of all other peoples, with the same rights and obligations. I call upon all peoples of the world, especially those which were afflicted by the Nazi occupation and considered it their duty to close the chapter of coercion and oppression by one people against another and to lend a willing hand to all the victims of terrorism, fascism, and Nazism, to see clearly today the responsibilities cast upon them by history toward our downtrodden People which wants its children to have a place under the sun in their homeland -- a place where they can live in freedom, like the rest of the children of the world.
Mr President.

It is cause for optimism that our struggle should culminate in the ongoing intifadah when the international atmosphere is marked by a serious and sustained quest for international detente, accord, and progress. We are heartened by the successes scored by the United Nations and its secretary-general in contributing effectively to settling many problems and defusing trouble spots around the world in this new environment of international detente.

Surely, it is impossible to consolidate this new, positive international climate without addressing problems and trouble spots around the globe. This would enable us to formulate a more accurate and reliable yardstick to assess the endeavors of man and nations and to brace for the next century and the challenges and new responsibilities it will lay before us in terms of averting wars and destruction and promoting more freedom, well-being, peace, and progress for mankind.

No one, Mr. President, would dispute the fact that the Palestine problem is the problem of our contemporary world. It is the oldest on your agenda. It is the most intricate and complex. Of the regional issues, it poses the most serious threat to international peace and security. Hence, its priority among the issues that should command the attention of the two superpowers and all the countries of the world. Hence, the need for an effort to outline a course for its equitable solution—a solution that would spread peace across the Middle East.

We in the Palestine Liberation Organization—as a leadership responsible for the people of Palestine and its destiny, loyal to the struggle of our people, venerating, the sacrifices of our martyrs, eager to contribute to the prevailing climate of coexistence and detente, and [the] consensus of the need to participate in the peaceful efforts to find a political settlement that would put an end to the tragedies of wars and fighting and would open the way for peaceful coexistence under international law—summoned our Palestine National Council to convene in an extraordinary session in Algiers last 12-15 November; the purpose being—, to specify and clarify our position as a main party to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which cannot be settled without its participation and approval.

It pleases me to inform you, with great pride, that our Palestine National Council, through a totally free exercise of democracy, has again demonstrated its ability to shoulder its national responsibilities, endorsing serious constructive and responsible resolutions which pave the way for us to reinforce and highlight our desire and contribution to find a peaceful settlement that would secure the national and political rights of our people as well as peace and security for everyone else.

Mr President:

. The first and decisive resolution of our Palestine National Council was the proclamation of the establishment of the State of Palestine, with the holy city of Jerusalem [al-Quds ash-Sharif] as its Capital. The State of Palestine was declared:
By virtue of the Palestinian Arab people's natural historic, and legal right to their homeland, Palestine, and of the sacrifices of their successive generations in defense of the liberty and independence of their homeland;

Pursuant to the resolutions of the Arab summit conference,

By the authority of international legitimacy, as embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations since 1947;

In implementation of the Palestinian Arab people's right to self-determination, political independence, and sovereignty on their soil, and in conformity with your Successive resolutions.

It is important for me, in repeating this historic proclamation before the international community, now that it has become one of the Official United Nations documents to reaffirm that this decision is irreversible and that we will not relent until it succeeds in casting off the Occupation, enabling Our Palestinian people wherever they may be to exercise their sovereignty in their state, the State of Palestine. In it they shall develop their national and cultural identity and enjoy full equality in rights. Their religious and political beliefs and their human dignity shall be safeguarded under a democratic parliamentary system of government built on freedom of opinion; the freedom to form parties; the protection of the rights of the minority by the majority and respect for the decision of the majority by the minority; social justice and equal rights, free of ethnic, religious, racial, or sexual discrimination; a constitution that guarantees the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; and on the basis of total allegiance to the centuries-old spiritual and civilizational Palestinian heritage of religious tolerance and coexistence.

The State of Palestine is an Arab State; its people are an integral Part of the Arab nation and of the nation's heritage, its civilization, and its aspiration to attain its goals of social progress, unity and liberation. [The State of Palestine] is committed to the Charter of the League of Arab States, the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the principles of non-alignment.

It is a peace-loving state committed to the principles of peaceful coexistence and it shall strive with all states and peoples to attain a permanent peace built on justice and respect of rights.

It is a state which believes in the settlement of international and regional disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the charter and resolutions of the United Nations. It rejects threats of force, violence, terrorism, or the use of these against its territorial integrity and political independence, or against the territorial integrity of any other state, without prejudice to its natural right to defend its territory and independence.

It is a state which believes that the future can only bring security to those who are just or have come back to justice. This, Mr. President, is the State of Palestine which we proclaimed and which we shall endeavor to embody so that it can take its place among the states of the world and share creatively in shaping a free world where justice and peace prevail. Our state, God willing, shall have its provisional government at the earliest possible opportunity. The PNC has mandated the PLO Executive Committee to assume the functions of the said government in the interim.
To embody the aforementioned decision, our Palestine National Council adopted a series of resolutions. I am keen to spotlight the most salient of these, which underline our serious determination to pursue the path of an equitable peaceful settlement and to exert maximum effort to ensure its success.

**Our PNC reaffirmed the necessity of convening an international conference on the issue of the Middle East and its core, the Palestinian issue, under the auspices of the United Nations and with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council and all parties to the conflict in the region, including, on an equal footing, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on the understanding that the international conference will be held on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the safeguarding of the legitimate national and political rights of the Palestinian people, foremost among which is its right to self-determination.**

Our PNC reaffirmed the need for Israel's withdrawal from all the Palestinian and Arab territories it occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem; the establishment of the Palestinian state; the annulment of all expropriation and annexation measures; and the dismantling of the settlements established by Israel in the Palestinian and Arab territories since 1967, as called for in the Arab summit resolutions of Fez and Algiers.

Our PNC also reaffirmed the necessity of seeking to place the occupied Palestinian territories, including Arab Jerusalem, under the supervision of the United Nations for a limited Period, to protect our people to create an atmosphere conducive to the success of the proceedings of the international conference toward the attainment of a comprehensive Political settlement and the achievement of peace and security for all peoples and states in the Middle Fast, on the basis of mutual consent, and to enable the State of Palestine to exercise its effective authority in these territories reaffirmed earlier by the resolutions of the Arab summits.

Our PNC called for the settlement of the issue of Palestinian refuge, in accordance with the pertinent United Nations resolutions. It guaranteed freedom of worship and the right to engage in religion rites for all faiths in the holy Places in Palestine. And it reconfirmed that the relationship between the fraternal Jordanian and Palestinian peoples is a privileged one and that the future relationship between the State of Palestine and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will be built on confederal foundations, on the basis of the two fraternal people's free and voluntary choice, in consolidation of the historic ties that bind them and the vital interests they hold in common. The PNC reaffirmed the need for the Security Council to draw up and guarantee arrangements for security and peace between all the states that are parties to the conflict in the region.

It is important for me, Mr. President, to point out that these resolutions, in their content and wording, reflect our firm desire for peace and freedom, and our total awareness of the climate of international detente and of the eagerness of international community to achieve balanced solutions that address the claims and fundamental interests of the parties in conflict. These resolutions attest to the solemnity of the Palestinian's people's position on the question of peace; that they are committed to peace and believe that it should be secured and guaranteed by the security council under the aegis of the United Nations. These resolutions constitute a firm,
unambiguous response to all arguments, prejudices, stands, and pretexts used by some nations to cast doubt on the position and policy of the Palestine Liberation organization

At a time when our people were voting for peace through their intifadah and their representatives in the PNC, thereby confirming their positive response to the prevailing mood of detente in international relation and to the growing trend toward the settlement of world conflicts by peaceful means, the Israeli government was fanning the flames of aggressive, expansionist conflicts, and religious fanaticism, thereby announcing its adherence to the option of belligerence and the dismissal of our people's right.

The Palestine side, for its part, has formulated clear and responsible political positions which conform with the will of the international community, to promote the convening of the international peace conference and the success of its proceedings. The gratifying and courageous international backing as expressed in the recognition of the State of Palestine is further proof of the credibility of our course and resolutions and their compliance with the international will for peace.

While we greatly appreciate the free American voices that have explained and supported our position and resolutions, we note that the U.S. administration remains uncommitted to even-handedness in its dealings with the parties to the conflict. It continues to demand from us alone the acceptance of positions which cannot be determined prior to negotiation and dialogue within the framework of the international conference.

I would point out here that the answer to the many questions being posed, regardless of their source, rests solely on the acceptance of the equality of the two parties to the conflict and on the recognition of their equal rights on a reciprocal basis. And if the policies applied on the ground are any reflection of the policy-makers intentions, it is the Palestinian side that has more cause to worry and to demand reassurances about its fate and its future, facing as it does a state of Israel that is bristling with the latest of arms, including nuclear weapons.

Mr President:

Our Palestine National Council has reaffirmed its commitment to the UN resolutions that uphold the right of peoples to resist foreign occupation, colonialism, and racial discrimination, and their right to struggle for independence. It has also reaffirmed its rejection of terrorism. in all its forms, including state terrorism, emphasizing its commitment to its past resolutions in this regard, to the resolution of the Arab summit in Algiers in 1988, to UN resolutions 42159 of 1987 and 61/40 of 1985, and to what was stated on this subject in the Cairo Declaration of 7 November 1985.

The position, Mr President, is clear and free of all ambiguity. And yet, I, as chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, hereby once more declare that I condemn terrorism in all its forms, and at the same time salute those sitting before me in this hall who, in the days when they fought to free their countries from the yoke of colonialism, were accused. of terrorism by their oppressors, and who today are the faithful leaders of their peoples, stalwart champions of justice and freedom. I also offer a reverent salute to the martyrs who have fallen at the hands of
terrorism and terrorists, foremost, among whom is my lifetime companion and deputy, the martyr-symbol. Kbalil al-Wazir, and the martyrs who fell in the massacres to which our people have been subjected in the various cities, villages, and camps of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and South Lebanon.

Mr President, Honorable Members:

. The situation in our Palestinian homeland can bear no more waiting. Our people and our children, leading our march to liberty, holding aloft the torch of freedom, are being martyred daily for the sake of ending the occupation and laying the foundation of peace in their free, independent homeland and in the region as a whole.

For this reason, the Palestine National Council, taking into consideration the circumstances of the Palestinians and the Israelis and the need for a spirit of tolerance between them, built its resolutions on foundations of realism.

The United Nations bears an historic, extraordinary responsibility toward our people and their rights. More than forty years ago, the United Nations, in its Resolution 181, decided on the establishment of two states in Palestine, one Palestinian Arab and the other Jewish. Despite the historic wrong that was done to our people, it is our view today that the said resolution continues to meet the requirements of International legitimacy which guarantee the Palestinian Arab people's right to sovereignty and national independence.

The acceleration of the peace process in the region requires special efforts on the part of the international community, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, who bear a great responsibility toward the cause of peace in our region.

The United Nations, the permanent members of the Security Council, and all International blocs and bodies have a vital role to play at this stage. In my capacity as chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, presently assuming the functions of the provisional government of the State of Palestine, I therefore present the following Palestinian peace initiative:

First: That a serious effort be made to convene, under the supervision of the secretary-general of the United Nations, the preparatory committee of the international conference for peace in the Middle East-in accordance with the initiative of President Gorbachev and president Mitterand, which President Mitterand presented to your assembly toward the end of last September and which was supported by many states-- to pave the way for the convening of the international conference, which commands universal support except from the government of Israel.

Second. In view of our belief in international legitimacy and the vital role of the United Nations, that actions be undertaken to place our occupied Palestinian land under temporary United Nations supervision, and that international forces be deployed there to protect our people and, at the same time, to supervise the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from our country.

Third: The PLO will seek a comprehensive settlement among the parties concerned in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the State of Palestine, Israel, and other neighbors, within
the framework of the international conference for peace in the Middle East on the basis of resolutions 242 and 338 and so as to guarantee equality and the balance of interests, especially our people's rights, in freedom, national independence, and respect the right to exist in peace and security for all.

If these principles are endorsed at the international conference, we will have come a long way toward a just settlement, and this will enable us to reach agreement on all security and peace arrangements.

Mr President:

I hope it is clear to everyone that our Palestinian people, determined though they are to gain their legitimate national rights to self-determination, repatriation, and the ending of the occupation of the Palestinian state's territory, are equally determined to strive for those goals by peaceful means within the framework of the international conference under the sponsorship of the United Nations and in accordance with its charter and resolutions. I assure you that, like all other peoples on earth, we are a people that yearns for peace--and perhaps with greater enthusiasm, considering our long years of suffering and the harsh conditions that plague us and our children, who are deprived of the normalcy of a life free of war, free of tragedy, free of the torment of exile, free of hopelessness and daily anguish.

So let the voices supporting the olive branch, peaceful coexistence, and international entente be heard. Let all hands join in defense of an historic, possibly irreplaceable opportunity to put an end to a tragedy that has lingered too long and cost thousands of lives and the destruction of hundreds of village and cities. We reach for the olive branch because it sprouts in our hearts from the tree of the homeland, the tree of freedom.

Mr President, Honorable Members:

I come to you in the name of my People, offering my hands that we can make true peace, peace based on justice. I ask the leaders of Israel to come here, under the sponsorship of the united Nations, so that, together, we can forge that peace. I say to them, as I say to you, that our people, who want dignity, freedom, and peace for themselves and security for their state, want the same things for all the states and parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. And here, I would address myself specifically to the Israeli people in all their parties and forces, and especially to the advocates of democracy and peace among them. I say to them: Come, let us make peace. Cast away fear and intimidation. Leave behind the specter of the wars that have raged continuously in the furnace of this conflict for the past forty years. Set aside all threats of wars to come, whose fuel could only be the bodies of our children and yours. Come, let us make peace. Let us make the peace of the bold, far from the arrogance of power and the weapons of destruction; far from occupation, oppression, humiliation, murder, and torture.

“Say: O Peoples of the Book! Come to common terms,” so that we can build peace in the land of peace, the land of Palestine. “Glory to God in the highest, and on Earth peace, goodwill toward men.” “O Lord, thou art the peace, and the peace is of you, and the peace shall return unto you. Let us live, O Lord, in peace, and enter Heaven thy house, the house of peace.” Finally, I say to
our people: The dawn approaches. Victory is at hand. I see the homeland in your holy stones. I see the flag of our independent Palestine fluttering over the hills of our beloved homeland. Thank you. Peace be upon you, and God's mercy and His blessings.

Transcript of Arafat press conference
December 14, 1988

Source:

Let me highlight my views before you. Our desire for peace is a strategy and not an interim tactic. We are bent to peace come what may. Our statehood provides salvation to the Palestinians and peace to both Palestinians and Israelis. Self-determination means survival for the Palestinians. And our survival does not destroy the survival of the Israelis as their rulers claim.

Recognition of UN resolutions 242 and 338

Yesterday (Tuesday) in my speech I made a reference to the United Nations Resolution 181 (on the partition of Palestine) as the basis for Palestinian independence. I also made a reference to our acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations with Israel within the framework of an international conference. These three resolutions were endorsed at our Palestinian National Council session in Algiers.

Recognition of Israel's right to exist

In my speech also yesterday (Tuesday) it was clear that we mean our people's right to freedom and national independence according to Resolution 181 and the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security and as I have mentioned including the state of Palestine and Israel and other neighbours according to the Resolutions 242 and 338.

Renunciation of terrorism

As for terrorism, I renounced it yesterday (Tuesday) in no uncertain terms and yet I repeat for the record that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism. Between Geneva and Algiers we have made our position crystal clear.

Any more talk such as the Palestinians should give more -- you remember this slogan, the Palestinians should give it more -- or it is not enough, or the Palestinians are engaging in propaganda games and public relations exercise, will be damaging and counterproductive.

Enough is enough. Enough is enough. Enough is enough. All remaining matters should be discussed around the table and within the international conference. Let it be absolutely clear that neither Arafat nor any (one else) for that matter can stop the intifada, the uprising. The intifada
will come to an end only when practical and tangible steps have been taken towards the achievement of our national aims and the establishment of our independent Palestinian state.

In this context I expect the EEC to play a more effective role in promoting peace in our region. They have political responsibility, they have moral responsibility and they can deal with it.

Finally, I declare before you and I ask you to kindly quote me on that: We want peace. We want peace. We are committed to peace. We want to live in our Palestinian state and let live.
Appendix C, Annex 32 -- Letters of Mutual Recognition (Oslo I)
September 9, 1993

Golan (2008, p. 14) contends that these letters were “in many ways the most important of all the [Oslo] documents because they represented the historic breakthrough and constituted perhaps the only irreversible move in the whole process.”

**Result:** Arafat’s letter affirmed not only the reality of Israel but its legitimacy – one of Israel’s original goals. Rabin’s letter accepted the PLO as a negotiating partner. Both moves were unprecedented.

Conservative elements within Israel questioned Arafat’s sincerity and his ability to deliver his commitments. For example, the promise to change parts of the Palestinian Covenant hostile to Israel remained a source of contention. Conservative elements within the PLO pointed out that Israel was recognizing only the PLO – not a state of Palestine (see emphasis added below).

**Text of the letter from Yasser Arafat to Prime Minister Rabin**

*Source: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/recogn.html*

September 9, 1993
Yitzhak Rabin
Prime Minister of Israel

Mr. Prime Minister,

The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following PLO commitments:

The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.


The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.
The PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.

In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the Declaration of Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.

Sincerely,
Yasser Arafat, Chairman
The Palestine Liberation Organization

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Text of the letter from Yasser Arafat to Norwegian foreign minister

September 9, 1993
His Excellency
Johan Jorgen Holst
Foreign Minister of Norway

Dear Minister Holst,

I would like to confirm to you that, upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the PLO encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and cooperation.

Sincerely,
Yasser Arafat
Chairman
The Palestine Liberation Organization

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Text of the letter from Prime Minister Rabin to Chairman Arafat

September 9, 1993
Yasser Arafat
Chairman
The Palestinian Liberation Organization

Mr. Chairman,
In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.

Yitzhak Rabin
Prime Minister of Israel
Appendix C, Annex 33

Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements
(Better known as the Oslo accords)
September 13, 1993

The Declaration of Principles (DOP) was not intended to be a peace treaty – only to establish the framework for reaching a peace agreement and for temporary arrangements pending resolution of all differences. It was a lofty – and, in hindsight, premature – goal, considering the repeated violations by both sides and consequent deterioration of what little trust that had existed.

The key paragraphs are shown below in bold (emphasis added). Ellipses indicate deletion of less significant details, but all article headings have been preserved.

The preamble should sound familiar; it would be repeated in subsequent agreements and statements. Every word was saturated with years of bloodshed and bargaining. For example, “legitimate” and “just” signified Palestinian insistence that its cause had not been fully honored. Israel resisted the term “national rights” because it might imply Palestinian independence, which Israel was not ready to concede (Golan, 2008, p. 16).

Some omissions are more significant than some inclusions. Example: Article 1 specifies a transition period, but it does not say when. Articles IV and V acquire meaning in their interpretation. Palestinians took hope that it implied an agreement to restrict settlements; Israel intended nothing of the kind. Articles X and XV, which provided for resolution of disputes through negotiation, could be interpreted as a commitment not to resort to violence; the PLO intended nothing of the kind.

Although the DOP provides a detailed timetable, both sides seemed to regard it as a suggestion, not as a deadline. Since no third-party enforcement or even observation was provided, some slippage was inevitable as each side waited for the other to fulfill its obligations.

Sources:
http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.siu.edu/ehost/detail?sid=defeef1d-7a1f-4647-9f08-862d86025f7c%40sessionmgr12&vid=3&hid=19&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZS%20Principles

The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the “Palestinian delegation”), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles.

Article I AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Article II FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD
The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

Article III ELECTIONS
...

Article IV JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS
The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.
It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
...

Article VII INTERIM AGREEMENT
...

Article VIII PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY
...

Article IX LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS
...

Article X JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

Article XI ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS
...

Article XII LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT
...

Article XIII REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES
After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.

In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.

Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

Article XIV ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.
Article XV RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVI ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMS

…

Article XVII MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

…

ANNEX I PROTOCOL ON THE MODE AND CONDITIONS OF ELECTIONS

…

ANNEX II PROTOCOL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

…

ANNEX III PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

…

ANNEX IV PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

…

AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

…

B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Article VI (2)

…

Article VII (2)

…

Article VII (5)
... 

Article VIII 
... 

Article X 
... 

Annex II 
It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel: (SHIMON PERES)

For the P.L.O.: (MAHMOUD ABBAS)

Witnessed By: The United States of America: (WARREN CHRISTOPHER)

The Russian Federation: (ANDREI KOZYREV)
Appendix C, Annex 34 -- Clinton Parameters
White House, 23 December, 2000

U.S. President Bill Clinton, unwilling to give up on peace despite the failure of the Camp David summit in July 2000 and faced with escalating violence from the Al-Aqsa intifada, made one last attempt at a deal before he left office. He asked mid-level negotiators for Israel and Palestine to accept his summary of all that had been agreed previously and all that had been disputed previously and to consider his proposals to bridge the gaps.

Clinton gave the two sides a deadline of Dec. 27 to accept the parameters as a basis for negotiation (Clinton Peace, 2000; Perez, 2000, Dec. 24, p. A4). He intended the parameters as a frame within which Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Israel’s leading dove, and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat could then reach a settlement. He did not intend the parameters themselves to be negotiated. They were presented as “take it or leave it.”

**Result:** What happened next is hotly disputed. Although several participants have written articles or books (e.g., Dennis Ross, Clinton’s chief Middle East negotiator), the most polemical account played out as a running debate in the New York Review of Books (Aug. 9, June 13 and June 27). Representing the Israel point of view were Barak and historian Benny Morris. The rebuttals were written by Robert Malley, a special assistant to Clinton, and Hussein Agha, described as a Palestinian analyst (Levy, 2008). Of those writing in the New York Review, only Malley was present when Clinton presented his parameters to negotiators for the two sides. (See roster of participants, below.) The negotiators were expected to report back to their respective governments and obtain acceptance of the parameters.

What was not disputed was that Clinton failed -- again. The parameters did not result in face-to-face negotiations between Barak and Arafat, much less an agreement.
Ehud Barak, Israel’s prime minister, accepted the proposals by Clinton’s deadline. PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat withheld his answer, then equivocated, raising objections about the Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley, Jerusalem neighborhoods, the Temple Mount, refugees, borders, and control of airspace, among others (Golan, 2008, p. 55; Greenburg, 2001, Jan. 3, p. A10; Ross, 2004, pp. 3-14). Even Clinton’s invitation for Arafat to visit the White House on Jan. 2, 2001, for a full-court press was insufficient to budge the PLO chairman.

Ross described the situation with an Arabic saying: “Seeing the President had made no difference. As he had so often in his career, Arafat was seeking to have it both ways, creating the illusion of being positive by accepting the ideas, but practically rejecting them with his reservations. We were seeing a variant of what Arab leaders had always referred to as ‘the Arafat answer’: La-Na’am (no and yes in Arabic)” (p. 13). By then, Clinton and Barak were about to leave office -- Clinton on Jan. 20, 2001, and Barak after losing re-election on Feb. 6.

Although much of the debate in the New York Review is familiar and argumentative, some details are intriguing. For example, Malley and Agha distinguished between the Wailing Wall of the Temple Mount and the Western Wall (June 13, p. 48): “Arafat did not reject Israeli sovereignty over the Wailing Wall but over the much larger Western Wall (of which it is a part), which encroaches on the Muslim Quarter of the Old City.”

Arafat also wanted clarity on who would own what. The Clinton parameter could be understood as giving Palestine sovereignty over the top of the Temple Mount, where stand the places holy to Islam (Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa mosque) and as giving Israel sovereignty over the earth beneath, site of the First and Second Temples and the Holy of Holies, which are sacred to Jews. In fact, Barak said Clinton had previously proposed exactly that compromise.
Clarity certainly would have been welcome for what could have been a brilliant compromise, especially if excavating were prohibited and all faiths were assured access to the Dome.

As for refugees, Malley and Agha conceded that “All acknowledged that there would not be an unlimited, ‘massive’ return of Palestinian refugees to Israel” (June 13, p. 46). Did “all” include Arafat? Barak was dubious, based on the right of the lead negotiator to overrule trial balloons floated by subordinates. If “all” also included Arafat’s successors, the refugee issue would be reduced to haggling over numbers.

But Malley and Agha said Israel was pressed to acknowledge that refugees have the right to return to their homes in Israel. What might seem like a small concession was magnified in Barak’s mind to an existential issue: “Palestinians and Israelis understand that concession of the principle will entail a gradual effort at full implementation, in this generation or the next, spelling chaos and the subversion of the Jewish state and its replacement by an Arab-majority ‘Palestine,’ a 23rd Arab state. The demand for the right of return, in the deepest sense, is a demographic mechanism to achieve Israel’s destruction” (June 27, p. 47).

The essence of the parameters was a trade involving refugees and the Temple Mount. Palestinians would give up the demand for refugees to return to homes now in Israel in return for sovereignty over the Temple Mount compound on which stands the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock, both sacred to Muslims world-wide. Israel would get sovereignty over the Western Wall and the plaza facing it. In addition, Palestinians would be able to place their capital in Jerusalem and gain sovereignty over its Arab neighborhoods. Clinton proposed simply that Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem would come under Palestinian sovereignty, Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty. Those were the parameters; details regarding precisely where to draw boundary lines were left to negotiation.
Regarding West Bank borders, Clinton proposed that Israel withdraw from 94% to 96% of the territories behind 1967 lines, with a land swap equal to 1% to 3% of the area to compensate the Palestinians. Golan described the idea of accommodating 80% of the settlers on no more than 6% of the land as equivalent to squaring the circle (Golan, 2008, p. 50).

Israel’s security needs would be met with an international “force” – a step beyond the international “presence” Israel had previously accepted. The new Palestinian state would be “non-militarized.

When Arafat left the White House on Jan. 2, 2001, a frustrated Dennis Ross complained, “Arafat had the best deal he could ever get. He could not get more and he had hit the proverbial wall. He could not wring out one more concession or gain one more tactical advantage. ... The game was over” (Ross, 2004, p. 13).

Ross was wrong. The shrewd Arafat was to wring another concession or three before the month was out. The phase that started at Camp David would continue at Taba, but it would effectively end with the inauguration of George W. Bush as president of the United States and the election of Ariel Sharon as prime minister of Israel. The deal was not consummated primarily because both sides were adamant about refugees and the Temple Mount. There also were other issues (see above), but without compromises on those two, any deal was doomed.

No single official text of the parameters was issued (Golan, 2008, p. 55; Perez, 2000, Dec. 26, p. A1). The version reproduced here is from the Web site of the Jewish Peace Lobby, an American Jewish organization

(http://www.peacelobby.org/clinton_parameters.htm).

The Peace Lobby appended this note: “After reading the above text to the Israeli and Palestinian delegates in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, President Clinton left the
room. His aides went over the text subsequently to ensure that each side had copied the points accurately. The White House did not release an official text. This version is derived from a copy published in Haaretz’s English edition on January 1, 2001, and a slightly more complete version issued by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center.” Haaretz is an independent Israeli daily newspaper with separate editions in Hebrew and in English.

Key points are indicated below in bold type (emphasis added).

Unofficial Text of Clinton Parameters

Attendance

United States: President Clinton, Secretary Albright, John Podesta, Samuel Berger, Steve Richetti, Bruce Reidel, Dennis Ross, Aaron Miller, Robert Malley, Gamal Hilal

Palestine: Sa'eb Erakat, Mohammad Dahlan, Samih Abed, Ghaith Al-Omari.

Israel: Shlomo Ben-Ami, Gilead Sher, Penny Medan, Shlomo Yanai, Gidi Grinstein

Minutes

President Clinton:

Territory:

Based on what I heard, I believe that the solution should be in the mid-90’s, between 94-96% of the West Bank territory of the Palestinian State.

The land annexed by Israel should be compensated by a land swap of 1-3% in addition to territorial arrangements such as a permanent safe passage.

The Parties also should consider the swap of leased land to meet their respective needs. There are creative ways of doing this that should address Palestinian and Israeli needs and concerns.

The Parties should develop a map consistent with the following criteria:

* 80% of settlers in blocks.
* Contiguity.
* Minimize annexed areas.
* Minimize the number of Palestinians affected.

Security:

The key lies in an international presence that can only be withdrawn by mutual consent. This presence will also monitor the implementation of the agreement between both sides.

My best judgment is that the Israeli presence would remain in fixed locations in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the International force for another 36 months. This period could be reduced in the event of favorable regional developments that diminish the threats to Israel.

On early warning stations, Israel should maintain three facilities in the West Bank with a Palestinian liaison presence. The stations will be subject to review every 10 years.
with any changes in the status to be mutually agreed.

Regarding emergency developments, I understand that you will still have to develop a map of the relevant areas and routes. But in defining what is an emergency, I propose the following definition:

Imminent and demonstrable threat to Israel's national security of a military nature that requires the activation of a national state emergency.

Of course, the international forces will need to be notified of any such determination.

On airspace, I suggest that the state of Palestine will have sovereignty over its airspace but that two sides should work out special arrangements for Israeli training and operational needs.

I understand that the Israeli position is that Palestine should be defined as a "demilitarized state" while the Palestinian side proposes "a state with limited arms." As a compromise, I suggest calling it a "non-militarized state."

This will be consistent with the fact that in addition to a strong Palestinian security forces, Palestine will have an international force for border security and deterrent purposes.

Jerusalem and Refugees:

I have a sense that the remaining gaps have more to do with formulations than practical realities.

**Jerusalem:**

The general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli. This would apply to the Old City as well. I urge the two sides to work on maps to create maximum contiguity for both sides.

Regarding the Haram/Temple Mount, I believe that the gaps are not related to practical administration but to the symbolic issues of sovereignty and to finding a way to accord respect to the religious beliefs of both sides.

I know you have been discussing a number of formulations, and you can agree one of these. I add to these two additional formulations guaranteeing Palestinian effective control over the Haram while respecting the conviction of the Jewish people.

Regarding either one of these two formulations will be international monitoring to provide mutual confidence.

1- **Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram, and Israeli sovereignty over a) the Western Wall and the space sacred to Judaism of which it is a part; b) the Western Wall and the Holy of Holies of which it is a part.**

There will be a fine commitment by both not to excavate beneath the Haram or behind the Wall.

2- Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall and shared functional sovereignty over the issue of excavation under the Haram and behind the Wall such that mutual consent would be requested before any excavation can take place.

**Refugees:**

I sense that the differences are more relating to formulations and less to what will
happen on a practical level.

I believe that Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 war and the need to assist the international community in addressing the problem.

An international commission should be established to implement all the aspects that flow from your agreement: compensation, resettlement, rehabilitation, etc.

The US is prepared to lead an international effort to help the refugees.

The fundamental gap is on how to handle the concept of the right of return. I know the history of the issue and how hard it will be for the Palestinian leadership to appear to be abandoning this principle.

The Israeli side could not accept any reference to a right of return that would imply a right to immigrate to Israel in defiance of Israel's sovereign policies regarding admission or that would threaten the Jewish character of the state.

Any solution must address both needs.

The solution will have to be consistent with the two-state approach that both sides have accepted as a way to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: the state of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people and the state of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people.

Under the two-state solution, the guiding principle should be that the Palestinian state would be the focal point for Palestinians who choose to return to the area without ruling out that Israel will accept some of these refugees.

I believe that we need to adopt a formulation on the right of return that will make clear that there is no specific right of return to Israel itself but that does not negate the aspiration of the Palestinian people to return to the area.

In light of the above, I propose two alternatives:

1- Both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to historic Palestine, or,

2- Both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland.

The agreement will define the implementation of this general right in a way that is consistent with the two-state solution. It would list the five possible homes for the refugees:

1- The state of Palestine.
2- Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap.
3- Rehabilitation in host country.
4- Resettlement in third country.
5- Admission to Israel.

In listing these options, the agreement will make clear that the return to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and areas acquired in the land swap would be the right of all Palestinian refugees, while rehabilitation in host countries, resettlement in third countries and absorption into Israel will depend upon the policies of those countries.

Israel could indicate in the agreement that it intends to establish a policy so that some of the refugees would be absorbed into Israel consistent with Israel's sovereign decision.

I believe that priority should be given to the refugee population in Lebanon. The parties would agree that this implements resolution 194.
The End of Conflict:

I propose that the agreement clearly mark the end of the conflict and its implementation put an end to all claims. This could be implemented through a UN Security Counsel Resolution that notes that Resolutions 242 and 338 have been implemented and through the release of Palestinian prisoners.

Concluding remarks:

I believe that this is the outline of a fair and lasting agreement. It gives the Palestinian people the ability to determine their future on their own land, a sovereign and viable state recognized by the international community, Al-Quds as its capital, sovereignty over the Haram, and new lives for the refugees.

It gives the people of Israel a genuine end to the conflict, real security, the preservation of sacred religious ties, the incorporation of 80% of the settlers into Israel, and the largest Jewish Jerusalem in history recognized by all as its capital.

This is the best that I can do. Brief your leaders and tell me if they are prepared to come for discussions based on these ideas. If so, I would meet them next week separately. If not, I have taken this as far as I can.

These are my ideas. If they are not accepted, they are not just off the table, they also go with me when I leave office.
Appendix C, Annex 35 – Mitchell Report
April 30, 2001

Following the collapse of the Camp David summit in 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton appointed a committee to try to restart the peace process. The committee and its report were named after its chairman, George J. Mitchell, a former U.S. senator. The committee’s mission was based on understandings developed at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit, which followed the failed Camp David summit in July 2000.

The background was escalating violence from the second intifada, which had started the previous fall. The committee was charged with making recommendations for how to prevent violence -- not to determine guilt or innocence. (See letter from Clinton to Mitchell, Dec. 6, 2000, quoted in http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2001/3/Sharm%20el-Sheikh%20Fact-Finding%20Committee%20-%20Second%20St.)

The Mitchell Committee (also called the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee) proposed nothing new – e.g, cessation of violence, security cooperation, confidence-building, freezing all settlement activity including natural growth, lifting road closures and resuming negotiations. Observations were similarly obvious – e.g., “Despite their long history and close proximity, some Israelis and Palestinians seem not to fully appreciate each other’s problems.”

Perhaps the committee failed to appreciate that each side understands the other’s problems only too well. The central problem as viewed by Hamas, for example, was how to eradicate Israel. The central problem of at least some in Israel was how to force the Palestinians to give up and meekly accept its terms.

The main value of this report turned out to be a succinct description of the situation as of early 2001. The key finding was that the Sharon visit to the Temple Mount did not cause the Al-
Aqsa intifada. More significant, the committee said, were the events that followed and the failure of all participants to exercise restraint. Digging deeper, the committee traced the root of the problem to high expectations and low results from the Oslo process, with each side blaming the other for breakdowns in accomplishments and timetables.

**Result:** Perhaps the most chilling observation that resulted from the Mitchell Commission’s inquiry was quoted in Morris (2001, p. 662): “The [Mitchell] report quoted a statement by senior PA official Abu Ali Mustafa from July 23, 2000, just after the breakdown of the Camp David summit and two months before the Intifada’s outbreak: ‘The issues of Jerusalem, the refugees and sovereignty will be decided on the ground and not in negotiations. On this point it is important to prepare the Palestinian public for the next step, because without doubt we shall find ourselves in conflict with Israel in order to create new facts on the ground. ... I believe the situation in the future will be more violent than the [1987-93] Intifada.’” [Emphasis added.]

This statement is interesting on several counts:

1. The Camp David summit did not break down until July 25 – two days before the statement was issued (Perlez, 2000, July 26, p. A1). In other words, it didn’t matter how the Camp David negotiations turnout; Mustafa was girding for action “on the ground.”

2. Abu Ali Mustafa was his nom de guerre; his real name is Zibri, according to Israelinsider (PFLP leader, 2001, Aug. 27).

3. There was more to Mustafa than a “senior PA official.” IsraelInsider said he was secretary-general of the radical PLO faction Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, having been elected to succeed George Habash as its leader. The Middle East Media Research Institute cleared up some of the confusion -- and created more -- in a post (Only way, 2000) that
says Mustafa left the PFLP and joined the PA. Clearing up the confusion will be difficult because Mustafa was killed by an Israeli missile on Aug. 27, 2001, at his PFLP office in Ramallah (IsraelInsider, 2001). IsraelInsider further identifies Mustafa as the highest-ranking Palestinian leader to be targeted by Israel’s security cabinet.

4. The provocative quotation is not in the body of the Mitchell Report. It appears in a statement by the government of Israel and included with the report as an appendix.

5. The quotation in the Israeli statement is not original. It appears to have been taken from an interview with the Palestinian daily newspaper Al-Quds (IsraelInsider, 2001).

But taking the quotation at face value leaves open the question about what is meant by creating new “facts on the ground.” For the Palestinians, the context would suggest that the facts they have in mind are dead Israeli bodies. For the Israelis, the facts would be more settlements that squeeze the West Bank to the point that it will be too small and fragmented to support an independent state. In other words, negotiations are doomed because both parties have more to be gained by creating new facts. If Jerusalem, for example, eventually is populated entirely or almost entirely by Israelis, the issue of sovereignty would become moot.

Nevertheless, it is risky to take an Israeli quotation of a Palestinian source at face value. More research would be required to establish facts and context. Still, the quotation rings chillingly true.

**Text of the Mitchell Report**

Sources:


SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The Government of Israel (GOI) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) must act swiftly and decisively to halt the violence. Their immediate objectives then should be to rebuild confidence and resume negotiations.

During this mission our aim has been to fulfill the mandate agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh. We value the support given our work by the participants at the summit, and we commend the parties for their cooperation. Our principal recommendation is that they recommit themselves to the Sharm el-Sheikh spirit and that they implement the decisions made there in 1999 and 2000. We believe that the summit participants will support bold action by the parties to achieve these objectives.

The restoration of trust is essential, and the parties should take affirmative steps to this end. Given the high level of hostility and mistrust, the timing and sequence of these steps are obviously crucial. This can be decided only by the parties. We urge them to begin the process of decision immediately.

Accordingly, we recommend that steps be taken to:

END THE VIOLENCE
* The GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and undertakings and should immediately implement an unconditional cessation of violence.
* The GOI and PA should immediately resume security cooperation.

REBUILD CONFIDENCE
* The PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful "cooling off period" and implement additional confidence building measures, some of which were detailed in the October 2000 Sharm el-Sheikh Statement and some of which were offered by the U.S. on January 7, 2001 in Cairo (see Recommendations section for further description).
* The PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn and discourage incitement in all its forms.
* The PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alike that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will make a 100 percent effort to prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and incarcere terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.
* The GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the "natural growth" of existing settlements.
* The GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies and procedures encouraging non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators, with a view to minimizing casualties and friction between the two communities.
* The PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to fire upon Israeli populated areas and IDF positions. This tactic places civilians on both sides at unnecessary risk.
* The GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who had been employed in Israel to return to their jobs; and should ensure that security forces and settlers refrain from the destruction of homes and roads, as well as trees and other agricultural property in Palestinian areas. We acknowledge the GOI's position that actions of this nature have been taken for security reasons. Nevertheless, the economic effects will persist for years.
* The PA should renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, that Palestinian workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to organizations and individuals engaged in terrorism.
* The PA and GOI should consider a joint undertaking to preserve and protect holy places sacred to the traditions of Jews, Muslims, and Christians.
* The GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Palestinian and Israeli non-governmental organizations involved in cross-community initiatives linking the two peoples.

RESUME NEGOTIATIONS
In the spirit of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements and understandings of 1999 and 2000, we recommend that the parties meet to reaffirm their commitment to signed agreements and mutual understandings, and take corresponding action. This should be the basis for resuming full and meaningful negotiations.

INTRODUCTION
On October 17, 2000, at the conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, the President of the United States spoke on behalf of the participants (the Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, and the United States, the United Nations, and the European Union). Among other things, the President stated that:

The United States will develop with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as in consultation with the United Nations Secretary General, a committee of fact-finding on the events of the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence. The committee's report will be shared by the U.S. President with the U.N. Secretary General and the parties prior to publication. A final report shall be submitted under the auspices of the U.S. President for publication.

On November 7, 2000, following consultations with the other participants, the President asked us to serve on what has come to be known as the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee. In a letter to us on December 6, 2000, the President stated that:

The purpose of the Summit, and of the agreement that ensued, was to end the violence, to prevent its recurrence, and to find a path back to the peace process. In its actions and mode of operation, therefore, the Committee should be guided by these overriding goals ... The Committee should strive to steer clear of any step that will intensify mutual blame and finger-pointing between the parties. As I noted in my previous letter, "the Committee should not become a divisive force or a focal point for blame and recrimination but rather should serve to forestall violence and confrontation and provide lessons for the future." This should not be a tribunal whose purpose is to determine the guilt or innocence of individuals or of the parties; rather, it should be a fact-finding committee whose purpose is to determine what happened and how to avoid it recurring in the future.

After our first meeting, held before we visited the region, we urged an end to all violence. Our meetings and our observations during our subsequent visits to the region have intensified our convictions in this regard. Whatever the source, violence will not solve the problems of the region. It will only make them worse. Death and destruction will not bring peace, but will deepen
the hatred and harden the resolve on both sides. There is only one way to peace, justice, and security in the Middle East, and that is through negotiation.

Despite their long history and close proximity, some Israelis and Palestinians seem not to fully appreciate each other's problems and concerns. Some Israelis appear not to comprehend the humiliation and frustration that Palestinians must endure every day as a result of living with the continuing effects of occupation, sustained by the presence of Israeli military forces and settlements in their midst, or the determination of the Palestinians to achieve independence and genuine self-determination. Some Palestinians appear not to comprehend the extent to which terrorism creates fear among the Israeli people and undermines their belief in the possibility of co-existence, or the determination of the GOI to do whatever is necessary to protect its people.

Fear, hate, anger, and frustration have risen on both sides. The greatest danger of all is that the culture of peace, nurtured over the previous decade, is being shattered. In its place there is a growing sense of futility and despair, and a growing resort to violence.

Political leaders on both sides must act and speak decisively to reverse these dangerous trends; they must rekindle the desire and the drive for peace. That will be difficult. But it can be done and it must be done, for the alternative is unacceptable and should be unthinkable.

Two proud peoples share a land and a destiny. Their competing claims and religious differences have led to a grinding, demoralizing, dehumanizing conflict. They can continue in conflict or they can negotiate to find a way to live side-by-side in peace.

There is a record of achievement. In 1991 the first peace conference with Israelis and Palestinians took place in Madrid to achieve peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In 1993, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel met in Oslo for the first face-to-face negotiations; they led to mutual recognition and the Declaration of Principles (signed by the parties in Washington, D.C. on September 13, 1993), which provided a road map to reach the destination agreed in Madrid. Since then, important steps have been taken in Cairo, in Washington, and elsewhere. Last year the parties came very close to a permanent settlement.

So much has been achieved. So much is at risk. If the parties are to succeed in completing their journey to their common destination, agreed commitments must be implemented, international law respected, and human rights protected. We encourage them to return to negotiations, however difficult. It is the only path to peace, justice and security.

DISCUSSION

It is clear from their statements that the participants in the summit of last October hoped and intended that the outbreak of violence, then less than a month old, would soon end. The U.S. President's letters to us, asking that we make recommendations on how to prevent a recurrence of violence, reflect that intention.

Yet the violence has not ended. It has worsened. Thus the overriding concern of those in the region with whom we spoke is to end the violence and to return to the process of shaping a sustainable peace. That is what we were told, and were asked to address, by Israelis and
Palestinians alike. It was the message conveyed to us as well by President Mubarak of Egypt, King Abdullah of Jordan, and UN Secretary General Annan.

Their concern must be ours. If our report is to have effect, it must deal with the situation that exists, which is different from that envisaged by the summit participants. In this report, we will try to answer the questions assigned to us by the Sharm el-Sheikh summit: What happened? Why did it happen?

In light of the current situation, however, we must elaborate on the third part of our mandate: How can the recurrence of violence be prevented? The relevance and impact of our work, in the end, will be measured by the recommendations we make concerning the following:
* Ending the Violence.
* Rebuilding Confidence.
* Resuming Negotiations.

WHAT HAPPENED?
We are not a tribunal. We complied with the request that we not determine the guilt or innocence of individuals or of the parties. We did not have the power to compel the testimony of witnesses or the production of documents. Most of the information we received came from the parties and, understandably, it largely tended to support their arguments.

In this part of our report, we do not attempt to chronicle all of the events from late September 2000 onward. Rather, we discuss only those that shed light on the underlying causes of violence. In late September 2000, Israeli, Palestinian, and other officials received reports that Member of the Knesset (now Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon was planning a visit to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Palestinian and U.S. officials urged then Prime Minister Ehud Barak to prohibit the visit. Mr. Barak told us that he believed the visit was intended to be an internal political act directed against him by a political opponent, and he declined to prohibit it.

Mr. Sharon made the visit on September 28 accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli police officers. Although Israelis viewed the visit in an internal political context, Palestinians saw it as highly provocative to them. On the following day, in the same place, a large number of unarmed Palestinian demonstrators and a large Israeli police contingent confronted each other. According to the U.S. Department of State, "Palestinians held large demonstrations and threw stones at police in the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal bullets and live ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 persons and injuring about 200." According to the GOI, 14 Israeli policemen were injured.

Similar demonstrations took place over the following several days. Thus began what has become known as the "Al-Aqsa Intifada" (Al-Aqsa being a mosque at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount).

The GOI asserts that the immediate catalyst for the violence was the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on July 25, 2000 and the "widespread appreciation in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse." In this view, Palestinian violence was
planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at "provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative."8

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) denies the allegation that the intifada was planned. It claims, however, that "Camp David represented nothing less than an attempt by Israel to extend the force it exercises on the ground to negotiations,"9 and that "the failure of the summit, and the attempts to allocate blame on the Palestinian side only added to the tension on the ground..."10

From the perspective of the PLO, Israel responded to the disturbances with excessive and illegal use of deadly force against demonstrators; behavior which, in the PLO's view, reflected Israel's contempt for the lives and safety of Palestinians. For Palestinians, the widely seen images of the killing of 12-year-old Muhammad al Durra in Gaza on September 30, shot as he huddled behind his father, reinforced that perception.

From the perspective of the GOI, the demonstrations were organized and directed by the Palestinian leadership to create sympathy for their cause around the world by provoking Israeli security forces to fire upon demonstrators, especially young people. For Israelis, the lynching of two military reservists, First Sgt. Vadim Novesche and First Cpl. Yosef Avrahami, in Ramallah on October 12, reflected a deep-seated Palestinian hatred of Israel and Jews.

What began as a series of confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli security forces, which resulted in the GOI's initial restrictions on the movement of people and goods in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (closures), has since evolved into a wider array of violent actions and responses. There have been exchanges of fire between built-up areas, sniping incidents and clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians. There have also been terrorist acts and Israeli reactions thereto (characterized by the GOI as counter-terrorism), including killings, further destruction of property and economic measures. Most recently, there have been mortar attacks on Israeli locations and IDF ground incursions into Palestinian areas.

From the Palestinian perspective, the decision of Israel to characterize the current crisis as "an armed conflict short of war"11 is simply a means "to justify its assassination policy, its collective punishment policy, and its use of lethal force."12 From the Israeli perspective, "The Palestinian leadership have instigated, orchestrated and directed the violence. It has used, and continues to use, terror and attrition as strategic tools."13

In their submissions, the parties traded allegations about the motivation and degree of control exercised by the other. However, we were provided with no persuasive evidence that the Sharon visit was anything other than an internal political act; neither were we provided with persuasive evidence that the PA planned the uprising.

Accordingly, we have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the GOI to respond with lethal force.

However, there is also no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent effort to
contain the demonstrations and control the violence once it began; or that the GOI made a consistent effort to use non-lethal means to control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. Amid rising anger, fear, and mistrust, each side assumed the worst about the other and acted accordingly.

The Sharon visit did not cause the "Al-Aqsa Intifada." But it was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited. More significant were the events that followed: the decision of the Israeli police on September 29 to use lethal means against the Palestinian demonstrators; and the subsequent failure, as noted above, of either party to exercise restraint.

WHY DID IT HAPPEN?
The roots of the current violence extend much deeper than an inconclusive summit conference. Both sides have made clear a profound disillusionment with the behavior of the other in failing to meet the expectations arising from the peace process launched in Madrid in 1991 and then in Oslo in 1993. Each side has accused the other of violating specific undertakings and undermining the spirit of their commitment to resolving their political differences peacefully.

Divergent Expectations: We are struck by the divergent expectations expressed by the parties relating to the implementation of the Oslo process. Results achieved from this process were unthinkable less than 10 years ago. During the latest round of negotiations, the parties were closer to a permanent settlement than ever before.

Nonetheless, Palestinians and Israelis alike told us that the premise on which the Oslo process is based - that tackling the hard "permanent status" issues be deferred to the end of the process - has gradually come under serious pressure. The step-by-step process agreed to by the parties was based on the assumption that each step in the negotiating process would lead to enhanced trust and confidence. To achieve this, each party would have to implement agreed upon commitments and abstain from actions that would be seen by the other as attempts to abuse the process in order to predetermine the shape of the final outcome. If this requirement is not met, the Oslo road map cannot successfully lead to its agreed destination. Today, each side blames the other for having ignored this fundamental aspect, resulting in a crisis in confidence. This problem became even more pressing with the opening of permanent status talks.

The GOI has placed primacy on moving toward a Permanent Status Agreement in a nonviolent atmosphere, consistent with commitments contained in the agreements between the parties. "Even if slower than was initially envisaged, there has, since the start of the peace process in Madrid in 1991, been steady progress towards the goal of a Permanent Status Agreement without the resort to violence on a scale that has characterized recent weeks."14 The "goal" is the Permanent Status Agreement, the terms of which must be negotiated by the parties.

The PLO view is that delays in the process have been the result of an Israeli attempt to prolong and solidify the occupation. Palestinians "believed that the Oslo process would yield an end to Israeli occupation in five years,"15 the timeframe for the transitional period specified in the Declaration of Principles. Instead there have been, in the PLO's view, repeated Israeli delays...
culminating in the Camp David summit, where, "Israel proposed to annex about 11.2% of the
West Bank (excluding Jerusalem)..." and offered unacceptable proposals concerning Jerusalem,
security and refugees. "In sum, Israel's proposals at Camp David provided for Israel's annexation
of the best Palestinian lands, the perpetuation of Israeli control over East Jerusalem, a continued
Israeli military presence on Palestinian territory, Israeli control over Palestinian natural
resources, airspace and borders, and the return of fewer than 1% of refugees to their homes."16

Both sides see the lack of full compliance with agreements reached since the opening of the
peace process as evidence of a lack of good faith. This conclusion led to an erosion of trust even
before the permanent status negotiations began.

Divergent Perspectives: During the last seven months, these views have hardened into divergent
realities. Each side views the other as having acted in bad faith; as having turned the optimism of
Oslo into the suffering and grief of victims and their loved ones. In their statements and actions,
each side demonstrates a perspective that fails to recognize any truth in the perspective of the
other.

The Palestinian Perspective: For the Palestinian side, "Madrid" and "Oslo" heralded the prospect
of a State, and guaranteed an end to the occupation and a resolution of outstanding matters
within an agreed time frame. Palestinians are genuinely angry at the continued growth of
settlements and at their daily experiences of humiliation and disruption as a result of Israel's
presence in the Palestinian territories. Palestinians see settlers and settlements in their midst not
only as violating the spirit of the Oslo process, but also as an application of force in the form of
Israel's overwhelming military superiority, which sustains and protects the settlements.

The Interim Agreement provides that "the two parties view the West Bank and Gaza as a single
territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period." 
Coupled with this, the Interim Agreement's prohibition on taking steps which may prejudice
permanent status negotiations denies Israel the right to continue its illegal expansionist
settlement policy. In addition to the Interim Agreement, customary international law, including
the Fourth Geneva Convention, prohibits Israel (as an occupying power) from establishing
settlements in occupied territory pending an end to the conflict.17

The PLO alleges that Israeli political leaders "have made no secret of the fact that the Israeli
interpretation of Oslo was designed to segregate the Palestinians in non-contiguous enclaves,
surrounded by Israeli military-controlled borders, with settlements and settlement roads violating
the territories' integrity."18 According to the PLO, "In the seven years since the [Declaration of
Principles], the settler population in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem and the Gaza
Strip, has doubled to 200,000, and the settler population in East Jerusalem has risen to 170,000.
Israel has constructed approximately 30 new settlements, and expanded a number of existing
ones to house these new settlers."19

The PLO also claims that the GOI has failed to comply with other commitments such as the
further withdrawal from the West Bank and the release of Palestinian prisoners. In addition,
Palestinians expressed frustration with the impasse over refugees and the deteriorating economic
circumstances in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The Israeli Perspective: From the GOI perspective, the expansion of settlement activity and the taking of measures to facilitate the convenience and safety of settlers do not prejudice the outcome of permanent status negotiations.

Israel understands that the Palestinian side objects to the settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Without prejudice to the formal status of the settlements, Israel accepts that the settlements are an outstanding issue on which there will have to be agreement as part of any permanent status resolution between the sides. This point was acknowledged and agreed upon in the Declaration of Principles of 13 September 1993 as well as in other agreements between the two sides. There has in fact been a good deal of discussion on the question of settlements between the two sides in the various negotiations toward a permanent status agreement.

Indeed, Israelis point out that at the Camp David summit and during subsequent talks the GOI offered to make significant concessions with respect to settlements in the context of an overall agreement.

Security, however, is the key GOI concern. The GOI maintains that the PLO has breached its solemn commitments by continuing the use of violence in the pursuit of political objectives. "Israel's principal concern in the peace process has been security. This issue is of overriding importance... [S]ecurity is not something on which Israel will bargain or compromise. The failure of the Palestinian side to comply with both the letter and spirit of the security provisions in the various agreements has long been a source of disturbance in Israel." 

According to the GOI, the Palestinian failure takes several forms: institutionalized anti-Israel, anti-Jewish incitement; the release from detention of terrorists; the failure to control illegal weapons; and the actual conduct of violent operations, ranging from the insertion of riflemen into demonstrations to terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians. The GOI maintains that the PLO has explicitly violated its renunciation of terrorism and other acts of violence, thereby significantly eroding trust between the parties. The GOI perceives "a thread, implied but nonetheless clear, that runs throughout the Palestinian submissions. It is that Palestinian violence against Israel and Israelis is somehow explicable, understandable, legitimate."

END THE VIOLENCE

For Israelis and Palestinians alike the experience of the past several months has been intensely personal. Through relationships of kinship, friendship, religion, community and profession, virtually everyone in both societies has a link to someone who has been killed or seriously injured in the recent violence. We were touched by their stories. During our last visit to the region, we met with the families of Palestinian and Israeli victims. These individual accounts of grief were heart-rending and indescribably sad. Israeli and Palestinian families used virtually the same words to describe their grief.

When the widow of a murdered Israeli physician -- a man of peace whose practice included the treatment of Arab patients -- tells us that it seems that Palestinians are interested in killing Jews for the sake of killing Jews, Palestinians should take notice. When the parents of a Palestinian child killed while in his bed by an errant .50 caliber bullet draw similar conclusions about the
respect accorded by Israelis to Palestinian lives, Israelis need to listen. When we see the shattered bodies of children we know it is time for adults to stop the violence.

With widespread violence, both sides have resorted to portrayals of the other in hostile stereotypes. This cycle cannot be easily broken. Without considerable determination and readiness to compromise, the rebuilding of trust will be impossible.

