8-1-2010

THE MOBILIZATION OF MEMORY: THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO IN GERMAN AND BRITISH MEMORY, 1815-1915

Kevin Pryor
Southern Illinois University Carbondale, kpryor@siu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/theses

Recommended Citation
THE MOBILIZATION OF MEMORY: THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO IN GERMAN AND BRITISH MEMORY, 1815-1915

By

Kevin Pryor

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the field of History

Approved by:

S. Jonathan Wiesen, Chair
Joseph Sramek
Theodore R. Weeks

Graduate School
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
June 28, 2010
AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

KEVIN PRYOR, for the Master of Arts degree in HISTORY, presented on JUNE 28, 2010, at Southern Illinois University Carbondale.

TITLE: THE MOBILIZATION OF MEMORY: THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO IN GERMAN AND BRITISH MEMORY, 1815-1915

MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. S. Jonathan Wiesen

This Thesis examines the evolution of the Battle of Waterloo from the perspective of both British and German historical memory over the course of a century. In popular media, Waterloo emerged as a potent symbol for the unity of the nation in both German and British contexts. The Thesis’s comparative study of historical memory argues that historical memory is integrally related to a society’s development; subsequent generations of Britons and Germans reimagined themselves fighting Waterloo in such diverse media as poetry, editorials, popular history, and iconography.

In the British context, the memory of Waterloo from 1815-1914 was partial to small-scale commemorations that reflected expanded notions of Britishness that was more in synch with Britain’s political development. This use of a historical memory in effect helped to define what was British. The memory of Waterloo was far less straightforward in the case of Germany during the same period, where the erratic course of German political evolution stymied efforts to turn Waterloo into a national public symbol. Paradoxically, the volatility of German politics only served to intensify efforts to shape Waterloo into a national memory because emphasizing a German victory over Napoleon in 1815 simplified and obscured the complexities of German historical development.

All these intertwined strains of memory found themselves at play during the centennial of Waterloo in 1915 as intellectuals and artists mobilized memory of Waterloo for the war effort. In
this wartime environment, Waterloo became instrumentalized along four interlocking iterations in both nations as they used Waterloo to present a case for the legitimacy of their respective war efforts. This memory’s failure to predict the course of the First World War ultimately rendered Waterloo irrelevant to each society as a master symbol of historical memory.
DEDICATION

This work would not have been possible without the support of others. Foremost among them are my parents, Ray and Mary Pat Pryor, who have been nothing but supportive during the process of my education. My Grandfather, John Ross Nugent, also shares a degree of responsibility for stoking my interest in history and pushing me towards Cleo at an early age. My friends and colleagues at the SIUC Department of History have also been of immense help, especially Christina Bearden-White and Deb Wilson. I also owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Joseph Sramek, who first turned me on to this topic. Butch Wilson’s technical assistance was instrumental in helping transcend the barriers of distance for the oral difference. Christi McCallum was a source of tremendous inspiration and greatly assisted the writing and editing process of this Thesis. Finally, my Father’s black Labrador retriever, Licorice, was insistent in her efforts to remind me that there are other important things in life besides debates over a battle’s nomenclature.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to formally thank Dr. S. Jonathan Wiesen for his support and advice throughout this project in spite of the problems of distance. Dr. Joseph Sramek’s class on Victorian Britain was instrumental in shaping the course and direction of this Thesis. Dr. Theodore Weeks also deserves formal recognition for his assistance and keen editorial eye.
PREFACE

Unless noted, all translations are mine. I have elected to keep titles, political parties and certain words untranslated in the text. The decision to keep the original German was more than stylistic in that some words convey their meaning better in their original tongue than in translation. When a German word not in common usage first appears, it will have a parenthesis with the proper translation. With regards to German poetry, this study opts for the approach that it is better to replicate the meaning of author by a close translation. The result is that it destroys much of the poetic meter of the original author. Since the focus of this study is the ideas behind depictions of Waterloo, this is an acceptable tradeoff.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1 – Introduction: The Flexibility of Memory</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2 – Waterloo in British Memory: 1815-1915</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3 – Waterloo in German Memory: 1815-1915</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4 – The Mobilization of Memory: Waterloo in a Time of Global War</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5 – Conclusion: The Fading Memory of Waterloo</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

THE FLEXIBILITY OF MEMORY

One of the most dramatic paintings of the Battle of Waterloo is Lady Elizabeth Butler’s *Scotland Forever!* Through a clever use of perspective, Butler’s 1881 painting draws the viewer’s eye along a charging line of horsemen; the exaggerated poses of both the riders and their mounts create a sense of urgent movement as they hurtle towards a focal point. The net result is an image that summons up a moment in time: the charge of the Royal Scots Greys on the afternoon of 18 June 1815, spoiling Napoleon’s afternoon attack. Butler’s painting was an enormous success and became one of the most prominent late-Victorian depictions of the Napoleonic Wars. It was a professional and commercial success, garnering Butler a degree of fame and being a staple for pictorial advertisements. The painting became so iconic that during the opening year of the First World War an anonymous enterprising German artist modified Butler’s painting for a frontline New Years greeting card. The charging Scots now became German Uhlans through the hasty addition of a Prussian standard. Whereas *Scotland Forever!* gazed towards the past to extol Britain’s martial heritage, its German plagiarist used the Battle of Waterloo to project a victorious future. The Prussians charge under peeling bells and a rayed “1915” and inset on the left of the composition a soldier’s family prays for a safe return of their soldier in the year to come.\(^1\)

The German use of Butler’s painting is emblematic of how individuals could invoke the memory of Waterloo for different ends. The ease with which the 1915 postcard transformed a British context into a German one reflects a process of gradual cultural diffusion for a century. The battle became a potent metaphor within European culture during the nineteenth century. It

was the subject of numerous paintings, novels, songs, and popular histories meant for mass consumption. This cultural process coincided with the emergence of the modern national state, so memory of the Battle of Waterloo often had a symbiotic relationship with the state and nationalism, extolling and justifying the current order. How Waterloo became such potent mirror that reflected contemporary society is the subject of this study. Between 1815 and 1915, the battle served as a way for the victors to orientate themselves in this immense time of crisis and change.

Of the 1815 combatants, Britain and Germany shared the highest degree of common experience with Waterloo. Their memories of Waterloo could bask in martial glory of defeat because unlike their Dutch-Belgian allies, British and German troops performed well in the fight against Napoleon. The French too cultivated a legend of Napoleonic glory, but Waterloo’s ignominious end acted against dwelling on this memory. Ernest Meisonnier, the most renowned nineteenth-century French painter of Napoleonic subjects, never once depicted Waterloo. In the case of Britons and Germans, Waterloo became a dramatic canvas upon which to depict a national identity.

The emphasis upon the dramatic aspects of the Battle of Waterloo highlights how the cultivation of memory is a highly imaginative act. Instead of focusing on the campaign as a whole, depictions of Waterloo often utilized a series of separate historical anecdotes that easily fit into a grand historical context, such as in the case of the Scots Grey’s charge and Butler’s painting. Accordingly, an examination of the historical memory of Waterloo concurs with the arguments put forth by Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities*. In this extended essay on the origins of nationalism, Anderson argues that nationalism emerged as a political force with the advent of mass literacy. Predominantly middle-class literati created a systematic, albeit fictional,
picture of the nation for the reading public. The nation according to Anderson “is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”² Media that emphasize the dramatic nature of Waterloo suit Anderson’s concept of imagined communities particularly well and depictions of Waterloo relied upon extolling the nation united in arms for a common purpose under a just hierarchy. Invoking such a community would be useful to orient a nation in a state of flux, as was seen in the case of Britain where the memory of Waterloo was most developed and institutionalized.

While Britain was a highly fractious and divided polity in the century after 1815, the Waterloo memory preserved notions of unity of purpose and a sense of Britishness which owed its justification through vanquishing a brilliant, but dangerous, foe on behalf of Europe. The military aspect of this identity was particularly important to this new iteration of British identity. As Linda Colley noted, British identity during the eighteenth century “was superimposed over an array of internal differences in response to contact with the Other, and above all in response to conflict with the Other.”³ In particular, Colley argued that the century-long battle with Catholic France homogenized a large segment of Protestant British culture by giving it both common purpose and a common enemy. Not only were these series of wars physical contests between two states, but the British Isles’ physical isolation from France ensured this contest would be rhetorical as well: the French ideal became the negative mirror upon which to gaze at a romanticized British patriotism. This study fuses together both Colley and Anderson’s approaches to national identity through a comparative analysis of the constant retellings of this particular Napoleonic story in both German and British memory.

The comparative German and British context of Waterloo this study draws together much of the scholarship on the Napoleonic Wars for both cultures. In the case of British cultural history, there is much to build upon. Philip Shaw’s analysis of Waterloo-based literature examines the role the battle had upon British Regency culture. Like Colley, Shaw postulates that British identity developed in the conflict with France and the end of the Napoleonic Wars ushered in a sense crisis among British cultural elites. As Waterloo ended an era, British Romanticists such as Scott or Wordsworth tried to reestablish this period by revisiting the 18 June in triumphant artistic portrayals.⁴ Although Shaw concludes that this task was ultimately quixotic for the Romantics, this study’s examination of less rarified media such as advertisements or children’s novels illustrates how this older vision persisted up to 1915. In this vein this bears out the conclusions of Elisa Renee Milke’s dissertation on Waterloo and the localist state, which argues that consumption of cultural depictions of Waterloo “helped transform Waterloo into a national icon and furthermore, it did so over time. Several generations…learned to recognize the battle as a key event in Britain’s history because the marketplace supplied representations for young people who otherwise had little or no connection to 1815.”⁵ As will be seen in this study, Waterloo became an exercise in the commemoration of the British character.

The historiography of German memory of Waterloo is considerably more tangled than that of its counterpart across the North Sea. This was in no small measure due to the politically-divided nature of the German states after 1815, which makes it considerably more difficult for a historian to speak of a unified “German” memory of 1815, even though one estimate asserts that

---

a plurality of Wellington’s troops originated from the German-speaking areas. Furthermore, unlike Britain, Germans experienced direct Napoleonic occupation and rule. Therefore analysis of this period consolidates Waterloo with German reaction to the Napoleonic era in general, often focusing upon German resistance during the period 1813-15. For example, Christopher Clark echoes Shaw through his description of German Romanticists’ use of nonverbal and pictorial methods to reassert cultural power after the war ended. In particular, both the Gymnast Turner movement and painters such as Caspar David Friedrich adapted the costumes and performative acts of the volunteer units that fought against Napoleon to create a non-traditional memory. Sam Mustafa’s monograph on the German commemoration of Ferdinand von Schill also illustrates the plasticity of memory. “Once safely dead,” Mustafa writes of this failed martyr, “he always did as he was told. He became a loyal Hohenzollern, a Nazi, a Communist, and a liberal, each in turn, as needed.” This method of recasting the meaning of the Napoleonic experience to fit the jagged complexities of contemporary German history fits into this study’s analysis of the German memory of Waterloo.

The use of comparative history by this study unifies these two strands of Napoleonic historiography. In particular, contrasting German and British visions of 1815 lends insight into how national memories develop in multiple ways. This study contends that in times of crisis the memories of these two victors often engaged in a loose dialogue with each other through addressing the assertions of their titular 1815 ally’s memory of the defeat of Napoleon. At times complementary, at times chauvinistic, the memory of Waterloo often had to acknowledge the existence of both enemies and allies.

6 Peter Hofschroèer, 1815, The Waterloo Campaign: the German Victory: From Waterloo to the Fall of Napoleon (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), 339.
Such alternating national visions of Waterloo expose the political and cultural developments behind the successful cultivation of memory. The sociologist Maurice Halbwachs asserted that “collective memory provides the group a self-portrait that unfolds through time, since it is an image of the past, and allows the group to recognize itself through the total succession of images.”

Through the repetition of this immobilized past through media, in such cases as religious sacramental rituals, Halbwachs demonstrated that a collective memory can emerge out of a group of individuals participating in such a ceremony. Building on this concept of the collective memory, French historian Pierre Nora developed the concept of a site of memory (*Lieux de mémoire*) in that the past becomes inextricably entangled with the present because of collective memory’s importance to identity. For a site of memory to be relevant for the present, Nora maintains that collective memory operates with an intricate process of inclusion and exclusion of historical details. Both theorists of collective memory assert that there is a clear distinction between memory and history, with the former being a scientific and deliberate reconstruction of the past whereas collective memory is a social process of understanding the past.

In this respect, the memory of Waterloo matches this distinction very well through an examination of an imagined battlefield over the *longue durée*. There is, however, one major caveat to the Nora/Halbwach’s approach to collective memory explored in this study: however selective memory is, it cannot exist independently from historians. The process of explaining the past sets the parameters for the collective memory, thus enabling it to coalesce.

By the same token neither did historians during this time period stand apart from the collective memory of their society; they were as vulnerable to its biases as their readership. As

---

history became more professionalized during the nineteenth century, its relationship with the state channeled its energies in ways beneficial for the state.\textsuperscript{12} The history of Waterloo was even more susceptible to this process, as it was at its core a military event and success or failure in war frequently becomes a nationalist preoccupation. David Lowenthal observed that “histories do not merely illustrate or eulogize but explain a people’s special genius.”\textsuperscript{13} Among both victors at Waterloo, historians and memorialists would set out to explain the unique dynamics of their national victory over Napoleon. This is particularly apparent in the examples of popular histories of Waterloo meant for a broad readership such as those written by W. H. Fitchett in Britain or Ferdinand Schmidt’s \textit{Gymnasium} reader \textit{Preussens Geschichte in Wort und Bild}. Examining these works of popular history bridges the gap between professional and public outlined by Nora and Halbwachs by serving as a reminder that historians meant for their works to be read by the public. Non-professional exercises in memory also worked parallel to these academics in that they used both products of historians and their historical methodology to buttress their arguments about the symbolism of Waterloo. Genre painters of Waterloo, for example, often displayed a fetishistic fidelity to factual minutia to authentically recreate a moment in time that would resonate with their audience.

In the case of the two groups most responsible for the 1815 victory over Napoleon, the Germans and the British attempted over a century to claim Waterloo as glorious moment in the national history. In particular, these memories of Waterloo sought to reaffirm as eternal a particular martial identity that originated in the eighteenth-century struggle with France. Correspondingly, this strand of historical memory simultaneously expanded and restricted a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} For more on this inclination see George G. Iggers, \textit{Historiography in the Twentieth Century} (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1997), 23-35.
\end{itemize}
sense of national identity to lines first developed during the earlier periods. As the century drew on, the task became to keep Waterloo relevant for a public living in a world that rapidly was moving away from the Europe of 1815. This task forced the gatekeepers of memory to be increasingly creative and adapt to new media to present a relevant vision of Waterloo for their audiences. Therefore this study examines the multiple avenues of memory Waterloo opened up for the Germans and the British, such as poems, paintings, fiction, and monuments, as well as works of history. The examination of the intersection of history, memory and society is the central focus of this study.

