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Factors Influencing Arms Control

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INTRODUCTION

Since nuclear weapons were first constructed, nations have been attempting to discover a way to control their destructiveness. The first such attempt was engineered by J. Robert Oppenheimer, the founder of the atomic bomb, in the form of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. This report was the basis for the Baruch Plan, which was a disarmament proposal presented by Bernard Baruch to the United Nations in the late 1940s. The proposal was rejected because it called for international control of fissionable materials, which was considered a violation of national sovereignty by the Soviet Union. The character of arms control negotiations has changed significantly since the 1940s and 50s. Beginning in the mid-1960s, the focus of arms control shifted from disarmament to strategic arms limitation, with an emphasis on bilateralism (National Academy of Sciences 1985:3; Schoenbaum 1987:30).

This paper will examine the factors which influence arms control from a historical perspective. Of primary interest are bilateral negotiations on strategic arms, starting in 1969 with the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although specific treaties must be examined in order to illustrate the manner in which particular factors may operate, the primary focus of this discussion will be limited to arms control negotiations at a theoretical level. It is the intent of this paper to provide a comprehensive
examination of the variables which act upon the arms control process without providing an in-depth analysis of any one variable. This paper will illustrate the influence of the actors who formulate arms control, and the political environment surrounding negotiations, in order to provide an understanding of how arms control treaties are shaped.

GOVERNMENTAL FACTORS

Presidential variables

Political affiliation. On its face, the political party affiliation of the president may appear to be a factor which influences the arms control process. In practice, as this paper will suggest, there are a variety of variables which constrain the power of individual actors to shape arms control to their personal preferences. Kegley and Wittkopf explain:

Change the people who make the policy, and the policy itself will probably change, so one view has it. However, perusal of this theory and corresponding evidence...has shown us that this tenet is not persuasive. Kissinger's hypothesis that it really doesn't make a difference who is elected president—the essential outlines of foreign policy will remain the same regardless—appears more cogent. Why? As we have seen, the system recruits the same types of individuals into positions of power. And top-level decision-making posts are frequented by many of the same individuals over time, according to a revolving door principle. Moreover, once in office individuals tend to be shaped by, more than they are able to shape, the roles they occupy. As a result, individual differences tend to be cancelled out: new decision makers act like and reach the same kinds of decisions as their predecessors (1987:551-1).

The theory espoused by Kegley and Wittkopf indicates that individuals are shaped by the roles they fill. This would
suggest that the political affiliation of an individual president, over the long term, would have no real effect on her/his arms control policy choices.

In the realm of arms control since 1969, it is difficult to ascertain the role of political party affiliation on arms control in a way which does not involve theory. Lyndon Johnson was only in office for a brief time, during which no substantive arms control negotiations were conducted. Eight years later, Carter, a Democrat president, surfaced for four years; then the country was once again under Republican rule for eight years in the form of Reagan. Because there has only been one presidential term (out of a possible five) in which a Democrat was in office, the sample size is inadequate to draw any valid conclusions which would correlate political party with a successful negotiating posture. A more realistic approach, discussed in the contents of this paper, is to construct a framework of interacting variables which may help to determine under which circumstances arms control, in a general sense, is feasible.

**Transition time.** When assessing the factors which affect an executive's conduct of foreign policy, it is important to include transition time. The term "transition" has been used in various ways by different authors. Mosher identifies the most frequent use of the term as the period of approximately eleven weeks between the presidential election and the inauguration (1987:35). However, when looking at the effects of a presidential transition on policy, it is more accurate to use a broader interpretation of
the term. Even after inauguration, a new president is not able to immediately implement the policy of his or her choice (if such a choice has been made). Several prerequisites are necessary: the making and confirmation of major political appointments; the development and implementation of programs which support the established policies; appropriate budget planning; and, the forming of relations with members of the legislature to aid in the implementation of the programs (Mosher et.al. 1987:35).

When these prerequisites are included, the broader definition of transition time may encompass up to as much as a year and a half of time lost in formulating a new president's approach to foreign policy (Mosher et.al. 1987:37). Additionally, because of the disruptive nature of an upcoming election year, a president may lose some of his or her ability to conduct policy in the manner in which s/he chooses. If this additional disruptive force is entered into the calculation of transition time, it may be that only two years out of a four-year presidential term may prove to be productive in terms of policy-making (Miller 1984:85).

Transition time is a relevant factor affecting arms control negotiations because, as Mosher notes, "...major undertakings, such as a SALT treaty or a Panama Canal treaty, often require more than four years to develop, negotiate, and ratify" (1987:43). Goldberger indicates that the transition time lost due to the electoral process may affect long-range planning in arms control (1988:69). The specific nature of these effects should be evaluated to assess the significance of transition time.
to arms control.

One of the most important effects of a presidential transition is the shift in strategy and posture of foreign policy, particularly if the transition is from one political party to another (Mosher et. al. 1987:33). Diehl notes that a new leader often takes time out to review his or her predecessor's policies and to make alterations (1987:11). In most cases, newly-elected leaders wish to make their own personal mark on policy, and this may entail changes in bureaucratic personnel and negotiating teams (Sloss and Davis 1987:35). The manner in which a new president attempts to adjust arms control policy to his or her own expectations may take one of several forms: a delay in negotiations to reassess the options; an immediate alteration in arms control policy; and, continuation of the policies of the preceding president with minimal reevaluation.

Often new leaders need to take time upon entering office to "overcome the instinct to substantially repudiate the policies of their predecessors, to study the issues anew from their own perspectives, to organize the policy machinery, and to formulate their own policies" (Miller 1984:85). This was the approach taken by President Nixon in 1969. He put the SALT negotiations which had started with the Johnson administration on hold to study the problem, review the options, and consult NATO allies (Schoenbaum 1987:35; Frye 1974:78; Miller 1984:85). Although Nixon was not opposed to the eventual adoption of Johnson's policies on SALT, he demanded the presentation of as many options
as possible, and looked with particular suspicion upon those prepared by the bureaucracy (Frye 1974:79). This extensive evaluation of SALT policy served to delay the progress of negotiations. Although this approach may enhance the prospects for arms control in the long run, in the short run it serves as an impediment to the negotiating progress.

Another possible effect of the transition period is a radical shift in policy attempted shortly after the inauguration of the new president. Diehl notes that this type of alteration in policy is one characteristic of leadership change (1987:11). This approach was exemplified by President Carter. While attempting to avoid a delay in the negotiating process, the Carter administration at the same time chose to present an ambitious comprehensive proposal in March of 1977 (Miller 1984:85). This approach failed for several reasons: Carter did not understand the extent to which Brezhnev was committed to the Vladivostok proposal as a result of his bargaining with Nixon, Ford, and with the Politburo (Mosher et.al. 1987:211); Carter did not anticipate the suspicion with which the Soviet Union regarded the public manner in which the new proposal was presented (Mosher et.al. 1987:211); the members of the Soviet establishment were testing the willpower of the new administration (Talbott 1979:75); and, the Soviets were offended at Carter's naive assumption that he could continue SALT negotiations while at the same time criticizing the Soviet Union on human rights abuses (Talbott 1979:75). Diehl concludes that Carter's decision to
surprise the Soviet Union with a new SALT II proposal halted the progress of the negotiations for at least a year (1987:12). Carter was eventually able to conclude the SALT II negotiations on the basis of the Vladivostok agreement reached by President Ford in 1974 (Lodal 1988:153). This example seems to indicate that arms control negotiations are not enhanced by sudden shifts in policy during the transition time of a new administration.

The process of arms control appears to be aided by continuity in policy. The bureaucratic inertia encountered when dealing with opponents who have become committed to an established proposal is best changed by increments, not sudden change. Radical shifts in arms control policy due to leadership changes in the U.S. have not benefitted the negotiating process, as Carter's experience demonstrates. Additionally, when new administrations force significant delays in negotiations, these negotiations are obviously not fruitful during that time. It is possible to avoid the complications caused by a presidential transition when a president is reelected and makes no significant policy changes, when an important member of the previous administration is elected to the presidency and attempts to continue past policies, or when a new administration chooses to appoint some of the key figures of the past administration to their former posts in the negotiating process. Mosher notes that "Kissinger drew heavily on personnel from the State Department, the Defense Department, and the CIA in building the national security advisor's staff. Since these individuals had served in
the Johnson administration, they provided a substantial amount of continuity as well as expertise" (1987:196).

Continuity is difficult to establish in a political system in which elections for the presidency are held every four years. This problem is compounded by legislative elections occurring every two years, changing the composition both at the onset of a new administration and also during its term. Even if a leader is reelected, control of the legislature by a different political party may undermine the continuity of arms control policy (Diehl 1987:12). Because changes in policy are disruptive to the arms control negotiating process, elections in the legislature may impose transition time problems on the executive branch.

There is a tendency among newly-elected leaders to take aggressive positions toward the Soviet Union due to pressure to conform to campaign rhetoric, the desire not to be seen as "soft" on communism, and often as a result of personal convictions (Mosher et.al. 1987:32). This has been exemplified by the rhetoric and actions of President Reagan. Reagan dismissed the SALT II treaty of the previous Carter administration as "fatally flawed," made unflattering statements about the nature and aims of the Soviet Union, refused to negotiate with the Soviet Union until new military expenditures put the U.S. in a position of strength, and appointed arms control critic Eugene Rostow to head the ACDA (Van Cleave 1984:14; Brown 1987:178). This ideology of anti-communism is itself inimical to arms control negotiations. During his first term in office, Reagan made no substantial gains
in the arms control arena. Mosher notes that those presidents who were initially hostile toward the Soviet Union who were reelected to a second term (Eisenhower, Nixon, and Reagan) began their second terms on less aggressive themes (1987:33). Although there is no indication that the tendency to project an aggressive attitude toward the Soviet Union will manifest itself in every leader, it is apparent that when it does occur, it inhibits the negotiating process (although if the leader is reelected it is less likely to be a strong theme).

The final complication of the transition process is the absence of competent advisement for the newly-elected president. This occurs because inexperienced appointees may need time to familiarize themselves with foreign policy problems, and because the appointments themselves take time. Mosher notes that during both the Carter and Reagan transitions, the Senate confirmation process was time-consuming. He explains:

Confirmation of more than half of their appointments in the State Department took longer than two months, and in the Defense Department, about one month. But some cases required three months or more, some were delayed by a half year, and a few were held up by an individual senator indefinitely (1987:120).

The lack of political advisors in key positions makes it difficult for a new leader to assess and formulate policy, leading to a delay in arms control negotiations or a hastily and poorly-constructed policy. These complications seem to indicate that regardless of a president's commitment to arms control, transition time will impede progress in arms control.

Presidential commitment to arms control. A willingness on
the part of the president is necessary to negotiate any arms control agreement. Miller claims: "...the strong and direct commitment of the President and his close associates in the White House seems to be a decisive element in determining whether and how much arms control can succeed" (1984:89). Because the president is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy, s/he must be willing to incorporate the concept of arms control in order to mobilize the bureaucracy around the task of negotiating a suitable agreement. Without a strong presidential commitment to and involvement in arms control, bureaucratic efforts may lack cohesion and direction (Seaborg and Loeb 1987:449). Different components of the bureaucracy may be motivated by conflicting purposes and goals, and a personal interest by the president is necessary to mold these into a single national policy.

Miller claims that although presidential commitment to arms control is a necessary factor to the ratification of a treaty, by itself it is not sufficient (1984:90). There are many political impediments that cannot be overcome by presidential will alone, as the Carter administration demonstrated. Additionally, it is difficult to evaluate the sincerity of the presidential commitment itself. A president may enter arms control negotiations to placate political opposition without any real commitment to a treaty, as Reagan was often accused of doing (Diehl 1987:9). Or, a president may offer a far-reaching proposal simply to embarrass a rival, with no intent to reach an
agreement (Diehl 1987:9). Therefore, although presidential commitment to arms control may be necessary to successfully negotiate a treaty, it may be difficult to ascertain the sincerity of this commitment. Often a perceived commitment may simply be a political ploy to achieve an end other than the reduction of arms. In this type of case, no treaty is intended, and the political climate for future arms control may be jeopardized.

The Department of State and the National Security Council

Two key government actors influencing arms control policy are the National Security staff and the Department of State. Although these two components of the bureaucracy are separate entities, and will be evaluated individually at the beginning of this section, they have overlapping functions as well. In this respect, it is appropriate to define one component in terms of how it affects the other, as well as what happens when conflict ensues between the two.

The department of state. Unlike the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a quasi-independent member of the Department of State, the State Department proper lacks expertise in the technical aspects of bilateral arms control (Clarke 1979:123). This affects State's ability to be a major voice in the analysis of arms control policy. Additionally, State Department employees find themselves with little time to concentrate on arms control matters. As Gelb explains:

Precisely because the secretary and the departments are engaged in and have primary responsibility for the
conduct of foreign policy, i.e., the day-to-day business of diplomacy and congressional appearances, as a practical matter there is little time to make policy. It seems inconceivable that such day-to-day tasks should even take precedence over policymaking, but they do; there is no choice. By and large, this is true of the State Department's policy planning staff as well (1983:287).

Clarke concurs with this analysis, noting that the Secretary of State "must deal daily with many diverse issues; he could not and should not focus too heavily on arms control" (1979:114). An example of what can happen if a Secretary of State attempts to be involved in all areas of foreign policy concern can be seen in Henry Kissinger. In addition to running the activities of the State Department and engaging in Middle East diplomacy, Kissinger was also involved in SALT II negotiations. As a result, he may have been a contributing factor to the slow progress made in the negotiations while he was Secretary of State (Jenson 1988:49).

The State Department's influence is also curtailed by the president himself. Gelb explains that one reason presidents prefer their own national security staff is because the State Department does not attempt to frame its proposals in a manner in which will elicit political support. Because State is not attuned to politics, Gelb claims, they are "doomed to being ignored" (1983:284). Additionally, presidents eventually notice that the primary interest of the State Department is the long term, whereas an individual president is more apt to stress the short term as circumscribed by his or her own term in office. Although presidents may begin their term by utilizing visible actors such as the State Department, they soon turn to members
in their own staff with more accommodating political views in order to articulate their policy interests (Gelb 1983:285).