Cessation of Violence: Since 1991, the parties have consistently committed themselves, in all their agreements, to the path of nonviolence. They did so most recently in the two Sharm el-Sheikh summits of September 1999 and October 2000. To stop the violence now, the PA and GOI need not "reinvent the wheel." Rather, they should take immediate steps to end the violence, reaffirm their mutual commitments, and resume negotiations.

Resumption of Security Cooperation: Palestinian security officials told us that it would take some time - perhaps several weeks - for the PA to reassert full control over armed elements nominally under its command and to exert decisive influence over other armed elements operating in Palestinian areas. Israeli security officials have not disputed these assertions. What is important is that the PA make an all-out effort to enforce a complete cessation of violence and that it be clearly seen by the GOI as doing so. The GOI must likewise exercise a 100 percent effort to ensure that potential friction points, where Palestinians come into contact with armed Israelis, do not become stages for renewed hostilities.

The collapse of security cooperation in early October reflected the belief by each party that the other had committed itself to a violent course of action. If the parties wish to attain the standard of 100 percent effort to prevent violence, the immediate resumption of security cooperation is mandatory.

We acknowledge the reluctance of the PA to be seen as facilitating the work of Israeli security services absent an explicit political context (i.e., meaningful negotiations) and under the threat of Israeli settlement expansion. Indeed, security cooperation cannot be sustained without such negotiations and with ongoing actions seen as prejudicing the outcome of negotiations. However, violence is much more likely to continue without security cooperation. Moreover, without effective security cooperation, the parties will continue to regard all acts of violence as officially sanctioned.

In order to overcome the current deadlock, the parties should consider how best to revitalize security cooperation. We commend current efforts to that end. Effective cooperation depends on recreating and sustaining an atmosphere of confidence and good personal relations. It is for the parties themselves to undertake the main burden of day-to-day cooperation, but they should remain open to engaging the assistance of others in facilitating that work. Such outside assistance should be by mutual consent, should not threaten good bilateral working arrangements, and should not act as a tribunal or interpose between the parties. There was good security cooperation until last year that benefited from the good offices of the U.S. (acknowledged by both sides as useful), and was also supported indirectly by security projects and assistance from the European Union. The role of outside assistance should be that of creating the appropriate framework, sustaining goodwill on both sides, and removing friction where possible. That framework must
be seen to be contributing to the safety and welfare of both communities if there is to be acceptance by those communities of these efforts.

REBUILD CONFIDENCE
The historic handshake between Chairman Arafat and the late Prime Minister Rabin at the White House in September 1993 symbolized the expectation of both parties that the door to the peaceful resolution of differences had been opened. Despite the current violence and mutual loss of trust, both communities have repeatedly expressed a desire for peace. Channeling this desire into substantive progress has proved difficult. The restoration of trust is essential, and the parties should take affirmative steps to this end. Given the high level of hostility and mistrust, the timing and sequence of these steps are obviously crucial. This can be decided only by the parties. We urge them to begin the process of decision immediately.

Terrorism: In the September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the parties pledged to take action against "any threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement." Although all three categories of hostilities are reprehensible, it was no accident that "terrorism" was placed at the top of the list.

Terrorism involves the deliberate killing and injuring of randomly selected noncombatants for political ends. It seeks to promote a political outcome by spreading terror and demoralization throughout a population. It is immoral and ultimately self-defeating. We condemn it and we urge that the parties coordinate their security efforts to eliminate it.

In its official submissions and briefings, the GOI has accused the PA of supporting terrorism by releasing incarcerated terrorists, by allowing PA security personnel to abet, and in some cases to conduct terrorist operations, and by terminating security cooperation with the GOI. The PA vigorously denies the accusations. But Israelis hold the view that the PA's leadership has made no real effort over the past seven months to prevent anti-Israeli terrorism. The belief is, in and of itself, a major obstacle to the rebuilding of confidence.

We believe that the PA has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence by making clear to both communities that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and by taking all measures to prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.

Settlements: The GOI also has a responsibility to help rebuild confidence. A cessation of Palestinian-Israeli violence will be particularly hard to sustain unless the GOI freezes all settlement construction activity. The GOI should also give careful consideration to whether settlements that are focal points for substantial friction are valuable bargaining chips for future negotiations or provocations likely to preclude the onset of productive talks.

The issue is, of course, controversial. Many Israelis will regard our recommendation as a statement of the obvious, and will support it. Many will oppose it. But settlement activities must not be allowed to undermine the restoration of calm and the resumption of negotiations.

During the half-century of its existence, Israel has had the strong support of the United States. In
international forums, the U.S. has at times cast the only vote on Israel's behalf. Yet, even in such a close relationship there are some differences. Prominent among those differences is the U.S. Government's long-standing opposition to the GOI's policies and practices regarding settlements. As the then-Secretary of State, James A. Baker, III, commented on May 22, 1991:

"Every time I have gone to Israel in connection with the peace process, on each of my four trips, I have been met with the announcement of new settlement activity. This does violate United States policy. It's the first thing that Arabs -- Arab Governments, the first thing that the Palestinians in the territories -- whose situation is really quite desperate - the first thing they raise when we talk to them. I don't think there is any bigger obstacle to peace than the settlement activity that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace."

The policy described by Secretary Baker, on behalf of the Administration of President George H. W. Bush, has been, in essence, the policy of every American administration over the past quarter century.

Most other countries, including Turkey, Norway, and those of the European Union, have also been critical of Israeli settlement activity, in accordance with their views that such settlements are illegal under international law and not in compliance with previous agreements.

On each of our two visits to the region there were Israeli announcements regarding expansion of settlements, and it was almost always the first issue raised by Palestinians with whom we met. During our last visit, we observed the impact of 6,400 settlers on 140,000 Palestinians in Hebron and 6,500 settlers on over 1,100,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The GOI describes its policy as prohibiting new settlements but permitting expansion of existing settlements to accommodate "natural growth." Palestinians contend that there is no distinction between "new" and "expanded" settlements; and that, except for a brief freeze during the tenure of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin, there has been a continuing, aggressive effort by Israel to increase the number and size of settlements.

The subject has been widely discussed within Israel. The Ha'aretz English Language Edition editorial of April 10, 2001 stated:

"A government which seeks to argue that its goal is to reach a solution to the conflict with the Palestinians through peaceful means, and is trying at this stage to bring an end to the violence and terrorism, must announce an end to construction in the settlements."

The circumstances in the region are much changed from those which existed nearly 20 years ago. Yet, President Reagan's words remain relevant: "The immediate adoption of a settlements freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed..."

Beyond the obvious confidence-building qualities of a settlement freeze, we note that many of the confrontations during this conflict have occurred at points where Palestinians, settlers, and security forces protecting the settlers, meet. Keeping both the peace and these friction points will be very difficult.

Reducing Tension: We were told by both Palestinians and Israelis that emotions generated by the
many recent deaths and funerals have fueled additional confrontations, and, in effect, maintained
the cycle of violence. We cannot urge one side or the other to refrain from demonstrations. But
both sides must make clear that violent demonstrations will not be tolerated. We can and do urge
that both sides exhibit a greater respect for human life when demonstrators confront security
personnel. In addition, a renewed effort to stop the violence might feature, for a limited time, a
"cooling off" period during which public demonstrations at or near friction points will be
discouraged in order to break the cycle of violence. To the extent that demonstrations continue,
we urge that demonstrators and security personnel keep their distance from one another to reduce
the potential for lethal confrontation.

Actions and Responses: Members of the Committee staff witnessed an incident involving stone
throwing in Ramallah from the perspectives, on the ground, of both sides. The people
confronting one another were mostly young men. The absence of senior leadership on the IDF
side was striking. Likewise, the absence of responsible security and other officials counseling
restraint on the Palestinian side was obvious.

Concerning such confrontations, the GOI takes the position that "Israel is engaged in an armed
conflict short of war. This is not a civilian disturbance or a demonstration or a riot. It is
characterized by live-fire attacks on a significant scale [emphasis added] ... [T]he attacks are
carried out by a well-armed and organized militia..."29 Yet, the GOI acknowledges that of some
9,000 "attacks" by Palestinians against Israelis, "some 2,700 [about 30 percent] involved the use
of automatic weapons, rifles, hand guns, grenades, [and] explosives of other kinds."30

Thus, for the first three months of the current uprising, most incidents did not involve Palestinian
use of firearms and explosives. B'Tselem reported that, "according to IDF figures, 73 percent of
the incidents [from September 29 to December 2, 2000] did not include Palestinian gunfire.
Despite this, it was in these incidents that most of the Palestinians [were] killed and wounded.
."31 Altogether, nearly 500 people were killed and over 10,000 injured over the past seven
months; the overwhelming majority in both categories were Palestinian. Many of these deaths
were avoidable, as were many Israeli deaths.

Israel's characterization of the conflict, as noted above, is overly broad, for it does not adequately
describe the variety of incidents reported since late September 2000. Moreover, by thus defining
the conflict, the IDF has suspended its policy of mandating investigations by the Department of
Military Police Investigations whenever a Palestinian in the territories dies at the hands of an
IDF soldier in an incident not involving terrorism. In the words of the GOI, "Where Israel
considers that there is reason to investigate particular incidents, it does so, although, given the
circumstances of armed conflict, it does not do so routinely."32 We believe, however, that by
abandoning the blanket "armed conflict short of war" characterization and by re-instituting
mandatory military police investigations, the GOI could help mitigate deadly violence and help
rebuild mutual confidence. Notwithstanding the danger posed by stone-throwers, an effort should
be made to differentiate between terrorism and protests.

Controversy has arisen between the parties over what Israel calls the "targeting of individual
enemy combatants."33 The PLO describes these actions as "extra-judicial executions,"34 and
claims that Israel has engaged in an "assassination policy" that is "in clear violation of Article 32
of the Fourth Geneva Convention... "35 The GOI states that, "whatever action Israel has taken has been taken firmly within the bounds of the relevant and accepted principles relating to the conduct of hostilities."36

With respect to demonstrations, the GOI has acknowledged "that individual instances of excessive response may have occurred. To a soldier or a unit coming under Palestinian attack, the equation is not that of the Israeli army versus some stone throwing Palestinian protesters. It is a personal equation."37

We understand this concern, particularly since rocks can maim or even kill. It is no easy matter for a few young soldiers, confronted by large numbers of hostile demonstrators, to make fine legal distinctions on the spot. Still, this "personal equation" must fit within an organizational ethic; in this case, The Ethical Code of the Israel Defense Forces, which states, in part:
The sanctity of human life in the eyes of the IDF servicemen will find expression in all of their actions, in deliberate and meticulous planning, in safe and intelligent training and in proper execution of their mission. In evaluating the risk to self and others, they will use the appropriate standards and will exercise constant care to limit injury to life to the extent required to accomplish the mission.38

Those required to respect the IDF ethical code are largely draftees, as the IDF is a conscript force. Active duty enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers and junior officers -- the categories most likely to be present at friction points -- are young, often teenagers. Unless more senior career personnel or reservists are stationed at friction points, no IDF personnel present in these sensitive areas have experience to draw upon from previous violent Israeli-Palestinian confrontations. We think it is essential, especially in the context of restoring confidence by minimizing deadly confrontations, that the IDF deploy more senior, experienced soldiers to these sensitive points.

There were incidents where IDF soldiers have used lethal force, including live ammunition and modified metal-cored rubber rounds, against unarmed demonstrators throwing stones.39 The IDF should adopt crowd-control tactics that minimize the potential for deaths and casualties, withdrawing metal-cored rubber rounds from general use and using instead rubber baton rounds without metal cores.

We are deeply concerned about the public safety implications of exchanges of fire between populated areas, in particular between Israeli settlements and neighboring Palestinian villages. Palestinian gunmen have directed small arms fire at Israeli settlements and at nearby IDF positions from within or adjacent to civilian dwellings in Palestinian areas, thus endangering innocent, Israeli and Palestinian civilians alike. We condemn the positioning of gunmen within or near civilian dwellings. The IDF often responds to such gunfire with heavy caliber weapons, sometimes resulting in deaths and injuries to innocent Palestinians. An IDF officer told us at the Ministry of Defense on March 23, 2001 that, "When shooting comes from a building we respond, and sometimes there are innocent people in the building." Obviously, innocent people are injured and killed during exchanges of this nature. We urge that such provocations cease and that the IDF exercise maximum restraint in its responses if they do occur. Inappropriate or excessive uses of force often lead to escalation.
We are aware of IDF sensitivities about these subjects. More than once we were asked: "What about Palestinian rules of engagement? What about a Palestinian code of ethics for their military personnel?" These are valid questions.

On the Palestinian side there are disturbing ambiguities in the basic areas of responsibility and accountability. The lack of control exercised by the PA over its own security personnel and armed elements affiliated with the PA leadership is very troubling. We urge the PA to take all necessary steps to establish a clear and unchallenged chain of command for armed personnel operating under its authority. We recommend that the PA institute and enforce effective standards of conduct and accountability, both within the uniformed ranks and between the police and the civilian political leadership to which it reports.

Incitement: In their submissions and briefings to the Committee, both sides expressed concerns about hateful language and images emanating from the other, citing numerous examples of hostile sectarian and ethnic rhetoric in the Palestinian and Israeli media, in school curricula and in statements by religious leaders, politicians and others.

We call on the parties to renew their formal commitments to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and to abstain from incitement and hostile propaganda. We condemn hate language and incitement in all its forms. We suggest that the parties be particularly cautious about using words in a manner that suggests collective responsibility.

Economic and Social Impact of Violence: Further restrictions on the movement of people and goods have been imposed by Israel on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. These closures take three forms: those which restrict movement between the Palestinian areas and Israel; those (including curfews) which restrict movement within the Palestinian areas; and those which restrict movement from the Palestinian areas to foreign countries. These measures have disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians; they have increased Palestinian unemployment to an estimated 40 percent, in part by preventing some 140,000 Palestinians from working in Israel; and have stripped away about one-third of the Palestinian gross domestic product. Moreover, the transfer of tax and customs duty revenues owed to the PA by Israel has been suspended, leading to a serious fiscal crisis in the PA.

Of particular concern to the PA has been the destruction by Israeli security forces and settlers of tens of thousands of olive and fruit trees and other agricultural property. The closures have had other adverse effects, such as preventing civilians from access to urgent medical treatment and preventing students from attending school.

The GOI maintains that these measures were taken in order to protect Israeli citizens from terrorism. Palestinians characterize these measures as "collective punishment." The GOI denies the allegation:

Israel has not taken measures that have had an economic impact simply for the sake of taking such measures or for reasons of harming the Palestinian economy. The measures have been taken for reasons of security. Thus, for example, the closure of the Palestinian territories was taken in
order to prevent, or at least minimize the risks of, terrorist attacks. ... The Palestinian leadership has made no attempt to control this activity and bring it to an end.40

Moreover, the GOI points out that violence in the last quarter of 2000 cost the Israeli economy $1.2 billion (USD), and that the loss continues at a rate of approximately $150 million (USD) per month.41

We acknowledge Israel's security concerns. We believe, however, that the GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who have been employed in Israel to return to their jobs. Closure policies play into the hands of extremists seeking to expand their constituencies and thereby contribute to escalation. The PA should resume cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure that Palestinian workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to terrorists and terrorist organizations. International development assistance has from the start been an integral part of the peace process, with an aim to strengthen the socio-economic foundations for peace. This assistance today is more important than ever. We urge the international community to sustain the development agenda of the peace process.

Holy Places: It is particularly regrettable that places such as the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, and Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem have been the scenes of violence, death and injury. These are places of peace, prayer and reflection which must be accessible to all believers.

Places deemed holy by Muslims, Jews, and Christians merit respect, protection and preservation. Agreements previously reached by the parties regarding holy places must be upheld. The GOI and the PA should create a joint initiative to defuse the sectarian aspect of their political dispute by preserving and protecting such places. Efforts to develop inter-faith dialogue should be encouraged.

International Force: One of the most controversial subjects raised during our inquiry was the issue of deploying an international force to the Palestinian areas. The PA is strongly in favor of having such a force to protect Palestinian civilians and their property from the IDF and from settlers. The GOI is just as adamantly opposed to an "international protection force," believing that it would prove unresponsive to Israeli security concerns and interfere with bilateral negotiations to settle the conflict.

We believe that to be effective such a force would need the support of both parties. We note that international forces deployed in this region have been or are in a position to fulfill their mandates and make a positive contribution only when they were deployed with the consent of all of the parties involved.

During our visit to Hebron, we were briefed by personnel of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), a presence to which both parties have agreed. The TIPH is charged with observing an explosive situation and writing reports on their observations. If the parties agree, as a confidence-building measure, to draw upon TIPH personnel to help them manage other friction points, we hope that TIPH contributors could accommodate such a request.
Cross-Community Initiatives: Many described to us the near absolute loss of trust. It was all the more inspiring, therefore, to find groups (such as the Parent's Circle and the Economic Cooperation Foundation) dedicated to cross-community understanding in spite of all that has happened. We commend them and their important work.

Regrettably, most of the work of this nature has stopped during the current conflict. To help rebuild confidence, the GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Israeli and Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) already involved in confidence-building through initiatives linking both sides. It is important that the PA and GOI support cross-community organizations and initiatives, including the provision of humanitarian assistance to Palestinian villages by Israeli NGOs. Providing travel permits for participants is essential. Cooperation between the humanitarian organizations and the military/security services of the parties should be encouraged and institutionalized.

Such programs can help build, albeit slowly, constituencies for peace among Palestinians and Israelis and can provide safety nets during times of turbulence. Organizations involved in this work are vital for translating good intentions into positive actions.

RESUME NEGOTIATIONS

Israeli leaders do not wish to be perceived as "rewarding violence." Palestinian leaders do not wish to be perceived as "rewarding occupation." We appreciate the political constraints on leaders of both sides. Nevertheless, if the cycle of violence is to be broken and the search for peace resumed, there needs to be a new bilateral relationship incorporating both security cooperation and negotiations.

We cannot prescribe to the parties how best to pursue their political objectives. Yet the construction of a new bilateral relationship solidifying and transcending an agreed cessation of violence requires intelligent risk-taking. It requires, in the first instance, that each party again be willing to regard the other as a partner. Partnership, in turn, requires at this juncture something more than was agreed in the Declaration of Principles and in subsequent agreements. Instead of declaring the peace process to be "dead," the parties should determine how they will conclude their common journey along their agreed "road map," a journey which began in Madrid and continued -- in spite of problems -- until very recently.

To define a starting point is for the parties to decide. Both parties have stated that they remain committed to their mutual agreements and undertakings. It is time to explore further implementation. The parties should declare their intention to meet on this basis, in order to resume full and meaningful negotiations, in the spirit of their undertakings at Sharm el-Sheikh in 1999 and 2000.

Neither side will be able to achieve its principal objectives unilaterally or without political risk. We know how hard it is for leaders to act -- especially if the action can be characterized by political opponents as a concession -- without getting something in return. The PA must -- as it has at previous critical junctures -- take steps to reassure Israel on security matters. The GOI must -- as it has in the past -- take steps to reassure the PA on political matters. Israelis and
Palestinians should avoid, in their own actions and attitudes, giving extremists, common criminals and revenge seekers the final say in defining their joint future. This will not be easy if deadly incidents occur in spite of effective cooperation. Notwithstanding the daunting difficulties, the very foundation of the trust required to re-establish a functioning partnership consists of each side making such strategic reassurances to the other.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The GOI and the PA must act swiftly and decisively to halt the violence. Their immediate objectives then should be to rebuild confidence and resume negotiations. What we are asking is not easy. Palestinians and Israelis - not just their leaders, but two publics at large - have lost confidence in one another. We are asking political leaders to do, for the sake of their people, the politically difficult: to lead without knowing how many will follow.

During this mission our aim has been to fulfill the mandate agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh. We value the support given our work by the participants at the summit, and we commend the parties for their cooperation. Our principal recommendation is that they recommit themselves to the Sharm el-Sheikh spirit, and that they implement the decisions made there in 1999 and 2000. We believe that the summit participants will support bold action by the parties to achieve these objectives.

END THE VIOLENCE
* The GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and undertakings and should immediately implement an unconditional cessation of violence. Anything less than a complete effort by both parties to end the violence will render the effort itself ineffectual, and will likely be interpreted by the other side as evidence of hostile intent.
* The GOI and PA should immediately resume security cooperation. Effective bilateral cooperation aimed at preventing violence will encourage the resumption of negotiations. We are particularly concerned that, absent effective, transparent security cooperation, terrorism and other acts of violence will continue and may be seen as officially sanctioned whether they are or not. The parties should consider widening the scope of security cooperation to reflect the priorities of both communities and to seek acceptance for these efforts from those communities.
We acknowledge the PA's position that security cooperation presents a political difficulty absent a suitable political context, i.e., the relaxation of stringent Israeli security measures combined with ongoing, fruitful negotiations. We also acknowledge the PA's fear that, with security cooperation in hand, the GOI may not be disposed to deal forthrightly with Palestinian political concerns. We believe that security cooperation cannot long be sustained if meaningful negotiations are unreasonably deferred, if security measures "on the ground" are seen as hostile, or if steps are taken that are perceived as provocative or as prejudicing the outcome of negotiations.

REBUILD CONFIDENCE
* The PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful "cooling off period" and implement additional confidence building measures, some of which were proposed in the October 2000 Sharm el-Sheikh Statement and some of which were offered by the U.S. on January 7, 2001 in Cairo.
* The PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn and discourage incitement in
all its forms.

* The PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alike that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will make a 100 percent effort to prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.

* The GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the "natural growth" of existing settlements.

The kind of security cooperation desired by the GOI cannot for long co-exist with settlement activity described very recently by the European Union as causing "great concern" and by the U.S. as "provocative."

* The GOI should give careful consideration to whether settlements which are focal points for substantial friction are valuable bargaining chips for future negotiations or provocations likely to preclude the onset of productive talks.

* The GOI may wish to make it clear to the PA that a future peace would pose no threat to the territorial contiguity of a Palestinian State to be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

* The IDF should consider withdrawing to positions held before September 28, 2000 which will reduce the number of friction points and the potential for violent confrontations.

* The GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies and procedures encouraging non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators, with a view to minimizing casualties and friction between the two communities. The IDF should:

* Re-institute, as a matter of course, military police investigations into Palestinian deaths resulting from IDF actions in the Palestinian territories in incidents not involving terrorism. The IDF should abandon the blanket characterization of the current uprising as "an armed conflict short of war," which fails to discriminate between terrorism and protest.

* Adopt tactics of crowd-control that minimize the potential for deaths and casualties, including the withdrawal of metal-cored rubber rounds from general use.

* Ensure that experienced, seasoned personnel are present for duty at all times at known friction points.

* Ensure that the stated values and standard operating procedures of the IDF effectively instill the duty of caring for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as Israelis living there, consistent with The Ethical Code of The IDF.

* The GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and permit Palestinians who had been employed in Israel to return to their jobs; and should ensure that security forces and settlers refrain from the destruction of homes and roads, as well as trees and other agricultural property in Palestinian areas. We acknowledge the GOI's position that actions of this nature have been taken for security reasons. Nevertheless, their economic effects will persist for years.

* The PA should renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, that Palestinian workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to organizations and individuals engaged in terrorism.

* The PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to fire upon Israeli populated areas and IDF positions. This tactic places civilians on both sides at unnecessary risk.

* The GOI and IDF should adopt and enforce policies and procedures designed to ensure that the response to any gunfire emanating from Palestinian populated areas minimizes the danger to the lives and property of Palestinian civilians, bearing in mind that it is probably the objective of gunmen to elicit an excessive IDF response.
* The GOI should take all necessary steps to prevent acts of violence by settlers.
* The parties should abide by the provisions of the Wye River Agreement prohibiting illegal weapons.
* The PA should take all necessary steps to establish a clear and unchallenged chain of command for armed personnel operating under its authority.
* The PA should institute and enforce effective standards of conduct and accountability, both within the uniformed ranks and between the police and the civilian political leadership to which it reports.
* The PA and GOI should consider a joint undertaking to preserve and protect holy places sacred to the traditions of Muslims, Jews, and Christians. An initiative of this nature might help to reverse a disturbing trend: the increasing use of religious themes to encourage and justify violence.
* The GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Palestinian and Israeli nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in cross-community initiatives linking the two peoples. It is important that these activities, including the provision of humanitarian aid to Palestinian villages by Israeli NGOs, receive the full backing of both parties.

RESUME NEGOTIATIONS
* We reiterate our belief that a 100 percent effort to stop the violence, an immediate resumption of security cooperation and an exchange of confidence building measures are all important for the resumption of negotiations. Yet none of these steps will long be sustained absent a return to serious negotiations. It is not within our mandate to prescribe the venue, the basis or the agenda of negotiations. However, in order to provide an effective political context for practical cooperation between the parties, negotiations must not be unreasonably deferred and they must, in our view, manifest a spirit of compromise, reconciliation and partnership, notwithstanding the events of the past seven months.
* In the spirit of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements and understandings of 1999 and 2000, we recommend that the parties meet to reaffirm their commitment to signed agreements and mutual understandings, and take corresponding action. This should be the basis for resuming full and meaningful negotiations.

The parties are at a crossroads. If they do not return to the negotiating table, they face the prospect of fighting it out for years on end, with many of their citizens leaving for distant shores to live their lives and raise their children. We pray they make the right choice. That means stopping the violence now. Israelis and Palestinians have to live, work, and prosper together. History and geography have destined them to be neighbors. That cannot be changed. Only when their actions are guided by this awareness will they be able to develop the vision and reality of peace and shared prosperity.
Appendix C, Annex 36 — Arab Peace Initiative (Saudi Peace Plan)
March 28, 2002

Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah offered normal relations with Arab countries if Israel would withdraw from the occupied territories including East Jerusalem and accept a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. His initiative was adopted unanimously at the Arab League summit meeting in Beirut and renewed by another Arab summit in 2007. It was still in play in 2010 when Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak wrote in the New York Times (Sept. 1, p. A21), “The Arab Peace Initiative, endorsed by all Arab states, offers Israel peace and normalization in exchange for Israel’s withdrawal from Arab territory and a just solution to the Palestinian refugee issue.”

The proposal put the Arab states on record as supporting a two-state solution. The initiative, if accepted, would end long-standing conflicts with Syria and Lebanon. But it ducked the hard problem of the fate of Palestinian refugees, calling only for a “just solution” in accordance with UNGA Resolution 194, which said that refugees “should” be permitted to return to their homes. More specifically, the 2002 initiative called for Israel to withdraw from “all” occupied territories, which would be politically difficult if not impossible for Israel. Note that the Mubarak statement called for Israel to withdraw only “from Arab territory.” Omission of “all” could be interpreted as a softening of the Arab position.

Similarly, U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 called for Israeli withdrawal only from “territories,” meaning some territories but not necessarily all. Paragraph 4 made it clear that no Arab country (other than Palestine itself) would have to accept any refugees. The Geneva Initiative the following year was to pick up on that idea and to apply it also to Israel.
The 2002 initiative went beyond the similar Fahd (Arab Fez) Peace Initiative of 1982 by offering peace agreements and normal relations specifically with Israel. But even that raised questions to the Israelis. Vague references to “normal relations” and to a “peace agreement” left open the question of whether Arab countries such as Syria would be willing to sign a formal peace treaty with Israel. In other words, why was he word “agreement” paired with peace rather than “treaty”? Do the Arab states have in mind an arrangement more like a truce than like a durable peace?

Result: The Israelis did not reject the Saudi initiative as a reasonable starting point for negotiations, but neither have they embraced it. The Palestinian Authority supported the initiative. Opposition elements within both sides rejected it. The United States signaled its qualified approval.

Text of the Arab Peace Initiative, adopted at Beirut summit
This is the official translation of the full text of a Saudi-inspired peace plan adopted by the Arab summit as published on the Arab League internet site.
Source: http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm

The Arab Peace Initiative
The Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit Level, at its 14th Ordinary Session,

--Reaffirming the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo Extra-Ordinary Arab Summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the strategic option of the Arab Countries, to be achieved in accordance with International Legality, and which would require a comparable commitment on the part of the Israeli Government.

--Having listened to the statement made by His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, the Crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in which his Highness presented his Initiative, calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land for peace principle, and Israel's acceptance of an independent Palestinian State, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel.

--Emanating from the conviction of the Arab countries that a military solution to the conflict will not achieve peace or provide security for the parties, the council:
1- Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its strategic option as well.

2- Further calls upon Israel to affirm:

   a. Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967 as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon.

   b. Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.

   c. The acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

3. Consequently, the Arab Countries affirm the following:

   a. Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region.

   b. Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace.

4. Assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries.

5. Calls upon the Government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this initiative in order to safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further shedding of blood, enabling the Arab Countries and Israel to live in peace and good neighborliness and provide future generations with security, stability, and prosperity.

6. Invites the International Community and all countries and Organizations to support this initiative.

7. Requests the Chairman of the Summit to form a special committee composed of some of its concerned member states and the Secretary General of the League of Arab States to pursue the necessary contacts to gain support for this initiative at all levels, particularly from the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Muslim States and the European Union.
These two speeches, on April 4 and June 24, reflected the American understanding of the famous “road map to peace” that a quartet of international powers would present on behalf of the international community. The other members of the quartet were the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia.

The speeches gave more emphasis to what President Bush wanted to accomplish than on how to accomplish it. The “what” was the easy part.

**Result:** The speeches were significant for their clear statement of United States’ support for a Palestinian state. Note also the expectation that the state would follow the American model, including a constitution with separation of powers, a working democracy, multi-party elections and a market economy.

President Bush praised the Arab Peace Initiative because it acknowledged Israel’s right to exist, and he called on Israel to withdraw from Palestinian cities and to stop expanding its settlements (emphasis added in the transcript below).

### Text of Bush’s April 4 speech

*Source: [http://middleeast.about.com/od/israelandpalestine/a/me070906.htm](http://middleeast.about.com/od/israelandpalestine/a/me070906.htm)*

Good morning. During the course of one week, the situation in the Middle East has deteriorated dramatically. Last Wednesday, my Special Envoy, Anthony Zinni, reported to me that we were on the verge of a cease-fire agreement that would have spared Palestinian and Israeli lives.

That hope fell away when a terrorist attacked a group of innocent people in a Netanya hotel, killing many men and women in what is a mounting toll of terror.

In the days since, the world has watched with growing concern the horror of bombings and burials and the stark picture of tanks in the street. Across the world, people are grieving for Israelis and Palestinians who have lost their lives.

When an 18-year-old Palestinian girl is induced to blow herself up, and in the process kills a 17-year-old Israeli girl, the future, itself, is dying -- the future of the Palestinian people and the
future of the Israeli people. We mourn the dead, and we mourn the damage done to the hope of peace, the hope of Israel's and the Israelis' desire for a Jewish state at peace with its neighbors; the hope of the Palestinian people to build their own independent state.

Terror must be stopped. No nation can negotiate with terrorists. For there is no way to make peace with those whose only goal is death.

This could be a hopeful moment in the Middle East. The proposal of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, supported by the Arab League, has put a number of countries in the Arab world closer than ever to recognizing Israel's right to exist. The United States is on record supporting the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people for a Palestinian state.

Israel has recognized the goal of a Palestinian state. The outlines of a just settlement are clear: two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side, in peace and security.

This can be a time for hope. But it calls for leadership, not for terror. Since September the 11th, I've delivered this message: everyone must choose; you're either with the civilized world, or you're with the terrorists. All in the Middle East also must choose and must move decisively in word and deed against terrorist acts.

The Chairman of the Palestinian Authority has not consistently opposed or confronted terrorists. At Oslo and elsewhere, Chairman Arafat renounced terror as an instrument of his cause, and he agreed to control it. He's not done so.

The situation in which he finds himself today is largely of his own making. He's missed his opportunities, and thereby betrayed the hopes of the people he's supposed to lead. Given his failure, the Israeli government feels it must strike at terrorist networks that are killing its citizens.

Yet, Israel must understand that its response to these recent attacks is only a temporary measure. All parties have their own responsibilities. And all parties owe it to their own people to act.

We all know today's situation runs the risk of aggravating long-term bitterness and undermining relationships that are critical to any hope of peace. I call on the Palestinian people, the Palestinian Authority and our friends in the Arab world to join us in delivering a clear message to terrorists: blowing yourself up does not help the Palestinian cause. To the contrary, suicide bombing missions could well blow up the best and only hope for a Palestinian state.

All states must keep their promise, made in a vote in the United Nations to actively oppose terror in all its forms. No nation can pick and choose its terrorist friends. I call on the Palestinian Authority and all governments in the region to do everything in their power to stop terrorist activities, to disrupt terrorist financing, and to stop inciting violence by glorifying terror in state-owned media, or telling suicide bombers they are martyrs. They're not martyrs. They're murderers. And they undermine the cause of the Palestinian people.

Those governments, like Iraq, that reward parents for the sacrifice of their children are guilty of soliciting murder of the worst kind. All who care about the Palestinian people should join in
condemning and acting against groups like Al-Aqsa, Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and all groups which opposed the peace process and seek the destruction of Israel.

The recent Arab League support of Crown Prince Abdullah's initiative for peace is promising, is hopeful, because it acknowledges Israel's right to exist. And it raises the hope of sustained, constructive Arab involvement in the search for peace. This builds on a tradition of visionary leadership, begun by President Sadat and King Hussein, and carried forward by President Mubarak and King Abdullah.

Now, other Arab states must rise to this occasion and accept Israel as a nation and as a neighbor. Peace with Israel is the only avenue to prosperity and success for a new Palestinian state. The Palestinian people deserve peace and an opportunity to better their lives. They need their closest neighbor, Israel, to be an economic partner, not a mortal enemy. They deserve a government that respects human rights and a government that focuses on their needs -- education and health care -- rather than feeding their resentments.

It is not enough for Arab nations to defend the Palestinian cause. They must truly help the Palestinian people by seeking peace and fighting terror and promoting development.

Israel faces hard choices of its own. Its government has supported the creation of a Palestinian state that is not a haven for terrorism. Yet, Israel also must recognize that such a state needs to be politically and economically viable.

Consistent with the Mitchell plan, Israeli settlement activity in occupied territories must stop. And the occupation must end through withdrawal to secure and recognize boundaries consistent with United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338. Ultimately, this approach should be the basis of agreements between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon.

Israel should also show a respect, a respect for and concern about the dignity of the Palestinian people who are and will be their neighbors. It is crucial to distinguish between the terrorists and ordinary Palestinians seeking to provide for their own families.

The Israeli government should be compassionate at checkpoints and border crossings, sparing innocent Palestinians daily humiliation. Israel should take immediate action to ease closures and allow peaceful people to go back to work.

Israel is facing a terrible and serious challenge. For seven days, it has acted to root out terrorist nests. America recognizes Israel's right to defend itself from terror. Yet, to lay the foundations of future peace, I ask Israel to halt incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas and begin the withdrawal from those cities it has recently occupied.

I speak as a committed friend of Israel. I speak out of a concern for its long-term security, a security that will come with a genuine peace. As Israel steps back, responsible Palestinian leaders and Israel's Arab neighbors must step forward and show the world that they are truly on the side of peace. The choice and the burden will be theirs.
The world expects an immediate cease-fire, immediate resumption of security cooperation with Israel against terrorism. An immediate order to crack down on terrorist networks. I expect better leadership, and I expect results.

These are the elements of peace in the Middle East. And now, we must build the road to those goals. Decades of bitter experience teach a clear lesson: progress is impossible when nations emphasize their grievances and ignore their opportunities. Storms of violence cannot go on. Enough is enough.

And to those who would try to use the current crisis as an opportunity to widen the conflict, stay out. Iran's arms shipments and support for terror fuel the fire of conflict in the Middle East. And it must stop. Syria has spoken out against al Qaeda. We expect it to act against Hamas and Hezbollah, as well. It's time for Iran to focus on meeting its own people's aspirations for freedom and for Syria to decide which side of the war against terror it is on.

The world finds itself at a critical moment. This is a conflict that can widen or an opportunity we can seize. And so I've decided to send Secretary of State Powell to the region next week to seek broad international support for the vision I've outlined today. As a step in this process, he will work to implement United Nations Resolution 1402, an immediate and meaningful cease-fire, an end to terror and violence and incitement; withdrawal of Israeli troops from Palestinian cities, including Ramallah; implementation of the already agreed upon Tenet and Mitchell plans, which will lead to a political settlement.

I have no illusions. We have no illusions about the difficulty of the issues that lie ahead. Yet, our nation's resolve is strong. America is committed to ending this conflict and beginning an era of peace.

**Text of Bush's June 24 speech**

Source: [http://middleeast.about.com/od/israelandpalestine/a/me070906.htm](http://middleeast.about.com/od/israelandpalestine/a/me070906.htm)

For too long, the citizens of the Middle East have lived in the midst of death and fear. The hatred of a few holds the hopes of many hostage. The forces of extremism and terror are attempting to kill progress and peace by killing the innocent. And this casts a dark shadow over an entire region. For the sake of all humanity, things must change in the Middle East.

It is untenable for Israeli citizens to live in terror. It is untenable for Palestinians to live in squalor and occupation. And the current situation offers no prospect that life will improve. Israeli citizens will continue to be victimized by terrorists, and so Israel will continue to defend herself.

In the situation the Palestinian people will grow more and more miserable. **My vision is two states**, living side by side in peace and security. There is simply no way to achieve that peace until all parties fight terror. Yet, at this critical moment, if all parties will break with the past and set out on a new path, we can overcome the darkness with the light of hope. Peace requires a new and different Palestinian leadership, so that a Palestinian state can be born.
I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I call upon them to build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty. If the Palestinian people actively pursue these goals, America and the world will actively support their efforts. If the Palestinian people meet these goals, they will be able to reach agreement with Israel and Egypt and Jordan on security and other arrangements for independence.

And when the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institutions and new security arrangements with their neighbors, the United States of America will support the creation of a Palestinian state whose borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle East.

In the work ahead, we all have responsibilities. The Palestinian people are gifted and capable, and I am confident they can achieve a new birth for their nation. A Palestinian state will never be created by terror -- it will be built through reform. And reform must be more than cosmetic change, or veiled attempt to preserve the status quo. True reform will require entirely new political and economic institutions, based on democracy, market economics and action against terrorism.

Today, the elected Palestinian legislature has no authority, and power is concentrated in the hands of an unaccountable few. A Palestinian state can only serve its citizens with a new constitution which separates the powers of government. The Palestinian parliament should have the full authority of a legislative body. Local officials and government ministers need authority of their own and the independence to govern effectively.

The United States, along with the European Union and Arab states, will work with Palestinian leaders to create a new constitutional framework, and a working democracy for the Palestinian people. And the United States, along with others in the international community will help the Palestinians organize and monitor fair, multi-party local elections by the end of the year, with national elections to follow.

Today, the Palestinian people live in economic stagnation, made worse by official corruption. A Palestinian state will require a vibrant economy, where honest enterprise is encouraged by honest government. The United States, the international donor community and the World Bank stand ready to work with Palestinians on a major project of economic reform and development. The United States, the EU, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund are willing to oversee reforms in Palestinian finances, encouraging transparency and independent auditing.

And the United States, along with our partners in the developed world, will increase our humanitarian assistance to relieve Palestinian suffering. Today, the Palestinian people lack effective courts of law and have no means to defend and vindicate their rights. A Palestinian state will require a system of reliable justice to punish those who prey on the innocent. The United States and members of the international community stand ready to work with Palestinian leaders to establish finance -- establish finance and monitor a truly independent judiciary.

Today, Palestinian authorities are encouraging, not opposing, terrorism. This is unacceptable. And the United States will not support the establishment of a Palestinian state until its leaders
engage in a sustained fight against the terrorists and dismantle their infrastructure. This will require an externally supervised effort to rebuild and reform the Palestinian security services. The security system must have clear lines of authority and accountability and a unified chain of command.

America is pursuing this reform along with key regional states. The world is prepared to help, yet ultimately these steps toward statehood depend on the Palestinian people and their leaders. If they energetically take the path of reform, the rewards can come quickly. If Palestinians embrace democracy, confront corruption and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a provisional state of Palestine.

With a dedicated effort, this state could rise rapidly, as it comes to terms with Israel, Egypt and Jordan on practical issues, such as security.

We know this is possible, because in our lifetimes we have seen an end to conflicts that no one thought could end. We've seen fierce enemies let go of long histories of strife and anger. America itself counts former adversaries as trusted friends: Germany and Japan and now Russia.

Conflict is not inevitable. Distrust need not be permanent. Peace is possible when we break free of old patterns and habits of hatred. The violence and grief that troubled the Holy Land have been among the great tragedies of our time. The Middle East has often been left behind in the political and economic advancement of the world. That is the history of the region. But it need not and must not be its fate.

The Middle East could write a new story of trade and development and democracy. And we stand ready to help. Yet, this progress can only come in an atmosphere of peace. And the United States will work for all the children of Abraham to know the benefits of peace.
Appendix C, Annex 38 -- Road Map to Peace
2003

The quartet – comprising the United States, the United Nations, the European Union and Russia – presented this plan on behalf of the international community. The road map did not define the outcome of negotiation. Instead, it proposed methods and milestones to guide negotiation.

The road map assumed that a two-state solution was the goal, beginning with security and ending with a comprehensive solution to all final-status issues. (See Appendix O.) It further assumed that territorial negotiations would be based on 1967 armistice lines, not on the 1948 lines.

The road map implemented the Tenet Plan and Mitchell Committee report and drew its vision from U.S. President Bush’s Rose Garden speeches the year before.

Key points included unequivocal declarations of each other’s right to exist (emphasis added in the text below). Previous such declarations apparently were deemed equivocal. The Quartet also made the usual (futile) demand that Israel freeze settlement activity in the occupied territories. Note the separate demand that Israeli immediately dismantle settlement “outposts,” which even the Israeli government conceded were illegal. Of special interest were statements in the Preamble and in the security section of Phase I regarding senior-level meetings to evaluate performance. This was the monitoring mechanism that was missing from previous initiatives, including Oslo, Mitchell and Tenet (Golan, 2008, p. 81).

Result: Too many detours undermined good intentions, and the road map never was implemented. “Pushed to the sidelines” was the way Dolan (2008, p. 92) put it. Although Palestinians liked the deadlines for creation of their state and Israelis liked the conditionality, the plan did not specify how the target dates and benchmarks should be met if the sides did not
perform as expected (Golan, 2008, p. 78). The road map’s most important accomplishment was the complete and unilateral withdrawal of Israeli settlements and outposts from the Gaza Strip in 2005.

The road map is worth study because it is the only document after Oslo that has been officially accepted (albeit with reservations, by Israel) and thus likely to influence future negotiations. Some of Israel’s reservations were not trivial. For example, Reservation 6 said, “In connection to both the introductory statements and the final settlement, declared references must be made to Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state and to the waiver of any right of return for Palestinian refugees to the State of Israel” (Israeli cabinet, 2003). The point is relevant to the Obama round of negotiations because Israel pressed it again. Although official references to recognizing Israel as a Jewish state date back at least as far as 2001 (Kessler, 2010, Oct. 2), Reservation 6 was the first time that Israel had added it to a demand for recognition. Previously, it was deemed sufficient merely to declare Israel’s right to exist in peace and security, as under the 1993 Oslo Accords and repeated in the road map. Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, fumed, “You can call yourselves whatever you want. But I will not accept it” (Kessler, 2010, Oct. 2). Salaam Fayyad, Palestinian prime minister, added “Actually, we did more than just recognize Israel’s existence back in 1993. ... We had recognized then Israel’s ‘right to exist in peace and security.’ It’s a very high form of recognition, if you will. Mutual recognition among nations is typically not that way. ... Let me tell you what we got in return ... it involved Israel recognizing the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, that’s all. That’s all” (Duss, 2010, Sept. 27).

No less controversial was Israel’s demand for a waiver of any right of return for refugees, which has been traditionally left to later negotiations.
Golan’s critique (2008, p. 85-92) focused on the road map’s vagueness and, in some places, its contradictions, such as the simultaneous call for democracy and replacement of Yasser Arafat without elections. A major problem, she said, was the prolonged process of getting to substantive issues, during which time extremists could cause trouble. The introduction of a monitoring mechanism was welcome but its timing (in Phase III) was late and its powers were unclear.

Attempts to establish an American-style democracy could tie Palestine in knots for decades. For example, why a constitution? Israel gets along fine without one.

More delays resulted from confusion over the differences between what was to be accomplished sequentially, simultaneously, reciprocally, and in parallel as a condition for moving from phase to phase. And what standards were envisioned as sufficient for proceeding? What the road map lacked was a high-speed on-ramp.

“GOI” is an abbreviation for Government of Israel. NGOs are Non-Government Organizations. AHLC is an abbreviation for the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee of the Quartet for assistance to Palestinians. The Bertini Report, mentioned in the section on Humanitarian response, refers to recommendations by Catherine Bertini, a personal envoy of the United Nations secretary-general. Her 15,000-word report from August 2002 may be found at http://domino.un.org/bertini_rpt.htm.

Text of the Road Map

Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2989783.stm

A performance-based road map to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The following is a performance-based and goal-driven road map, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the
political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of
the Quartet.

The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by
2005, as presented in President Bush's speech of 24 June, and welcomed by the EU, Russia and
the UN in the 16 July and 17 September Quartet Ministerial statements.

A two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to
violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against
terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and
through Israel's readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be
established, and a clear, unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated
settlement as described below.

The Quartet will assist and facilitate implementation of the plan, starting in Phase I, including
direct discussions between the parties as required.

The plan establishes a realistic timeline for implementation.

However, as a performance-based plan, progress will require and depend upon the good faith
efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each of the obligations outlined below.

Should the parties perform their obligations rapidly, progress within and through the phases may
come sooner than indicated in the plan.

Non-compliance with obligations will impede progress.

A settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an independent,
democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and
its other neighbours.

The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in
1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace,
UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah - endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit - calling for
acceptance of Israel as a neighbour living in peace and security, in the context of a
comprehensive settlement.

This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all
tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.

The Quartet will meet regularly at senior levels to evaluate the parties' performance on
implementation of the plan. In each phase, the parties are expected to perform their obligations
in parallel, unless otherwise indicated.
Phase I: Ending terror and violence, normalising Palestinian life, and building Palestinian institutions (present to May 2003)

In Phase I, the Palestinians immediately undertake an **unconditional cessation of violence** according to the steps outlined below; such action should be accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by Israel.

Palestinians and Israelis resume security co-operation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services.

Palestinians undertake comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood, including **drafting a Palestinian constitution, and free, fair and open elections** upon the basis of those measures.

Israel takes all necessary steps to help normalise Palestinian life.

**Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 2000** and the two sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security performance and co-operation progress.

**Israel also freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report.**

At the outset of Phase I:

- **Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security** and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.
- **Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel**, as expressed by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions end incitement against Palestinians.

**Security**

- Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.
- Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption.
- **GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to**
facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan.
· Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources, Quartet representatives begin informal monitoring and consult with the parties on establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and its implementation.
· Implementation, as previously agreed, of US rebuilding, training and resumed security co-operation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (US-Egypt-Jordan). Quartet support for efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive ceasefire.

- All Palestinian security organizations are consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.

- Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume security co-operation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of US security officials.

· Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror.
· All donors providing budgetary support for the Palestinians channel these funds through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance’s Single Treasury Account.
· As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since 28 September 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to 28 September 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF.

Palestinian institution-building

· Immediate action on credible process to produce draft constitution for Palestinian statehood. As rapidly as possible, constitutional committee circulates draft Palestinian constitution, based on strong parliamentary democracy and cabinet with empowered prime minister, for public comment/debate. Constitutional committee proposes draft document for submission after elections for approval by appropriate Palestinian institutions.
· Appointment of interim prime minister or cabinet with empowered executive authority/decision-making body.
· GOI fully facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC and cabinet sessions, internationally supervised security retraining, electoral and other reform activity, and other supportive measures related to the reform efforts.
· Continued appointment of Palestinian ministers empowered to undertake fundamental reform. Completion of further steps to achieve genuine separation of powers, including any necessary Palestinian legal reforms for this purpose.
· Establishment of independent Palestinian election commission. PLC reviews and revises election law.
· Palestinian performance on judicial, administrative, and economic benchmarks, as established by the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform.
· As early as possible, and based upon the above measures and in the context of open debate and transparent candidate selection/electoral campaign based on a free, multi-party process, Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections.
GOI facilitates Task Force election assistance, registration of voters, movement of candidates and voting officials. Support for NGOs involved in the election process.

GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem based on a commitment that these institutions operate strictly in accordance with prior agreements between the parties.

Humanitarian response

Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation. Israel and Palestinians implement in full all recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions, lifting curfews and easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods, and allowing full, safe, and unfettered access of international and humanitarian personnel.

AHLC reviews the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza and launches a major donor assistance effort, including to the reform effort.

GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer of funds, including arrears, in accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism.

Civil society

Continued donor support, including increased funding through PVOs/NGOs, for people to people programs, private sector development and civil society initiatives.

Settlements

GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001.

Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements).

Phase II: Transition (June 2003-December 2003)

In the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement.

As has been noted, this goal can be achieved when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror, willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty.

With such a leadership, reformed civil institutions and security structures, the Palestinians will have the active support of the Quartet and the broader international community in establishing an independent, viable, state.

Progress into Phase II will be based upon the consensus judgment of the Quartet of whether conditions are appropriate to proceed, taking into account performance of both parties.
Furthering and sustaining efforts to normalise Palestinian lives and build Palestinian institutions, Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003.

Its primary goals are continued comprehensive security performance and effective security cooperation, continued normalisation of Palestinian life and institution-building, further building on and sustaining of the goals outlined in Phase I, ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution, formal establishment of office of prime minister, consolidation of political reform, and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.

- International conference: Convened by the Quartet, in consultation with the parties, immediately after the successful conclusion of Palestinian elections, to support Palestinian economic recovery and launch a process, leading to establishment of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders.

  - Such a meeting would be inclusive, based on the goal of a comprehensive Middle East peace (including between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon), and based on the principles described in the preamble to this document.

  - Arab states restore pre-intifada links to Israel (trade offices, etc.).

  - Revival of multilateral engagement on issues including regional water resources, environment, economic development, refugees, and arms control issues.

    - New constitution for democratic, independent Palestinian state is finalised and approved by appropriate Palestinian institutions. Further elections, if required, should follow approval of the new constitution.
    - Empowered reform cabinet with office of prime minister formally established, consistent with draft constitution.
    - Continued comprehensive security performance, including effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.
    - Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the international conference. As part of this process, implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum territorial contiguity, including further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
    - Enhanced international role in monitoring transition, with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet.
    - Quartet members promote international recognition of Palestinian state, including possible UN membership.

Phase III: Permanent status agreement and end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (2004-2005)

Progress into Phase III, based on consensus judgment of Quartet, and taking into account actions of both parties and Quartet monitoring.
Phase III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilisation of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005.

- Second international conference: Convened by Quartet, in consultation with the parties, at beginning of 2004 to endorse agreement reached on an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and formally to launch a process with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet, leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and, to support progress toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible.
- Continued comprehensive, effective progress on the reform agenda laid out by the Task Force in preparation for final status agreement.
- Continued sustained and effective security performance, and sustained, effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.
- International efforts to facilitate reform and stabilise Palestinian institutions and the Palestinian economy, in preparation for final status agreement.
- Parties reach final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and fulfils the vision of two states, Israel and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security.
- Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.
Appendix C, Annex 39 -- Geneva Initiative (Geneva Accord)
December 1, 2003

Encouraged by the progress of the Taba Summit in 2001 but distressed at its ultimate failure, two individuals – one Israeli and one Palestinian – put together teams of negotiators, acting privately, to see what could be accomplished without official sanction. The members were hardly beginners at Middle Eastern politics. Yossi Beilin, for example, was minister of justice in the Barak administration. Yasser Abed Rabbo was minister of information in the Palestinian Authority. Other team members were similarly accomplished. They produced an accord that was ready for signatures by the heads of state or that could serve as a framework for additional negotiations.

Unlike the road map, which started with confidence-building, the Geneva Initiative started with political agreements that could produce security. Unlike earlier approaches, it recognized all previous serious proposals, including the Arab Peace Initiative, President Bush’s Rose Garden Speeches, the Oslo Agreements, Clinton Parameters, Taba Summit and even the road map to peace. Unlike previous initiatives, it replaced language referring to the PLO or the Palestinian Authority with “Palestinian state” (Golan, 2008, p. 94).

Another first was a fleshed-out mechanism for outside parties to monitor compliance and to verify that both sides had kept their promises. One more innovation was a provision for a reconciliation program. Although sparsely detailed, it nevertheless provided a first step in healing more than a century’s accumulation of grievances by both parties.

On the other hand, some of the wording was so vague, ambiguous or contradictory that critics on both sides rejected it. For example, did the refugees’ “right of return” mean to Israel or to Palestine? Israeli critics objected because they said it does; Palestinian critics objected because they said it did not. (See below, emphasis added.)


**Results:** The attempt at compromise proved unsuccessful, in part because it did not provide a clear proposal regarding refugees: May they or may they not return to Israel? Any straightforward answer is likely to be incendiary. The accord seemed to say (see below, emphasis added) that yes, refugees and their children have the right to return to their pre-1948 homes. Rights, after all, do survive regardless of whether they are exercised or permitted. However, Israel would be allowed to decide how many refugees it would accept. Palestinian officials suspected that the number might be zero, and the effect of the initiative would be to surrender refugee rights in return for almost all of the West Bank. This trade-off had been rejected previously at the Camp David summit.

See also Item 2 in Article 4: Sovereignty. Israel has consistently insisted on demilitarizing a Palestinian state and retaining control over aspects such as external security. See also Item 5. Further, it would be politically difficult if not impossible for Israel to remove most settlements, considering how many, how large they are and how far they have penetrated the West Bank. And the paragraph on terrorism made promises that both sides have broken in previous agreements.

The initiative demonstrated that there existed on both sides an undercurrent willing to take bold and risky compromises in order to make peace. It also solidified thinking in the direction of a comprehensive, two-state solution incorporating ideas from previous initiatives. The best testimonial to its influence was the fact that it has remained in play for so long, strengthened by addendums released in 2009.

What Golan (2008, p. 110) described as one of the initiatives’ greatest achievements puzzles this observer: “recognition of Jews as a people with a right to a state (and Israel as the Jewish homeland).” On Page 94, she added “along with the same right of the Palestinians.” What does that mean? Previous statements going back to the Oslo Accords seem to have covered
that point, making Israel’s latest insistence that Palestinians recognize Israel “as a Jewish
state” seem redundant. The Nusseibeh-Ayalon Petition, for example, referred to Israel as the
“only state of the Jewish people” (Golan, 2008, p. 114). The other great achievement, according
to Golan (2008, p. 110) was what she described as the trade-off between the right of return and
sovereignty over the Temple Mount.

Only Article 7, on refugees, is reproduced here in its entirety. An ellipsis (...) indicates
missing sections. Section headings have been retained. The “Geneva” in the title came from the
city in Switzerland where the initiative was announced.

Partial Text of the Geneva Initiative

Preamble
…
Affirming their deep belief that the logic of peace requires compromise, and that the only
viable solution is a two-state solution based on UNSC Resolution 242 and 338 ;
…
Article 1 - Purpose of the Permanent Status Agreement
…
2. The implementation of this Agreement will settle all the claims of the Parties
arising from events occurring prior to its signature. No further claims related to events
prior to this Agreement may be raised by either Party.
Article 2 - Relations between the Parties
1. The state of Israel shall recognize the state of Palestine (hereinafter
"Palestine") upon its establishment. The state of Palestine shall immediately
recognize the state of Israel.
2. The state of Palestine shall be the successor to the PLO with all its rights and
obligations.
3. Israel and Palestine shall immediately establish full diplomatic and consular
relations with each other and will exchange resident Ambassadors, within one month of
their mutual recognition.
4. The Parties recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their
respective peoples. The Parties are committed not to interfere in each other’s
internal affairs.
…
Article 3 - Implementation and Verification Group
…
Article 4 – Territory
1. The International Borders between the States of Palestine and Israel

(a) In accordance with UNSC Resolution 242 and 338, the border between the states of Palestine and Israel shall be based on the June 4th 1967 lines with reciprocal modifications on a 1:1 basis as set forth in attached Map 1.