The master’s thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter One deals with the British memory of Waterloo from 1815 to the eve of the First World War. This chapter argues that Waterloo emerged as a master-symbol for the Victorian Era in the sense that it became an ubiquitous presence in British popular culture. The cultivation of a memory cult around the battle occurred almost immediately after the battle ended. The British Isles’ proximity to the battlefield, a burgeoning print culture, and the fact that a sizable portion of Wellington’s forces was British helped to sustain this cult. In addition to drawing upon Colley, the chapter builds upon the findings of James Peck and Scott Hughes Myerly who argued that the civilian public saw themselves within cultural depictions of the British military. The memory of Waterloo proceeded along three overlapping stages from 1815-1914, the first extolling late Georgian and early-Victorian political order, the second using it as a metric for evaluating Britain’s mid-century status, and the final stage imagining Waterloo as an essentially British affair extolling an idealized vision of contemporary British society.

14 This chapter builds upon and expands elements of an earlier paper “Waterloo over the Longue Durée: The Battle of Waterloo in British Popular Memory.”
Chapter Two postulates that German cultural commemorations of Waterloo were far
more complicated than their British counterparts, despite the significant presence of German
troops on the battlefield. Germans utilized many of the same motifs as their counterparts across
the North Sea, such as the extolling of martial glory and hero-worship of Marshal Blücher, but
Germany’s historical development produced important variations in their particular memory cult.
This chapter broadly asserts that the memory of the Befreiungskriege (Wars of Liberation) of
1813-15 gradually emerged as a conservative and pro-monarchist memory by 1914.\footnote{Stefan Berger, Germany (London: Arnold, 2004), 37.} Like the
British memory of 1815-1914, German memory of Waterloo developed along three overlapping
stages. The first phase involved the invoking of patriotism and German sacrifices between 1813-
15 as a means to forget the proceeding period characterized by humiliation and collaboration
with the French occupation. In this sense, German memory runs parallel to that of post-Vichy
France in that sites of memory became a means to overshadow a politically embarrassing history.
German unification in 1871 was integrally related to the second phase as the German historians
and intellectuals sought to shape Prussia’s contribution as an important stage in its natural
development as leader of the German states. The tensions that resulted from this instrumentalized
use of the past became readily apparent in the third phase as multiple nationalism used the
memory of the Napoleonic Wars to celebrate their vision of the German state. This phase came
to a head during the centennial of the Battle of Leipzig in 1913, which witnessed the intersection
of state nationalism, populist nationalism, and a German liberal critique of both that harkened
back to a patriotism celebrated during the first phase of German memory. Since many of the
*dramatis personae* of Waterloo such as Blücher or Gneisenau were involved in the Wars of
Liberation, this chapter also examines media that delved into their role in an earlier period such
as Louise Muhlbach’s *Napoleon and Blücher; An Historical Novel*, which chronicles Blücher’s unique brand of indefatigable resistance to the Napoleonic imperium.

Chapter Three shows how the advent of the First World War sharpened and exaggerated the memory of Waterloo, as both societies enlisted their history for the war effort. This final chapter simultaneously examines both British and German memories of Waterloo under the stresses of wartime. In the case of Britain invoking the Battle of Waterloo entailed hitherto unexplored vagaries as their ostensible ally in 1815 was now their foe. The German memory of Waterloo ironically became more straightforward through an emphasis upon both French expansionism and the Britain’s unjust assumption of sole credit for Napoleon’s defeat. Wartime mobilization of memory followed four intersecting patterns. The first pattern was one of orientation where the historical memory of the past gave comfort for an uncertain future. The second pattern was that of hero-worship, where extolling the victors of 1815 was a way to simultaneously commend their successors in the trenches. The inverse of this was using 1815 as a means to express a narrow chauvinism in which the Napoleonic Era exposes the worst excesses of the current enemy. Finally, memory of Waterloo expressed itself in commemorative acts that reflected nations trying to understand the full meaning of their history. With the exception of the last aspect of memory, the wartime mobilization of memory found very little traction after 1915. The inability of First World War One battles to conform to either sides’ narrative that battles could be decisive like Waterloo ultimately limited the power of any embellished memory to assert itself after the war.
Waterloo: The Battle and the Campaign

This mobilization of memory was made considerably easier by the straightforward nature of the events of 18 June 1815. The salient features of this battle were even more prominent in societies for whom Waterloo was far from a distant memory. This made individuals’ use of historical references and imagery a much easier task as their creators did not need to fully explain the battle itself. The same cannot be said of today as Waterloo approaches its bicentennial. Therefore it is essential to keep the events of 1815 in context to better understand the evolution of Waterloo’s memory. The most useful means of doing so is to try and distinguish between the Battle of Waterloo and the Waterloo Campaign.

Escaping from Elba in March 1815, Napoleon quickly consolidated his hold over France in a sudden march on Paris. Assuming once again the title Emperor of the French, the Allied powers in Vienna ignored Napoleon’s entreaties for peace. Hoping to forestall another invasion of France, Napoleon gathered his most veteran legions and marched to defeat the nearest Allied armies: the Duke of Wellington’s Allied Army in Flanders, consisting of British, Dutch and German troops, and Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher’s Prussian force on the Rhine. Although outnumbered by both armies, Napoleon took advantage of his central position to prevent Blücher and Wellington from uniting. Napoleon’s intention was to defeat each army in detail. Although Napoleon inflicted a severe reverse upon the Prussians at the town of Ligny on June 16, his subordinate Marshal Ney was only able to fight Wellington to a bloody stalemate northwest of Ligny in the hamlet of Quatre-Bras that same day. Despite his heavy Allied losses, including the

---

17 The number of histories dealing with the Battle of Waterloo is vast. The most modern and up to date synthesis of military scholarship on the battle is Jeremy Black’s The Battle of Waterloo (New York: Random House, 2010). Although first published during the early nineteenth century, William Siborne’s The Waterloo Campaign, 1815 (Westminster: A. Constable, 1895) still is one of the most thoroughly documented histories of this battle utilizing interviews with the battle’s participants. David Chandler’s The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: Macmillan, 1966) provides a balanced and modern view of the battle from the opposing sides. Moving more towards social history, the chapter on Waterloo in John Keegan’s The Face of Battle (New York: Viking Press, 1976) represented the battle from the perspective of the common soldier rather than generals.
infamous “Black Duke” of Braunschweig-Lüneburg, Frederick William, Quatre-Bras bought Wellington time to retreat to the more defensible position along and behind a series of ridges southeast of the town of Waterloo. Ahead of these ridges, the Allied army anchored its line around three strong points— the stone chateau of Hougoumont, the farmhouse of La Haye Saint, and a series of sandpits and defiles. Napoleon, erroneously believing that Blücher was in full retreat, sent the bulk of his army against Wellington’s position on June 18. He detailed a corps under Marshal Emmanuel de Grouchy to pursue Blücher and prevent him from uniting with Wellington, but the Prussians evaded Grouchy’s detachment and marched to unite with Wellington. Blücher persuaded his subordinates August von Gneisenau and Hans von Ziethen that their best option was to march their full force to Wellington. The French attack on Wellington’s position came in three waves. Napoleon delayed the first attack by General comte D’Erlon’s infantry corps upon La Haye Saint and the defiles because of the rains the night before had hampered his deployment of its artillery support. Although this attack made some progress, a timely cavalry charge under General Uxbridge fatally disrupted the French effort. Because Wellington’s main force was located behind the ridges, Ney confused arriving British reinforcements for retreating troops and launched a massive but futile cavalry assault onto prepared British and Dutch infantry in the center of Wellington’s line. Napoleon, seeing that his two assaults had failed and now under pressure from Blücher’s renewed advance to cut off his lines of communication with France, launched one last attack that evening at 7:30 PM. Using his only remaining fresh troops, the elite Imperial Guard, he attacked Wellington’s position left of the still-defended Hougoumont. Responding to yet another attack, Wellington is reputed to have said “O for night to arrive, or Blücher!” Catching fire upon multiple sides from the Anglo-Dutch, the hitherto undefeated Guard collapsed, precipitating a French rout from the field. Meeting with
Blücher at the chateau of Belle-Alliance, Wellington did not pursue his defeated foe with the rigor advocated by his German ally. Nevertheless the Waterloo campaign was over and Napoleon had lost as the dispirited French field army disintegrated.

The swift collapse of the French army after its retreat highlights the complex nature of the 1815 campaign. It was highly uncharacteristic for armies of the late-Napoleonic period to collapse after a single defeat, as evidenced by the swift recovery of the Prussians after Ligny. Jeremy Black notes that the political paranoia that followed Napoleon’s return helped precipitate an unparalleled collapse among French armies after the Guard’s retreat. With the benefit of hindsight, Napoleon’s defeat was something of a foregone conclusion. His strategy to retain his throne was strategic nonsense; had he defeated both Blücher and Wellington he would have had to defeat the even larger Russian and Austrian armies advancing from Germany. Napoleon’s grand strategy was roughly analogous to that of Hitler’s invasion of Russia in 1941 in that its planning and execution emphasized a series of military victories that were logistically impossible to sustain over the long run and had the inadvertent effect of cementing a fractious political alliance. Nor was Napoleon’s army in 1815 capable of this ambitious task. Its size was only slightly more than a fifth of the 1812 Grand Armee and the French command structure was too rigid, especially in comparison to its enemies. In the case of the Prussians, the adaptation of an organized general staff system allowed for Prussian army to recuperate from defeat far quicker than Napoleon anticipated despite the fact that Blücher suffered injuries at Ligny and was not in command for several hours. By contrast Napoleon required Grouchy to strictly adhere to his vague orders, resulting in the Prussian attack upon Napoleon’s flank in the late afternoon. Yet although the problematic nature of Napoleon’s strategy was apparent and became fodder for

---

18 Black, Waterloo, 146-47.
19 For more on the emergence of the Prussian general staff, see Gordon A. Craig’s The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), 58-65.
generations of military historians, this study’s research indicates that the gate-keepers of the Waterloo memory would prefer the uncomplicated narrative of the fate of Europe being decided in a single day to that of a campaign doomed to a foregone conclusion. As we shall see, the events of those June days would run wild in the imaginations of Britons and Germans for a century.
CHAPTER 1
WATERLOO IN BRITISH MEMORY: 1815-1915

I shall not be far wrong in asserting that there exists not in the United Kingdom, man, woman, or child, who has not either seen pictures or panoramas of Waterloo, heard songs on Waterloo, read books on Waterloo, talked for weeks about Waterloo, and full two-thirds of the adult population could not rest until they journeyed forth to have a look at Waterloo.- Harry Austin

Thus spoke “Harry Austin” the narrator of the allegedly autobiographical 1838 military picaresque novel *Guards, Hussars, and Infantry: Adventures of Harry Austin*. Representing something of an everyman of the British Army; Austin fought with Wellington throughout the Spanish Peninsula, observed the titanic battles of Vittoria and Waterloo, and ended his military career back in England with his lovely Spanish wife whom Austin rescued from the privations of a corrupt nunnery. What was ironic and noteworthy about this novel was that its author does not bother to describe the battles that were the denouement of his military service. His account instead focused on an archetypical British rogue’s escapades coupled with wry comments on the avariciousness of moneylenders and the dandyism of his fellow officers. The above passage suggested that within the space of a little over twenty years, the British reading public had been so saturated by Waterloo that this anonymous author felt that leaving only the barest description of this event would set him apart from his contemporaries.

In many respects, the self-effrontery of *Guards, Hussars, and Infantry* encapsulated the dilemmas and opportunities that the memory of the Battle of Waterloo posed to Britons over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Battle of Waterloo represented the climax of British involvement in over twenty years of war with France. The Duke of Wellington cemented his already considerable reputation by commanding an army that put an end to Napoleon’s brief attempt to return to power. Although Britain’s cumulative contribution to the

---

defeat of Napoleon was on a scale similar to that of her continental allies, the symbolism of Wellington’s victory magnified British self-perception of the nation’s preeminence in this struggle. As the din and horror of battle faded, Waterloo became an iconic image in British popular memory. The status this event enjoyed among Britons as an example of a native martial valor and prowess fed the expectation that postwar depictions of Waterloo correspond to those ideas. While some authors on the Napoleonic era would eschew this trope, many would end up embracing and expanding upon it.

This was made easier by the fact that for many in the nineteenth century, the general course of Waterloo was very well-known among the British public. In many respects, Waterloo was an unprecedented experience for Regency Era Britain. The nation’s proximity to the Low Countries ensured that Waterloo was less of an abstraction to the public than the battlefields in the Iberian Peninsula or Mediterranean. The sequential course of the battle, coupled with the sudden collapse and retreat of the French imparted an inherent sense of drama to the battle. Furthermore, Waterloo was a decisive battle. Years of hard fighting had followed the great British victories of Trafalgar in 1805 and Salamanca in 1812, something that was not the case with Waterloo. All this made it easier for Britons to attach meaning to the events of June 16-18. British writers and artists could glean from Waterloo answers to the larger questions of Britain’s place in the world. This utilitarian approach to history mirrored the idea of a usable past developed by the American historian James Harvey Robinson. “The present,” wrote Robinson, “has hitherto been the willing victim of the past; the time has come when it should turn on the past and exploit it in the interests of advance.”

mentally refight Waterloo, this cultivation of historical memory often attempted to place and orientate Victorian and Edwardian eras into a wider current of a glorious past.

Yet the militaristic nature of Waterloo ensured that there were limits to this expansion of Britishness. By its very nature, the act of extolling Wellington’s Army meant extolling the contemporary British Army. The institution was closed off to many in British society, and as the century wore on the Army increasingly became the bastion of an aristocratic ethos at odds with the industrialized world. Building upon Linda Colley’s thesis, James Peck’s examination of Victorian war novels argued that “because of the nature of revolutionary threat Napoleon represented, [Victorian novels] reaffirmed the importance of traditional, that is to say aristocratic, leadership…and cling on to an aristomilitary code at the very time when Britain was changing its social, political, and cultural composition.”

By the same token, Scott Hughes Myerly concluded that this martial ethos expressed through military spectacle represented a way for Victorians to acclimate to the machine age by embracing an organization which turned individuals into a disciplined machine while retaining a small preindustrial hierarchy at its apex. An examination of popular depictions of Waterloo supports both historians’ conclusions. The memory of Waterloo, especially in literature directed at children, attempted to reaffirm as eternal a particular British martial identity that originated in the eighteenth century struggle with France. Correspondingly, this strand of historical memory simultaneously expanded and restricted a sense of British identity to lines first developed during this earlier period.

These multiple imagined Battles of Waterloo had strong implications for the creation of British identity during the nineteenth century. By continuing this essential struggle through popular depictions of the Battle of Waterloo, the Victorian and Edwardian gatekeepers of

---

22 Peck, War, the Army and Victorian Literature, 4.
23 Myerly, British Military Spectacle, 170-1.
memory ensured that eighteenth-century precepts of Britishness would find new currency. An important aspect of this new century-long conflict was that it was in reality fictive. Until 1914, Britain only fought small wars and none of them with France. Therefore this sense of British identity had more leeway than its eighteenth-century counterpart; it could attempt to incorporate a wider array of Britons to include in the national story. The nobility of its enemies could also reflect to Britain’s greater benefit.

