**A Suite in Six Attitudes: Subverting (and Succumbing to) the Textual Bias**

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Cover Page Footnote
Leanna Smithberger is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Communication at the University of South Florida. The author would like to thank Dr. Chris McRae and Alex Davenport for their unwavering support and invaluable feedback.

Erratum
The audio of "I Am Enough: A Suite in Six Attitudes" is available through this journal at https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/kaleidoscope/vol18/iss1/3/. Individual tracks may be streamed at https://soundcloud.com/kalscopejrnl/sets/i-am-enough-a-suite-in-six-attitudes

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A Suite in Six Attitudes: Subverting (and Succumbing to) the Textual Bias

Leanna Smithberger

This essay challenges textual dominance in academia by using music composition and performance as a method and representation of inquiry. I argue that this is a form of tactical resistance since it plays within the system, meeting requirements but challenging expectations. The resulting text from the project satisfies academic requirements for a written text, but subverts expectations as to the form that text should take. I provide the musical score and a discussion of the creation and performance of the composition to show how even when attempting to abandon textualism, we are still constrained by it. Despite this, I present music as a useful approach to performance studies because it can introduce the local particulars of embodied performance and listening to the academy.

Keywords: music, performance, textualism

This essay can be accused of tilting at cultural windmills — the giant that is “text” is so embedded in our everyday and academic practices it can hardly be touched. Just as Don Quixote could never defeat his imagined monsters, this essay will not overthrow textual dominance. The attempt, however, is not entirely futile. Attempting to subvert textualism provides insight into the structures and practices that enable it, are constrained by it, and perform it (Conquergood 151).

In this essay, I present a musical performance created and given as an experiment in subversion. To begin, I contextualize this performance within the literature of performance studies and argue that, even as musical composition and performance fail to transcend textualism, they undermine textual structures and practices in meaningful ways. I then provide the score of the composition, “I Am Enough: A Suite in Six Attitudes,” as well as my account of the creating and doing of the performance. To close, I discuss the ways in which I attempt, succeed, and fail to challenge textual dominance in the academy.

Texts and Textualism

To clarify, my stance is in no way anti-texts. Texts are an extraordinary resource humans have invented and honed to act extra-locally, co-ordinating multiple sites of everyday performances across time and space (Smith 174).

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We author texts, speak through texts, and use texts to speak for us. Cooren presents a performative understanding of texts, highlighting the chain of human and nonhuman actors engaged in doing-the-everyday (377). In this sense, texts are never just words on a page; texts have agency, standardizing and organizing our increasingly complex and fractured lives (Mumby and Kuhn 158). Arguing against texts in such a complex and globalized world, then, would amount to anarchy.

As Conquergood wisely argues, “textocentrism — not texts — is the problem” (151). If texts lend stability across time and space, then studying texts allows us to understand how we perform stability, and a critical approach reveals the significance of those performances for the actors involved, locally and extra-locally. A performance studies approach challenges everyday performances of stability, using embodiment and sensory experience to deliberately disrupt conventional ways of knowing (Pelias and VanOosting 221). Such disruptions make present the absent presences, or those felt materialities we actively unfeel in service of capitalist, neoliberal conventions (Kapchan 39).

Communication studies has sought to introduce instability into academe by challenging the conventions of texts — both what counts as a text, and the authority automatically conferred to certain types of texts (Cloud and Feyh 302; Jakes 320; Worthan 14). Blurring the boundaries of what counts as a text, along with dramatistic theories from scholars such as Burke and Goffman, has led some scholars to suggest everything is a text, capable of being read by a skilled and critical audience. However, Conquergood points out the text-as-metaphor-for-living is grounded in privileged, Western assumptions about the nature of experience — namely the assumption that reading and writing are an imperative focus of human life (147). As Burke astutely states, “a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing,” and the visual metaphor of the world-as-text is in no way exempt (49). If we accept the world-as-text metaphor, we conceal, or make absent, how we perform the world-as-text metaphor. In other words, by taking for granted the metaphor of reading for sense-making, we are also taking for granted the underlying assumptions and social affordances that enable such a metaphor.

The world-as-text metaphor is possible because of a rich history of textualism — the dominance of textual (and therefore visual) representations of reality (Jackson 10). Mehan refers to the competition for discursive power and hegemony as the “politics of representation,” and in the academy, written research persists as the preferred means of representing experience (253). Jackson positions performance studies within a rhetorical tradition, invoking historical students of rhetoric in ancient Greece who memorized, interpreted, and presented written speeches, students of elocution who perfected annunciation and tone, and the scholars of the twentieth century who wrestled with the relationship between the lived and represented presents
In this Western account of rhetoric, texts are central, but somehow not quite representative.