...

2. Sovereignty and Inviolability

(a) The Parties recognize and respect each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, as well as the inviolability of each others territory, including territorial waters, and airspace. They shall respect this inviolability in accordance with this Agreement, the UN Charter, and other rules of international law.

...

5. Settlements

(a) The state of Israel shall be responsible for resettling the Israelis residing in Palestinian sovereign territory outside this territory.

...

Article 5 – Security

...

4. Terrorism

(b) The Parties shall take joint and, in their respective territories, unilateral comprehensive and continuous efforts against all aspects of violence and terrorism. These efforts shall include the prevention and preemption of such acts, and the prosecution of their perpetrators.

...

Article 6 – Jerusalem

...

3. Capital of Two States

The Parties shall have their mutually recognized capitals in the areas of Jerusalem under their respective sovereignty.

...

ii. The state of Palestine shall be responsible for maintaining the security of the Compound and for ensuring that it will not be used for any hostile acts against Israelis or Israeli areas. The only arms permitted on the Compound shall be those carried by the Palestinian security personnel and the security detachment of the Multinational Presence.

...

i. At the end of the withdrawal period stipulated in Article 5/7, the state of Palestine shall assert sovereignty over the [Temple Mount] Compound.

...

6. The Wailing Wall

The Wailing Wall shall be under Israeli sovereignty.
Article 7 - Refugees

1. Significance of the Refugee Problem
   (a) The Parties recognize that, in the context of two independent states, Palestine and Israel, living side by side in peace, an agreed resolution of the refugee problem is necessary for achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace between them.
   (b) Such a resolution will also be central to stability building and development in the region.

2. UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative
   (a) The Parties recognize that UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative (Article 2.ii.) concerning the rights of the Palestinian refugees represent the basis for resolving the refugee issue, and agree that these rights are fulfilled according to Article 7 of this Agreement.

3. Compensation
   (a) Refugees shall be entitled to compensation for their refugeehood and for loss of property. This shall not prejudice or be prejudiced by the refugee’s permanent place of residence.
   (b) The Parties recognize the right of states that have hosted Palestinian refugees to remuneration.

4. Choice of Permanent Place of Residence (PPR)
The solution to the PPR aspect of the refugee problem shall entail an act of informed choice on the part of the refugee to be exercised in accordance with the options and modalities set forth in this agreement. **PPR options from which the refugees may choose shall be as follows**;
   (a) The state of Palestine, in accordance with clause a below.
   (b) Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap, following assumption of Palestinian sovereignty, in accordance with clause a below.
   (c) Third Countries, in accordance with clause b below.
   (d) The state of Israel, in accordance with clause c below.
   (e) Present Host countries, in accordance with clause d below.
      i. PPR options i and ii shall be the right of all Palestinian refugees and shall be in accordance with the laws of the State of Palestine.
      ii. Option iii shall be at the sovereign discretion of third countries and shall be in accordance with numbers that each third country will submit to the International Commission. These numbers shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that each third country shall accept.
      iii. Option iv shall be at the sovereign discretion of Israel and will be in accordance with a number that Israel will submit to the International Commission. This number shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that Israel shall accept. As a basis, Israel will consider the average of the total numbers submitted by the different third countries to the International Commission.
      iv. Option v shall be in accordance with the sovereign discretion of present host countries. Where exercised this shall be in the context of prompt and extensive development and rehabilitation programs for the refugee communities.
Priority in all the above shall be accorded to the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon.

5. Free and Informed Choice
The process by which Palestinian refugees shall express their PPR choice shall be on the basis of a free and informed decision. The Parties themselves are committed and will encourage third parties to facilitate the refugees’ free choice in expressing their preferences, and to countering any attempts at interference or organized pressure on the process of choice. This will not prejudice the recognition of Palestine as the realization of Palestinian self-determination and statehood.

6. End of Refugee Status
Palestinian refugee status shall be terminated upon the realization of an individual refugee’s permanent place of residence (PPR) as determined by the International Commission.

7. End of Claims
This agreement provides for the permanent and complete resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem. No claims may be raised except for those related to the implementation of this agreement.

8. International Role
The Parties call upon the international community to participate fully in the comprehensive resolution of the refugee problem in accordance with this Agreement, including, inter alia, the establishment of an International Commission and an International Fund.

9. Property Compensation
(a) Refugees shall be compensated for the loss of property resulting from their displacement.
(b) The aggregate sum of property compensation shall be calculated as follows:
   i. The Parties shall request the International Commission to appoint a Panel of Experts to estimate the value of Palestinians’ property at the time of displacement.
   ii. The Panel of Experts shall base its assessment on the UNCCP records, the records of the Custodian for Absentee Property, and any other records it deems relevant. The Parties shall make these records available to the Panel.
   iii. The Parties shall appoint experts to advise and assist the Panel in its work.
   iv. Within 6 months, the Panel shall submit its estimates to the Parties.
   v. The Parties shall agree on an economic multiplier, to be applied to the estimates, to reach a fair aggregate value of the property.
   (c) The aggregate value agreed to by the Parties shall constitute the Israeli “lump sum” contribution to the International Fund. No other financial claims arising from the Palestinian refugee problem may be raised against Israel.
   (d) Israel’s contribution shall be made in installments in accordance with Schedule X.
   (e) The value of the Israeli fixed assets that shall remain intact in former
settlements and transferred to the state of Palestine will be deducted from Israel’s contribution to the International Fund. An estimation of this value shall be made by the International Fund, taking into account assessment of damage caused by the settlements.

10. Compensation for Refugeehood
   (a) A "Refugeehood Fund" shall be established in recognition of each individual’s refugeehood. The Fund, to which Israel shall be a contributing party, shall be overseen by the International Commission. The structure and financing of the Fund is set forth in Annex X.
   (b) Funds will be disbursed to refugee communities in the former areas of UNRWA operation, and will be at their disposal for communal development and commemoration of the refugee experience. Appropriate mechanisms will be devised by the International Commission whereby the beneficiary refugee communities are empowered to determine and administer the use of this Fund.

11. The International Commission (Commission)
   (a) Mandate and Composition
      i. An International Commission shall be established and shall have full and exclusive responsibility for implementing all aspects of this Agreement pertaining to refugees.
      ii. In addition to themselves, the Parties call upon the United Nations, the United States, UNRWA, the Arab host countries, the EU, Switzerland, Canada, Norway, Japan, the World Bank, the Russian Federation, and others to be the members of the Commission.
      iii. The Commission shall:
         1. Oversee and manage the process whereby the status and PPR of Palestinian refugees is determined and realized.
         2. Oversee and manage, in close cooperation with the host states, the rehabilitation and development programs.
         3. Raise and disburse funds as appropriate.
      iv. The Parties shall make available to the Commission all relevant documentary records and archival materials in their possession that it deems necessary for the functioning of the Commission and its organs. The Commission may request such materials from all other relevant parties and bodies, including, inter alia, UNCCP and UNRWA.
   (b) Structure
      i. The Commission shall be governed by an Executive Board (Board) composed of representatives of its members.
      ii. The Board shall be the highest authority in the Commission and shall make the relevant policy decisions in accordance with this Agreement.
      iii. The Board shall draw up the procedures governing the work of the Commission in accordance with this Agreement.
      iv. The Board shall oversee the conduct of the various Committees of the Commission. The said Committees shall periodically report to the Board in accordance with procedures set forth thereby.
      v. The Board shall create a Secretariat and appoint a Chair thereof. The Chair
and the Secretariat shall conduct the day-to-day operation of the Commission.

(c) Specific Committees
   i. The Commission shall establish the Technical Committees specified below.
   ii. Unless otherwise specified in this Agreement, the Board shall determine the
       structure and procedures of the Committees.
   iii. The Parties may make submissions to the Committees as deemed
       necessary.
   iv. The Committees shall establish mechanisms for resolution of disputes
       arising from the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement
       relating to refugees.
   v. The Committees shall function in accordance with this Agreement, and shall
       render binding decisions accordingly.
   vi. Refugees shall have the right to appeal decisions affecting them according
       to mechanisms established by this Agreement and detailed in Annex X.

(d) Status-determination Committee:
   i. The Status-determination Committee shall be responsible for verifying
      refugee status.
   ii. UNRWA registration shall be considered as rebuttable presumption (prima
       facie proof) of refugee status.

(e) Compensation Committee:
   i. The Compensation Committee shall be responsible for administering the
      implementation of the compensation provisions.
   ii. The Committee shall disburse compensation for individual property pursuant
       to the following modalities:
       1. Either a fixed per capita award for property claims below a specified
          value. This will require the claimant to only prove title, and shall be processed according
          to a fast-track procedure, or
       2. A claims-based award for property claims exceeding a specified value for
          immovable and other assets. This will require the claimant to prove both title and the
          value of the losses.
   iii. Annex X shall elaborate the details of the above including, but not limited to,
       evidentiary issues and the use of UNCCP, “Custodian for Absentees’ Property”, and
       UNRWA records, along with any other relevant records.

(f) Host State Remuneration Committee:
   There shall be remuneration for host states.

(g) Permanent Place of Residence Committee (PPR Committee):
   The PPR Committee shall,
   i. Develop with all the relevant parties detailed programs regarding the
      implementation of the PPR options pursuant to Article 7/4 above.
   ii. Assist the applicants in making an informed choice regarding PPR options.
   iii. Receive applications from refugees regarding PPR. The applicants must
       indicate a number of preferences in accordance with article 7/4 above. The applications
       shall be received no later than two years after the start of the International Commission’s
       operations. Refugees who do not submit such applications within the two-year period
       shall lose their refugee status.
   iv. Determine, in accordance with sub-Article (a) above, the PPR of the
applicants, taking into account individual preferences and maintenance of family unity. Applicants who do not avail themselves of the Committee’s PPR determination shall lose their refugee status.

v. Provide the applicants with the appropriate technical and legal assistance.

vi. The PPR of Palestinian refugees shall be realized within 5 years of the start of the International Commission’s operations.

(h) Refugeehood Fund Committee
The Refugeehood Fund Committee shall implement Article 7/10 as detailed in Annex X.

(i) Rehabilitation and Development Committee
In accordance with the aims of this Agreement and noting the above PPR programs, the Rehabilitation and Development Committee shall work closely with Palestine, Host Countries and other relevant third countries and parties in pursuing the goal of refugee rehabilitation and community development. This shall include devising programs and plans to provide the former refugees with opportunities for personal and communal development, housing, education, healthcare, re-training and other needs. This shall be integrated in the general development plans for the region.

12. The International Fund
(a) An International Fund (the Fund) shall be established to receive contributions outlined in this Article and additional contributions from the international community. The Fund shall disburse monies to the Commission to enable it to carry out its functions. The Fund shall audit the Commission’s work.

(b) The structure, composition and operation of the Fund are set forth in Annex X.

13. UNRWA
(a) UNRWA should be phased out in each country in which it operates, based on the end of refugee status in that country.

(b) UNRWA should cease to exist five years after the start of the Commission’s operations. The Commission shall draw up a plan for the phasing out of UNRWA and shall facilitate the transfer of UNRWA functions to host states.

14. Reconciliation Programs
(a) The Parties will encourage and promote the development of cooperation between their relevant institutions and civil societies in creating forums for exchanging historical narratives and enhancing mutual understanding regarding the past.

(b) The Parties shall encourage and facilitate exchanges in order to disseminate a richer appreciation of these respective narratives, in the fields of formal and informal education, by providing conditions for direct contacts between schools, educational institutions and civil society.

(c) The Parties may consider cross-community cultural programs in order to promote the goals of conciliation in relation to their respective histories.

(d) These programs may include developing appropriate ways of commemorating those villages and communities that existed prior to 1949.

Article 8 - Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee (IPCC)
...
Article 9 - Designated Road Use Arrangements
...
Article 10 - Sites of Religious Significance
...
Article 11 - Border Regime
...
Article 12 - Water: still to be completed

Article 13 - Economic Relations: still to be completed

Article 14 - Legal Cooperation: still to be completed

Article 15 - Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees
...
Article 16 - Dispute Settlement Mechanism
...
Article 17 - Final Clauses
...
The timing of Sharon’s speech was significant. Israel had just finished unilaterally withdrawing its soldiers and settlers from the Gaza Strip. Sharon, as prime minister, had pushed through the disengagement despite opposition from within his right-wing party and his cabinet. Less than four months later, he would suffer a paralyzing stroke, and the Gaza Strip would fall into civil war between Fatah and Hamas.

Result: Sharon’s U.N. speech was noteworthy for public recognition by Israel of the Palestinian right to its own state and of the need to compromise. Sharon defended Israeli’s claim to sovereignty over all of Jerusalem and Israel’s need for what he called a security fence. The main passages are highlighted in bold (emphasis added).

Text of Ariel Sharon's Speech to the UN General Assembly, September 15, 2005
Source: http://www.zionism-israel.com/hdoc/Sharon_UN.htm

My friends and colleagues, heads and representatives of the UN member states, I arrived here from Jerusalem, the capital of the Jewish people for over 3,000 years, and the undivided and eternal capital of the State of Israel.

At the outset, I would like to express the profound feelings of empathy of the people of Israel for the American nation, and our sincere condolences to the families who lost their loved ones. I wish to encourage my friend, President George Bush, and the American people, in their determined efforts to assist the victims of the hurricane and rebuild the ruins after the destruction. The State of Israel, which the United States stood beside at times of trial, is ready to extend any assistance at its disposal in this immense humanitarian mission.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
I stand before you at the gate of nations as a Jew and as a citizen of the democratic, free and sovereign State of Israel, a proud representative of an ancient people, whose numbers are few, but whose contribution to civilization and to the values of ethics, justice and faith, surrounds the world and encompasses history. The Jewish people have a long memory, the memory which united the exiles of Israel for thousands of years: a memory which has its origin in G-d's commandment to our forefather Abraham: "Go forth!" and continued with the receiving of the Torah at the foot of Mount Sinai and the wanderings of the children of Israel in the desert, led by Moses on their journey to the promised land, the land of Israel.
I was born in the Land of Israel, the son of pioneers - people who tilled the land and sought no fights - who did not come to Israel to dispossess its residents. If the circumstances had not demanded it, I would not have become a soldier, but rather a farmer and agriculturist. My first love was, and remains, manual labor; sowing and harvesting, the pastures, the flock and the cattle.

I, as someone whose path of life led him to be a fighter and commander in all Israel's wars, reaches out today to our Palestinian neighbors in a call for reconciliation and compromise to end the bloody conflict, and embark on the path which leads to peace and understanding between our peoples. I view this as my calling and my primary mission for the coming years.

The land of Israel is precious to me, precious to us, the Jewish people, more than anything. Relinquishing any part of our forefathers' legacy is heartbreaking, as difficult as the parting of the Red Sea. Every inch of land, every hill and valley, every stream and rock, is saturated with Jewish history, replete with memories. The continuity of Jewish presence in the Land of Israel never ceased. Even those of us who were exiled from our land, against their will, to the ends of the earth - their souls, for all generations, remained connected to their homeland, by thousands of hidden threads of yearning and love, expressed three times a day in prayer and songs of longing.

The Land of Israel is the open Bible, the written testimony, the identity and right of the Jewish people. Under its skies, the prophets of Israel expressed their claims for social justice, and their eternal vision for alliances between peoples, in a world which would know no more war. Its cities, villages, vistas, ridges, deserts and plains preserve as loyal witnesses its ancient Hebrew names. **Page after page, our unique land is unfurled, and at its heart is united Jerusalem, the city of the Temple upon Mount Moriah, the axis of the life of the Jewish people throughout all generations, and the seat of its yearnings and prayers for 3,000 years. The city to which we pledged an eternal vow of faithfulness, which forever beats in every Jewish heart: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand forget its cunning!"**

I say these things to you because they are the essence of my Jewish consciousness, and of my belief in the eternal and unimpeachable right of the people of Israel to the Land of Israel. However, I say this here also to emphasize the immensity of the pain I feel deep in my heart at the recognition that we have to make concessions for the sake of peace between us and our Palestinian neighbors.

The right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel does not mean disregarding the rights of others in the land. The Palestinians will always be our neighbors. We respect them, and have no aspirations to rule over them. **They are also entitled to freedom and to a national, sovereign existence in a state of their own.**

This week, the last Israeli soldier left the Gaza Strip, and military law there was ended. The State of Israel proved that it is ready also to make painful concessions in order to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians. The decision to disengage was very difficult for me, and involves a heavy personal price. However, it is the absolute recognition that it is the right path for the future of Israel that guided me. Israeli society is undergoing a difficult crisis as a result of the
Disengagement, and now needs to heal the rifts.

Now it is the Palestinians' turn to prove their desire for peace. The end of Israeli control over and responsibility for the Gaza Strip allows the Palestinians, if they so wish, to develop their economy and build a peace-seeking society, which is developed, free, law-abiding, transparent, and which adheres to democratic principles. The most important test the Palestinian leadership will face is in fulfilling their commitment to put an end to terror and its infrastructures, eliminate the anarchic regime of armed gangs, and cease the incitement and indoctrination of hatred towards Israel and the Jews.

Until they do so - Israel will know how to defend itself from the horrors of terrorism. This is why we built the security fence, and we will continue to build it until it is completed, as would any other country defending its citizens. The security fence prevents terrorists and murderers from arriving in city centers on a daily basis and targeting citizens on their way to work, children on their way to school and families sitting together in restaurants. This fence is vitally indispensable. This fence saves lives!

The successful implementation of the Disengagement Plan opens up a window of opportunity for advancing towards peace, in accordance with the sequence of the Roadmap. The State of Israel is committed to the Roadmap and to the implementation of the Sharm El-Sheikh understandings. And I hope that it will be possible, through them, to renew the political process.

I am among those who believe that it is possible to reach a fair compromise and coexistence in good neighborly relations between Jews and Arabs. However, I must emphasize one fact: there will be no compromise on the right of the State of Israel to exist as a Jewish state, with defensible borders, in full security and without threats and terror.

I call on the Palestinian leadership to show determination and leadership, and to eliminate terror, violence and the culture of hatred from our relations. I am certain that it is in our power to present our peoples with a new and promising horizon, a horizon of hope.

Distinguished representatives,

As I mentioned, the Jewish people have a long memory. We remember events which took place thousands of years ago, and certainly remember events which took place in this hall during the last 60 years. The Jewish people remember the dramatic vote in the UN Assembly on November 29, 1947, when representatives of the nations recognized our right to national revival in our historic homeland. However, we also remember dozens of harsh and unjust decisions made by United Nations over the years. And we know that, even today, there are those who sit here as representatives of a country whose leadership calls to wipe Israel off the face of the earth, and no one speaks out.

The attempts of that country to arm itself with nuclear weapons must disturb the sleep of anyone who desires peace and stability in the Middle East and the entire world. The combination of murky fundamentalism and support of terrorist organizations creates a serious threat that every
member nation in the UN must stand against.

I hope that the comprehensive reforms which the United Nations is undergoing in its 60th anniversary year will include a fundamental change and improvement in the approach of the United Nations, its organizations and institutions, towards the State of Israel.

My fellow colleagues and representatives,

Peace is a supreme value in the Jewish legacy, and is the desired goal of our policy. After the long journey of wanderings and the hardships of the Jewish people; after the Holocaust which obliterated one third of our people; after the long and arduous struggle for revival; after more than 57 consecutive years of war and terror which did not stop the development of the State of Israel; after all this - our heart's desire was and remains to achieve peace with our neighbors. Our desire for peace is strong enough to ensure that we will achieve it, only if our neighbors are genuine partners in this longed-for goal. If we succeed in working together, we can transform our plot of land, which is dear to both peoples, from a land of contention to a land of peace - for our children and grandchildren.

In a few days time on the Hebrew calendar, the New Year will begin, the 5,766th year since the Creation. According to Jewish belief, the fates of people and nations are determined at the New Year by the Creator - to be spared or to be doomed. May the Holy One, blessed be He, determine that this year, our fate and the fate of our neighbors is peace, mutual respect and good neighborly relations.

From this distinguished podium, on behalf of the people of Israel, I wish all the people of the world a happy New Year.

Shana Tova!
Appendix D

U.N. resolutions related to the Arab-Israeli conflict
1947-2009

Tracking United Nations Resolutions through the years provides a unique way of understanding the Arab-Israeli conflict. From 1947 to 2009, the United Nations adopted 1,016 resolutions related to Israel and the Middle East – 707 by the General Assembly (General Assembly, 2010) and 309 by the Security Council (Security Council, 2010). An additional 42 were vetoed by the United States (U.S. vetoes, 2010), bringing the total to 1,058. Comparable figures for other countries are not available, but it is difficult to recall circumstances that would cause those numbers to be exceeded for any other country.

General Assembly resolutions differ from Security Council resolutions in two ways: Security Council resolutions can be vetoed; General Assembly resolutions cannot. Security Council resolutions are considered binding on all members under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter; General Assembly resolutions are not. Article 25 says members “agree to accept and carry out the decision of the Security Council.”

Resolutions by the General Assembly break down neatly into three periods: From 1947 to 1973, Israel was the subject of an average of 3.5 resolutions a year. From 1974 to 1994, the average jumped to 11.3, and from 1995 to 2009, the average reached 26.8 – topping out at 31 in 1997.

The rhetoric of the resolutions tracks the volume. In the first period, the language was routine. In the second period, the rhetoric became shrill, bristling with words such as demands, condemns, illegal, inadmissible, and null and void. In the third period, typical language moderates to words like requests, invites and urges. Statements regarding the rights of
Palestinians are balanced by statements regarding the rights of states to live in peace within secure borders.

The reasons for these changes are beyond the scope of this study, but it is tempting to conclude that the strong language was not working. Hammon (2010) counted 77 Security Council resolutions that he said Israel had violated. Israel shrugged off most of them. The pivotal event was the Madrid Conference, which marked the start of serious negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. The change in mood at the United Nations is reflected in General Assembly Resolution 48/58 (1993), which sets a new standard in neutral language.

Appendix D – United Nations Resolutions

Contents

1947  Annex 1 -- Partition of Palestine: General Assembly Resolution 181
1948  Annex 2 -- Return of Refugees: General Assembly Resolution 194 (III)
1949  Annex 3 -- Israel Admitted to the United Nations: General Assembly Resolution 273
1969  Annex 5 -- U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
      General Assembly Resolution 2535
1974  Annex 7 -- The Question of Palestine: General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX)
      Annex 8 -- Observer Status Granted to the PLO: General Assembly Resolution 3237
1975  Annex 9 -- Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People
      General Assembly Resolution 3376
      Annex 10 -- Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
      General Assembly Resolution 3379
1977  Annex 11 -- Special Unit on Palestinian Rights: General Assembly Resolution 32/40 B
1978  Annex 12 -- United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
      Security Council Resolution 425
1981  Annex 14 -- Peace Between Egypt and Israel: General Assembly Resolution 36/120 F
1987  Annex 15 -- Measures To Prevent International Terrorism: General Assembly Res 42/159
1991  Annex 16 -- Elimination of Racism and Racial Discrimination
      General Assembly Resolution 46/86
1993  Annex 17 -- Middle East Peace Process: General Assembly Resolution 48/58
Appendix D, Annex 1 -- Partition of Palestine
General Assembly Resolution 181
November 29, 1947

This resolution authorizes the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state. The Zionists accepted; the Arabs did not – at least until 1988. The Zionist Jews declared the state of Israel on May 15, 1948, but no corresponding Arab state was created. The Arabs’ reasons for rejecting 181 are worth a close look because they would continue to frustrate peace negotiations over the coming decades (Shalev, 1991, p. 136):

--At its most fundamental, the Arabs’ argument was based on their historic and corporate right to the land – all the land -- which no one was authorized to give or sell. The U.N. resolution did not respect the exclusive claim of Palestine’s Arab inhabitants to their homeland.

--The U.N. plan gave Jews 56% of Palestine with a population of 499,000 Jews and 438,000 Palestinians. Only about 8% of the land in Palestine had been purchased by Jews or the Jewish Agency. The Arabs would get 42% of the land, with 818,000 Palestinians and 10,000 Jews. In total, the Jews accounted for only 32% of the population. The figures are approximations, but regardless of how they are interpreted, the Jews got vastly more land than their population or land ownership would justify.

--Jerusalem would be internationalized, a decision objectionable for the same reasons: This was land that had been Arab since time immemorial. It was land that is holy to all Muslims, not just Arabs. It cannot be appropriated by infidels for any cause, regardless of how worthy.

--To the extent that the decision to partition the land is sentimental, based on sympathy for Jews caught in the Holocaust, it was unjust to punish the Palestinian Arabs for the sins of the Nazis – and most countries, including the United States and Great Britain themselves would not
accept significant numbers of Jewish refugees, although they supported resettled the refugees on Arab land.

—Any decisions regarding Palestine should left to its people -- self-governing and self-determining.

Golan (2008, p. 3) added two other reasons that the Palestinian Arabs did not take advantage of the opportunity to create their own state: 1. Surrounding Arab states, especially Jordan and Egypt, did not support an independent Palestine because they intended to divide all of land among themselves. 2. Palestinian Arabs lacked strong local leaders.

Not until 1988 – shortly after the start of the first intifada -- did the Arabs begin to discuss the idea of establishing a Palestinian state separate from Israel (Shalev, 1991, p. 136). However, circumstances had changed drastically in the interim and Palestinian leadership was as divided as ever. What the Zionists would have accepted in 1947 was no longer on the negotiating table in 1988, and some Palestinians continued to insist on a one-state solution that would put all of Palestine under Arab rule (Shalev, 1991, p. 138). The envisioned boundaries are identified in the map at Annex 1, Appendix H, although the wars of 1948, 1956, and 1973 made drastic revisions.

The key provisions in the U.N. resolution are shown below in bold type (emphasis added). Sections after Part IA define the implementation of the partition. Only section headings are shown below in most cases. The wonder is that authors of this resolution anticipated a peaceful transition to partition, an economic union and an independent Jerusalem.

Text of the First Part of General Assembly Resolution 181 -- Partition of Palestine
Source of the complete text: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/res181.asp

The General Assembly, Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a Special Committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future Government of Palestine at the second regular session;
Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and

Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364)(1) including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,

Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future Government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

Requests that

The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;

The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;

The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;

The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;

Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;

Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and

Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part 1, Section B, Paragraph I below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly.*
The General Assembly,

Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed 2,000,000 dollars for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine.

PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION

Part I. - Future Constitution and Government of Palestine

A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE

The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the mandate and to evacuate each area. The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.

Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in Part III of this Plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in Parts II and III below.

B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE

C. DECLARATION

Chapter I: Holy Places, Religious Buildings and Sites

Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit, and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizen of the other State and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.

Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.

Chapter 2: Religious and Minority Rights

Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.

No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.
All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws. …

Chapter 3: Citizenship, International Conventions and Financial Obligations

1. Citizenship Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights.

D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT
The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit. …

Freedom of Transit and Visit
The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each State and the City shall control residence within its borders.

E. ASSETS

F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Part II. - Boundaries

A. THE ARAB STATE [boundaries described in detail]

B. THE JEWISH STATE [boundaries described in detail]

C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM [boundaries described in detail]

Part III. - City of Jerusalem

A. SPECIAL REGIME
The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a corpus separatum under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. … Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY

C. STATUTE OF THE CITY

D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME

Part IV. Capitulations
The most-often quoted paragraphs are No. 5, regarding negotiations; No. 7, holy places; No. 8, governance of Jerusalem; No. 9 access to Jerusalem; and No. 11, return of refugees. Their interpretation remains controversial. Article 11 (bold emphasis added) sparks the most controversy due to disputes over its meaning and timing. It says refugees “should” be permitted to return or receive compensation; what it does not say is which refugees (Arab only? Arab and Jew?) nor does it use the critical words “right of return.” If the Jewish refugees are not welcomed back to their previous countries (especially Arab countries) or offered compensation, does Israel have to accept Palestinian refugees? When is “earliest practicable”? In whose judgment? And who will judge the intentions, whether peaceful or aggressive, of refugees wishing to return?

Israel accepted the resolution in a joint protocol at the Lausanne conference, but its ambiguities render it difficult to enforce. Israel did offer to receive 100,000 Palestinian refugees, but the offer was declined by Arab delegates and then withdrawn by the Israelis. General Assembly resolutions, unlike Security Council resolutions, are not binding.

Of potentially more value was the creation of a conciliation commission to seek a peaceful resolution to the war then raging. However, the parties were too far apart, too unrealistic in their demands and too weak to impose their will on their opponents (Burns, 2000, July 27, p. 10).
The General Assembly,

Having considered further the situation in Palestine,

1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and

Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;

2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions:

(a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;

(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;

(c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;

3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States which will constitute the Conciliation Commission;

4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;

5. Calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 1/ and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;
6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

7. Resolves that the Holy Places -- including Nazareth -- religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval;

8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu'fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control;

Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area;

The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, who shall co-operate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area;

9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;

10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities;
11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;

12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution;

The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will provide a limited number of guards to the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;

13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations;

14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution.
Appendix D, Annex 3 -- Israel Admitted to the United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 273
May 11, 1949

Note the fifth paragraph (emphasis added). The resolution of 29 November 1947 (footnote 3) was the partition plan (General Assembly Resolution 181). The resolution of 11 December 1948 (footnote 4) “resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with the neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date” (General Assembly Resolution 194).

Israel was required to accept resolution 194 as a condition of admission to membership in the United Nations. It did so, but then excused its refusal to comply by arguing that the resolution says only “should” and sets no deadline. Both resolutions are reprinted previously in this appendix.

The provision of resolution 181 calling for a “Special International Regime” for Jerusalem has been less controversial because both Palestinians and Israelis oppose it. Each insists on exclusive sovereignty over the city for themselves.

Text of General Assembly Resolution 273 – Israel Admitted to the United Nations
Source: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/83E8C29DB812A4E9852560E50067A5AC

Having received the report of the Security Council on the application of Israel for membership in the United Nations,1/

Noting that, in the judgment of the Security Council, Israel is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter,

Noting that the Security Council has recommended to the General Assembly that it admit Israel to membership in the United Nations,

Noting furthermore the declaration by the State of Israel that it "unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a Member of the United Nations".2/

Recalling its resolutions of 29 November 1947 3/ and 11 December 1948 4/ and taking note
of the declarations and explanations made by the representative of the Government of Israel 5/ before the ad hoc Political Committee in respect of the implementation of the said resolutions,

The General Assembly,

Acting in discharge of its functions under Article 4 of the Charter and rule 125 of its rules of procedure,

1. Decides that Israel is a peace-loving State which accepts the obligations contained in the Charter and is able and willing to carry out those obligations;

2. Decides to admit Israel to membership in the United Nations.

1/ See document A/818.

2/ See document S/1093.


4/ See Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during Part I of its third session, pp. 21-25.

5/ See documents A/AC.24/SR.45-48, 50 and 51.
Appendix D, Annex 4 -- Basis for Peace
Security Council Resolution 242
November 22, 1967

Most recent Israeli-Palestinian peace proposals refer to Resolution 242. It is one of the U.N.'s most important contributions to peace in the area, although it is not without ambiguities. The concept of “land for peace” is derived from the wording shown below in bold [emphasis added]. “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces” implies giving up land in return for “Termination of all claims or states of belligerency,” which implies making peace.

The resolution presents problems for both sides. For the Palestinians to accept the resolution would implicitly acknowledge Israel’s right to exist without a corresponding acknowledgement of Palestinians’ right to their own state. The Israelis, for their part, were not convinced that Palestinians would be satisfied to live in peace with an adjacent Israeli state.

Israel took heart from the resolution’s recognition of the importance of “secure and recognized boundaries” and of “withdrawal ... from territories occupied.” Israel’s expectation of a trade-off based on “peace for peace” proved to be unrealistic.

Note the careful wording. Omitting the definite article “the” before “territories” enabled Israel to interpret the resolution as calling for withdrawal from “some” territories, but not “all” territories [underlined emphasis added]. Note also the reference to “every state in the area” – which could be interpreted to exclude the Palestinian territories, which do not comprise a state or a part of any state. The effect is to leave open the boundaries – or even the existence -- of any future Palestinian state.

The text in French (an official language of the United Nations) removes the ambiguity by using the preposition “des,” meaning “from the.” Palestinians prefer the French translation.
Text of Security Council Resolution 242: Basis for Peace

Source: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/un242.htm

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

Affirms further the necessity:

For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
This resolution is noteworthy for connecting the issues of refugees with the “inalienable rights of the people of Palestine” and for its bias against Israel. It signaled a shift in world sympathies toward the Palestinians, in part because of Israel’s stunning victory in 1967. Subsequent resolutions would treat Palestinians as a people, recognize their “inalienable rights, and, more ominously, recognize their right to fight to achieve it.

Resolutions 237, 2252 and 2452 seek to protect civilians and prisoners caught up in the Arab-Israeli war. The agency in the title is better known by its initials: UNRWA. It provides the basic humanitarian services denied by both the refugees’ host countries and by Israel.

Text of General Assembly Resolution 2535 (XXIV) -- UNRWA

Sources:
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/41F2C6DCE4DA052560DF004E0AC8

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Gravely concerned that the denial of their rights has been aggravated by the reported acts of collective punishment, arbitrary detention, curfews, destruction of homes and property, deportation and other repressive acts against the refugees and other inhabitants of the occupied territories,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

Recalling also its resolution 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and its resolution 2452 A (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 calling upon the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities,
Desirous of giving effect to its resolutions for relieving the plight of the displaced persons and the refugees,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine;

2. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation resulting from Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories and Israel's refusal to implement the above resolutions;

3. Requests the Security Council to take effective measures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to ensure the implementation of these resolutions.
Appendix D, Annex 6 -- Call for Negotiations
Security Council Resolution 338
October 22, 1973

Resolutions 242 and 338 usually are cited in tandem as a basis for ending violence in the Middle East. The critical word is “decides” in the third paragraph (emphasis added), which might be interpreted to make Resolution 242 binding.

Just as Resolution 242 brought the 1967 war to an end, Resolution 338 ended the 1973 war. The most distinctive contribution of resolution 338 was the call for direct negotiations, as indicated below in bold type (emphasis added). The resolution also was noteworthy for gaining two co-sponsors that were often at odds: the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Text of Security Council Resolution 338 – Call for Negotiations
Source: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/un338.htm

The Security Council,

Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
Appendix D, Annex 7 -- The Question of Palestine
General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX)
November 22, 1974

The significance of this resolution is its recognition of the PLO to represent the Palestinian people and the decision to include the “question of Palestine” on the General Assembly’s agenda. (See bold type, emphasis added.) Note also the permission it gives to the Palestinians to pursue their rights “by all means” and the reaffirmation of the right of return for Palestinian refugees.

Text of General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX) – The Question of Palestine
Source: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/025974039ACFB171852560DE00548BBE

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Palestine,

Having heard the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,

Having also heard other statements made during the debate,

Deeply concerned that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved and recognizing that the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace and security,

Recognizing that the Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its grave concern that the Palestinian people has been prevented from enjoying its inalienable rights, in particular its right to self-determination,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Recalling its relevant resolutions which affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including:
   1. (a) The right to self-determination without external interference;
   2. (b) The right to national independence and sovereignty;
2. Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return;
3. Emphasizes that full respect for and the realization of these inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine;
4. Recognizes that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
5. Further recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
6. Appeals to all States and international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people in its struggle to restore its rights, in accordance with the Charter;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution;
9. Decides to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session.
Appendix D, Annex 8 -- Observer Status Granted to the PLO

General Assembly Resolution 3237
22 November 1974

By this resolution, the United Nations granted observer status to the PLO – similar to Switzerland, Korea, and others before they were admitted to full membership. The Republic of China (Taiwan) on the other hand has been denied observer status. The Holy See (Vatican) has been granted observer status with all rights of membership in the United Nations except voting.

Text of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3237 – Observer Status Granted


The General Assembly, Having considered the question of Palestine,
Taking into consideration the universality of the United Nations prescribed in the Charter,

Recalling its Resolution 3102 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973,

Taking into account Economic and Social Council Resolutions 1835 (LVI) of 14 May 1974 and 1840 (LVI) of 15 May 1974,

Noting that the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, the World Population Conference and the World Food Conference have in effect invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in their respective deliberations,

Noting also that the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in its deliberations as an observer,

1. Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;

2. Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;

3. Considers that the Palestine Liberation Organization is entitled to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps for the implementation of the present resolution.
This resolution creates a committee (see below, emphasis added) with a mandate to recommend a program that would enable Palestinians to exercise their rights to self-determination, national, independence and return to their homes – long-standing projects of the United Nations (Paragraph 4, emphasis added). The resolution is noteworthy mostly as one in a series of futile resolutions condemning Israel without contributing to a solution that would accomplish the stated objectives. The committee was still in existence in 2010.

The cited resolution, 3236, recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Its text is reproduced previously in this appendix as Annex 7. A companion resolution, 3379, next in this appendix, equates Zionism with racism.

**Text of General Assembly Resolution 3376 – Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People**

Source: [http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/B5B4720B8192FDE3852560DE004F3C47](http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/B5B4720B8192FDE3852560DE004F3C47)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its Resolution 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of that resolution,

Deeply concerned that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved,

Recognizing that the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace and security,

1. Reaffirms its Resolution 3236 (XXIX);

2. Expresses its grave concern that no progress has been achieved towards:

   (a) The exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights in Palestine, including the right to self-determination without external interference and the right to national independence and sovereignty;
(b) The exercise by Palestinians of their inalienable right to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted;

3. Decides to establish a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People composed of twenty Member States to be appointed by the General Assembly at the current session;

4. Requests the Committee to consider and recommend to the General Assembly a programme of implementation, designed to enable the Palestinian people to exercise the rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX), and to take into account, in the formulation of its recommendations for the implementation of that programme, all the powers conferred by the Charter upon the principal organs of the United Nations;

5. Authorizes the Committee, in the fulfilment of its mandate, to establish contact with, and to receive and consider suggestions and proposals from, any State and intergovernmental regional Organization and the Palestine Liberation Organization;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its tasks;

7. Requests the Committee to submit its report and recommendations to the Secretary-General no later than 1 June 1976 and requests the Secretary-General to transmit the report to the Security Council;

8. Requests the Security Council to consider, as soon as possible after 1 June 1976, the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of the inalienable rights recognized in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Resolution 3236 (XXIX);

9. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Committee of the action taken by the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 8 above;

10. Authorizes the Committee, taking into consideration the action taken by the Security Council, to submit to the General Assembly, at its thirty-first session, a report containing its observations and recommendations;

11. Decides to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session.
Appendix D, Annex 10 -- Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

General Assembly Resolution 3379 (XXX)
10 November 1975

This is the infamous resolution equating Zionism with racism (see below, emphasis added in bold). It is infamous not only for its anti-Semitism but also as one of the few and perhaps the only General Assembly resolution ever rescinded (Moynihan, 1975, Dec. 7). The rescission, by General Assembly Resolution 46/86, was adopted 16 years later. It consisted of one sentence and does not name what it was rescinding. That requires referring back to this original resolution.

Text of U.N. General Assembly Res. 3379 (XXX) – Elimination of All Forms of Racism

Source:
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/InternatlOrgs/MFADocuments/Pages/UNITED%20NATIONS%20GENERAL%20ASSEMBLY%20RESOLUTION%203379%20-X.aspx

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1904 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963, proclaiming the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and in particular its affirmation that "any doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous" and its expression of alarm at "the manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas in the world, some of which are imposed by certain Governments by means of legislative, administrative or other measures",

Recalling also that, in its resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, the General Assembly condemned, inter alia, the unholy alliance between South African racism and zionism,

Taking note of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace 1975, proclaimed by the World Conference of the International Women's Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, which promulgated the principle that "international co-operation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, zionism, apartheid and racial discrimination in all its forms, as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self-determination",

Taking note also of resolution 77 (XII) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twelfth ordinary session, held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, which considered "that the racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regime in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin,
forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being",

Taking note also of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-Aligned Countries, adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology,

**Determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.**
Appendix D, Annex 11 -- Special Unit on Palestinian Rights
General Assembly Resolution 32/40 B
December 2, 1977

Of the two parts to this resolution, only Part B is reproduced here. The cited sources show both parts. The special unit established by this resolution (emphasis added) has been renamed the United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights (UNDPR) and is part of the Department of Political Affairs of the UN Secretariat (Academic dictionaries, n.d.). Its purpose was to prepare studies that promote the Palestinian cause (Paragraph 1a, emphasis added) and to gain maximum publicity for them (Paragraph 1b, emphasis added).

The UNDPR has been criticized as the only U.N. division devoted to a single group of people, and the annual International Day of Solidarity With the Palestinian People (Paragraph 1c, emphasis added) is the only “Day” dedicated to one group (Academic dictionaries, n.d.). The day was still being celebrated in 2012 (Question, 2012).

Footnote 6 refers to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3376. It established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.

Text of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 32/40 B -- Palestinian Rights
Sources:
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/F9E33F224E8F88D8852570EC00735E7C

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,6/

Noting, in particular, the observations contained in paragraphs 38 to 42 of that report,
Recognizing the need for the greatest possible dissemination of information on the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and on the efforts of the United Nations to promote the attainment of those rights,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to establish within the Secretariat of the United Nations a **Special Unit on Palestinian Rights** which would;

   (a) **Prepare**, under the guidance of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, **studies and publications** relating to:

   (i) The inalienable rights of the Palestinian people;

   (ii) Relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations;

   (iii) The activities of the Committee and other United Nations organs, in order to promote the attainment of those rights;

   (b) **Promote maximum publicity** for such studies and publications through all appropriate means;

   (c) Organize in consultation with the Committee, commencing in 1978, the annual observance of 29 November as the **International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people**;

2. Further requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full cooperation of the Office of Public Information and other units of the Secretariat in enabling the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights to perform its tasks;

3. Invites all Governments and organizations to lend their cooperation to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights in the implementation of the present resolution.
Appendix D, Annex 12 – United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL)
Security Council Resolution 425
March 19, 1978

Alarmed at attacks by the PLO from its bases in southern Lebanon, Israel invaded the bases in 1978. To bring the conflict to an end, the Security Council created a multinational peacekeeping force called Unifil, which is an acronym for United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Its mission was to replace Israeli troops and act as a buffer between the two countries. The interim force was still in place in 2013, although the PLO was expelled from Lebanon in 1982.

Source: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/un425.htm

The Security Council,

Taking note of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/12600 and S/12606) and the Permanent Representative of Israel (S/12607),

Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace,

Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East, Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;

Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;

Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of this resolution.
Appendix D, Annex 13 -- Acquisition of Territory by Force: Jerusalem
Security Council Resolution 478
August 20, 1980

The “basic law” to which this resolution refers is reproduced in Appendix C, Annex 24 (1980). With that law, Israel annexed East Jerusalem, which it captured from Jordan in the 1967 war and which Jordan had annexed after capturing it in Israel’s 1948 war of independence. Israel then redoubled Arab wrath by proclaiming all of the unified Jerusalem, which Israel now held, as its capital. Bold emphasis was added to the paragraph censuring Israel.

Text of Security Council Resolution 478 – Acquisition of Territory by Force: Jerusalem
Source: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/DDE590C6FF232007852560DF0065FDDB

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolution 476 (1980),

Reaffirming again that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible,

Deeply concerned over the enactment of a "basic law" in the Israeli Knesset proclaiming a change in the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, with its implications for peace and security,

Noting that Israel has not complied with resolution 476 (1980),

Reaffirming its determination to examine practical ways and means, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to secure the full implementation of its resolution 476 (1980), in the event of non-compliance by Israel,

1. Censures in the strongest terms the enactment by Israel of the “basic law” on Jerusalem and the refusal to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions;

2. Affirms that the enactment of the "basic law" by Israel constitutes a violation of international law and does not affect the continued application of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem;

3. Determines that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and in particular the recent "basic law" on Jerusalem, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith;
4. Affirms also that this action constitutes a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

5. Decides not to recognize the "basic law" and such other actions by Israel that, as a result of this law, seek to alter the character and status of Jerusalem and calls upon:
   (a) All Member States to accept this decision;
   (b) Those States that have established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem to withdraw such missions from the Holy City;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution before 15 November 1980;

7. Decides to remain seized of this serious situation.
Appendix D, Annex 14 -- Peace Between Egypt and Israel
General Assembly Resolution 36/120 F
10 December 1981

This resolution marks a low point in United Nations diplomacy. The strong language reflects the negative reaction of most Arab countries to the 1978 Camp David accords and to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The resolution condemns Israel by name, as usual, but not Egypt. In essence, the resolution is saying that Egypt did not have the right to act in its own interest – that no peace treaty was better for the world than a peace treaty that did not resolve the question of Palestine. The resolution, also as usual, hammers tediously on the word “inalienable,” repeating it four times in the brief resolution.

Today, the resolution can be read as a (rather intemperate) call for a comprehensive, multilateral solution, but at the time any movement toward peace should have been welcome. Jordan, following the lead of Egypt, was able to conclude its own peace treaty with Israel further easing tensions in an area that saw seven wars in less than 40 years.

Text of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 36/120 F

Sources:
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/unga36_120.html

The General Assembly,

Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 34/65 A and B of 29 November and 34/65 C and D of 12 December 1979 and 35/169 B of 15 December 1980,

Taking note of paragraphs 26, 27 and 52 of the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

1. Strongly reaffirms its rejection of those provisions of the accords which ignore, infringe, violate or deny the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return, the right of self-determination and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, and which envisage and condone continued Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

2. Expresses its strong opposition to all partial agreements and separate treaties which constitute a flagrant violation of the rights of the Palestinian people, the principles of the Charter and the resolutions adopted in the various international forums on the Palestinian issue, as well as the principles of international law, and declares that all agreements and separate treaties have no validity in so far as they purport to determine the future of the Palestinian people and of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

3. Declares that no State has the right to undertake any actions, measures or negotiations that could affect the future of the Palestinian people, its inalienable rights and the occupied Palestinian territories without the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization on an equal footing, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, rejects all such actions, measures and negotiations, and considers all such actions, measures and negotiations as a flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people;

4. Decides that all actions, measures and negotiations to implement or execute such accords and agreements, or any part thereof, are null and void in so far as they purport to determine the future of the Palestinian people and of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.
Appendix D, Annex 15 -- Measures to Prevent International Terrorism
General Assembly Resolution 42/159
December 7, 1987

The United Nations has tried repeatedly to define and eliminate terrorism. This resolution marks one of these attempts. The controversial articles are Nos. 8 and 14, shown below in bold type (emphasis added). The wording seems to suggest that the definition of terrorism does not apply to acts by people trying to free themselves from colonial domination, foreign occupation or racist regimes – such as perhaps the Palestinians. That interpretation is supported by the final vote: 153-2. The two states voting no were Israel and the United States.

Text of United Nations General Assembly Res. 42/159 – Prevent International Terrorism
Source: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/a42r159.htm

Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes:

(a) Report of the Secretary-General;
(b) Convening, under the auspices of the United Nations, of an international conference to define terrorism and to differentiate it from the struggle of peoples for national liberation;

The General Assembly,


Reaffirming its resolution 40/61 of 9 December 1985, adopted without a vote, and the importance thereof in the consideration of the question of international terrorism and, in particular, in the strengthening of co-operation in preventing and eliminating terrorism,

Recalling the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism contained in its report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session,
Recalling also the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, the Definition of Aggression and relevant instruments on international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict,


Convinced of the importance of the observance by States of their obligations under the relevant international conventions to ensure that appropriate law enforcement measures are taken in connection with the offences addressed in those conventions,

Deploring the continuation of all terrorist acts, including those in which States are directly or indirectly involved, which spread violence and terror, may result in loss of human lives and material damage and jeopardize the normal functioning of international relations,

Deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of those acts of international terrorism which can pose a threat to international peace and security and to friendly relations among States,

Convinced of the importance of expanding and improving international co-operation among States, on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis, which will contribute to the elimination of acts of international terrorism and their underlying causes and to the prevention and elimination of this criminal scourge,

Convinced that international co-operation in combating and preventing terrorism will contribute to the strengthening of confidence among States, reduce tensions and create a better climate among them,

Reaffirming the principle of the self-determination of peoples as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming also the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination, and upholding the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
Noting the efforts and important achievements of the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization in promoting the security of international air and sea transport against acts of terrorism, consistent with General Assembly resolution 40/61,

Appealing to all States to take all appropriate steps to prevent terrorist attacks against various forms of public transport,

Urging all States to take effective measures, in accordance with established principles of international law, in order that all acts, methods and practices of international terrorism may be brought to an end,

Mindful of the necessity of maintaining and safeguarding the basic rights of the individual in accordance with the relevant international human rights instruments and generally accepted international standards,

Recognizing that the effectiveness of the struggle against terrorism could be enhanced by the establishment of a generally agreed definition of international terrorism,

Taking into account the proposal made at its forty-second session to hold an international conference on international terrorism, as referred to in agenda item 126 (b),

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

1. Once again unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardize friendly relations among States and their security;

2. Deeply deplores the loss of human lives which results from such acts of terrorism;

3. Also deplores the pernicious impact of acts of international terrorism on relations of co-operation among States, including co-operation for development;

4. Calls upon all States to fulfil their obligations under international law to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in other States, or acquiescing in activities within their territory directed towards the commission of such acts;

5. Urges all States to fulfil their obligations under international law and to take effective and resolute measures for the speedy and final elimination of international terrorism and, to that end:

   (a) To prevent the preparation and organization in their respective territories, for commission within or outside their territories, of terrorist acts and subversive acts directed against other States and their citizens;

   (b) To ensure the apprehension and prosecution or extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts;
(c) To endeavour to conclude special agreements to that effect on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis;

(d) To co-operate with one another in exchanging relevant information concerning the prevention and combating of terrorism;

(e) To harmonize their domestic legislation with the existing international conventions on this subject to which they are parties;

6. Appeals to all States that have not yet done so to consider becoming party to the international conventions relating to various aspects of international terrorism referred to in the preamble to the present resolution;

7. Urges all States not to allow any circumstances to obstruct the application of appropriate law enforcement measures provided for in the relevant conventions to which they are party to persons who commit acts of international terrorism covered by those conventions;

8. Also urges all States, unilaterally and in co-operation with other States, as well as relevant United Nations organs, to contribute to the progressive elimination of the causes underlying international terrorism and to pay special attention to all situations, including colonialism, racism and situations involving mass and flagrant violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms and those involving alien domination and occupation, that may give rise to international terrorism and may endanger international peace and security;

9. Welcomes the efforts undertaken by the International Civil Aviation Organization aimed at promoting universal acceptance of and strict compliance with international air-security conventions, and its ongoing work on a new instrument for the suppression of unlawful acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation;

10. Also welcomes the work undertaken by the International Maritime Organization on the problem of terrorism on board or against ships, and the initiative under way to draft instruments on the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation and of fixed platforms on the continental shelf;

11. Requests the other relevant specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations, in particular the Universal Postal Union, the World Tourism Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency, within their respective spheres of competence, to consider what further measures can usefully be taken to combat and eliminate terrorism;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on international terrorism in all its aspects and on ways and means of combating it, including, inter alia, the convening, under the auspices of the United Nations, of an international conference to deal with international terrorism in the light of the proposal referred to in the penultimate preambular paragraph of the present resolution;
13. Further requests the Secretary-General to follow up, as appropriate, the implementation of the present resolution and to submit a report in this respect to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

14. Considers that nothing in the present resolution could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter of the United Nations, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes and foreign occupation or other forms of colonial domination, nor, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration, the right of these peoples to struggle to this end and to seek and receive support;

15. Decides to include the item in the provisional agenda of its forty-fourth session.
Appendix D, Annex 16 -- Elimination of Racism and Racial Discrimination
General Assembly Resolution 46/86
December 16, 1991

The rescinded General Assembly Resolution, 3379 (see Appendix D, Annex 10), adopted 16 years earlier, equated Zionism with racism.

The United States and the Soviet Union were among 85 co-sponsors of the rescinding resolution. They acted because Israel made rescission a condition for its participation in the Madrid Peace Conference.

Resolution 46/86 also earned a place in the record books as one of the shortest – if not the shortest – General Assembly resolution.

Text of General Assembly Resolution 46/86

The general assembly decides to revoke the determination contained in its resolution 3379 (XXX) of 10 November 1975.
Appendix D, Annex 17 -- Middle East Peace Process
General Assembly Resolution 48/58
December 14, 1993

This resolution is noteworthy primarily for its neutral, even-handed approach to peace in the Middle East. Contrast the tone of this resolution with, for example, the negative tone of Resolution 36/120 (from 1981, reproduced previously in this appendix). Contrast also the reaction of the United Nations to the 1978 Camp David accords and to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel with the reaction of the U.N. to the Common Agenda agreement between Jordan and Israel (emphasis added) that led to a peace treaty the following year.

Text of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/58 – Middle East Peace Process

Sources:
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/unga48_58.html

The General Assembly,

Stressing that the achievement of a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict will constitute a significant contribution to strengthening international peace and security,

Recalling the convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East at Madrid on 30 October 1991, on the basis of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, and the subsequent bilateral negotiations, as well as the meetings of the multilateral working groups, and noting with satisfaction the broad international support for the peace process,

Noting the continuing positive participation of the United Nations as a full extraregional participant in the work of the multilateral working groups,

Bearing in mind the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, signed by the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993,

Also bearing in mind the Agreement between Israel and Jordan on the Common Agenda [which says nothing about the PLO], signed in Washington, D.C., on 14 September 1993,
1. Welcomes the peace process started at Madrid, and supports the subsequent bilateral negotiations;

2. Stresses the importance of, and need for, achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

3. Expresses its full support for the achievements of the peace process thus far, in particular the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed by the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Agreement between Israel and Jordan on the Common Agenda, which constitute an important initial step in achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and urges all parties to implement agreements reached;

4. Stresses the need for achieving rapid progress on the other tracks of the Arab-Israeli negotiations within the peace process;

5. Welcomes the results of the international donors Conference to Support Middle East Peace, convened in Washington, D.C., on 1 October 1993, and the establishment of the high-level United Nations task force to support the economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and urges Member States to provide economic, financial and technical assistance to the Palestinian people during the interim period;

6. Calls upon all Member States also to extend economic, financial and technical assistance to States in the region and to render support for the peace process;

7. Considers that an active United Nations role in the Middle East peace process and in assisting in the implementation of the Declaration of Principles can make a positive contribution;

8. Encourages regional development and cooperation in the areas where work has already begun within the framework of the Madrid Conference.
This is the first Security Council resolution to propose a two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. See the paragraph in bold (emphasis added). The specific conflict under consideration was the second, Al-Aqsa, intifada. The resolution also is noteworthy for its even-handed approach to the conflict.

The Tenet plan called for a cease-fire as part of an elaborate security arrangement that was never implemented. The Mitchell report was one of many failed blueprints for political discussions intended to pave the way for negotiations toward a Palestinian state (Purdum, 2002). George Tenet was the CIA director; George Mitchell, former Senate majority leader, chaired a Middle East peace commission. The Mitchell report is reproduced in Appendix C, Annex 35 (2001). The four powers whose diplomatic efforts were welcomed constitute the so-called “quartet” that has been active in urging both sides toward peace. Resolutions 242 (Basis for Peace) and 338 (Call for Negotiations) are reproduced previously in this appendix.

Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah proposed full normalization of relations with Israel in exchange for its withdrawal from the territories claimed after the 1967 war (Purdom, 2002). It remains on the table, promoted by the United States.


The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973),

Affirming a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders,
Expressing its grave concern at the continuation of the tragic and violent events that have taken place since September 2000, especially the recent attacks and the increased number of casualties,

Stressing the need for all concerned to ensure the safety of civilians,

Stressing also the need to respect the universally accepted norms of international humanitarian law,

Welcoming and encouraging the diplomatic efforts of special envoys from the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the European Union and the United Nations Special Coordinator and others, to bring about a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

Welcoming the contribution of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah,

1. Demands immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction;

2. Calls upon the Israeli and Palestinian sides and their leaders to cooperate in the implementation of the Tenet work plan and Mitchell Report recommendations with the aim of resuming negotiations on a political settlement;

3. Expresses support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and others to assist the parties to halt the violence and to resume the peace process;

4. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
Appendix E -- Maps Show the History of the Conflict

Contents

Maps tell the story of the Arab-Israeli conflict graphically. They explain, they show, they
describe, they establish. The power to map, like the power to define, is the power to control.
Zealots are willing to kill – and to die — for lines and dots on maps. Maps, like histories, are
published by the winners.

The major issues involving Israel and Palestine come to focus in the maps that each side
attempts to impose — regardless of whether the issue is borders or Jerusalem or refugees or
settlements or water. The quarrel, at its base, is over the maps that each side seeks to draw and
enforce. Although the Israelis have the upper hand as of this writing, they do not have total
control, which makes the business of map-drawing by Jews and Arabs fluid, controversial and
significant, as the following maps demonstrate.

Annex 1 -- Israel in Biblical Times

Annex 2 -- Ottoman Syria, 1864

Annex 3 -- Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916

Annex 4 -- Peel Commission Partition Plan, 1937

Annex 5 -- United Nations Partition Plan, 1947

Annex 6 -- Second Bernadotte Partition Plan, 1948

Annex 7 -- Cease-fire lines, 1949

Annex 8 -- Israel in the Middle East

Annex 9 -- Jewish Emigration From Arabic Countries
Annex 10 -- Results of the Six-Day War, 1967

Annex 11 -- Yom Kippur War Cease-Fire Lines, 1973

Annex 12 -- Camp David Proposals, 2000

Annex 13 -- Security Barrier

Annex 14 -- Settlements

Annex 15a – Jerusalem, 2008


Annex 16 -- Palestinian Refugees, 2003

Annex 17 -- Israel Today
Appendix E, Annex 1: Israel in Biblical Times

The most fundamental claim to the Holy Land is based on who was there first vs. who was there most recently. Both Jews and Arabs trace their heritage back to Abraham – the Jews through Isaac and the Arabs through Ismael (Ishmael).

This family tree of the first generations of God’s chosen people is accepted by Jews, Muslims and Christians. The positions of Abraham and Ishmael are central to the Muslim narrative. In Muslim tradition, Abraham was the first Arab. The race then branched to Ishmael, the son of Abraham by Hagar, the servant of his wife Sarah, who had been barren. The Arab narrative is reinforced with the marriage of Ishmael’s daughter Mahalath to Esau, the first-born son of Isaac and Rachel (Genesis 28:9). The Tanakh lists the generations of Ishmael at Genesis 25:12-16 and at 1 Chronicles 1:29-31.

Abraham settled in Palestine about 1800 B.C. His descendants, through Isaac, included Kings David and Solomon, who ruled about 1000 B.C. and whose domain extended from the Euphrates River to what is now the Sinai. Their kingdoms (see map on the next page) did not quite extend to the Nile River, as promised in Genesis 15:18, but they did include Jordan, most of Syria and Lebanon, and a slice of Egypt (Reich, 2008, p. 3). The Arab claim was reinforced
about 635 A.D. when Muslim Arabs under Caliph Umar conquered Palestine from the Byzantines.
The Ottoman Turks ruled the region shown in the map on the next page from 1516 to 1917. The map was the basis for a dispute that originated in the McMahon Correspondence of 1915-1916 (Antonius, 1939). The British, through McMahon, promised independence to Arabs in this region – except for “portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo —” in return for a military alliance against the Turks in World War I. The Arabs interpreted the British pledge as including Palestine; the British did not. For the text of the McMahon Correspondence, see Annex 1, Appendix C, of this study.

“The fact that Sir Henry McMahon, who is at pains through the correspondence to enumerate by name each of the provinces affected by his reservations, does not mention the Sanjaq of Jerusalem, even indirectly, disposes at once of the argument that the present territory of Palestine was specifically excluded from the area in which Great Britain pledged herself to recognise and uphold an independent Arab government” (Antonius, 1939, pp. 176-178).

Vilayets and sanjaqs were administrative provinces in the Ottoman Empire (Pappe, 2006). The British argued that “the word districts was to be read as equivalent to vilayets; and that, since the Vilayet of Damascus included that part of Syria – now known as Transjordan – which lay to the east of the River Jordan, it followed that that part of Syria – now known as Palestine – which lay to the west of the Jordan was one of the portions of territory reserved in Sir Henry McMahon’s phrase” (Antonius, 1939). It turned out later that the British had no intention of ceding Palestine either to its ally France or to the Arabs, and the ambiguity was deliberate with intent to deceive. See Appendix C for the source documents.
The map below shows how the French, British and Russians plotted to divide the defeated Ottoman Empire among them (Palestine Facts, 1916). The arrangement was secret until the Russians announced the terms. The area known as Palestine is shown in the map as jointly controlled by the British and French, but the British wanted sole control and eventually got it. Great Britain was concerned about securing its trade routes to India. Palestine anchored both an overland route from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea and the approaches to the Suez Canal. Appendix C, Annex 2, has the source document for the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
The Peel Commission (1937) made the first official proposal to partition Palestine. The Jews accepted, although they would have surrendered Jerusalem to British control and the strip of land, shown in the map on the next page with hashmarks between Jerusalem and the Mediterranean, would have split the new country into two parts. When the Arabs refused to cede any land to the Jews, the British ultimately dropped the plan.

It is interesting to speculate how the history of the Middle East might have changed if the Arabs had accepted the proposed partition. They would have gotten considerable more land than in any subsequent offer and much more than the Israelis of today contemplate including in a peace agreement. See Appendix C (1937, Annex 14) for the source document.
Appendix E, Annex 4 -- Peel Commission Partition Plan, 1937 (continued)
Appendix E, Annex 5 -- United Nations Partition Plan
1947

Compare the division of land proposed by the Peel Commission (Annex 4, above) with the division of land proposed by the United Nations (Morsy, 2009). The Arabs protested that the amount of land proposed for the Jewish state far exceeded the amount of land actually owned by Jews. In rebuttal, the Jews said, “According to British government statistics, prior to the establishment of the state, 8.6 percent of the land area now known as Israel was owned by Jews; 3.3 percent by Arabs who remained there; 16.5 percent by Arabs who left the country. More than 70 percent of the land was owned by the [previous Ottoman] government. Under international law, ownership passed to Israel in 1948. The public lands included most of the Negev [desert] – half of Palestine’s post-1922 total area” (Davis & Decter, 1982, p. 12). Although land purchases amounted to a small fraction of the country’s total area, “they nevertheless provided the strategic backbone for a Jewish state” (Khalidi, 2006, p. 104). The map was retrieved Feb. 10, 2011, from http://www.unpost.org/?p=246
Appendix E, Annex 5 -- United Nations Partition Plan, 1947

**Land owned by Jews, 1946**

- Palestinian Land
- Jewish-Owned

**UN Partition Plan, 1947**

- Palestinian Land
- Jewish-Owned
- International

Cities mentioned:
- Haifa
- Tel Aviv
- Ramallah
- Jerusalem
- Gaza City
- Hebron
- Beersheba
- Egypt

Scale:
- 0 to 60 Kilometers

Geographic locations:
- Mediterranean Sea
- Sea of Galilee
- Jordan
- Lebanon
U.N. envoy Folke Bernadotte made everyone angry when he proposed this, his second, partition plan. Rejected by all parties, neither plan had a chance for adoption. The Arabs, as usual, refused to cede an inch of land for an independent Jewish state. The Israelis, emboldened by the success of their War of Independence, preferred force of arms to diplomacy to determine the boundaries of their new state. Details of Bernadotte’s first plan, which called for a unitary state, never were made public (Isseroff, 2005).
Appendix E, Annex 6 -- Second Bernadotte Partition Plan, 1948 (continued)
The maps on the next page compare the partition proposed by the United Nations in 1947 with the boundaries that were in place when a cease-fire was accepted in 1949. The result of the fighting was a catastrophe (nakba in Arabic) for the invading Arab armies. Israel’s War of Independence left Jordan in control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem and Egypt in control of the Gaza Strip. Source: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs. Retrieved Nov. 25, 2010, from http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/MAPS/1947-un-partition-plan-reso.html
Appendix E, Annex 7 -- Cease-Fire Lines, 1949 (continued)
Appendix E, Annex 8 -- Israel in the Middle East

Israel (shaded in red in the map below) is almost lost in the midst of Muslim countries of the Middle East and northern Africa (shaded in yellow). Countries are identified as Muslim if Arabic is an official language. (Arabic also is an official language of Israel, along with Hebrew.) How this tiny new country of Israel was able to secure its independence by repeatedly defeating the armies of its larger and more populous neighbors who were intent on eradicating it is one of the amazing stories of modern history.
Life for Jews in Arabic countries became more difficult after Israel’s War of Independence. More than 850,000 Jews were evicted or fled from their homes in Arab countries (Peters, 1984, p. 33). Fewer than 34,000 remained after the 1970s. For example, of the 38,000 Jews in Libya in 1948, some 30,000 immigrated to Israel; the rest went elsewhere. The few who remained were forced to leave after the Six-Day War in 1967, and by 1970, no Jews remained (Aharoni, A., 2002). The map on the next page shows the primary sources of emigrants from Middle Eastern and North African countries.
Appendix E, Annex 9 -- Jewish Emigration From Arabic Countries, 1970s (continued)
Appendix E, Annex 10 -- Results of the Six-Day War
1967

The Six-Day War expanded the territory occupied by Israel. (See the map on the next page.) Although the Sinai Peninsula was ultimately traded to Egypt in return for a peace treaty, similar efforts to cede parts of the Golan Heights to Syria in return for a peace treaty have been unsuccessful. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank came under Israeli domination, giving rise to questions about whether it was wise for Israel to assume responsibility for so many refugees and so many Arab citizens (June 10, 1967). Israel eventually disengaged from Gaza in 2005 and withdrew all its military outposts and settlements.
Appendix E, Annex 10 -- Results of the Six-Day War, 1967 (continued)
Appendix E, Annex 11: Yom Kippur War, Cease-Fire Lines
1973

By the time hostilities had ended, Israel not only had captured almost all of the Sinai Peninsula (again) but it also had crossed the Suez Canal and was about 50 miles from Cairo. On the northern front, Israeli tanks were threatening Damascus. Although the initial attack had caught Israel surprise and unprepared, the Arab armies were routed at the end (Yom Kippur, 2013). Nevertheless, the Egyptians had fought well enough to claim victory, and thus felt that it could negotiate peace with honor, leading to a peace treaty with Israel in 1979.
Appendix E, Annex 12 -- Camp David Proposals
2000

The map at the right on the next page reflects the last offer that U.S. President Clinton and Israel Prime Minister Ehud Barak proposed to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat at the Camp David Summit in July 2000. The map at the left is Chairman Arafat’s interpretation of what was offered. He rejected it in part because he said it would create three isolated West Bank blocs, separated by Jewish settlements. Note especially the Israeli security zone that cut off the West Bank from Jordan and the Jordan River. Then, 17 days before leaving office, Clinton presented a modified proposal (lower map) to Arafat. Although it, too, was rejected, it created a basis on which the parties could continue to negotiate in private. The result – the Taba Summit – did not produce a public document but the participants said they were on the verge of a deal when Sharon defeated Barak in Israeli elections and momentum was lost (Ross, 2004, p. xxiv-xxv).
Appendix E, Annex 12 -- Camp David Proposals, 2000 (continued)

As Arafat understood it

As intended by the U.S. and Israel

As Clinton amended the U.S. proposal
A fence in most places and a wall in others, it is intended to protect Israel from Palestinian terrorist attacks. The barrier generally follows the 1949 armistice line (the “Green Line”), but so many Jewish settlements have been built inside the West Bank that the barrier’s path has come to look more like an attempt at a de facto land-seizure than a security measure. (See map on the next page.) With its twists and turns, the security barrier is more than twice the length of the Green Line.

Palestinians claim that the barrier divides neighborhoods, encroaches on private land, and complicates travel. Israelis justify the fence in part because they said it has reduced the number of attacks since the barrier was started in 2003. As of July 2010, about a third of the barrier remained to be built (Bard, 2010; West Bank Barrier Route Projections, 2010).
Jewish settlements within in the occupied territories keep growing in number and population, complicating the division of land in any peace solution. The settlements range from a few families living in a rural outpost to major cities such as Pisgat Zeev, with a population of 42,000 in northern Jerusalem, and Ariel, with 18,000 within in the northern West Bank heartland. Americans for Peace Now names 172 settlements and 99 outposts on its Web site (Facts on the Ground, 2011). The CIA World Factbook (2011) estimates that 531,129 Jewish settlers live in the occupied territories of the West Bank, Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem.

Israel has announced that under any permanent peace agreement it intends to keep Gush Etzion, Maale Adumim, Ariel, and Modiin Ilit (Kershner, 2011, March 14). Map data is based on the Spiegel Database, developed by the Israeli Ministry of Defense (Excerpts, 2013).
Appendix E, Annex 14 – Settlements, 2010 (continued)
Appendix E, Annex 15a – Jerusalem
2008

There are several Jerusalems:

— The Old City, including the Temple Mount, the Moslem Quarter, the Jewish Quarter, the Armenian Quarter and the Christian Quarter. Annex 15a shows the divisions.

— East Jerusalem, which was annexed by Jordan after Israel’s War of Independence and which Palestinians still consider theirs, and West Jerusalem, which was annexed by Israel after its War of Independence. The dividing line, also called the Green Line, was the position of the armies at the 1949 armistice.


— Jerusalem as a collection of settlements, enclaves and exclaves, disputed territories, demilitarized area, and No Man’s Land, all mixed together in a complex relationship that will be difficult to unravel in any final-status agreement.

The mixture in its confusing detail is shown in Annex 15a (Map – Jerusalem, 2013) on the next page and Annex 16b on the following pages.
Appendix E, Annex 15a – Jerusalem, 2008 (continued)
Jerusalem has expanded to the point that it practically touches Bethlehem on the south and Ramallah on the north. Sites holy to one group might turn up in locations controlled by another group. The Temple Mount is a prominent example. It is controlled by Israel, administered by an Islamic Waqf (a Muslim trust) and sacred to both.

The “no-man’s land” was a buffer between Israeli and Jordanian forces at the end of the 1948 war. The armistice line left Mount Scopus as an island outside Israel-controlled West Jerusalem. A no-man’s land also is observed around the Latrun Salient overlooking the highway between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv (Reich, 2008, p. 203).
Appendix E, Annex 15b – Jerusalem and Vicinity, 2008 (continued)
Appendix E, Annex 16 -- Palestinian Refugees
2003

There are three categories of refugees: those in United Nations recognized camps; those who registered with the United Nations but who live outside the designated camps in countries adjacent to Israel; and those who scattered through the Middle East or throughout the world. The map identifies the camps with an orange circle; the size of the circle indicates the size of the camp. The greatest concentration of refugee camps is in the Gaza Strip. Jordan has the most registered refugees living outside the camps.

Israel has long complained that it absorbed a million Jewish refugees from Arab countries, whereas the Arab countries have absorbed rather few Arab refugees from Palestine. Egypt, which used to rule the Gaza Strip, has not absorbed any Palestinian refugees. The difference, said Palestinians, is that the Jewish refugees do not want to go back to their previous homes, whereas the Palestinians do. No wonder, said Rosen (2007) and Sayigh (2006), considering how badly Palestinian refugees have been treated in host Arab countries.

Sayigh positioned refugees at the center of the debate over how to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel’s problem is that even if it were to accept all or even a significant number of Muslim refugees it would be unable to retain its status as a democratic Jewish state.

The source of the map on the following page is the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs. The map is based on 2003 data provided by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (Palestine Facts, 2004).
Appendix E, Annex 16 -- Palestinian Refugees, 2003 (continued)
Appendix E, Annex 17 -- Israel Today

Israel’s relationships with Lebanon and Syria are complex, as the map on the following page suggests (Reich, 2008). Note the major role played by the United Nations in separating belligerents in the Golan Heights region at the north end of the map. The area around the Sea of Galilee is especially sensitive because it is the largest freshwater lake in Israel and a primary source of water for this parched land. The Sea of Galilee also is known as Kinneret, the Sea of Gennesar, Lake Tiberias or, in Arabic, Bahret Tabariya.
Appendix E, Annex 17 -- Israel Today (continued)
Appendix F, Annex 1 -- What the Tanakh Says About --

This appendix quotes key passages that identify what the Tanakh says about the land of Israel, its people, its holiest cities, and its God. The Tanakh also is known as the Hebrew Bible, the Jewish Bible or, to Christians, as the Old Testament. Unless otherwise specified, the translation used here is by the Judaica Press, Rabbi A.J. Rosenberg, editor. (http://www.chabad.org/library/bible_cdo/aid/63255/jewish/The-Bible-with-Rashi.htm). Occasional reference is made to other translations, such as the NIV (New International Version) and the KJV (King James Version).

The Tanakh includes the same books as in the Protestant Old Testament, but it differs in some instances in sequence, numbering and translation. For example, the Tanakh is organized in three sections: the Torah (Pentateuch -- the five books of Moses), the Prophets (counted as eight books) and the Writings (starting with Psalms and ending with the combined Chronicles). This gives the Tanakh 24 books from what the Protestant Old Testament numbers as 39. The Old Testament sequence of books is the same through Judges, but the Tanakh then follows with Samuel, whereas the Old Testament follows with Ruth. For a detailed comparison of the two sequences, see Annex 2 at the end of this appendix.

The Tanakh does not number its chapters and verses, so to avoid confusion, Jewish scholars have adopted the Christian reference system when translating from the Hebrew and the division of Samuel, Kings and Chronicles into two books each.

The Tanakh and Old Testament also differ occasionally in their English translations. For example, the NIV translates Isaiah 7:14 as “Therefore the Lord himself will give you a sign: The virgin (Hebrew: “almah”) will conceive and give birth to a son, and will call him Immanuel.”
The Judaica Press translation renders “almah” as young woman” because the Hebrew language has a different word to indicate a woman who has not had sexual intercourse.

Judaism’s basic statement of faith is as firmly monotheistic as Islam’s. The Jew testifies, Hear, O Israel: The Lord is our God; the Lord is one” (Deuteronomy 6:4). The Muslim testifies “There is no God but Allah.”

The Tanakh emphasizes repeatedly that the bond between the land, the people and their God is permanent and indissoluble. Each defines the other. In the Torah (Pentateuch) alone, some 100 references confirm that God has given the land of Canaan and environs to his people, Israel, if they remain faithful. Examples:

--“And I will give you and your seed after you the land of your sojourning, the entire land of Canaan for an everlasting possession, and I will be to them for a God” (Genesis 17:8, emphasis added).

--“And You did establish to Yourself Your people Israel to be a people unto You forever; and You, Lord, became their God.” (2 Samuel 7:24, emphasis added.)

--“He remembered His covenant forever, the word He had commanded to the thousandth generation … Saying, “To you I shall give the land of Canaan, the portion of your heritage.’ “ (Psalm 105:8, 11, emphasis added.)

However, the qualification is repeated almost as often: “Take good heed to yourselves, to love the Lord your God. For if you turn away, and cling to the remnant of these nations, that remain with you; and intermarry with them and mingle with them and they with you; Know of a certainty that the Lord your God will not drive these nations out from before you, anymore; and they will be a snare and an obstacle to you, and a goad in your sides and thorns in your eyes,
until you perish from this good land, which the Lord your God has given you” (Joshua 23:11-13).

In addition to the Tanakh, which is written, Judaism also accepts as sacred oral law, consisting of the Mishna and Gemara. Only the Tanakh will be considered here.

... about the land

A land (or nation) called Israel (as distinct from a people called Israelites) emerged under King Saul. 1 Samuel 13:19 says, “Now, not a smith was to be found in all the land of Israel.” The name “Israel” is believed to have come from God, as recounted in Genesis 32:25-31. The climax is in Verse 29, when Jacob, Abraham’s grandson, wrestles with a man he believes to be an angel from God. The angel says, “Your name shall no longer be called Jacob, but Israel, because you have commanding power with [an angel of] God and with men, and you have prevailed.”

Exekiel has 18 references to the “land of Israel.” The word “Israel” also has a more restrictive meaning in the Tanakh: to designate the kingdom of the 10 tribes that settled north of Jerusalem. They split away in 1 Kings 12 after the death of Solomon. The modern state of Israel calls the land Samaria.

The land south of Jerusalem was occupied by the tribes of Judah and Benjamin. Their land took its name from the dominant tribe, Judah. The modern state of Israel calls the land Judea. Today, both Samaria and Judea are occupied primarily by Palestinian Muslim Arabs, although Samaria and Judea formed the core of the ancient kingdom of Israel as ruled by David and Solomon.
The name Zion, a hill in Jerusalem, is a common synecdoche for the city – especially in Psalms – and, by extension, for the nation: “For the sake of Zion, I will not be silent, and for the sake of Jerusalem I will not rest” (Isaiah 62:1).

A less common reference is to the Holy Land, as in Zechariah 2:16 (2:12 in the NIV):

“And the Lord shall inherit Judah as His share on the Holy Land, and He shall again choose Jerusalem.” Bimson (1988) traces to Zechariah 2:2 the reference to Israel as the Holy Land. See also Psalm 78:54. Some translations render “His sanctuary” as “Holy Land.” Other references:

Genesis 12:6-7
And Abram passed through the land, until the place of Shechem, until the plain of Moreh, and the Canaanites were then in the land. And the Lord appeared to Abram, and He said, “To your seed I will give this land.”

Genesis 13:14-15, 17
And the Lord said to Abram after Lot had parted from him, “Please raise your eyes, and see, from the place where you are, northward and southward and eastward and westward. For all the land that you see, I will give to you, and to your seed to eternity. … Rise, walk in the land, to its length and to its breadth, for I will give it to you.”

Genesis 15:7
[God speaking to Abraham:] And He said to him, “I am the Lord, Who brought you forth from Ur of the Chaldees, to give you this land to inherit it.”

Genesis 15:18
On that day, the Lord formed a covenant with Abram, saying, "To your seed I have given this land, from the river of Egypt until the great river, the Euphrates river.

Genesis 17:8
[God speaking to Abraham:] And I will give you and your seed after you the land of your sojournings, the entire land of Canaan for an everlasting possession, and I will be to them for a God."

Genesis 24:7
The Lord, God of the heavens, … Who swore to me, saying, “To your seed will I give this land …”

Genesis 26:1-3
And there was a famine in the land …and Isaac went to Abimelech the king of the Philistines, to Gerar. And the Lord appeared to him, and said, "Do not go down to Egypt; dwell in the land that I will tell you. Sojourn in this land, and I will be with you, and I will bless you, for to you and to
your seed will I give all these lands, and I will establish the oath that I swore to Abraham, your father.

Genesis 28:13  
[To Jacob:] "I am the Lord, the God of Abraham your father, and the God of Isaac; the land upon which you are lying to you I will give it and to your seed."

Genesis 35:12  
[God to Jacob/Israel:] “And the land that I gave to Abraham and to Isaac, I will give to you and to your seed after you will I give the land."

Exodus 3:17  
[God speaking to Moses:] And I said, “I will bring you up out of the affliction of Egypt, to the land of the Canaanites, the Hittites, the Amorites, the Perizzites, the Hivvites, and the Jebusites, to a land flowing with milk and honey.” [See Exodus 13:5.]

Exodus 6:2-4, 8  
God spoke to Moses, and He said to him, “I am the Lord. I appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob with [the name] Almighty God, but [with] My name YHWH, I did not become known to them. And also, I established My covenant with them to give them the land of Canaan, the land of their sojournings in which they sojourned. … I will bring you to the land, concerning which I raised My hand to give to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, and I will give it to you as a heritage; I am the Lord.”

Exodus 13:5  
[Moses speaking to the Israelites:] “And it will come to pass that the Lord will bring you into the land of the Canaanites, the Hittites, the Amorites, the Hivvites, and the Jebusites, which He swore to your forefathers to give you a land flowing with milk and honey and you shall perform this service in this month.” [See also Exodus 3:17.]

Exodus 23:31  
And I will make your boundary from the Red Sea to the sea of the Philistines, and from the desert to the river, for I will deliver the inhabitants of the land into your hands, and you shall drive them out from before you.

Exodus 33:1-3  
The Lord spoke to Moses: “Go, ascend from here, you and the people you have brought up from the land of Egypt, to the land that I swore to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, saying: ‘I will give it to your descendants.’ I will send an angel before you, and I will drive out the Canaanites, the Amorites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Hivvites, and the Jebusites to a land flowing with milk and honey; because I will not go up in your midst since you are a stiff necked people, lest I destroy you on the way.”

Leviticus 26:42  
[God speaking:] “I will remember My covenant [with] Jacob, and also My covenant [with] Isaac, and also My covenant [with] Abraham I will remember. And I will remember the Land, …”
The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: “Command the children of Israel and say to them, When you arrive in the land of Canaan, this is the land which shall fall to you as an inheritance, the land of Canaan according to its borders.

“Your southernmost corner shall be from the desert of Zin along Edom, and the southern border shall be from the edge of the Sea of Salt [the Dead Sea] to the east. The border then turns south of Maaleh Akrabim [elevation of Akrabim], passing toward Zin, and its ends shall be to the south of Kadesh barnea. Then it shall extend to Hazar addar and continue toward Azmon. The border then turns from Azmon to the stream of Egypt, and its ends shall be to the sea. The western border: it shall be for you the Great [Mediterranean] Sea and the border this shall be your western border. This shall be your northern border: From the Great [Mediterranean] Sea turn yourselves toward Mount Hor. From Mount Hor turn to the entrance of Hamath, and the ends of the border shall be toward Zedad. The border shall then extend to Ziphron, and its ends shall be Hazar enan; this shall be your northern border. You shall then turn yourselves toward the eastern border, from Hazar enan to Shepham. The border descends from Shepham toward Riblah, to the east of Ain. Then the border descends and hits the eastern shore of Lake Kinnereth. The border then continues down along the Jordan, and its ends is the Sea of Salt [the Dead Sea]; this shall be your Land according to its borders around.”

Moses commanded the children of Israel saying, “This is the Land which you are to apportion for inheritance through lot, that the Lord has commanded to give to the nine and a half tribes. For the tribe of Reuben's descendants according to their fathers' house, and the tribe of Gad's descendants according to their fathers' house, and half the tribe of Manasseh have already received their inheritance. The two and a half tribes have received their inheritance on this side of the Jordan, near Jericho in the east, toward the sunrise.”

Turn and journey, and come to the mountain of the Amorites and to all its neighboring places, in the plain, on the mountain, and in the lowland, and in the south and by the seashore, the land of the Canaanites, and the Lebanon, until the great river, the Euphrates River. See, I have set the land before you; come and possess the land which the Lord swore to your forefathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give them and their descendants after them.

And it will be, when the Lord, your God, brings you to the land He swore to your fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give you, great and good cities that you did not build.

And you shall do what is proper and good in the eyes of the Lord, in order that it may be well with you, and that you may come and possess the good land which the Lord swore to your forefathers, to drive out all your enemies from before you, as the Lord has spoken.

And he brought us out of there, in order that He might bring us and give us the land which He swore to our fathers.
Deuteronomy 8:1
Every commandment that I command you this day you shall keep to do, that you may live and multiply, and come and possess the land that the Lord swore to your forefathers.

Deuteronomy 8:7-10
For the Lord your God is bringing you to a good land, a land with brooks of water, fountains and depths, that emerge in valleys and mountains, a land of wheat and barley, vines and figs and pomegranates, a land of oil producing olives and honey, a land in which you will eat bread without scarcity, you will lack nothing in it, a land whose stones are iron, and out of whose mountains you will hew copper. And you will eat and be sated, and you shall bless the Lord, your God, for the good land He has given you.

Deuteronomy 9:1, 3
Hear, O Israel: Today, you are crossing the Jordan to come in to possess nations greater and stronger than you, great cities, fortified up to the heavens. … You shall know this day, that it is the Lord your God Who passes over before you as a consuming fire He will destroy them, and He will subdue them before you; and you shall drive out them and destroy them quickly, as the Lord spoke to you.

Deuteronomy 9:5
Not because of your righteousness or because of the honesty of your heart, do you come to possess their land, but because of the wickedness of these nations, the Lord your God drives them out from before you, and in order to establish the matter that the Lord swore to your forefathers, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

Deuteronomy 11:8-15
[Therefore] keep all the commandments that I command you this day, in order that you may be strong and come and possess the land to which you are crossing, to possess it, and in order that you may prolong your days on the land that the Lord swore to your forefathers to give to them and to their seed a land flowing with milk and honey.

For the land to which you are coming to possess is not like the land of Egypt, out of which you came, where you sowed your seed and which you watered by foot, like a vegetable garden.

But the land, to which you pass to possess, is a land of mountains and valleys and absorbs water from the rains of heaven, a land the Lord, your God, looks after; the eyes of Lord your God are always upon it, from the beginning of the year to the end of the year.

And it will be, if you hearken to My commandments that I command you this day to love the Lord, your God, and to serve Him with all your heart and with all your soul, I will give the rain of your land at its time, the early rain and the latter rain, and you will gather in your grain, your wine, and your oil. And I will give grass in your field for your livestock, and you will eat and be sated.

Deuteronomy 11:22-25
For if you keep all these commandments which I command you to do them, to love the Lord, your God, to walk in all His ways, and to cleave to Him, then the Lord will drive out all these nations from before you, and you will possess nations greater and stronger than you. Every place
upon which the soles of your feet will tread, will be yours: from the desert and the Lebanon, from the river, the Euphrates River, and until the western sea, will be your boundary. No man will stand up before you; the Lord your God will cast the fear of you and the dread of you on all the land upon which you tread, as He spoke to you.

Deuteronomy 11:31
For you are crossing the Jordan, to come to possess the land which the Lord, your God, is giving you, and you shall possess it and dwell in it.

Deuteronomy 19:7-9
Therefore, I command you, saying, “You shall separate for yourself three cities [of refuge].” And when the Lord, your God, expands your boundary, as He swore to your forefathers, and He gives you all the land of which He spoke to give to your forefathers; if you will keep all this commandment to perform it, which I command you this day, to love the Lord, your God, and to walk in His ways all the days, you shall add three more cities for yourself, in addition to these three.

Deuteronomy 30:5
And the Lord, your God, will bring you to the land which your forefathers possessed, and you [too] will take possession of it, and He will do good to you, and He will make you more numerous than your forefathers.

Deuteronomy 34:1-4
And Moses went up from the plains of Moab to Mount Nebo, [to the] top of the summit facing Jericho. And the Lord showed him all the Land: The Gilead until Dan, and all [the land of] Naftali, and the land of Ephraim and Manasseh, and all the land of Judah, until the western sea, and the south, and the plain, the valley of Jericho, the city of palm trees, until Zoar. And the Lord said to him, “This is the Land I swore to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, saying, ‘I will give it to your offspring.’ I have let you see it with your eyes, but you shall not cross over there.”

Joshua Chapters 13-21
[The promised land is divided among the tribes. Nine tribes get land on the western side of the Jordan River, two get land on the eastern side and one tribe straddles the river.]

Joshua 21:41 [Note: This is Verse 43 in KJV and NIV.]
And the Lord gave to Israel the entire land that He swore to give to their fathers, and they inherited it and dwelled in it.

1 Kings 5:1 [This is Chapter 4, Verse 21, in KJV and NIV.]
And Solomon reigned over all the kingdoms from the River to the land of the Philistines, and to the border of Egypt,

Isaiah 60:21
And your people, all of them righteous, shall inherit the land forever, a scion of My planting, the work of My hands in which I will glory.
Jeremiah 11:5
In order to establish the oath that I swore to your forefathers to give them a land flowing with milk and honey as of this day. And I replied and said, “Amen, O Lord.”

Jeremiah 16:14-15
Therefore, behold days are coming, says the Lord, and it shall no longer be said, “As the Lord lives, Who brought up the children of Israel from the land of Egypt,” But, “As the Lord lives, Who brought up the children of Israel from the northland and from all the lands where He had driven them, and I will restore them to their land that I gave to their forefathers.”

Ezekiel 20:40-42
But on My holy mount, on the mountain of the height of Israel, says the Lord God. There all the house of Israel-yea, all of them-will serve Me in the land; there I will accept them, and there I will require your heave offerings and the first of your food with all your hallowed things. With a pleasing savor I shall accept you when I take you out of the nations, and I shall gather you from the lands in which you were scattered, and I shall be hallowed through you before the eyes of the nations. And you will know that I am the Lord when I bring you to the land of Israel, to the land that I lifted My hand to give to your forefathers.

Psalms 105:42-44
For He remembered His holy word with Abraham His servant. And He took out His people with joy, His chosen ones with joyful singing. And He gave them lands of nations, and they inherited the toil of kingdoms.

... about the people

Despite major exiles to Egypt, to Assyria, to Babylon and, finally, by the Romans, to the diaspora, Abraham’s descendants maintained a hold on their faith, their holy books, their culture and even their names. 2 Samuel 7:24 says, “And You did establish to Yourself Your people Israel to be a people unto You forever; and You, Lord, became their God.” Of course, some “people Israel” never left and some kept returning, as told in Exodus, in Chapter 1 of Ezra, and elsewhere.

The Tanakh uses several names for the descendants of Abraham, including Hebrew, Israelite and Jew.

Pharaoh and speak to him, “So said the Lord, God of the Hebrews, ‘Let my people go, that they may serve Me.’ ” Jonah identifies himself as a Hebrew in Jonah 1:9 and David is identified as a Hebrew in 1 Samuel 29:3. Nehemiah connects the Jews with Hebrew as a language in Chapter 13, Verses 23-24: “Also in those days, I saw the Jews who had married Ashdodite, Ammonite, and Moabite women. And half their children were speaking Ashdodite, and they did not know how to speak Hebrew.”

Israelite is by far the most common name for the people. It refers to descendants of Abraham’s grandson Jacob, whose name was changed by God to Israel in Genesis 32:28. References to Israelites begin shortly afterward, as in Genesis 32:33 (Verse 32 in the NIV): “Therefore, the children of Israel may not eat the displaced tendon, which is on the socket of the hip, until this day, for he touched the socket of Jacob’s hip, in the hip sinew.”

Genesis 47:27 identifies Jacob and his brethren in Egypt as Israelites: “And [the people of] Israel dwelt in the land of Egypt in the land of Goshen.” And in Exodus 3:10, God says to Moses, “So now come, and I will send you to Pharaoh, and take My people, the children of Israel, out of Egypt.”

1 Samuel uses Israelites and Hebrews interchangeably. From Chapter 13, Verse 20: “And all Israel went down to the (land of) the Philistines to sharpen each man his plowshare and his colter and his axe and his mattock.” But Chapter 14, Verse 11: “And the Philistines said, “Behold, Hebrews are emerging from the holes wherein they hid themselves.”

The appellation Jew means a descendant of the tribes of Judah or Benjamin, which split with the other 10 tribes to become the Kingdom of Judah, called Judea by Rome (and by modern Israel). Some of the most prominent references to Jews are in the book of Esther.
What name to use is a persistent problem. For example, God renamed Jacob as Israel in Genesis 32:28 but the name Jacob was not forgotten, and the two were used in parallel in passages such as Genesis Chapter 48, Verse 2: “And [someone] told Jacob and said, ‘Behold, your son Joseph is coming to you.’ And Israel summoned his strength and sat up on the bed.”

Even God used the names interchangeably, as in Chapter 46, Verse 2: “And God said to Israel in visions of the night, and He said, ‘Jacob, Jacob!’ And he said, ‘Here I am.’ ”

Isaiah 44:5 says: “This one shall say, ‘I am the Lord's,’ and this one shall call himself by the name of Jacob, and this one shall write [with] his hand, ‘To the Lord,’ and adopt the name Israel.”

Confusion over nomenclature is best illustrated by the Christian Apostle Paul, writing in 2 Corinthians 11: “Are they Hebrews? So am I. Are they Israelites? So am I. Are they Abraham’s descendants? So am I. … I have been in danger from rivers, in danger from bandits, in danger from my fellow Jews.”

Today, “Hebrew” is used most commonly to identify one of the two official languages of the state of Israel and in Jewish liturgy; “Israeli” to identify citizens of the state of Israel; and “Jew” to identify descendants of members of the Kingdom of Judah and converts to Judaism anywhere in the world.

Hebrew is also an ancient language (along with the vernacular Aramaic) in the land of Israel (Katz, 2006). Other references in the Tanakh:

Genesis 12:1-3
And the Lord said to Abram, … “I will make you into a great nation, and I will bless you, and I will aggrandize your name, and [you shall] be a blessing. And I will bless those who bless you, and the one who curses you I will curse, and all the families of the earth shall be blessed in you.”

Genesis 13:14-17
And the Lord said to Abram after Lot had parted from him, "Please raise your eyes and see, from the place where you are, northward and southward and eastward and westward. For all the land
that you see I will give to you and to your seed to eternity. And I will make your seed like the
dust of the earth, so that if a man will be able to count the dust of the earth, so will your seed be
counted. Rise, walk in the land, to its length and to its breadth, for I will give it to you.”

Genesis 14:13
And the fugitive came and he told Abram the Hebrew.

Genesis 15:5
And He took him outside, and He said, “Please look heavenward and count the stars, if you are
able to count them.” And He said to him, “So will be your seed.”

Genesis 15:13
And He said to Abram, “You shall surely know that your seed will be strangers in a land that is
not theirs, and they will enslave them and oppress them, for four hundred years.”

Genesis 17:2, 4, 6, 8
[God speaking to Abram:] “And I will place My covenant between Me and between you, and I
will multiply you very greatly. … As for Me, behold My covenant is with you, and you shall
become the father of a multitude of nations. … And I will make you exceedingly fruitful, and I
will make you into nations, and kings will emerge from you. … And I will give you and your
seed after you the land of your sojournings, the entire land of Canaan for an everlasting
possession, and I will be to them for a God.”

Genesis 35:10
God said to him, “Your name is Jacob. Your name shall no longer be called Jacob, but Israel
shall be your name.” And He named him Israel.

Genesis 40:15
[Joseph, in prison, to Pharaoh’s cupbearer:] “I was stolen from the land of the Hebrews.”

Exodus 2:11
Moses grew up and went out to his brothers and looked at their burdens, and he saw an Egyptian
man striking a Hebrew man of his brothers.

Exodus 19:3, 6
Moses ascended to God, and the Lord called to him from the mountain, saying, “So shall you say
to the house of Jacob and tell the sons of Israel, … And you shall be to Me a kingdom of princes
and a holy nation.' These are the words that you shall speak to the children of Israel.”

Exodus 32:9
And the Lord said to Moses: “I have seen this people and behold! they are a stiff necked people.”

Deuteronomy 11:23
Then the Lord will drive out all these nations from before you, and you will possess nations
greater and stronger than you.
Isaiah 11:12
And He shall raise a banner to the nations, and He shall gather the lost of Israel, and the scattered ones of Judah He shall gather from the four corners of the earth.

Isaiah 36:11 (and 2Kings 18:26)
And Eliakim and Shebna and Joah said to Rabshakeh, “Please speak to your servants in Aramaic for we understand it; do not speak with us in Judean [“in Hebrew” in NIV] within the hearing of the people who are on the wall.”

Isaiah 43:5-6
Fear not for I am with you; from the east I will bring your seed, and from the west I will gather you. I will say to the north, “Give,” and to the south, “Do not refrain; bring My sons from afar and My daughters from the end of the earth.”

Jeremiah 23:3-4
And I will gather the remnant of My flocks from all the lands where I have driven them, and I will restore them to their dwellings and they shall be fruitful and multiply. And I will set up shepherds over them and they shall pasture them, and they shall no longer fear nor shall they be dismayed, nor shall [any of them] be missing, says the Lord.

Jeremiah 50:17
A scattered sheep is Israel which lions have driven away. First the king of Assyria devoured him, and this last one broke his bones, Nebuchadrezzar the king of Babylon.

Ezekiel 34:12-13
As a shepherd seeks out his flock on the day he is among his separated flocks, so will I seek out My flocks, and I will save them from all the places where they have scattered on a cloudy and dark day. I will take them out from among the nations, and I will gather them from the lands and bring them to their land, and I will shepherd them to the mountains of Israel, by the streams and in all the dwellings of the land.

Micah 2:12
[God speaking:] “I will surely assemble, O Jacob, all of you; I will surely gather the remnant of Israel; together I will make them as sheep in a fold, as a flock within its stall shall they stir with people.”

Micah 4:6-7
On that day, says the Lord: I will heal the limping one, and the lost one I will gather, and those whom I harmed. And I will make the limping one into a remnant, and the scattered one into a mighty nation, and the Lord shall reign over them on Mount Zion from now and forever.

Lamentations 5:2-5
Our heritage has been turned over to strangers, our houses to aliens. We have become orphans and fatherless, our mothers are like widows. Our water we have drunk for payment; our wood needs must come by purchase. We are pursued [with a yoke] on our necks; we toil but it does not remain with us.
... about Jerusalem

For 3,000 years, Jews have claimed Jerusalem as their capital – indeed, as their heart and soul. In 1 Kings 11:36, God, speaking to Jeroboam, refers to “Jerusalem, the city which I have chosen to put my name there.” The Jews substantiate their claim to Jerusalem with hundreds of references in the Tanakh. Pipes (2001) counts 769 references to Jerusalem. Another 154 passages refer to Zion, which means Jerusalem, or, in some cases, the broader land of Israel. Dozens more use other references, such as “city of David.” 2 Samuel 5:7,9 makes the connection: “Nevertheless David took the stronghold of Zion; the same is the city of David. … And David dwelt in the stronghold, and called it the city of David.”

Note especially 2 Chronicles 3:1, which makes it clear that the temple -- “house of the Lord” -- is in Jerusalem, specifically on Mount Moriah. Subsequent verses add detailed instructions for how to build and furnish the temple.

In his speech to the United Nations in 2005, Israeli’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon quoted from Psalm 137:5-6 to express the depth of the Jewish attachment over the ages: “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning. Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, if I remember thee not; if I set not Jerusalem above my chiefest joy.” The Judaica Press translates the verses a little differently (see below), but they and others still express the anguished attachment of Jews for Jerusalem.

Isaiah 62:1
For the sake of Zion, I will not be silent, and for the sake of Jerusalem I will not rest, until her righteousness comes out like brilliance, and her salvation burns like a torch.

Jeremiah 19:10-12
And you shall break the jug before the eyes of the men who go with you. And you shall say to them: so said the Lord of Hosts: so will I break this people and this city, as one breaks the potter's vessel, which can no longer be repaired, and in the Topheth they will bury without place to bury. So will I do to this place, says the Lord, and to its inhabitants, and to make this city like the Topheth.
Ezekiel 5:5
So said the Lord God: This is Jerusalem; in the midst of the nations I have placed it, and around it are lands.

Psalm 122
I rejoiced when they said to me, “Let us go to the house of the Lord.” Our feet were standing within your gates, O Jerusalem. The built-up Jerusalem is like a city that was joined together within itself. There ascended the tribes, the tribes of God, testimony to Israel, to give thanks to the name of the Lord. For there were set thrones for judgment, thrones for the house of David. Request the welfare of Jerusalem; may those who love you enjoy tranquility. May there be peace in your wall, tranquility in your palaces. For the sake of my brethren and my companions, I shall now speak of peace in you. For the sake of the house of the Lord our God, I shall beg for goodness for you.

Psalm 137: 1, 5-6
By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat, we also wept when we remembered Zion. … If I forget you, O Jerusalem, may my right hand forget [its skill]. May my tongue cling to my palate, if I do not remember you, if I do not bring up Jerusalem at the beginning of my joy.

Psalm 147:2
The Lord is the builder of Jerusalem; He will gather the outcasts of Israel.

II Chronicles 3:1
And Solomon commenced to build the House of the Lord in Jerusalem on Mount Moriah, where He had appeared to his father David, which he had prepared in David's place, in the threshing floor of Ornan the Jebusite.

... about other Jewish holy places

_The four holiest cities of Judaism are Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias and Safed. For a complete list of holy places in the country, see Israel’s National Heritage Sites._

_The Temple Mount in Jerusalem (emphasis added; see separate entry, above) is the holiest site. The second holiest is the Cave (or Tomb) of the Patriarchs (Cave of Machpelah) in Hebron. Abraham and his family lived in Hebron, now part of Judea (at the southern end of the West Bank). The cave is the burial site of three famous couples: Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Rebecca, and Jacob and Leah._
Safed, in Galilee, northwest of Lake Kinneret, became a center of Jewish scholarship following the expulsion of Jews from Spain in 1492. Tiberias, on the shore of Lake Tiberias in Galilee, is where the Jerusalem Talmud was composed.

Rachel’s Tomb and Joseph’s Tomb are revered by both Arabs and Jews, and they have clashed frequently over their control. Rachel’s Tomb, in Bethlehem, is the third holiest site in Judaism. Joseph’s Tomb is in Shechem near Nablus. All three burial sites are in West Bank territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority (Sontag, 2000, Oct. 4; Joseph’s Tomb, 2011; and Schmemann, 1998).

Genesis 13:18
And Abram pitched his tents, and he came, and he dwelt in the plain of Mamre, which is in Hebron [emphasis added], and there he built an altar to the Lord.

Genesis 23:19
And afterwards, Abraham buried Sarah his wife in the cave of the field of Machpelah, facing Mamre, which is Hebron, in the land of Canaan.

Genesis 25: 8-9
And Abraham expired and died in a good old age, old and satisfied, and he was gathered to his people. And Isaac and Ishmael his sons buried him in the Cave of Machpelah in the field of Ephron the son of Zohar the Hittite, which faces Mamre.

Genesis 28:16-19
And Jacob awakened from his sleep, and he said, “Indeed, the Lord is in this place, and I did not know [it].” And he was frightened, and he said, “How awesome is this place! This is none other than the house of God, and this is the gate of heaven.” … And he named the place Beth El, but Luz was originally the name of the city.

Genesis 35:19
So Rachel died, and she was buried on the road to Ephrath, which is Bethlehem.

Deuteronomy 34:1-6
And Moses went up from the plains of Moab to Mount Nebo, [to the] top of the summit facing Jericho. And the Lord showed him all the Land: The Gilead until Dan, and all [the land of] Naftali, and the land of Ephraim and Manasseh, and all the land of Judah, until the western sea, and the south, and the plain, the valley of Jericho, the city of palm trees, until Zoar. And the Lord said to him, "This is the Land I swore to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, saying, 'I will give it to your offspring.' I have let you see it with your eyes, but you shall not cross over there." And Moses, the servant of the Lord, died there, in the land of Moab, by the mouth of the Lord. And
He buried him in the valley, in the land of Moab, opposite Beth Pe'or. And no person knows the place of his burial, unto this day. [Numbers 20 and Deuteronomy 32:51 explain why God would not allow Moses or his brother Aaron to enter the promised land.]

Joshua 6
[Jericho is one of the oldest cities in the world and the first city captured by the Israelites after their Exodus from Egypt. God himself planned the attack to demonstrate that he alone was responsible for the victory.]

Joshua 10:12-14
Then Joshua spoke to the Lord on the day when the Lord delivered up the Amorites before the children of Israel, and he said in the sight of Israel, “Sun, stand still upon Gibeon, and Moon in the valley of Ajalon.” And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, until the people had avenged themselves upon their enemies. Is this not written in the book of Jashar? (which is the Torah)? So the sun stood still in the midst of the heaven, and it did not hasten to go down exactly a whole day. [Gibeon was a Canaanite city north of Jerusalem. All that remains are near the Palestinian village of Jib on the West Bank.]

Joshua 24:32
And the bones of Joseph, which the children of Israel had brought up out of Egypt, they buried in Shechem, in the parcel of ground which Jacob bought from the sons of Hamor the father of Shechem, for a hundred pieces of money; and they became the inheritance of the children of Joseph. [Joseph was Abraham’s great-grandson. Shechem is near the West Bank city of Nablus, where a tomb has been designated as a minor shrine, although doubts remain as to who is buried there.]

1 Kings 19:2 forward
And Ahab told Jezebel all that Elijah had done, and all that he had killed all of the prophets with the sword. Jezebel sent a messenger to Elijah saying, "So may the gods do and so may they continue unless at this time tomorrow, I will make your life like the life of one of them. And he saw, and he arose and went for his life, and he came to Beer Sheba which belonged to Judah. … And he arose and ate and drank, and he went with the strength of this meal forty days and forty nights up to the mountain of the Lord, Horeb. And he came there to the cave, and he lodged there. And behold! The word of the Lord came to him. [His lodging place, known today as Elijah’s Cave, has been identified as on Mount Carmel southeast of the Mediterranean seaport of Haifa.]

… about God

Compare the way God is described in the Tanakh and in the Quran. He is nominally the same being but a somewhat different picture of him emerges in the two holy books. Keep in mind that Islam does not claim to be a new religion – rather, a continuation of the covenants revealed to the prophets before Muhammad. One important difference is that God in the Tanakh takes an
active, personal role in addressing his chosen people, leading them, feeding them, judging, and rewarding and chastising them. God in the Tanakh demands not only obedience but also total love: “You shall love the Lord, your God, with all your heart and with all your soul, and with all your means” (Deuteronomy 6:5). In one sense, the entire Bible reveals God to his people, so the citations that follow present only a glimpse of God’s powers, purposes and nature.

Genesis Chapters 1 and 2.

[God creates the world.]

Genesis 18:20-21, 23-26, 28-32; Genesis 19:24 [This is the famous story in which God negotiates the fate of two sinful cities with Abraham.]

And the Lord said, "Since the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah has become great, and since their sin has become very grave, I will descend now and see, whether according to her cry, which has come to Me, they have done; [I will wreak] destruction [upon them]; and if not, I will know." I will descend now and see, whether according to her cry, which has come to Me, they have done; [I will wreak] destruction [upon them]; and if not, I will know."

And Abraham approached and said, "Will You even destroy the righteous with the wicked? Perhaps there are fifty righteous men in the midst of the city; will You even destroy and not forgive the place for the sake of the fifty righteous men who are in its midst? Far be it from You to do a thing such as this, to put to death the righteous with the wicked so that the righteous should be like the wicked. Far be it from You! Will the Judge of the entire earth not perform justice?" And the Lord said, "If I find in Sodom fifty righteous men within the city, I will forgive the entire place for their sake."

Perhaps the fifty righteous men will be missing five. Will You destroy the entire city because of five?" And He said, "I will not destroy if I find there forty-five." And he continued further to speak to Him, and he said, "Perhaps forty will be found there." And He said, "I will not do it for the sake of the forty." And he said, "Please, let the Lord's wrath not be kindled, and I will speak. Perhaps thirty will be found there." And He said, "I will not do it if I find thirty there." And he said, "Behold now I have desired to speak to the Lord, perhaps twenty will be found there." And He said, "I will not destroy for the sake of the twenty." And he said, "Please, let the Lord's wrath not be kindled, and I will speak yet this time, perhaps ten will be found there." And He said, "I will not destroy for the sake of the ten."

And the Lord caused to rain down upon Sodom and Gomorrah brimstone and fire, from the Lord, from heaven.

Genesis 22:1-2, 9, 11, 16-18
And it came to pass after these things, that God tested Abraham, and He said to him, “Abraham,” and he said, “Here I am.” And He said, “Please take your son, your only one, whom you love, yea, Isaac, and go away to the land of Moriah and bring him up there for a burnt offering on one of the mountains, of which I will tell you.” … And they came to the place of which God had spoken to him, and Abraham built the altar there and arranged the wood, and he bound Isaac his son and placed him on the altar upon the wood. … And an angel of God called to him from
heaven and said, “Abraham! Abraham!” And he said, “Here I am.” And he said, “Do not stretch forth your hand to the lad, nor do the slightest thing to him, for now I know that you are a God fearing man, and you did not withhold your son, your only one, from Me.” And he said, "By Myself have I sworn, says the Lord, that because you have done this thing and you did not withhold your son, your only one, That I will surely bless you, and I will greatly multiply your seed as the stars of the heavens and as the sand that is on the seashore, and your descendants will inherit the cities of their enemies. And through your children shall be blessed all the nations of the world, because you hearkened to My voice.”

Exodus 3:13-14
And Moses said to God, “Behold I come to the children of Israel, and I say to them, 'The God of your fathers has sent me to you,' and they say to me, ‘What is His name?’ what shall I say to them?” God said to Moses, “Ehyeh asher ehyeh (I will be what I will be),” and He said, “So shall you say to the children of Israel, ‘Ehyeh (I will be) has sent me to you.’ ”

Exodus 15:3
The Lord is a Master of war; the Lord is His Name.

Exodus 20:3
You shall not have the gods of others in My presence.

Exodus 20:5-7, 20
I, the Lord, your God, am a zealous God, Who visits the iniquity of the fathers upon the sons, upon the third and the fourth generation of those who hate Me, and [I] perform loving kindness to thousands [of generations], to those who love Me and to those who keep My commandments. You shall not take the name of the Lord, your God, in vain, for the Lord will not hold blameless anyone who takes His name in vain. … You shall not make [images of anything that is] with Me. Gods of silver or gods of gold you shall not make for yourselves.

Deuteronomy 3:1-3
Then we turned and went up the way of Bashan, and Og, the king of Bashan, came forth toward us, he and all his people, to war at Edrei. And the Lord said to me, “Do not fear him, for I have given him, all his people, and his land into your hand, and you shall do to him as you did to Sihon, king of the Amorites, who dwelt in Heshbon.” So the Lord, our God, delivered into our hands also Og, the king of Bashan and all his people, and we smote him until no remnant remained of him.

Deuteronomy 6:4
Hear, O Israel: The Lord is our God; the Lord is one.

Deuteronomy 6:15, 18-19
For the Lord, your God, is a zealous God among you, lest the wrath of the Lord, your God, be kindled against you, and destroy you off the face of the earth. … And you shall do what is proper and good in the eyes of the Lord, in order that it may be well with you, and that you may come and possess the good land which the Lord swore to your forefathers, to drive out all your enemies from before you, as the Lord has spoken.
Deuteronomy 7:2
And the Lord, your God, will deliver them to you, and you shall smite them. You shall utterly destroy them; neither shall you make a covenant with them, nor be gracious to them.

Deuteronomy 7:9
Know, therefore, that the Lord, your God He is God, the faithful God, Who keeps the covenant and loving kindness with those who love Him and keep His commandments to a thousand generations.

Deuteronomy 13:18
And nothing that is doomed to destruction shall cling to your hand, so that the Lord may return from His fierce wrath, and grant you compassion, and be compassionate with you, and multiply you, as He swore to your forefathers.

Joshua 23:12-15
For if you turn away, and cling to the remnant of these nations, that remain with you; and intermarry with them and mingle with them and they with you; Know of a certainty that the Lord your God will not drive these nations out from before you, anymore; and they will be a snare and an obstacle to you, and a goad in your sides and thorns in your eyes, until you perish from this good land, which the Lord your God has given you. And, behold, this day I am going the way of all the earth; and you shall know with all your hearts and with all your souls, that not one thing of all the good things that the Lord your God has spoken concerning you has failed; all have happened to you, not one word of it has failed. And it shall be, that as all the good things that the Lord your God has spoken to you have come to pass, so shall the Lord bring upon you all the evil things, until He has destroyed you from this good land, that the Lord your God has given you.