The development of memory of Waterloo evolved along three overlapping phases from 1815-1914. The first phase, running from roughly 1815 to the 1850s cemented a popular narrative of the battle in the consciousness of the British populace, exalting the figure of Wellington as a paternalistic savior of the nation from Napoleonic despotism. The memorialization of this period saw Britain’s prosperous European position as a natural consequence of the efforts of its armies in Flanders. Poems, dioramas and stage productions all tapped into this popular current to project a vision of a collective identity gained through war. From the 1850s to the 1870s, the memory of Waterloo became more unstable. Britain’s preeminence on the continent was no longer as assured as it was earlier, and newspaper editorials show how efforts at Waterloo memorialization sometimes met with a more jaundiced eye. Yet the importance of this battle meant that there were significant efforts to recast the myth of the fight against France into a more universal effort suitable for the new world Britannia found herself inhabiting. These efforts paid dividends during the late-Victorian and Edwardian eras, as the emerging middle-class culture embraced the ideals of chivalry and militaristic nationalism that earlier conceptions of Waterloo had already inculcated. Paintings, new dioramas, and children’s literature all contributed to a metamorphosis of Waterloo into a vision that while not as anti-French as earlier conceptions, proved to be even more militantly British and hero-
worshiping than its predecessor. By the eve of the First World War, Waterloo had become a potent cultural metaphor for British life, albeit one divorced from the realities of 1815.

PHASE ONE: ENGLAND AND VICTORY!

News of Napoleon’s defeat caused a sensation in Britain even as the battle itself had just ended. The proximity of the Low Countries and Britain’s command of the seas ensured that his victory in the field quickly became a cause for national celebration. Wellington’s skills at self-promotion, honed by years of service in the Peninsula, contributed greatly to the theatrical elements of this celebration. On June 21, he sent his aide-de-camp Henry Percy with his dispatch along with two captured French eagles. According to one contemporary, after informing Downing Street, Percy interrupted a ball “pushing aside everyone who happened to be in his way, darting upstairs, into the ballroom, stepping hastily up to the Regent, dropping on one knee, laying the flags at his feet, and pronouncing the words ‘Victory, Sir, Victory!’”24 Napoleon’s abdication and casting himself as Themistocles before the British nation only added to a greater sense of British superiority in banishing Napoleon from Europe.

In this climate of national euphoria, the British mercantile instinct that Napoleon often commented on found itself unchecked. The former emperor’s carriage, captured by Prussian troops during the retreat, became the property of the Egyptian Hall in Piccadilly. The proprietor of the popular museum, William Bullock, claimed in 1818 that this carriage, along with Napoleon’s wardrobe, horses, and his Dutch coachman had in this venue and its travelling exhibitions received 110,000 visitors at a schilling a head.25 The panorama painter and entrepreneur Henry Aston Barker rushed to the battlefield to gather evidence for an authentic

recreation of the battle. He would use this data to construct a massive panorama of the battlefield in March 1816 in Leicester Square. The 360-degree painting revolved around a central platform and offered the London crowds an authentic Waterloo experience through the use of stage lighting and movement of the canvas. Barker’s panorama, like Napoleon’s carriage, proved an immense draw for British crowds, netting its proprietor a profit of over £10,000 within a few months. The presence of a rival panorama on the Strand did not hurt Barker’s profits, and he was able to amass a considerable fortune from ticket sales and commemorative pamphlets and etchings. These panoramas and popular amusements became an inexpensive way for Britons to participate in national celebration. For those with greater financial means, the battlefield itself became one of the top destinations for British tourists. The Belgians cleared the battle’s detritus while shaping the landscape to better suit the expectations of its visitors. For example, within a year of the battle, the locals had erected forty-foot tall wooden scaffold at the French position to observe the battlefield from the perspective of Napoleon. Locals sold relics of the battle ranging from spent cannonballs to leftover remains of soldiers’ kits, such as broken muskets or boots. On a more grisly level, the teeth of so many dead young men allegedly became a boon for nineteenth-century dentists and the moniker “Waterloo Teeth” entered into popular vocabulary for natural dentures. The Romantic poet Walter Scott was also among the many tourists who visited the site in the immediate aftermath of the battle. Although the resulting poem 1815 “The Field of Waterloo” was one of many poems celebrating Wellington’s victory that year, Scott’s poem was particularly salient in that it addressed the theme of exactly how future generations should approach the memory of this epochal battle.

27 Milkes, A Battle’s Legacy 372-73.
29 Milkes, A Battle’s Legacy, 377.
Scott approached Waterloo from the perspective of a British Romantic in that he saw that the closest analogy humans could have of the death and suffering was the natural landscape. Noting the farmland surrounding the fields juxtaposed with the shattered spires of Hougoumont, he mused:

Than that which peasant’s scythe demands,
   Was gathered in by sterner hands,
   With bayonet, blade, and spear.
   No vulgar crop was theirs to reap,
   No stinted harvest thin and cheap!
   Heroes before each fatal sweep
   Fell thick as ripened grain\(^{30}\)

These human sheaves of grain found themselves between the goals of two giant forces of will: Napoleon and Wellington. Like his Romantic contemporary Benjamin Robert Haydon, the two commanders are analogous in their superhuman abilities; Wellington happened to be a more pure form of the Napoleonic genius shorn of its overweening ambition. Scott’s Napoleon emerges as an active force of nature, ordering his men to repeatedly charge, and Wellington’s task is to use his sublime powers of command to inspire his men to resist this onslaught:

   But HE [Wellington], his country’s sword and shield,
   Still in the battle-front revealed,
   Where danger fiercest swept the field,
   Came like a beam of light,
   In action prompt, in sentence brief -
   “Soldiers, stand firm!” exclaimed the Chief,
   “England shall tell the fight!”\(^{31}\)

Semmel notes the battlefield itself became for Scott a living embodiment of memory of this struggle of men against the world; the tree under which Wellington had his command post became especially significant.\(^{32}\) The gradual absorption of the human relics of the battlefield

\(^{30}\) Walter Scott “The Field of Waterloo” V, lines 4-10.
\(^{31}\) Ibid., X, lines 11-18.
\(^{32}\) Semmel, “Reading the Tangible,” 20-1.
paralleled that of previous empires such as Greece or Rome. Thus by combining all these factors, Waterloo became one of the most illustrious in the pantheon of British military victories:

In many a field of bloody conquest known,
--Such may by fame be lured, by gold be hired:
'Tis constancy in the good cause alone
Best justifies the deed thy valiant sons have won.  

Britain’s magnanimity in victory, the nobleness of the Duke of Wellington, and the ease at which British troops were able to translate their commander’s will clearly indicate to the reader what type of bloody field the one in Belgium has become.

Although lacking the subtlety of Scott’s other poetry, “The Field of Waterloo” proved to be a respectable seller, going into the third edition three months after its October publication. Although few in this first cohort of the memory cult of Waterloo would go as far as Scott in his Romanticist elitism, the core values of Britain’s noble sacrifice and Wellington’s native genius were apparent in other, more plebian, Waterloo entertainments. One of the most prominent of these was the equestrian show The Battle of Waterloo performed at Astley’s Amphitheater in 1824. The show ran for 144 consecutive performances, the whole season, and Wellington attended not once, but twice.  

Combining bare-bones theater with what would later be the forerunner of the modern circus, Astley’s Amphitheater originated from the efforts of a father and son British cavalry veterans: Philip Astley senior and junior. During the Napoleonic Wars, Astley’s performed numerous reenactments of land and naval battles such as Trafalgar or the storming of the Bastille. The plays themselves were often simplistic morality tales, but with performed with pomp and a claim for the highest historical fidelity. According to Gillian Russell’s examination of popular entertainments like Astley’s, “people attended not because their entertainments were

---

33 Scott, Conclusion, lines 50-4.
34 Peck, War, the Army and Victorian Literature, 145.
more or less theatrical but because theater, like the camp and the parade ground, created the desire to see war.”

The play, written by J. H. Amherst, examined Waterloo from the perspectives of the leadership and the rank and file from both sides. Although Napoleon comes across as a man of destiny and nobility, he cannot persuade a captured British trooper, Corporal Standfast, to betray his King. Touched by his loyalty, he rewards this corporal with his liberty and a star from his own jacket. The French ranker, a Monsieur Maladroit does not have the same courage as Standfast. In the second scene, Maladroit, a French deserter in Ligny hints at the future betrayal of his Emperor to two Belgian girls: When de French speak to me, I say, ‘Long live the Emperor!’ and when de English do speak to me, I sing out ‘God save Great George our King!’

Standfast, his liberty given by Napoleon, still has important papers about the French disposition to give to Wellington, but was captured by Antoine. Molly Maloney, a female Irish camp follower rescued Standfast and reunited him with his love, Mary. The last dialogue of the play was Wellington and his staff mounting their chargers, crying “Now, gentlemen let’s on the field, and share all the danger: for the honour of England, we must be resolute, and noble cry—‘England and Victory!’” The stage directions ended with a full battle, instructing Napoleon, for all his earlier magnanimity, to beat a hasty retreat right after Molly entered the fray with her own pistols.

*The Battle of Waterloo* attracted widespread praise during its first run. According to the *Drama or Theatrical Pocket Magazine*, the production was “gargantuan in everything except

---

37 Ibid., 17.
dullness.” The Times praised the equestrian horsemanship. “The horses of the cavalry behaved quite as well as if they had been in the fight with their riders,” according to its reviewer. Just as in Scott’s epic poem, the martial glory of Waterloo shared an innate connection with the authenticity and prowess of the British character, as exemplified by men such as Standfast and Wellington. The attention to historical fidelity, advertised by the Astleys and noted by the Times’ review, had less to do with The Battle of Waterloo’s plausibility than with the fact that it fed into what was fast becoming the accepted memory of Waterloo among the British public. Too much attention to historical fidelity could prove hazardous for those who worked against the grain of the Waterloo memory, as would be the case in William Siborne’s model.

In 1830, acting on behalf of the government, Major-General Rowland Hill contracted Siborne, a trained topographical surveyor in the British Army, to construct an accurate model of Napoleon’s third attack of the day for the United Service Museum. Siborne was a highly meticulous researcher and spent several months in Belgium surveying the battlefield to produce an accurate scale of the land’s topography. Being conversant in German, he also solicited accounts of the battle from Prussian sources as well as many of the surviving British and French officers. The result was a diorama of the battle as Siborne conceived of it at 7:00 PM, with the Imperial Guard bearing down upon Wellington’s position while a sizable Guard detachment defended Napoleon’s rear against Blücher’s advancing Prussians. Measuring 21 x 19 feet the diorama contained 80,000 10 mm French, British, and Prussian figurines, each representing two individual soldiers. Siborne had since incurred significant debts researching and constructing the model as the new Whig government had withdrawn the support for a project that would

38 Drama or Theatrical Pocket Magazine, quoted in Peck, War, the Army and Victorian Literature, 145.
enhance the prestige of the leader of the rival Tories. More importantly, Siborne’s recreation had called into question the authenticity of Wellington’s original June dispatch which had downplayed the Prussian contribution to this moment of crisis. Upon its exhibition in Egyptian Hall, Wellington refused to visit the Siborne’s creation. In a letter to Lady Wilton, he justified his absence, “I was unwilling to give any sanction to the truth of such representation in this Model, which must have resulted in my visiting it, without protesting such erroneous representation.”

In addition to his debts, Siborne now found himself the object of institutional hostility in British Army institutions such as the *United Service Journal* and found his military career had stalled.

Siborne’s case illustrates one of the fundamental characteristics of the politics of memory: that history serves mythology rather than the other way around. Siborne’s professional career ended despite the fact that the model won wide praise. *The Times* raved the Siborne had “has executed his task with great accuracy, and presented the public a plan of the great event of the day which will convey a better notion than a mere map or the reading a mere account without auxiliary explanation.”

Yet Siborne’s quest for historical accuracy had tread upon those who were the prime beneficiaries of this memory. Wellington had no problem with the inaccuracies of Astley’s *The Battle of Waterloo*, but Siborne’s model undercut his position as the sole victor over Napoleon during the assault of the Guard. This put an interesting twist upon Patrick J. Geary’s suggestion that once scholarly premises have been “projected onto [a] period have been accepted, political leaders can draw out policy implications to suit their political agenda.”

In this case, Wellington, as the author of the dispatches from the battlefield, helped lay out the

---

41 Quoted in Ibid., 166.
42 “Plan Of The Battle Of Waterloo” *The Times* October 5, 1838, 4.
foundation of the British perceptions of Waterloo. This memory’s tap into a primal form of British identity ensured that he could use public memory to gain political power. However the image of Wellington and Waterloo as paragons of British military supremacy and virtue had potential liabilities, especially for British conservative Tories. When British militia troops attacked a Manchester radical protest at St. Peter’s Field on 16 August 1819, killing 15, the radical press was able to use the memory of Waterloo against the conservative Liverpool government by calling the event the Peterloo Massacre. Labor historian E. P. Thompson noted that Peterloo energized a moribund political radicalism that had been cowed by censorship and post-1815 patriotism. Wellington’s public stature ensured he would be a de facto symbol for the Tory party, but his tenure as prime minister from 1828-30 was far from popular, especially as Irish political agitation forced him to accede to Catholic Emancipation. The Duke’s military-style leadership and inexperience with politics ensured that his partnership with the political head of the Tories, Robert Peel, was less than ideal. His unpopularity reached a nadir when in the summer of 1832, a radical London crowd assaulted this symbol of the “Old Corruption” due to his party’s opposition to political reform. Although he assumed near-dictatorial powers as the head of a Conservative caretaker government in 1834, his underwhelming political fortunes meant that it was only after Wellington’s gradual removal from active party life could the Tories fully capitalize on the memory of Waterloo by returning him to the status of a symbol of the conservative nation.

In the case of local Tory clubs Waterloo Day became a date to affirm loyalty to the crown and to rally conservatives after the political setbacks of the 1820s and 30s. Milkes notes that local Tory festivals and banquets on the anniversary of Waterloo emerged as an important part of

---

the calendar of conservative counter-demonstrations to radical dining groups.\textsuperscript{46} Waterloo became a potent symbol in Tory associational life as exemplified in the 1837 song “The Hero of a Hundred Fights” reprinted in the Tory newspaper \textit{The Derby Mercury}. Meant to carry “Conservatism to the piano-fortes and harps of our fair countrywomen” the song extols Wellington’s victories spanning from India to Waterloo as a symbol of Old England:

\begin{verbatim}
The Champion of Old England’s fame,  
The Hero of a hundred fights!  
How oft along the swelling waves,  
When many a well-fought field was won,  
Hath Triumph borne the self-same song  
Of Victory and Wellington!  
Fill high the cup to him whose sword  
For years maintain’d his country’s rights.\textsuperscript{47}
\end{verbatim}

In this case Wellington and Waterloo represented England’s past glories, Peel and the current Tory leadership represented the road to future prosperity. Underneath the \textit{Derby Mercury’s} ode to Wellington is a song extolling Peel, “England’s Hope, or With Peel For Our Pilot”, in which the author claims to express “the feeling of the hero of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington himself, when saying that the subject of the next song is truly England’s hope.”\textsuperscript{48} Engaging in this language of patriotism, the Tories claimed Waterloo’s place in British politics for themselves. An 1835 article in \textit{Blackwood’s Magazine} used Waterloo celebrations to impugn the patriotism of the publication’s Whig opponents. “Of all days in the year most hateful to the Whigs is the 18th of June,” the editorial claimed. It then listed a variety of stock arguments Whigs allegedly used to strip Wellington of his military glory, such as his needing to have the Prussians save his army.\textsuperscript{49} This denial of Britain’s glory was in stark contrast to an Edinburgh Tory Waterloo banquet, where its chairman extolled Wellington as the bringer of peace and

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 317.  
\textsuperscript{47} Anonymous, “Conservative Songs” \textit{The Derby Mercury} May 3, 1837.  
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{49} Anonymous, “Anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo,” \textit{Blackwood’s Magazine} 38 (July 1835), 114.
freedom to both Britain and the continent. Referencing Wellington’s assumption of all executive positions in 1834, the chairman asserted:

Although his tenure of office was short, it was successful in removing some of the prejudices which had been instilled into the minds of the people—in demonstrating to them, that the opinions and principles which he advocated were not only not incompatible with liberal government, but were essential to preservation, and in reminding them of what was in danger of being forgotten, namely, the vast importance of sincerity and integrity as ingredients in the character of public men.50

In these above cases demonstrate how during a time of British political definition the memory of Waterloo became enfolded into the new vocabulary of the British right.