**National security assistant and staff.** The original role of the national security advisor was the coordination of defense, foreign policy, and other security matters, as well as to identify matters that required presidential attention (Fox 1982:52). This role, however, has been expanding in recent times. As Destler notes:

For each of the five presidents of the sixties and seventies, the primary manager of foreign policy issues was the assistant for national security affairs. Under the formal aegis of the National Security Council, this aide has headed a staff of foreign policy analysts and operators which has varied in size—no more than 12 under McGeorge Bundy (1961-66), rising to 18 under Walt Rostow (1966-69) and to a peak of over 50 under Henry Kissinger (1969-1975) before dropping into the 40s under Brent Scowcroft (1975-77) and the 30s under Zbigniew Brzezinski (1977-81) (1983:261).

Other authors on foreign policy decision-making agree that although the stature of the NSC may have fluctuated under different presidents and advisors, it has become a much more important force in policymaking than it was in the 1960s (Gelb 1983; Mosher et al. 1987).

Many authors have noticed that the NSC has often been used as an alternative to the State Department (Gelb 1983; Destler 1983; Mosher et al. 1987). Destler claims:

The "National Security Council" became in practice not the powerful senior advisory forum envisioned at its creation, but the senior aide and staff instituted under the Council name. Presidents employed this aide and staff not just as a link to the permanent government but also as an alternative to it, at least for certain issues they deemed particularly important (1983:260).
A historical example of the substitution of the national security apparatus for the traditional role of the State Department can be seen in the conduct of President Nixon's arms control policy. Nixon was of the firm opinion that the direction of foreign policy should originate in the White House and be transmitted to the bureaucracy (Sonnenfeldt 1987:67), and in accordance with this belief, negotiations at the 1972 Moscow summit were carried out by National Security Assistant Kissinger at the exclusion of the State Department (McDonald 1987:63).

There are several reasons that presidents gravitate toward their national security staff. One reason is that presidents feel a need to search for opportunities to visibly demonstrate their capacity for leadership, and this is not possible if important foreign policy decisions are made by the bureaucracy. So, eventually, the role of the State Department is lessened to make the president look competent and active (Gelb 1983:286).

Another reason presidents place such importance on the NSC staff is because they see these individuals as more attuned to their own personal needs (Destler 1983; Gelb 1983). As Destler explains:

Staff-dominated policymaking provides the president a responsive personal environment (his senior experts, just down the hall, a minute's walk away) while reducing the degree he works personally with senior statutory aides who have competing institutional loyalties—the secretaries of state and defense, the joint chiefs of staff—and thus shielding him somewhat from the political-institutional realities of the world outside 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue (1983:272).

Because the president expects those aides who are in close
physical proximity to his office to be better informed about his own personal interests than the institutional bureaucracy at Foggy Bottom, the NSC staff is the most logical recipient of his or her trust. As Gelb notes, regardless of the formal power structure in the system, actual power will be vested in those whose political views parallel those of the president (1983:291). It has been observed that officials formerly employed in the State Department, Defense Department, and the CIA tend to act differently when they are a member of the White House staff simply because they are physically closer to the president and know what issues and policies concern White House officials (Gelb 1983:284).

A president may also place more trust in his/her NSC staff because of the nature of the position itself. A member of the NSC staff is appointed by the president, and is not subject to approval by Congress. Because the staffer answers only to the president, and has been selected primarily because the president has respect for his/her abilities, the president is more likely to feel comfortable consulting the NSC staff member.

Additionally, because the NSC staff are not entrenched in the bureaucracy, the president often views them as being more flexible components in the decision-making process (Destler 1983:263), and thus may be more likely to seek options from them on important arms control issues.

Another crucial function performed by the NSC is that of intermediary between the president and the Pentagon. Because the
Pentagon will not cooperate with the State Department on arms control matters, the NSC staff must be the interagency communications link (Gelb 1983:286). This gives the NSC the unique role of coordinator and synthesizer of bureaucratic inputs in the arms control policymaking process.

**National security-department of state conflict.** As has been described above, there are overlapping functions between the State Department and the NSC. As Gelb notes, "While the secretary of state, as head of the senior agency with expertise would be the logical foreign policy leader, it is 'natural' for reasons of propinquity and politics for the NSC advisor to play such a role as well" (1983:295). The NSC actively seeks to usurp the role of the State Department as well. Gelb claims:

...national security advisors and their staffs have tended above all to focus on State Department business and political-strategic relationships--paying considerably less attention to defense and foreign economic questions. This too may reflect presidential inclinations, but it also means that the staff coordinates less, and competes more with State and its secretary (1983:273).

Often the NSC actually serves as a replacement for the State Department in the policymaking process. This, of course, is likely to lead to conflict between the two actors. As has already been indicated, the NSC has had the primary policymaking function in most administrations since the late 1960s. Similarly, there has been conflict among the NSC assistant and other members of the bureaucracy in every administration. One of the most memorable conflicts appeared during the Carter administration between Secretary of State Vance and National
Security Assistant Brzezinski. These two advisers had very different perspectives on international affairs, and different goals for arms control policy. Carter attempted to accommodate the competing advise of both individuals, but often wound up favoring one over the other, often not in a consistent pattern. This did nothing for the credibility of his policies. Such conflicts also occurred in the succeeding Reagan administration. The Office of Research Coordination of the CRS notes that because of serious interagency conflicts and the ensuing confusion of purpose and tactics, the Reagan administration gave the impression that it did not want to negotiate seriously (1988:235).

Although there are unique problems and advantages in relying solely on the State Department or the NSC, there are also difficulties when no attempts are made to forge a cooperative decision-making apparatus. Diehl notes that when bureaucratic components cooperate in policymaking, they can be a positive force. But, when there is conflict and dispute between agencies, "the prospects for arms control is considerably dimmed" (1987:12). Additionally, bureaucratic conflict, particularly when a president relies on the NSC staff, harms the consensus-building mechanisms necessary for the implementation of the arms control agreements that are negotiated.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will be considered,

1Congressional Research Service
for the purposes of this paper, to be an independent factor influencing arms control. This is justified due to the Agency's semi-independent status within the State Department. The 1961 Arms Control and Disarmament Act made the director of the Agency "the principal advisor to the Secretary of State and the President on arms control and disarmament matters" (Clarke 1985:198). However, this status fails to grant the Agency complete autonomy. Clarke notes that although the Agency director has the legal authority to report directly to the president, s/he remains under the direction of the Secretary of State, making the Agency quasi-independent at best (1985:198). Additionally, Clarke explains that the Agency is in no way a mechanical puppet of the State Department. Instead, there is a concerted effort by both parties to coordinate their positions on arms control, contributing to the Agency's "quasi-independence" (1979:111). Because the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has functions which are both distinct and to some degree separate from the duties of the State Department, its effects on arms control will be evaluated as a factor in itself.

As a member of a large government bureaucracy, the ACDA is affected by the actions of other components of the system. Senator Cranston notes that policymaking is a function of the executive branch, and although the ACDA has some responsibility within this branch for formulating arms control policy, it is only one of the elements in the process (1978:205). The president primarily uses senior advisors during important
consultations. The junior status of the ACDA, in addition to the image problems of the Agency which will be discussed later, preclude it from being utilized in these crucial decisions (Clarke 1985:204).

Within the office of the president, the ADCA is dependent upon the structure of the National Security Council for its power to influence arms control policy. This includes placement on various committees, the amount of interagency cooperation, and the president's willingness to conduct arms control negotiations (Clarke 1985:217). Although formally the ACDA director has advisory status in the NSC, this role may be enhanced or limited by the manner in which the system operates under a particular president. Clarke compares the disorganized and confusing national security structure at the onset of the Reagan Administration (1985:212) to the well-organized, coordinated systems of the Ford and Nixon administrations (1985:217), and concludes that there is a relationship between the clarity of organization in the national security council (or lack of) and the ACDA's ability to contribute to policy formulation (or inability). The influence of the ACDA upon the NSC appears to depend upon the structure of the NSC system itself more than its legally designated role.

Often the NSC structure itself is abandoned in presidential decision-making. Final decisions are often made informally by top-level advisors without any direct influence from the ACDA (Clarke 1985:214). The ACDA has no institutional mechanism for
contributing to this type of informal decision. The president is not mandated to solicit the advice of the director. Because the Agency has no real public or congressional constituency, it has no bargaining lever to use to gain influence in the decision-making apparatus. As a result, Clarke claims that "on major, politically sensitive transactions—even in the Carter administration (thought to be the most receptive to the advice of the ACDA)—ACDA's input is usually not considered, at least not on a timely basis" (1985:215).

The president may also effect the role of the ACDA in his/her appointment of directors. For example, President Reagan appointed two directors during his two terms—Eugene Rostow and Kenneth Adelman. Clarke classifies them both as "members of the conservative, global containment, 'rearmament,' anti-SALT group that directed American national security policy during this period" (1985:211). The director is the mouthpiece for the Agency. When s/he is hostile to arms control, or lacks experience (as Rostow did), arms control concerns are less likely to be articulated effectively by the Agency. This diminishes the ACDA's ability to influence policy. On occasion, the ACDA lacks a director. When Reagan first took office, the ACDA had to wait for six months before it obtained a director confirmed by the Senate (Clarke 1985:211). Later, when Rostow was fired, it took another four months before ACDA had a director (Clarke 1985:212). As of the end of April, President Bush has not yet appointed a director for the ACDA. This lack of a credible Agency mouthpiece
may decrease its likelihood of being consulted on important arms control decisions.

Another actor affecting the influence of the ACDA on arms control is the State Department. Jenson notes that the role of the ACDA is circumscribed by the State Department, to which the ACDA is subservient. This limits the ACDA's ability to formulate arms control policy (1988:26). Additionally, within that relationship, ACDA is directed to "manage" negotiations, and the Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations reports to the director, who must consult with the secretary of state before the president is advised of the progress of negotiations (Clarke 1985:202).

The ACDA director does have the legal authority to circumvent the State Department apparatus and confide in the president directly (Clarke 1979:109). For this mechanism to be effective, a cordial relationship must exist between the president and the director. According to Clarke, the only director in the history of the ACDA to have such a relationship with a president was Warnke. This resulted in increased access to the Oval Office and a positive reception with President Carter (1985:204). However, Clarke also notes that Warnke had a close personal relationship with Secretary of State Vance (1985:204). Clarke declines to comment on how the relationship between Warnke and Vance may have facilitated cordiality between Warnke and Carter, but it is possible that Warnke may not have been as effective had Vance's friendship been absent.
Even given a personal friendship between a president and an ACDA director, direct consultation is infrequent. Clarke claims that, in fact, such direct consultation has yet to occur. He argues, "No ACDA director, to my knowledge, has ever seen the president about ongoing negotiations—or any other matter—without first consulting the secretary" (1985:202). The secretary of state is, then, the sieve through which ACDA arms control policies must be filtered before they reach the ear of the president, who is the final executor of all foreign policy.

The ACDA is restricted by the degree of autonomy that the secretary of state chooses to allow it. For instance, Kissinger kept the role of the ACDA strictly supervised, limiting its potential for independent action, while Rogers allowed ACDA a high degree of autonomy in dealing with arms control matters (Clarke 1979:109). Clarke notes that tightening the rein of control over the ACDA "risks stifling the distinctive voice ACDA must have to carry out its mission" (1985:199).

Because the State Department may utilize information on arms control provided by the ACDA, and because ACDA depends on the State Department to channel its findings to the President, both actors benefit from cooperating with each other. If the relationship between the ACDA director and the Secretary of State is negative, the opportunities for cooperation and coordination

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Clarke notes that one reason for the autonomy allowed by Rogers was the fact that Rogers himself was not a strong secretary of state. This contributed to the independence of the ACDA in this period.
are jeopardized (Clarke 1979:109). However, despite its complaints about being excluded from certain executive policy discussions, ACDA and the State Department generally operate in a cooperative atmosphere in most arms control negotiations (Clarke 1985:202). This is the optimal relationship for both actors, with the ACDA providing the State Department with analytical research in exchange for a chance to participate in the formulation of arms control policy.

In addition to relations with the Secretary of State, the ACDA may be affected by its relations with other actors in the executive branch as well. For instance, during the Nixon administration ACDA director Gerard Smith, who is remembered for some of the most productive periods in the history of the ACDA, "eventually resigned over strained relations with Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger" (Clarke 1985:210). This indicates that although a positive relationship with the secretary of state is a necessary prerequisite for an opportunity to play a role in arms control policy-making, it is not sufficient to guarantee that role. Additional actors may present obstacles to ACDA's success. In the Reagan administration's National Security Council of 1982, Richard Burt of the State Department and Richard Perle of the Defense Department were primarily responsible for coordinating the NSC system. Both were critical of arms control and did not provide ACDA with an opportunity to be an influence on U.S. foreign policy (Clarke 1985:217). The ACDA is not able to circumvent the authority of
these other actors because it does not have an outside constituency to lobby on its behalf. Clarke claims that such a constituency "can importantly buttress an agency's clout within the executive branch" (1985:225). The agency's lack of pressure groups renders it incapable of countering opposition to arms control within the executive branch. It must depend upon receptive members of the departments it deals with in order to contribute to arms control.

Despite the limitations on ACDA's ability to be a direct participant in the formulation of policy, the agency is able to indirectly influence arms control by the information that it provides to policymaking groups. The basic role of ACDA appears to be an provider of analytical data. Clarke claims that the analytical capability of the ACDA has led to professionalism in arms control and has allowed it to contribute decisively to several arms control agreements (1985:198). Clarke also identifies testimony from an ACDA scientist, who claims that the conceptual origin for all arms control initiatives is the ACDA, adding that during the Nixon-Ford era of SALT negotiations, ACDA did between 50- and 90 percent of the analysis and paper-writing for the endeavor (1979:115).

Additionally, its research capability allows it to act as a catalyst in the introduction of new ideas and to keep those ideas active in the system (Clarke 1985:203). Because the Agency is a permanent institution which concentrates on one specific aspect of foreign policy--arms control--it brings an element of
continuity to arms control negotiations (Clarke 1979:115). In this respect, ACDA can be seen as the perpetual nagging voice in the bureaucracy demanding that policymakers consider arms control options. The Agency is effective to the extent that the executive branch listens to and acts upon its advice.