Isaiah 43:10-12
“You are My witnesses,” says the Lord … before Me no god was formed and after Me none shall be. I, I am the Lord, and besides Me there is no Savior. … you are My witnesses,” says the Lord, “and I am God.”

Jeremiah 15:6
You have forsaken Me, says the Lord. You shall go backwards, and I have stretched out My hand over you and destroyed you. I am weary of repenting.

Jeremiah 15:20-21
[God speaking:] And I will make you for this nation into a fortified copper wall, and they shall fight against you but they shall not prevail against you, for I am with you to redeem you and to save you, says the Lord. And I will save you from the hand of the wicked, and I will redeem you from the hand of the terrible.

Jeremiah 18:3-11
So I went to the house of the potter, and behold, he was doing work on the wheels. And the vessel that he was making of clay was spoiled in the potter's hand, and he made it again another vessel, as it had pleased the potter to make. And the word of the Lord came to me, saying: As
this potter can I not do to you, O house of Israel? says the Lord. Behold, as clay in the potter's hand, so are you in My hand, O house of Israel. One instant I may speak concerning a nation and concerning a kingdom, to uproot and to demolish and to destroy. And when that nation repents of its evil for which I spoke concerning it, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do to it. And at one instant I may speak concerning a nation and concerning a kingdom, to build and to plant, And it will do what is evil in My eyes, not to hearken to My voice, I will repent of the good I said to benefit it. And now, say now to the men of Judah and to the inhabitants of Jerusalem, saying, So said the Lord: Behold I am devising evil upon you, and I am laying plans against you. Return now, each one from his evil way and improve your ways and your deeds.

Daniel 6:11 [Daniel 6:10 in the NIV; concerning the direction of prayer. Compare the Jewish and Muslim traditions regarding the direction of prayer.]

And Daniel, when he knew that a writ had been inscribed, came to his house, where there were open windows in his upper chamber, opposite Jerusalem, and three times a day he kneeled on his knees and prayed and offered thanks before his God just as he had done prior to this. [See also 1 Kings 8:44, King Solomon speaking:] “pray to the Lord toward the city [Jerusalem] that You have chosen, and (toward) the house [Temple] that I have built for Your name.” See also 1 Kings 8:48, repeated in II Chronicles 6:34: “Pray to You toward their land, which You gave to their fathers, the city that You have chosen, and the house which I have built for Your Name.”

Modern practice is for diaspora Jews to pray toward Israel; Jews in Israel pray toward Jerusalem; and Jews in Jerusalem pray toward the site of the ancient temples (Temple Mount).

The verses in the Tanakh are reinforced by the Gamara: “If one was standing outside Eretz Yisrael, he should direct his heart towards Eretz Yisrael ... If one was standing in Eretz Yisrael, he should direct his heart towards Jerusalem. ... If one was standing in Jerusalem, he should direct his heart towards the temple” (Zlotowitz, Schorr & Malinowitz, 1997). Since the exact location of the previous temples is not known, the practice is to face the Temple Mount.

Although angels were busy beings in the Tanakh, the only good angels with names are in the New Testament (Gabriel in Luke 1:19 and 26 and Michael in Revelation 12:7). In the Quran, the angel Gabriel delivers God’s messages to the Prophet Muhammad.

... about Ishmael

Islam contends that Arabs and Jews both descended from Abraham, which would make the Arab-Israeli conflict basically a family feud between cousins. The Arab claim flows through
Ishmael, whom the Tanakh accepts as the son of Abraham by his wife’s servant Hagar. The bond is reinforced by the marriage of Ishmael’s daughter Mahalath to Esau (Edom), who was Abraham’s grandson through Isaac. For the founders’ family tree, see Appendix E, Annex 1.

The claim that Ishmael is the father of the Arab people (Miller, 2004, pp. 17, 139, 170) is controversial and difficult to document from the genealogies reported in the Tanakh. Chapman (1989) concludes: “The link between Abraham and Ishmael and Islam is an article of faith and therefore cannot be subjected to this kind of critical questioning. ... Was Ishmael therefore the father of the Arabs? The most, I believe, we can say is that Ishmael may well have been the ancestor of some of the tribes of N.W. Arabia. ... I cannot accept uncritically the identification of Ishmael with the Arabs and with Islam, firstly because there is no historical evidence for the assertion that Abraham or Ishmael was ever in Mecca and secondly because this claim is so intimately bound up with an Islamic view of history and with an Islamic understanding of revelation and inspiration. ... It involves accepting beliefs about Abraham and Ishmael which are based neither on Scripture nor on historical evidence, but entirely on Islamic tradition and dogma” (p. 50-57). Guillaume (1956) also denies that there is any historical evidence connecting Abraham or Ishmael with Mecca.

Entine (2007), examining the chromosomal evidence, concludes: “Seven out of ten Jewish men and half of Arab men whose DNA was studied inherited their male chromosomes from the same paternal ancestors, who lived in the prehistoric Middle East during the Neolithic Period, about 7,800 years ago. But the evidence shows that over the subsequent thousands of years, Jews and Arabs went their own way, with little intermarriage. Overall, Arabs and Jews have about 18 percent of all their chromosomes in common. Jews and Arabs may be related, but they are now very distant cousins” (p. 332).
Lewis (1999) examined the claim that Jews and Arabs are ethnically related as members of a common race -- Semites – i.e., descendants of Shem, one of Noah’s three sons (Genesis 5:32 and 6:10). The evidence is based primarily on the similarity of Hebrew and Arabic languages. The point usually is that Arabs cannot be “anti-Semitic” since they are Semites, too.

Lewis concluded that the claim of a common ancestor confuses race and language.

“Serious scholars,” he said, “have pointed out – repeatedly and ineffectually – that ‘Semitic’ is a linguistic and cultural classification, denoting certain languages and in some contexts the literatures and civilizations expressed in those languages. As a kind of shorthand, it was sometimes retained to designate the speakers or those languages. At one time it might thus have had a connotation of race, when that word itself was used to designate national and cultural entities. It has nothing whatever to do with race in the anthropological sense that is now common usage” (p. 45). Psalm 83, quoted below, seems to indicate that the Ishmaelites and the Edomites were enemies of the Israelites.

Genesis 16:10-12, 15
And the angel of the Lord said to her [Hagar], “I will greatly multiply your seed, and it will not be counted for abundance. And the angel of the Lord said to her, “Behold, you will conceive and bear a son, and you shall name him Ishmael, for the Lord has heard your affliction. And he will be a wild donkey of a man; his hand will be upon all, and everyone's hand upon him, and before all his brothers he will dwell.” … And Hagar bore a son to Abram, and Abram named his son, whom Hagar had borne, Ishmael.

Genesis 17:18
And Abraham said to God, “If only Ishmael will live before You!” [The meaning is debatable. The passage has been translated as in your presence (Jerusalem Bible), in thy sight (Revised Standard Version), under thy special care (New English Bible), under your blessing (New International Version) and, more broadly, Why not let Ishmael be my heir? (Today’s English Version). Chapman (1989) says, “Immediately after Ishmael is born … we might expect Abraham to respond with joy and thanksgiving. Sadly, however, he is so incredulous that he simply laughs. … What he is saying in effect is: ‘Won’t Ishmael do? How can you possibly give me a son by Sarah? Can’t you regard Ishmael as my own son and fulfill your promises through him?’ God’s answer … is not as simple as it seems. … It looks to me as if the writer of Genesis … wants us to understand that the earlier promise to Abraham concerning Ishmael was fulfilled during the patriarchal period.”]
Genesis 17:20
And regarding Ishmael, I have heard you; behold I have blessed him, and I will make him fruitful, and I will multiply him exceedingly; he will beget twelve princes, and I will make him into a great nation.

Genesis 21:9-13, 17-18, 20-21 – And Sarah saw the son of Hagar the Egyptian, whom she had borne to Abraham, making merry. And Sarah said to Abraham, “Drive out this handmaid and her son, for the son of this handmaid shall not inherit with my son, with Isaac.” But the matter greatly displeased Abraham, concerning his son. And God said to Abraham, “Be not displeased concerning the lad and concerning your handmaid; whatever Sarah tells you, hearken to her voice, for in Isaac will be called your seed. But also the son of the handmaid I will make into a nation, because he is your seed.” … And God heard the lad's voice, and an angel of God called to Hagar from heaven, and said to her, “What is troubling you, Hagar? Fear not, for God has heard the lad's voice in the place where he is. Rise, pick up the lad and grasp your hand upon him, for I shall make him into a great nation.” … And God was with the lad, and he grew, and he dwelt in the desert, and he became an archer. And he dwelt in the desert of Paran, and his mother took for him a wife from the land of Egypt.

Genesis 25:8-9
And Abraham expired and died in a good old age, old and satisfied, and he was gathered to his people. And Isaac and Ishmael his sons buried him in the Cave of Machpelah in the field of Ephron the son of Zohar the Hittite, which faces Mamre.

Genesis 25:12-18
Now these are the generations of Ishmael the son of Abraham, whom Hagar the Egyptian, the maidservant of Sarah, bore to Abraham. … And these are the years of the life of Ishmael: one hundred years and thirty years and seven years; and he expired and died and was gathered to his people. And they dwelt from Havilah to Shur, which borders on Egypt, going towards Asshur; before all his brothers he dwelt.

Genesis 25:20-23
And Isaac was forty years old when he took Rebekah … for a wife … and Rebekah his wife conceived. And the children struggled within her, and she said, “If [it be] so, why am I [like] this?” And she went to inquire of the Lord. And the Lord said to her, “Two nations are in your womb, and two kingdoms will separate from your inwards, and one kingdom will become mightier than the other kingdom, and the elder will serve the younger.

Genesis 28:9
So Esau went to Ishmael, and he took Mahalath, the daughter of Ishmael, the son of Abraham, the sister of Nebaioth, in addition to his other wives as a wife.

Genesis 36:2-4, 13
Esau took his wives from the daughters of Canaan: … also Basemath, daughter of Ishmael. … and Basemath bore Reuel. … And these are the sons of Reuel: …

Malachi 1:1-3
The burden of the word of the Lord to Israel in the hand of Malachi. I loved you, said the Lord, and you said, “How have You loved us?” Was not Esau a brother to Jacob? says the Lord. And I loved Jacob. And I hated Esau, and I made his mountains desolate and his heritage into [a habitat for] the jackals of the desert.

Psalm 83:2-7
O God, have no silence, do not be silent and do not be still, O God. For behold, Your enemies stir, and those who hate You raise their heads. Against Your people they plot cunningly, and they take counsel against Your protected ones. They said, “Come, let us destroy them from [being] a nation, and the name of Israel will no longer be remembered.” For they have taken counsel with one accord; against You they form a pact. The tents of Edom and the Ishmaelites, Moab and the Hagrites [emphasis added].

[Chapman (1989) contends that Psalm 83 links the Ishmaelites with the enemies of Israel, putting them in the same category as the uncircumcised Philistines. Chapman concludes that Muhammad did not realize until later that Ishmael was the son of Abraham, and therefore that Abraham was the ancestor of some of the Arabs. The spelling of the name (Isma’il) is Greek or Syriac, not Semitic, Chapman said. Muhammad wanted to show that his revelations were the same as those to Abraham, who was prior to Moses (prophet of the Jews) and to Jesus (prophet of the Christians). Thus the Quran says that Abraham and Ishmael built the Kaaba, although Guillaume (1956) finds no evidence for the assertion that Abraham or Ishmael was in Mecca (p. 61).]

1 Chronicles 1:28, 31
The sons of Abraham: Isaac and Ishmael. … all these were the sons of Ishmael.
**Appendix F, Annex 2 – Books of the Tanakh**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TANAKH: 24 books</th>
<th>OLD TESTAMENT: 39 books</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TORAH (5 books of Moses)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Genesis</td>
<td>2. Exodus</td>
</tr>
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<td>2. Exodus</td>
<td>3. Leviticus</td>
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<td>3. Leviticus</td>
<td>4. Numbers</td>
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<td>5. Deuteronomy</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NEVIIM (prophets) 8 books</strong></td>
<td>6. Joshua</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Ruth</td>
<td>9. 1 Samuel</td>
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<td>14. 2 Chronicles</td>
<td>15. Ezra</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Nehemiah</td>
<td>17. Esther</td>
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<td>17. Esther</td>
<td>18. Job</td>
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<td>18. Job</td>
<td>19. Psalms</td>
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<td>19. Psalms</td>
<td>20. Proverbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Ecclesiastes</td>
<td>22. Song of Solomon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Song of Solomon</td>
<td>23. Isaiah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Isaiah</td>
<td>24. Jeremiah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Lamentations</td>
<td>26. Ezekiel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Ezekiel</td>
<td>27. Daniel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Daniel</td>
<td>28. Hosea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Joel</td>
<td>30. Amos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Amos</td>
<td>31. Obadiah</td>
</tr>
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<td>31. Obadiah</td>
<td>32. Jonah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Jonah</td>
<td>33. Micah</td>
</tr>
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<td>33. Micah</td>
<td>34. Nahum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Nahum</td>
<td>35. Habakkuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Habakkuk</td>
<td>36. Zephaniah</td>
</tr>
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<td>36. Zephaniah</td>
<td>37. Haggai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Haggai</td>
<td>38. Zechariah</td>
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<td>39. Malachi</td>
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Appendix G -- What the Quran and the Hadiths Say About -- …

Understanding the religious fervor of the Arab-Israeli conflict requires an investigation, however brief, into the basic elements of the scriptures that direct the beliefs on which action is based. The most important fact about Islam is that it is not just a religion. Nor is it just a moral, ethical and legal system. It is all of those identities and more. Islam is a total way of life -- and of death. The Western ideal of a firewall between church and state is foreign to Muslims. The mosque is the state, although Hofmann (1993) prefers the formulation “religion and the state” (emphasis original) so as to indicate that the two, although not identical, “must be brought into a harmonious relationship with each other in an Islamic way” (p. 90).

Islam is also zealously evangelistic. It tolerates minorities but only if it is clear who is in charge. Historically, Jews have generally -- but not always -- fared better under Islam than under Christianity. Jews and Muslims do not mix well as equals or under Jewish domination. There is too much shared history and too many heated rivalries competing for hearts and minds, shrines and land.

The primary scripture of Islam is the Quran. It is said to contain the literal words of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad through the angel Gabriel between 610 and 632 A.D. while Muhammad was in Mecca and Medina, now part of Saudi Arabia. He word “quran” literally means recitations. Since Muhammad could not read or write, he recited the revelations to his literate companions, who wrote them down in Arabic. About 10 years after Muhammad’s death in 632 A.D., his companions gathered the revelations into a single volume composed of 114 suras (chapters) arranged in approximate order of decreasing
length. Scholars do not agree on the order in which the verses were revealed to Muhammad.\textsuperscript{14} Robinson (2003, p. 95), after reviewing unsuccessful attempts to settle on an acceptable chronology, concluded: “It should, however, be obvious that the problem of the chronology of the revelations is still far from solved.”

Gabriel is mentioned twice by name in the Quran – 2:97 and 66:4 – but more frequently in the Hadiths, especially in Sahih al-Bukhari’s collection. Sura 16, Verse 102, for example refers to Gabriel by his title: Holy Spirit: “Say, the Holy Spirit has brought the revelation from thy Lord in Truth, in order to strengthen those who believe, and as a Guide and Glad Tidings to Muslims.”

Islam is fiercely monotheistic, believing in one God – Allah, in Arabic. Muhammad emphasized that he is not God and should not be worshipped. He said he was God’s last and greatest messenger in a line of prophets starting with Adam and including Moses and Jesus.

The Muslim statement of faith, called the shahada, is among the simplest of any religion: “I profess that there is no deity but Allah” and “Muhammad is his messenger.” In expanded form, it adds a requirement to pray five times a day (salat or salah), to give alms (zakat), to fast during the month of Ramadan (sawm) and to perform pilgrimage [hajj, to Mecca] if able. These are the pillars of Sunni Islam (Sahih Muslim, Sura 1, Book 1, Number 1).

Although faith and belief are important, Islam is primarily a religion of action. It is not about achieving “metaphysical certainty” (Armstrong, 2006, p. 61). More important was the practice of “works of justice” (p. 68). Citing Sura 112 of the Quran, Armstrong said, “The

\textsuperscript{14} The first sura is not the longest and the last sura is not the shortest. Some “fully contradictory” verses have been placed together, apparently because they deal with the same topic (Landau-Tasseron, 2003, Vol. 3, p 36).
principle of tawhid (unity) became the crux of Muslim spirituality. ... Like all Quranic teaching, [it was] a call to action.”

Also revered as scripture are the Hadiths: accounts (narrations or traditions) of the words and deeds attributed to Muhammad personally, as opposed to the Quran, which are said to contain the words of God. The Hadiths, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, were compiled as late as 200 years after Muhammad’s death, which means that some are considered more authentic than others. The Hadiths usually start with a statement specifying the source of the account, traced back to Muhammad through a series of trustworthy witnesses. Of the dozens of Hadith collections, Sunni Muslims consider six – arranged here in order of perceived authenticity – as the most authoritative and thus as binding as the Quran. The two main denominations of Islam, Shiism and Sunnism, have different sets of Hadiths and an expanded set of pillars. I will stick to the Sunni viewpoint because most Palestinians are Sunni Muslims. The most revered Hadiths:

- Sahih al-Bukhari, collected by Imam al-Bukhari.
- Sahih Muslim, collected by Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj.
- Sunan al-Sughra (also called Sunan an-Nasai), collected by al-Nasai.
- Sunan Abu Dawud, (also called Sunan Abi Daud), collected by Abu Daud.
- Sunan al-Tirmidhi, collected by al-Tirmidhi.
- Al-Muwatta, collected by Imam Malik.

“Sahih” means authentic; “sunan” means the norm, usual practice, example, custom.

The first and most highly regarded of the six was collected by the Persian scholar, Imam Muhammad al-Bukhari. Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj was a student of al-Bukhari and a teacher of al-Tirmidhi. Al-Nasai was a student of Abu Daud. The Muwatta was collected by Imam Malik ibn Anas.

Trying to understand any religion from its holy books is difficult enough, but with Islam the problems are magnified by differences in language, translations, culture, the
passage of time since the revelations were received, branch (Sunni vs. Shiite), and the sheer volume of the literature. Any selection, by necessity, will be incomplete and a potential distortion caused by lack of context. The best description probably is self-definition – in this case, what Muslims say they believe. But even in their entirety, the Quran and Hadiths are incomplete because they omit traditions that have developed since the books were compiled, and traditions are no less important to Muslims than to, say, Jews or Roman Catholics.

The quotations cited here were selected because they are mentioned prominently in the histories, commentaries and reports related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The primary translations employed here are from the Web site of the University of South California’s Center for Muslim-Jewish Engagement, hereafter CMJE:

http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/quran/. It publishes the complete Quran in three respected, side-by-side translations, three complete Hadith collections and one partial collection. A word search in the CMJE Web site returns all hits from all three translations in the entire Quran. The site also provides a transliteration guide and an extremely useful index. The three translations are by renowned Islamic scholars Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Marmaduke Pickthall and M.H. Shakir. The Hadiths were prepared by the Muslim Students Association at the University of Southern California.

The quotations that follow are organized topically. The Quranic references are to sura and verse, so that 9:81 refers to Sura (Chapter) 9, Ayah (Verse) 81. The al-Bukhari Hadith provides three figures in this order: volume, book and number. Note that the reference system for Hadiths is not standardized. Each publisher will have an individual numbering system. Note, too, that translators make frequent use of parentheses to aid interpretation; parentheses do not exist in the Arabic Quran. In rare cases where I add comments, they are in brackets: [
and J. Note also that “Sura” is not quite the equivalent of “Chapter” because of the way the Quran is organized. Therefore, I will use Sura (not “Chapter”) to designate the 114 numbered sections of the Quran.

One of the recurring issues in study of the Quran is the concept of abrogation – i.e., that a later teaching may supersede an earlier teaching. The Quran deals directly with the issue in Sura 2:106, in which Allah says, “None of Our revelations do We abrogate or cause to be forgotten, but We substitute something better or similar. Knowest thou not that Allah Hath power over all things?” Other references to abrogation are in Sura 16:101 and Sura 13:39.

Remember that most suras are numbered in descending order of size, not chronologically, so the order of the verses, even within chapters, might not offer a reliable clue as to which verse came first. Where verses appear to differ, later revelations are generally considered to take precedence over earlier revelations.

An example of internal abrogation has to do with wine and gambling. Sura 2:219 and 4:13 have been interpreted as permitting wine but discouraging it. Al-Bukhari Hadith 6-60-142 and 6-60-144 reinforce this interpretation. Is this abrogation or is Muhammad just giving believers time to adjust to the new rule?

Sunan Abu-Dawud makes drinking wine a capital offense and then repeals it in the same narration: “Narrated Qabisah ibn Dhuwayb: The Prophet (peace_be_upon_him) said: If anyone drinks wine, flog him; if he repeats it, flog him, and if he repeats it, flog him. If he does it again a third or a fourth time, kill him. A man who had drunk wine was brought (to him) and he gave him lashes. He was again brought to him, and he flogged him. He was again brought to him and he flogged him. He was again brought to him and he flogged him. The punishment of killing (for drinking) was repealed, and a concession was allowed” (Book 38,
Number 4470, in the CMJE translation). But this narration is considered weak (da’eeef). Other examples include Quran 58:12 abrogated by the following verse and Quran 2:240 abrogated by previous verse 2:234.

It is beyond the scope of this study to settle theological issues, but abrogation does become relevant to an understanding of the nature and history of Islam as practiced in Palestine:

**Example:** Sura 2:62 seems to promise heaven for Jews and Christians; but Sura 5:69 and 3:85 declares “lost” any who desire a religion other than Islam.

**Example:** Does Sura 9:29, which is aggressive, abrogate Sura 2:109 and Sura 2:256, which are passive? Sura 9:29 says Muslims should “Fight those who believe not in Allah … until they pay the Jizya [poll tax] with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.” But Sura 2:109 counsels “forgive and overlook” and Sura 2:256 urges tolerance and peace (“Let there be no compulsion in religion”).

The most important verse in the Quran as regards the Arab-Israeli conflict is Sura 17, which states: “Glory to (Allah) Who did take His servant for a Journey by night from the Sacred Mosque to the farthest Mosque, whose precincts We did bless, in order that We might show him some of Our Signs: for He is the One Who heareth and seeth (all things).”

Muslims believe that the “farthest mosque” is the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, and thus sacred. Muslims farther believe that the Prophet Muhammad was taken from Mecca to Jerusalem on a heavenly creature (a horse?) called al-Buraq, which Muhammad tethered on the Western Wall while he ascended into heaven, sanctifying the wall. Wasserstein (1978) says the identification of the “farthest mosque” with Jerusalem dates from the caliphate of Abd al-Malik b. Marwan (685-705), who was engaged in conflict with Abd Allah b. al-Zubayr
who was installed at Mecca. Pipes (2001) argues that there was indeed a mosque called the
“Farthest Mosque” in Jerusalem and on the Temple Mount, but it was built in 715 – more
than four decades after the death of the Prophet. More likely, he says, the mosque that the
Prophet intended was in near-by Jirana, which the Prophet visited in 630, or in Mecca itself.

Those who criticize the Quran should read it first. Some practices attributed to Islam
have originated elsewhere. For example, justification for the stoning of adulterers is not found
in the Quran; the prescribed penalty is scourging (Sura 64, Verse 2). Mortimer (1982)
identifies veiling of women as a classic case in point. The Quran says nothing about veiling
the face and head.

… about Muhammad, the ‘unlettered prophet’

Quran 2:97 [This is one of two verses in the Quran that mention Gabriel by name. The other is
in 66:4, quoted below]
Say: Whoever is an enemy to Gabriel—for he brings down the (revelation) to thy heart by
Allah's will, a confirmation of what went before, and guidance and glad tidings for those who
believe,-

Quran 3:144
Muhammad is no more than a messenger.

Quran 4:13
…those who obey Allah and His Messenger will be admitted to Gardens with rivers flowing
beneath [heaven], to abide therein (for ever) …

Quran 6:50
Say: “I tell you not that with me are the treasures of Allah, nor do I know what is hidden, nor
do I tell you I am an angel. I but follow what is revealed to me.”

Quran 7:157
Those who follow the messenger, the unlettered Prophet, whom they find mentioned in their
own (scriptures),- in the law and the Gospel; - for he commands them what is just and forbids
them what is evil; he allows them as lawful what is good (and pure) and prohibits them from
what is bad (and impure); He releases them from their heavy burdens and from the yokes that
are upon them. So it is those who believe in him, honour him, help him, and follow the light
which is sent down with him,- it is they who will prosper.
Quran 7:188
Say: “I have no power over any good or harm to myself except as Allah willeth. If I had knowledge of the unseen, I should have multiplied all good, and no evil should have touched me: I am but a warner, and a bringer of glad tidings to those who have faith.”

Quran 10:15
But when Our Clear Signs are rehearsed unto them, those who rest not their hope on their meeting with Us, Say: ‘Bring us a reading other than this, or change this,” Say: "It is not for me, of my own accord, to change it: I follow naught but what is revealed unto me: if I were to disobey my Lord, I should myself fear the penalty of a Great Day (to come).’”

Quran 16:102
Say, the Holy Spirit has brought the revelation from thy Lord in Truth, in order to strengthen those who believe, and as a Guide and Glad Tidings to Muslims.

Quran 17:1
Glory to (Allah) Who did take His servant for a Journey by night from the Sacred Mosque to the farthest Mosque, whose precincts We did bless, in order that We might show him some of Our Signs: for He is the One Who heareth and seeth (all things).

Quran 61:2
It is He Who has sent amongst the Unlettered a messenger from among themselves, to rehearse to them His Signs, to sanctify them, and to instruct them in Scripture and Wisdom, although they had been, before, in manifest error.-

Quran 61:6 [“Ahmad” is another name for the Prophet Muhammad.]
And remember, Jesus, the son of Mary, said: "O Children of Israel! I am the messenger of Allah (sent) to you, confirming the Law (which came) before me, and giving Glad Tidings of a Messenger to come after me, whose name shall be Ahmad." But when he came to them with Clear Signs, they said, "this is evident sorcery!"

Quran 66:4 [This is one of two verses that mention Gabriel in the Quran. The other is in 2:97, quoted above.]
If ye two turn in repentance to Him, your hearts are indeed so inclined: But if ye back up each other against him, truly Allah is his Protector, and Gabriel, and (every) righteous one among those who believe,—and furthermore, the angels - will back (him) up.

Sahih al-Bukhari Volume 9, Book 93, Number 615 -- So Allah's Apostle used to listen whenever Gabriel came to him, and when Gabriel left, the Prophet would recite the Qur'an as Gabriel had recited it to him.

... about Jerusalem

Jerusalem enters Muslim theology primarily in three contexts, in order of significance:

the point of departure for Muhammad’s night journey to heaven; the direction to face while
praying (qibla); and references to mosques to be visited. Neither the Quran nor Hadiths mention Jerusalem by name or use its Arabic names, Baitul Maqdis (the Holy House) or al-Quds (The Holy); references to it are assumed by context and indicated by a parenthetical insertion that supplies the translator’s understanding of Allah’s intent, which has given rise to questions. For example, Sura 17:1 specifies that the jumping off point for Muhammad’s journey to heaven is “the farthest Mosque.” But Muhammad died in 632 A.D., Arabs conquered Jerusalem in 638, and construction of the mosque named Al-Aqsa (the farthest) began in 685.

Wasserstein (1978, p. 223) cites A.J. Arberry’s translation of Sura 17:1 as the “further mosque” and dates its connection to Jerusalem as having arisen from a rivalry between two contenders for the title of caliph. Abd al-Malik b. Marwan (685-705), having been installed in Jerusalem, needed a sacred text affirming the superiority of Jerusalem over Mecca, where Abd Allah b. al-Zubayr had been installed.

The CMJE translators of the Hadiths (but not the Quran) refer to Bayt (or Bait) al-Maqdis and to Ilya (or Elia or Aelia) and insert in parentheses that Jerusalem is meant. The connection is most explicit in the translation for Sahih Muslim Book 23, Number 4986: “This Hadith is narrated on the authority of Abu Huraira through another chain of transmitters, but he did not mention Aelia (Capitolina, i.e. Bait al-Maqdis).” Colonia Aelia Capitolina was the name that the Romans gave to Jerusalem after they had razed it.

Quran 2:142
The fools among the people will say: “What hath turned them from the Qibla to which they were used?” Say: To Allah belong both east and West: He guideth whom He will to a Way that is straight.”
Quran 2:144
We see the turning of thy face (for guidance) [close parenthesis added] to the heavens: now
Shall We turn thee to a Qibla that shall please thee. Turn then Thy face in the direction of the
sacred Mosque: Wherever ye are, turn your faces in that direction.

Quran 17:1
Glory to (Allah) Who did take His servant for a Journey by night from the Sacred Mosque [in
Mecca] to the farthest Mosque, whose precincts We did bless,- in order that We might show
him some of Our Signs: for He is the One Who heareth and seeth (all things).

Sahih al-Bukhari – Book 2, Volume 1, Number 39
When the Prophet came to Medina, he stayed first with his grandfathers or maternal uncles
from Ansar. He offered his prayers facing Baitul-Maqdis (Jerusalem) for sixteen or seventeen
months, but he wished that he could pray facing the Ka'ba (at Mecca). The first prayer which
he offered facing the Ka'ba was the 'Asr prayer in the company of some people. Then one of
those who had offered that prayer with him came out and passed by some people in a mosque
who were bowing during their prayers (facing Jerusalem). He said addressing them, "By
Allah, I testify that I have prayed with Allah's Apostle facing Mecca (Ka'ba)." Hearing that,
those people changed their direction towards the Ka'ba immediately. Jews and the people of
the scriptures used to be pleased to see the Prophet facing Jerusalem in prayers but when he
changed his direction towards the Ka'ba, during the prayers, they disapproved of it.

Sahih al-Bukhari – Book 4, Volume 1, Number 151: Narrated 'Abdullah bin 'Umar: “Once I
went up the roof of our house and saw Allah's Apostle answering the call of nature while
sitting over two bricks facing Bait-ul-Maqdis (Jerusalem).”

Sahih al-Bukhari – Book 8, Volume 1, Number 392
Allah's Apostle prayed facing Baitul-Maqdis for sixteen or seventeen months but he loved to
face the Ka'ba (at Mecca) so Allah revealed: "Verily, We have seen the turning of your face to
the heaven!" (2.144) So the Prophet faced the Ka'ba and the fools amongst the people namely
"the Jews" said, "What has turned them from their Qibla (Bait-ul-Maqdis) which they
formerly observed" (Allah revealed): "Say: 'To Allah belongs the East and the West. He
guides whom he will to a straight path'." (2.142) A man prayed with the Prophet (facing the
Ka'ba) and went out. He saw some of the Ansar praying the 'Asr prayer with their faces
towards Bait-ul-Maqdis, he said, "I bear witness that I prayed with Allah's Apostle facing the
Ka'ba." So all the people turned their faces towards the Ka'ba.”

Sahih Bukhari -- Book 55, Volume 4, Number 585 [Muhammad’s disciple, Abu Dhar, gets a
history lesson.]
I said, ‘O Allah's Apostle! Which mosque was first built on the surface of the earth?’ He said,
‘Al-Masjid-ul-Haram (in Mecca).’ I said, ‘Which was built next?’ He replied ‘The mosque of
Al-Aqsa (in Jerusalem).’ I said, ‘What was the period of construction between the two?’ He
said, ‘Forty years.’ ” [The location of the Masjid al-Haram is unquestionably in Mecca; the
location of the Al-Aqsa Mosque (the “farthest mosque”) to which the Prophet Muhammad
referred is less obvious because there were no mosques in Jerusalem at the time.]
Sahih Muslim -- Book 4, Number 1073 [*Finding no unambiguous passages -- i.e., without parenthetical assumptions or insertions -- either in the Quran or in the Hadiths directing the prayers of Muslims initially to Jerusalem, Pipes (2001) suggests that the first direction of prayer had been toward Syria:]*

Ibn Umar reported: As the people were praying at Quba, a man came to them and said: It has been revealed to file Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) during the night and he has been directed to turn towards the Kaba. So turn towards it. Their faces were towards Syria and they turned round towards Kaba.”

Sahih Muslim -- Book 7, Sura 91, Number 3218

Abu Huraira … reported it directly from Allah's Apostle … that he said: “Do not undertake journey but to three mosques: this mosque of mine, the Mosque of al-Haram and the Mosque of Aqsa (Bait al-Maqdis).”

Malik’s Muwatta -- Book 1, Chapter 75, Number 309. *This is the famous account of Muhammad’s night journey into heaven. It introduces al-Buraq, which is described as “an animal white and long, larger than a donkey but smaller than a mule” – by tradition, a horse, although Muhammad certainly knew a horse when he saw one. “I mounted it and came to the Temple” – here the Hadith inserts in parentheses: ‘(Bait Maqdis in Jerusalem)’ – “then tethered to it the ring used by the prophets” -- again, by tradition, the Western Wall of the Haram Al-Sharif -- “and entered the mosque to pray.” At this point Muhammad’s guide is identified as Gabriel, described in Sura 78 as an angel, and the Hadith says, “Then he took me to heaven.” Some negotiations take place regarding the number of obligatory prayers, and Allah and Muhammad settle on five. Muhammad meets Adam, Jesus, Abraham and other prophets.*

Malik’s Muwatta -- Book 5, Number 5.7.17

“I heard the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, say, ‘Only make a special journey to three mosques: the mosque of the Haram (Makka), this mosque (Madina), and the mosque of Ilya [also spelled Elia] or the Bait Al-Maqdis (two names of Jerusalem)” [Also spelled Bayt in English to avoid the association of “bait” with “lure”].

... about jihad

*English translations accepted by CMJE do not use the word jihad, apparently because it is an Arabic word. Natan (2004) compiled 164 verses that refer to jihad in the Quran. The CMJE index points to 24 verses under the heading of jihad, which it defines as fighting, struggling, endeavoring or striving, as in striving for self-improvement, for virtue or for social justice. Landau-Tasseron (2003, p. 36) cites only 10 passages where the Arabic root j-h-d*
definitely denotes warfare (highlighted below in bold type). Sometimes the context is ambiguous, sometimes pacific, sometimes paired with fighting.

*Internal jihad clearly is the meaning of Sura 2, Verse 148, which urges believers, to “strive together (as in a race) towards all that is good.”* Sura 22.78 is an even more obviously pacific. It affirms jihad in the sense of effort to obey God, urging believers to “strive in His cause as ye ought to strive, (with sincerity and under discipline). ... establish regular Prayer, give regular Charity, and hold fast to Allah!”

The key words that usually signal a context of fighting are “in the cause of Allah” or “in Allah’s cause.” Suras 9.5 and 9.29 are referred to as the “sword verses” (Landau-Tasseron, 2003, p. 40). Sura 2, gets the notion of fighting, striving and struggling all in one verse (218).

*Nor do the CMJE translations of the Quran use the expression holy war or even holy in the context of war. However, believers who die while fighting in the cause of Allah (shaheed, usually translated as holy martyrs) are promised heaven with a rich set of rewards.*

Passages that use the root j-h-d (jihad) to show the relationship between jihad and fighting in the cause of Allah are shown below in bold type (emphasis added).

The CMJE translations of the Hadiths, on the other hand, preserve the term jihad and add references to holy battles and to who may call for a jihad (meaning holy battle). Properly called, believers (with a few exceptions) are required to take up arms. Burkhari 4-52-42 and 4-52-79, for example, limits authority for a call to arms to a Muslim ruler.

**Quran 2:190-193**

Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors. And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have Turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the Sacred Mosque, unless they (first) fight you there; but if they fight you, slay them. Such is
the reward of those who suppress faith. But if they cease, Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. And fight them on until there is no more Tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah; but if they cease, Let there be no hostility except to those who practise oppression.

Quran 2:216
Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that ye love a thing which is bad for you. But Allah knoweth, and ye know not.

Quran 4:74
Let those fight in the cause of Allah Who sell the life of this world for the hereafter. To him who fighteth in the cause of Allah,- whether he is slain or gets victory - Soon shall We give him a reward of great (value).”

Quran 4:84
Then fight in Allah's cause - Thou art held responsible only for thyself - and rouse [Pickthal: “urge on”] the believers.

Quran 4:91
…if they withdraw not from you nor give you (guarantees) of peace besides restraining their hands, seize them and slay them wherever ye get them:

Quran 4:95
Not equal are those believers who site (at home) and receive no hurt, and those who strive and fight in the cause of Allah. … those who strive and fight Hath He distinguished above those who sit (at home) by a special reward,-

Quran 5:54
… soon will Allah produce a people whom He will love as they will love Him,- lowly with the believers, mighty against the rejecters, fighting in the way of Allah …

Quran 8:61
But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace …

Quran 9:14
Fight them, and Allah will punish them by your hands, cover them with shame, help you (to victory) over them, heal the breasts of Believers,

Quran 9:29
Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.
**Quran 9:41**
Go ye forth, (whether equipped) lightly or heavily, and strive and struggle, with your goods and your persons, in the cause of Allah.

**Quran 9:44**
Those who believe in Allah and the Last Day ask thee for no exemption from fighting with their goods and persons. And Allah knoweth well those who do their duty.

**Quran 9:73**
O Prophet! Strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites! Be harsh with them. Their ultimate abode is hell. What does it mean to be harsh? Sura 66 Verse 9, which is on the same topic, uses the words firm, stern and hard.

**Quran 9:81**
Those who were left behind (in the Tabuk expedition) rejoiced at sitting still behind the messenger of Allah [Muhammad], and were averse to striving with their wealth and their lives in Allah’s way.

**Quran 9:88**
But the Messenger, and those who believe with him, strive and fight with their wealth and their persons: for them are (all) good things: and it is they who will prosper.

**Quran 9:123**
O ye who believe! fight the unbelievers who gird you about, and let them find firmness [Pickth: “harshness”] in you: and know that Almight is with those who fear Him.

**Quran 25:52**
Therefore listen not to the Unbelievers, but strive against them with the utmost strenuousness, with the (Qur'an).

**Sahih al-Bukhari -- Book 52**
*The title of the book is translated as “Fighting for the cause of Allah (jihad).”*

**Sahih al-Bukhari -- 1-2-25**
Allah’s Apostle was asked, ‘What is the best deed?’ He replied, ‘To believe in Allah and His Apostle (Muhammad).’ The questioner then asked, ‘What is the next (in goodness)?’ He replied, ‘To participate in jihad (religious fighting) in Allah’s Cause.’

**Sahih al-Bukhari -- 1-10-505**
I asked the Prophet ‘Which deed is the dearest to Allah?’ He replied, ‘To offer the prayers at their early stated fixed times.’ I asked, ‘What is the next (in goodness)?’ He replied, ‘To be good and dutiful to your parents.’ I again asked, ‘What is the next (in goodness)?’ he replied, ‘To participate in jihad (religious fighting) in Allah’s cause.’

**Sahih al-Bukhari-- 3-46-724**
Allah’s Apostle said, ‘A pious slave gets a double reward.’ Abu Huraira added: ‘By Him in
Whose Hands my soul is but for Jihad (i.e., holy battles), Hajj, and my duty to serve my mother, I would have loved to die as a slave.’ ”

Sahih al-Bukhari-- 4-52-42
Allah’s Apostle said, ‘There is no Hijra (i.e., migration) (from Mecca to Medina) after the Conquest (of Mecca), but Jihad and good intention remain and if you are called (by the Muslim ruler) for fighting, go forth immediately.’ ”

Sahih al-Bukhari-- 4-52-79
On the day of the Conquest (of Mecca) the Prophet said, ‘There is no emigration after the Conquest but Jihad and intentions. When you are called (by the Muslim ruler) for fighting, go forth immediately.”

Sahih al-Bukhari-- 4-52-311
When you are called for jihad, you should immediately respond to the call.”

Sahih al-Bukhari-- 4-53-352
Allah's Apostle said, ‘Allah guarantees him who strives in His Cause and whose motivation for going out is nothing but Jihad in His Cause and belief in His Word, that He will admit him into Paradise (if martyred) or bring him back to his dwelling place, whence he has come out, with what he gains of reward and booty.’ ”

Sahih al-Bukhari-- 4-53-412
Allah's Apostle said on the day of the conquest of Mecca, “There is no migration now, but there is Jihad (i.e., holy battle) and good intentions. And when you are called for Jihad, you should come out at once.”

Sahih al-Bukhari -- 4-56-792
The Prophet said, “A time will come when the people will wage holy war …”

Sahih al-Bukhari-- 5-59-598
I said to the Prophet, ‘For what will you take his pledge of allegiance?’ The Prophet said, ‘I will take his pledge of allegiance for Islam, Belief, and for Jihad (i.e. fighting in Allah's Cause).’ ”

Sahih al-Bukhari-- 9-93-519
He [Muhammad] said, “There are one-hundred degrees in Paradise which Allah has prepared for those who carry on Jihad in His Cause.”

Sahih al-Bukhari-- 9-93-550
A man came to the Prophet and said, “A man fights for pride and haughtiness another fights for bravery, and another fights for showing off; which of these (cases) is in Allah's Cause?” The Prophet said, “The one who fights that Allah's Word (Islam) should be superior, fights in Allah's Cause.”
Sahih Muslim – Book 1, Number 0148
Abu Dharr reported: I said: “Messenger of Allah, which of the deeds is the best? He (the Holy Prophet) replied: Belief in Allah and Jihad in His cause.”

Sahih Muslim – Book 5, Number 2239
… These who engage in prayer will he invited to enter [heaven] by the gate of prayer; those who take part in Jihad will be invited to enter by the gate of Jihad;”

Sahih Muslim – Book 18, Number 4279
When we returned from Jihad. by a good fortune for me, I performed Pilgrimage.

Sahih Muslim – Book 19, Number 4347
The properties abandoned by Banu Nadir were the ones which Allah bestowed upon His Apostle … He would meet the annual expenditure of his family from the income thereof, and would spend what remained for purchasing horses and weapons as preparation for Jihad.

Sahih Muslim – Book 20, Number 4597
The translator in parentheses defines jihad as “fighting for the cause of Islam.”

Sahih Muslim – Book 20, Number 4677
Messenger of Allah, where shall I be if I am killed? He replied: “In Paradise.”

Sunan Abu-Dawud – Book 10, Number 1795
“… I am eager to wage war in the cause of Allah (i.e. jihad), …”

Sunan Abu-Dawud – Book 14, Number 2513
Apostle of Allah, tell me about jihad and fighting. He replied: “Abdullah ibn Amr, if you fight with endurance seeking from Allah your reward, Allah will resurrect you showing endurance and seeking your reward from Him, but, if you fight for vain show seeking to acquire much, Allah will resurrect you making a vain show …”

Sunan Abu-Dawud – Book 14, Number 2514
… Who will tell our brethren about us that we are alive in Paradise provided with provision, in order that they might not be disinterested in jihad and recoil in war? Allah Most High said: “I shall tell them about you, …”

Sunan Abu-Dawud – Book 14, Number 2527
Striving in the path of Allah (jihad) is incumbent on you along with every ruler, whether he is pious or impious; the prayer is obligatory on you behind every believer, pious or impious, even if he commits grave sins; the (funeral) prayer is incumbent upon every Muslim, pious and impious, even if he commits major sins.

Sunan Abu-Dawud – Book 37, Number 4330
The best fighting (jihad) in the path of Allah is (to speak) a word of justice to an oppressive ruler.”
Malik’s Muwatta – Book 20

[The title of this book is translated as “Stimulation of desire for jihad.”]

Malik’s Muwatta – Book 21, Number 21.15.34
Umar ibn al-Khattab used to say, ‘O Allah! I ask you for martyrdom in Your way and death in the city of Your Messenger!’

Malik’s Muwatta – Book 21, Number 21.18.42
One of the Ansar was eating some dates in his hand, and said, ‘Am I so desirous of this world that I should sit until I finish them?’ He threw aside what was in his hand and took his sword, and fought until he was slain.”

… about martyrs

The Arabic word shaheed usually is translated as martyr or holy martyr – i.e., one who gives his life for Allah. Davidson (2003, March 9, p. 18) translates the word as “suicide bomber.” The Abu-Dawud Hadith (Book 20, Number 3105) gives this definition affirmatively:

“… The Apostle of Allah said … What do you consider martyrdom? They said: Being killed in the cause of Allah,” which connects martyrdom and jihad.

The Quran suggests that martyrs will receive some special, sometimes unspecified, rewards, not available to all believers, after death. Sura 4.74, for example, promises, “To him who fighteth in the cause of Allah, -- whether he is slain or gets victory -- Soon shall We give him a reward of great (value).” Sura 47.4 offers celebrity: “But those who are slain in the Way of Allah,– He will never let their deeds be lost.”

One of the specified rewards is a kind of life after death, as pledged in Sura 2.154:

“And say not of those who are slain in the way of Allah: ‘They are dead.’ Nay, they are living, though ye perceive (it) not.” Sura 3.169 reinforces the position: “Think not of those who are slain in Allah's way as dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the presence of their Lord;”
Sura 3.195 adds: “… Those who have left their homes, or been driven out therefrom, or suffered harm in My Cause, or fought or been slain, verily, I will blot out from them their iniquities, and admit them into Gardens with rivers flowing beneath; [heaven] …” But the same reward is promised to all believers.

Sura 9.20 promises that those who “strove hard in Allah’s way” will rank much higher with Allah. Since no one strives harder than martyrs, by analogy they will gain a higher level of heaven than ordinary believers.

The heroic aspect of martyrdom is captured by Sura 47.4: “But those who are slain in the Way of Allah, He will never let their deeds be lost.”

The most specific (but least trustworthy) statement of rewards are found in a commentary on Sura 36 of the Quran (ibn Kathir, 2008) under the heading Merit of the Martyrs: “As the first drop of his blood gushes forth, a martyr is granted six merits: all of his sins are forgiven, he is shown his place in Paradise, he is married to wide-eyed Huris, he is secured from the great fear (on Judgement Day) and the torment of the grave, and he is adorned with the adornments of Iman.) Ahmad was alone in recording this Hadith. Abu Ad-Darda’, may Allah be pleased with him, reported that Allah’s Messenger said, [Arabic text follows.] (A martyr is allowed to intercede for seventy members of his household.) This was recorded by Abu Dawud.”

One of the most famous quotations attributed to Islam promises that martyrs will be rewarded with 72 beautiful virgins as consorts in heaven. But no passage in the Quran supports this supposition. The closest that any authoritative reference comes is a Hadith collected by al-Tirmidhi (2009). The Hadith describes the heaven that awaits all who die as believers: “The humblest inhabitant of Paradise will have eighty thousand servants and
seventy-two wives, and a large pavilion will be erected for him made of pearls, aquamarine, and rubies covering the distance between Jabiyah and San’a” (Names of two cities far away from each other).” Mak (2009) translates wives as houris.

The most graphic descriptions are found in the ibn Kathir’s commentaries, which are accepted as authoritative, although in a lesser position than the Quran and the Hadiths. Referring to Quran Sura 56, ibn Kathir defines the hur: “Therefore, Allah’s statement, (Verily, We have created them) meaning, in the other life, after they became old in this life, they were brought back while virgin, youthful, being delightfully passionate with their husbands, beautiful, kind and cheerful. Abu Dawud at-Tayalisi recorded that Anas said that the Messenger of Allah said, (in Paradise, the believer will be given such and such strength for women.) Anas said, ‘I asked, “O Allah’s Messenger! Will one be able to do that?”’ He said, (He will be given the strength of a hundred (men).’ At-Tirmidhi also recorded it and said, ‘Sahih Gharib.’ Abu al-Qasim al-Tabarani recorded that Abu Hurayrah said that the Messenger of Allah was asked, “O Allah’s Messenger! Will we have sexual intercourse with our wives in Paradise” He said ‘The man will be able to have sexual intercourse with a hundred virgins in one day.’ ”

Although the West is blamed for propagating the myth that suicide bombers are promised virgins in heaven, some captured terrorists refer to the promise to explain their commitment. Abdul Rhman Maath Thafir al Amri, interviewed at Guantanamo, Cuba, is quoted in a U.S. Defense Department summary of evidence: “The detainee stated he joined jihad for religious reasons, motivated by the media, Allah’s promise of 72 virgins, and paradise in heaven” (Al Amri (2006, June 21, p. 9). Abdullah el-Faisal, imam of a mosque in London, was said to “promise teenage Muslim boys that their reward in paradise would be 72
virgins if they died as religious martyrs” (Cowell, 2007). Warraq (2002) quoted Hamas activist Muhammad Abu Wardeh, who described on CBS-TV how he recruited terrorists for suicide bombings in Israel: “If you become a martyr, God will give you 70 virgins, 70 wives and everlasting happiness.” And shortly before the suicide attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the ringleader, Mohammed Atta, rallied his co-conspirators, saying, “The virgins are calling you” (Kristof, 2004, Aug 4).

The Quran does promise beautiful virgins – the Arabic word is hur – but they are to be made available to all believers and the precise number is not specified. In fact, the Arabic hur has entered the English language as houri and is defined by Webster’s New World College Dictionary (Third Edition) as “1 in Muslim belief, any of the beautiful nymphs of the Muslim Paradise 2 a seductively beautiful woman.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2nd Edition) defines a houri as “one of the beautiful virgins provided in paradise for all faithful Muslims.” The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd Edition) give this description: “A nymph of the Muslim Paradise. Hence, applied allusively to a voluptuously beautiful woman.”

The Quran describes hur in several sensuous passages, such as Sura 44, Verses 51 and 54: “As to the Righteous (they will be) in a position of Security … We shall join them to fair women with beautiful, big, and lustrous eyes.” Sura 56.22, 24 and 35-36 goes on to say, “And (there will be) Companions with beautiful, big, and lustrous eyes … A Reward for the deed of their past (life). We have created (their Companions) of special creation. And made them virgin – pure (and undefiled).- For the Companions of the Right Hand.” And Sura 78 adds at Verses 31 and 33: “Verily for the Righteous there will be a fulfillment of (the heart’s) desires … And voluptuous women of equal age;”
Jarrar (2003, p. 456) adds: “Traditional sources state that the houris are forever at the age of 33 and will always retain their virginity; all unpleasant physical functions of the body are non-existent in paradise.”

So although the Quran does not specifically reserve the blessing of hur for martyrs, it is possible to see that suicide bombers could be recruited with these and other verses, such as:

Quran 3:195
And their Lord hath accepted of them, and answered them: "Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of you, be he male or female: Ye are members, one of another: Those who have left their homes, or been driven out therefrom, or suffered harm in My Cause, or fought or been slain,- verily, I will blot out from them their iniquities, and admit them into Gardens with rivers flowing beneath;- A reward from the presence of Allah, and from His presence is the best of rewards."

Quran 9:38
O ye who believe! what is the matter with you, that, when ye are asked to go forth in the cause of Allah, ye clinging heavily to the earth? Do ye prefer the life of this world to the Hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the Hereafter.

Quran 47:4
… those who are slain in the Way of Allah,- He will never let their deeds be lost.

Quran 55:46, 56 and 56:36
But for such as fear the time when they will stand before (the Judgment Seat of) their Lord, there will be two Gardens [in heaven]- … In them will be (Maidens), chaste, restraining their glances, whom no man or Jinn before them has touched;- … Companions restrained (as to their glances), in (goodly) pavilions … And made them virgin – pure (and undefiled),-

Quran 56:22
And (there will be) [in heaven] Companions with beautiful, big, and lustrous eyes,- [This is one of the passages in which hur have been translated as Companions.]

Malik’s Muwatta – Book 21, Number 21.15.34
Umar ibn al-Khattab used to say, “O Allah! I ask you for martyrdom in Your way and death in the city of Your Messenger!”

… about the after-life

Sura 56, titled “The Event, The Inevitable,” deals with death, heaven and hell. The question becomes how the rewards of everyone in heaven differ from the rewards promised to
martyrs. Sura 4, Verse 57, of the Quran says, “And (as for) those who believe and do good deeds, We will make them enter gardens beneath which rivers flow, to abide in them for ever; they shall have therein pure mates, and We shall make them enter a dense shade.” Drinking wine, which is prohibited on earth (Sahih Muslim Book 23, Sura 1: Forbiddance of Wine), will be enjoyed in purified form in heaven: “Their thirst will be slaked with Pure Wine sealed” (Quran 83.25).

Quran 9:38
O ye who believe! what is the matter with you, that, when ye are asked to go forth in the cause of Allah, ye cling heavily to the earth? Do ye prefer the life of this world to the Hereafter? But little is the comfort of this life, as compared with the Hereafter.

Quran 55:60
Is there any Reward for Good - other than Good?” [The answer includes: Quran 55:70: In them will be fair (Companions), good, beautiful … [Verse 72:] Companions restrained (as to their glances), in (goodly) pavilions;- [and Verse 74:] Whom no man of Jinn before them has touched;-]

Quran 78:31, 33
Verily for the Righteous there will be a fulfilment of (the heart's) desires; … And voluptuous women of equal age;” There is no suggestion in the sura that the Righteous includes only martyrs.

Malik’s Muwatta -- Volume 4, Book 52, Number 53
The Prophet said, ‘Nobody who dies and finds good from Allah (in the Hereafter) would wish to come back to this world even if he were given the whole world and whatever is in it, except the martyr who, on seeing the superiority of martyrdom, would like to come back to the world and get killed again (in Allah's Cause).’ ”

… about Jews

The Quran expresses mixed feelings about the Jews, who also are described as Children of Israel and People of the Book (the Tanakh). Some Jewish traditions are claimed as Arabic traditions. Both Arabs and Jews count Adam, Moses, Abraham, and others as their prophets. Muhammad expected the Jews also to embrace him as a prophet. When most Jews did not, Muhammad was wrathful.
Sura 5, Verse 15, makes the case: “O people of the Book! There hath come to you our
Messenger, revealing to you much that ye used to hide in the Book, and passing over much
(that is now unnecessary): There hath come to you from Allah a (new) light and a perspicuous
Book, -” And from Sura 5.65: “If only the People of the Book had believed and been
righteous, We should indeed have blotted out their iniquities and admitted them to gardens of
bliss.”

But Allah curses the Jews in 5:78 and 9:30, and turns some of them into apes and
swine in Sura 5, Verse 60. The malediction is repeated in Sura 7:166: “When in their
insolence they transgressed (all) prohibitions, We said to them: ‘Be ye apes, despised and
rejected.’ ” Sura 9, Verse 30, accuses the Jews of calling Uzair (Ezra) the son of Allah (God),
but nothing in the Jewish literature makes such a claim.

The strongest condemnation is in the al-Bukhari Hadiths, considered the most
authentic account of the life and sayings of Muhammad. Volume 4, Book 2, Number 176,
relates, “Allah's Apostle said, ‘You (Muslims) will fight with the Jews till some of them will
hide behind stones.’ The stones will (betray them), saying, “O Abdullah (servant of Allah)!
There is a Jew hiding behind me; so kill him.’ ”

Two of the Hadith collections – al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim – blame the Jews for
feeding Muhammad poison. The briefest citation is in Sahih Muslim Book 26, Number 5431:
“Anas b. Malik reported that a Jewess brought poisoned meat and then served it to Allah's
Messenger (may peace be upon him).” The previous passage provides details. Although
Muhammad did not die immediately, al-Bukhari Volume 5, Book 59, Number 713 reported
that the poison contributed to his death: “Narraeted 'Aisha: The Prophet in his ailment in
which he died, used to say, ‘O 'Aisha! I still feel the pain caused by the food I ate at Khaibar,
and at this time, I feel as if my aorta is being cut from that poison.’ ” The Jews are quoted in 
al-Bukhari 5-59-713 explaining the attempt: “They said, ‘We wanted to know if you were a liar in which case we would get rid of you, and if you are a prophet then the poison would not harm you.’ ”

Quran 2:40
O Children of Israel! call to mind the (special) favour which I bestowed upon you, and fulfil your covenant with Me as I fulfil My Covenant with you, and fear none but Me.