A non-Western approach to rhetoric further troubles the relationship between texts and experience. Arabic rhetoric is deeply influenced by the disparity between formal, written Arabic (Classical Arabic), and spoken Arabic, the vernacular used in everyday interaction (Suchan 281). Classical Arabic is intimately connected with Islam, and rather than being viewed as a tool for argumentation, such as in Western rhetorical traditions, language is itself the container of truth. In Arabic-speaking cultures, a persuasive rhetor is one who is able to “sing the truth” through language, evoking the beauty of the language through metaphor and emotional delivery (5). The Aztec word closest to a Western understanding of rhetoric, *huehuetlahtolli*, explicitly invokes past performances and is often translated as “the word of the ancients” or “the word of the elders” (Abbott 252). The *huehuetlahtolli* were passed orally from fathers to sons, and it is only because of the recordings of Spanish missionaries that these cultural addresses have been preserved in a textual medium. In both Arabic-speaking cultures and in ancient Aztec culture, texts may preserve linguistic choices, but the meaning and significance is only evident through recitation and performance.

Textualism in the Western world is so central, and has been central for so long, that it is easy to delude one’s self into thinking it has always been this way. Barthes, however, points out the relative newness of text as a literary object of study, tracing the linguistic shift away from works, attributing it to the influence of Marxism, Freudianism, and structuralism (156). Though he resists the tendency to categorize literature as either text or work, he differentiates the two explaining, “the work can be held in the hand, the text is held in language,” and “the Text is experienced only in an activity of production” (156). Text, then, is discursive and cultural — in short, the text is performative.

While such a performative notion of the text might seem to smooth over any lingering dichotomy between text and performance, it fails to account for the multiple ways text is used in performance studies literature. Worthen provides three “interlaced” ways of conceptualizing text: “(1) as a canonical vehicle of authorial intention; (2) as an intertext, the field of textuality; (3) as a material object, the text in hand” (14). Barthes’ distinction between the work and the text differentiates the first two usages, but these are continually muddied by a tendency to conflate them with “the third sense of text,” the material text (15). Such a plural understanding of texts is not inherently dichotomous to performance, however as Worthen points out, “the opposition between text and performance” is often invoked to make disciplinary arguments about belonging and authority.

These disciplinary arguments are the politics of representation in action, seeking to determine which texts are acceptable and, therefore, which texts get
to act\(^1\) across space and time. Smith, unlike Barthes, argues for the importance of the material text, since it is the material text which allows for translocal performances (174). In other words, while texts may be picked up and interpreted differently depending on the particular context, they are “readable as the same” because of their materiality. For Smith, the material object is the authority, not, as Worthen suggests, a container for an absent author’s intentions. Texts have agency, and performers who create or interpret texts are involved in text-reader conversations in which both human and text author experience.

It is important to note, however, that textual agency is best considered in terms of the hybridicity, or synthesis, of action, which is to say the acknowledgement that action does not have a fixed point of origin (Cooren 377). Texts lose agency if they are no longer recognized by human actors as being agential; thus, texts need human agents in order to be recognized as having the authority to act, just as human agents need texts to act translocally. Institutions and organizations, such as universities, colleges, and departments, rely on texts to coordinate and regulate everyday performances. The authority to decide what counts as an acceptable text, then, carries significant consequences for the continued existence of that institution or organization.

Textocentrism, when considered from a hybrid agency perspective, cannot entirely be avoided without threatening the existence of the organized world. However, textocentrism can be challenged, especially the centrality of particular kinds of texts, or particular norms governing the creation and interpretation of texts. The dichotomy operating beneath the arguments about the textual bias in academia can be thought of as the local versus the translocal, or the particular versus the standardized. The textual bias is one that favors translocal, standardized action — it does not eliminate the need for human agency, but it seeks to minimize embodied differences by introducing and enforcing consistency. Challenging the textual bias, then, is an attempt to reintroduce embodied difference without overturning institutionalized forms of knowing, communicating, and representing experience. In the next section, I discuss tactical resistance and how music can subversively challenge the norms of textual representation in the academy.

**Music as Tactical Resistance**

While resisting textocentrism may ultimately prove futile, there is merit in “staying with the trouble,” as Haraway puts it, and struggling against it nonetheless (1). This essay seeks to stay with the trouble of textocentrism in academe, but in order to do so, I cannot completely abandon convention. Staying with the trouble, “living and dying with each other in a thick present,” requires tactical resistance — resistance that challenges the taken-for-granted, even as it remains reflexively complicit in maintaining other taken-for-granteds (De Certeau et al. 6; Haraway 1).