Clarke claims that the in-house defense expertise of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency exerts some influence on the formulation of arms control policy for the Agency. He explains: "It combines technical, scientific, economic, and foreign affairs specialists with one of the largest defense systems analysis operations outside the Pentagon. This capability affords ACDA a measure of independence vis-a-vis State and Defense and, to the extent that it is used by policymakers, a degree of influence" (1979:122). The research conducted by ACDA is beneficial to policymakers because it provides them with an objective basis for decision-making. Clarke argues that without the analytical support of the ACDA, there "would not be an effective analytical counterweight to DOD" (1979:125). This prevents the government's approach to arms control from being motivated solely by military concerns. ACDA provides options and alternate viewpoints, which are crucial to informed decision-making. Clarke goes on to claim that: "An administration intent on gutting the agency will surely undercut this capability because, absent a sound analytical base, ACDA is effectively disarmed; it then has little of value to offer other governmental units" (1985:222).

ACDA's research also benefits members of Congress who are
briefed by the Agency regarding the progress of on-going negotiations. ACDA keeps Congress informed through committee hearings, briefings, consultations, and meetings with individual Senators and Congressmen and their staff (ACDA Annual Report 1984:111). This is done through the Office of General Counsel and Congressional Affairs. Additionally, the Agency director claimed to have visited Congress more than 25 times in 1984 (ACDA Annual Report 1984:111). Clarke indicates, "Without ACDA, the quantity and quality of arms control information received by Congress as well as the essential and valuable oversight role of congressional authorizing committees would be sharply reduced" (1985:203). The Agency claims that the communication channel flows both ways—they provide information to Congress and Congress makes recommendations to ACDA about its own arms control goals.

Because the agency must receive information from other components of the bureaucracy in order to synthesize and analyze arms control concerns, it depends on cooperation from those actors for its own influence. Clarke claims that on balance, during bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, "ACDA's access to information directly affecting these negotiations is generally adequate" (1979:104). Specifically, he notes that the cooperation of the CIA has been consistent, particularly because during most of the Agency's first 17 years, at least one of the Agency's high-ranking officers was a former CIA official (1979:106). The ACDA is also able to get information from the
NSC if difficulties occur. Clarke claims that throughout the 1970s, the NSC staff was cooperative in supplying the ACDA with all but the most sensitive information (1979:105).

Not all bureaucratic actors, however, are as receptive to ACDA's requests for information. Because the ACDA is small in size and has the status of a junior actor within the executive branch, it relies on the good will of senior actors for much of its informational resources. Clarke notes, "Information is the grist of the policy process and can be utilized to influence outcomes. Problems arise and hard bargaining frequently results when a department withholds, partially withholds, or delays submission of information deemed vital by another bureaucratic actor" (1979:100). The ACDA's influence on arms control policy, then, may be limited by uncooperative parties within the executive branch. One of these limiting factors is the Department of Defense. The ACDA formally has a Senior Military Advisor who acts as a liaison between its offices and the office of the Secretary of Defense. Despite this, ACDA is seldom given information about the DOD's future defense plans, which is a necessary factor in formulating current and future arms control approaches. Clarke relates an example of an ACDA analyst who was shocked to find that the ACDA did not have a copy of the DOD's Five-Year Defense Plan. Apparently before working for ACDA this analyst had had regular access to the document. Secretary of Defense Laird denied Gerard Smith's request for a copy of the report, and the analyst, working through a network of personal
contacts, had to go to the Pentagon to view it. He was not permitted to take a copy from the building (1979:103). The DOD also excludes ACDA from input on planning for future weapons systems, although this may directly affect ACDA's job in the bureaucracy. Although Congress attempted to remedy this problem by requiring the ACDA to prepare annual Arms Control Impact Statements, the DOD and the ACDA both agree that the statements "have virtually no impact on weapons' decisions, strain interdepartmental relations, and are burdensome, time-consuming, and costly" (Clarke 1985:216). The DOD, then, has the ability to limit the influence of the ACDA by denying it critical information for assessing arms control proposals. It appears that the DOD often utilizes this ability.

Another informational problem ACDA faces is backchannel negotiations. This occurs when the national security advisor or the secretary of state chooses to conduct negotiations in secret, without informing ACDA of the results. Clarke claims that in many of the important breakthroughs in sensitive strategic arms negotiations, the executive exercises his prerogative by conducting the talks on an informal level, without the participation of ACDA (1985:206). Goldberger distinguishes between "technical" and "policy" information, noting that although ACDA usually has access to technical information during on-going negotiations, it may be kept in the dark about policy decisions and developments (1988:104). Backchannel negotiations were particularly prevalent during Kissenger's reign as National
Security Advisor to President Nixon. According to Clarke, Gerard Smith was constantly uninformed of the private meetings between Kissenger and the Soviets which were conducted parallel to the formal negotiations that Smith himself was conducting. Often breakthroughs in SALT happened of which Smith was unaware, although his Soviet counterparts across the bargaining table were (1979:105). This certainly diminished Smith's credibility, and severely restricted the Agency's influence on the arms control process.

The Agency does, however, often play a more significant role in frontchannel negotiations. The role of the ACDA in these negotiations is "management" of the talks on a policy course "directed" by the president and his/her advisors (Clarke 1985:205). The chief negotiator of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Strategic Arms Reduction Talks is generally an employee of ACDA, and through the Agency's director, reports the progress of the talks to the secretary of state and the president (Clarke 1985:205). Although it is possible for a president to choose a separate chief negotiator, the Agency is still always represented in the delegation, and it chairs the SALT /START backstopping committee, thus ensuring the Agency a role in the implementation of policy (Slocombe and Kramer 1985:118). In 1977, Congress created the position of Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations, ranking equally with Deputy Director, to allow a substitute chair of the delegation when the Agency director's duties mandate that s/he remain in Washington.
(Slocombe and Kramer 1985:119). The Ambassador to the INF talks was housed in ACDA as well. The responsibilities of the leader of an arms control delegation include preparing positions for the negotiations (under guidelines established by the president), the actual leading of the delegation, and briefing the President, Secretaries of State and Defense, National Security Council Advisor, NATO, Congress, and other officials (ACDA Annual Report 1984:121). The formal role of ACDA, then, gives the Agency an opportunity to influence arms control when the Director or Special Representative actually chairs the delegation. Slocombe and Kramer claim, "In practice, ACDA's role in most formal negotiations is substantial" (1985:117).

There are other ways in which ACDA influences arms control negotiations. The Agency's Bureau of Strategic Programs is responsible for developing recommendations for arms control strategy and tactics, as well as language for current and future bilateral arms reduction talks (ACDA Annual Report 1984:124). Additionally, ACDA provides legal advisors to negotiating delegations through its Office of General Counsel and Congressional Affairs (ACDA Annual Report 1984:126). The administrative personnel for negotiating delegations is provided by the Agency's Bureau of Strategic Programs, which is also responsible for periodic ABM Treaty Reviews, the Standing Consultation Committee, and diplomatic advisory personnel in ongoing negotiations (ACDA Annual Report 1984:124). This bureau also bears the primary responsibility for consulting with allies,
preparing analyses of military systems and integrating them into the planning process, and monitoring external research contracts on outer space weapons systems, and strategic and theater forces (ACDA Annual Report 1984:124). The Bureau of Verification and Intelligence plans, organizes, and supervises studies on the verifiability of current and proposed treaties (ACDA Annual Report 1984:125) and works on the development of improved means for verification (ACDA Annual Report 1984:10). The Agency also participates in interagency working level groups made up of junior and senior actors which attempt to coordinate positions on ongoing and prospective negotiations (Clarke 1985:214). In addition to chairing negotiating delegations, then, ACDA has a broad range of responsibilities in areas which supplement the arms control process.

ACDA's influence in these areas is often affected by its image. According to Clarke, many in the DOD and the military, as well as congressional conservatives, pejoratively refer to ACDA officials as "arms controllers," and imply that they are "soft" on national security (1985:207). ACDA does not have the constituency to give the Agency the bureaucratic leverage it needs in order to counter these charges. Often, the suspicion aroused by the military or certain conservatives in Congress serves to limit the formal role of ACDA. John Newhouse claims that the distrust that Kissinger and others in the executive branch had of Gerard Smith had an effect on the confidence given to the formal negotiations headed by Smith (Clarke 1979:35).
This distrust may have contributed to Kissinger's extensive use of backchannel negotiations in order to limit the role of ACDA officials. Suspicion of ACDA had done more than simply limit the Agency's negotiating power; twice it has resulted in "purges" which have severely damaged the very operation of the agency itself.

The first purge took place in 1974. According to Clarke, the circumstances following the purge had their roots in congressional disappointment in the first SALT treaty. He claims that there was skepticism about the likelihood of a SALT II agreement, some former supporters of SALT I felt that perhaps the treaty was simply a cover-up for "escalating armament levels," and doubts about the effectiveness of the Agency led to a congressional investigation (1979:33). Jenson claims that the investigation took place at the instigation of Senator Jackson (1988:38), who was so disappointed by SALT I that he proposed the Jackson Amendment (a statement by Congress which specified equal limits on weapons for a future SALT II treaty). During this purge, fourteen high-level ACDA officials were fired as were about one-third of the Agency's personnel (Jenson 1988:51). The budget was also cut sharply. This purge limited ACDA's capacity to conduct research and to participate in policy formulation. Although ACDA eventually recovered from this purge, it was not to be the only occurrence.

The 1981 purge, provoked largely by Senator Jesse Helms, was more devastating than the first (Clarke 1985:210). Not only was
the Agency's budget drastically reduced, but it also suffered a severe depletion in personnel. This personnel shortage "made it hard or impossible to adequately staff and support ongoing negotiations while simultaneously carrying out essential analytical and interagency functions" (Clarke 1985:206). Clarke claims that the morale of the Agency was low, and poor internal management limited its policy role. He cites a General Accounting Office Report which found that between March of 1981 and September of 1982, there were eight organizational redesignations, some of which reversed changes made only a short while before (1985:211). Some of the effects of the purge on the Agency were even more severe.

Some of the results of the massive budget cuts were listed by Clarke:

--The Agency's research budget sank to an all-time low of 1 million
--The elimination of many staff positions
--The Agency's library was moved to the George Washington University (where it could not be recovered for at least five years)
--The Office of Operations Analysis (and computer system) was abolished (1985, p222).

It has been noted that the ACDA's ability to provide information was its chief bargaining lever in the policymakers process. With the diminishing of this ability, ACDA's influence has also been severely diminished.

The question of ACDA's future is still up in the air. In 1983, congressional concern over the Agency led it to appropriate
21 million for the fiscal year 1984, and under pressure in August of that year, the Reagan administration vowed to request an additional 2 million for that fiscal year (Clarke 1985:225). Additionally, the Reagan administration indicated that it planned to phase in 25 more employees over a two-year period (Clarke 1985:225). However, the effects of the changes may not be substantial—the computer facilities alone will cost much more than the original 5 million investment (Clarke 1985:224), and restoration of employees and morale will be slow. It is also not clear how future administrations will choose to utilize ACDA. The influence of ACDA is dependent on the attitudes of others concerning arms control, defense expenditures, the nature of the Soviet Union, and the proper role of the United States in world politics (Clarke 1985:198). Clarke suggests that the ACDA will always be influential up to a certain point, but beyond strictly controlled limits, it would be politically unwise for an administration to become too visibly committed to arms control (1985:198).

**Congress**

**Congressional committees.** Congressional committees are the foundation for the congressional decision-making process. Although a wide range of committees may have a peripheral interest in arms control, the issue is formally in the domain of four committees: the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. Because the two houses of Congress are
constitutionally authorized to perform different tasks, the manner in which they influence arms control also differs. The Senate is empowered with the responsibility of "advice and consent" on treaties, as well as approval of presidential appointments. The House is responsible for approving government expenditures.

Although evaluation of arms control treaties are within the jurisdiction of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, it plays a small role in this process. First, the House Foreign Affairs Committee does not have the political clout of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, perhaps, in part, because members of the House committee cannot vote for the formal ratification of a treaty. Second, the House Foreign Affairs Committee is classified as a "minor committee," which means that its members may serve on other committees as well. This may minimize the amount of time committee members are willing to devote to any issue that they are not obligated to evaluate. Third, according to Spanier and Uslaner, constituents of congresspersons are not as concerned with foreign policy as they are with domestic issues. Elections by district every two years forces congresspersons to be responsive to these concerns. Because a visible profile in the foreign policy arena may lead to accusations of being more interested in the fate of other nations than the people of one's own district, a congressperson is likely to avoid becoming involved in these areas (Spanier and Uslaner 1989:167-169). The main activity of the House Foreign Affairs Committee is foreign
aid legislation, which, Spanier and Uslaner note, is not a salient issue for the mass public (1989:185). It does not appear that the House Foreign Affairs Committee has any significant influence on arms control due to the lack of a formal mechanism to promote influence, and a lack of desire to become involved in foreign policy issues.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in comparison, has a much more active role in formulating arms control policy. The committee has jurisdiction over a wide range of issues, including general arms control and disarmament matters, arms sales, treaties, executive agreements, military and economic assistance programs, and overseeing the activities of the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Clark 1978:100). Additionally, the Foreign Relations Committee has a charter to "study and review, on a comprehensive basis, matters relating to the national security policy ... of the United States" (Clark 1978:100). On occasion, the Foreign Relations Committee may invite members of other committees to participate in hearings related to treaties, it is not obligated to do so. In the case of SALT II, the Senate Armed Services Committee held hearings on the military implications of the treaty, but Senate Majority Leader Byrd did not permit their opposition report to be filed until a year later (Congressional Research Service report 1984:106). The Foreign Relations Committee also holds confirmation hearings on several presidential appointments, including State Department and ACDA officials, as well as the
heads of negotiating delegations. The committee, it appears, has
the formal authority to influence arms control in a significant
manner. However, this authority is dependent upon the degree to
which the committee is willing to exercise it, as well as the
amount of cooperation offered by the executive.

The House and Senate Armed Service Committees are primarily
concerned with military affairs, the defense budget, and arms
exports (Spanier and Uslaner 1989:183-4). They have a reputation
for following the advice of military leaders on issues related to
military strategy and arms control (Seaborg and Loeb 1987:452),
and those who gravitate toward these committees tend to be
classified as conservatives who are supportive of increases in
The reason for this pro-military attitude may be that those
members of Congress with military bases or defense industries in
their state or district seek out assignment to these committees
(Aspin 1978:46; Spanier and Uslaner 1989:188). The role of the
Senate and House Armed Services Committee on the negotiation of
arms control treaties seems to be peripheral: they have no
formal jurisdiction to hold hearings on treaty ratification, and
they appear to be highly influenced by the Pentagon and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on their decision to support (or refusal to
support) a given treaty. Therefore, they are not viewed, for the
purpose of this paper, to be an important independent factor in
influencing arms control.