Quran 2:47
Children of Israel! call to mind the (special) favour which I bestowed upon you, and that I preferred you to all other (for My Message).

Quran 2:61
…They were covered with humiliation and misery; they drew on themselves the wrath of Allah. This because they went on rejecting the Signs of Allah and slaying His Messengers without just cause. This because they rebelled and went on transgressing.

Quran 2:65
And well ye knew those amongst you who transgressed in the matter of the Sabbath: We said to them: "Be ye apes, despised and rejected."

Quran 2:83
And remember We took a covenant from the Children of Israel (to this effect): Worship none but Allah; treat with kindness your parents and kindred, and orphans and those in need; speak fair to the people; be steadfast in prayer; and practise regular charity. Then did ye turn back, except a few among you, and ye backslide (even now).

Quran 2:88
They say, “Our hearts are the wrappings (which preserve Allah's Word: we need no more).” Nay, Allah's curse is on them for their blasphemy: Little is it they believe.

Quran 3:93
All food was lawful to the Children of Israel, except what Israel Made unlawful for itself, before the Law (of Moses) was revealed. Say: "Bring ye the Law and study it, if ye be men of truth."

Quran 3:112
Shame is pitched over them (Like a tent) wherever they are found, except when under a covenant (of protection) from Allah and from men; they draw on themselves wrath from Allah, and pitched over them is (the tent of) destitution. This because they rejected the Signs of Allah, and slew the prophets in defiance of right; this because they rebelled and transgressed beyond bounds.
Quran 3:181
Allah hath heard the taunt of those who say: “Truly, Allah is indigent and we are rich!”- We shall certainly record their word and (their act) of slaying the prophets in defiance of right, and We shall say: “Taste ye the penalty of the Scorching Fire!”

Quran 4:46-47
…Allah hath cursed them for their Unbelief; and but few of them will believe. O ye People of the Book! believe in what We have (now) revealed, confirming what was (already) with you, before We change the face and fame of some (of you) beyond all recognition, and turn them hindwards, or curse them as We cursed the Sabbath-breakers, for the decision of Allah Must be carried out.

Quran 4:155
(They have incurred divine displeasure): In that they broke their covenant; that they rejected the signs of Allah; that they slew the Messengers in defiance of right; that they said, “Our hearts are the wrappings (which preserve Allah's Word; We need no more);- Nay, Allah hath set the seal on their hearts for their blasphemy, and little is it they believe;”

Quran 5:13
But because of their breach of their covenant, We cursed them … but forgive them, and overlook (their misdeeds): for Allah loveth those who are kind.

Quran 5:51
O ye who believe! take not the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors: They are but friends and protectors to each other. And he amongst you that turns to them (for friendship) is of them. Verily Allah guideth not a people unjust.

Quran 5:59-60
Say: “O people of the Book! Do ye disapprove of us for no other reason than that we believe in Allah, and the revelation that hath come to us and that which came before (us), and (perhaps) that most of you are rebellious and disobedient?” Shall I point out to you something much worse than this, (as judged) by the treatment it received from Allah? those who incurred the curse of Allah and His wrath, those of whom some He transformed into apes and swine, those who worshipped evil;- these are (many times) worse in rank, and far more astray from the even path!

Quran 5:63
… Evil indeed are their works.

Quran 5:64
The Jews say: “Allah's hand is tied up.” Be their hands tied up and be they accursed for the (blasphemy) they utter. Nay, both His hands are widely outstretched: He giveth and spendeth (of His bounty) as He pleaseth. But the revelation that cometh to thee from Allah increaseth in most of them their obstinate rebellion and blasphemy. Amongst them we have placed enmity and hatred till the Day of Judgment. Every time they kindle the fire of war, Allah doth
extinguish it; but they (ever) strive to do mischief on earth. And Allah loveth not those who do mischief.

Quran 5:68
Say: “O People of the Book! ye have no ground to stand upon unless ye stand fast by the Law, the Gospel, and all the revelation that has come to you from your Lord.” It is the revelation that cometh to thee from thy Lord, that increaseth in most of them their obstinate rebellion and blasphemy. But sorrow thou not over (these) people without Faith.

Quran 5:69
Those who believe (in the Qur'an), those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Sabians and the Christians,- any who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and work righteousness,- on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve.

Quran 5:78
Curses were pronounced on those among the Children of Israel who rejected Faith, by the tongue of David and of Jesus the son of Mary: because they disobeyed and persisted in excesses.

Quran 5:82
Strongest among men in enmity to the believers wilt thou find the Jews and Pagans; …

Quran 7:137
And We made a people, considered weak (and of no account), inheritors of lands in both east and west, - lands whereon We sent down Our blessings. The fair promise of thy Lord was fulfilled for the Children of Israel, because they had patience and constancy, and We levelled to the ground the great works and fine buildings which Pharaoh and his people erected (with such pride).

Quran 7:166
When in their insolence they transgressed (all) prohibitions, We said to them: "Be ye apes, despised and rejected."

Quran 9:30
The Jews call 'Uzair a son of Allah, and the Christians call Christ the son of Allah. That is a saying from their mouth; (in this) they but imitate what the unbelievers of old used to say. Allah's curse be on them: how they are deluded away from the Truth!

Quran 17:104
And We said thereafter to the Children of Israel, “Dwell securely in the land (of promise)”: but when the second of the warnings came to pass, We gathered you together in a mingled crowd.
Quran 20:47
“So go ye both to him, and say, ‘Verily we are messengers sent by thy Lord: Send forth, therefore, the Children of Israel with us, and afflict them not: with a Sign, indeed, have we come from thy Lord! and peace to all who follow guidance!”

Quran 27:76
Verily this Qur'an doth explain to the Children of Israel most of the matters in which they disagree.

Quran 33:26-27
And those of the People of the Book who aided them - Allah did take them down from their strongholds and cast terror into their hearts. (So that) some ye slew, and some ye made prisoners. And He made you heirs of their lands, their houses, and their goods, and of a land which ye had not frequented (before). And Allah has power over all things.

Quran 45:16
We did aforetime grant to the Children of Israel the Book the Power of Command, and Prophethood; We gave them, for Sustenance, things good and pure; and We favoured them above the nations.

Quran 46.10
Say: “See ye? If (this teaching) be from Allah, and ye reject it, and a witness from among the Children of Israel testifies to its similarity (with earlier scripture), and has believed while ye are arrogant, (how unjust ye are!) truly, Allah guides not a people unjust.”

Sahih al-Bukhari -- 1-8-392
Narrated Bara bin Azib: Allah’s Apostle prayed facing Baitul-Maqdis for sixteen or seventeen months but he loved to face the Kaba (at Mecca) so Allah revealed: “Verily, We have seen the turning of your face to the heaven!” (2:144) So the Prophet faced the Kaba and the fools amongstst the people namely “the Jews” said, “What has turned them from their Qibla (Bait-ul-Maqdis) which they formerly observed’ ” (Allah revealed): “Say: ‘To Allah belongs the East and the West. He guides whom he will to a straight path.’ ”

Sahih al-Bukhari -- 2-23-445
The Prophet (p.b.u.h) said, ‘Whoever intentionally swears falsely by a religion other than Islam, then he is what he has said, (e.g. if he says, ‘If such thing is not true then I am a Jew,’ he is really a Jew).’ ”

Sahih al-Bukhari -- 3-39-524
Allah's Apostle gave the land of Khaibar to the Jew's on the condition that they work on it and cultivate it, and be given half of its yield.

Sahih al-Bukhari -- 4-56-666
I heard ‘Umar saying, ‘May Allah Curse so-and-so!’ Doesn't he know that the Prophet said, ‘May Allah curse the Jews for, though they were forbidden (to eat) fat, they liquefied it and sold it.’ ”
I heard Allah's Apostle saying, "The Jews will fight with you, and you will be given victory over them so that a stone will say, 'O Muslim! There is a Jew behind me; kill him!'" 

Allah's Apostle said, "When the Jews greet anyone of you they say: 'Sam'Alaika (death be upon you); so you should say; 'Wa 'Alaika (and upon you).’ "

I will expel the Jews and Christians from the Arabian Peninsula and will not leave any but Muslim.

… about infidels

They but wish that ye should reject Faith, as they do, and thus be on the same footing (as they); But take not friends from their ranks until they flee in the way of Allah (From what is forbidden). But if they turn renegades, seize them and slay them wherever ye find them; and (in any case) take no friends or helpers from their ranks;

Unbelievers are unto you open enemies.

The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land.

When your Lord revealed to the angels: I am with you, therefore make firm those who believe. I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve. Therefore strike off their heads and strike off every fingertip of them.

And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah altogether and everywhere; but if they cease, verily Allah doth see all that they do.

A (declaration) of immunity from Allah and His Messenger, to those of the Pagans with whom ye have contracted mutual alliances:- … Allah and His Messenger dissolve (treaty) obligations with the Pagans.

But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, an seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but
if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practise regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.

Quran 9:11
But (even so), if they repent, establish regular prayers, and practise regular charity,- they are your brethren in Faith: (thus) do We explain the Signs in detail, for those who understand.

Quran 9:12
But if they violate their oaths after their covenant, and taunt you for your Faith,- fight ye the chiefs of Unfaith: for their oaths are nothing to them: that thus they may be restrained.

Quran 47:4
Therefore, when ye meet the Unbelievers (in fight), smite at their necks; At length, when ye have thoroughly subdued them, bind a bond firmly (on them): thereafter (is the time for) either generosity or ransom: Until the war lays down its burdens. Thus (are ye commanded): but if it had been Allah's Will, He could certainly have exacted retribution from them (Himself); but (He lets you fight) in order to test you, some with others.

Quran 98:6
Those who reject (Truth), among the People of the Book and among the Polytheists, will be in Hell-Fire, to dwell therein (for aye). They are the worst of creatures.

Abu-Dawud – 14-2676: “So Allah the Exalted revealed; ‘Let there be no compulsion in religion. Truth stands out clear from error.’ ”

... about suicide (qatlu nafihi)

The term “suicide” is not mentioned in the Yusuf Ali, Pickthol or Shakir translations of the Quran. The closest is Sura 4.20. Most of the prohibitions are found in al-Bukhari.

Joseph Lelyveld (2001, Oct. 28), interviewing Muslim youths in Gaza the month after the 9/11 hijackings, found that the promise of divine favor for righteous deeds more compelling than the prospect of sex after death. But he noted a double-think: Since it is believed that martyrs do not really die, they cannot commit suicide.

Quran 4:29
Nor kill (or destroy) yourselves.

Sahih al-Bukhari – 2-23-445: Narrated Jundab the Prophet said, “A man was inflicted with wounds and he committed suicide, and so Allah said: My slave has caused death on himself hurriedly, so I forbid Paradise for him.”
… about Allah (God)

The entire Quran can be read as revelations about God. The verses presented here offer a sample of how Allah describes himself. Note the occasional appeals to the “Children of Israel,” as in Sura 2, Verse 40 – repeated in 2:47 and elsewhere. By referring to Israel as an object, as in Sura 3, Verse 93, the Quran sometimes means Israel the nation, not just the descendants of Jacob (Israel).

Quran 2:127 [Abraham speaking to God]
Thou art the All-Hearing, the All-knowing.

Quran 4:34
Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means. Therefore the righteous women are devoutly obedient, and guard in (the husband's) absence what Allah would have them guard. As to those women on whose part ye fear disloyalty and ill-conduct, admonish them (first), (Next), refuse to share their beds, (And last) beat them (lightly); but if they return to obedience, seek not against them Means (of annoyance): For Allah is Most High, great (above you all).

Quran 4:135 [“Next to the doctrine of the absolute oneness of God, perhaps the most important assertion in the Quran is that God has revealed his will to men through apostles who brought a written message; and the Quran, last in time and the completion of all that had gone before, was in strict agreement with the earlier scriptures and explained, and where necessary modified or abrogated, part of their teaching” (Guillaume, 1956, p. 63)]
O ye who believe! Believe in Allah and His Messenger, and the scripture which He hath sent to His Messenger and the scripture which He sent to those before (him). Any who denieth Allah, His angels, His Books, His Messengers, and the Day of Judgment, hath gone far, far astray.

Quran 4:171
Christ Jesus the son of Mary was (no more than) a messenger of Allah, and His Word, which He bestowed on Mary, and a spirit proceeding from Him: so believe in Allah and His messengers. Say not "Trinity" : desist: it will be better for you: for Allah is one Allah: Glory be to Him: (far exalted is He) above having a son.

Quran 5:48
To thee We sent the Scripture in truth, confirming the scripture that came before it, and guarding it in safety: so judge between them by what Allah hath revealed, and follow not their vain desires, diverging from the Truth that hath come to thee. To each among you have we prescribed a law and an open way. If Allah had so willed, He would have made you a single
people, but (His plan is) to test you in what He hath given you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all is to Allah; it is He that will show you the truth of the matters in which ye dispute;

Quran 12:38
… never could we attribute any partners whatever to Allah …

Quran 14:4
Allah leaves straying those whom He pleases and guides whom He pleases: and He is Exalted in power, full of Wisdom.

Quran 14:7
And remember! your Lord caused to be declared (publicly): "If ye are grateful, I will add more (favours) unto you; But if ye show ingratitude, truly My punishment is terrible indeed."

Quran 14:10
He Who invites you, in order that He may forgive you your sins and give you respite for a term appointed!

Quran 14:27
Allah will establish in strength those who believe, with the word that stands firm, in this world and in the Hereafter; but Allah will leave, to stray, those who do wrong: Allah doeth what He willeth.

Quran 14:36
Thou art indeed Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.

Quran 14:41
"O our Lord! cover (us) with Thy Forgiveness - me, my parents, and (all) Believers, on the Day that the Reckoning will be established!

Quran 14:44
So warn mankind of the Day when the Wrath will reach them: then will the wrong-doers say: "Our Lord! respite us (if only) for a short term:

Quran 14:47
… the Lord of Retribution.

Quran 15:28-29 [See also Sura 21, Verse 91. Guillaume (1956, p. 195) concludes from these verses regarding Adam and Mary, mother of Jesus, that the Holy Spirit is not part of the godhead in a Christian trinity but rather an emanation from God.] Behold! thy Lord said to the angels: "I am about to create man, from sounding clay from mud moulded into shape; "When I have fashioned him (in due proportion) and breathed into him of My spirit, fall ye down in obeisance unto him."
Quran 16:102
Say, the Holy Spirit has brought the revelation from thy Lord in Truth, in order to strengthen those who believe, and as a Guide and Glad Tidings to Muslims.

Quran 19:58
Those were some of the prophets on whom Allah did bestow His Grace,- of the posterity of Adam, and of those who We carried (in the Ark) with Noah, and of the posterity of Abraham and Israel of those whom We guided and chose. Whenever the Signs of (Allah) Most Gracious were rehearsed to them, they would fall down in prostrate adoration and in tears.

Quran 22:23
Allah will admit those who believe and work righteous deeds, to Gardens beneath which rivers flow: they shall be adorned therein with bracelets of gold and pearls; and their garments there will be of silk.

Quran 22:26 [Muslim tradition maintains that Abraham and his son Ishmael built the Kaba. The tradition is based on this sura, 22:26, and on 2:127.]
Behold! We gave the site, to Abraham, of the (Sacred) House [the Kaba], (saying): "Associate not anything (in worship) with Me; and sanctify My House for those who compass it round, or stand up, or bow, or prostrate themselves (therein in prayer).

Quran 26:78-81 [Attributes of God. This sura tells the story of the Exodus.]
"Who created me, and it is He Who guides me;
"Who gives me food and drink,
And when I am ill, it is He Who cures me;
"Who will cause me to die, and then to life (again);
"And who, I hope, will forgive me my faults on the day of Judgment.

Quran 45:16
We did aforetime grant to the Children of Israel the Book the Power of Command, and Prophethood; We gave them, for Sustenance, things good and pure; and We favoured them above the nations.

Quran 112 [in its entirety]
Say: He is Allah, the One and only; Allah, the Eternal, Absolute; He begetteth not, nor is He begotten; And there is none like unto Him.

Sahih Muslim – [The title of Book 1 is “The Book of Faith.”]
Abu-Dawud – Book 14, Number 2526: “Three things are the roots of faith: to refrain from (killing) a person who utters, "There is no god but Allah" and not to declare him unbeliever whatever sin he commits, and not to excommunicate him from Islam for his any action; and jihad will be performed continuously since the day Allah sent me as a prophet until the day the last member of my community will fight with the Dajjal (Antichrist).”
... about government

Quran 9:71
The Believers, men and women, are protectors one of another: they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil: …

[The following quotation is taken from the introduction to Book 20 of the Sahih Muslim translation: http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/engagement/resources/texts/muslim/hadith/muslim/020.smt.html]

"The Islamic State is not an end in itself, but a means to an end, the end being the development of a community of people who stand up for equity and justice … The state," says Dr Iqbal," from the Islamic standpoint, is an endeavour to transform these ideal principles into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite human organization. It is in this sense alone that state in Islam is a theocracy, not in the sense that it is headed by a representative of God on earth who can always screen his despotic will behind his supposed infallibility. …

"As this State is meant to enforce the law of the Shari'ah within its territorial jurisdiction, it is duty bound to make itself an efficient organ for transforming the high ideals of Islam into reality. … So far as the nature of the Islamic State is concerned, it is theocracy with regard to God in the sense that the de jure sovereignty belongs to Allah.

"An Islamic State is, therefore, theocratic in one aspect as it is run according to God-given laws, but it is altogether a different theocracy of which Europe has had the bitter experience and in which, a priestly clan is sharply marked off from the rest of the population and exercises an unchecked domination and enforces laws of its own making in the name of God, and thus imposes its own godhood upon the common people.

"The priest puts himself as a mediator between the masses and the unseen God. Such a system is quite un-Islamic. The theocracy built by Islam is not ruled by a particular religious class, but by the whole community of Muslims including the rank and file. as Allah has not appointed a particular individual, group, race or class as the representative of the Real Sovereign upon the earth, but the whole community.

"Even a lowliest villager could dare tell the Commander of the Faithful that he would set him straight like a spindle if he deviates an inch from the path of righteousness. This shows that the rulers and the officials in the Islamic State are answerable both to God and man for their actions, and the people have every right to criticise. not only their public behaviour, but even their private activities. …

"Freedom of expression is one of the fundamental rights of the citizen which an Islamic State must respect. … the State is bound to create such conditions in which the good reigns supreme in the society and evil is suppressed and exterminated, and its citizens learn to live as good Muslims."

... about minorities

Quran 2:62
Those who believe (in the Qur'an), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians,- any who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and work
righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve.

Quran 2:256
Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from Error: whoever rejects evil and believes in Allah hath grasped the most trustworthy hand-hold, that never breaks. And Allah heareth and knoweth all things.

Quran 109:6
To you be your Way, and to me mine.

... about Abraham, Jacob (Israel) and Ishmael (Ismail)

Abraham and his son Ishmael are revered as forefathers of the Arabs and as the first Muslims. Compare what the Quran and the Tanakh tell us about them. The two faiths paint somewhat different pictures, although each is said to carry the imprimatur of God. See Appendix E, Annex 1, for the founders’ family tree. It is accepted by both Muslims and Jews.

The following is a selection from among more than 50 references by name to Abraham and a dozen to Ishmael. Note especially Sura 3, Versa 68 (highlighted in bold, emphasis added), which refers to Muhammad’s relationship to Abraham. The son of Abraham by Hagar is represented as either Ishmael or Ismail, depending on the translator’s preference.

Quran 2:124
And remember that Abraham was tried by his Lord with certain commands, which he fulfilled: He said: “I will make thee an Imam to the Nations.” He pleaded: "And also (Imams) from my offspring!” He answered: “But My Promise is not within the reach of evil-doers.”

Quran 2:125
Remember We made the House a place of assembly for men and a place of safety; and take ye the station of Abraham as a place of prayer; and We covenanted with Abraham and Isma'il, that they should sanctify My House for those who compass it round, or use it as a retreat, or bow, or prostrate themselves (therein in prayer).

Quran 2:126
And remember Abraham said: "My Lord, make this a City of Peace, and feed its people with fruits,-such of them as believe in Allah and the Last Day." He said: "(Yea), and such as reject Faith,-for a while will I grant them their pleasure, but will soon drive them to the torment of Fire,- an evil destination (indeed)!"
Muslim tradition maintains that Abraham and his son Isma'il built the Kaba. The tradition is based on this sura, 2:127, and on sura 22:26.

And remember Abraham and Isma'il raised the foundations of the House (With this prayer): “Our Lord! Accept (this service) from us: For Thou art the All-Hearing, the All-knowing.”

This was the legacy that Abraham left to his sons, and so did Jacob; "Oh my sons! Allah hath chosen the Faith for you; then die not except in the Faith of Islam."

They say: “Become Jews or Christians if ye would be guided (To salvation).” Say thou: “Nay! (I would rather) the Religion of Abraham the True, and he joined not gods with Allah.”

Say ye: "We believe in Allah, and the revelation given to us, and to Abraham, Isma'il, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, and that given to Moses and Jesus, and that given to (all) prophets from their Lord: We make no difference between one and another of them: And we bow to Allah (in Islam)."

Allah did choose Adam and Noah, the family of Abraham, and the family of 'Imran above all people,-

Abraham was not a Jew nor yet a Christian; but he was true in Faith, and bowed his will to Allah's (Which is Islam), and he joined not gods with Allah.

Without doubt, among men, the nearest of kin to Abraham, are those who follow him, as are also this Prophet and those who believe: And Allah is the Protector of those who have faith.

Say: "We believe in Allah, and in what has been revealed to us and what was revealed to Abraham, Isma'il, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, and in (the Books) given to Moses, Jesus, and the prophets, from their Lord: We make no distinction between one and another among them, and to Allah do we bow our will (in Islam)."

"Thus will thy Lord choose thee and teach thee the interpretation of stories (and events) and perfect His favour to thee and to the posterity of Jacob - even as He perfected it to thy fathers Abraham and Isaac aforetime! for Allah is full of knowledge and wisdom."

"And I follow the ways of my fathers,- Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; and never could we
attribute any partners whatever to Allah: that (comes) of the grace of Allah to us and to mankind: yet most men are not grateful.

Quran 14:39
"Praise be to Allah, Who hath granted unto me in old age Isma'il and Isaac: for truly my Lord is He, the Hearer of Prayer!

Quran 19:54
Also mention in the Book (the story of) Isma'il: He was (strictly) true to what he promised, and he was a messenger (and) a prophet.

Quran 22:26 [Muslim tradition that Abraham and his son Ishmael built the Kaba is based on this sura and on 22:26.]
Behold! We gave the site, to Abraham, of the (Sacred) House, (saying): "Associate not anything (in worship) with Me; and sanctify My House for those who compass it round, or stand up, or bow, or prostrate themselves (therein in prayer).

Quran 22:78
He has chosen you, and has imposed no difficulties on you in religion; it is the cult of your father Abraham. It is He Who has named you Muslims,

Quran 37:102-109 [This sura tells the stories of the sacrifice of Isaac, of Lot and of Noah.]
And when (his son) was old enough to walk with him, (Abraham) said: O my dear son, I have seen in a dream that I must sacrifice thee. So look, what thinkest thou? He said: O my father! Do that which thou art commanded. Allah willing, thou shalt find me of the steadfast. So when they had both submitted their wills (to Allah), and he had laid him prostrate on his forehead (for sacrifice), We called out to him "O Abraham! "Thou hast already fulfilled the vision!" - thus indeed do We reward those who do right. For this was obviously a trial-

Quran 37:117
And We gave them the Book which helps to make things clear;

Quran 37: 152
"Allah has begotten children"? but they are liars!
Appendix H -- Assassinations, Massacres, and Riots

The most obvious way to tell the story of the Arab-Israeli conflict is by wars – vast mechanized armies involving entire states, groups of states, and whole regions. I pause here briefly for a fleeting view of the conflict through a more personal lens: assassinations, massacres and riots, with an even briefer consideration of suicide bombings.

Assassination is defined as targeted killing of a public figure, done secretly for political purposes. A massacre is the indiscriminate killing of a large number of people (at least three), who usually are unsuspecting, helpless and unresisting. A riot is spontaneous, wanton violence by an anonymous mob of at least three people displaying anger or protest for a common purpose; it is often a wildly emotional escalation of what began as a public demonstration.

A riot, unlike a massacre, builds in intensity. It does not usually start with the intention to kill, although deaths of rioters and their targets might occur. A massacre, unlike a riot, begins with the intent of one or a small number of people who intend to kill broadly. Assassination, on the other hand, usually involves one or a small number of people who are intent on killing one or a small number of politically prominent people. If the target is not politically prominent the killing is more aptly described as murder, but all three terms have some degree of political motivation.

The terms should be used cautiously to avoid trivializing them, as in describing a decisive victory by a sports team as a “massacre.”

Abdel Jawad (2007, p. 61) illustrates the difficulty of consensus definitions. For example, he defines a massacre as an attack aimed at a population that has already surrendered, resulting in three or more fatalities. Such a definition omits surprise attacks on populations that have not been given an opportunity to surrender. At the other extreme, Reich (2008, p. 13), defines a
pogrom as an “organized massacre,” which could be applied too broadly to include the Holocaust as state policy.

This leaves open the question of how to classify suicide attacks, also called homicide attacks or, by Muslims, martyrdom operations, because the Quran forbids suicide. A suicide operation is defined as a sudden attack, usually a bombing, by someone who expects to die along with the intended victims. The line between a “suicide bombing” and a “massacre” is hazy. Suicide attacks are not identified separately here because there have been so many. Close calls have been resolved according to terminology used by historians or mainstream newspapers.

Suicide missions were not invented in the Middle East, but the Arabs and Jews have perfected the technique for maximum propaganda effect. The object, after all, is not just to kill the enemy but to publicize a political cause through terror. An Israeli Web site that tracks Palestinian suicide bombings said that between 1980 and 2008, there were 170 suicide bombings, 40% by Hamas, and 26% each by Fatah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, killing 804 civilians ((List of Palestinian suicide attacks, 2013). Another Web site identifies 50 suicide attacks in 1999. Morris (2001, p. 626) describes 1994-1996 as the “heyday of the suicide bombers.”

In a strange twist of logic, all four actions can be counter-productive. For example, with Israels killing prominent Palestinian militants and Palestinians killing prominent Palestinian doves, it should be no wonder that the Palestinians lack leadership and Israel lacks negotiating partners.

What leavens the depressing tales of riots and massacres is the occasional story of kindness and mercy where it is least expected. Ashkenazi (2009) tells such a story about Geula Wolfson and her mother Yonah, who was ready to give birth just as an Arab mob was running
amok in Hebron in 1929. An Arab neighbor invited Yonah to give birth in their basement. When
the mob came to their front door looking for Jews, the Arab family said, “We have already killed
our Jews.” The mob believed them and departed. The story is worth reading in its entirety, but
have plenty of tissues on hand. Similar stories are told at

Assassinations

Note the number of Arab-on-Arab killings. Morris (2001) said, “More Arabs were being
ekilled by fellow Palestinians than by the British or the Jews” (p. 151). Morris (2004) added that
the Husseinis became the leading Palestinian political party by assassinating some of their
opponents, especially the Nashashibis (p. 22). The following list includes only some prominent
political leaders.

1933 -- Chaim Arlosoroff, a key figure in the Zionists Mapai Party. The murder was
never solved, but Segev (1999, p. 352) suggests that the motive was political rivalry with another
political party.
1937 -- Lewis Andrews, acting district commissioner of the Galilee, by Arab gunmen
1939 -- The mukhtar of the Arab village of Amma by a local rebel band for refusing its
demands for money (Morris, 2001).
1944 -- Lloyd Moyne, the British resident minister in Cairo, by Lehi.
1948 -- Egyptian Prime Minister Noqrashi Pasha by the Muslim Brotherhood, whose
Supreme Guide himself was assassinated shortly afterward (Lewis, 1993, p. 140). An attempt by
the brotherhood to assassinate Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954 failed.
1948 -- U.N. diplomat Folke Bernadotte, by Lehi.
1951 -- Jordan’s King Abdullah, by a Palestinian militant.
1973 -- Zuhair Muhsein, described by Morris (2001, p. 367) as a Baath party apparatchik,
“apparently by agents of the Iraqi-backed Abu Nidal.
1981 -- Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, by Arab militants.
1982 -- President-elect of Lebanon Bachir Gemayel, a Maronite, by a Syrian agent.
1983 -- Issam Sartawi, prominent Palestinian dove, by Palestinian hard-liners.
1991 -- Khalidi (2006, p. 163) identifies 13 founders of Fatah who were assassinated
Massacres

Most Arab Web sites list only massacres by Israelis, and most Israeli Web sites list only massacres by Arabs (except Deir Yassin, which the Israelis acknowledge, in 1948). The lists are combined here, including only those cited in the major history books. In general, firefights between opposing regular military forces are omitted. A definitive list is impossible due to problems of definition, the sheer number of massacres, and – perhaps most significantly -- the lack of survivors.

In the course of the 1948-1949 Israeli war of independence, says Morris (2008, p. 405-406) “the Palestinian Arabs, besides killing the odd prisoner of war, committed only two large massacres – involving 40 workers in the Haifa Oil refinery and about 150 surrendering or unarmed Haganah men in Kfar Etzion.’

Some commentators, Morris said, added a third massacre, a convoy of medical workers to Mount Scopus in Jerusalem. Morris himself describes several other attacks as massacres.

“In the yearlong war, Yishuv troops probably murdered some 800 civilians and prisoners of war all told – most of them in several clusters of massacres in captured villages,” Morris said, adding that, “In general, from May 1948 onward, both Israel and the Arab states abided by the Geneva convention, took prisoners, and treated them reasonably well.”
Morris (2001) also makes a point of including in his accounts rare examples of mercy by individuals on both sides, such as on pp. 115 and 211.

Abdel Jawad (2007, p. 60) says he has documented nearly 70 massacres between December 1947 and January 1949, but they are not confirmed in Morris or Reich. The following list should be taken as representative of the most publicized massacres, and certainly not as comprehensive:

1929 -- Arab riots in Hebron kill 68 and drive out 500 Jews (Reich, 2008, p. 30).

1946 -- Jews blow up the King David Hotel, British military headquarters in Jerusalem, causing 91 military and civilian deaths.


1948, Jan. 4 -- Jews detonate a truck bomb outside the Arab National Committee in Jaffa, killing 26.

1948, Jan. 5 -- Jews blow up a hotel in Jerusalem, killing 26 civilians (Morris, 2001, p. 198).

1948, Feb. 22 -- An Arab bomb-maker aided by two British Deserters blew up trucks on Ben-Yehuda Street, killing 58 and wounding 32. Vengeful Jews killed 27 soldiers.

1948, Feb. 28 -- Jews kill 30 Arabs with a car bomb in a garage in Haifa.

1948, Feb. 29 -- Cairo-Haifa train. Against British, revenge. Train had military coaches. 28 soldiers killed, 35 wounded. Head: 30 British soldiers die in Palestine as mines rip train, Brewer (1948, March 1, p. 1)

1948, March 11 -- A car bomb blew up the headquarters of the Jewish Agency, killing 12 and injuring 10.

1948, March 31 -- 40 killed, 60 wounded. All civilians, mostly Arabs. New York Times (1 April 1948.) Schmidt (1948, April 1) 40 Arabs are slain in the mining of a train.

1948, April 13 -- Hadassah medical convoy, carrying doctors and nurses, was trapped and more than 70 Jews died (Morris, 2001, p. 209). Vengeance for Deir Yassin.

1948, Dec. 13 and 29 -- Jews throw bombs into a crowd outside the Haifa Oil Refinery, killing six and wounding dozens. The Arab workers at the refinery then turn on the Jewish workers, killing 39 and wounding 50 (Morris, 2001, p. 198).


1953 -- West Bank village of Qibya, killing 60 civilians (Morris, 2001, p. 276).

1956 -- The Gaza Strip village of Kafr Kasin, killing 49 Israeli Arabs who broke a curfew of which they were not aware (Hadawi, 1989, p. 155; Morris, 2001, p. 295).

1956, Nov. 3 -- Khan Yunis. Israeli soldiers executed several dozen suspected fedayeen. Morris (2001, p. 295) reports that at least one senior commander was dismissed, although he was returned to active service in 1967.

1972 -- Arabs abduct Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, killing 11.

1974, May 15 -- Palestinian infiltrators break into a school in Maalot and take the children hostage, killing 21 and wounding several others. Maalot is near the border of Lebanon and Israel (Reich, 2008, pp. 103 and 327).


1982, Sept. 19 -- Sabra and Shatila, Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. Official estimates of the dead ranged from 460 to 800. Although the killings, many execution style, were committed by the Maronite Phalange Party, Israel’s ally in Lebanon, the Kahan Commission, appointed by the Israeli government, found that the Israeli army bore indirect responsibility. It knew or should have known about the massacre and stopped it. The main blame was directed at Ariel Sharon, who was removed from his position as minister of defense, although he was allowed to remain in the Israeli cabinet (Morris, 2001, p. 540-549).
1990 -- Temple Mount Massacre erupts as a series of incidents responding to rumors and threats. The main attack, against policemen stationed on the mount to protect Jews observing Sukkoth on the plaza below, resulted in 18 or 19 Arabs killed and 100 wounded plus 34 Israelis injured. Nineteen revenge stabbings elsewhere killed 11 Israelis and wounded a dozen more. Three more died a year later at the first anniversary of the event. (Morris, 2001, pp. 584-585.)

1994 -- An Israeli settler, Baruch Goldstein, opened fire on unarmed Muslims praying at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, killing 29 and wounding 125. Israeli Defense Forces killed 19 more in putting down the riots that followed (Morris, 2001, p. 624).

Riots

1920 -- Palestine Riots. Also called Jerusalem Riots or Nabi Musa riots, after a local Muslim holiday. It was the first violent confrontations that eventually would escalate into Arab-Israeli wars. The riots, around the Old City of Jerusalem, were protests against Jewish immigration. An Arab mob ransacked the Jewish Quarter. The British response was erratic. Four Arabs and five Jews were killed, 216 Jews and 23 Arabs were injured. The riots marked the beginning of the end of mutual trust. Cause: Denial of British promises for Arab self-determination. Palin Commission of Inquiry blamed the Arabs and implicitly upheld the accusation of British-Arab collusion (Morris, 2001, p. 97).

1921 -- Jaffa riots were triggered by a clash between Jewish communists and socialists (Morris, 2001, p. 101). Arabs joined in. When it was over, 47 Jews and 48 Arabs were killed and 146 Jews and 73 Arabs were wounded. Haycraft Commission determined that the violence was rooted in political and economic anger at Jewish immigration.

1929 -- Riots in Jerusalem, Hebron and elsewhere. A minor dispute over access to the Western Wall of the Temple Mount led to marches and counter-marches. Following Muslim prayers, several thousand Palestinians attacked Jews and Jewish shops in Jerusalem. Violence spreads, lasting a week, during which 133 Jews and 116 Arabs were killed and hundreds more were wounded. The Shaw Commission blamed Arab hostility toward Jews and Arab disappointment over their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future (Morris, 2001, 116). Khalidi (1991) describes the problem of landlessness in detail. The riots radicalized both Palestinians and Jews (Morris, 2001, p. 127).

1936-1939 -- Arab Revolt. The largest uprising against the British in the history of the Middle East until the Intifadas (Morris, 2001, p. 129), in part because it bared rifts within Palestinian leadership. Attempts at appeasement by limiting immigration failed and alienated both Arabs and Jews. Fear of dispossession fueled riots that erupted into rebellion. The Peel Commission in 1937 concluded that the mandate was unworkable and proposed partition and an exchange of population, which infuriated the Arabs who opposed surrendering an inch of what they viewed as their country, and they resumed the revolt with renewed vigor. Then came the Woodhead Commission, which recommended a different partition scheme; a White Paper, which rejected partition (Morris, 2001, p. 156-157) and the London (St. James) Conference, which Morris said was doomed because the positions of the Arabs and Jews were too far apart and neither trusted the British. Morris (2001, p. 150) quoted estimates of 3,000 to 6,000 Arab dead,
with 4,500 killed by other Arabs; 6,000 in detention; 2,000 Arab houses destroyed; and devastating financial losses. Jewish casualties were estimated in the hundreds. No settlements were destroyed and three dozen were added. Morris (2004, p. 23) adds that internal rivalries, strikes and violence compelled tens of thousands of Palestinians to flee the country.

Temple Mount riots (1996) -- Toward the end of the Oslo peace process, when progress had stopped and settlements were expanding, Israel opened a tunnel under the Temple Mount, supposedly to provide better access for archeologists. Arabs saw it as a threat to the Dome of the Rock and Al-Aqsa Mosque. Three days of riots followed, killing 70 Palestinians and 15 Israelis (Golan, 2008, p. 27).
Appendix I – Pertinent (and Impertinent) Quotations

Of all the ways to tell the story of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the most pointed often is a pithy quip. Frequently humorous or, on occasion, bitter or even as a rallying cry, it becomes memorable not only for its clever turn of phrase but also for the insight that it contains.

An attempt has been made here to match the epigram with the circumstances. The intent is not to tell jokes but rather to illuminate either a speaker or an issue. Readers are invited to submit corrections, additions or further explanations.


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Defining who is a Jew is nowhere so difficult as in Israel itself. Arabs insist that Judaism is a religion and that Jews are citizens of the country in which they lived previously. Simply
denying that assertion is difficult for Jews because it contains a kernel of truth: Although millions of Jews emigrated to Israel, many others found their national identity elsewhere.

When Meir was encouraging Henry Kissinger, United States secretary of state, to make Israel a top priority in the American administration, she reminded him that he was and a Jew. He replied that he was, in order, an American, the secretary of state and a Jew.

“Oh, Mr. Secretary,” she replied, “in Israel, we read from right to left” (Kramer, 1982, in a slightly different version).

***

War and peace were always on Meir’s mind – as prime minister, as a woman, and as a mother.

Speaking to the National Press Club in Washington in 1957, Meir said, “Peace will come when the Arabs will love their children more than they hate us” (Golda Meir, 2010). Shenker (1970) quotes Meir personalizing the quotation: “Peace will come when Nasser loves his own children more than he hates the Israelis” (p. 27).

Meir’s compassion was evident in her remarks at a press conference in London in 1969: “When peace comes, we will, perhaps, in time be able to forgive the Arabs for killing our sons, but it will be harder for us to forgive them for having forced us to kill their sons” (Golda Meir, 2010). Wikiquote put the remark in the context of a discussion with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat during peace talks: “We can forgive you for killing our sons. But we will never forgive you for making us kill yours” (Talk, 2009, Feb. 14). Both might be correct.

***

Israelis are famous for tolerating a wide range of vigorously argued opinions. Dozens of political parties vie for seats in the Knesset. New York Times reporter Thomas Friedman, a
wordsmith himself, put it this way: “A friendly discussion between two Israelis sounds like four Americans having an argument. (Friedman, 1989, p. 504).

Even revered leaders are not immune from an affectionate poke. At a state dinner that Israel was hosting for West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, Meir made the following remark, picked up by the Associated Press and run as a separate story by the New York Times: “Let me tell you something that we Israelis have against Moses. He took us 40 years through the desert in order to bring us to the one spot in the Middle East that has no oil” (Mrs. Meir, 1973, June 11, p. 3).

Sometimes a leader will turn the jest back against his loyal critics. When Dwight Eisenhower met with Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, the American president was said to have mused, “It is very hard to be president of 170 million people.” Ben-Gurion reportedly shot back, “It’s even harder to be prime minister of 2 million prime ministers!” (Quoted in Entine, 2007, p. 291.)

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Meir might have been thinking of people who say that some honor has “humbled” them when she quipped, “Don’t be so humble; you’re not that great” (p. 8).

***

Meir took pride in the Israelites’ efforts to improve the land they found upon arrival. She said: “Did the desert in Israel bloom as long as we were in exile? No – rocks, desert, malaria, trachoma – this is what the country was like before we came back” (p. 43). “When I came to Palestine in 1921, the heavy industry was chocolate. And when I asked, ‘Why does it taste so sandy?’ I was told, ‘Sand is our only natural resource’ ” (p. 70).
Giles (1969, p. A15) said, “I came to Israel in 1921. One of the first sights that shocked me was an Arab ploughing with a very primitive plough … Pulling the plough was an ox and a woman. Now if it means that we have destroyed this romantic picture by bringing in tractors and combines and threshing machines, this is true.”

Winston Churchill put it this way: “It is very difficult to make a case for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery” (quoted in Peters, 1984, p. 232).

***

No other chief executive of a country in the modern Middle East remains -- even decades later -- so quotable about politics as Meir. No quote better illuminates the Israeli approach to war, peace and security than her justification for refusing to withdraw from territory conquered in the 1967 war: “The Muslims can fight and lose, then come back and fight again. Israel can only lose once.”

“The Egyptians could run to Egypt, the Syrians into Syria,” Meir said. “The only place we could run was into the sea, and before we did that we might as well fight” (Brainy).

She would elaborate: “We have no intension of going down in order that some should speak well of us” (p. 12).

Asked if Israel was prepared to retreat to the vulnerable pre-1967 borders, she replied, “I’m sorry, so accommodating we are not” (p. 35).

“Why is it so outlandish for us to expect, after three wars, a signed peace agreement – something that is usually concluded between the parties in any war? The only strange aspect of this situation is that the party seeking this agreement is not the side that lost the war, but the side that won” (p. 36).
Meir opposed a two-state solution to the refugee problem. “Do the Arabs need another state?” she said. “They already have 14. We have only one: (p. 33).

When world opinion turned against Israel, Meir was not moved. “If we have to have a choice between being dead and pitied, and being alive with a bad image, we’d rather be alive and have the bad image” (p. 26). Wikiquote, crediting Meier’s 1973 interview with journalist Oriana Fallaci, puts it a little differently: “I prefer to stay alive and be criticized than be sympathized.”

Other sources word the quote this way: “If I had to choose between a lot of sympathy in the world towards Israel destroyed, and less understanding of Israel with Israel alive, I am sorry that we are not understood, but I think I would rather be alive” (Giles, 1969, p. A15).

The following quotation is the basis for Israel’s rejection of charges that it violates the Geneva Convention, which says that refugees should be allowed to return to their country of origin: “There were no such things as Palestinians. When was there an independent Palestinian people with a Palestinian state? It was either southern Syria before the First World War, and then it was a Palestine including Jordan. It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist” (Giles, 1969, p. A15).

Israel’s own boundaries are still considered “provisional” in that they remain – even in 2013 – subject to negotiation. But Meir is “reviled even today” for those remarks, even though, speaking politically rather than practically, she was correct (Garfinkle, 1991, p. 541). Said (1979, 1994, 337) rejected Meir’s characterization as “notorious and deeply Orientalist.”

Some of Meir’s remarks had a political bite, but she had the knack of coating them with a smile. Examples:

“The only friendly neighbor we have is the Mediterranean” (p.13).
“Kings and presidents can’t mobilize their armies, attack another people, lose the battle, and then say it isn’t nice to take something by force” (p. 18).

“There should be some place on earth where there is a Jewish majority. As a minority we have quite a history” (p. 6).

“To be or not to be is not a question of compromise. Either you be or you don’t be” (Shenker, 1974, Dec. 12, p. 99).

“I understand the Arabs wanting to wipe us out, but do they really expect us to cooperate?” (p. 15).

“Israeli democracy is so lively that there were, and are, almost as many ‘doves’ as ‘hawks,’ but I have yet to come across any Israeli who thinks that we should turn ourselves, permanently, into clay pigeons – not even for the sake of a better image” (Meir, 1975, in My Life on page 312).

“One newspaperman asked: ‘Would Israel employ nuclear weapons if her survival were in jeopardy?’ to which I could only reply, truthfully, that I thought we hadn’t done so badly with conventional weapons” (Meir, My Life, 1975, p. 329).

***

When the late Israeli diplomat Abba Eban knew he had a good line, he used it often and in a variety of wordings. Marc. D. Charney quoted one version of his best-known lines in Eban’s obituary (Charney, 2002, Nov. 18, p. B7). My favorite version was quoted in his BBC obituary (Israel’s diplomatic giant, 2002): “Arabs never pass up an opportunity to pass up an opportunity” (for peace or land).” Prime examples were the times when the Palestinians were offered a state (e.g., by the Peel Commission and again by UNGA Resolution 181) and they turned it down
because they wanted all of Palestine. Of course, it might also be said that the Israelis missed some opportunities, too..

The BBC also cited another of Eban’s famous quotations: “History teaches us that men and nations only behave wisely once they have exhausted all other alternatives” – an observation as relevant today as any time in history (Israel’s diplomatic giant, 2002).

One of Eban’s admirers might have been PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Charney (2002, Nov. 18, p. B7) quotes a 1967 speech by Eban to the United Nations: “The Middle East, tired of wars, is ripe for a new emergence of human vitality. Let the opportunity not fall again from our hands.” In 1974, also speaking to the United Nations, Arafat said in his penultimate paragraph, “Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand” (see Appendix C, Annex 21, 1974).

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More meaningful to Israelis was Chairman Arafat’s speech at the Dehaishe refugee camp on Oct. 21, 1996: “We know only one word: jihad, jihad, jihad.” (Arafat, 1997).

***

Former Prime Minister of Israel Shimon Peres was speaking of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the following observation could be applied to any apparently intractable conflict: “If a problem has no solution, it may not be a problem, but a fact -- not to be solved, but to be coped with over time.” The quotation is attributed to Peres – sometimes as “Peres’s Law” – but none of the citations give an original source or identify the context. One of dozens of Web references is at http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Shimon_Peres

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Another prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, grasped a painful truth: “One does not make peace with one’s friends. One makes peace with one’s enemy” (Ross, 2004, p. 765).

***

The description of Palestine early in the 19th Century as “a land without people for a people [meaning Jews] without land” has a checkered history. One early source was the book *The Land of Israel According to the Covenant with Abraham, with Isaac, and with Jacob* by Alexander Keith (1844, p. 43), who described the scattered Israelites as: “a people without a country; even as their own land, as subsequently to be shown, is in a great measure a country without a people.” Entine (2007) says Theodor Herzl in 1893 coined the phrase as “a people with no country for a country with no people,” but he does not cite a source. For a history of the phrase, see Garfinkle (1991), who was unable to connect the quip with Herzl. “It appears nowhere in his books, letters or diary,” Garfinkle said (p. 539).

The slogan is nonsense, of course. The land was occupied by hundreds of thousands of people who were cultivating the land and tending flocks, as any number of travelers in the region have attested. The slogan has come to be used mainly to discredit Zionists (Morris, 2001, p. 42).

***

Perhaps the most important document in the history of the Middle East was the 1917 Balfour Declaration in which Great Britain endorsed a national home for Jews in Palestine. Novelist Arthur Koestler, writing 32 years later, was still stunned at the declaration’s presumption: “In this document,” Koestler said, “one nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third” (Koestler, 1949, p. 4). He could have added, “Even more extraordinary is the fact that this third country (Palestine) was part of the empire of a fourth (the Ottomans)” (1949: Lest we forget).
Ameen Rihani, an Arab-American, looked sadly at the unsuccessful attempts by Great Britain to balance its commitments to the Arabs, the Jews and the French, and said, “The Promised Land had become the too-much-promised land” Oren, 2007, p. 372).

***

One of the mysteries of the Arab-Israeli conflict is how a country as little as Israel, with no natural resources worth fighting over, can generate so much publicity. Day after day, news stories, editorials, pictures and columns are published about events that would be ignored elsewhere. Several observers have tried to describe this conundrum. I will quote two:

Chaim Weismann, one of the founders of political Zionism, early recognized the peculiarity of Mandate Palestine. In a 1923 speech in New York, he said there was no other country where the distance between the sublime and the ridiculous was so small. Everything happens in the glare of 18 generations. “Palestine,” he said, “is like a sounding-board. Every noise is blazoned forth over the world. If a Jew is killed in Piccadilly, in the Ukraine, or run over by a motor-car on Broadway, it is an ordinary affair. If something of this kind happens in the Holy Land, it becomes an act of state, an act of violence, two races clashing with each other” (Weizmann, 1923).

Laqueur (1980) connects the world’s intense interest in Israel with terrorism and with the country’s democratic freedoms, suggesting that all three magnify each other. What is news, Laqueur says, depends upon the presence of reporters and TV cameras. For example, a massacre or a mass execution in a Third World country would rate no more than a few paragraphs, if any. However, if ten schoolgirls burn a tire in Bethlehem, he said, all hell will break loose. Why? Because, Laqueur says, “in Israel there is one of the heaviest concentrations of newspapermen on earth. This is partly because their editors believe that everything happening in Israel is most
important and that world peace depends on it, and partly because Israel is one of only three or four countries left outside Europe, Japan, and North America in which journalists can move about freely.’’ Let them try to cover terrorists training in Libya or an execution in Sudan, Laqueur challenges, or let them try to probe deeply into the struggle between terrorists and the army in Argentina, and they will soon find themselves in serious trouble. “Selective publicity, then, is one of the sources of misconception about terrorism: another is the vagueness – indeed, the utter carelessness – with which the term is used, not only in the media but also in government announcements and by academic students of the subject. Terrorism is used as a synonym for rebellion, street battles, civil strife, insurrection, rural guerrilla war, coups d’etat, and a dozen other things. The indiscriminate use of the term not only inflates the statistics, it makes understanding the specific character of terrorism and how to cope with it more difficult” (pp. 110-111).

***

It’s a rare peace proposal that doesn’t contain some provision for international guarantees, international presence or international forces. The Israelis are reluctant to entrust their survival to external promises. They saw how quickly the UN removed its buffer from the Sinai as Egypt massed its forces before the 1967 war. Then Nasser reimposed its blockade of the Straits of Tiran. The United States, Britain and France had guaranteed Israel’s right of navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba but, aside from denouncing the blockade, did nothing else. Meir (1975, p. 297) assessed the guarantees as “worthless,” threatening the survival of Israel, which had depended on them for its security, leading former Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin to comment bitterly, “In the whole world, there is no guarantee that can guarantee a guarantee” (Morris, 2001, p. 446).
The strategy of “land for peace” originated with United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which assumed that Israel’s grateful enemies would make peace if only Israel would return the land it had conquered. But Israel had a different idea: peace for peace. As Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, put it in one of his famous quotes, “We are ready for peace in exchange for peace” (Morris, 2001, p. 265). In other words, Israel was willing to live in peace with its neighbors if they were willing. Israel misjudged. Its enemies wanted more than peace. The land-for-peace strategy worked with Egypt and the Sinai but it snagged elsewhere, leading a host of cynics, who saw that territorial concessions were not working, to reword the slogan to “land for promises” and finally “land for nothing.” The cynics wanted something concrete in return for surrendering hard-won land.


Palestinians offer few opportunities for funny quips, perhaps because their suffering is so intense. One of the most powerful quotations is attributed to an Arab boy in an Israeli prison, interviewed by New York Times reporter Thomas Friedman (1989):

“So what exactly did you do that landed you here [in prison]” Friedman asked.

“I threw a stone at some Jews,” said Mazen.

“Why?”

“Because I didn’t have a grenade” (p. 388).
Rallying cries make powerful quotations. Morris (2001) cites these two as common among Palestinian demonstrators:

“Itbah al-Yahud!” (Slaughter the Jews) (Morris, 2001, p. 94).

“Nashrab dam al-Yahud” (We will drink the blood of the Jews) (Morris, 2001, p. 95).

Shahada is the Muslim profession of faith. It consists of two statements: La ilaha illallah (There is no God but Allah) and Muhammadur rasul Allah (Muhammad is his messenger).

Perhaps the most common rallying cry is Allahu Akbar, usually translated as God is Great, God is Greater or God is Greatest. It is used as a battle cry and to express happiness, approval, praise or extreme stress. The expression is called the Takbir.

***

Rage and defiance provide unique opportunities for a pungent response. Few did it better than the Arab leaders, meeting in Khartoum after suffering a devastating defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967. But if victory in a fight is defined as the destruction of the opponent’s will to resist, the Israelis did not win. Whereas defeated parties might be expected to sue for peace, the Arab leaders took the famous Vow of the Three Nos toward Israel: No peace, no recognition, no negotiations. Even the Hebrew word for this attitude – chutzpah – isn’t strong enough.

***

The British White Paper of 1939 was intended to put a virtual end to Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Jews were furious, but World War II intervened, forcing the Jews to choose between the British and the Germans. Jewish leader David Ben-Gurion, who was to become Israel’s first prime minister, rallied his dispirited compatriots with the cry, “We will fight together with Great Britain in this war as if there is no White paper, and we will fight the White Paper as if there is no war” (Levin, 2002, p. 164). Meir (1975, p. 130) remembers the cry a little
differently: “We shall fight Hitler as if there were no White Paper and fight the White Paper as if there were no Hitler.” The British, on the other hand, were not exactly eager for Jewish allies. “The British,” she said (p. 135), “were dead set against letting the Jews of Palestine volunteer for the army (though 130,000 did so) and invented a series of complicated schemes … for keeping enlistment in the yishuv down to the bare minimum, including insistence upon equal numbers of Jewish and Arab recruits.

***

One of the most famous rallying cries comes from the Hebrew Bible: Psalm 137:5. Ariel Sharon, Israel’s prime minister, quoted it as the climax to his speech to the United Nations in 2005: "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand forget its cunning." (See Appendix C, Annex 40, 2005.)

***

Outsiders have trouble understanding of the conflict – and none was more puzzled than William Ormsby Gore, British undersecretary of state to the colonies, in the 1920s, as reported in Isseroff (2009). The British had hoped to establish self-governing institutions in Palestine, as required by the mandate. The Jews were alarmed by the prospect of such institutions, which would have an Arab majority. The Arabs, in turn, would not accept British offers of self-government if they included any Jews at all, and so no institutions were created. To which a frustrated Ormsby-Gore concluded, “Palestine is largely inhabited by unreasonable people” (quoted in Wasserstein, 1978, p. 108).

***
American government officials have made so many policy statements about the Arab-Israeli conflict that it is hard to narrow them to a quotable few. The following express a consistent U.S. position:

President Lyndon Johnson, from a speech to the National Foreign Policy Conference of Educators: Requiring Israel to withdraw to its borders before 1967 “is not a prescription for peace, but for a renewal of hostilities … There must be secure and there must be recognized borders” (Johnson, 1967, June 19, p. 18).

President Ronald Reagan: “In the pre-1967 borders, Israel was barely ten miles wide at its narrowest point. The bulk of Israel’s population lived within artillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am not about to ask Israel to live that way again” (Reagan, 1982, Sept. 2, p. A11).

President George H.W. Bush: "For a Texan, a first visit to Israel is an eye-opener. At the narrowest point, it's only 8 miles from the Mediterranean to the old Armistice line: That's less than from the top to the bottom of Dallas-Ft. Worth Airport. The whole of pre-1967 Israel is only about six times the size of the King Ranch near Corpus Christi” (Bush, 2001, May 3).