This politically-orientated reading of Waterloo was not the only way the British government celebrated the battle. Milkes observes that Whig newspapers covering the Tory banquets decried conservatives’ monopolization of Waterloo, which they asserted was a national victory.51 The Waterloo Medal bolstered such an opinion. Cast from silver, the medal featured a portrait of the Prince Regent on one side and a Goddess of Victory between the words “Wellington” and “Waterloo” on its back. A novelty of the item was that the recipient of the medal had his name, rank, and regiment embossed by machine on the medal’s edges.52 In an unprecedented move, all soldiers, regardless of rank, were eligible to receive this medal provided that they served the British Army in any capacity in Flanders from 16-18 June 1815. The decision to commemorate only Waterloo rankled many British Army veterans who did not serve in Waterloo, leading eventually to the establishment of a silver General Service Medal for all participants in the war from 1793-1814, with clasps to signify other major battles. These medals signified the start of an important aspect of Waterloo, the commemoration of the common soldier. Previous parliamentary medals and awards only celebrated the commanders, but now

50 Ibid., 118.
51 Milkes, A Battle’s Legacy, 322.
government praised the sacrifices and services of all British subjects in service to the crown, a process that would continue into the modern British Army.

Another way Parliament showed its new commitment to the ordinary soldiers was through its commission of Daniel Maclise’s painting *The Meeting of Wellington and Blücher*.53 Measuring twelve feet high and forty-six feet long, this fresco adorned the Royal Gallery of the newly-rebuilt Hoses of Parliament in 1861. Like previous paintings of Wellington and Waterloo, such as George Jones’s *The Battle of Waterloo*, Maclise’s fresco placed Wellington at the composition’s focal point. However, surrounding the two generals is a charnel house of death and destruction. Wellington grasps Blücher’s hand, but neither commander seems jubilant over their victory over Napoleon. Religious imagery abounds in the fresco; several men grasp at crucifixes, and in one poignant episode to the right of Wellington, three soldiers recreate a *pieta*. In the latter case, political symbolism abounds, the dead soldier was Frederick Howard, a soldier eulogized by Byron in his poem ‘Childe Harold’, and his companions wear the uniforms of an English Foots Guard, a Scots Highlander, and an Irish Fusilier. In this way British culture fused with British politics, elevating the scene of death into one of collective sacrifice from all components of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the sober painting’s depiction of death highlighted that at the mid-nineteenth century as the original participants of Waterloo started to die off. The surrealist atmosphere could only be expected as generations with no experience of the Napoleonic Wars tried to depict their ultimate meaning.

**PHASE TWO: NOTHING WHICH YOUNGER GENERATIONS NEED BE AT PAINS TO COMMEMORATE**

In 1846, London authorities installed the largest equestrian statue in Britain on Hyde Park

---

53 The following description is based on details gleaned from the governmental website *Explore Parliament*’s page on the Maclise’s painting. [http://www.explore-parliament.net/nssMovies/06/0647/0647_.htm](http://www.explore-parliament.net/nssMovies/06/0647/0647_.htm)
Corner. Measuring 30 feet high, 26 feet long, and 22 feet in girth, the statue was of Wellington and his Waterloo horse, Copenhagen. Many, including Queen Victoria, considered this bronze statue to be an eyesore. As the city of London expanded, the London authorities eventually removed the statue to the Aldershot Military Town in 1883. *Punch*, the leading satirical journal of the Victorian age, sensed an obvious opportunity, and published a satire entitled “The Poor Duke (A Legend of Hyde Park and Piccadilly)” in which the specter of the deceased Duke wanders the streets London. Confronting a policeman outside the former Astley’s, Wellington’s ghost inquired:

“Well, and how did the Battle go last night?”
“What Battle, Sir?” asked the policeman.
“Why, ‘The Battle of Waterloo.’ Surely they played it?”
“Played it!” replied the custodian of the law. “Why-Sir, they haven’t played *that* for the last twenty years or more! Why it’s almost forgotten.”

After failing to receive comfort from other statued luminaries such as John Stuart Mill or George IV, Wellington and his steed drowned themselves in the bed of the Serpentine. Aside from its acerbity, *Punch*’s lampoon was notable for how it revealed the tensions latent in remembering Waterloo as 1815 became more remote. Through monuments and commemorations, the Battle of Waterloo might be present among the British public, but its memory would have to have to be recast to reflect a new form of identity to retain its relevance in a changed world.

*The Times* was one of the first to note how the heroic mode of Scott and Amherst was inapplicable to the world of 1865. In a June 27 editorial, the author asserted that the results of Waterloo were very meager. “The treaties which followed [Waterloo] have been torn to shreds,” the editorial stress, “and more remains of the Thirty Years’ War than of the Waterloo campaign.

---

54 Antony McCallum, *1st Duke of Wellington astride Copenhagen his charger in Matthew Wyatt’s statue on Round Hill, Aldershot*, http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e5/Wellingtonstatue.jpg
The restored Bourbons were driven out of France again, twice over. The proscribed dynasty came back again, and reigns now.” Applying a counterfactual revisionism, *The Times*’s author concluded that Louis Napoleon’s Empire reflected the type of empire his uncle would have created had he been more predisposed to negotiation in 1815. In a reversal of the earlier patriotic memory, it concluded:

The ideas -which [Napoleon] represented survived; the dynasty which he founded rose again and the ruins on which his throne had been raised it was found beyond our power to reconstruct. Under such circumstances, we think the celebration of Waterloo might as well be discontinued. The victory was a splendid military achievement, but the policy which the war expressed was no enduring or successful policy. The battle was a battle which soldiers may well remember but it decided nothing which younger generations need be at the pains to commemorate.57

Two years later, *Punch* would offer a similar sentiment about the meager results of 1815 for the present day in “Two Eighteenths of June.” Noting that the Austro-Prussian War began on the anniversary of Waterloo, *Punch* connected the more illustrious efforts of Britain’s 1815 forbearers with its Palmerston-counterpart:

Holy Alliance! Then we saw
Prussian, Russian, and Austrian combine O'er Europe’s war-blurred map to draw
The measuring-tape and marking-line. France crush'd, and revolution done,
And peoples taught they can't be free— 'Tis strange, when vultures are at one,
How wonderfully they agree!
Now, see this goodly work unpick’d—
Holy Alliance drawing swords! Eighteen-fifteen’s arrangements kicked
To shivers by its sovereign lords: Napoleon's forfeit name, once more,
Symbol of European power, France at peace, arbiter of war.
The Emperor master of the hour!
And England folding brawny hands,
And looking on with even heart, As one who by a quarrel stands,
With neither brawler taking part— Oh, startling difference in the tune58

56 Anonymous, “There must be something strangely attractive in the story of Waterloo” *The Times* June 27, 1865, 11.
57 Ibid.
Some British intellectuals would try to understand French defeat in 1870-71 in the context of a repeat of Waterloo. For example, an 1870 *Birmingham Daily Post* review of a pro-Napoleon French book on Waterloo argued that the numbers decided the 1815 battle, a lesson that Wellington knew but neither Napoleon nor his nephew truly understood. The inability of the French to grasp this meant that in both cases “there was some strange miscalculations on the part of the French Marshals, the same underrating of the enemy forces, and still more of his prudent intelligence.”\(^59\) Despite this comfort of history’s repetition, it was clear that the German Wars of Unification ushered in a new form of industrial conflict quite unlike that of Napoleonic Era.

The above cases suggested that the previous memory of Waterloo could no longer be plausible; whatever the sacrifices of its arms and the genius of its commander, it could not be said that it created a tangible and permanent settlement upon the continent. Yet Waterloo remained too much of an iconic image in British culture for it to remain fallow. Furthermore, Britain had suffered a string of imperial setbacks in the mid-nineteenth century such as the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857-59, which nearly ended British rule over India, and the Crimean War of 1853-56, which exposed to the British public the detrimental effects that an unreformed Napoleonic Era army such as the purchase of commissions could have on a modern battlefield. These blows underscored the need of a positive memory. The solution was for the meaning of Waterloo to be applied to a wider concept of British identity that was more congruent with the new nationalist Europe.

One way in which this occurred was by incorporating Waterloo as an exemplar of what Peck referred to as “Christian Militarism” in which “the military code of the Wellington era had

---

been refashioned into a moral and religious cause."\textsuperscript{60} The articulation of this ideology had started in the late 1840s amid the last remnants of the Wellington-centered memory cult but received a dynamic boost with the advent of mass media depictions of British troops during the Crimean War. Olive Anderson’s analysis notes that the Crimean War allowed the British middle classes to see their army as a People’s Army reflecting their beliefs and values.\textsuperscript{61} Christian militarism also entailed a militarization of middle class society as middle class institutions such as political reform and missionaries adapted a martial regimen emphasizing hierarchy in the service of God.

In this ethos, the Waterloo men and Wellington were exemplars of the Christian soldier acting in conscience against a vague tyranny. Composed on the Duke’s death in 1852 by the Scot and staunch British nationalist, Charles Mackay’s song “A Dirge for Wellington” memorialized a figure of divine justice and protection was typical of this. The Duke was:

\begin{verbatim}
Shield of our laws!
   Ever in peril's night
   Heaven send such arm of might—
   Guardian of Truth and Right,—
   Raised in their cause!
\end{verbatim}

By the same token, the British officer, amateur geologist, and poet Thomas Austin would extol many of those same martial virtues discernable in the ordinary ranks of the Duke’s men.

Assuming the voice of one of the units, his poem “Waterloo: The Life Guardsmen’s Song” declared:

\begin{verbatim}
We pause not even to draw breath.
Thus we fight for England's fame,
   For home, and all that hear our name,
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{60} Peck, \textit{War, the Army and Victorian Literature}, 73.
For every tie that love may claim,  
Even to death.\textsuperscript{63}

Austin further empathized with the Waterloo veterans in his anonymous hero of “The Chelsea Pensioner” whom had left “half his limbs in Flanders or Spain” and urged his reader to:

\begin{quote}
Go see him on Sunday at church in his place,  
Where he prays at the altar in hopes to find grace,  
His God has his first thought, his sovereign the next,  
As his chaplain expounds the bless’d words of his text,  
Which bring peace to his bosom, and hope to his soul,  
As he thinks of the future, and looks to that goal  
Where his cares, and his sorrows, and trials, will cease,  
And his spirit inherit bless’d mansions of peace.\textsuperscript{64}
\end{quote}

In these two poems, there is no substantial difference between the stalwart warriors of Wellington’s legions and the pious pensioner at prayer; in either case the soldier attends to his duties with a mixture of determination and patriotism under the direction of a benevolent leader.

The most extreme vision of this worship of Wellington as a Christian soldier can be found in the 1861 article “Wellington’s Career” in the Anglican evangelical periodical \textit{The Christian Observer}. Ostensibly a review of Edward Bruce Hamley’s \textit{Wellington's Career: a Military and Political Summary}, the author argued that Hamley’s historical critiques of Wellington misread the divine providence evident in Wellington’s career. According to the reviewer “there is scarcely such another instance in the page of history of a man especially raised up, created, fitted, educated, and then placed in the exact sphere and department for which he had been prepared…that the Unseen Hand seems to come visibly forth, like the hand which wrote on the wall of Belshazzar's palace.”\textsuperscript{65} The reviewer proceeded to demonstrate that at every stage of Wellington’s military career he was out-numbered by superior forces, but providence assured his

\textsuperscript{64} Thomas Austin, “The Chelsea Pensioner,” in Ibid., 65  
victories. In the case of Waterloo, “Wellington’s Career” contended that Wellington was outnumbered through a complicated arithmetic in which a Prussian or Dutch soldier’s combat abilities only equaled half that of a British or French soldier. In this estimation, the arrival of the Prussians in the afternoon of the battle was irrelevant in that they were a nugatory force unequal to either the French or the British.

The article circumvented issues of Wellington’s complicity in the abuses of his troops after the siege of Badajoz by drawing equivalencies to the actions of the Israelites in the Old Testament. “Wellington’s Career” concluded by expanding this metaphor further by arguing that Wellington’s postwar controversies were like the mistakes committed by Solomon. Peel unscrupulously manipulated Wellington into backing Catholic Emancipation and the Duke also bore the brunt of negative criticism from the necessary opposition to political reform because of the Peel’s machinations. In this instance, the honest, divinely-ordained soldier became the cat’s-paw of venal and corrupt politician whose only goal was political power.

A Christian militarist interpretation of the memory of Waterloo was clearly invoked also in Waterloo, A Lay of Jubilee by William Selwyn. In contrast to the jubilee editorial in The Times, which advocated that Waterloo’s commemoration be forgotten due to Europe’s current political situation, this epic lay by Queen Victoria’s personal chaplain saw Waterloo as a universal Christian allegory. The moments of the battle were presented as a repeats of biblical episodes. The defenders of Hougoumont’s chateau endured their own fiery furnace, and Napoleon’s army was the new army of Pharaoh approaching a Redcoat sea.

---

66 Ibid., 147-48.
67 Ibid., 157-57.
68 William Selwyn, Waterloo, a Lay of Jubilee for June 18, A.D. 1815 (Cambridge: Deighton, Bell, 1865), 21, 41.
For Selwyn, Waterloo represented a particularly prominent example of when the whole of the United Kingdom faced a challenge with a united front. Uxbridge’s afternoon cavalry charge, consisting of the English Royals, the Scottish Greys, and the Irish Inniskillings and in “their Union charged the Kingdoms three.”69 The sacrifice and devotion of each nation in turn received due praise from Selwyn. Picton, the Welsh-born general who died repulsing D’Erlon’s advance, transformed an emblematic example of national sacrifice:

His men will still rush on, and evermore
Remember him, when battle rages fierce;
And deem they hear his rough but hearty cheer,
‘Come on! brave ragged rascals.’ He is fall’n;
Fall’n—but to rise again in after wars,
In many a soldier from the hills of Wales;
Who knowing how he lived, and how he died,
Will gladly yield up life for victory.70

Waterloo thus conveyed both unity and certainty for contemporary Britons. Building upon the Wellington-centered hero worship of the earlier period, the Duke, while mourning the dead, thanks God for the desired result.71 By using the memory of Waterloo to reflect an ideal polity, Britain’s unity metaphorically emerged from the experience of battle. All present-day Britons needed to do was trust God and their monarch, and the success of Waterloo would repeat itself.