Congressional mechanisms to influence arms control. In
addition to the activities of individual committees, Congress also has a role, as an entity, in the arms control process. This is particularly true of the Senate, as this chamber is responsible for voting for or against treaty ratification. Acting as a body, Congress has several mechanisms by which to influence arms control.

First, the Senate has several constitutional mechanisms through which they can affect an arms control treaty. These mechanisms revolve around the Senate's responsibility for treaty ratification. Initially, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which has exclusive jurisdiction over treaties, may hold extensive hearings involving a large number of witnesses. However, the influence of the Senate at this point is limited due to indirect control of the process by the executive branch. Although the decision to conduct a hearing is made by the Committee Chairman in consultation with the Ranking Minority Member, the decision is made on the basis of a report written by the State Department which ranks treaty priorities (Congressional Research Service study 1984:107). Although a Committee is not obligated to adhere to these priorities, the State Department's rankings are usually respected. Additionally, the hearings themselves typically involve witnesses from the State Department, which is a component of the executive branch (Congressional Research Service study 1984:108). In this respect, treaty hearings by their very nature serve to limit the power of senators for autonomous actions to influence arms control.
treaties.

The decision to ratify a treaty, however, may be based on more than simply executive testimony. Outside sources of information, in addition to personal opinion, may convince members of the Senate that ratification of the treaty as is would not be in the interests of national security. If this is the case, the Senate has a variety of constitutional mechanisms to express their displeasure with the contents of the treaty:

1. They can vote to amend the text of the treaty, which requires the consent of both nations involved.

2. They can state formal reservations during the ratification process. These reservations change U.S. treaty obligations, although they may not affect the text of the treaty, and require the consent of the other party to the treaty.

3. Senators can construct formal understandings, which are statements that clarify or elaborate on treaty provisions, but do not alter them. This does not require the consent of the other signer of the treaty.

4. They may make formal declarations on the treaty, which are statements that express the position of the Senate on matters relating to the treaty, but that are not directed at the specific contents of the treaty itself. (above from a study prepared by the Congressional Research Service 1984:11.)

Additionally, the Senate has the option of passing a congressional resolution. A resolution is a mechanism which suggests a direction or approach to arms control policy. The problem with this approach is that it lacks the force of law, and administrations are therefore not obligated to listen to this form of advice. Additionally, because the executive frequently conducts negotiations in secret, Congress may not be aware of the manner in which their suggestions may contradict current U.S.
arms control policy (Cranston 1978:208-209).

It appears that if Congress is completely at odds with current arms control policy, it can adopt a constitutional mechanism which requires renegotiation of the treaty. Usually a president will not submit a treaty to Congress if s/he suspects that this level of discontent with the content of the treaty exists.

If senators simply desire that a treaty be adhered to in a certain manner, they may adopt the constitutional mechanisms mentioned above which are not binding upon the executive. Although these may appear to be alternatives which have no real impact upon U.S. interpretation of the treaty, it must be remembered that adherence to all arms control agreements is the sole responsibility of the Senate (Cranston 1978:212). In this respect, Congress has a significant opportunity to shape the obligations of arms control treaties. The key word here is opportunity. Although Congress has a variety of mechanisms with which to influence arms control, their use is dependent upon the will of the Senate.

Members of Congress are often used as advisors and observers of delegates to arms control negotiations. The use of congresspersons for this purpose began in 1977 with President Carter, who first appointed members of Congress to advise the U.S. SALT delegation (Jenson 1988:38). Since that time, members of both the House and the Senate are routinely used in this capacity for all major treaties treaties (Congressional Research
Service study 1984:104; Jenson 1988:38; Talbott 1979:95). The effectiveness of this type of mechanism in influencing arms control appears to be limited, however. Talbott notes that congressional advisors appeared to have little substantive impact on the progress and direction of the negotiations (1979:95). He does note one exception, it which members of Congress insisted upon Soviet compliance in the matter of an "agreed data base" for the purpose of treaty verification. Although the Soviets were unwilling initially, congressional lobbying evoked a change in their position on this matter (Talbott 1979:95-96). Although Talbott gives no explanation for this isolated incident of congressional influence on Soviet negotiators, one reason may be that the Soviets feared that congressional concern over verification would uniquely jeopardize treaty ratification. On most matters of negotiating strategy, the Soviet and American negotiators may perceive that the resulting treaty could be "sold" to the Senate if accompanied by the appropriate information and testimony. As Cranston notes, although congressional presence at arms control negotiations may serve to provide members of Congress with more information on the negotiations and more interest in the process, it does not give them a voice at the bargaining table itself (1978:210). In fact, the typical result of having congressional involvement in arms control negotiations is that it increases the prospects for bipartisan support and minimizes the likelihood that the treaty will be challenged (Jenson 1988:38). In other words, by giving
Congress a minor role in the arms control process, a president can coopt those who may oppose the treaty for a very small price. In this respect, congressional advisors and observers to arms control negotiations may actually serve to decrease the ability of Congress to influence arms control.

Another opportunity which can be utilized by Congress, in this case the Senate, to influence the course of arms control is confirmation hearings. Jenson notes that because the Senate has the power to confirm top-level arms control negotiators, it may have some leverage for influencing arms control. The example he cites is the confirmation hearing of Paul Warnke as director of the ACDA. Because some members of Congress were not enthusiastic about the direction of Carter's arms control policy, they indicated to the president that Warnke would not be confirmed unless he promised them that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would play a greater role in the negotiations (Jenson 1988:35). In this manner, Congress may use confirmation hearings to extract agreements from the president on the negotiation of arms control. Additionally, the ease or difficulty with which an important figure in arms control is confirmed sends a signal to the president. If the vote is close, or if the appointment is not approved, the president should view it as a warning that Congress is not supportive of the direction of arms control negotiations and may not ratify any resulting treaties. If the appointment is easily approved, the president may be able to interpret the decision as indicating that the Senate trusts his/her choice of
that particular negotiator, and may have few objections to the current course of arms control negotiations (Talbott 1979:56; Cranston 1978:210-211). Confirmation hearings, then, may be a mechanism through which Congress can mold the parameters of treaty negotiations, even if they are not present in the negotiating delegation itself.

Senators may also use confirmation hearings as a vehicle to obtain information on treaty negotiations. One example of this is Paul Nitze's confirmation hearing for the position of Ambassador while he served as head to the U.S. delegation to the INF negotiations. In this hearing, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held open and closed sessions with Nitze on the status of current treaty negotiations (Congressional Research Service study 1984:95). A problem facing this mechanism for congressional influence is the use of persons who are not confirmed by the Senate to negotiate arms control agreements (such as the national security assistant). When an unconfirmed negotiator is used, Congress is denied the opportunity to gather information on the qualifications and negotiating strategy of the individual, and is prevented from signalling to the president its expectations for arms control.

Congress may also influence arms control through related actions which may indicate their confidence level with respect to the president's foreign policy. For instance, Cranston notes that in March of 1977, a large number of senators sent a letter to President Carter supporting his human rights position.
Cranston interprets: "This action can be seen as a step toward a general foreign policy consensus that would support the president in future major initiatives such as a SALT II treaty" (1978:211). Other such actions include the 1983 House resolution banning funding for ASATs despite the wishes of President Reagan; the 1987 House defense authorization bill which banned spending for the deployment of nuclear weapons beyond the SALT II limits that President Reagan intended to abandon; and the 1987 House ban on ASAT testing (Jenson 1988:36). These actions, which may seem unrelated to current treaty negotiations, are an indication to the president that Congress is dissatisfied with progress on arms control negotiations, and may intend to take autonomous action, if necessary, to promote congressional arms control goals. At a minimum, these actions can be seen as votes of "no confidence" on current arms control policy. The Jackson Amendment to the SALT I treaty can also be seen as an action unrelated to SALT I, but with the intent of signalling a loss of confidence with Nixon's arms control policy at that time. The purpose of the Jackson Amendment was to warn the negotiators of a future SALT II treaty of congressional expectations. Frye notes: "Seemingly innocuous on its face, the Jackson Amendment was a sophisticated maneuver to enhance the leverage which he and the Armed Services Subcommittee on SALT would have on future strategic arms negotiations" (1974:98).

Congress may also use its power to strengthen the voice of government agencies to influence the direction of arms control
negotiations. For instance, in the 1970s Congress created the Office of Technology Assessment and the Congressional Budget Office to provide them with in-depth information on weapons systems, and also attempted to expand the capabilities of the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress in order to expand their ability to investigate weapons programs (Platt 1978:4). Implementing such changes would provide Congress with more leverage in arms control because it enhanced congressional ability to evaluate weapons systems and their effects on national security. Congress was more able to make more informed choices on the defense budget, and also in ratifying arms control agreements.

Congress also has the option of changing the statutory charter of the ACDA to allow it a stronger voice in arms control negotiations (Cranston 1978:207). This would probably change the character of the negotiations due to the expanded power of a pro-arms control actor.

Another area of congressional control which has the potential to affect arms control policy is the defense budget. Platt claims:

It is clear that the framers of the Constitution intended this power of the purse to be used extensively with regard to defense. Besides the appropriations clause, Article I provides that Congress shall "provide for the common defense," and Articles 12, 13, and 14 give Congress the power "to raise and support armies," "to provide and maintain a navy," and "to make rules for the government and regulation of land and naval forces" (1978:14).

These responsibilities seem to indicate that Congress controls
defense policy through the authorization of military expenditures and the regulation thereof. Cranston claims: "Congress has the most influence over arms policymaking in the area of weapons procurement. Through its annual defense budget, Congress can to some extent codify the overall strategy governing the acquisition and deployment of weapons systems" (1978:206). However, he notes: "...the idea of integrating arms control considerations into defense policy decisions has not been in any sense a significant factor" (Cranston 1978:206). Additionally, Congress has a reputation for approving the executive's proposed defense budget without making any major additions or subtractions (Aspin 1978:43; Platt 1978:5). It appears that although Congress may possess a mechanism to control defense policy and to also shape arms control, it does not attempt to utilize it effectively. This is not solely because of a lack of ambition on the part of the Congress. Often, by the time a new weapons system comes up for consideration in Congress, the bureaucratic momentum has taken hold, and the added support of the defense contractors and unions involved in the project serve to push it along (Aspin 1978:54). Aspin also notes that the military often determines the necessity of a certain weapons system long before Congress ever sees the specific budget items (1978:54). Because the military and the bureaucracy, as well as outside interest groups, are committed to a weapons system very early, politically it becomes very difficult for Congress to reject its development, whatever congressional arms control concerns may be.
In the 1980s, Congress began to use its power over defense expenditures to pressure the executive to adopt a more positive attitude toward arms control. This approach utilized weapons systems as a bargaining chip to gain executive concessions on arms control proposals. Jenson notes that the build-down approach to START was a result of 45 senators cosponsoring a resolution advocating the approach and making it clear that their support of the MX missile was dependent upon Reagan's adoption of their proposal (1988:221). In April of 1983 many congresspersons and senators, both Democrats and Republicans, tied the fate of the MX missile to "signs of increased 'flexibility' and 'seriousness' in the administration's attitude toward arms control" (Garfinkle 1984:190). Reagan agreed to the approach insisted upon by Congress because of his advocacy of the MX (Jenson 1988:37). As a result, "arms control enthusiasts in Congress have apparently been handed a club to wield each time a vote arises on MX funding in the future" (Van Cleave 1984:19). This example illustrates how powerful of a mechanism control of the defense budget can be if Congress chooses to exercise its authority. It is possible that the bargaining chip strategy will be used more frequently in the future due to its success in pushing a president who was perceived as reluctant to the negotiating table.

How congressional concerns may affect executive actions. In addition to actual congressional actions affecting arms control, the known concerns of Congress may affect executive behavior as
well. Cranston notes: "A prudent administration... will have
taken into account what the Senate is or is not likely to accept.
That is the greatest opportunity for congressional influence"
(1978:212). Because the executive perceives members of Congress
as having certain expectations for an arms control treaty, they
may wish to meet some of these expectations in order to get the
treaty ratified. One example of this is the negotiating posture
of Carter and Brezhnev on SALT II. Because it was perceived that
Congress expected reductions more significant than the original
Vladivostok levels, the two leaders committed themselves to
cutting Vladivostok ceilings by 17 to 25 percent (Frye 1978:22).
Additionally, General Rowny claims that the original START
proposal was preferred by the Reagan administration, but the
build-down proposal was adopted to placate Congress (Jenson
1988:37).

A president may also attempt to meet the request of certain
influential senators in order to ensure ratification of a treaty.
Because in a Congress of 535 members it only takes 34 senators to
block the ratification of a treaty, it is important that no
influential individual is opposed to the treaty (Miller 1984:83).
Throughout the 1970s, Senator Henry Jackson was one of the most
important members of the Senate, and he attempted to use his
power to shape the nature of the treaties negotiated during that
period. For these reasons, he may be viewed as a model for the
type of opposition a president may have to anticipate and placate
in Congress. Neustadt and May explain:
Jackson was not just a human being, he was a United States Senator. Carter and his aides would have done well to think of him as, for practical purposes, a small but powerful foreign country, with his own independent interests and his own equivalent of government departments (1986:202).

Neustadt and May claim that it should have been a high priority of Carter's to negotiate with Jackson while they negotiated with Brezhnev, "for advance concessions to either would doom the treaty" (1986:202). This seems to indicate that a president should anticipate the nature of the complaints of his/her strongest opposition, and then attempt to address these complaints during the negotiation of the treaty. Jackson is not an isolated example, but a typical one. Although Senator Jackson did not survive to trouble the Reagan administration, Senators Cohen, Nunn, Gore, and Dicks forced changes in the START negotiations policy in much the same manner. A president should be prepared to listen to and negotiate with political opposition in the Senate, or to coopt the senators by permitting them limited involvement in the treaty formulation process. Without this anticipation of congressional concern, an arms control treaty may not be ratified.

One issue which concerns all members of Congress is the verification of an arms control treaty. To the extent that congressional concern about verification is voiced, the executive is likely to ensure that adequate means to detect cheating are explicit in the treaty. Failure of the executive to meet such congressional expectations will probably risk the ratification of the treaty. Talbott notes that that during the SALT II
negotiations, congressional advisors warned the negotiating delegation that they would oppose the treaty if it was not completely verifiable (1979:192). He argues that throughout the history of SALT, a major concern has always been meeting congressional expectations of verifiability, which became more difficult throughout the 1970s as Congress became increasingly skeptical (Talbott 1979:109).