***

The following quotation captures in two sentences, the essence of the Israeli position: “If the Arabs put down their weapons today, there would be no more violence. If the Jews put down their weapons today, there would be no more Israel.” (Netanyahu, 2006, p. 6). To which an anonymous Internet commentator replied, “Oh, yeah? Try telling American gun owners that if only they would put down their weapons, there would be no more violence.” The original quote is suspect since it could not be traced to the specific issue of a publication. The source given above credits a defunct Australian weekly news magazine, the Bulletin, from 2006. It specifies a page number but not an issue. The Huffington Post cites Netanyahu but no publication. Israel

U.S. President Richard Nixon employed a similar linguistic twist to discredit rival U.S.S. R.: “We want peace; they want the Middle East” (Oren, 2007).

***

The last word goes to former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: “The great tragedies of history occur not when right confronts wrong, but when two rights face each other” (Kissinger, 1974, p. 290).
Appendix J -- Style Guide

First reference for nomenclature, spelling, style, and usage is the Associated Press Stylebook (Christian, Jacobsen, & Minthorn, 2009); second from The New York Times Manual of Style and Usage (Siegal & Connolly, 1993); third, from Times usage (based on a frequency count derived from a search for options); and fourth, in rare cases, from Web postings (based on a frequency count based on Google searches). Decisions are attributed, with scores and sources.

The question of what to call the contentious, 35-acre site in Jerusalem is instructive. The Associated Press recognizes both Temple Mount and Haram al-Sharif (but not Haram ash-Sharif). The Times stylebook is silent. The third option – a frequency count derived from a search in the Times database – yielded 482 hits for Temple Mount, 125 for Haram al-Sharif and 101 for Noble Sanctuary. The decision was to use Temple Mount unless quoting (directly or in paraphrase) a source who uses another term.

New York Times database search included “All Results Since 1851” Note: The Times search engine is not sensitive to case or punctuation. Thus “Arab Israeli Conflict” and “Arab-Israeli conflict” yielded the same number of hits. The choice between them was based on frequency of use. Scores are reported below when significant differences were found. If all 10 of the first citations agree, no further investigation was undertaken; if the first 10 citations disagree, the next 10 or 20 were consulted.

1967 war = 4,920 hits. Of the first 20 hits, 13 were lowercase, five were uppercase and two were not relevant. Six-Day War = 2,320 hits. Of the first 20 entries, 14 were capitalized, six were not; 15 included hyphens, five did not. June war = 190 hits.

Abbas, Mahmoud
Abu or Abou.

Al-Aqsa = Associated Press style. Note the capital A on Al and the hyphen between Al and Aqsa. Al means the in Arabic. The Associated Press violates its own style in lowercasing old city.

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades = No apostrophe; both plural.
Al-Aqsa intifada.
Al-Jazeera = Associated Press style.
Allahu Akbar = Both words were capitalized in 13 of the first 20 hits.
Al-Quds = Associated Press style. The Arabic name for Jerusalem. It means the holy.
amir = See emir.
Jewish-Arab conflict = 13 hits.
Arab-Jewish Conflict. See Arab-Israeli Conflict.
Arafat, Yasser = Associated Press style.
Ark of the Covenant = The box that held the Ten Commandments, given by God to Moses.
Balfour Declaration.
Basic Law.
bin.
security barrier. As a single word, fence was preferred to wall in all cases except with separation.
British mandate.
Camp David summit.
Churchill White Paper.
Declaration of Principles = See Oslo accords.
Fatah = Associated Press style. “Do not use with the prefix al-. A secular Palestinian party and former guerrilla movement founded by Yasser Arafat.
fatwa = 2,040 hits vs. 100 for fatwah. An insignificant number are capitalized.
fedayeen
First Temple = Capitalized in eight of the first 10 references.
Gaza Strip = more than 10,000 hits.
hadiths = Of 32 hits, 10 were capitalized, nine were lowercase and four were irrelevant. Of the first 10 hits in Google, nine were lowercase.
Halakhah = Of 16 references in the New York Times database, seven were capitalized, two were lowercase and seven were irrelevant (e.g., within titles or names).
Haram al-Sharif = Associated Press style. Note the omission of al- (meaning the) before Haram and the lowercase al- before Sharif.
Hezbollah = Associated Press style.
high priest (Judaism) = Lowercase in seven of 10 entries.
Holy Land.
Holy of Holies.
Hussein = Associated Press style for the Arabic name.
ibn.
imam = Lowercase in seven of 10 entires, capitalized in one and irrelevant in two.
intifada = In the first 20 references, intifada was written lowercase in 13, capitalized in two and irrelevant in five.
Israel-Arab Conflict. See Arab-Israeli Conflict.
Jewish-Arab Conflict. See Arab-Israeli-Conflict.
June war = See 1967 war.
Kaaba = New York Times style.
keffiyeh = 106 hits vs. 11 for keffiyah.
Kotel.
Lausanne protocol.
Lebanon war (in conjunction with 1982) = 107 hits; “Operation Peace for Galilee,” 26; First Lebanon war, 0. An examination of the first 20 entries under Lebanon war yielded 17 hits for lowercase war and three for uppercase War.
Letters of mutual recognition (Oslo I).
madrasa = 379 hits in the New York Times vs. 58 for madrassah.
mandatory Palestine. The first 20 hits in database of The New York Times split 10/10 on whether to capitalize “mandatory.” Google does not discriminate between upper and lowercase.
McMahon correspondence = Note lowercase “c” in correspondence. Not MacMahon.
Medina. Not Medinah.
Mitchell report.
mohareb.
Muhammad = Associated Press style. The chief prophet and central figure of the Islamic religion.
mujahedeen = Associated Press style. Arabic for holy warriors. The singular is mujahed.
Muslims = Associated Press style.
Moslems. See Muslims.
mullah = Associated Press style.
Nakba produced 140 hits. An examination of the first 50 entries showed 31 capitalized and 19 lowercased. Search for Naqba produced seven hits.
Naqba. See Nakba.
new historiography. Lowercase.
Noble Sanctuary. See Temple Mount.
occupied territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip) produced 9,220 hits. Examination of the first 20 hits showed 18 in lowercase and two in uppercase.
Old City of Jerusalem.
Operation Kadesh. Israeli reference to Suez crisis (q.v.).
Oslo accords = 1,250 hits; declaration of principles, 378.
Palestine Liberation Organization = Associated Press style. Not Palestinian Liberation Organization. PLO is acceptable in all references.
Palestine mandate.
Palestinian Authority = >10,000 hits; Palestinian National Authority, 144.
Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. See Arab-Israeli Conflict.
Palestinian Liberation Organization. See Palestine Liberation Organization.
Palestinian National Authority. See Palestinian Authority.
Palestinian National Charter.
Palestinian National Covenant. See Palestinian National Charter.
Prophet Muhammad = Associated Press style. See *Muhammad*.
Quartet = Of the first 10 references, seven were capitalized and three were written in lowercase.
Reagan plan.
road map to peace = (two words, lowercase, 258 hits). Road map for peace = 163 hits.
San Remo conference.
Sea of Galilee = 249 hits. Lake Tiberias drew five hits. No other common variation – Sea of Chinnereth, Sea of Kinnereth, Tiberias Lake, Sea of Tiberias and Lake of Gennesaret – scored any hits.
shaheed.
Shariah = Associated Press style.
sheik = Associated Press style.
Shiite = Associated Press style. Plural = Shiites. The alternate spelling Shia is acceptable in quotes.
Sinai campaign = See Suez crisis.
Six-Day War. See 1967 war.
Suez crisis (1956) = 1,920 hits. Sinai campaign, 250; Suez war, 185; Tripartite Aggression, 11; Suez/Sinai War, 3; and Operation Kadesh, 0. An examination of the first 20 hits under Suez crisis showed 13 written lowercase as crisis, 2 as Crisis and 5 not relevant because they were in all capital letters.
sunnah.
sura [Quran] = 118 hits vs. 16 for surah. (Capitalize when referring to a specific chapter.)
Stockholm declaration.
Sykes-Picot agreement.
Taba talks = 306 hits; Taba conference = 62 hits; Taba summit = 43 hits.
Temple Mount = 482 hits; Haram al-Sharif, 125; Noble Sanctuary, 101.
Ten Commandments = Associated Press style.
ulema = 401 hits vs. 195 for ulama.
umma = Tie between capitalized and lowercase.
UNRWA = Six hits vs. two for U.N.R.W.A. and two for Unrwa.
Western Wall [of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem] = 425 hits. Wailing Wall [Jerusalem], 142 hits.
U.S. = Associated Press style. Use periods in copy but not in headlines.
Venice declaration.
Wailing Wall. See *Western Wall*.
war of attrition (1967-1970) = Of the first 20 hits, 18 were written lowercase, two uppercase and one not relevant.
war of independence (1948). Search for [Israel “War of Independence”] produced 767 hits. Examination of the first five pages with 44 entries produced 31 references in lowercase and 13 in uppercase.
Waqf. Of the first 20 hits, the word was capitalized in 16 and lowercase in four.
West Bank = 14,918 hits. Judea/Samaria = 368.
Yedioth Ahronoth. 207 hits vs. seven for Yediot Ahronoth.
Yishuv.
Yom Kippur War = 194 hits; Middle East War of 1973, 160; 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 102;
1973 Middle East War, 85; October War, 29; and Ramadan War, 2. War was capitalized in 23 of
the first 30 hits; in the others, war was lowercase.
zakat (alms) = 177,000 hits on google vs. 38,100 for zakah.
## Appendix K – Dictionaries

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cordial
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| dominate       | serious  |
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| doubts         | share    |
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stumbling block
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submarines
submission
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ultimatum
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unacceptable
unbearable
uncompromising
underground
undermine
undermined
Appendix L – Codebook
Coding protocol for “The Rhetoric of Terrorism and Conciliation in the Arab-Israeli Conflict”

Stage 1: Instructions to coders

Introduction
This study will be based on a content analysis of articles about Arab-Israeli relationships. The articles will have appeared between Sept. 22 and Oct. 5, 2000, and between Feb. 19 and March 4, 2005, in Al-Quds, Haaretz and Jerusalem Post. The point of the study is to determine whether harsh rhetoric can be correlated with harsh acts in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Standards for relevance
--Involves Israeli-Palestinian relations.
--Involves words or deeds by Palestinians or Israelis.
--Likely to influence what a reader thinks or does.
--Likely to increase or to decrease hostilities; to inflame or to conciliate; to agitate or to calm.
If you are uncertain about whether a certain article qualifies, compare the writer’s choice of words with the dictionary of inflammatory and conciliatory words (furnished separately). In close calls, the presence of one or more of these words will cause the story to be considered relevant.

Definitions
Inflammatory words are defined as likely to increase tensions between Israelis or Palestinians or both. They are “fighting words” such as suicide, bomber, terrorist, martyr, killed, assassination and any reference to the fence/wall or to the occupied territories/colonies.

Conciliatory words are likely to reduce tensions between Israelis or Palestinians or both. They are pacific words such as truce, peace, ceasefire, cooperation, negotiations, optimism and trust.

Separate dictionaries will be created for each category.

Included sections
1. Main news and feature.
2. Opinion.

Excluded sections
1. Sports.
2. Society
3. Business
4. Photographs and cartoons (but not captions)
5. Style/fashion
6. Entertainment
7. International
8. Obituaries (but do include news stories on deaths resulting from terrorist action)
9. Religion (but do include attempts to demonize the other side with religious justification)
10. Reprints of stories from other newspapers.
Stage 1: Coding sheet

Initials of coder

Date of coding

Newspaper ID#
  1 = Al-Quds
  2 = Haaretz
  3 = JPost

Date that the article was published

Article identification number

Number of page on which the article was published

Section in which the article was published
  1 = News (includes features and news analysis)
  2 = Opinion (includes letters to editor, editorials, columns)
  3 = Other

Writer
  1 = Unnamed reporter or caption writer
  2 = Unnamed editorial or opinion writer
  3 = Bylined news or feature
  4 = Bylined opinion
  5 = Wire service (with or without byline)
  6 = Letter to editor
  7 = Caption
  8 = Other

Headline: __________________________________________________________

Stage 2: Building the dictionary

Inflammatory words or phrases | Conciliatory words or phrases
|
Appendix M – Final-Status Issues

So why is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict so difficult to resolve? What makes it intractable? What specific issues defy compromise? Chapter 1 laid out the origins of the conflict, its significance and its durability. This appendix identifies the components of its intractability – the so-called “final-status issues” -- and reviews proposed solutions.

Resistance to negotiation and compromise goes way back. No other region of the world has suffered so many, so extended, so publicized and such disastrous riots, wars, invasions and uprisings as Israel, many of which involved its neighbors and other countries in the region. Consider only the most deadly events:

1920 – Arab riots.
1921 – Arab riots
1929 – Arab riots, also called the Wailing Wall riots.
1936-1939 – Arab revolt.
1948-1949 – Israel’s war of independence, called the Nakba (catastrophe) by Arabs.
1956 – Suez crisis.
1967 – Six-day war.
1974 – Yom Kippur war.
1978 – Lebanon invasion, also called Litani Operation.
From a religious perspective, the conflict pits Jews and Muslims, both of whom consider the land sacred. Christians surrendered their territorial claims with the defeat of the last Crusaders in the 13th century, although they continue to revere numerous sites as holy.

Johns (2009, November) called this land, so deeply imbued with religion, “one of the most contentious places on Earth.” He called the reach of this tiny slip of land “nothing short of profound: It touches the souls of more than 3.5 billion people around the world” (p. 1).

Only rarely, said Belt (2009, November), -- such as during the Oslo negotiations of the 1990s, for example -- have the combatants embraced a future based on hope and mutual goodwill. When the goodwill collapsed in 2000, hard-liners on both sides rose to power. “No wonder,” Belt concluded, “outsiders throw up their hands and pronounce the Holy Land rift beyond repair” (p. 83).

Modern History of the Conflict

Although the conflict between Arab Muslims and Jews goes back to Muhammad, whom the Jews rejected in the 7th century A.D. as a prophet in their tradition, the modern history begins with the assassination of Alexander II of Russia in 1881. The Jews were blamed, initiating a series of pogroms that drove out most of them. With nowhere to go, some of them fled to their ancient homeland. This was the first of successive waves of Jewish immigrants, and they clashed with the indigenous Arab Muslims and, later, with Great Britain, which treated Palestine like a colony. The clashes culminated on May 14, 1948, when the Zionists declared their little country independent and named it Israel. To preserve their independence, they had to fight a series of wars with neighboring Muslim Arab states. Although Israel won, it was left with a restless Arab Muslim minority within Israel and domination over unruly concentrations of resentful Palestinians in the occupied territories – primarily the West Bank (of the Jordan River, including
East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip – known to Jews world-wide as Samaria in the north and Judea in the south. The Palestinians’ undefined status, their lack of a state to represent them and their inability to govern themselves created an intolerable situation that has won the sympathy of the world.

**Intractable**

Intractable conflicts have been studied by several disciplines. Bar-Tal (2007, July), writing in the American Behavioral Scientist, characterized intractable conflicts as protracted and violent, with ebbs and flows over time; perceived as unsolvable with no peaceful resolution in sight; requiring an extensive investment; multifaceted; zero-sum (in that a gain for one side is perceived as a loss for the other); constant; and consumed with details. Bar-Tal’s definition is correct, but it could be simplified as a stalemate that both sides see as more costly to settle than to perpetuate.

The significance of the Arab-Israeli conflict is magnified by the sense of fraternity that neighboring states – some powerful like Egypt, some rich like Saudi-Arabia -- feel for their Muslim-Arab cousins in Palestine and that the world powers (at different times, the U.S.S.R, Great Britain, France and the United States) feel for both sides.

Most proposals to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict envision the West Bank and Gaza Strip combined into a new state called Palestine. Other observers have imagined a binational state joining Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into a single country, but with less success. The Jews of Israel adamantly refuse to live as a minority under Muslim Arab sovereignty. A unitary state would have about 10.4 million Muslim Arabs, 5.8 million Jews, and 322,000 “other” (Klinger, 2011).
The reasons that the conflict is so difficult to solve help to explain the world’s fascination with it: Each side has a just but incompatible claim – phrased as a sacred trust from God -- to the same piece of ground. Their struggle to assert their rights is the very essence of tragedy, which does not usually develop as Good vs. Evil but rather as Good vs. Good. Both sides are willing not only to die to uphold their legitimate claims but also to kill moderate elements on their own side. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was not assassinated by Israeli Jews in 1970; he was shot by Egyptian Arabs. Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was not assassinated by Palestinian or Egyptian Arabs; he was shot by an Israeli Jew. The motive for both killers was the same: They feared that their leaders were willing to compromise in order to make peace.

The assassins made their point to future negotiators: Compromise is risky in the extreme. For example, at the Camp David summit in 2000, Arafat was refusing to give an inch, and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright demanded to know why (Ross, 2004). “Arafat got very emotional,” Ross said, “asking her if she wanted to go to his funeral” (p. 693).

The view of the conflict as Good vs. Good aligns with a movement called the New Historiography, developed in the late 1980s by historians such as Benny Morris (2004b) and Ilan Pappe (2006). New Historiography was influenced by Israel’s release of archival documents, which showed that its conduct had not been entirely blameless in some circumstances. Unfortunately, comparable information is unavailable from the Arabs, who have not opened their archives to scholarly examination. Morris’s position was that the student of Middle East politics should “struggle against his political inclinations” (p. 25), which is difficult when one side supplies most of the written records.
The thrust of the New Historiography movement, Morris said, is that the conflict cannot not be understood in black-and-white terms. Both sides have strong claims as well as just grievances.

Atran & Ginges (2009, January 25) offered this pessimistic summary: “The most depressing feature of the conflict is the sense that future fighting is inevitable. Rational calculation suggests that neither side can win these wars. This small territory is the world’s great symbiotic knot … the mother of all problems” (p. WK12).

**Attempts at conciliation**

Some of the smartest and most powerful people in the world have tried to reconcile the Israelis and the Palestinians -- without success. U.S. President Bill Clinton pulled out all the stops in trying to find a formula for peace between the two sides before he left office in 2001. “I want to reach agreement, but we owe it to ourselves to know that if we cannot reach agreement, it is because it is impossible,” Clinton told Ehud Barak, Israeli prime minister, and Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Clinton had gathered them and their aides at Camp David, Md., for marathon negotiations (Ross, 2004, p. 664). Clinton failed, and he was only one of the latest to suffer rejection.

The first might have been the Lebanese Christian Negib Azoury, who predicted in 1905 that Arab nationalists and Zionists “are destined to fight each other continually until one of them wins. The fate of the entire world will depend on the final results of this struggle between these two peoples representing two contrary principles” (Pipes, 2004, p. 137). David Ben Gurion, Israel’s founding prime minister, was no more optimistic. He said in a 1919 speech, “There is no solution to this question. No solution! There is a gulf and nothing can fill this gulf” (quoted in Wasserstein (1978, p. 140).
The conflict, Wasserstein (1978) said, was not just a matter of “marginally overlapping interests. It was a head-on collision.” He quoted a 1937 British inquiry by the Peel Commission, which concluded bluntly, “An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country … There is no common ground between them” (p. 239).

After more than 130 years of fighting and negotiating, the conflict has narrowed to a handful of fundamental issues, all of which must be resolved to the satisfaction of both Palestinians and Israelis in order to end the conflict. Failure to agree on any one overturns them all, and the conflict will continue. They are difficult because they go to the core of existence and identity.

The oddest fact is that the solutions are well-known and, when considered individually, generally accepted. At its foundation, the blockage has become not an ability to find solutions but rather it has become their implementation. The missing piece to the missing peace is trust. Both parties suspect that the other would crush it, given the chance, and each has cause.

First, the issues, which are complex; then, the solutions, which are simple when viewed in isolation:

A search of the database of The New York Times in 2010 for references to “final status” yielded 11 useful hits in which the reporter or the source provided a list of issues. The column at the left of Table 2.1 shows the date on which the story appeared. The numbers under the column headings indicate the order in which the issue was mentioned. The right-hand column identifies the source of the list. For example, when Martin S. Indyk, former U.S. ambassador to Israel identified the final status issues in The New York Times, he mentioned security first, followed by settlements, recognition of a Palestine state, borders, and Jerusalem.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Borders/Land</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Jerusalem</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Settlements</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5/1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>‘Experts’</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>8/29</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Cooper&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>8/29</td>
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<td>Oren&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>8/30</td>
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<td>Editorial</td>
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<td>8/31</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mubarak&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>9/1</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>Cooper</td>
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<td>Abbas&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Netanyahu&lt;sup&gt;20&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<tr>
<td>9/2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>‘Analysts’</td>
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<tr>
<td>9/14</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Landler&lt;sup&gt;21&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>16</sup> Helene Cooper, reporter, The New York Times.
<sup>17</sup> Michael B. Oren, Israeli ambassador to the United States
<sup>18</sup> Hosni Mubarak, president of Egypt
<sup>19</sup> Mahmoud Abbas, secretary-general of the PLO and top Palestinian negotiator at the Camp David summit. Later, president of the Palestinian National Authority on the Fatah ticket
<sup>20</sup> Benjamin Netanyahu, prime minister of Israel, 1996-1999 and again from 2009.
<sup>21</sup> Mark Landler, reporter, The New York Times
The two issues identified as “Other” and attributed to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were a final peace that would (1) end the conflict and claims on Israel and (2) require Palestinians to recognize Israel as the national state of the Jewish people (Kershner, 2010, September 2, p. A10). The list of other issues identified by different sources at different times is lengthy and is discussed last as a separate category.

The sequence in which the issues are mentioned is of minor significance in most cases, since all must be settled for peace to take hold. An exception is the September 2 story, in which Netanyahu made it clear the security is crucial, almost to the exclusion of other issues. On the other hand, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, as might be expected, was more concerned about the establishment of a Palestinian state and less concerned about Israel’s security.

One reason for the complexity is that all final-status issues are related. For example, a Palestinian state cannot be established without fixing its borders, and Israeli will never agree to borders until its security needs have been addressed. Israel’s Jewish identity cannot be assured if it admits more than a token number of Palestinian refugees. Who has sovereignty over what land is nowhere so sensitive as in Jerusalem, specifically the Temple Mount, which Arabs call the Haram al-Sharif.

For an independent view of intractable issues, Table M.2 was created from the closing chapters of The Missing Peace by Dennis Ross, who was the chief negotiator for U.S. President Bill Clinton. Ross (2004) provides the most detailed account of negotiations at the head-of-state level during last days of the Clinton administration. The left-hand column shows the name and page number in Ross’s book; the right-hand column identifies other issues. For example, Ross on p. 517 says Israelis in general believe water is second most important. The bottom line sums the number of times that someone has mentioned the issue as “final status.”
Table M.2

How Key People Rank the Final-Status issues, as Reported in Ross (2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Borders/Land</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Jerusalem</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ross, p. 511</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Israelis,’ p. 517</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2: Water</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Israelis,’ p. 517</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3: Timetable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barak, 22 p. 521</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1: Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria, p. 517</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Israelis,’ p. 543</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barak, p. 552</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2: Water</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ross, p. 607</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arafat, 23 p. 630</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ross: p. 633</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Berger, 24 p. 737</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shlomo, 25 p. 642</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Abu Ala, 26 p. 643</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ross: p. 644</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ross: p. 647</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Dahlan, 27 p. 700</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ross, p. 756</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton, 28 p. 801</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Ross (2004)*

22 Ehud Barak, prime minister of Israel, 1999-2001
23 Yasser Arafat, chairman of the PLO
24 Samuel (Sandy) Berger, U.S. national security adviser, 1997-2001
25 Shlomo Ben-Ami, Israeli minister of internal security, 1999-2001, and acting foreign minister,
26 Abu Ala (Ahmed Qurei), lead Palestinian negotiator at Oslo
27 Mohammad Dahlan, head of Palestinian security in Gaza, negotiator
28 Bill Clinton, president of the United States, 1993-2001
Note that the precedence attached to some issues varies by time and circumstance, even with the same negotiator. Ross himself illustrates the fluidity, identifying borders and security first and second on Page 511 and as third and fourth on Page 607. The point is that any issue on a final-status list is a potential deal-breaker – even if the Israelis and Palestinians can reach an agreement on all the rest.

Water is a prime example of an “other” deal-breaker. It is not mentioned in the New York Times list and mentioned only three times in the Ross lists, but water is the most important natural resource in the region. Whoever controls access to water can render all the other issues meaningless.

A timetable for implementation is similarly sensitive. A timetable is mentioned only once in the tables above. However, experience has shown that agreement is easy if a final-status issue is postponed or if implementation is set far enough into the future, but unless the parties perform on time, as agreed, even truces fall apart. Nor can Israel fix borders until it is assured that the solution to the refugee issue lies on the Palestinian side, not on the Israeli side, of their border.

Two additional lists are worth special consideration because they illustrate the thinking of both sides in the post-Arafat, post-Sharon era. The first comes from a speech by Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian National Authority since 2005. The speech, delivered on Nov. 11, 2008, is known as “Abbas’s Six Points.” As usual, it is impossible to know whether he was rallying his supporters or articulating a negotiating strategy, or whether his remarks were intended for his home audience or for international consumption. This is how the speech was reported by Deutsche Presse-Agentur by the Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz, and by Earth Times, an online newspaper published in the United Kingdom: “Abbas told tens of thousands of Palestinians who gathered at his Ramallah headquarters to mark four years since the death of
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat that he wants a full peace deal and will accept no partial deal. ‘We rejected Israeli proposals that indicated making concessions including on Jerusalem and the refugees,’ he said. ‘We either get all six points – Jerusalem, settlements, borders, refugees, water and security – or nothing at all’” (Abbas: Israel proposed concessions on Jerusalem, 2008, November 11).

The second list comes from a speech by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu:
Recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, land/borders, settlements, refugees, security (Transcript, 2011). The speech raises a question about whether land and borders should be divided into separate issues. Netanyahu added this paragraph, which deviated from his prepared speech: “So I want to be very clear on this point: Israel will be generous on the size of a Palestinian state, but we’ll be very firm on where we put the border with it. This is an important principle; shouldn’t be lost.” The transcript of the speech as delivered was printed in The Washington Post; the speech as written was published by NewsBusters (Netanyahu, 2011).

Theories abound as to why tentative agreements are so quick to unravel. Perhaps no observer has been so close to negotiations for so long as Dennis Ross, chief negotiator for the United States under three presidents. As a rule, he said, Arab leaders lack legitimacy. Power traditionally is inherited or seized – not elected. There is no sense of public participation in a political process. This results in a sense of vulnerability that makes the leaders risk-averse. They are afraid of being accused of conceding perceived rights. “The underlying reality has been that the Arab partner in a negotiation with Israel is always the arbiter of what is acceptable … It will always be Israel’s Arab partner, and not Israel, who decides if a deal can be done. There are few in Israel who question the legitimacy of the Palestinian national movement. Others, however, question whether the Palestinians – or Arabs more generally – are truly willing to make peace
with them” (Ross, 2004, p. 762-763). New York Times reporter Deborah Sontag concluded, “Many Israelis were not in much of a hurry to get to the endgame. They simply wanted the terrorism to stop” (Sontag, 2001, July 26, p. A10).

In following review of specific issues, note the trap of wishful thinking – i.e., “If only this one key issue (fill in the blank) could be resolved, everything else will fall into place.” It is a trap because each issue is crucial – or else it would not have been identified as final-status. Thus the order in which they are discussed here might as well be random.

The present study builds upon a pilot study that compared the difference between inflammatory and conciliatory rhetoric in 10 Middle Eastern newspapers and the independent Arabic Web site Al Jazeera (Witte, 2006). The pilot study was limited to news and comment regarding to the 2005 suicide bombing outside a nightclub in Tel Aviv. The present study has been expanded to include a contrasting event: the visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount in 2000.

**Existence**

This might be the supreme issue. Two parties cannot negotiate meaningfully as long as either fears that the other denies its right to exist and seeks its annihilation. Both will seek domination, not equality or fairness. “Our contest with you,” said one clandestine leaflet addressed by the Palestinian underground to the Israelis, is one of “faith, existence, and life” (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 31). More recently, Muhammad Dahlan, former chief of the Palestinian Authority’s secret police and a negotiator at the 2000 Camp David summit, defended Fatah from charges that it was soft on Israel. “For the 1,000th time, I want to reaffirm that we are not asking Hamas to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Rather we are asking Hamas not to do so, because Fatah never recognized Israel’s right to exist” (quoted in Goldberg, 2009, p. BR12).
Fatah is the largest faction in the Palestine Liberation Organization, which governs the West Bank. Morris (2009) said contradictory statements, such as the PLO’s recognition of Israel in 1988, were staged to lull hopeful Westerners.

The Israeli response was not optimistic: “The ultimate and existential question underlying the search for resolution of this conflict is Arab acceptance of a two-state solution … Once Palestinians accept that, … issues such as refugees, Jerusalem, permanent borders and security become solvable” (Cohen, 2010).

The speech by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the U.S. Congress (Transcript, 2011) made it sound as if he and Israel had just come for the first time to accept the notion that a Palestinian state had a right to exist. “Two years ago,” the prime minister said, “I publicly committed to a solution of two states for two peoples: a Palestinian state alongside a Jewish state.” And again: “I stood before my people – and I told you it wasn’t easy for me. I stood before my people, and I said, ‘I will accept a Palestinian state.’ ” Palestinians didn’t believe it when he said the same thing before, and they didn’t believe it in 2011. Their conclusion was that Israeli intended to keep its boot on the Palestinian neck in perpetuity. A two-state solution did not become U.S. policy until 2001 (Ross, 2004, p. 786).

Jewish fears go back more than a century. The first British high commissioner, Herbert Samuel, proposed a legislative council. The Palestinians rejected it because it would have Jewish members (Morris, 2001, p. 209). Then Samuel tried to create an advisory council, but it was rejected for the same reason (Wasserstein, 1978, p. 127-128). Palestinians refused even to set up an Arab Agency as a counterpart to the Jewish Agency. “The failure of the Arab Agency scheme marked the final collapse of all Samuel’s attempts to provide a constitutional legitimation for British rule in Palestine … Indeed any acceptance by them [Palestinians] of such proposals
would implicitly legitimize the Jewish National Home and the British mandate, and thus weaken their power to oppose Zionism and imperial rule” (Wasserstein, 1978, p. 129-130). In 1947, Palestinians rejected a United Nations resolution authorizing a state of Palestine because the resolution also authorized a state of Israel (Morris, 2001, p. 186). See Appendix D, Annex 1 (1947), for the complete text of the resolution. More recently, current manifestos of the dominant Arabic political parties bluntly deny Israel’s right to exist:

**From the charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization** (Appendix C, 1964, 1968):
“Armed struggle is the only way of liberating Palestine … The partition of Palestine, which took place in 1947, and the establishment of Israel, are fundamentally invalid, however long they last … Judaism is a revealed religion; it is not a separate nationality, nor are the Jews a single people with a separate identity; they are citizens of their respective countries … the liberation of Palestine will eliminate the Zionist and imperialist presence in that country.”

**From the Fatah Constitution** (Appendix C, 1964), under the heading of Goals:
“Complete liberation of Palestine, and eradication of Zionist economic, political, military and cultural existence.” Under the heading of Methods: “This struggle will not cease unless the Zionist state is demolished and Palestine is completely liberated.”

**From the Phased Plan** of the PLO (Appendix C, 1974): “The Liberation Organization will employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated.”

**From the Hezbollah Program** (Appendix C, 1985): “Israel must be wiped out of existence … Our struggle will end only when this entity [Israel] is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease fire, and no peace agreements, whether separate or consolidated …
Fighting Israel is the responsibility of all Muslims in all parts of the world … negotiating with the enemy is high treason.”

**From the Hamas covenant** (Appendix C, 1988): “Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it … rid the land and the people of their uncleanness, vileness and evils … The Prophet … has said: ‘The Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him … The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up … Initiatives, and so-called peaceful solutions and international conferences, are in contradiction to the principles of the Islamic Resistance Movement … There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad … Secularism completely contradicts religious ideology … The Islamic nature of Palestine is part of our religion … Their [Israeli] plan is embodied in the ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion,’ and their present conduct is the best proof of what we are saying.”

**From Iran** (Reich, 2008): “Israel saw Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat … Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had sustained a rhetorical campaign against Israel, labeling Israel ‘illegitimate’ and calling for its destruction. He … stated that Israel should be ‘wiped off the map’ ” (p. 283). To Israel, his remarks sounded chillingly like the rhetoric that preceded wars in 1967 and 1973.

For a more personal testament, Shalev (1991) quotes Abu Iyad, *nom de guerre* of Salah Mesbah Khalaf, a PLO official who said he, along with everyone else in his generation, opposed partition. “Indeed, he had not entertained it [supporting partition] until three months ago, as he
had always advocated the liberation of all of Palestine in one blow. But today Abu Iyad believes, ‘I was a fool. I am indeed interested in the liberation of Palestine, but how? Step by step, we must propose the right way to liberation. When first we spoke of the strategy of stages, disputes erupted among us, and accusations of treason were traded’ ” (p. 243). Abu Iyad’s shift in strategy did not reassure either Arabs or Israelis, and he was assassinated in Tunis. His assailants were never identified. Shalev is an author and adjunct senior research fellow at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv.

Lack of trust translates into extreme fears. “The Palestinians for their part see Israel as intent on controlling the entire area, perhaps indefinitely, perhaps through annexation, perhaps through wholesale evictions of current Arab residents as in 1948-1949 … In Israel, the two major political movements are divided between the far right ‘not one inch’ and the far left ‘land for peace’ ” (Shalev, 1991, p. 176).

Suspicious of evil intent lie just below the surface. During the 2000 Camp David summit, Israeli Prime Minister Barak had presented a position that the Palestinians found unreasonable. Ross (2004, p. 608) describes their reaction: “I went to see Yasser [Arafat], Saeb [Erekat, chief Palestinian negotiator] and [Mohammad] Dahlan [representing Gaza]. They were fuming, saying this was an outrage. The Israelis did not want a deal, they wanted to occupy the Palestinians forever.”

Trust was easier to establish with some foreign enemies than with domestic enemies. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977 convinced the Israelis that he sincerely wanted peace, and two years later the Israelis not only returned the Sinai Peninsula but promised autonomy for the Palestinians in a peace treaty. Negotiations with Jordan also moved successfully to a peace treaty. Both treaties have held, but that didn’t translate into trust closer to
home. “The belief that the Palestinians would resort to violence whenever they were unhappy fed the view of many that no deal with the Palestinians would hold” (Ross, 2004, p. 625).

A modern gesture comparable to Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem would be the declaration that Palestinians will accept a Jewish state, Netanyahu insisted. He said it was all that was holding back Israel from offering a “far-reaching” compromise. “You see,” said Netanyahu, “our conflict has never been about the existence of a Palestinian state. It’s always been about the existence of the Jewish state” (Transcript, 2011).

The Palestinians, for their part, rejected Netanyahu’s demand. They said they had already recognized the state of Israel. How Israel wished to characterize itself was of no concern to them. Further, Palestinians contended that recognizing Israel as a Jewish state would undercut one of their core demands, which is to allow refugees to return to their homes in what is now Israel (Enough game playing, 2010).

Conditioned by its existential fears and surrounded by enemies, Israel has said that it would accept a Palestinian state only if it were demilitarized – i.e., limited to the type of weapons and formations relevant to a police department. Palestinian negotiators say that without the ability for self-defense and self-determination, its state would be merely a vassal of Israel – not much different from the present situation, which has existed since 1967 (Mitnick, 2010, p. A7).

In fact, Palestine has never existed as an independent state and was under self-rule only twice in its written history – about 1000-900 B.C. and 165-65 B.C. In modern history, it was ruled by the Ottoman Turks (who were Muslims, but not Arabs) until 1917, then by the British until 1948, then by neighboring Arab countries, which attacked Palestine -- not to liberate it but to divide it among themselves. Egypt got the Gaza Strip, Jordan got the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and Syria got the Golan Heights -- and kept them until they were seized by Israel in
the 1967 war. Israel maintained that if the Arab countries wanted an independent Palestine, they had ample capability and decades of time. See Appendix D (1980) for the text of United National Security Council Resolution 478, which censured Israel for annexing East Jerusalem, which Jordan had previously annexed along with the rest of the West Bank in 1950. Davis and Decter (1982) found it ironic that the only country in the Middle East that supported a Palestinian Arab state after the British left in 1948 was Israel, by virtue of its support for the UN partition resolution (See Appendix D, 1947). One of the ironies of history is that Palestine, which had been torn asunder by attacking Arab Armies in 1948, was reunited by Israel’s victory in 1967.

Palestinian independence became a hot topic again in 2011 after Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, and Salam Fayyad, prime minister in the West Bank, said they would press the United Nations to recognize Palestine as an independent country. The move gave new relevance to the 1988 Palestinian declaration of independence, which had little effect at the time, but which has been given new life by Fayyad, who cites its authority. A copy of the declaration and accompanying “Political Communique” may be found in Appendix C (1988). It is mild compared to the manifestos quoted above and accepts the legality of the 1947 U.N. partition resolution that granted statehood to both Israel and Palestine. The interpretation is game-changing because the Palestinians previously had declared they would rather not have a state if it meant accepting a Jewish state on any part of the land that they considered their exclusive birthright (Ibrahim, 1988).

Security

Negotiation and diplomacy begins with the recognition of an opponent’s needs and by distinguishing between one’s own needs and one’s wants. Ross (2004) makes this point repeatedly in his book. As an example, he quotes Israeli Prime Minister Barak: “There is no
power in the world that can force on us collective national suicide” (Ross, 2004, p. 677). The Palestinians on the other hand thought Israel was overcompensating for the surprise attacks by Arab states in 1973 (p. 608).

Golda Meir, prime minister of Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur war, would have demurred. In one of her famous quotations, she said, “The Muslims can fight and lose, then come back and fight again. Israel can lose only once.” (Appendix I). Also: “I don’t know, gentlemen, whether you … realize what it means to be the member of a people whose very right to exist is constantly being questioned” (also Appendix I).

Overcompensating or not, Israeli officials stressed repeatedly that no peace deal is possible until they are satisfied that Israel would be able to defend itself. “The outcome of the final status issues is in many ways contingent on resolving Israeli security issues,” said Michael B. Oren, Israel’s ambassador to the United States (Cooper, 2010, August 30, p. A4).

Sontag (2001, July 26) captured PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat’s frustration with Israeli demands: “They have to control the Jordan Valley … the air above, the water aquifers below, the sea and the borders” (p. A10).

Shalev (1991) cites a relatively innocuous article in a London periodical (Middle East Mirror, June 2, 1988) as a breakthrough in rapprochement: “This was the first Palestinian document that recognized the existence of legitimate Israeli security concerns and a symmetry of interests. The document [by Bassam Abu Sharif, Arafat’s political adviser] contained something that no Palestinian had ever proposed, namely, direct negotiations with the Zionist enemy” (p. 136). It struck sparks with some of Sharif’s peers, Shalev said, who called it “deviant” – strong criticism in Islam.
Security issues are difficult in part because they often are coupled with other issues. “[The Israelis] made it clear there were certain irreducible minimums for Israel when it came to early warning, guaranteed access routes through the West Bank and zones of Israeli security responsibilities” [such as outposts on the west side of the Jordan River in what would be Palestinian territory]. Palestinians, for their part, made it equally clear that such arrangements never could be tolerated by any sovereign state (Ross, 2004, p. 608).

Barak drew familiar lines in the sand: “There are three things that we are not willing to concede – Israel’s security, Israel’s holy sites [primarily the Western Wall of the Temple Mount], the unity of the nation [primarily Jerusalem]. If we have to face the choice between a blow to one of them and between going to a confrontation, the choice is clear to every Israeli (Joint Statement, 2000, July 26, p. A10).

Security was no less an issue to the Palestinians than to the Israelis. To the Palestinians, security meant self-determination – the ability to prevent Israel from riding roughshod over them any time Israel felt threatened.

**Borders/Land**

Burke (1954, 1967) thought that most conflicts could be traced to a dispute over property, either actual or symbolic, or both. Oliver and Steinberg (1993) said both were involved here. “The Arab-Israeli tragedy is focused most fundamentally on a contest over land as identity,” they said (p. 16).

Conventional wisdom has long held that the Arab-Israeli conflict was, at its heart, territorial – that the conflict boiled down to a turf battle over a finite piece of ground that happened to be infused with religious zealotry (Stephens, 2010, May 17). Landler and Myers (2011, May 20) called the establishment of borders “the region’s most intractable problem” and
its “most nettlesome dispute” (p. A1). Dowty (2008) described as myths that the Arab-Israeli conflict is age-old, that it is caused by ethnic hatred, that it is rooted in a clash of religions, and therefore it is insoluble. Instead, he said, “it is based on the claim of two peoples to the same piece of land (p. 2).

There is no shortage of authors who have made the same observation, including Wolfsfeld (1997): “The notion of exchanging land for peace has been the most divisive issue facing the country for almost 30 years” (p. 53). Smith (2008) said: “The issues in the Israel-Palestine conflict come down to a question of land – who can live there and who controls its use” (p. 56).

Arabs have never forgotten that the United Nations in 1947 granted Jews, who made up 30 percent of the population of Palestine, 55 percent of what they considered their territory. Most long-time Arab residents were evicted or frightened into leaving and 400 Arab villages were razed to prevent their residents from returning (Morris, 2004a). By the end of 1949, the Jews were in possession of 80 percent of Arab Palestine and 750,000 Palestinians became homeless refugees (Belt, 2009, pp. 84-85).

Khalidi (2006) speaks eloquently of the plight of landless people – people without a country and without the privileges that accompany citizenship, such as passports that permit freedom of foreign travel. “From the beginning of the [British] Mandate [1919] until the end of the 1930s, the British obstinately rejected the principle of majority rule, or any measure that would have given a Palestinian Arab majority control over the government of Palestine … They could never get out of the iron cage fashioned by their British masters” (p. 35, 47). Khalidi understood the cruel contradictions of the situation – a Christian mandatory power [Great
Britain pledged to establish a national home [Jewish] in a land [Muslim] that is holy to three incompatible religions (p. 53).

How strongly do the protagonists feel? Mishal & Aharoni (1994) quoted this anonymous leaflet publisher: “Let any hand be cut off that signs [away] a grain of sand in Palestine in favor of the enemies of God … who have seized … the blessed land” (p. 51). Arafat’s aides adopted the same philosophy in the 2000 negotiations: “Palestinians believed they were entitled to 100 percent of the territory” (Ross, 2004, pp. 724, 726, 729).

Competition for the narrow sliver of land between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River go back to the end of the 19th century (Masalha, 1997). “Demography, land and water were always at the heart of the conflict between the Zionist immigrants/settlers and the native Palestinians,” he said (p. xvi).

Israel’s wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 left it in control of considerably more territory than had been envisioned for it in United Nations resolution 181. (See maps in Appendix E, 1947, 1949 and 1973.) Israel thought it could exchange peace for peace. In other words, Israel was willing to live in peace if its Arab antagonists were willing to live in peace. The Israelis were wrong. The Arabs did not bite, so the concept of land for peace was born with United Nations resolution 242 (See text in Appendix C, 1967). It worked in some cases, such as the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979. Israel gave up the Sinai Peninsula, which it had captured (again) in 1973, and Egypt agreed to sign a peace treaty. Land for peace didn’t work in other situations, such as Syria. Israel offered the Golan Heights, which it captured from Syria in 1973, but Syria refused a peace treaty. Israel finally gave up waiting for Syria to accept or to negotiate and effectively annexed the territory in 1981.
As Palestinians pressed their demands for an independent state, the issue shifted to the question of where to draw the boundaries of the new state. The Palestinians claimed as its border the cease-fire line in 1949. However, Israel by 2011 had built dozens of settlements inside the line and contended that the accident of the cease-fire line would leave Israel with an indefensible eastern border ( Transcript, 2011). The Jordan River border is no less controversial. In his address to the U.S. Congress, Netanyahu described as “vital, absolutely vital” for Israel to maintain a long-term military presence along the Jordan River” – an arrangement the Palestinians maintain that no sovereign state would permit. Israel’s justification for the demand is to guard against a threat from the east – a threat that Israel has faced in each of its wars ( Transcript, 2011; Morris 2001, p. 289).

Palestinians also rejected Israeli demands for guaranteed access routes through the West Bank, for annexation of land occupied by Israeli settlements and for Israeli military outposts. Arafat said they would leave it isolated from Jordan and concluded that its state would consist of narrow strips connecting isolated islands. Arafat said this was no state, but rather a collection of cantons – “bantustans,” as he called them, reminiscent of the noncontiguous homelands assigned by while rulers of South Africa as part of their policy of apartheid ( Oren, 2007a, p. 579). Without secure borders under its control, statehood would mean nothing, Arafat said. Palestine officials have said repeatedly that they “will not accept Israeli soldiers on their future land” ( Bronner, 2011, June 25). “He [Abu Ala, speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council] would not address anything unless the Israelis first conceded the eastern border – ensuring that Israel would have no presence between the putative Palestinian state and Jordan” ( Ross, 2004, p. 668).

Israel’s willingness to trust was eroded by its experience with the Gaza Strip and South Lebanon. Israel had pledged to withdraw its military and its settlers from the Gaza Strip, and it
The withdrawal from Lebanon, though under pressure, also was voluntary. “We thought we’d get peace,” Netanyahu said. Instead, what Israel got was 12,000 rockets fired by Hezbollah and Hamas (Transcript, 2011). Israel responded forcefully with a bloody incursion into Gaza territory – a tactic that would have been awkward to say the least if Gaza had been part of the sovereign state of Palestine.

Less violent but more effective was Israel’s answer to suicide bombers. “None was more effective than the security barrier erected along the West Bank [boundary] line beginning in 2003” (Fact Sheets, 2010). The border fence roughly traces the Green Line, which identified the position of the belligerents after Israel’s war of independence and the starting position of forces in the 1967 war. Amazingly, it brought the rate of successful suicide bombings to zero (Schoenfeld, 2011, June 13). Noting that the border fence complicated peace negotiations, Schoenfeld added, “That might be true, but frequent murderous blasts in Israel’s major cities did not exactly foster loving dialogue, either” (p. A13).

Schoenfeld might have dismissed too glibly the complications of fixing borders. To protect Jewish settlements like Ariel, which has a population of 20,000, the security barrier extends 12 miles inside the West Bank. Palestinians were left to wonder if Israel had any intention of abandoning Ariel when the final status of borders is negotiated, or if the fence will indeed mark a “fact on the ground” that Israel intends to use as a border. As of July 2009, the border fence was planned to run for more than 400 miles – double the length of the Green Line. As the barrier snaked around, it effectively annexed 12 percent of the West Bank (Cohen, 2009, November 16). The barrier was originally intended to be completed by 2010, but Israel no longer gives an anticipated date for completion. As of July 2009, about 60% of the barrier had been completed and most construction had stopped pending rulings by the Israeli Supreme Court on
challenges to the proposed route. Israel previously fenced off boundaries with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the Gaza Strip (Fact Sheets, 2010). The map in Appendix E, Annex 13, compares the route of the separation barrier with the Green Line.

Palestinians raised two primary objections to the fence: First, it encroaches on land they intend to claim for their state; and second, in some cases, it divides communities, families and even individual farms. The Israeli Supreme Court has been sensitive to those objections and has ordered the barrier to be re-routed in some cases.

When the Camp David summit broke down in 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton and his negotiators blamed PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat for being unwilling to compromise. Arafat complained that the summit had been called in haste to accommodate Clinton, who was about to leave office, and to accommodate Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who was facing an election, which he eventually lost. Arafat’s position was that he already had ceded his limit before the summit began. Since he already had recognized Israeli sovereignty over 80 percent of British-ruled Palestine and over the western half of Jerusalem, he was unwilling to surrender what little was left of the West Bank and East Jerusalem (Greenberg, 2000, July 26, p. A12). New York Times columnist William Safire scoffed, saying “the land Arab leaders want is the Land of Israel” (Safire, 2000, July 27, p. A25).


U.S. President Barack Obama stirred up a hornet’s nest when he said out loud (Obama, 2011, May 19) what had been commonly understood about land and borders – that the
boundaries in place before the start of the 1967 war would serve as the starting point for negotiations. This boundary, also called the Green Line, marked the position of the Arab and Israeli armies when an armistice ended Israel’s war of independence in 1949. Map 1967 in Appendix E shows the location. A range of legal and military decisions are driven by the armistice line, including the border fence, which generally follows the Green Line.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu reacted sharply to Obama’s reference to the armistice line of 1949 as even a place to start border negotiations. “Remember that, before 1967, Israel was all of nine miles wide. … These were not the boundaries of peace; they were the boundaries of repeated wars, because the attack on Israel was so attractive. So we can’t go back to those indefensible lines” (Solomon & Lee, 2011, May 21, p. A8).

Although the border between Israel and Syria remained unresolved following Israel’s capture of the Golan Heights in 1967, the borders that caused the most trouble since then are the borders with the West Bank and with East Jerusalem, which Israel captured from Jordan. The West Bank is assumed to become part of the future state of Palestine. Where the boundary line will be drawn is a matter of intense interest because the two countries – Israel and future Palestine – are so small. They have no land to spare.

Complicating negotiations further are the settlements that Israel has built since 1967. Neither Israel nor the Palestinians have been specific about their fate in a negotiated settlement (Appendix H, Annex 14 shows how many, how large and how deeply the settlements have penetrated into the West Bank.)

In reporting on negotiating positions, Ross (2004) cited a breathtaking range of negotiating positions on West Bank land that would pass to the new state of Palestine -- from 70% (offered by the Israelis) to 100% (demanded by the Palestinians). Another variable had to
do with swaps – i.e., land that Israel would relinquish in exchange for Palestinian land behind the Green Line in the West Bank. The border between Israel and the Gaza Strip is not in dispute.

Less discussed was how Gaza and the West Bank would be connected. They are about 20 miles apart physically and even further apart economically and politically. Gaza is controlled by Hamas; the West Bank is controlled by Fatah. Gaza is overcrowded; the West Bank has more space. Gaza is poor; the West Bank is more prosperous.

Attempts to settle these issues by imposing or even urging some specific settlement have foundered. Well-intentioned third parties, such as the United States, finally despaired and resorted to the formula that final boundaries would have to be settled by negotiation between Israelis and Palestinians. Even the United Nations finally adopted this posture (e.g., Appendix D, 1973). Unless both Israelis and Palestinians can be satisfied that the outcome was fair, continued conflict would be inevitable.

Ultimately, arguments over who was there first, who is in the majority and where, and who is the greater victim become pointless. They settle nothing. In just the millennia of recorded history, the Levant has been invaded and conquered by Egyptians, Phoenicians, Hittites, Assyrians, Canaanites, Israelites, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Christian Crusaders, Arab Muslims, Ottoman Turks, French, British, Jews and more. Even Napoleon had his moment of triumph in the “Holy Land.” His troops conquered it and then left, proving once more that the land belongs to whoever has the will and the ability to defend it.

**Jerusalem**

Jerusalem can legitimately be considered to be the holiest city on earth, considering the number and diversity of people who consider it sacred. The city touches the religious faith of some 3.5 billion Christians, Muslims and Jews – half the people on Earth. Countless more have
been willing to kill and be killed over the centuries for the privilege of ruling it (Johns, 2009).

Religion is the city’s sole reason for being. It does not lie on any important trade route, it is not a seaport, and it controls no significant natural resources -- not even much water or agriculture.

Yet both Israelis and Palestinians claim Jerusalem as their capital. Both demand exclusive sovereignty over it and over the Temple Mount -- the holiest part of the holiest city.

King Solomon built the first temple in Jerusalem, and it was destroyed by the Babylonians in 586 B.C. King Herod built the second, which was demolished by the Romans in 70 A.D. The only visible remnant is a portion of the wall that supported the southwest side of the temple grounds, called the Western Wall or the Wailing Wall.

Ancient Jewish law forbids ordinary citizens from treading on the holiest part of the temple. Since the temple’s precise location is unknown, observant Jews are admonished not to set foot anywhere on the Temple Mount. Instead, they cling to the Western Wall as their most important place of worship.

When Jews all over the world pray, they turn to face Jerusalem. The Prophet Muhammad also established Jerusalem as the original direction of Muslim prayer, but changed the direction to face Mecca.

The Temple Mount contains two Muslim shrines: the gold Dome of the Rock, which dates from 691 A.D., and Al-Aqsa mosque, which dates from 705 A.D. The prominent dome covers a revered rock known as the foundation stone. Together, the Dome of the Rock and the mosque comprise the third most holy site in Islam (after Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia).

The Temple Mount lies within the “Old City” of Jerusalem, with its Jewish, Muslim, Christian and Armenian Quarters. The Temple Mount is wholly within the Muslim Quarter except for the Western Wall, which forms part of the boundary with the Jewish Quarter. The Old
City lies at the western edge of East Jerusalem, which borders the West Bank. The map in Appendix E, 2008, clarifies the relationships.

To get an idea of scale, consider that the Temple Mount covers about 35 acres within the Old City, which itself covers about 225 acres (a third of a square mile). The Al-Aqsa mosque has a capacity of about 5,000 worshippers. The plaza can accommodate some hundred thousand.\(^{29}\)

The United Nations resolution that partitioned Palestine called for Jerusalem to be administered internationally (Appendix D, 1947). Both sides rejected that arrangement. In the war that followed Israel’s declaration of independence, Jordan gained control of the east side of Jerusalem, the Old City and the Temple Mount. Israel had seized only the west side of Jerusalem by the time the armistice was signed. Jordan denied Jews access to their holy sites, the most important of which were in East Jerusalem, and desecrated some of them.

The capture of the rest of Jerusalem by the Israelis in 1967 was cathartic in the extreme. However, since observant Jews are not supposed to set foot on the Temple Mount and since the area is holy to Muslims, Israel granted administrative control over the Temple Mount to an Islamic trust called a Waqf, but Israel retained sovereignty. The international community does not recognize Israel’s claims to East Jerusalem or to the Temple Mount.

Details of the history of Jerusalem are beyond the scope of this study, which focuses on the religious sensitivity of the site after 1949, especially in 2000, as it related to the second

\(^{29}\) Precise numbers are difficult to pin down. They depend, for example, on whether the people are standing upright or prostate in prayer. The capacity of the Al-Aqsa Mosque is put at “5,000+” by the Website en.wikipedia.org. Answers.com puts the capacity of the plaza between the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock at one million, which seems like an exaggeration, in answer to the question “How many people does Masjid al-Haram hold?” Elder of Zion, an Israeli blog, said in a post on Aug. 17, 2012, that Arab media are reporting that some half a million people are expected to go to the Temple Mount on the last Friday of Ramadan. The author, assuming a maximum of 5,000 people per acre, a plaza of 35 acres minus the two mosques, projects that the actual number would be significantly lower than 150,000.
intifada. The emotional depth is best expressed by Miller (2004): “Perhaps no city on the entire planet has witnessed as much violence over such a long period as Jerusalem, conquered dozens of times, reduced to rubble no less than five times, and in recent years a frequent target for Palestinian terrorists trying to reclaim their land” (p. 192).

In his speech to the United Nations in 2005, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon expressed the Jews’ deep attachment to Jerusalem by referring to the Tanakh, the Jewish holy book: “Page after page, our unique land is unfurled, and at its heart is united Jerusalem, the city of the Temple upon Mount Moriah, the axis of the life of the Jewish people throughout all generations, and the seat of its yearnings and prayers for 3,000 years. The city to which we pledge an eternal vow of faithfulness, which forever beats in every Jewish heart: ‘If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand forget its cunning’ ” (See Appendix C, 2005, for a transcript of Sharon’s speech and to Appendix F for relevant passages from the Tanakh.)

Jerusalem – the city, the Temple Mount or both – is commonly cited as the main reason for impasse in Arab-Israeli relations. Much of what is known about the negotiating positions of the two sides comes from first-person accounts of the summits at Camp David and Washington in the summer and winter of 2000.