This second iteration of the Waterloo reinforced the notion that the battle represented an extreme example of an essential British character under fire. This Britishness was united and capable of heroic feats when under proper leadership. As The Times and Punch pieces indicated, a strict historical interpretation of Waterloo could only maintain only the most tenuous connections to relevance in the industrial and national age. The Vienna Settlement that Waterloo secured was a dead letter in Europe by 1871. Yet if the memory cult surrounding Waterloo

---

69 Ibid., 28.
70 Ibid., 39.
71 Ibid., 82.
retreated into an imagined reverie of martial glory, then it allowed Britons to adapt this particular “lesson” of history towards any end. The final stanzas of Selwyn’s lay indicated the flexibility inherent to this approach. Referencing the Franco-British cooperation during the Crimean War, he concluded:

And when the peace was broken,  
those who fought The fight of giants on that awful day,  
With equal daring, but unequal end,  
Were found in arms, and conquering, side by side,  
Against the strong oppressor of the weak.\(^2^2\)

By the same token, *The Times* ahistorically observed that during the consecration of a new Belgian cemetery and memorial in 1890 that Belgium “profited as largely as Great Britain by British sacrifices, and has known how to use them to its permanent advantage. In the national developments, which unless for Waterloo would have been forever unattainable, it has cultivated the example of England, and has framed its institutions on English models.”\(^2^3\) The Belgians, despite their Orleanist-influenced constitution, become analogous to Britons by maintaining the memory of Waterloo through the monuments of this quintessentially British battlefield.

PHASE THREE: TO RENEW IN POPULAR MEMORY THE GREAT TRADITIONS OF THE IMPRIAL RACE TO WHICH WE BELONG

This retreat into imagination allowed Waterloo to enter into the twentieth century as a potent symbol for Britain’s power. By asserting that it was the historical battle itself that confirmed British identity, the popular memory of Waterloo could emerge independent of the cause itself. Therefore, British writers could empathize with their French foes to a much greater extent than before in that this imagined enterprise was a purely British conception. The desire for imperial unity, as expressed in Selwyn’s poem, became stronger as Scots, Welsh, Irish, and English united in a martial crusade. Such a sense of purpose and unity would be useful in the

\(^{2^2}\) Ibid., 83.  
\(^{2^3}\) Anonymous, “Every Englishman will rejoice in the honours” *The Times* August 28, 1890, 7.
sustaining the expansive imperial project late Victorians had inherited. Wellington remained an object of veneration and hero-worship, but the distinctions between the Duke and his soldiers was less well-defined in the art and literature this period.

One of the more spectacular uses of Waterloo in this period was an 1889 advertising campaign for Eno’s Fruit Salts, a popular sodium bicarbonate antacid. In a series of bold columns, the ad asked its viewers in large type:

Is the Fall of England’s Greatness Near At Hand?
Wellington at Waterloo!
What was Wellington’s ideal of this life?
To dare nobly, To live strongly, and never Hesitate in the sublime devotion to DUTY!
When Wellington rode into his infantry squares at Waterloo, as the diminished numbers closed up to receive a charge of French cavalry, he said to his men “Stand steady, lads; think of what they will say of us in England;” to which they replied “Never fear, Sir.”

In even smaller print, the ad claims that a man has no higher duty than to conquer pain; hence the need for Eno’s scientifically-derived antacids to conquer indigestion.

Aside from its absurd analogies and sensationalism, the Eno’s ad was notable for the way it illustrated how Waterloo had so permeated British culture that it became a stock symbol. The ad further shows how such a loose reading Waterloo seamlessly fit into the British Empire. At the ad’s bottom, smaller print informed the reader how Eno’s helped a regiment win the Battle of Kandahar during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80). According to the testimony of a British cavalry ranker, his regiment’s colonel gave his men a bottle of Eno’s before the battle, giving them a restful sleep. Bookending these two experiences in the advertisement drew the explicit connection that the modern British Army resembled the one of Wellington’s through its just hierarchy and devotion to duty. Rather than taking an antacid to ease stomach pain, the individual target of the Eno’s ad would vicariously recreate those moments in British history.

---

74 Eno’s Fruit Salts, “Is the Fall of England’s Greatness Near At Hand?” advertisement, The Penny Illustrated Paper and Illustrated Times, August 3, 1889, 158, emphasis original.
The painting *Scotland Forever!* by Elizabeth Thompson Butler exemplified this trend towards a focus upon an individual’s experience in the titanic struggle within a British collective mindset, albeit less histrionically. Butler’s painting was a notable success of the 1881 season and established her reputation as a premier painter in this genre. Based upon the Scottish Greys’ cavalry unit during Uxbridge’s charge, the canvas, exhibited at the Royal Academy in 1881, depicts a line of Scottish horse charging straight at the viewer. Through a skillful use of perspective, Butler’s painting drew the eye along a set path, creating a unified linear composition. The slightly exaggerated poses gave the painting a sense of swift movement. As *Punch*’s positive but typically caustic review mused, “our gallant troopers are charging so heavily that you might almost mistake them for so many Scotch hotelkeepers attacking a body of tourists from the South.” Like her previous paintings on the Crimean War, her battle compositions had as their subject the common soldier. This was a marked contrast to other, earlier battle portraits which often had a commander at its focal point. “I never painted for the glory of war,” Butler asserted in her autobiography, “but to portray its pathos and heroism.” By eschewing death though Butler’s paintings make the glory of war indistinguishable from its heroism. In doing so, she tapped into the larger late Victorian middle-class attitudes towards war and the military. Although composed of men from the lower orders of society, the military’s innate hierarchy and wartime experience drained the military of any baleful influence of its class origins. As J. W. M. Hichberger has noted, this rhetorical symbiosis between the soldier and his

---

corporate identity of his unit “could be used to simultaneously deify and dehumanize the men.”

Butler’s virtuosity in this genre only accentuated this connection between heroism and glory.

Although Butler publically eschewed the connection between heroism and martial glory, the emerging genre of children’s literature made no such claims. Looking through a survey of children’s adventure books, J. S. Bratton notices “that the overwhelming surface impression is that a blatant reiteration of racial pride, militaristic values, and a coarse enthusiasm for conquest characterizes serialized adventure stories.” Imbued with the ethos of the nationalistic public school environment, these books often placed Britain’s current prosperity as the natural byproduct of the heroic sacrifices of her military.

The 1870 inaugural issue of Beeton’s Own Magazine: An Illustrated Journal of Fact, Fiction, History, and Adventure has elements that confirmed Bratton’s observations. Priced and marketed directly at children, the first issue had a truncated reproduction of Maclise’s The Meeting of Wellington and Blücher along with an accompanying poem. Whereas the original painting emphasized death and destruction, the Beeton’s lithograph sanitized the composition by removing all of Maclise’s corpses. The stoic emotions of the commanders are a reflection of allied teamwork rather than a reaction to carnage. The accompanying poem “The Meeting of Wellington and Blücher” likened war into a sports match. It starts off with an allusion to the empire: Hear, all you boys of England, of Scotland, and of Wales./ Of the green isle of Ireland, the Mountains and the Vales/ The story of fierce Waterloo, ‘twixt two captains fought/ Who

never yet had met their match, in bloody fields though sought. According to the poem, the plans of Blücher and Wellington worked in perfect conjunction, Wellington acting as defense and Blücher as offense, allowing both to beat the French. The poem concluded by disparaging attempts to allocate victory to either captain; what was far more important was that Napoleon lost.

William Henry Fitchett’s juvenile history *Deeds that won the Empire: Historic Battle Scenes* also argued for a sanitized nationalism. In his preface he noted that his tales represented an “effort to renew in popular memory the great traditions of the Imperial race to which we belong.” Like *Beeton’s*, Fitchett’s publishers fixed the book’s price at a level affordable for children and it became a highly respectable seller, the six-penny edition selling over a 100,000 copies. Although his tome dealt mostly with naval battles, *Deeds that won the Empire* not surprisingly devoted a copious chapter to Waterloo. In this account, both British soldiers and their enemy came across as engaged in a chivalrous contest, whereas Britain’s Dutch and Prussian allies were less than able to meet the test of Napoleon’s genius. In a particular anecdote of extolling the nature of a hierarchal society, Fitchett relayed the story how a wealthy benefactor donated £500 for the bravest man at Waterloo. Wellington, the judge in this matter, rewarded Macdonnell, the commander of the Hougemount defense, who in turn donated this sum to his faithful sergeant. Fitchett also described acts of bravery and mercy on the battlefield, as Wellington’s troops sought to recognize the gallantry of their beaten foe. Although Wellington emerged as the day’s hero, Fitchett concluded that the Duke’s courage matched that of the

---

83 Fitchett, *Deeds that won the Empire*, 238.
“rawest British militia lad.” Such a connection between British children’s innate bravery during time of war would be even more pronounced in the genre of Boy’s Own Adventure books.

One of the most prolific writers of these stories was G. A. Henty who wrote over a hundred historical novels for children between 1867 and 1906. His Waterloo novel, *One of the 28th*, centered around the adventures of a young county squire Ralph Conway. Almost through with schooling at the start of the novel, Ralph visits a wealthy benefactor, Herbert Penfold, in 1813. While at the Penfold estate, a French privateer collided with Ralph’s fishing vessel and Ralph becomes a prisoner of the French on their cruise to the West Indies. The privateer’s captain treats Ralph honorably and he eventually earns his freedom in exchange for helping the ship escape capture in its West Indies base. Making his way back to Britain, Ralph obtains a commission in the prestigious 28th regiment through Penfold’s influence. After dispatching a bloodthirsty Irish bandit, the regiment deployed to Waterloo. The text then alternates between Henty’s didactic recitation of the battle’s events and the experience of Ralph and his loyal Irish subaltern Denis. Although Ralph lost his arm, he learned that Penfold has died and left him an estate of £25,000. Ralph ends the novel quietly retired at his country estate with Denis as his butler.

Although of dubious literary merit, *One of the 28th* illustrated how deeply martial virtues attached themselves to British identity at this time. Ralph’s training, complete with hazing and practical jokes such as filling Ralph’s boots with water, was more analogous to a late-Victorian boarding school environment than the harsh reality of British Army discipline during the Napoleonic Era. Henty also asserted that Wellington’s British army consisted mostly of raw recruits, as exemplified by Ralph; yet their innate moral character ensured they could surmount

---

84 Ibid., 276.  
the challenge posed by Napoleon’s veterans. Of these British character traits, courage was essential. “The British soldier is always at his gayest when the prospect of fighting is before him,” Henty wrote of the troops marching towards Waterloo.⁸⁶ Denis, the loyal, undereducated Irish servant to Ralph, acted as comic relief, whereas the Irish bandit, the Red Captain, represented a more sinister Ireland, a red-headed deserter from the Peninsular Wars.⁸⁷

M. B. Manwell’s novel *Geordie Stuart: A Novel of Waterloo* incorporated Christian militarism within this more chivalrous conception of warfare. The main character, a young boy named Geordie, is a scion of the Stuart line of the Charles Edward Stuart whose childhood is filled with reveries of martial glory. Trusted in the care of his uncle Mr. Joseph and aunt Miss Betsy while his father serves his British sovereign abroad, Geordie practices his swordplay more than his Kirk catechism, wishing to fight in a cause “as glorious as that of the Charlies.”⁸⁸ Geordie eventually fails his catechism, but his guardians realize that his true destiny is that other Scottish alternative to a churchman, a soldier. On his adventures in the countryside, Geordie befriends a captured French soldier only one year older than him. This Frenchman, a Provençal named Denise, is of a noble mien, but frightfully homesick for his native land. Geordie enlists the aid of Miss Betsy, stirred on by her youthful memories of “Bonnie Prince Charlie” and her Christian charity to the homesick boy, in an ultimately successful escape attempt. Geordie, after his father confirmed his Mr. Joseph’s conclusion that Geordie will never be a scholar, later obtains a commission in the Scot’s Greys, just in time for him to depart for Belgium in 1815.

Manwell would present Waterloo as Geordie’s ultimate rite of passage, both to for the process of becoming a man and as a religious Scot. While nervously awaiting the Iron Duke’s order to prepare for battle, Geordie wistfully pines for his native land, but once Wellington gives

---

⁸⁶ Ibid., 298.
⁸⁷ Ibid., 198-99.
the word to prepare for the field, the “Scot lad’s heart gave a frantic leap as a Highland pibroch thrilled out its wail, shrill and high, above the din.”  

When battle came, Geordie would have to master his passions and await the order to charge. In a scene reminiscent of *Scotland Forever!*, Geordie and the Scot’s Greys charge, “like a mighty, raging, foaming human sea let loose at last,” once Wellington’s “eagle eye” had spotted a mistake of Napoleon. 

Amid the French ranks is Geordie’s friend Denise and the two soldiers immediately recognize one another on the battlefield. Before the two can speak, Denise parries a mortal blow aimed at Geordie by another French soldier. The young Scot continues his fight, but returns after the battle to find his old comrade in tears. Geordie at first assumes that Denise is ashamed of his nation’s loss, but then realized that his friend is dying. He embraces Denise, kisses his forehead and assures him that when they meet in Heaven, there will be no sides and “no more death, no more parting.” 

Geordie returns home a hero, but Denise’s death causes him to shy away from extreme adulation and he embarks upon an illustrious military career in Burma, but always carries with the pious humility and notions of duty he learned in June 1815.

A noteworthy aspect of *Geordie Stuart* is the novel’s attitude to towards Scottish military history. Manwell used a portrait of the Scottish pretender Charles Edward Stuart as a metaphorical plot device which Geordie used as inspiration for a military career. At the end of the novel, Geordie hangs his medals under the approving eyes of his forbearer. 

The novel never acknowledges the contradiction of using Charles Edward Stuart, a Catholic who aspired to overthrow the Hanoverian dynasty, as source of inspiration for a Protestant warrior of the British Empire. Furthermore, Miss Betsy’s nostalgia for her “Bonnie Prince” becomes the harmless

---

89 Ibid., 108.  
90 Ibid., 112.  
91 Ibid., 119.  
92 Ibid., 123.
reverie of a woman recapturing her youth. Manwell’s ability to redraft this period of Scottish history from a period of rebellion and treason to a quaint, martial loyalism reflected the long-term impact of the Napoleonic Wars on Scotland’s public image in Britain. Milkes notes that Scottish-based regiments such as the Scot’s Greys would use the anniversaries of Waterloo to parade and bolster their image as Britain’s foremost warriors. Furthermore, Scottish military kit and dress such as kilts and bagpipes remained an anachronistic part of the Scottish regiments for the British Army through the twentieth century, thus drawing a tighter connection between Britain’s martial past and present with Scotland being its bridge.

Scotland’s success at recasting its checkered loyalist history was in marked contrast to that of Ireland. Although efforts such as the Maclise’s painting tried to associate Irish sacrifices in Waterloo, the sacrifices of Irish troops in 1815 could not transcend the vagaries of nineteenth-century Irish politics. For example, the conservative monthly journal *The Constitutional Magazine* used the memory of Wellington against Gladstone’s 1886 attempt to introduce Home Rule for Ireland. In the September 1887 article “Wellington’s Words”, Wellington became the natural successor of Nelson to carry the fight against French tyranny on land. The article drew an analogy between the passions of the French Revolution and the popular drive for Irish independence. “A conspiracy of demagogues,” had stoked mob anger through “orations and seditious speeches at public meetings, and by violent publications through the press.” The article closed with an ominous warning towards the Gladstone ministry with a quote from Wellington that the greatest soldier of his age would never trust a traitor in government. Although Irish Home Rule failed in the nineteenth century, its imminent success in 1915 prompted the retired Irish colonel Charles Henry Gardiner to write a pamphlet *Soldiers and Civil*
war (Is the Centenary of Waterloo to be Civil War?) Invoking a positive view of the British military as the chief defense against tyranny from the time of the English Civil War onwards, Wellington and Waterloo have pride of place in their dispatch of French tyranny. Parliament’s passage of the Irish Home Rule Act ensured that civil war would again return the British Isles if George V and like-minded loyalists did not thwart it. To do so, the pamphlet concluded that patriots must “take the Great Duke as a guide—that he ‘would willingly sacrifice his life to stay a month of it’ i.e. Civil War.”