Problems in congressional influence. Most of the mechanisms cited in this section require action by a cohesive House and Senate. However, in practice, cohesion is difficult to achieve due to the fragmentation of responsibility among various committees (Cranston 1978:209) and the ideological differences between the members of Congress themselves. This is a barrier to the effective use of Congressional mechanisms to influence arms control.

Another problem faced by Congress in its attempt to influence arms control policy is a lack of information. Frye explains: "...for congressmen to be consistently effective on complex questions of arms control, they must have multiple avenues of access to information..." (1978:24). Yet, the prime source of information for most persons in Congress remains the executive branch. Dine points out:

Control of information means control of policymaking. The executive branch, with a foreign policy-defense-intelligence community of four and a half million people, has monopolized the collection, analysis, and control of data (1978:64).

Congressional power to influence arms control can therefore be
limited by an executive branch which chooses to be uncooperative about information-sharing. According to Cranston, Congress often has to operate in a vacuum, without access to vital information, and relegated to ineffectiveness in policymaking attempts (1978:209).

One attempt to remedy this lack of Congressional information sources was the legislation which required the ACDA to submit annual arms control impact statements. The goal of these statements was to provide Congress with information on weapons systems from an arms control perspective (Cranston 1978:206). The ACIS, however, is widely regarded as ineffective in providing vital information. Cranston explains:

The law merely calls for a statement on the general impact of the weapons system on "arms control policy and negotiation." It does not require specific information on what effect a particular weapons system may have, for example, on SALT or on prospects for control of conventional arms transfers. Nor does it offer detailed guidelines on the information that would be most useful (1978:206).

Due to the inadequacy of information provided by government sources, Congress has turned to private organizations such as the Arms Control Association, the Federation of American Scientists, Members of Congress for Peace through Law, the Council for a Livable World, and the Center for Defense Information for detailed information and expert witnesses to testify about arms control and national security policies (Platt 1978:5; Frye 1978:30). As outside resources increase congressional knowledge on arms control issues, it is expected that congressional participation in arms control policymaking will also increase.
Military

The "military" is often used as a collective term to describe the actions and motivations of those in the armed services and the Department of Defense. It is difficult, however, to evaluate to the collective interests of such a group because the "military" is not a cohesive entity. In this section, I will evaluate how each of the three components of the military serves to influence arms control.

One component of the military is the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This group includes the highest ranking officer from each branch of the service, and a chair appointed by the president. The chair of the JCS has advisory status in the National Security Council, and is usually represented in some fashion at all NSC meetings (Barrett 1985:129). Acting as a body, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) serve as the principal military advisor to the president (Barrett 1985:130). According to Kegley and Wittkopf, the JCS have several duties:

As a body, the joint chiefs are responsible, among other things, for preparing strategic plans and providing strategic and operational direction to the armed forces, and for advising the secretary of defense on military requirements as they relate to budget making, military assistance programs, industrial mobilization plans, and programs of scientific research and development. They are assisted in their tasks by a joint staff comprising some 400 officers selected from each branch of the armed forces (1987:385).

Because the JCS have a great capacity to influence defense strategy, they are also accorded a great amount of influence in evaluating arms control because, in part, they are perceived to
be experts on the strategic requirements of national security. This power to influence arms control is particularly evident in the ratification process of an arms control treaty. Moorer explains: "It is fair to say that Congress will not ratify or consent to ratification of a treaty dealing with military matters if the Joint Chiefs of Staff don't support it. I think every president is sensitive to that" (1987:75; also mentioned in Seaborg and Loeb 1987; Clarke 1979; Panofsky 1979; Neustadt and May 1986; Fox 1982). A wise president will elicit JCS support for a treaty well before ratification (Fox 1982:53; Neustadt and May 1986:131). When the JCS find themselves in opposition to the president, they can rely on the support of congressional allies to support their position. Because it is usually assumed that the JCS has the capability to collect the needed votes in the Senate to defeat a treaty, the president is often forced to bargain with the joint chiefs for their support (Seaborg and Loeb 1987:452; Panofsky 1979:56). Fox notes: "That the joint chiefs... can charge a price for their support is obvious and a great source of strength in the bureaucratic politics of national security policy-making" (1982:54).

The traditional price charged by the joint chiefs for their support of an arms control treaty has been increased defense spending in areas not involved in the treaty. In order to obtain support for the SALT I treaty, Nixon offered to fund the testing and deployment of MIRVs (Seaborg and Loeb 1987:452; Neustadt and May 1986:131). Such measures were also taken to secure the joint
chiefs' support for SALT II. Talbott explains:

...the prospective sacrifice of the MX and the qualified acceptance of the Soviet definition of the Backfire as a medium, nonstrategic bomber--disgruntled the JCS when they found out about them. Later, when Brzezinski was asked why the comprehensive proposal had given the military more than it had asked for on cruise missile range, he replied that it was "the only way to get the Chiefs on board" the entire proposal (1979:61).

In the end, the JCS was able to get funding for the MX missile project--to the tune of approximately 50 billion (Seaborg and Loeb 1987:452).

The bargaining power of the JCS is substantial. This permits them an important role in the formulation of arms control policy. As a result of their contribution to the policy making process, the JCS is able to shape treaties to safeguard their interests. Once the negotiations are concluded, the JCS tends to support the ratification of the treaty, although a price may be demanded for such support.

Another component of the military is the officers in the armed services. Because of their expertise in matters which are directly affected by arms control, such as the actual operation of weapons systems, they are accorded a measure of influence in the arms control process (Jenson 1988:30). This influence manifests itself in what Kegley and Wittkopf refer to as the "military-congressional alliance." This alliance involves the connections of high level military officers to influential members of Congress, particularly those members in the four military committees (Kegley and Wittkopf 1987:383; Jenson 1988:30). This alliance, on occasion, has allowed the armed
services to promote policies and programs which are not supported by the civilian leadership in the Pentagon (Kegley and Wittkopf 1987:383). However, the alliance may be a detriment to the military in that the rivalries between the services may result in fragmented and contradictory demands (Kegley and Wittkopf 1987:383).

Fragmentation occurs because, ultimately, each branch of the service is attempting to justify its own existence. This means that "the Air Force will always lobby for bombers, the Army for tanks" (Berkowitz 1987:28). In arms control, as each branch of the service attempts to protect its own weapons systems, it may eagerly support measures which would affect the weapons systems of the other branches (Jenson 1988:31). Because the armed services, particularly in matters of weapons curtailment, may not be able to form a cohesive group with well-defined demands, their influence on arms control may be diminished.

In recent years, the influence of the armed services has declined as the power of the Secretary of Defense has increased, according to Kegley and Wittkopf (1987:383). The Department of Defense is considered to be an important source of power in influencing arms control (Clarke 1985:218; Kegley and Wittkopf 1987:382). One reason for this is because, as Clarke explains: "The Defense Department maintains a distinct 'sovereignty' over weapons and defense programs, although several of them relate directly or indirectly to current or future arms control and foreign policy issues" (1985:215). When conflicts arise between
the JCS and the Pentagon, the interests of the Secretary of State are usually accommodated (Moorer 1987:74). This attests to the power structure within the military: the Secretary of State rests atop the structure, the JCS is found in the middle layer, and at the bottom lies the armed services.

The progress of arms control negotiations is not likely to be aided by the Secretary of State. Clarke notes that the Pentagon "is sometimes cautiously supportive of arms control measures," however, "neither by mission nor by disposition is DOD inclined to be the driving force for movement in the arms control field" (1985:200). Like the JCS, the Secretary of Defense may demand increased defense spending in return for support of an arms control agreement (Kegley and Wittkopf 1987:389; Seaborg and Loeb 1987:452). Because the Secretary of Defense plays such a key role in the formulation of arms control policy, the substance of agreements may be shaped by his/her desire to maintain existing weapons programs, and to leave options open for the development of future systems. The result may be that the arms control treaties which are ratified are those which do not create radical changes in force structure or military policy. Treaties are more likely to impose minor changes on existing programs, while military spending is simply shifted to other weapons programs.

As an entity, all components of the military appear to approach arms control cautiously, demanding increased defense spending in exchange for their support of a treaty. The result
is that changes in composition of the nuclear arsenal, and in national security policy in general, are likely to be incremental.

SOCIETAL FACTORS

Elite opinion

Political elites are those individuals who tend to set the agenda for government policy. Since World War II, Dorman claims that the power of elites has become entrenched in the political system (1986:261). Elite attitudes are viewed as consistent, and resistant to change. Johnson claims that major prodding from activists among the masses is a necessary factor in promoting a shift in elite attitudes (1987:252). Elite opinion, then can be viewed as a factor which exists in the political system and may have an influence on arms control.

The difficulty in evaluating this factor is that there is no cohesive, clearly defined group that can be designated as "the elite opinion makers." Some individuals and groups who may be classified as political elites support arms control; other such groups are opposed.

Some authors perceive the political elites to be a voice which opposes arms control and refers to the Soviet Union as "the evil Empire" (Johnson 1987:251). Johnson claims: "Since 1947, no foreign policy opinion held by elites and masses has been as consistent and potent as hostility toward the Soviet Union (1987:250). Others claim that political elites are forces which
work for arms control (Hadstedt 1988; Mosher et al. 1987; O'Neill and Schwartz 1987), often to the detriment of U.S. interests (Van Cleave 1984; Wessell 1984). Van Cleave explains:

National political leaders...reinforce the political pressures on themselves; pressures that lead them to extol arms control, accommodate to achieve agreements, and then pretend that bad arms control is good arms control. Those same pressures are then brought to oppose necessary defense programs and their proper funding (1984:14).

It appears clear that there is no cohesive ideology binding together the elites in the political system. It is expected that political elites, as a structure, have no significant influence on arms control policy. Diehl concurs with this analysis: "A split among elites over arms control policy prevents the consensus needed to formulate a coherent arms control policy and an enlightened bargaining strategy" (1987:12).

Public opinion

Although public opinion is recognized as a legitimate factor in government policymaking, it is difficult to evaluate the effect of public opinion on arms control. One reason for this is that arms control is not a salient issue in the mind of the public (Diehl 1987:8; Panofsky 1979:14). The concerns arms control attempts to address are far removed from the everyday lives of most individuals. Surveys conducted during 1980 and 1981 by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center and the Gallup Organization found that less than 10 percent of the adult population in the U.S. mentioned the threat of war when asked to name the most important problem they perceived to be facing the
country (Schuman et al. 1986:520). It has been suggested that the reason the public does not perceive the threat of war to be important is that most people are more concerned about problems which have a more immediate effect on their lives (Schuman et al. 1986:520; Panofsky 1979:14; Seaborg and Loeb 1987:455). Because the public does not perceive the threat of nuclear war as an immediate and serious concern, it is not likely that they will exert prolonged pressure on policymakers to reduce this threat.

Typically, citizens do not critically evaluate their thoughts on arms control; instead, they tend to support the positions endorsed by the political leaders with whom they agree on other issues (Seaborg and Loeb 1987:455). Most people do not understand what factors make war more likely (Diehl 1987:8), nor do they know what types of weapons should be limited in order to prevent the threat of nuclear war (Diehl 1987:8). The inability to evaluate the need for arms control in an analytical fashion may prevent the public from forming deeply-held opinions in this area. And, the absence of deeply-held convictions precludes consistency in public opinion.

Over time, public opinion on arms control is shifting and contradictory. The causes for this inconsistency are unclear. One possible explanation is that public opinion changes when the U.S.-Soviet relationship changes. Miller suggests: "...public attitudes towards defense and arms control are schizophrenic. Put most simply, the public fears both nuclear war and the Soviet Union, and the political climate of the moment is determined by
which of these fears is predominant" (1984:87). The National Academy of Sciences concurs with this analysis, explaining:

"Public support for arms control has been closely linked with the varying fortunes of the U.S.-Soviet political relationship" (1985:22). Throughout the 1970s, the American public has been viewed as anti-militaristic due to the disillusion suffered after Vietnam and Watergate. It is argued that U.S.-Soviet relations were fostered by this desire to curtail the power of the military establishment (Morris 1988:300). The Christian Science Monitor claimed that by the 1980s, public opinion became more militaristic and anti-Soviet, with 58 percent of those polled by the NBC News supporting increased defense spending and 62 percent favoring the return of the military draft (Office of Research Coordination, CRS:1988:154). Blacker attributes the election victory of Reagan's 1980 campaign against the SALT II treaty as a symbol of the popular decline of U.S.-Soviet relations (1987:99).

Berkowitz, however, attributes the inconsistency of public opinion to changes in defense spending. He claims:

...each time defense spending began to rise, public support for cutting defense spending also began to rise... Four decades of experience suggests that the United States simply will not support annual defense budgets much above 260 billion for any length of time --regardless of whether or not the Soviets violate an agreement (1987:85).

The time frame for each cycle of public opinion, according to Berkowitz, is five or six years (1987:84). Although Berkowitz's model claims that public opinion will be shifted by military spending regardless of the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is
possible that the underlying causes of both military spending and political "detente" are related. This, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

Whatever the cause, public opinion changes over time. These changes manifest themselves in various ways. The public is generally regarded as simultaneously favoring both attempts at military superiority and the negotiation of an arms control agreement (Blacker 1987:147; Paine 1986:278; Miller 1984:87). Because the implementation of both of these options is often not politically feasible, the public can be viewed as lacking consistent support for arms control negotiations.

Inconsistency is also present when the public does profess specific support for arms control. CBS and *The New York Times* conducted a survey during the peak of the nuclear freeze campaign and discovered that 77 percent of the public supported a nuclear freeze in principle, yet only 25 percent said they would favor a freeze if it did not stop the Soviet Union from deploying weapons (Berkowitz 1987:80). Additionally, 66 percent of the people in the CBS/*New York Times* survey suspected that the Soviet Union would cheat on an arms control agreement if given the opportunity (Berkowitz 1987:80). This conclusion has also been supported by a poll conducted for the Committee on the Present Danger (Adelman 1984:244), in addition to research by Talbott (1979:31). The effect of this attitude, according to Berkowitz, is: "If an arms control proposal is exposed to public scrutiny for any length of time, the debate will reveal any flaws in it. Those flaws drain
support, so that the arms control proposal that American democracy favors today will be the one it rejects tomorrow" (1987:80). Arms control appears to be a short-term public interest which will ultimately lose its appeal in the long term.