U.S. negotiators were surprisingly candid with their opinions about why the summits failed. U.S. President Bill Clinton, for example, blamed the failure of 2000 on the inability to agree on who should control the one square kilometer of the Temple Mount. “[Jerusalem],” Clinton said, “was the most difficult problem” (cited in Perlez, 2000, July 26, p. A1).

Daniel Pipes (2001), a director of the U.S. Institute of Peace, writing in the Middle East Quarterly, said, “The Camp David II summit and the Aqsa intifada that followed have confirmed
what everyone had long known: Jerusalem is the knottiest issue facing Arab and Israeli negotiators.”

A New York Times editorial (Failure at Camp David, July 26, 2000) called sovereignty over East Jerusalem “the most sensitive point” (p. A22). Sandy Berger, the U.S. national security adviser to President Clinton, said Jerusalem was “the one issue he felt could not be bridged.”

Ross (2004), Clinton’s chief Middle East negotiator, identified Jerusalem as “the most evocative of all issues” (p. 600). “We could not solve the territory if we could not solve Jerusalem (p. 681). Golan (2008) agreed:

There was not necessarily agreement on the other issues – refugees, borders, security – but the two sides appeared to come quite close to agreement on these matters … while the Jerusalem issue was the one that prevented the drafting of a final agreement of any kind. … The Israeli team had come around gradually to the idea of expanding the borders of Jerusalem … to include the East Jerusalem suburb of Abu Dis and then have Abu Dis proclaimed the capital of the Palestinian state with administrative jurisdiction over East Jerusalem. …

Nevertheless, it fell far short of the Palestinians’ demand for all of East Jerusalem (with the possible exception of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and the Western Wall) … Moreover, the idea of Palestinian custodianship of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif was no more than the already existing situation, with continued Israeli sovereignty deemed totally unacceptable by Arafat – and possibly by the Muslim world as well (Golan, 2008, p. 45).

Perlez (2000, July 26) colorfully called the Temple Mount “the Gordian knot” (p. A10). Sovereignty over the holy sites, Perlez said, was the heart of the problem. Johns (2009) supplied
this superlative: “Of all the issues dividing Israelis and Palestinians, none is more volatile than sovereignty over Mount Mariah” (facing p. 24). Mount Mariah was believed to have been one of two mountains on which the temple was built.

Some authorities tried – unsuccessfully -- to split Jerusalem into two issues: sovereignty over the city and sovereignty over the Temple Mount within the city – but neither the Israeli nor the Palestinians -- would tolerate bifurcation. Elie Wiesel (2010), Holocaust survivor and author, put it this way: “Seventeen times destroyed and seventeen times rebuilt, it [Jerusalem] is still in the middle of diplomatic confrontations that could lead to armed conflict. Neither Athens nor Rome has aroused that many passions … the most difficult, the most sensitive issue, … Jerusalem is the heart of our heart, the soul of our soul” (p. A5).

Mackey (2010, March 25) quoted a speech to the Israeli Knesset by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin: “I said yesterday and I repeat today, that there are not two Jerusalems; there is only one Jerusalem. From our perspective, Jerusalem is not a subject for compromise. Jerusalem was ours, will be ours, is ours and will remain as such forever.” The vow derives added emphasis from the identity of its speaker – the most dovish of Israel’s prime ministers, assassinated in 1995 for being too willing to make peace.

Palestinians were no less adamant: Again from Mackey (2010, March 25), this time quoting Robert Malley, director of Near Eastern affairs for the U.S. National Security Council: “The Americans spent countless hours seeking imaginative formulations to finesse the issue of which party would enjoy sovereignty over this sacred place — a coalition of nations, the United Nations Security Council, even God himself was proposed. In the end, the Palestinians would have nothing of it: the agreement had to give them sovereignty, or there would be no agreement at all.”
“God himself”? Jerusalem is the mother of far-fetched notions. The idea of assigning divine sovereignty to the area under the surface where the First and Second Jewish temples stood was broached seriously by Jordan’s King Hussein (Perlez, 2000, October 2). When Arafat left the Camp David summit meeting in July, he made it clear that Palestinians must control East Jerusalem and that any notions that sovereignty would be shared or that God would hold sovereignty over the holy sites was unacceptable (p. A12).

Mohammad Rashid, Arafat’s finance adviser, summed up the impasse this way: “God cannot create another Haram/Temple Mount” (Ross, 2004, p. 700). In other words, there is only one Haram/Temple Mount. If they are unwilling to share, they can’t both have sovereignty over it at the same time. Rashid identified only five possibilities: The Palestinians have sovereignty, the Israelis have sovereignty neither has sovereignty, sovereignty is shared, or a third party has sovereignty. Both sides rejected all the options except their own. Rashid called this “the most difficult of all issues” (Ross, 2004, p. 700).

Resolution of the dispute over the city foundered over attempts to package a resolution over the Temple Mount. Late in the last day of the summit, with no resolution in sight, President Clinton turned to Saeb Erekat, chief Palestinian negotiator and tried his version of what Ross (2004, p. 707) incongruously called a “Hail Mary.” Clinton said: “How about I try to get you the following: sovereignty [for Palestinians] in the outer neighborhoods, limited sovereignty in the inner neighborhoods, sovereignty in the Muslim and Christian Quarters, with custodial sovereignty over the Haram.” Arafat rejected the offer, and it was never presented to the Israelis because it was considered hopeless.

Other doomed notions that were floated late in the summit and rejected by either or both sides: Palestinians gain sovereignty over the Muslim Quarter of the Old City; a complex
combination of sovereignty, custodianship, shared responsibilities and diplomatic status; Palestinians get sovereignty over all outer neighborhoods, the Muslim Quarter and custodianship over the holy sites; Palestinians get sovereignty above ground and Israelis below ground in the Temple Mount; sovereignty settled by referendum; Palestinians get religious and administrative sovereignty and Israel retains sovereignty in name only; internationalize the Temple Mount (p. 695); and do away with the notion of sovereignty and substitute custodianship. Arafat rejected all of those ideas for the same reason: He insisted on exclusive sovereignty.

Attempts to negotiate control over just the Western Wall by isolating it from the rest of the Temple Mount were no more successful. The wall is holy to the Jews as the last relic of their ancient sanctuary and of their national glory. They claimed a right of access and prayer. Muslims also consider the wall sacred because the Prophet Muhammad used it to tether the steed that brought him to Jerusalem from Mecca for his miraculous night journey to heaven. The Jews were afraid the Palestinians would deny them access, as Jordanians did when they controlled the site between 1949 and 1967. The Muslims were afraid that if they gave the Jews the Western Wall they would use it as the first step in a plan to tear down the entire site and rebuild the temple (Wasserstein, 1978, 222-224).

“The Palestinians,” said Ross (2004, p. 623), “would never contemplate an endgame, much less major concessions to the Israelis, without knowing what was possible for them on Jerusalem.” Ross quoted Saeb Erekat, “Israel would lose all incentive to respond to the Palestinians on Jerusalem if everything else was resolved.”
Refugees

The refugee issue surfaced immediately after the armistice of 1949 ended open warfare. At a conference that year in Lausanne, Switzerland, the Arab states refused to discuss any other issue until the refugees were repatriated. Under pressure from the United States, Israel offered to accept 100,000 refugees if Arab countries would agree to a comprehensive peace and to accept the remaining refugees. The Arabs refused, deeming 100,000 insufficient. Israel said the refugees were the Arabs’ problem, since they started the war, and no solution could be discussed except in the context of an over-all settlement. Israel agreed “in principle” to the return of all refugees – required as a condition of membership in the United Nations – but once Israel was admitted, it waffled on the commitment (Morris, 2004a).

Tragically, not much has changed in the ensuing 60-plus years, and the refugee camps became a “boiling cauldron of misery, hate and despair” (Cattan, 1969, p. 119).

“Settlements are no longer the real issue that separates Israel and the Palestinians. The real issue is refugees” (Steinhardt, 2010, March 12). “Successive directors of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) have all emphasized in their Annual Reports the total failure of attempts at resettlement of the refugees,” he said (p. 141). “The proposal to solve the refugee problem by payment of compensation to the refugees represents another misconception which creates false hopes regarding a just and equitable solution … No one will sell his birthright or alienate his homeland for cash” (p. 147). Perlez (2001, January 6) reported, “In

30 Although it not true that all Palestinians are Muslims (some are Christians, Druzes or others) their special interests are beyond the scope of this research. It will be assumed here that Palestinians are Arab Sunni Muslims. Note also that this study uses the United Nations definition of refugee, which includes descendants of refugees and those who have acquired a new citizenship, not the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), which excludes them. Precise definitions are essential to understanding the refugee issue. Slight changes in wording – e.g., adding descendants – can affect hundreds of thousands of people.
detailed written objections [to the Clinton parameters, reproduced in Appendix C, 2000], the Palestinians said the right of return remained central (p. WK 18). The statement said: “We cannot, however, accept a proposal that secures neither the establishment of a viable Palestinian state nor the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes” (Official Palestinian Response, 2001, January 1).

Chiller-Glaus (2007) analyzed all the proposed solutions and affirmed that no peace agreement was possible as long as the refugee issue remained unresolved. The fundamental problem, he concluded, was that Israelis viewed the refugees in humanitarian terms, whereas most Palestinians called them a political and legal problem that called for justice. Dan Meridor, a senior Israeli minister, agreed on the centrality of the refugee issue: “Israel cannot agree on borders before ensuring that the solution to the Palestinian refugee issue lies not in Israel, but on the other side of the lines” he said (Kershner, 2010, July 14, p. A6).

Morris (2004a) said the issue of refugees emerged from the 2000 Camp David summit as “the single most important and intractable issue” (p. 2). Kifner (2000, December 31) called refugees “perhaps the most difficult element in the Middle East peace puzzle (p. WK1,4). Netanyahu (2011) emphasized in his speech to Congress that Israel would accept no peace deal that would allow refugees to return to Israel. Golan said the conflict could be ended quickly if only Palestinians would drop the demand to allow refugees to return to what is now Israel (p. 110).

Edward Said (1979a), the Palestinian-American author and teacher, summarized the arguments most succinctly: “We are told that the Palestinians were an ‘exchange’ for the Jews who left the Arab countries to come to Israel; that they left in spite of Haganah urging that they not leave; that those who stayed are better off than their brethren in surrounding Arab countries;
that there is only one haven for Jews and there are 21 for Arabs, and why can’t Arabs be like Jews and take in their own refugees; … that there is a Palestine, and that it is in Transjordan; that other refugees … have resettled elsewhere …; that the Palestinians are simply a political pawn (or football) used by the Arab regimes.” Said dismisses all of them and in rebuttal cites Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “1. Everyone has a right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. 2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” The reasons for departure, Said insisted, are irrelevant” (p. 45, 47).

Peace negotiations are complicated because the Palestine Liberation Organization – recognized as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”31 – represents four main constituencies: Palestinian refugees living in camps, Palestinian refugees living outside camps, Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, and Palestinians living in Israel as Israeli citizens. Their interests are not always the same. For example, the so-called right of refugees to return to their original homes after war’s end is not a personal problem for Israeli Palestinians, who never left their original homes. Some of them might not even want to move to a new state of Palestine. Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza might not want to delay their quest for statehood because Israel is resisting demands by Palestinians in refugee camps outside Israel to return to their original homes, which might no longer exist.

“As a mainly expatriate organization,” according to Said, “the PLO has historically been concerned with return as the chief result and benefit of liberation. … The exiles … expressed

31 The action was taken by the Seventh Arab Summit Conference in Rabat, Morocco, in 1974, and by the United States and Israel in 1993. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3236 (XXIX), 1974, refers to the PLO as “the representative of the Palestinian people” (See Appendix D for the text).
their politics in holistic terms: They were exiled not from parts of Palestine but from all of it, and therefore all of it had to be liberated” (Said, 1979a, pp. 135-136).

Bad blood among refugee groups and Arab states began almost immediately after Israel’s war of independence. Fischbach (2003) reported that three groups of refugees sent their own delegations to represent their interests at the 1949 Lausanne Conference. “Relations between the refugees groups and the delegations from the Arab states were reportedly hostile,” he said, quoting the chief Israeli negotiator (p. 91).

Sayigh (2006) put the refugees at the center of the conflict, although she said she understood that their rights are “the most vulnerable of bargaining items” (p. 136). Interests diverged even between refugee camps. For example, Golan (2008) said refugees in the West Bank and Gaza would be automatically part of the Palestinian state, those in Jordan already were citizens of Jordan, and those in Syria were able to work and live there. The main concern, she said, was for the 180,000 to 200,000 refugees in Lebanon; they were the most miserable and the most vulnerable (p. 59, 161).

Shalev (1991) declared: “The residents of the Territories desire above all a solution that will remove Israeli rule, and are far less concerned about the problems of the Palestinian diaspora” (p. 176). Stephens (2011, May 17) provided a personal touch: “Listen in on the internal dialogue of Palestinians and you will hear that the ‘right of return’ is an inviolable, inalienable and individual right of every refugee. In other words, a right that can never (and never safely) be bargained away by Palestinian leaders for the sake of a settlement with Israel” (p. A 15). The refugees are not naïve, Stephens said. They are aware that their Arab hosts have treated them badly and that the United Nations relief agency (UNRWA) perpetuates the refugee problem, but
a grudge that has been nursed for 653 years will never allow a political accommodation with Israel. The headline showed their resolve: “Israel will never have peace.”

The Arab rebuttal is cited by Pounds (1964): “The Arab states have tended to oppose schemes for settling [the refugees]; they claim that this would condone the Jewish occupation of Israel, to which they are unalterably opposed” (p. 104). The Israelis, in turn, allege that the Arab states are using the refugees as hostages to obtain sympathy from the world community and to buttress their status as victims. The entire state of Israel is composed of refugees, they say, most of them from Arab and Christian countries that forced them to leave or treated them so badly that they were eager to escape, even if they had to leave all their belongings behind. The difference, Arabs say, is that the Jewish refugees do not want to go back; Palestinian do want to return to their homes and land.

Refugees generally were incensed that the PLO was ignoring their interests. As Golan (2008) gave vent to their frustrations, he raised another sore subject: The divergent interests between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO. “The most difficult [negotiating] points were, of course, the refugees and Jerusalem. There was no room for compromise with Israel on the right of return … The refugee issue was no less sensitive for the Palestinians than it was for the Israelis. Arafat had negotiated all the Oslo agreements without regard for the refugees, and the Palestinian Authority represented only those Palestinians in the occupied territories. The PLO, on whose behalf Arafat also spoke, theoretically represented all Palestinians – and many abroad had not been happy with the neglect of the refugee problem” (p. 52).

Any proposed solution except return to Israel is likely to draw a harsh response from refugees. In a speech to the National Council of US-Arab Relations, a senior UNRWA official, Andrew Whitley, urged Palestinian refugees to abandon what he called the “cruel illusion” that
they would ever be able to return home. He said they should consider integrating into the
countries where they are living, rather than continuing to suffer in a state of helpless limbo under
apartheid conditions. For speaking this heresy, Al-Awda, the Palestinian Right to Return
Coalition, expressed shock and demanded Whitley’s immediate dismissal, calling him “an
enemy of the people.” Whitley recanted and apologized (Action Alert, 2010, November 1).

Analyzing the Whitley incident for the Huffington Post, Ben Cohen concluded that “the
refugee question, and its associated right of return, has been deliberately positioned by the Arab
side as the single biggest obstacle to a final settlement of the conflict with Israel” (Cohen, 2010,
October 28). Cohen called it a “quixotic struggle with no end.”

Why do Palestinians so vehemently demand repatriation? Said (1979a) said it had to do
with what he called the doubly nuanced meaning of Palestine: “If we think of Palestine as having
the function of both a place to be returned to and of an entirely new place, a vision partially of a
restored past and of a novel future, perhaps even a historical disaster transformed into a hope for
a different future, we will understand the word’s meaning better” (p. 125). The irony is that the
statement would ring just as true if the word “Israel” were substituted for the word “Palestine.”
The suggestion that Palestinians might find fulfillment elsewhere falls just as flat as did the
suggestion a century before that the Jews should make their national home in East Africa.

Why does Israel refuse so categorically Palestinian demands for repatriation? The
numbers tell the story. The population of Israel was about 7.7 million as of April 2011, including
5.8 million Jews, 1.7 million Arabs and 300,000 other (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011).
About 4.8 million Palestine refugees were registered with the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency (UNRWA, 2011). Adding 1.7 million Israeli Arabs and 4.8 million registered refugees,
Arabs would outnumber Jews 6.5 million to 5.8 million. Israel would not survive as a Jewish state.

If there is one issue on which most Israelis agree it is that they cannot permit unrestricted repatriation. Some consideration has been given to a token acceptance, as in the Clinton parameters of 2000, but Palestinian leaders demand full repatriation and Israeli leaders have said they would accept few, if any, Palestinian refugees (Levinson & Entous, 2010, August 21).

Ehud Olmert (2007, March 30), prime minister of Israel from 2006 to 2009, told the Jerusalem Post that the return of any refugees to Israel was “out of the question” and beyond negotiation. “I will never accept a solution that is based on their return to Israel, any number,” nor would Olmert agree that Palestinians had any right to return to Israel. “I will not agree to accept any kind of Israeli responsibility for the refugees. Full stop. It’s a moral issue of the highest level. I don’t think that we should accept any kind of responsibility for the creation of this problem” (p. 1).

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed. “The Palestinian refugee problem will be resolved outside the borders of Israel,” he said in his speech to Congress in 2011. “And worst of all, they [Palestinians] continue to perpetuate the fantasy that Israel will one day be flooded by the descendants of Palestinian refugees” (Netanyahu, 2011). Any “return,” Olmert and Netanyahu insisted, shall be to the state of Palestine, when it is established, and not to Israel.

The word “suicide” comes up quickly when Israelis react to proposals for unrestrained Palestinian immigration. Shalev (1991) called the demand by refugees to return to Israel “tantamount to [national] suicide” (pp. 66-67). Ehud Barak, prime minister during the 2000 Camp David summit, was talking about both security and refugees when he said, “There is no power in the world that can force on us collective national suicide” (Ross, 2004, p. 677). That
most quotable of prime ministers, Golda Meir, put a smile on her retort: “There should be some place on earth where there is a Jewish majority. As a minority we have quite a history” (Shenker & Shenker, 1970).

Following the collapse of the 2000 Camp David summit, the two sides made another attempt at agreement in negotiations at Taba in the Sinai peninsula. In dispatching its negotiating team, the Israeli cabinet issued three policy guidelines. The first one said: “Israel will never allow the right of Palestinian refugees to return to inside the State of Israel” (Israel’s position, 2001, January 21).

The significance of the debate is that a demand for refugees to return to Israel is, in effect, a rejection of the two-state solution – i.e., Israel, as a Jewish state, existing peacefully beside Palestine, a Muslim-Arab state. This two-state concept was first proposed by the Peel Commission in 1937. (See Appendix C, 1937.) The United Nations adopted the idea in General Assembly resolution 181, which called for partition of Palestine into two states. (See Appendix D, 1947, for the pertinent parts of the U.N. resolution.) Palestinian negotiators have said they accepted a two-state arrangement since the Oslo Accords in 1993, but an influx of Palestinian refugees into Israel would result in a Muslim-Arab majority and would swallow up the Jewish state.

The prospect of a bi-national state with Arabs and Jews mingling peacefully has long been ruled out as impractical. The one would dominate the other, and they would make life miserable for each other. The new development (since 1967) has been the unrestrained building of settlements, which pose the reverse threat of refugee immigration, but will ultimately lead inevitably to the same result: a bi-national state.
Settlements

Settlements did not become a final-status issue until after the 1967 war. Israel won the war and sought to negotiate peace treaties. The Arab states replied with their famous “Three No’s”: No peace, no recognition, no negotiation. One would think the Arabs had won. Instead, they lost – twice: They lost not only the war but they also lost the Palestinians’ confidence that the Arab states would be able to obtain justice for them. If any hope remained, the Yom Kippur war of 1973 and Egypt’s subsequent peace treaty with Israel erased it: The Palestinians were on their own. All they could expect from their Arab cousins was moral support.

The result was that Israel, now in possession of the Jewish heartland of Samaria and Judea (the so-called “West Bank” of the Jordan river), started building settlements – lots of them. Sources differ on exactly how many. Judt (2009, June 22), writing in The New York Times, said there were “about 120” officially authorized Israeli communities inside the Green Line that marks the border between Israel and the West bank, plus “80 to 100” unofficial settlements, military outposts and industrial zones – all considered illegal under international law (p. A21) or “disputed,” according to Israelis (Kershner, 2010, August 30, p. A7). Mitnick (2010, September 21), writing in the Wall Street Journal, reported “123 Jewish settlements recognized by the Israeli government and dozens of other unrecognized sites spread across the West Bank.” Palestine Monitor reported 121 settlements, which it referred to as “colonies” plus 102 outposts as of March 15, 2010 (Palestine Monitor, 2010). In B’Tselem’s 2010 annual report, it said it found 124 authorized settlements in occupied territory on the West Bank, 100 unauthorized settlements and 12 neighborhoods on land that Israel annexed to Jerusalem (B’Tselem, 2010, December 29). (B’Tselem, a non-government organization, identifies itself as the Israeli information center for human rights in the occupied territories.)
Peace Now, a liberal Israeli advocacy group opposed to settlement-building, identified 137 settlements and 100 outposts and provided data for each one on its Web site (Settlements and Outposts, n.d.). Peace Now described outposts as nascent settlements, typically small and rough. Official settlements extend eastward as far as 22 miles inside the Green Line.

By 2010, the settlements were home to 300,000 Israelis (Friedman, 2010, September 8). Another 200,000 had settled in East Jerusalem, but Israel does not count them as settlers, since East Jerusalem has been annexed into Israel (Settlements issue, 2009, July 30). The map in Appendix E, Annex 14, shows how deeply and how broadly the settlements have penetrated.

The community of Modiin Illit, for example, has a population of 45,000 mostly ultra-Orthodox Jews (Bronner & Kershner, 2009, July 26). Ariel, in the geographical center of what Israel calls Samaria, has 20,000 residents. Maale Adumim covers 2.7 square miles of built-up area just east of Jerusalem, but it has been allocated 20 square miles – about two-thirds the size of New York’s Manhattan. Gaza, on the other hand, holds no special religious significance for the Jews, whereas Samaria and Judea are both Jewish heartlands.

Alarmed at the erosion of what they considered their birthright, the Palestinians demanded that Israel stop the encroachments and refused to negotiate without a freeze. “A settlement freeze is a crucial first step,” said Zahi Khouri, a Palestine businessman (Khour, 2009, September 8).

Israel agreed to a nine-month moratorium. When it ran out, Israel refused to extend it and resumed building. The international community, including even the United States, supported the Palestinians, but Israel was adamant, adding a demand of its own: recognition not just of Israel but of Israel as a Jewish state. The Palestinians refused, in part because it would undercut their
demand for repatriation of refugees. Israel as a Jewish state is obviously inconsistent with an Arab-Muslim majority.

So final-status negotiations came to stalemate in 2011. This example sets up the familiar chicken-and-egg puzzle: “As soon as borders are decided, Israel will stop building in all areas beyond them” (Dershowitz, 2011). “This is the only way toward peace.” In other words, Israel must stop building settlements as a precondition to negotiations over borders, but the borders must be decided as a precondition to a settlements freeze.

Nevertheless, that was not the major obstacle to a peaceful resolution. The settlements problem has been solved before, at least on a small scale. In the Sinai, Israel met its obligations under the peace treaty with Egypt by dismantling all 18 settlements and outposts. The Gaza Strip was more difficult, but Israel met its obligations under the Oslo Accords by forcibly removing 8,000 extremely reluctant homesteaders from all 21 Gaza settlements. Dismantling 120 (or more) settlements populated by half a million defiant West Bank Jews would be more challenging, but allowing them to stay likely would provoke defiance from the 2.5 million Palestinians who live in the West Bank.

An even more serious issue is the existential threat that the settlements pose to both Israeli and Palestinians:

--To Palestinians, the settlements, together with the security barrier, erode the territory – already extremely limited – that would form the state of Palestine. They fully understand the difficulty Israel would face – politically and economically – of relocating cities as populous as Ariel or as expansive as Maale Adumim.

--To Israelis, the settlers become both a kind of reverse hostage and a sentinel to provide early warning of hostile activity, especially from the east. Notice the string of small settlements
strung along the Jordan River in the map in Appendix E, Annex 14. Israel has repeatedly promised to remove them after some years when its security fears subside. Israel opposes a unilateral freeze on settlement activity and unilateral dismantling of settlements. It must get something in return from the Palestinians, and the Palestinians are unwilling to make any concessions as long as they think the United States and the world community will force Israel’s hand for them.

Israel tried the unilateral approach with Gaza, and it bit them. Instead of peace, Israel got Hamas and rockets (Bronner, 2009, January 25). The Wall Street Journal made the same point in an editorial (Obama’s turn against Israel, 2010, March 15).

From November 26, 2009 to September 26, 2010, Netanyahu imposed an unprecedented, 10-month freeze on new housing construction in the West Bank. Less than a month before the freeze expired, Netanyahu and Abbas met briefly and discussed only a framework. Abbas asked for an extension, but it was too late. An exasperated Netanyahu refused. The freeze expired, Abbas walked out, and settlement building resumed; negotiations did not (Diplomacy 101, 2009, November 27; Landler & Cooper, 2010, September 2).

Former Prime Minister Golda Meir explained why the freeze would be an emotional issue for Israelis: “Was it logical … for the world (including our super-pious doves) to demand of a Jewish government that it pass legislation expressly forbidding Jews to settle anywhere on earth? … Obviously, no Israeli government could ever obligate itself to a permanent banning of Jews from any part of the Holy Land” (Meir, 1975, p. 340).

To which a Palestinian might respond, “Live where you want, but don’t dispossess us from our homes.” Most of the land in the West Bank was state-owned from Ottoman days, and
Israel appropriated all of it (Morris, 2001, p. 335). However, some 21 percent of the built-up area of the settlements is land that Israel admits is private property, owned by Palestinians.

To encourage Jews to resettle in the West Bank, Israel provides incentives. Palestinians get disincentives, such as Israel’s control of water, which prevents the establishment of Palestinian agriculture. Roads built to serve the settlements split and isolate Palestinian neighborhoods. Some 160 check-points in the West Bank restrict movement by Palestinians who want to seek work, attend school, cultivate fields, obtain medical care, visit relatives and more. Worst of all, the right of a free people to self-determination is denied (Hareuveni, 2010).

Looking forward, most Israelis and Palestinians have examined numerous proposals for how to deal with West Bank settlements. The two most commonly discussed are (1) a single state of Palestine with a merger of populations and (2) separate states along current partition lines. The default solution has been the two-state option. As recently as July 8, 2011, U.S. House of Representatives, by a vote of 407-6, endorsed the two-state option, to be achieved through negotiation.

But how? Settlements, with hundreds of thousands of Jews, are scattered throughout the West Bank. The Arab and Jewish populations would have to be either merged or separated. In just the West Bank, 500,000 Jewish settlers would be a minority among 2.5 million Muslim Arabs. A merger of all jurisdictions also would prove catastrophic for the existence of a Jewish state. The combined Muslim-Arab population in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza, totals about 5.9 million; The Jewish population is about 5.8 million. Even if the population estimates are somewhat off, the trend is unfavorable for Jews, since the birth rate among Arabs exceeds the birth rate among Jews. Indeed, the Palestinian Arab birthrate, at 3% a year, is the highest in the world (Morris, 2009, p. 8). Israel as a Jewish state would be doomed.
Nor do prospects favor the two groups living together amicably. Rather few communities are currently mixed and even fewer neighborhoods in those communities are mixed. Integrated neighborhoods are rare for reasons that have nothing to do with ethnicity or religion. Affluent families, which tend to be Israeli, prefer not to live with poor families, which tend to be Arab.

Even liberal Israelis who sympathize with the Palestinians found themselves pulled in opposite directions. Polls showed that most Israelis believe a two-state solution is the only way to preserve Israel as a Jewish state, but they also felt a religious attraction to Samaria and Judea, the biblical names for the West Bank, according to Peace Now, a leftist Israeli group that advocated a two-state solution. “If the settlements do not stop spreading,” it said, “the land between the Jordan River and the sea will soon become indivisible for all practical purposes, and the two-state option will cease to exist” (Kershner, 2010, September 21, p. A6). The Syrian foreign minister, Walid al-Moallem, agreed: “Relentless settlement activities are about to make this two-state solution a dead letter” (al-Moallem, 2010). Egypt’s former president, Hosni Mubarak, chipped in with a concurring opinion: “Settlements and peace are incompatible, as they deepen the occupation that Palestinians seek to end” (Mubarak, 2010, September 1, p. A21).

Ethan Bronner, writing in The New York Times, put the issue even more harshly: “Most Palestinians – and many of the Israeli left – argue that there are now too many Israeli settlements in the West Bank for a viable, contiguous Palestinian state to arise there … If this view holds, the Israelis have closed out any serious option of a two-state solution” (Bronner, 2010, August 21, p. A6).

Khalidi (2006) said he believed the situation already has deteriorated to the point that it is irreversible. “Palestinian statehood, and with it a two-state solution, are now in fact completely impossible” (p. 153).
Settlements, thus, present double trouble to Israel. They not only impede peace negotiations but also imperil the viability of Israel as a Jewish state. As early as January 2009, Friedman (2009, January 25) said, “We are getting perilously close to closing the window on a two-state solution.” He blamed terrorist attacks by Hamas on the one hand and fanatical Jewish settlers on the other hand (p. WK10). A New York Times editorial later that year added, “The continued expansion of Israeli settlements has led Palestinians to doubt they will ever be allowed to build a viable state” (Settlements issue, 2009, July 30).

Thus, the one-state solution – Israel swallowed into a Palestine state dominated by Muslim Arabs – is back, and it is gaining traction, advocated by mainstream scholars, not just Palestinians. Those who favor a single state or who see it as inevitable include historian Tony Judt (2003) (a diaspora Jew), constitutional scholar Daniel Lazare (2003, November 3), Tel Aviv University vice president Gary Sussman (2004), and research scientist Virginia Tilley (2003). The only alternatives left to the Israelis, said Morris (2009), are to expel all or most Palestinians, to institute apartheid, or to accept minority status in an Arab-Muslim country.

After the failure of the 2000 Camp David summit, President Bill Clinton asked George Mitchell, a former U.S. senator, to conduct an independent review and recommend ways to restart the peace process and to stop the escalating violence that turned into the second (Al-Aqsa) intifada. Mitchell (Appendix C, Annex 35, 2001) became only one more in a long list of those who would recommend a settlement freeze -- and who would be ignored.

The last thing most Israelis want is a bi-national state in which Arab-Muslims outnumber Jews. The current status quo might be acceptable for the time being, but not as a permanent situation. The injustice of millions of Arabs without a country eventually will wear out the

**Water**

In a region that is mostly desert, water becomes a matter of life or death. Oil means nothing without water to drink and to nourish crops. Water is unique among the issues facing negotiators for peace. The supply is finite and insufficient to satisfy the needs of thirsty states with growing populations. Whoever controls the water controls the entire region. Hof (1997) equated water security with sovereignty and pointed out its implications for final-status negotiations. Hof quotes Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who said the greatest danger Israel has to face in negotiating peace with Syria was losing control over the headwaters of the Jordan River.

Israel’s far north gets 30 inches of rain a year, which is sufficient for more crops, but it gradually diminishes toward the arid southern half of the country (the Negev), which gets virtually no rain. The only significant river is the Jordan, which rises in the far north near Mount Herman and flows south for 150 miles before emptying into the Dead Sea. Visitors commonly express surprise at the river’s modest width and depth. On its way south, the Jordan River flows through the Sea of Galilee, which is Israel’s only natural fresh-water reservoir (Pounds, 1964). Israel has only two other small streams with continuous water (Morris, 2001, p. 4).

Israel’s two main concerns are security and water (Ross, 2004, p. 517 and on numerous other pages and by numerous other commentators). The pipeline that matters most to Israel carries water, not oil. It was built and is operated by an agency called the National Water Carrier. It brings water from the Sea of Galilee in the North 80 miles south to central and southern Israel. Construction began in 1953 and was completed in 1964. Fatah’s first major guerrilla operation
was an attempt to sabotage it in 1965 (Andoni, 2009). It was a dumb move – the ultimate act of cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face. Israelis foiled the attempt.

Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestine Authority, commemorated the fourth anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat, by announcing what has become known as Abbas’s Six Points – the critical issues that must all be resolved before peace is possible. “We either get all six points,” he said, “or nothing at all.” The six, in the order he listed them: Jerusalem, settlements, borders, refugees, water and security (Abbas, 2008). Ross (2004) said it best: “It was necessary to solve the core questions or questions of principle, but solving them would mean little if there was no Palestinian economy, or if fundamental issues of trade and commerce with Israel were unresolved. People had to live,” and that meant water (p. 631).

Ariel Sharon, Israel’s former prime minister, said the 1967 war started with a dispute over water: “People generally regard June 5, 1967, as the day the Six Day War began. That is the official date. But in reality the Six Day War started two and a half years earlier, on the day Israel decided to act against the diversion of the Jordan [by Syria]” (Sharon, 2001, p. 167). If Syria had been allowed to succeed, said Davis and Decter (1982), “the project would have transformed Israel into a desert” (p. 64).

The location of the community of Ariel might seem strange, isolated as it is from Israel in the center of the West Bank – until it is understood that the settlement sits atop a major aquifer (Kershner, 2010, September 9). The situation is not unusual. “Many settlements are built on prime agricultural land confiscated from Palestinians, or over key water resources such as the Western Aquifer basin, springs and wells.” (Palestine Monitor, 2010).

Gaza presents an extreme example. It does not have an adequate, independent supply of potable water, and the wells that it does have are running dry.
Airspace

Although airspace is not mentioned as often as the final-status issues identified above, it is just as potent a deal-breaker. One of the marks of a sovereign country is the ability to control access by land, sea, and air. Palestinians are sensitive to all three.

Airspace poses special problems because Israel is already a small country. Dividing it into two (Israel and Palestine) and dividing them again (West Bank and Gaza, perhaps with a land bridge between them) makes air navigation tight for both civil and military aviation. Security concerns are paramount since a surprise attack by air has the potential to end a conflict quickly and, for the surprised party, badly. The 1967 war provides an example. Attacks by land take longer to develop and are easier to anticipate.

Lebanon complained “almost on a daily basis” that Israel’s warplanes violated its airspace (Israeli drone, 2011, March 5). Palestinians wanted guarantees against such intrusions. Israel would not agree except as part of an over-all peace deal. As a practical matter, both Israel and Palestine will need access to the other’s airspace – a difficult accommodation for disagreeable neighbors.

Israel’s use of Palestinian airspace for military purposes raises serious concerns (Overview of security decidable issues, n.d.): For example, Palestinians have come to associate Israeli aircraft with bombardment and assassinations. If Palestinians accepted Israel’s demand for demilitarization, Palestine might become a de facto ally of Israel and become the target of Arab reprisals intended for Israel.

The Israeli daily newspaper Maariv carried a story in 2008 about a security plan that Israel presented to the Palestinians and to the United States. Israel would set up alarm stations on the West Bank hills, deploy forces to the Jordanian border and exercise full control over
Palestinian airspace (Israel wants defenseless Palestine, 2008). The plan drew an immediate, angry reaction from Palestinians, who said the proposals would “completely erase the concept of an independent Palestinian state. … The plan is completely rejected.”

Following the failure of the 2000 Camp David summit, the Palestinians and Israelis resumed negotiations at Taba, Egypt, in January 2001. These talks also failed, and no official statement was released. However, the European Union envoy, Miguel Moratinos, prepared a summary that was published in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz (Moratinos, 2002). Control over Palestinian airspace was one of the issues on which the participants disagreed. Moratinos reported that the two sides agreed that Palestine would have sovereignty over its airspace, but the Palestinians would not cede overriding control to Israel, nor would it permit military operations or training. Palestinians said it would be inconsistent with its neutrality to grant Israel military privileges while denying them to its Arab neighbors.

**Other Final-Status Issues**

The list of potential deal-breakers is too lengthy to permit a comprehensive discussion of each one. For example, environmental concerns include and go beyond such typical American concerns about conservation, climate change, and habitat destruction. In a land with almost no natural resources, conservation and sharing are serious issues for both Israelis and Palestinians. Sea access is sensitive considering the attempts in 2011 to run the Israeli blockade of the Gaza strip. The West Bank, of course, is landlocked. The list goes on: law enforcement, arms control, prisoner exchange, freedom of movement (especially between Palestine and Israel), the border fence, economic development, supervision of holy sites (other than the Temple Mount), timetables and a host of thorny details that seem petty until disagreements begin and positions harden.
Palestinians have internal problems of their own. Melding the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into a single state means settling their internal political differences and negotiating a secure, 25-mile land bridge through Israel. Previous attempts to create a Pan-Arab coalition, such as between Egypt and Syria, foundered; a Pan-Palestine movement might be just as difficult. Pakistan tried to function as a split state and failed. Palestine also will need a policy for refugees who want to return to the new state. Israel accepts all Jewish immigrants and grants them citizenship; Palestine might need to be more selective at first. The status of Arab Israelis poses a particularly interesting problem. Would they choose to remain as citizens of Israel or would they join the new state of Palestine? Would they be allowed to choose? Under what terms?

**Proposed Solutions**

As intractable as the “final status” issues have been, each one has been solved at some point by some set of negotiators. The catch is that once the individual agreements are pulled together into a comprehensive package, one or both of the parties balk. It’s “Whac-A-Mole” with deadly stakes: Knock down one problem and another keeps popping up, in perpetuity. Clinton’s Parameters (Appendix C, Annex 34, 2000) marked one such attempt to whack all the moles with a single stroke, but that failed, too. The Taba (Egypt) talks in January 2001 are reputed to have come within a whisker of a comprehensive final-status solution before collapsing. The 2009 Geneva (Switzerland) Initiative was a model accord based on previously accepted individual agreements, but the package of compromises it proposed was unacceptable to the political leaders. Each side preferred no bread at all to only half a loaf.

Since the scope of this study is restricted to the creation of a threat-level index to manage the conflict, not to solve it, this section deals only briefly with examples of individual solutions. They are part of the history of the conflict, and might one day become the future.
Include Martin Indyk, the U.S. ambassador to Israel during the Clinton administration, as being among the hopefuls (Indyk, 2010): “There isn’t a lot to negotiate,” he said. “In the 17 years since the Oslo accords were signed, detailed final status negotiations have dealt exhaustively with all the critical issues. If an independent Palestinian state is to be established, the zone of agreement is clear and the necessary trade-offs are already known” (p. A21).

After 14 days of trying out every conceivable option to every major issue at the 2000 Camp David summit, President Clinton (2000, July 26) was as baffled as the rest of the world when accord slipped away. At the closing press conference, he said repetitively: “The good news is that there is not a great deal of disagreement. And I want to emphasize this. It seemed to me, anyway, there was not a great deal of disagreement in many of these areas about what the facts on the ground would be after an agreement were made. That is, how people would live. You know, for example, everyone conceded that Jerusalem [which Clinton identified as the main stumbling block] is a place that required everyone to have access to the holy sites” (p. A10).


Two days later, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (Mubarak, 2010, Sept. 1) picked up on the Times editorial assessment in an OpEd statement: “Previous negotiations have already resolved many of the details on the final status of refugees, borders, Jerusalem and security. The biggest obstacle that now stands in the way of success is psychological: the cumulative effect of years of violence and the expansion of Israeli settlements have led to a collapse of trust on both
sides. For the talks to proceed, we must rebuild trust and a sense of security. How do we do this? First, we must safeguard the peace process from further outbreaks of violence” (p. A23).

Indyk (2010, Aug. 26) said the public mood on both sides of the Green Line favored peace. Polls ebb and flow, depending on current circumstances, but they generally lend support to his impression. For example, Poll No. 36, conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in June 2010, showed that 63% of Palestinians support a compromise that would end the conflict permanently. Support for this position has been stronger – 69% in 2004 – but it has not been below 55% since 2003, and 58% said they support mutual recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and Palestine as a state for Palestinian people. Sample size was 1,270 adults in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Refugees outside those territories were not sampled. Margin of error was 3%. The poll was conducted at irregular intervals but at least twice a year.

Hints of “negotiation fatigue” are beginning to show up in off-hand comments. The lead negotiator for the Palestinians, Saeb Erekat, put it this way: “I just want my state and to be done with them” (quoted in Sontag, 2001, July 26, p. A10). Even Israel’s right-wing foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman said he was “ready to quit my settlement home to make peace” (Goldberg & Ibish, 2011, Jan. 20, p. A23).

American negotiator Dennis Ross (Ross, 2004), in his analysis of the failure of the Oslo accords and the 2000 summit, blamed Yasser Arafat for not preparing Palestinians for the compromises that will be necessary to secure their goal of statehood. “There was almost no conditioning of his [Arafat’s] public for peace. There was never talk of painful compromises for peace. On the contrary, Arafat was telling his public they would get everything, and give up nothing. … One critical lesson from the Oslo period is that no negotiation is likely to succeed if there is one environment at the negotiating table and another one on the street” (p. 766-768).
Ross also blamed the myths that each side tells itself, especially the mythology of victimhood. “Being a victim has not just become the Palestinian condition; it has become a strategy,” Ross said. “This is not to say that Palestinians have not been victimized. They surely have. They surely were betrayed in the past, and they surely have suffered. But they also have helped to ensure their status as victims.” The Jews, of course, suffered the Nazi Holocaust. Israelis also cite some 850,000 Jews who were evicted or have fled from Arab countries and became refugees since the Holocaust. Their story is less well-known because they were smoothly integrated into Israel, in contrast to Palestinians who were poorly treated by most Arab countries in which they sought refuge. The map in Appendix E, Annex 9, shows the Arab countries that the Jews left as refugees since 1949.

**New spirit**

Although peace has not been achieved, it would be incorrect to conclude that nothing has changed over the years. The three “no’s” of Khartoum in 1967 have morphed into “maybe’s.” Two Arab states have signed peace treaties with Israel – Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994 – and all three states have honored their commitments. Peace prevailed among them: a huge accomplishment. The Madrid conference of 1991 established the precedent of bilateral and multilateral negotiations involving Palestinians and Israelis.


The Oslo Accords in 1993 marked the first direct, face-to-face negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. Never before had Palestinians and Israelis even pretended to recognize the existence of each other (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 52; Shipler, 2002, Rev. ed, p. xv). Oslo dealt
with procedural matters – i.e., everything but final-status issues. That was left for the 2000 Camp David summit, which U.S. President Clinton described as unprecedented in scope and detail. The Taba talks the next year (Moratinos, 2002), moved the ball a few yards closer to the goal line, but there the drive stalled, a victim of the second intifada, suicide attacks, and reprisals.

The so-called “road map to peace” (Appendix C, U.S. President Bush’s rose garden speeches, 2002) was historic because for the first time the Israeli government formally committed itself to the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank (Reich, 2008, p. 256). Perhaps the most encouraging trend was the effort by Palestinians, led by a brilliant administrator, Salam Fayyad, to develop the infrastructure, institutions and credibility required for a successful state (Ezzedine, 2009, August 25).

This new spirit has not gone unnoticed. Even the copy desk at the New York Times was (parenthetically) impressed. A headline (Goldberg & Ibish, 2011, January 20) read: “Good news from the Middle East (really).” The story said, “We have recently seen startling shifts in both Israeli and Palestinian attitudes on the need for compromise.”

Wolfsfeld (1997) described the Oslo Accords as “one of the most important breakthroughs in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict” (p. 52). The breakthroughs included an exchange of letters of mutual recognition (Appendix C, 1993). Israel agreed to withdraw from Gaza and Jericho, to permit limited self-government in those areas, and to negotiate additional withdrawals from the West Bank (Appendix C, Declaration of Principles, 1993). The PLO, for its part, agreed to revoke sections of its covenant that had called for the elimination of Israel (Appendix C, Palestinian National Charter, 1964, 1968).

The West is in a position to exert considerable pressure on both parties, if it chooses to do so. For example, the United States provides $3 billion a year of aid to Israel (Reich, 1995;

Some of the specific acknowledgements go way back. Every Palestinian negotiator at the 2000 Summit had come to believe that the Arabs made a historic mistake by rejecting previous offers of statehood, such as United Nations General Assembly 181 (Appendix D, 1947). The Palestinians would have gotten more land than they had any expectation of getting by continuing to hold out, and they could have dealt later with Israel from a position of strength. Ross’s (2004) point was that the longer the Palestinians wait to cut a deal, the more shrinkage they can expect. The settlements were a prime example of gradual land erosion, but the argument was lost on the only negotiator who counted -- Yasser Arafat -- leaving Abba Eban, Israel’s late ambassador to the United States to comment derisively that “the Arabs never pass up an opportunity to pass up an opportunity (Appendix I).

Another opening for peace was the prospect that the unlikeliest of people might actually change their minds. Few Jews in the world were more reviled than Ariel Sharon, the ultimate hard-liner, reputed murderer of babies, butcher of Sabra and Shatila, and more. However, when Sharon became prime minister in 2001, he used his credibility to unilaterally withdraw civilian and military outposts from the Gaza Strip. Ross (2004) was as surprised as anyone. “Sharon,” Ross said, “came to believe that Israel’s economy could not recover unless the war with the Palestinians stopped, and for the first time, he began to publicly say so” (p. 792).
Even security – Israel’s major (some would say only) concern – has been addressed by Palestinian negotiators. Yasser Arafat did not compromise much at the 2000 Camp David summit, but he did authorize his negotiators to agree to early-warning sites on the Jordan River. Israel was equally agreeable. Schlomo Ben-Ami, Israel’s minister of internal security, said, “What mattered to Israel was the Palestinian western border with Israel, not what could be the Palestinian border with Jordan” (quoted in Ross, 2004, p. 636). Moreover, Egypt and Jordan offer a model for how to satisfy Israel’s security concerns.

Border negotiations have produced a bewildering range of numbers that have been floated at various times. In just the account of Ross (2004), the percentage of the West Bank, east of the Green Line, that would accrue to a Palestinian state extended from 70% (p. 676) to 99% (p. 680), with stops at 75% (p. 654), 80% (p. 798), 88% (p. 671), 97% (p. 671) and 98% (p. 680). The negotiating range settled at percentages in the 90s, with Israel seeking land for some of its largest settlements and reimbursing the Palestinians with offsetting swaps of land adjacent to the Gaza Strip, which the Israelis offered to cede entirely to the Palestinian state.

Leading up to the 2000 summit, discussions about Jerusalem were hopeful. Saeb Erekat, the lead Palestinian negotiator, told Ross (2004), “On Jerusalem, the Israelis have eight large neighborhoods … in East Jerusalem; those become part of Israel. The Arab neighborhoods become part of Palestine and one municipality will deal with transportation, water, electricity, and sewage … Dennis [Ross], we can do this” (p. 635). Based on discussions with Ehud Barak, Ross (2004) said, “If it came to crunch point, he [Barak] was prepared to meet terms I had heard from Saeb [Erekat] on either borders, refugees, or Jerusalem” (p. 640).

A major sticking point was the Palestinian demand for Jerusalem as its capital and Israeli refusal to divide the city. Golan (2008) found a solution in the Arab peace initiative (Appendix
C, 2002), which specified “East” Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state. Golan said that could be understood as a signal that only Arab Jerusalem was in question. Ross called Israel’s “no division” pledge a myth, since the Arab neighborhoods were destined to devolve to the Palestine state (p. 705). “On Jerusalem and security,” Ross (2004) said, “our differences were generally minor” (p. 726).

A more contentious issue was sovereignty over the Temple Mount. As early as the 1920s, Palestinians rioted over a rumor that Jews were threatening their holy sites. The Geneva Accords proposed resolving the issue with Palestinians giving up the demand for refugees to return to Israel in return for sovereignty over the Temple Mount (Appendix C, 2003).

Other proposed compromises involving the Temple Mount became so bizarre that they began to look reasonable: Palestine would get sovereignty above the surface of the ground, Israel below the surface; Israel would get sovereignty, Palestine would get custodianship (similar to the current arrangement); Israel would get sovereignty over just the Western Wall, Palestine over the rest (Clinton parameters, Appendix C, 2000); The United Nations would get international sovereignty over the entire Temple Mount (Appendix E, 1937 and 1947); and God would get sovereignty (Perlez, 2000, October 2). Arcane distinctions began to be made between custodianship, sovereignty, autonomy, and jurisdiction – and then between different types of sovereignty (i.e., religious sovereignty, administrative sovereignty, custodial sovereignty and limited sovereignty).

Sovereignty over the Temple Mount went far beyond mundane matters of authority or control. In the end, it might not matter who has control because Muslims, Christians and Jews all considered the Temple Mount as holy ground and demanded access. However, Israel pointed out that when Jordan ruled East Jerusalem between 1948 and 1967, Jews were excluded from the
Temple Mount and even from the Jewish Quarter in the Old City. Only when Jews gained
control was access to the Temple Mount guaranteed for all faiths. The fantasy limit was reached
on page 704, where Ross (2004) reported an attempt to find common ground by distinguishing
between sovereignty as a noun and as an adjective.

The refugee issue has simmered for more than six decades. The demand by all refugees
and their descendants to return to Israel has become a historic myth, meaning that it is
unattainable under any reasonable circumstance (Ross, 2004, p. 4).

At the United Nations Conciliation Commission meeting in 1949 in Lausanne,
Switzerland, Israel offered (unsuccessfully) to accept 100,000 refugees (Morris, 2001, p. 262).
Palestinian negotiators suggested that it might be sufficient for Israel to agree “in principle” to
Another formula called for Israel to accept an unspecified number of refugees – the specific
number to be determined later. The language implied that the number would be less than all. This
would have been a major concession, except Israel got to pick the number, and it might be zero.
Still, discussions about picking a number put the issue in play as negotiable. The opportunity for
refugees to return to the new state of Palestine was never opposed.

The question of who was responsible for refugees has never gone away. Palestinians
wanted Israel to admit blame; Israel refused, although it held out the possibility that some
carefully worded language might be acceptable. Negotiators thus proposed a concept of
collective responsibility, in which Israel would recognize the human suffering and the need to
solve the problem. It was not accepted, but neither was it rejected out of hand.

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32 Other myths identified by Ross were Israel’s refusal to share Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley.
One of the most interesting ideas at the summit was never debated. The idea recognized that some Israeli land would be given to the new state of Palestine in return for West Bank land occupied by Israeli settlers. This opened the possibility that refugees could be allowed to return to Israel but to areas marked for swapping. This land then would pass simultaneously from Israeli to Palestinian sovereignty. The refugees’ original homes were long gone and any house keys they retained would not work, so the refugees would have to find new homes in any case, whether in Israel or in Palestine. The proposal gained traction because it dealt with the “right of return” as a symbolic and emotional issue, not as specific to a piece of real estate.

President Clinton, recognizing the symbolism and emotions in formulating his parameters, summarized what he understood to be within the negotiating range of both parties. He proposed that Israel would acknowledge the moral and material suffering caused to the refugees. It would not be ruled out that Israel would accept some refugees, but there would be no specific right to return to the state of Israel. Nevertheless, Clinton said, “Israel could indicate in the agreement that it intends to establish a policy so that some of the refugees would be absorbed into Israel” (Appendix C, 2000). Both Arafat and Barak said they could accept the Clinton parameters “in principle” (Ross, 2004, p. 744). The Taba talks that followed kept the same formula (Moratinos, 2002) and with the same lack of success.

Solving the settlements problem ought to be a no-brainer. “Ending settlements is a consensus issue in the world, among American Jewry, and even among a majority of Israelis,” said Yossi Beilin, an Israeli negotiator at the 2000 summit, a cabinet minister and a member of the Knesset (in Bronner, June 6, 2009). Bronner cited contemporary polls showing that most Israelis supported a freeze on settlement construction. Israeli religious parties, on the other hand, supported settlement-building, and they cast the swing votes that kept Benjamin Netanyahu’s
government in power. Samaria and Judea (which constitute the West Bank) form the heartland of ancient Israel – more so than the coastal cities such as Tel Aviv – and they hold considerable symbolism for religious Israelis. Some of Judaism’s holiest sites are in the West Bank – e.g., Abraham’s tomb in Hebron, Joseph’s tomb in Nablus and Rachel’s tomb in Bethlehem. No observant Jew wants to risk being denied access to them by a Muslim government.

Negotiations over water and airspace are no less important than other final-status issues but they lack emotional and religious rigidity. Palestine obviously will need water to survive; denying it a reasonable amount is tantamount to denying its existence. Israel, due to its small size, obviously will need airspace for civil and military aviation to maneuver. If Palestine wants its own airport, it will need rights to Israeli airspace for the same reasons.

“Water, while technically considered one of the conflict’s four core issues, doesn’t evoke the same heated passions” (Levinson, 2010, May 21, p. A11). “Similarly” said Golan (2008), “although there was no agreement regarding water rights, there was the sense that agreement could be reached on this matter” (p. 46).

Not everyone believes that it would be practical to combine Gaza and the West Bank into the new country of Palestine. Clark (2009) among others was dubious. Although Gaza and the West Bank are only 25 miles apart, they are separated in more profound ways – e.g., Gazans are significantly poorer and more crowded than the West Bankers. “The idea that one nation can remain intact when its territory is non-contiguous has no real precedent in recent history. Just as East and West Pakistan fought a bloody war in 1971 that resulted in the formation of Bangladesh and Pakistan, so too will any attempt to link Gaza and the West Bank as a united ‘Palestine’ fail miserably” (p. 150).
As the expansion of Israeli settlements made a two-state solution increasingly impractical, attention turned to other alternatives. The New York Times reported fears by Egypt and Jordan -- Egypt that it might be pressed to take back Gaza and Jordan that it might be pressed to re-annex the West Bank (Slackman, 2009, January 11, p. A1). This, of course, was the situation from 1949 to 1967, but in 1973, Egypt and Jordan fought another war with Israel and lost the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Neither Egypt nor Jordan wanted the territories back, nor did they want the Palestinians to draw them into another war with Israel. The Gaza Strip and West Bank became “occupied territories,” wanted by no one but administered – which is to say “ruled” -- by Israel.

Another variation proposes making separate countries of the West Bank and Gaza. Clarke (2009) was no more optimistic. He questioned whether a combined Palestinian state could survive – much less a dismembered state.

‘What Could Go Wrong?’

So with all that progress and all that agreement, what could go wrong? Here are three (among many) opinions:

Ross (2004): “Even if both sides want peace, those who oppose it can create circumstances in which the politics of peacemaking become untenable” (p. 589).

Shalev (1991): “Neither side – Israel or the Palestinians – succeeded in imposing its will upon the other. The Palestinians cannot, by throwing stones and Molotov cocktails, compel Israel to withdraw from the Territories. Nor can Israel, by employing military force within the bounds of legality and the moral code it follows, being an end to the violence” (p. 11).

Khalidi (2006): A member of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace conference, Khalidi struck a common chord when he said, “Most of the leaders of the PLO … had spent their
entire careers in the atmosphere of a clandestine, underground liberation movement, and proved to be poorly suited for the task of state building … Almost nothing had been done to prepare for the moment when independence actually had to be negotiated and statehood prepared.” It is this issue that Salam Fayyed is working to correct, and is winning general praise (p. 159-162).

Every commentator seems to have “the answer.” None of them work. Thus the violence continues – spiking every now and then as terrorism – while the search continues for a way to control it so the tender buds of peace can dare to open.

‘Unreasonable’

If the conflict does not seem to make sense, you are not alone. William Ormsby-Gore, British under-secretary of state for the colonies, observed in 1923, “Palestine is largely inhabited by unreasonable people” (Wasserstein, 1978, p. 108).
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