Whereas Manwell’s novel illustrated how flexible historical memory could be, the realities of Irish politics precluded the use of Waterloo as a foundation for a loyalist identity. Henty’s Irish character Denis became Ralph’s butler, his loyalty being far more important than his intelligence. Emphasizing a specifically Irish contribution to Wellington’s army only accentuated issues of Irish separate identity; when invoked, as in Beeton’s poem or Maclise’s painting, their authors emphasized Irish comradeship with the troops the other kingdoms.

The net result of this memory cult of Waterloo during this third period was that it sharpened and exaggerated the British identity that had developed over the previous two periods. The Romantic theatricality of the earlier period fused with imagined reveries of the second. The historicism of Waterloo became divorced from its memorialization. With this trend it becomes possible for a Frenchman such as Denise to illustrate to a British boy the meaning of chivalry and Christian duty. Authors such as Henty and Manwell or Butler’s paintings made a fetish out of historical authenticity, but in a world sanctified by a simplistic martial glory, their authenticity was no more accurate than that of the Astley’s seventy years prior. Henty and Fitchett’s open intent was to inculcate among Victorian youth a sense of war’s meaning as a transformative

experience through history. In a preface to his *St. George for England*, Henty baldly stated “if [our forefather’s] empire is ever lost, it will be by the cowardice of their descendents.” This simplification of complex and diverse historical processes ensured that this carefully constructed edifice of memory could not survive the tumult of a global war.

While this British memory from 1815 to 1914 evolved in three separate stages, each phase illustrates the relationship between identity and what Richard Price termed the “localist estate.” “The outstanding feature of the period stretching from William and Mary to the mid-Victorian era,” Price asserts, “is precisely the expanding reach of local power and authority and the bristling vigor with which it addressed its obligations.” The central political question that preoccupied the elites in this political system was not that how to deal with the changing world, but the politics of inclusion and exclusion. The British political elite engaged in a series of adjustments, selectively choosing to incorporate segments of the population to better fit demographic realities. In earlier stages of memory, Wellington was the focal point, but by the time of novels such as *One of the 28th*, he is a distant presence on the battlefield. The memory of Waterloo reveals an ethnic and class-dimension to this localist process. As time went on certain groups could assume a more prestigious role in depictions of Waterloo. For example, the successful presentations of Scottish Waterloo valor such as in Butler’s paintings or *Geordie Stuart* reflected the growing acceptance of Scottish identity in British culture. The same could not be said of Ireland, as evidenced by the continued use of Wellington and Waterloo as political arguments against home rule long after the memory of both had become a largely cultural phenomenon. From 1860s onward, this localist memory gradually grew to incorporate the English and Scottish middle classes. Since Waterloo became a predominantly middle-class

---

97 G. A. Henty, quoted in Bratton, 82.
memory, so too did fictional portrayals of the men of 1815 come to resemble the milieu of their audience. Consumption of alcohol, one of the central facets of the daily life of both officers and enlisted men of the British Army, is completely absent from fictional portrayals of the British soldiers. This was in line with the Victorian middle classes’ increasing preoccupation with temperance and the abolition of public drunkenness. The central task for this localist memory was to make Waterloo’s memory relevant to society. The net result was that Waterloo as a cultural icon developed into a participatory memory with significant, albeit concealed, barriers for its audience.
CHAPTER 2
WATERLOO IN GERMAN MEMORY: 1815-1915

No wreaths rest on German graves,
Where Germans slumber, no green mound rises,
Nevertheless their heroic names shine
In proud marble
As in their church, now Hall of Fame
And the pantheon of quiet Waterloo—Martin Grief

Martin Grief’s 1865 poem “Auf dem Schlachtfeld von Waterloo” condensed many of the reactions German authors and artists had towards Waterloo and its commemoration. Although the monuments of the battlefield acknowledged contributions individual of German states such as Hannover and Prussia, there was nothing equivalent to the Lion’s Mound, a massive earth embankment erected by the King William I of the Netherlands in 1820 to mark where his son allegedly died. Although many German names bedecked the plaques of Church of Saint Joseph, the British memorials overshadowed them. Nature seemed to be the only marker for German sacrifice in Grief’s elegiac poem:

There they fought, the good German brothers,
There they fell so early into the hero’s grave,
Over which the light blue lilac
Now flutters up and down.

For many Germans, including Grief, it seemed that Waterloo was a forgotten German battlefield. For German intellectuals like Grief, their task was to make Germans remember their past.

Germany’s convoluted political development made such a task incredibly difficult. James J. Sheehan succinctly put it, until 1871 “‘Germany’ did not exist…there was no clear and readily acceptable answer to the question of Germany’s political, social, and cultural identity.”

---

100 Ibid., 294.
German attempts to build sites of memory around the events of June 1815 reflected Sheehan’s assertions. Although German memory of Waterloo utilized many of the same motifs as British ones, Germany’s unique historical context produced subtle but important disparities. For example, although Walter Scott’s “The Field of Waterloo” shared a number of similarities to Grief, especially in the case of nature’s commemoration of the battle, it would have been unthinkable for a German nationalist such as Grief to extol Napoleon like Scott’s poem. Above all, German memory had to deal with the ambiguities of the Napoleonic Era and its complicated legacy for Central Europe.

The British experience of the Napoleonic Wars proceeded along the lines of a straight narrative in which a sequence of British military victories culminated with Wellington’s victory at Waterloo. German experience with Napoleon was a far more crooked narrative rooted in the realities of the Napoleonic Era. Every German north of the Austrian border experienced either direct or indirect Napoleonic rule between 1806 and 1813. The heads of the German states had to navigate very complicated political eddies to survive this expansion of French power. This produced mixed results as seen in the cases of Bavaria and Prussia. Bavaria, under the direction of its chief minister Maximillian von Montgelas, used its alliance with Napoleon to expand the Wittlesbach dynasty’s power and prestige. By contrast, Prussia’s disastrous 1806 decision to preemptively attack France led to the loss of half its territory and its forced subordination to French prerogatives. French influence was felt beyond that of state elites. Napoleonic administration irrevocably altered legal, economic, and social patterns in ancien régime Germany. The failed invasion of Russia hastened the end of this political system as Napoleon’s German allies steadily abandoned him in the Spring and Autumn of 1813.
When confronting this legacy, nineteenth-century Germans would adapt a number of strategies to homogenize the highly diverse Napoleonic experience. An important aspect of this phenomenon was to argue that the *Befreiungskriege* (Wars of Liberation) represented a natural terminus to the Napoleonic period, eschewing any accommodation with the French empire. Few writers would emulate the approach of the Saxon government, which in the course of 1815 published two semi-official white papers, *Der König von Sachsen Friederich August und sein Benehmen in der neusten Zeit* (The King of Saxony and his behavior in the new era) and *Wie wurden wir sind?* (How did we become so?), which sought to explain to the Saxon public that the government’s alliance with Napoleon was both unwilling and the result of circumstances outside the king’s control.102 Instead of copying this approach, Germans writers and artists would represent the events of 1813-15 as a period of Germany’s triumphal victory over Napoleon. Figures in the resistance to Napoleon such as Blücher or Ludwig Adolf Wilhelm von Lützow became significant characters in this national drama. It is important to realize that while these multiple commemorations suggested a “German” experience, they did not necessarily have the same visions in mind. As Kevin Cramer persuasively argued in his study of collective memory of the Thirty Years’ War, many German historians and intellectuals would use their interpretations of history to vindicate their particular political and regional *weltanschauung*.103 The same process was apparent in German depictions of Waterloo. The national heroes of the battle could appear as exemplars of *bürgerlich* society in one depiction or as the sword and shield of their sovereign in the next. This process was far more contentious than in the case of Britain, where Waterloo helped codify the patriotic language of modern political division through popular


103 Kevin Cramer, *The Thirty Years’ War and German Memory in the Nineteenth Century* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007).
Toryism between 1820-40. In the immediate aftermath of 1815, there emerged what Clark observed as two conflicting narrative interpretations of the Befreiungskriege, dynastic and voluntarist, neither of which conformed to any clear-cut political division. In the case of the former, rulers of dynastic states tried to simultaneously retain their political and material gains while presenting an image that the Befreiungskriege vindicated their right to rule. The voluntarist strain of memory dragooned historical figures like Lützow or Blücher as symbols for a new, more participatory Germany. For example, the colors of Lützow’s Freikorps regiment of volunteers against Napoleon- black, gold, and red- became the basis for the postwar liberal cockades for a united Germany. Veterans of the Lützow’s corps such as Friedrich Ludwig Jahn tried to use the wartime experience to justify new modes of political thought. Jahn sought to create a healthy citizenry through organized gymnastics, but other reformers were more realistic and desired a national constitution. Amid such a contentious environment, German interpretation of Waterloo and the Befreiungskriege became mental battlefields upon which to project a triumphant vision of German destiny.

Prussia found itself the prime beneficiary of this divided memory in the immediate postwar years. Through a series of interconnected historical developments, Prussia shouldered the main German effort from 1813-15. Napoleon’s restrictions on the size of the Prussian Army forced reformers to adapt covert methods of recruitment more in line with a national rather than a dynastic state. Moreover, the upper echelons of the truncated Prussian Army retained a core nucleus of staunchly anti-Napoleon officers such as Blücher, August von Gneisenau, and Ludwig Yorck von Wartenburg. While the deeds of midlevel Prussians officers like Lützow or Schill were potent emblems of resistance, the actions of this anti-French circle could translate anti-

---

105 Craig, The Politics of the Prussian, 61.
French ideology into a tangible outcome. While in command of a corps guarding the remnants of the *Grand Armee* in Poland, Yorck independently reached an alliance with Russia thus opening up Central Europe to the Russian Army. Postwar political circumstances buttressed Prussian intellectuals and state elites’ attempts to exploit this *gestalt* of a Prussian-led liberation of Germany. The nineteenth-century Prussian military could exploit the military memory of *Befreiungskriege* not only due to its actions of 1813-15, but also because it was more ethnically homogenous than its main Austrian rival. Moreover, Austrian memory of the Napoleonic Wars was hitched to the political fortunes of Klemens von Metternich and his rigid conservatism. While Prussia would adhere to Metternich’s legitimacy principles, the Napoleonic memory of a dynamic Prussian leadership could justify an attempt to break from it. The eventual outcome of this situation was that Prussia was able to unify all the German states save Austria over the course of 1864-71. This development would have a crucial impact on the development the German memory of the Napoleonic Wars.

Like Britain, Germany’s memory of Waterloo from 1815-1914 evolved around three overlapping stages. The first stage lasted from 1815 to approximately the 1860s. Its central characteristics were that it consisted of local efforts to process and possess the memory of the Napoleonic Wars. This process included an effort to forget the period of collaboration by crafting a national narrative during which all Germans united to throw off the yoke of their Napoleonic oppressors. Where these visions of the past diverge is to what exactly the origins and goals of such a national effort were. The second phase began with the unification of Germany under the aegis of Prussia. This period witnessed Prussia’s gradual assimilation as the focal point for German history, especially in school textbooks for the new German empire. These efforts built upon the previous stage’s efforts, but excluded any alternative readings of Prussian history
that contradicted this march towards German unification. The highly provisional nature of the Kaiserreich’s political settlement and its overly determined approach to history created tensions within attempts to commemorate the Napoleonic Wars. In this final phase of German memory, the celebrations of the centennial of the Befreiungskriege offer a tantalizing glimpse into the tensions apparent in a highly-state centric national history.

PHASE ONE: THUS HE TORE ENEMIES OFF OF US

In August 1819, the Hanseatic city of Rostock in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern erected in its market square a bronze statue to celebrate the deeds of its most famous son, Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher. The statue had a high artistic pedigree. It was the result of collaboration between the prominent Berlin-sculptor Johann Gottfried Schadow with the Romantic poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. The statues itself incorporated a high degree of artistic anachronisms. It depicted the septuagenarian Blücher as a muscular man bent with determination; in his left hand he grasps a contemporary hussar’s sword and he wears the green smock of a Landwehr, his outstretched right arm holds a field marshal’s baton. The mythological Nemean Lion girded his upper torso, making it clear that Blücher was a contemporary Heracles. The statue’s granite base has four bronze tablets. The frontispiece used Blücher’s name and coat of arms, while its base carried a quote from Goethe: In peace and war./In collapse and victory/ Alert and great,/Thus he tore enemies off of us. On each side were allegorical depictions of both Ligny and Waterloo. In the Ligny frieze, the new Heracles lay under his horse, referencing an incident in which Blücher had his horse shot out from under him. Fortunately a divine angel with a shield emblazoned with the phrase “Germania’s Guardian-

---

106 Friedrich Christoph Förster, Der Feldmarschall Fürst Blücher von Wahlstatt und seine Umgebungen (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1821), 311.
Spirit” protected the hero while his Prussian troops, in contemporary garb, beat a fighting retreat from their French enemy. The Waterloo frieze showed the mounted Blücher chasing away the French, represented by two nightmarish monsters, one a chimera-like serpent and the other a skulking horned-panther. In the heaven’s above, a winged goddess of victory holds a laurel-wreath over Blücher’s head while two divine figures meet above an banner proclaiming the victory of “Belle-Alliance, 18 Juni 1815,” referencing Blücher’s preferred name for Waterloo.

The mixture of antiquity and the contemporary signified the various ways in which Waterloo became encoded into for public display. The use of allegory in the friezes shows how by 1819 the incidents of Blücher’s life were already well-known in Germany that memory of them needed only a slight prompting. The anachronistic mix of the contemporary images and ancient mythology served to make an explicit comparison between the glories of the recent past and antiquity. The statue also had a strong participatory element in the case of Rostock. In his 1821 biography of Blücher, Friedrich Christoph Förster noted “the city council assembled at Rostock and the citizens decided to erect a memorial, approved by the entire citizenry, and so now they appointed the Director of the Academy of Arts in Berlin, von Schadow along with Goethe in Weimar for its execution.” The city unveiled the statue on the anniversary of Blücher’s great 1813 victory at Katsbach. Yet this localist celebration also demonstrated the ambiguities the Napoleonic period held for contemporaries. Rather than portray Blücher in his Prussian hussars uniform and customary forage cap, Schadow portrayed the Field Marshal in quasi-mythological garb. But to portray him and Waterloo realistically would have celebrated


110 Förster, *Der Feldmarschall Fürst Blücher,* 311.
Prussia far more than Rostock. Yet the image of Germania’s Guardian-Spirit protecting its hero, spelled out explicitly on the monument, hints that this monument had a national orientation.