The effect of public opinion on arms control is minimal. One reason for this is that such opinion is inconsistent, and cannot provide constant, long-term pressure on policymakers (Diehl 1987:9). Also, because the public has little knowledge of weapons systems and their strategic implications, public pressure may lack the credibility to warrant sufficient attention (Diehl 1987:8).

If public opinion is strongly in favor of arms control at a given moment in time, it can stimulate a government decision to return to the negotiating table (Diehl 1987:8; Sloss and Davis 1987:34). An example of this power was Reagan's re-opening of the START talks after the nuclear freeze movement gained momentum, although many officials in his administration believed such a move would be contrary to U.S. interests (Diehl 1987:9). Once arms control negotiations have been entered, however, public opinion ceases to function as an influential factor because it is not powerful enough to affect the content or the timing of an agreement (Diehl 1987:8-10).

Media

The mainstream media is the primary source of information about arms control for the vast majority of Americans. The images these media presents, then, may influence the manner in
which the public perceives arms control. According to columnist Tom Wicker, an associate editor of the New York Times, the character of news policy is controlled by the League of Gentlemen, a group of owners and managers of the press institution who have a tendency to support government policy (Dorman 1986:269). Dorman claims that the nature of reporting on arms control and other policy matters consistently fits into a pattern which supports rather than questions official policy. He explains:

There is compelling evidence that the news media have consistently gone along with Washington's overstatements of Soviet strength and military spending, generally supported increases in U.S. military spending, and usually questioned the deployment of new weapons systems only on the basis of whether they are sound investments (1986:262).

As a result of this tendency to support the official policy line, the mainstream media present a consistent set of images to the general public upon which later perceptions of the merits of arms control may be based. In late 1983, the Gallup organization conducted a study to determine the attitudes of journalists toward arms control. They found that while 81 percent of journalists surveyed favored an agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union freezing the testing and deployment of nuclear weapons, only four percent answered "the nuclear arms race" when asked what they considered to be the most important problem facing the country (Dorman 1986:267). This may be indicative of the degree of emphasis placed on the importance of arms control in the mainstream media. Additionally, when journalists do
report on arms control, critical analysis is usually left out of the picture. According to Robert Karl Manoff, an editor and journalist:

The press may reflect and give vent to domestic differences over negotiating strategies, but when it comes to discussing the details and rationales of the other side's position, independent reporting stops at the water's edge (Dorman 1986:265).

Because journalists do not attempt to present arms control in an impartial manner, unflattering images of the Soviet Union develop. Dorman claims: "Soviet leaderships is routinely portrayed in the darkest of terms, and the bleakest motives are habitually ascribed to Soviet behavior" (1986:262). Kennan specifically claims that the news media presents an "endless series of distortions and oversimplifications," and is responsible for the "systemic dehumanization of the leadership of another great country" and the "monotonous misrepresentation of the nature and attitudes of another great people" (Dorman 1986:263). This image is not only perpetuated by journalists; the entertainment media also paint the same dehumanizing portrait of the Soviet Union for American viewers. As Johnson notes, "The box-office success of current anti-Soviet combat films such as Rambo attests to the continued popularity of Soviet-bashing" (1987:251).

The effect of these unflattering images may be detrimental to the prospects for concluding an arms control agreement. Kennan notes:

The view of the Soviet Union that prevails today in large portions of our governmental and journalistic
establishments is so extreme, so subjective, so far from what any sober scrutiny of external reality would reveal, that is not only ineffective but dangerous as a guide to political action (Dorman 1986:263).

The interpretation of a particular agreement is usually done in such a way as to discredit the motives of the Soviet Union (Dorman 1986:262). This does not facilitate public support for arms control.

Media attention can be disruptive to arms control in other ways, as well. Adelman claims that the very act of observation of arms control agreements by the media changes the nature of the negotiations. He uses the term "Hawthorne effect" to describe this phenomenon (Adelman 1984:243). The "Hawthorne effect" is used to refer to a group of individuals who deviate from their normal pattern of behavior when they are aware that their actions are being observed. Adelman argues that the amount of attention placed on arms control negotiations by the media reduces the effectiveness of such talks (1984:243). Specifically, Secretary of State Holmes claims:

...it is clear that today's degree of publicity is not a neutral element in negotiations. It can influence the choice of positions on both sides; it can limit the degree of nuance which is possible; it can hinder the ability to explore options (1986:5).

This decrease in negotiating flexibility due to media coverage, as Holmes indicates, is not conducive to the conclusion of a mutually acceptable arms control treaty.

The media may also affect public expectations of arms control negotiations. Excessive media attention to a summit may
raise the level of public expectations, and encourage the participants in the negotiations to "play to the headlines" (Weihmiller 1987:111). This type of political posturing, as Weihmiller notes, does not promote "effective discussion and communication" (1987:111).

**Interest groups**

For the purpose of this paper, an interest group will be defined as any group of individuals who have an interest in arms control policy and attempt to influence the formulation of that policy. There are large numbers of such groups in existence in the United States today, each with its own set of goals. This paper will investigate the mechanisms used to promote the goals of interest groups, but not the goals themselves. My intent is to discover the ways in which interest groups may influence the arms control process.

One mechanism used by interest groups to influence arms control policy is *campaign funding*. Groups make contributions to certain senators and representatives in order to keep in office those legislators who may support their goals. A wide variety of interest groups make campaign contributions to influence the nature of arms control policy. Some of these groups include: unions who are involved in defense-industry work; political action committees representing defense contractors; military interest groups such as the Navy League and the National Guard Association; organizations with a solely conservative agenda such as the National Conservative Political Action Committee; and
organizations with as decidedly liberal bent such as the Council for a Livable World. These groups raise millions of dollars for the reelection campaigns of legislators who can help promote their agendas. Those groups who oppose arms control tend to spend more money to fund legislative campaigns than those groups which support arms control. For instance, the American Security Council, a group which opposes arms control efforts, by itself has expenditures which surpass those of interest groups supporting arms control (Clarke 1979:159). Although such campaign contributions by conservative groups cannot elect a Congress opposed to arms control, they can help to ensure the election of a legislator who is receptive to their views. Interest groups with an agenda directed specifically at arms control know that alone, they cannot influence policy. They contribute to election campaigns to provide themselves the support of an individual who can play an influential role.

Interest groups may also influence policy to the extent that individuals within these groups may be selected for positions in the policymaking establishment. Parenti notes that policymakers and advisors are often drawn from the ranks of such policy groups as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Trilateral Commission, the Committee for Economic Development, the Business Council, and the Business Roundtable (1989:196). Parenti claims that at times, these groups have "virtually monopolized the membership of the National Security Council" (1989:197). For instance, President Ford appointed 14 members of the CFR to his
administration (Parenti 1989:196), President Carter appointed 17 members of the Trilateral Commission, including himself and vice-president Mondale (Parenti 1989:196), and President Reagan hired 30 CFR members as advisors, in addition to a dozen CFR members placed in top administrative positions such as Alexander Haig and George Shultz (Parenti 1989:197).

The Committee on the Present Danger, founded in 1976 to oppose SALT II and to warn of the impending Soviet-military buildup, found more than one-sixth of its 182 members appointed to leading positions in the Reagan administration, some of which were in the area of arms control (Office of Research Coordination, CRS 1988:82). The most well-known member of the Committee on the Present Danger is Paul Nitze, who, through his efforts to prevent the ratification of SALT II in 1979, earned "the political credentials for a job with Ronald Reagan" (Freedman 1988:28). It appears that established foreign-policy interest groups are fertile recruiting grounds for government employees.

The primary contribution made by interest groups to the arms control process lies in their ability to act as information sources for Congress (Clarke 1979:164). Clarke claims that in the aftermath of the ABM treaty, members of Congress were no longer willing to rely on solely the executive branch for information, and they turned to other organizations for advice and analysis on national security issues (1979:164).

An example of how an interest group can influence members of
Congress can be seen in the activities of the Arms Control Association (hereafter referred to as ACA). The ACA's activities are typical of interest groups with an arms control agenda, whether the group is opposed to or in support of arms control measures. ACA is a nonprofit, tax-exempt organization which does not formally consider itself to be a lobby (Clarke 1979:163). However, among its own membership, ACA is perceived as an interest group. Its members offer advice to members of Congress upon request, and are in frequent contact with friends in the House and Senate. The executive director may have informal phone conversations with individual legislators several times a week. These contacts may influence the position legislators take on arms control issues (Clarke 1979:164). ACA does not only interact directly with Congress, but it is also involved in public education through conferences and symposiums in the U.S. and abroad, press briefings, university speakers, and interviews on radio and television (Clarke 1979:163). Additionally, ACA members have assisted in the drafting of legislation affecting the ACDA through consultation with Congressman Zablocki (Clarke 1979:164). Through these activities, ACA is able to influence policy by promoting public awareness and providing members of Congress with information used to make decisions affecting arms control policy. Many interest groups with a specific agenda geared toward opposing or supporting arms control operate in a fashion similar to ACA.

In addition to formal organizations which seek to
influence national security policy, individuals representing certain classes of people may be considered interest groups for the purpose of this paper. One such informal group of individuals is weapons laboratory scientists and technicians. These individuals, like some formal organizations, have an interest in influencing arms control policy. In general, those who work in weapons labs are opposed to arms control. They attempt to influence policy by pressuring the president, the Pentagon, and by providing testimony to members of Congress.

There is also a special category of groups which act in such a way as to influence policy, yet have no specific agenda outside of research. Although not classified as interest groups, the actions of these organizations, through research and their role as consultants to Congress, may influence arms control policy. These organizations include think-tanks such as the Brookings Institution, the RAND Corporation, the Institute of Defense Analysis, and the Hudson Institute. The role these organizations perform may, in some respects, resemble that of an interest group, however, they retain an impartial agenda.

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Allies

It is expected that the U.S. would be concerned about the opinions of its allies when conducting arms control negotiations. The specific role played by allies in the arms control process, then, should be evaluated.
Allies may affect arms control by exerting pressure on the United States to conclude an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. Sloss and Davis note: "...U.S. allies have significant influence on the U.S. position in negotiations with the USSR that affect their interests" (1987:35; also in Diehl 1987:9). The Office of Research Coordination of the CRS claims that such pressure caused President Reagan to revise his INF proposal in March of 1983 (1988:216). It appears that even with the most reluctant of presidents, concerted allied demands may cause a change in the U.S. negotiating posture.

Allies may also limit U.S. flexibility once negotiations are underway (Office of Research Coordination, CRS 1988:184). One such example is French and British pressure on the Reagan administration to conclude an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and their unwillingness to allow their own INF weapons to be discussed. This type of inflexibility may serve to inhibit the progress of negotiations.

The role of allies in negotiations which do not directly concern European weapons systems is unclear. Most authors cite U.S. briefings of allies on the progress of such negotiations, but the role of allies in the formulation of arms control policy is not explicitly mentioned. It seems likely that allies are not given a strong voice in arms control negotiating strategies which do not affect them directly. The wisdom of this approach should be a matter for further investigation.

Soviet Cooperation
One of the most obvious factors to consider is Soviet cooperation and willingness to negotiate an arms control agreement. The determination of such willingness is, of course, based upon American perceptions of Soviet intentions. The difficulty lies in the fact that American observers are not in agreement over past Soviet intentions or the motivation for their present behavior. Most observers agree that Soviet negotiating behavior is shaped by phases which are influenced by both domestic and international events. They see the Soviets as more accommodat ing in periods of low stress. However, at any given point in time, there are likely to be multiple interpretations of Soviet intentions in arms control.

For example, some observers claim that from 1981 through 1983, the Soviets were not interested in serious negotiations. These observers argue that the Soviets simply wanted to block U.S. deployment of intermediate-range forces in Europe while maintaining their own monopoly of such missiles (Shultz in The INF Treaty 1988:17), and they were in a period of political paranoia due to leadership instability (Office of Research Coordination, CRS 1988:59; Gray 1987:49). Other observers cite Brezhnev's peace offensive of 1981 and 1982 as an indication of Soviet willingness to negotiate in that era (Office of Research Coordination of CRS 1988:xlviii), as well as the 1983 efforts of Andropov to reduce Soviet INF forces to French and British levels, the Soviet's proposal to ban ASATs, and their proposed nuclear test ban (Parenti 1989:180-1). Alexander Haig claims
that in the early years of the Reagan administration the Soviets were eager to enter arms control negotiations on almost any basis (MccGwire 1987:38).

As exemplified here, there is disagreement among scholars who specialize in the Soviet Union as to the legitimacy of Soviet negotiating intentions at any given time. What these scholars do agree on, however, is the importance of observing Soviet behavior and attempting to ascertain their arms control objectives in order to facilitate meaningful arms control agreements. The importance of Soviet cooperation and willingness to engage in serious negotiations as a factor in the arms control process is not in question. What does need to be resolved is an accepted method for evaluating Soviet intentions. Such a method would be a useful tool in predicting propitious periods in which to negotiate, and would help to explain why some past attempts have failed. It must be remembered, however, that there can be no completely accurate method of determining Soviet intentions because any assessment would be tainted by the nature of U.S. perceptions, and may be susceptible to manipulation by the bureaucratic interests involved.

Soviet leadership

As we have already seen, presidential transitions in the United States have the effect of delaying arms control negotiations, and may also result in hasty, poorly-planned positions when negotiations do begin. The Soviet Union also experiences transitions in leadership. Although during the 1970s
the leadership in the Soviet Union was dominated by Leonid Brezhnev, the 1980s saw the rise to power of three new Soviet leaders: Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, and Mikhail Gorbachev (additionally, Brezhnev was still in power at the beginning of the decade, for a total of four leaders). These two phases of Soviet leadership may be helpful in evaluating the effect of Soviet leaders on arms control negotiations.

Talbott claims that the reason SALT negotiations persisted throughout the 1970s under three different U.S. presidents was due to the "collective leadership almost obsessed with preserving the continuity of the negotiations in the face of political change" (1979:21). Under Brezhnev and his elite policy-making circle, a standard Soviet position was maintained and SALT I and II were signed (although the latter was not ratified by the U.S.).