1 For a discussion about what actions texts can and cannot do, see Cooren (380-387).
In his discussion of resistance in Big Red — a building in Chicago that provided “substandard housing to a mix of people from all over the world” (“Life in Big Red” 171) — Conquergood cites De Certeau’s notion of tactical resistance (204). De Certeau describes a tactic as having to “play with the terrain imposed on it, organized by the law of a strange force” (De Certeau et al. 6). Tactical resistance, then, is resistance that cannot be taken head-on — it is resistance that plays within the system even as it subverts it. In his ethnography of Big Red, Conquergood gives the tenants’ handling of the landlord and the water supply as examples of how the tenants behaved tactically — from a place of no power within a system organized by a socially-empowered other. Music composition, when undertaken within the academy, is also tactical because it disrupts conventions of research and publication, but not so much that it cannot still be published as research (Smithberger 86).

Music composition is tactical in the academy because it subverts textualism by implicating the body and demanding performance. A musical score is tactical because it plays within the terrain of the academy, where inscribed texts that can be published in books or journal articles are favored, rewarded, and even required. However, a musical score subverts the text-centered idea that reading alone is a sufficient experience of the text. Though it can be used for a textual reading, a musical score assumes performance by bodies for bodies. Small uses this aspect of musical score to justify his rejection of the reified concept “music” in favor of performance-based “musicking” (9). Eidsheim builds on this by arguing for a conception of music as “vibrational practice,” resisting the temptation to equate the production of music with reductive representations she calls the “figure of sound” (17). To accept a paradigm where music only exists as musicking or vibrational practice — which is to say music as verb or practice rather than product/text — is to understand the referential qualities of musical notation as useful for record-keeping and gaining acceptance to text-centered systems like academic publishing, but entirely insufficient for representing the sounds, feelings, or ideas to be interpreted and performed in the composition. In other words, music is written to be embodied.

Music composition is an especially useful approach to performance research because its tactical subversion does not threaten to overthrow existing text-centered structures. Conquergood lists five areas of analysis that open once the world is thought of as performance rather than text: cultural process, ethnographic praxis, hermeneutics, scholarly representation, and politics (96). The questions surrounding performance and hermeneutics, and performance and scholarly representation “are the most deeply subversive and threatening to the text-bound structure of the academy” because they undermine the dominance of textualism (97). Music composition questions what forms of knowledge and knowing are privileged while also opening possibilities for knowing differently, but the ability to translate music into a
musical score offers the opportunity to do so within the text-bound structure of the academy.

In the next section, I provide the musical score I composed for the performance “I Am Enough: A Suite in Six Attitudes,” and my account of developing and performing it. While I have previously published musical scores as part of an appendix, I have chosen to present the score in the body of this essay because it is not supplemental material. The musical score is a rich performance text which conjures text-reader performances of sense-making, even if those performances only take place in the imaginary (Smith 175). While I am aware that a full interpretation of the score is only possible if one has the requisite knowledge of musical notation, I encourage all readers to stay with the trouble of the score, noticing the shape, texture, and overall composition of the score as a visual text, as well as listening to the audio recordings of the movements.²

I Am Enough: A Suite in Six Attitudes

I wrote the first movement because I was angry. “Take Your Objectivity and Stuff It,” was a less-than-covert message to the professor of an arts-based research course who insisted on using social scientific language and traditional research conventions throughout the class. We were required to write weekly reflections about what we thought about the class, and as a compromise between my need to express my annoyance and my acceptance of academic power structures, I chose to vent my frustrations through music. The result was less than satisfying — my professor loved the composition and recording I sent her, ostensibly missing my intended disapproval. I continued to take an arts-based approach to research in that class and others; each time I faced criticism for composing and performing music as communication research, I turned to the piano to write my thinly veiled retorts. What was one song became the first movement of a piano suite that can be described as the complaints of a confused graduate student, the budding research philosophy of a young scholar, or testing the waters of a music-based method of performance research.

² Recordings of “I Am Enough: A Suite in Six Attitudes” are available for streaming through the Kaleidoscope website <https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/kaleidoscope/>.
I Am Enough: A Suite in Six Attitudes

I. Take Your Objectivity and Stuff It
The second movement, “No, You May Not Have the Lyrics,” was my response to an instructor’s request that I provide the lyrics in the body of the manuscript, but not the actual score. The movement is my stubborn refusal to let lyrics and music be separated simply for the sake of easier analysis. By removing the lyrics and singing the melody on a neutral syllable, the only way to present the piece as a text is by providing the musical score.
II. No, You May Not Have the Lyrics
The third movement, “I See Your Analysis and Raise You a Feeling,” is a response to the social scientific preference for objective observations rather than subjective experiences as a means for interpreting social phenomena. It is also my attempt to argue that music can better represent and communicate a felt experience than scientific data or traditional analysis.
The fourth movement, “Perhaps It Really Is Just a Song,” is both the admission of my own reservations about music as a method for inquiry, as well as my challenge that music, like language, is culturally embedded and referential and can never be devoid of meaning because of this. The audience is left to wonder whether the lyrics are nonsense or were consciously chosen, and whether this has anything to do with the meaning at all.
IV. Perhaps It Really is Just a Song