The Befreiungshalle (Hall of Liberation) in the Bavarian town of Kelheim utilized identical methods of visual encoding and allegory, albeit on a much grander scale than Rostock’s statue. Designed and erected under the auspices of Bavaria’s king Ludwig I, this neoclassical temple dominated the local landscape at the confluence of the Danube and Altmühl Rivers. It commemorated the entirety of Germany’s deliverance from the French, with both the Battle of Leipzig and Waterloo being the central metaphors for the building’s visual symbolism.\(^1\) Built in the shape of an eighteen-sided polygon, the exterior of the building has eighteen representations of the Germanic tribes. Thirty-four goddesses of victory, each representing a state in the current German Confederation, encircle the interior’s lower level. Bronze shields, melted from captured cannons and embossed with the name of an important battle, link each statue. On the walls above the goddesses are eighteen escutcheons, each bearing the name, rank, and nationality of a German general from the Befreiungskriege. At the center of the Befreiungshalle’s marble floor, illuminated by a shaft of light from the 150-foot high dome is the dedication “May the Germans (Teutschen) never forget what made necessary the struggle for freedom and by what means they triumphed.” Like many neoclassical buildings, the Befreiungshalle has symmetrical balance. For example, the building’s pillars and columns are in multiples of eighteen. The choice of the number eighteen was not a happenstance; it was on both the 18 October and 18 June that Napoleon met his greatest military defeats at Leipzig and

\(^1\) Although it can induce vertigo, the Bavarian state website Panoramen der Bayerischen Schlösser, Gärten und Seen has a virtual tour of both the interior and exterior of this building at http://www.schloesser-bayern.com/fileadmin/sites/schlbay/pano/nbay/kelh-bfh/pano.html?pano=eg/R001/pano.xml The following description is based off this virtual tour.
Waterloo. Although its construction was much delayed, Ludwig I would make it a point to dedicate the monument on the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig.

As a monument the *Befreiungshalle* represented an evolution of an earlier national monument erected by Ludwig I in 1842, the Germanic acropolis *Walhalla*, which in George L. Mosse’s estimation was “a temple [with] a Teutonic note predominated in the form of a Greek modal combined with German symbols.”\(^{112}\) Over a hundred marble busts of German figures dominated the interior of *Walhalla*, suggesting an evolution of a common German nation through its heroes. Unlike its predecessor, the *Befreiungshalle* used the Napoleonic Wars alone to symbolize sense of German unity. A battle like Waterloo, no matter how gigantic, represented just one of sixteen episodes of Germany’s triumph over Napoleon. Ludwig I laid down the first stone and at the monument’s dedication banquet he declared that the building symbolized, “our common German Fatherland, which takes second place to no other land, which has begun to feel that no foreigner could be allowed to repress it! Hail Germany!”\(^ {113}\) The historical context of the *Befreiungshalle* underscores the ambiguities of Germany’s Napoleonic experience. Although meant for all Germans, the building is specifically rooted in Bavaria. Over the entrance, the words “To the Liberation Fighters, Ludwig I, King of Bavaria” drew a clear connection from exactly whom this monument to Germany’s unity originated. Moreover, although Ludwig I personally detested the French and Napoleon, as Bavaria’s Crown Prince he was an active collaborator up to 1813. As Crown Prince, he led Bavarian contingents of the *Grand Armee* against Austria in 1805 and 1809. The *Befreiungshalle* was also a symbol of a Bavarian state

\(^{112}\) George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars Through the Third Reich* (New York: H. Fertig, 1975), 54.

\(^{113}\) Ludwig I, quoted in Adalbert Müller, *Kelheim, die Befreiungshalle und Weltenburg* (Regensburg: Manz, 1844), 17.
whose power had grown in territory and prestige through its alliance with Napoleon.\textsuperscript{114} Additionally, Bavaria’s post-1815 gains often had come at the expense of minor German nobles unable to match the power of the Wittelsbachs; thus expunging the remnants of the old Reich. But the \textit{Befreiungshalle} did not commemorate those complexities, but rather sought to erase them. Its neoclassical symbolism presented a seamless transition between the German unity of 1813-15 and that of post-Napoleon Germany with the Wittelsbach sovereign as a mediator. On a fundamental level the building itself was an image superimposed onto complex ambiguities.

Ludwig I bore the dubious distinction to be the only German ruler to lose his throne during the Revolutions of 1848. His massive art projects and illicit affair with the dancer Lola Montez alienated middle-class liberals and pious Catholic conservatives alike.\textsuperscript{115} Yet Ludwig’s ignominious end should not suggest that his notions of a Germany unified by the \textit{Befreiungskriege} were only expressed by elite circles. Clark establishes that nineteenth-century towns in the Prussian Rhineland rang church bells, engaged in target shooting tournaments, and held local militia processions to commemorate both Leipzig and Waterloo.\textsuperscript{116} Nor were these competing German memories necessarily compatible with each other. In an 1855 letter to Ludwig I, Klenze wrote that his architectural designs were not “the embodiment of a bourgeois necessity, but rather of a poetic-patriotic idea.”\textsuperscript{117} The colors of the Leipzig Freikorps became a potent symbol for political demonstrations against state authority such as the Wartburg Festival. This adaptation of a tricolor flag used the memory of patriotic Germans volunteers to obscure a mode of political symbolism commonly associated with the French Revolution. For middle-class

\textsuperscript{114} Sheehan, \textit{German History}, 261-62.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 631-33.
\textsuperscript{116} Clark, “The Wars of Liberation,” 555.
German liberals, this the legends of the nation in arms was a particularly potent argument for a more open government.

A popular method to convey this liberal patriotic mythology was through the historical novel. Among the most popular of these novelists in the mid-nineteenth century was Louise Mühlbach. She outlined her approach to historical fiction in her the preface of her novel Old Fritz and the New Era. The goal of the novelist was “to bring forth from the silent studio of the scholar and to expose in the public market of life, for the common good, the great men and great deeds embalmed in history, and of which only the studious have hitherto enjoyed the monopoly.” Mühlbach drew her characters from actual historical figures and used fiction to explain historical anecdotes. Born Klara Mundt and married to a prominent liberal intellectual, she was a highly prolific author and widely read; according to Mustafa only four authors were more popular than her for European lending libraries’ collections during the nineteenth century. The Napoleonic Wars proved a popular topic for her, with her 1858 novel Napoleon in Deutschland, translated into English as Napoleon and Blücher, covering the events of 1813-14 from the perspective of patriotic Germans mobilizing to defeat Napoleon.

Mühlbach’s central protagonist is the eponymous Marschal Vorwärzt (Marshal Forwards) and the opening chapters of the novel focus in on Blücher’s forced retirement at Napoleon’s behest. Despite his deeply-held hatred for French rule, Blücher took comfort in the companionship of his wife Amelia. The couple enjoys a highly equitable relationship; Amelia attended to his needs and participated in the discussions of politics with both her husband and his guests. In addition to his marriage, Blücher also maintained a very progressive politics. For example, when Scharnhorst visited him, the novel’s Blücher congratulated his guest for his

---

liberal reforms of the Prussian Army and his resilience against aristocratic officers of the “old régime” who sought “to prevent Scharnhorst from becoming the armorer of German liberty.”

As Napoleon’s army retreated from Russia, Blücher emerged as the central voice of authority for those who consistently argued that that Prussian king Frederick William III should seize the moment and avenge both Germany and his deceased wife, Queen Louisa, the patriotic queen whom Napoleon had insulted.

After Blücher, the most heroic characters in the novel are two women, Eleonore Prochaska and Anna Lühring, who disguised themselves as men to join the Lützow Freikorps. These two historic patriotic women, eager to emulate their deceased queen, served as a literary device for Mühlbach to illustrate German patriotism evident at all levels of society. For example, when selling their dresses to a Jewish pawnbroker for their uniforms, the pawnbroker gives them more money than the dresses’ worth. He justified this in a speech extolling Jewish patriotism towards the Fatherland:

I have also a heart for my country, and no one shall say that we Israelites do not feel and act like true Germans- that our hearts did not suffer under the disgrace which, for long years, has weighed down all of Germany, and that we will not joyfully sacrifice our blood and our life; and what is still more, our property, for the sake of the Fatherland.

The novel ended in 1814 with Blücher courageously leading his troops into Paris after having successfully convinced the King Frederick William III to pursue Napoleon. Although Mühlbach finished her novel before the events of 1815, there is little doubt as to how her flat and predictable characters would have behaved at Ligny and Waterloo.

Aside from her defects as a writer, Mühlbach was guilty of an equivalent degree of selective memory as was Ludwig I’s monuments. She dismissed the historical Blücher’s

---

121 Ibid., 248.
eccentric behavior, likely brought about by his heavy drinking, as the natural outcome of a patriotic soldier unable to fight against a diabolical foe.\textsuperscript{122} The importance of companionable marriage and domesticity, hallmarks of her pre-1848 liberal ideology, emerged in the novel as the basis of Blücher’s ability to sustain himself in the dark period of French hegemony. Likewise, her depiction of a civil society united in a common nationalist cause also reflects many of the current aspirations of German liberalism at midcentury. This political movement aspired for a German \textit{Volk} united under common law and patriotic duty towards the Fatherland irrespective of social class, albeit a society with \textit{Bürgertum}-defined cultural and social mores. Given that both Mühlbach and her husband supported the 1848 Revolutions, her ambivalence towards the monarchy became even noteworthy. In the novel Frederick William III had to earn his right to rule and be worthy of his deceased queen and wife. When Yorck defected to the Russians against his orders, the king’s patriotic ministers persuaded him to support his generals. Additionally her portrayal of German patriotism excluded alternative forms of nationalism. Napoleon’s most loyal ally, the Saxon king Frederick Augustus I, asserted that he remained at Napoleon’s side not for the Saxon interests of Saxony, but rather because Napoleon uncharacteristically treated this German monarch with a paternal kindness. This policy of exclusion corresponds well with limitations of German liberal ideology, which advanced an all-embracing vision of the nation, but could not incorporate movements at odds with a middle-class centered political order.

Ultimately, neither Mühlbach nor Ludwig’s political ideologies were dominant at the middle of the nineteenth century. Mühlbach may have been a bestselling author, but the contemporary state of German politics precluded the advancement of her brand of liberal nationalism inclusive of all components of society, including women and Jews. In the case of

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 108.
Bavaria’s monuments, the fate of Ludwig I in 1848 suggested that there were limitations to whatever cultural power the Wittelsbach king possessed from his sponsorship of the *Befreiungskriege*. In part this echoed the problems Rostock had with portraying Blücher and his battles, there simply were no satisfactory metaphors to convey a universal message to the highly heterogeneous German lands. Ludwig’s physical and Mühlbach’s fictional appeals to German unity could not transcend the realities of German political division.

**PHASE TWO: ENDOWED WITH A LOFTY AND BOLD SPIRIT CAPABLE OF ENTERPRISES LOOKING LIKE TEMERITY**

The creation of a unified German state in 1871 had a tremendous effect upon how Germans perceived their past. For example, Cramer observes that nationalist historians of the *Gründerzeit* (era of unification) such as Heinrich von Treitschke or Julius Otto Opel could now easily portray the 1871 declaration of an independent, Protestant-led Germany as the capstone of a historical development originating with Luther.\(^{123}\) Despite its structural faults, Bismarck’s *Kaiserreich* had concrete national and political boundaries; something quite unlike previous incarnations of German corporate identity such as the Holy Roman Empire, the Confederation of the Rhine, or the German Confederation. This unprecedented development made it easier for Germans to homogenize their history into a coherent narrative by using Prussia’s victory in 1871 as a natural endpoint.

In this phase of German memorialization, Waterloo became a much more tangible memory with Blücher’s army being the natural predecessor of Moltke’s. Victory on the field in 1815 became a retroactive confirmation of Prussia’s unique destiny. The contributions of individual German states such as Brunswick or Nassau became analogous to the current localist military arrangements of the *Kaiserreich* wherein Prussia assumed leadership, but each German

\(^{123}\) Cramer, *The Thirty Years’ War*, 91-2.
state retained its own army. While the Wars of Unification tended to displace the martial glory of the *Befreiungskriege*, it is important to note that during the *Gründerzeit* the Napoleonic Era was the last clear historical epoch that had occurred within living memory. The *Kaiserreich*’s economic development meant that a new, prosperous middle-class could now consume historical collectables such as busts of heroes like Queen Louise or mass-produced juvenile literature. This popular appetite for history combined with a formalized relationship between professional historians and the state created what Matthew Jefferies argues was an unusually strong *Geschichtskultur* (historical culture).\(^{124}\) Within this context, the memory of Waterloo was not just about understanding Germany’s past, but also its present.

As the movement towards German unification did not start with Bismarck, so to did the articulation of this variant of the Waterloo memory predate 1871. One of the earliest and most thorough examples of this was Christian Friedrich Scherenburg’s 1851 epic poem *Waterloo: ein vaterländisches Gedicht*. Composed in blank verse, Scherenburg dedicated his poem to “Prussia’s Banners” and portrayed the Allied campaign against Napoleon as an idealized quasi-medieval quest against the French:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Against this Colossus of Hate! All stand up} \\
\text{From their green round table,} \\
\text{Close hands and cross their hearts of the old covenant:} \\
\text{All for one, all against one!} \\
\text{And thus the eight states of Europe declare themselves against} \\
\text{The enemy of the world Bonaparte.}^{125}\end{align*}\]

Although Scherenburg extolled both the British Army and its commander Wellington, the most active participants in the battle are the German warriors and their commander Blücher. Of this Prussian Army, Scherenburg wrote, “The Prussians were striplings, even younger in experience/\(^{125}\)

\(^{124}\) Matthew Jefferies, *Imperial Culture in Germany, 1871-1918* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 100-01.

But constant upon these three:/With God, for King and country!”¹²⁶ In this poetic epic Blücher’s rash deployment at Ligny is the result of his chivalrous desire to form a dam against the French so Wellington’s scattered armies can assemble. Thus the poem rendered a military defeat into an action that was equal parts noble and militarily-sound.

Scherenburg also builds up Blücher throughout the text by repetition of “Forwards” (Vorwärts) as a frequent motif, drawing upon Blücher’s nickname among his men. This had the effect of turning the Prussian Army into the active force of the campaign; while Wellington and the British were potent in resistance, they need the energetic drive of Prussians from young Germany to finish Napoleon. The epic ends with a hubristic Napoleon exiled to the ocean, but with the warning “Whenever the gods punish, weep and learn/ This is not a fable, it is only the past/ and what happened can happen again.”¹²⁷

Like Scherenburg, the Prussian historian and active-duty officer Friedrich Wilhelm Varchmin also saw Waterloo as an idealized expression of Allied unity. In addition to his German-language version, he published his history in Dutch and English as well to celebrate the battle’s jubilee. Varchmin dedicated his English-version, The Battle of Waterloo: A Memorial of Jubilee for England and Germany, to the current Duke of Wellington in the hope that it would “have a fortifying, uniting, and encouraging effect on those nations who fifty years ago raised their banner in a time of troubles and calamity.”¹²⁸ In Varchmin’s estimation, the three Allied states worked together to free Europe in 1815 from a renewed French slavery. In this account, Wellington and Blücher were ideal complements to each other; Wellington’s cool resolution is an ideal match for the Prussian, who was “endowed with a lofty and bold spirit capable of

¹²⁶ Ibid., 10.
¹²⁷ Ibid., 75.
enterprises looking like temerity.”¹²⁹ When matched against these two men and their armies, the French were unable to prevail. Varchmin dismissed arguments about which nation bore chief responsibility for victory as a supercilious vanity practiced by neither Wellington nor Blücher.