The about-face in the 1980s, with up to four Soviet leaders dealing with a single U.S. president has, as many several authors claim, led to a stagnation in Soviet arms control policy (Adelman 1984/5:246; Jenson 1988:242; Blacker 1987:133; Gray 1987:52). Manifestations of this stagnation include inflexibility, and a lack of creative initiatives by Soviet leaders. Blacker, however, claims that the positive aspect of these leadership changes was an increase in internal debate on foreign policy issues. Although he claims that the debating was semi-public, occurred within proscribed limits, and ended when a high-level decision had been reached, he points out that it
indicates competition and posturing on the part of officials competing for power (1987:144). This is similar to what takes place during election periods in the United States. It also indicates that there may not be stagnation on an internal level, with new issues being raised and discussed. It is curious, however, that Soviet outward policy has not changed as a result of internal debate.

One reason that Soviet policy does not change after leadership changes may be that time is required for Soviet leaders to consolidate their power with the policy-making elite. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has estimated this consolidation period to a three- to eight-year process (The United States and the Soviet Union: Prospects for the Relationship 1983:6). This explanation, however, may not be adequate. A study by the Office of Research Coordination of the CRS notes that when General Secretary Gorbachev began talks with President Reagan, he was operating from a strong political base although he had only been in office for 254 days (1988:308). This may indicate that a long period may not be required for the consolidation of political power in the Soviet Union; others would argue that Gorbachev still has not attained the political base he needs to ensure the stability of his leadership position within the party.

In addition to the effect of leadership transition, another aspect of Soviet leadership to be examined is the effect of different leaders on Soviet arms control policy. Among scholars,
disagreement exists as to whether changes in leadership result in changes in policy. Some authors believe, for example, that General Secretary Gorbachev is a unique force in U.S.-Soviet relations. The Office of Research Coordination of the CRS claims that the fundamental differences between Gorbachev and his predecessors are: 1) A modified version of Marxism which emphasizes cooperation over confrontation and sees a nuclear war as an unwinnable catastrophe, 2) A recognition of global interdependence as a common factor between all nations, and 3) Historical revisionism and a less structured view of Marxist interpretation of history, with contemporary history seen as closer to reality (1988:1xxii). Additionally, Gorbachev is seen as one of the only Soviet leaders who has been interested in slowing the pace of military investment (Morris 1988:417). The Soviet proposals introduced by Gorbachev at the Reykjavik summit are seen as the bold policies of a new generation of Soviet leaders (Sloss and Davis 1987:20). The extent to which Gorbachev is symbolic of a new generation of Soviet leaders remains to be seen. It is uncertain as to whether, once the Soviet economy stabilizes (assuming this happens, which is also uncertain), the Soviet leadership will continue to advocate military concessions in the form of arms control negotiations, or whether they will revert back to third world expansion and resume their military buildup on a stronger economic foundation. There appears to be no agreement on this issue.

Just as there are some indications that the Soviet Union is
moving toward a more cooperative approach to arms control and international relations, there are also some factors for continuity in the Soviet system. One important factor for arms control negotiations is the presence of Soviet negotiators who have had several decades of experience, such as Yakov A. Malik, Vladimir Semenov, Semyon K. Tsarapkin, and Viktor P. Karpov (Jenson 1988:51). It seems likely that seasoned negotiators will adhere to a particular style of bargaining; in this area, Soviet behavior may have elements similar to the 1970s and early 1980s.

Additionally, in cases such as the transition from Brezhnev to Andropov, the new leader had been involved in the formulation of arms control policy under his predecessor and thus the transition had little impact upon negotiations (Jenson 1988:21). Because Soviet foreign policy is often determined by a very small, elite group, unless changes in leadership result in serious purges at the top, many elements of arms control policy are not likely to change.

Another factor which many precipitate continuity in Soviet arms control policy is the ideology which governs the Soviet world view (Office of Research Coordination, CRS 1988:1xxvii). Marxist-Leninist ideology is a common element in all Soviet leaders, and although Gorbachev may appear to have a more liberal interpretation of this ideology, it is likely that there will be a common thread between his arms control policy and that of other Soviet leaders. The Office of Research Coordination of the CRS claims that Gorbachev is a product of his culture, and has the
same "ideological ingredients, political aspirations, and essentially revolutionary strategy and tactics...strongly influenced by the traditionalism of Russian nationalism" (1988:247). They compare the spirit in Gorbachev's speeches to that evident in the speeches of Krushchev, Brezhnev, and Andropov (1988:247).

Another factor which encourages continuity is the nature of the Soviet political system itself. The Office of Research Coordination of the CRS claims that one of the most notable aspects of that political system is its rigidity, and the tough character of the Soviet elite. Because they see the institutional characteristics of the Soviet system as unchanging, they see little likelihood for change in Soviet policy (1988:1xxvi). It is difficult to ascertain the affects of Soviet leadership on arms control. On the one hand, it is apparent that when there are several leadership changes in rapid succession, Soviet arms control policy lack innovation and flexibility. And, traditionally, Soviet leadership has maintained a relatively consistent arms control policy despite changes in leadership. On the other hand, it is unclear whether Gorbachev symbolizes a change in Soviet policy. Although in many ways he appears to be a unique force in the policymaking establishment, there are also many pressures for continuity, both internally and externally. Internally, the decision-making body of the Soviet Union is entrenched. Externally, the prevailing image of the Soviet Union in the United States may also prove to be resistant to change.
Because U.S. perceptions of Soviet intentions are an important factor in determining arms control strategies, the effect of Soviet leadership changes may be limited by the degree to which U.S. perceptions are altered.

**Soviet actions and international events**

Many authors agree that international events can affect the progress of arms control negotiations. Diehl claims: "...another precondition of successful arms control is the absence of controversial political events (or a series of events as in the Cold War) during the arms control negotiation process" (1987:14; also noted in Jenson 1988). Diehl believes that the global context of negotiations can influence the scope of the agreement, as well as the likelihood that an agreement will be concluded (1987:3). The Office of Research Coordination for the CRS notes that external events affect arms control on three different levels. They explain:

> Negotiators and their work are inevitably linked to external historical forces and cannot, therefore, avoid the negative consequences when these forces are no longer congenial. For there is a line connecting the negotiating table to diplomacy and diplomacy to the larger province of international politics. Only when conditions are right at all three levels, particularly the determining level of international politics, can this line be firmly secured and success therefore assured. For success in negotiations depends upon converging interests, the outcome of success in diplomacy, but it ultimately depends on the international politics that shape these interests (1988:147).

In the negotiating posture of the United States, external events are deliberately connected to the progress of arms control through a process of linkage. This concept is best defined by
President Nixon, who explicitly advocated such a policy during his administration:

I should like to make clear that I view arms limitations talks in the context of our overall relations with the Soviet Union. While I do not advance explicit preconditions for the opening of talks and will stipulate none for their continuing, I do believe that, to be meaningful, progress in arms limitation must be accompanied by progress in the solution of critical political problems...(Diehl 1987:13).

The effect of linkage on arms control may be positive if U.S.-Soviet relations are already congenial (Diehl 1987:13); however, when relations are strained, linkage may cause complications in concluding an arms control agreement.

In contrast, the Soviet Union seldom links the progress of arms control to unrelated issues. The Soviet agenda appears advocate the conclusion of arms control agreements without strings, believing consideration of other issues to be inappropriate (United States and the Soviet Union: Prospects for the Relationship 1983:v).

The effects of linkage, in addition to the manner in which other international events influence arms control, can be illustrated by a brief examination of the external environment during the negotiation of SALT I, SALT II, and START/INF.

The negotiation of SALT I began in the late 1960s, with President Johnson's initial attempts to begin a dialogue with the Soviet Union. These attempts were ended abruptly by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of 1968. This was the first example of the U.S. linking the fate of the negotiation of
strategic nuclear weapons to Soviet actions elsewhere. SALT I also demonstrated the Soviet's unwillingness to impose a policy of linkage on arms control negotiations with the U.S. The Soviets allowed SALT I to be concluded despite their displeasure with the U.S. bombing of Hanoi. Some political analysts believe that had the U.S. blockaded North Vietnam earlier in the negotiations, progress might have been impeded. However, because it happened so close to the conclusion of a treaty, the Soviets decided to forgo linkage for what they viewed as a more important national priority (Roberts 1974:27).

During the SALT II negotiations, the political environment became a more important factor influencing the progress of the talks. Of primary importance were several incidents of perceived Soviet aggression. One area which hindered the progress of SALT II was Soviet involvement in Africa. The reliability of the Soviet Union as a negotiating partner was in question after the invasion of Angola by 12,000 Cuban troops (Mosher et.al. 1987:205). Soviet backing of the Ethiopian army in a conflict with Somalia also served to create anxiety in the U.S. about Soviet intentions. When asked why SALT II was never ratified by the United States Senate, Brzezinski claimed that the treaty "lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden" (Blacker 1987:102). In the Senate, many critics of the treaty encouraged fellow senators to withdraw their support in order to punish the Soviet Union for what was perceived as a Soviet policy of expansion in the third world (Blacker 1987:121), and the election campaigns of 1978 were
filled with attacks on Soviet intervention in Africa (Talbott 1979:203). Soviet action in Africa contributed to a decline in public and congressional support for SALT II.

The issue of the Soviet combat brigade was another incident of perceived Soviet expansion which served to complicate SALT II negotiations. In August of 1979, a Soviet combat brigade was "discovered" in Cuba. Congressional attention to this issue delayed debate about SALT II for weeks, and evoked memories of the Cuban missile crisis in the minds of the public before it was discovered that the troops had been on the island since the early 1960s. According to the Office of Research Coordination of the CRS, there were three serious negative effects of the combat brigade issue:

--It delayed treaty debate a precious month.

--It rekindled deep suspicions in the American mind about Soviet behavior in the Third world, even though the combat brigade issue proved to be a "phony one" and the Soviets without direct fault; nonetheless, they contributed to creating a climate in which American suspicions could be inordinately aroused.

--But whether phony or not, the issue linked Soviet behavior internationally to the fate of the treaty and in the weeks ahead that behavior; namely, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, became a decisive factor in bringing the ratification process to an abrupt halt (1988:129).

The final blow to the SALT II treaty came with yet another incident of perceived Soviet expansion—the invasion of Afghanistan. Diehl claims that although the impact of the event was short-lived, its timing was such that it was a crucial factor in damaging the treaty (1987:14). Afghanistan "gave the coup de
grace to the already seriously eroded and weakened mutual policy of detente established in May 1972" (Garthoff 1985:967). U.S. policy, as a result, shifted from retrenchment to global neo-containment (Office of Research Coordination, CRS 1988:72). There is some question as to whether the U.S. reaction to the invasion was appropriate. Garthoff claims:

As perceived at the time, it ...called for a visible reinforcement of a policy of containment against further Soviet expansionist moves in Southwest Asia. But it did not require that the administration make further relations with the Soviet Union hostage to a continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Nor did the Soviet action in Afghanistan, even if it were deemed to reflect an opportunistic attempt to expand the Soviet domain, represent "the greatest threat to peace since World War II," as Carter repeatedly characterized it, or even conceivably mean that "our own Nation's security was directly threatened" (1985:967).

Policymakers in the U.S. chose to react to the invasion in a hostile fashion which prevented further progress on negotiations. Garthoff argues that some officials in the Carter administration who favored a rapid military buildup were able to capitalize on the Afghanistan invasion in order to implement their agenda (1985:975).

Originally, Carter's intent was to suspend arms control negotiations in the short term until the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. Garthoff explains: "Initially some effort was made to distinguish between temporary punitive sanctions levied on particular activities, and preserving the underlying structure of the detente accords" (1985:969). However, Garthoff argues that Carter did not adopt a consistent policy to support his posture
Garthoff claims that Carter's decision to exert external pressure on the Soviets instead of resolving the threat through constructive dialogue only served to prevent the resumption of meaningful negotiations in the future (1985:970).

The SALT II negotiations were also complicated by actions initiated by the United States. For instance, the U.S. decision to tie the progress of arms control negotiations to Soviet emigration policy for Russian Jews served to hinder the progress of the talks (Diehl 1987:13).

The U.S. also complicated negotiations by formally recognizing China. The Soviets saw this rapprochement as threatening to their strategic interests in Asia. After Deng visited the United States, a Soviet diplomat in Washington said, "We are now in the post-Deng era of Soviet-American relations. This means that things that were possible two months ago in SALT are no longer possible now" (Talbott 1979:251). The Soviet Union, according to Talbott, began to explicitly endorse the policy of linkage when the U.S. resumed diplomatic relations with China. As a result, progress on SALT was halted and the summit date was set back six months. During this lull in negotiations, the combat brigade issue surfaced, which helped to prevent the
ratification of SALT II (Office of Research Coordination, CRS 1988:141). This example illustrates how U.S. actions may be interpreted as threatening by the Soviet Union, and may create Soviet-imposed linkage. In the same way as U.S.-created linkage undermines the progress of arms control, so do Soviet linkages. It is not clear, however, what criterion the Soviet Union uses to determine the threshold U.S. actions must reach to induce arms control linkage.

In addition to U.S. and Soviet actions which may be perceived as provocative, other events in the international environment may poison the progress of arms control. Garthoff claims:

The Iranian hostage crisis overshadowed all other aspects of international affairs, including relations with the Soviet Union, and it also impinged on them by aggravating American feelings of impotence and frustration. In turn, these feelings contributed to a dissatisfaction with the perceived fruits of detente, a heightened uneasiness over Soviet military strength, and a desire to reassert American power and will (1985:966).

The course of the START and INF negotiations have suffered from similar types of setbacks. The events which occurred during the negotiation of SALT I and II simply demonstrate the damaging effect that the external environment may have on arms control. From a historical perspective, it appears that arms control may be adversely affected by both U.S. and Soviet actions which trigger the perception that either side is not serious about arms control negotiations. The degree to which unrelated actions are linked to arms control depends upon a variety of societal and
governmental interests, as well as the international environment in general. It is clear, however, that when a country chooses to treat an action as hostile, negotiations will be jeopardized because of the distrust underlying the accusation and the resentment with which the accusation will be received. Actions by third parties may also complicate arms control if they are perceived to threaten a nation's security.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Verification

One important component of technology, as it affects arms control, is verification. Berkowitz distinguishes between the concept of monitoring an arms control agreement and the concept of verification of a treaty. He explains:

Monitoring refers to the technical process of gathering information and depends on such factors as photographic resolution, detectable communication signals, and camouflage. Verification refers to the use of this information to decide whether an arms control agreement has been violated. Verification thus involves political factors such as judgment, the willingness to risk cheating, and the willingness to suffer the political fallout of an accusation of a violation. Verification is monitoring capability multiplied by politics (1987:69).