Oh, give me some apple pie, and,
Oh!—
Give me ba-na-na bread, and, Oh!—

Give me an ice-cream sand-wich, Oh!—
but ne-ver

(Scatting)
The fifth movement, “This Is Yours Now, If You Need It,” was originally the last in the suite, and is inspired by a quote from Ursula Le Guin: “But by remembering it he had made the story his; and insofar as I have remembered it, it is mine; and now, if you like it, it’s yours...In the tale, in the telling, we are all one blood”(199). The meaning of the movement is created between performer and audience, and that meaning necessitates a relationship, even if it only lasts the short length of the piece.
V. This is Yours Now, If You Need It
Still grappling with the potential for music to be performance scholarship, I wrote the last movement, “But This One, This Is Mine,” as a composition experiment. Inspired by Goat Island’s impossible dance, the movement is deliberately hard with the focus on the performer’s body rather than tonal harmony. This movement is the culmination of the anger that began the entire project; it is the last outburst lamenting and celebrating the limits of my body, my music, and my scholarship.
VI. But This One, This Is Mine
Performing “I Am Enough: A Suite in Six Attitudes” allowed me to explore the ways in which music composition and performance can subvert textualism, even while succumbing to it. Music performance as embodied practice, supposedly listening-focused rather than visually-focused, does not conform to traditional notions of research presentation. However, the performance was given under the pretense of a solo piano recital, a form that carries with it an intertextual history of performer and audience expectations.
The piano recital is a script, and the audience and I faithfully performed the series of motions and interactions that comprise it. I walked out onto the stage and bowed, at which point the audience provided the requisite applause. I played the composition from start to finish, pausing between each movement but not standing or receiving applause. My audience was silent until I finally stood and bowed to receive their applause yet again. The only moment that may have threatened the standard script was when their applause continued, I jokingly sat back down for an encore, playing the opening lines of Beethoven’s “Für Elise,” in a major key for added comedic value. While this violates the norm in classical music performance that you do not alter the written score, especially that of a great composer, it is not without precedent, since performers such as Victor Borge built careers off of altering famous pieces for comedic effect.

As part of the piano recital script, I passed out a program before my performance, which named my performance as a piano recital and gave the composition and movement titles. Without the context of a recital or the names of each movement, I doubt the audience would have heard anything aside from music, which they would express liking or disliking based on preconceived ideas of what makes good music. Given the text of a program, the audience was encouraged to question what I meant by each of the titles, and how the titles related to the music and to themselves. This is not to say the meaning was no longer ambiguous or relational, only that there was meaning to be found in it at all.

In addition to the text of the program, I performed from a musical score. I read the performance note-for-note, just as I might have printed and read a poem word-for-word. Not only did the meaning of my performance hinge on the program text, but the actual doing of my performance was also wholly dependent on my ability to read the musical text on the pages in front of me. This points to another text-related bias: sight. I chose to place the piano in a central spotlight, facing to the side, so my hands were visible to the audience as I played. The binder holding my music was directly in front of me on the piano, placed so that no shadows would be cast across the pages. In the discussion following the performance, the audience offered comments about my feet using the sustain pedal or my fingers on the keys more readily than those privileging the sound experience of the performance.

**Conclusion**

Despite my attempts to avoid textualism, I ultimately ended up creating a performance that is still text- and sight-centered. After all, to avoid textualism entirely would be to risk the dissolution of the academy and, I argue, would risk missing the hybridicity of performance between human and text, which characterizes so many of our everyday interactions. Though it is possible a program was not necessary for my prior performance to have had meaning for the audience, it encouraged the audience to hear my performance as part
of a scholarly conversation about textualism and research practices, rather than being purely aesthetic. Notating the compositions as a written score allowed me to compose during my short moments of free time and perform it later. Having a written score also means I have a documented version of my performance to submit to academic outlets, allowing me to contribute to the translocality of the institution and progress in my career and performance of a graduate student.

“I Am Enough: A Suite in Six Attitudes,” challenges and subverts academic practices in a communication department by using music as a method of inquiry and performance, but necessarily succumbs to the dominance of textualism. Composing and performing a work of music functioned as a form of tactical resistance because it plays within the system; I have met the disciplinary requirements of producing a finished, written document while subverting expectations of form. Textualism is pervasive in our ways of being and doing, and music in no way avoids this. It does, however, challenge this dominance, and in challenging it, the ways in which we are bound and authored by texts become more apparent and can be questioned.

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