As this definition suggests, verification has both technological and political components.

Technologically, methods to monitor arms control agreements must exist for verification to be effective. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency notes that the technology developed in the 1960s and 1970s allowed verification of arms control agreements.
limiting the number of launchers by national technical means (ACDA Annual Report 1984:10). The agreements made possible by the ability to monitor launchers were SALT I and II. These agreements placed ceilings on certain weapons systems, and counted launchers to ascertain treaty adherence.

Willrich concurs with this analysis, noting that because the Soviets would not allow on-site inspection or surveillance by aircraft (as exemplified by the U-2 incident), national technical means was essential to arms control in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In particular, he claims that NTM was an important factor in concluding SALT I (1974:260). Daniel Papp, writing several years after Willrich, places the success of both SALT I and II on national technical means of verification (1987:186).

Technological developments are likely to have an adverse effect on the verification of future arms control treaties. Berkowitz claims that when technology is combined with the weapons limits of past arms control agreements, the result is a new generation of strategic weapons that will be able to evade traditional means of verification (1987:69). Additionally, he claims that current reconnaissance satellites have a limited ability to monitor treaty compliance because the amount of precision needed to gather technical information. To gather technical information, Berkowitz explains that a camera system must have a resolution of six inches (1987:73). Absent new generations of weapons, verification of treaty compliance is

the process of monitoring with reconnaissance satellites
still difficult. He notes that even with the most powerful photographic equipment, detection can be evaded by keeping an object inside a building or transporting it in a nondescript vehicle (1987:74). Attempting to count such things as cruise missiles and mobile missiles, were they to be an important component of an arms control agreement, would not be easy. This appears to indicate that as weapons technology has progressed throughout the 1970s, verification has become more problematic. With increasing advances in weapons technology in the 1980s, NIM to verify treaty compliance may be impossible without advances in monitoring technology as well.

The most recent bilateral arms control treaty has, in a sense, heeded this advice to the extent that it does not rely exclusively on national technical means. As Secretary of State Schultz has noted, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty has set a precedent in verification. In addition to other means of surveillance, the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed upon on-site inspection procedures which, Schultz claims, gives both sides redundant monitoring capabilities and, thus, a double-check on treaty compliance (The INF Treaty 1988:25). This type of capability aids arms control to the extent that it can allow each nation to be certain that the treaty provisions are being followed. And, as Jenson points out, cancelling an entire class of weapons (as the INF Treaty did) greatly simplifies the verification of treaty compliance (1988:193). This is because there are no limits to keep track of, and the launchers
themselves are exploded. Any sighting of a launcher would prove without a doubt that the treaty had been violated. It is uncertain, however, whether this type of treaty is the newest trend in arms control. Future arms control agreements may rely on ceilings instead of cancellation, and the Soviets may not always agree to on-site inspection. Additionally, even with the method of verification involved in INF, detecting the initial number of launchers depends upon reconnaissance, and it is possible that a nation could have launchers stored underground in order to evade initial detection. The point is, although agreements like INF are more conducive to arms control because they are easier to monitor, and thus, to verify compliance, they can still be circumvented. It is too early to determine the extent to which INF is verifiable.

The technological aspects of verification are politically important for arms control. Diehl notes that a prima facie fact about arms control is that it involves nations who are not friends, and do not have a relationship based upon trust. Yet, in order for arms control to succeed, each side must be assured that the other will abide by the terms of the treaty (1987:7). Neither side can, in this type of relationship, negotiate with the assumption that its counterpart is acting in good faith. This makes verification an important issue (Kaltelfleiter 1980:60). Because there is no institutional mechanism, such as a court of law, to enforce the contract of the treaty, an atmosphere of distrust exists because any violation of the
contract may be a life or death matter for a nation (Kaltefleiter 1980:60). Diehl notes that the tension between nations need not preclude success in arms control negotiations because the assurances of treaty verification can be a substitute for trust (1987:7).

Additionally, verification is particularly important to the domestic constituency in the United States, as Berkowitz explains:

...it is almost entirely an American concern in arms control talks. Gathering the necessary technical evidence of violations is not the only problem; American leaders must also be able to convince a significant part of the foreign policy bureaucracy, the American public, and the public's representatives in Congress (1987:167).

Verification, in this respect, can influence public and congressional opinion on the treaty.

As has been demonstrated in earlier sections, verification is one of the most important congressional concerns with regards to arms control treaties. Brown notes that congressional doubts about SALT II (prior to Afghanistan) stemmed from uncertainty about Soviet compliance and U.S. monitoring capabilities (1987:178). More recently, speaking out in support of the INF Treaty, Senator Dole used verification as an argument to justify the treaty's adoption. He stated, "...INF is an agreement that can be verified. Because the treaty's 'double-global-zero' levels ease the verification problem, the intelligence chiefs I consulted with assure me that, with adequate resources...they can do the verification job" (The INF Treaty 1988:7). This indicates
that verification capability can influence the climate of arms control in that a lack of confidence in NTM can prevent treaty ratification.

At an even more elementary level, verification, or its absence, can influence public support of a treaty. Public support may then determine the extent to which the Senate and the President find it politically acceptable to support an arms control treaty (Berkowitz 1987:69). Berkowitz claims that for the public to back a treaty, it must be assured that the Soviets have not cheated on past agreements, have not cheated to attain any significant advantage, and will not be able to cheat effectively on the treaty in question (1987:168). An example of how verification can affect public support for a treaty is SALT II. The treaty's fate came into question when the Iran crisis resulted in a loss of crucial U.S. treaty monitoring facilities in that country. Verification became a major issue in congressional debate and the administration was unable to assuage the public panic surrounding the treaty (Office of Research Coordination, CRS 1988:83). There is still some question as to whether the treaty would have been ratified absent the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This question exists because verification capabilities were uncertain.

Verification can be an important influence on arms control. When verification cannot be adequately ensured, a treaty may lose public and congressional support. The treaty's progress could come to a halt during the negotiation process itself if
negotiators do not feel that the proposal can be monitored. It is no accident that the major arms control agreements of the century have been ones that could be easily verified (Diehl 1987:7). Verification, then, is a substitute for trust between hostile nations.

Perceptions of Technological Security or Insecurity

The next factor to be evaluated is the role of technology. The effects of technology on arms control will be assessed by evaluating the developments themselves, as well as the manner in which political leaders perceive these developments to affect their national interest. Morris explains the role of technology in the arms race:

Forty years' history makes it clear that technology itself is an independent determinant of the pace and direction of the arms race, quite apart from the intentions or hopes of politicians and strategists. Time and again, technological breakthroughs have radically altered, or threatened to radically alter, the military balance (1988:439).

Two key themes can be seen in this explanation: 1) technological developments may complicate the policies of government officials and, 2) technological developments alter policymakers' perceptions of the military balance. Both of these themes will be examined.

Technology can be seen as an obstacle to negotiating arms control agreements. One reason for this, according to Richardson, is that the complexity of new strategic weapons technology makes it difficult for political leaders to conclude meaningful agreements, even in the most favorable of political
climates (1987:80). This may be due to an uncertainty over the strategic implications of the new technology, which makes it difficult to develop an agreement to control its use. Additionally, the rapid pace of technological change makes negotiating arms control agreements frustrating due to the fact that it may change a country's force posture, and the influx of a large number of new issues makes the strategic interests of the negotiating countries more difficult to ascertain (Morris 1988:30; Miller 1984:89). An example of technological developments complicating the arms control process can be seen in the SALT II negotiations. During these negotiations, changes in both countries' nuclear forces occurred as MIRVs, cruise missiles, and Backfire bombers (in the case of the Soviets) entered the picture. Although President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev were able to work out a framework for SALT II in the Vladivostok Accords of 1974, these technological advances complicated later negotiations for President Carter (Schoenbaum 1987:38; Miller 1984:89), and before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there was some question in Congress as to whether it would be in the best strategic interests of the U.S. to ratify the treaty.

An aspect of technology related to its development is where the development originated. In most cases, one country constructs a new weapon first, and takes a temporary "technological lead" while its opponent rushes to duplicate the development. A study by the National Academy of Sciences
indicates that if either side has, or is perceived to have, technological superiority in the military area being negotiated, the prospects for concluding an agreement are slim (1985:21). Sloss and Davis posit that the lack of progress on INF and START negotiations in the early 1980s was due to the fact that the Soviet Union felt itself to be in a position of technological inferiority, and as a result became rigid, defensive, and belligerent in arms control negotiations (1987:20). As a result of a technological imbalance, or the perception that such an imbalance may occur, the two adversaries are most likely to embark on a continuous quest for newer and better technology, otherwise known as an arms race. Blacker notes that such perceptions of a military imbalance are compounded by worst-case planning, in which policymakers simply assume that their opponent possesses a technological edge:

It is precisely because neither side can be completely confident in its judgment of these matters that both tend to assume the worst and plan accordingly. It is this dynamic, more than any other, that sustains the nuclear arms race and has made it difficult to reach even partial agreements to contain the military rivalry between the superpowers (1987:164; also Morris 1988:440; Brown 1987:188).

Policymakers are not only concerned about the technological aspects of military superiority, but they also assess the political applications of this superiority. In other words, behind every technological development, each side sees the other as attempting to achieve a position of global power for some nefarious purpose. Blacker explains that this fear is typical behavior for adversarial nations:
Each superpower detects in the military activities of its rival a bid for superiority. Each believes the other to be of the opinion that a nuclear war can be fought and won. Each sees the arms control proposals of its adversary as insincere and calculated to produce one-sided military advantage. Moreover, there is enough evidence that can be mustered in support of these and related propositions to make it impossible for political leaders in either country to dismiss them out of hand (1987:164).

The implication of these concerns is that, when a technological lead occurs, a nation will automatically assume that the move is calculated to make it vulnerable to a nuclear attack, and thus, is not likely to be willing to conclude an arms control agreement. Diehl notes that the weaker nation is unlikely to accept inferiority, and the stronger nation will not make significant concessions. He concludes that attempts to negotiate from strength simply serve to inhibit the arms control process (1987:5). Additionally, Diehl comments that a nation with the advantage of military superiority is not as likely to consent to arms control negotiations when this advantage may provide greater success if used as a bargaining lever in the political or military arena (1987:5).

It appears that the superpowers can only achieve success in arms control negotiations when they perceive themselves to be at a level of strategic parity. Roberts notes that although the parity need not be precise, "their political relationship and economic conditions must be such that each is prepared to accept some encumbrance on its freedom to extend and expand its nuclear arsenal" (1974:4). Most of the major strategic arms limitations of the past two decades have occurred when the United States and
the Soviet Union perceived a relative parity to exist. As Blacker claims, "Central to the success of the SALT process was the conviction that for the time being at least, neither superpower was in a position either to establish or to reclaim a position of meaningful nuclear superiority" (1987:162). According to Blacker, this cooperative attitude of working toward a mutual advantage was present during the negotiation of the ABM Treaty, the 1972 Interim Agreement, and SALT II (1987:162), although this understanding was "called into question" by the time of the 1980 presidential election (1987:134). The presumption of parity, then, no longer existed when the feasibility of SALT II was called into question by Congress. INF was eventually concluded on the basis of a presumption of parity, as well. Tucker explains:

...concern over an eroding military balance of power had eased substantially by 1988, in part because of the improvement since 1980 in this nation's military posture and in part because of developments in the Soviet Union that made Moscow's military power appear less imposing and less threatening than before (1988:3).

It appears that there is a relationship between the perception of strategic parity and an atmosphere conducive to arms control negotiations. It is uncertain whether this relationship is causal; however, it does seem highly unlikely that a nation would feel motivated to negotiate if it possessed a clear advantage or disadvantage in military technology.

In addition to relative parity, the effect of the weapons themselves on strategic stability is also important. When the
nature of a particular type of weapon threatens to disrupt an existing parity, which the superpowers view as mutually disadvantageous, then efforts to control the technology by treaty may be likely. For instance, according to Schoenbaum, the shared suspicion of ABM technology existed prior to the negotiation of the ABM Treaty:

In the late 1960s, both sides independently came to believe that ABM systems were not only destabilizing but would be extremely costly to build and would ultimately be insufficient to protect against new offensive capabilities and developments such as the new MIRVed systems (1987:34).

This fear of developing an expensive defensive system which may exacerbate the dangerous race in strategic arms led the U.S. and the Soviet Union to the bargaining table to begin talks on strategic arms limitation in November of 1969 (National Academy of Sciences 1985:143).

The combination of fear of the destabilizing technology of the arms race and the shared desire to maintain a strategic parity are factors which facilitate arms control. However, this type of situation is infrequent in the course of superpower relations. According to Blacker:

In the end, it was the brief coincidence in American and Soviet thinking--that each saw that the other side recognized the futility of trying to win the nuclear arms race and was therefore prepared to settle for approximate equality--that made possible not only the first SALT agreements but also the attempts to manage more effectively some of the outstanding political differences between the superpowers. Once the leaders of both countries become convinced that their counterparts were determined either to attain (in the Soviet case) or to regain (in the American case) meaningful military superiority, arms control and detente were doomed (1987:119).

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CONCLUSION

These variables act together to shape the U.S. position in arms control negotiations. It is not possible to label specific factors as primary and others as secondary because the importance of a factor is dependent upon the overall political context in which the negotiations occur. Factors which may play a leading role under certain circumstances may have a limited role in another context.

The limitations of this paper involve the analysis of these variables solely from the perspective of the United States. It is possible that scholars in the Soviet Union may perceive different factors operating on arms control negotiations. Further, the positions taken by the Soviet Union may also affect how these variables interact. However, investigating Soviet perceptions and motivations is beyond the scope of this paper.

One conclusion which can be drawn from this framework is that due to the large number of factors which can affect the course of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations, change must be incremental. No one variable has the capacity to overshadow the combined force exerted by the other variables. In order to successfully negotiate an arms control agreement, a wide range of conditions and influential groups must be satisfied, which makes radical shifts in negotiating posture unlikely. In the long run, the substance and process of negotiations are not likely to deviate from a certain historical norms because the effect of these factor is to limit policy options.
This paper was intended to be a brief overview of all of the possible factors which may influence arms control. Examples were presented to clarify the importance of these factors; however, the nature of this project did not permit an in-depth analysis of each factor nor did it enable me to make specific predictions about future arms control scenarios. Such a study will be undertaken in the future on the basis of the framework established in this paper.
WORKS CITED


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