Varchmin’s text articulated a vision that Waterloo contained relevant lessons for the future generations to an even greater extent than Scherenberg’s poem. For example, after noting that Germany could learn from Britain’s collective unity in 1815, he concluded that such unity would be useful for Germany in the context of the then-highly contentious issue of the occupation of the Danish duchies of Schleswig-Holstein. “What a fine lesson we can reap from the conflict of the little Danish insular people against the great German nation!” he wrote with chauvinistic aplomb.¹³⁰ Varchmin expanded this argument by contending that Germany must be allowed to expand to her natural frontiers to protect against the French menace. The 1814 decision for France to retain the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were particularly galling for him. A unified German state, Varchmin claimed, would be a beneficial center of gravity for Europe quite unlike the naturally rapacious France. In this variant of German memory, Varchmin’s constructs an argument that the nobility of Germany’s soldiers and commanders in 1815 meant that unified German state could work to preserve European peace fifty years later.

Both Varchmin and Scherenburg laid the groundwork for the particular trajectory that the German memory of Waterloo took after unification. Whereas British memory at mid-century had begun the gradual process of decoupling the battle from current events on the continent, the German variant of this memory moved in the opposite direction. The return of the Bonaparte dynasty in France only added more currency to this historical memory. Waterloo thus provided a convenient “lesson of history” for those Germans who did not wish to see a repeat of Napoleonic

¹²⁹ Ibid., 19.
¹³⁰ Ibid., 99.
hegemony. That Prussia was the main German actor in 1815 complimented its increasingly powerful position in Central Europe. Neither Austria nor the German Confederation could adequately guarantee the collective security needs of the smaller German states to meet the French threat. By keeping alive the memory of Napoleonic exploitation in German culture, writers ranging from Varchmin to Mühlbach endowed Napoleon III’s foreign policy with a far more sinister character than it possessed. Prussia consequently emerged as the leader of a unified Germany despite the presence of significant dynastic and confessional resistance to its leadership. The task in Berlin was to now make the new nation’s diverse population German.

One of the main tools for this process was the systemization of primary and secondary education. Although Berlin did not have any direct authority to impose national standards, Prussia asserted a steady form of “soft power” by virtue of being the largest market for history textbooks. It also used state power to sponsor ceremonies, such as Sedan Day which promoted a Prussian-centric view of history throughout the country. In the latter case, Karl Adolf Schmid’s 1877 guide for teachers, *Pädagogisches Handbuch für Schule und Haus*, instructed its readers on how to arrange festivals for children on important anniversaries such as Leipzig or Waterloo:

For the teachers and community leaders, it is excellent to arrange such festivals, not only because children are active, but at the same time they are reminded of the special importance of anniversaries. [Community leaders] determine the occasion of each festival; [teachers] will ensure that the all school functions remain the same. It requires a communal, orderly exodus of the pupils, including instruction in gymnastics and under banners and accompanied by music. A not too distantly-located forest meadow, or a suitable free space in or on a forest are ideal; additionally hold sweepstakes with victory prizes (the latter should be as simple as possible, without much material value, instead their symbolic significance make them appear desirable- medals, rings, bands) and sing all sorts of songs, especially *Turnlieder* [patriotic songs from 1813]. For this purpose the
school has to ensure that the pupils always practice a number of simple patriotic songs with lyrics and melody.\textsuperscript{131}

The above description of such a festival was one way to inculcate a dynamic patriotism in children. The children’s singing of the \textit{Turnlieder} and participating in gymnastics allowed them to make a connection between their experience with the current state and the deeds of their historical ancestors. The ultimate goal of such ceremony was to create a communal patriotism rooted in this synthesis of school activities and pedagogy.

School textbooks would also try to build a corporate Waterloo by accentuating the youth of the German soldiers under the command of the heroic Blücher. This didactic use of the Napoleonic Wars “deliberately blurred concepts like ‘the people’ and ‘the Germans’ to embrace a broader pan-German identity.”\textsuperscript{132} The gymnasium school reader \textit{Deutsches Lesebuch für höhere Unterricht-Anstalten} gave an highly idealized view of army of 1815 “as breath of refreshing youth permeated the army; they were planted everywhere, but nowhere was the young, green grove as dense as in the Lützow \textit{[Freikorps]. Here a student was the neighbor of the young clergyman; doctors, artists, teachers, naturalists…all wore the colorless black.”\textsuperscript{133}

Behind such florid prose were gross oversimplifications of both army life and the social origins of the volunteers. Given that the text’s primary readership was young teenage men, the emphasis upon the army’s collective unity based upon such verdant youth was particularly noteworthy precisely because the history text extolled young men who whose social background was very much like its own readership. Furthermore, the emphasis upon Prussia’s leadership of the \textit{Befreiungskriege} while acknowledging the heroism of non-Prussian subalterns such as the Duke

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{131}] Karl Adolf Schmid, \textit{Pädagogisches Handbuch für Schule und Haus. Auf Grundlage der Encyklopädie des gesammten Erziehungs und Unterrichtswesens, vornehmlich für die Volks-, Bürger-, Mittel- und Fortbildungsschulen in alphabetischer Ordnung bearbeitet} (Gotha: R. Besser, 1877), 778.
\item[\textsuperscript{132}] Mustafa, \textit{The Long Ride}, 194.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
of Braunschweig-Lüneburg would serve as a retroactive justification of the current political order.

These textbooks also shared with earlier manifestations of memory by confirming a narrative in which Blücher’s energetic army rescued Wellington’s brave troops from a certain defeat. Ferdinand Schmidt’s textbook *Preussens Geschichte in Wort und Bild* visually encoded this idea with its chapter on Waterloo opening with a picture of Blücher’s arrival at Waterloo on a white horse cheered on by weary British troops. Unlike British historical depictions of the battle such as Fitchett’s, Napoleon’s despotism and victimization of the German lands overshadowed any nobility he derived from his military acumen. For example, one reading argued that Napoleon was able to build upon the innate “foolishness of the French” to build a Oriental-style world-empire which replaced the rule of law with an arbitrary personal rule enslaved to his ambition. This emphasis on despotism supported the argument that only Germans truly understood the nature of French imperialism in 1815. Although Britain fought valiantly on 18 June, Schmidt concluded that they did not feel the urgent need to pursue Napoleon’s defeated army. “Wellington’s national honor did not feel offended” Schmidt wrote, “England in the long struggle was not subjugated and humiliated, while Blücher and his followers held the full wrath of Jena and Lübeck in their hearts and had not forgotten the seven years of shaming the nation.” Blücher’s energetic pursuit, done after a herculean effort to march to Wellington’s aid, caused the French to abandon Napoleon and bring peace back to Europe.

---

135 Gervinus, “Rückblick auf Napoleons Fall,” in Massius, 337.
One of the problems with these patriotic histories was that their authors needed to explain exactly why a Prussian-led German state failed to emerge immediately after 1815. Schmidt’s textbook would argue that this failure stemmed from the machinations of Metternich and Tsar Alexander II of Russia. The Austrian minister above all feared that Prussia was now fulfilling the task begun by the Great Elector in eighteenth century through its assumption its natural leadership of Germany. The tsar’s mistress enticed him to attempt reinvigorate an archaic religious order inimical to the new patriotism evident in Germany. This alliance of religion and realpolitik at the Congress of Vienna made “a mockery of the sacrifices necessary for Prussia’s restoration of the independence of Germany.”

The resulting German Confederation and its parliament could not satisfy the new German national consciousness evident among the returning soldiers. The consequence of this were decades of distrust between the Hohenzollern monarchy and its patriotic citizenry. Schmidt closed his textbook with the observation that the seeds sown during the Befreiungskriege “had borne their fruit in the present.” In this trajectory of German history, Waterloo was a prologue for the Wars of Unification in that it illustrated that Prussia’s national mission now had taken root among the true patriots of the Kaiserreich.

PHASE THREE: TO YOUR PLACE YOU GRAY-BEARDED SIRE/ BUT YOUR WORD SHALL LIVE THOUGH YOU EXPIRE

During its forty-seven year existence, the Kaiserreich mined nearly every potential historical event that could substantiate its historical pedigree. The state would even appropriate and shape preexisting monuments for this purpose. For example, state authorities added busts of William I, Bismarck, and the elder Molkte to Wahlalla to after their deaths to make the temple better correspond to the unified German state. The Hermannsdenkmal, a monument to the ancient German victory over the Roman empire in Westphalia, had in one of its alcoves the

---

137 Ibid., 649.
138 Ibid., 655.
inscription that Germany united around the sword of Prussia winning her freedom at “Leipzig, 18th October, 1813 – Paris, 31st March, 1814 – Waterloo, 18th June, 1815 – Paris, 3rd July, 1815.” The use of the name Waterloo instead of Belle-Alliance irked some nationalists. Erich Marcks recorded that Bismarck intensely disliked the name Waterloo. Marcks described the chancellor’s ire over the moniker Waterloo during a state dinner:

Belle Alliance! That is really German. The British are ashamed of the joint solidarity of the battle, never talk of our help, which really decided the battle; for them it is an ‘ill’ Alliance. They say Waterloo. The undignified fawning of the Germans means they have done the opposite. I am shocked every time I hear this battle’s name.  

An anonymous 1875 editorial in the periodical *Im Neuen Reich* argued that using the British name for the battle betrayed both Blücher and Germany’s sacrifices over the past sixty years. The name “Waterloo” came about due to the machinations of Wellington who actively campaigned for this name to minimize Blücher’s contribution. The editorial claimed that relative obscurity of the Belle-Alliance nomenclature thus became part of Wellington’s, and by extension Britain’s, desire for glory at the expense of Germany. “We know,” the editorial states, “that Blücher and Germany’s wish remained unfulfilled at the time and that we have had to learn to expect nothing from foreigners.”  

The chauvinism apparent in this editorial illustrated one aspect of how the highly-constructed nationalist project had taken on a life of its own beyond exalting just the Hohenzollern-run state, particularly when it reflected a denial of German destiny by a vengeful Britain. Besides this stoking chauvinism, this militarized culture had become an object of satire. For example, the vacuous militarist protagonist of Heinrich Mann’s 1914 novel *Der Untertan* presented its readers a savage critique of the Kaiserreich’s jingoistic culture. As

---

the centenary of the *Befreiungskriege* approached, each of these three responses to Germany’s historical past- state nationalism, mass nationalism, and critiques of both- would be evident in the centenary celebrations of the Battle of Leipzig.

1913 happened to coincide with the silver anniversary of Emperor Wilhelm II’s ascension to the throne. Wilhelm II intended the year to be a series of commemorations that would:

once again bring alive before us the events of the national uprising of Prussia 100 years ago. May this remembrance of the past always help to remind us in the present what we owe the Fatherland and incite us to apply the same loyalty, devotion, and unity in those tasks Providence presents to our generation just like our forefathers 100 years ago.141

Wilhelm II drew explicit connections between both himself and the actions of his Napoleonic-era ancestor Frederick William III, who bravely led the nation against his oppressors. At a 10 March speech at the imperial palace, Wilhelm II would use the memory of the Frederick Wilhelm III’s speech calling for a national *levée en masse* to suggest that the same spirit animated Germany’s contemporary army and supreme warlord.142 The centerpiece of the monarchy’s efforts in 1913 was to be the October unveiling of the *Völkerschlachtdenkmal* in Leipzig. It was the largest monument at the time of its construction. Unlike neoclassical monuments like the *Befreiungshalle* “the language of its architecture was emotional rather than rational: designed to make the individual feel small and insignificant, yet at the same time empowered by a belonging to a national community of vast potential.”143 The granite-faced exterior of the monument resembled a large step-pyramid with only the barest adornment.144 Its surroundings featured a tended oak grove encircling a massive sunken reflecting pool. Visitors cannot walk directly into the monument; they have to traverse the sides of the pool and then climb a massive stairway to

142 Smith, “The Monarchy versus the Nation,” 262.
143 Jefferies. Imperial Culture, 252.
144 The city of Leipzig maintains a virtual tour of the *Völkerschlachtdenkmal*, at [http://www.stadtgeschichtliches-museum-leipzig.de/site_english/voelkerschlachtdenkmal/panoramaansicht.php](http://www.stadtgeschichtliches-museum-leipzig.de/site_english/voelkerschlachtdenkmal/panoramaansicht.php) most of the following description is based off this virtual tour.
reach the Völkerschlachtdenkmal’s interior, which is guarded by the patron saint of soldiers, the archangel Michael. The heart of the monument is a symbolic crypt. Eight masks, each flanked by a knight with a downcast head look to center, where a bronze tablet allegedly marks where the bloodiest fighting on 18 October took place. The Völkerschlachtdenkmal’s layout recreates a pilgrimage where one must traverse through various national symbols such as oak groves or Michael’s quasi-medieval armor to reach its sacred center.

The financing of the monument had a public participatory element, including lotteries and festivals, although Mosse noted that right-wing populist groups often took the lead in these efforts. The monarchy planned a massive festival to mark the opening of this monument to the nation’s sacrifices. Planned as the first great celebration for a seven-year cycle commemorating the anniversaries of both the Befreiungskriege and the Wars of Unification, the October festival sought to incorporate all of Germany in its public symbolism. 43,000 gymnasts ran a relay through the entirety of Germany, each carrying an oak sprig as a baton. The state planned their route with military precision so that thousands of relay runners would arrive at their destination in time to present the Kaiser greetings from all the German “tribes” in the afternoon of 18 October. Various political associations joined in the festivities, a Berliner Tageblatt correspondent reported there were “marksman, gymnasts, and veterans from various wars, and the guilds with their handicraft insignia, associations of post-riders and other state employees, and associations of everything that one can otherwise imagine as the purpose of an association.” The sheer overwhelming presence of this ceremony would create for both the nation and the world the impression of a nation united in arms under its sovereign, amounting to a repeat of the idealized vision of 1813.

146 Jefferies, Imperial Culture, 252.
147 Anonymous, “Vor dem Denkmal,” Berliner Tageblatt, 18 October 1913.
The state was not alone in the attempt to capitalize on the *Befreiungskriege*’s centenary. The opening years of the twentieth century saw the growth of a middle-class youth movement in Germany such as the *Wandervögel* (Wandering Birds) who worshiped both nature and eschewed the militaristic pretenses of their elders. In many respects this large movement was an outgrowth of the *Kaiserreich*’s pedagogy, which emphasized outdoor recreational activities and the symbolic power of nature. Although the state had co-opted some of these youth groups in its *Völkerschlachtdenkmal* celebration, over two thousand *Wandervögel* attended an alternative demonstration outside Cassel at Meißner Mountain in October. This festival was not an explicit protest of the events in Leipzig, but in speeches given by its organizers warned against the militarism and contended that the heroes of 1813 were men united in common humanity.\(^{148}\) The importance of *Lützow Freikorps* was not their martial valor, but their youthful energy which a mass movement could remake Germany in the twentieth century.

The overly theatrical nature of 1913 centennial did not escape the attention of the regime’s growing corps of cultural critics. The arts magazine *Jugend* published a trenchant critique of the state’s increasingly bombastic anniversaries. Its editorial cartoon “Zum Regierungsjubiläum” featured Wilhelm II chauffeuring Germania in car symbolizing Germany. In a clear comment on these ceremonies, Germania leans over and tells her chauffer “Driver, After the 25 kilometer mark, drive much quieter with a smoother running.”\(^{149}\) However, one of the most prominent venues for disparagement of the state’s appropriation of the *Befreiungskriege* was the satirical journal *Simplicissimus*. This liberal magazine was one of the pioneers of modern German political satire using poems and political cartoons. It was also widely read, enjoying a

\(^{148}\) Jefferies, *Imperial Culture*, 254.
circulation of over 86,000 in 1908.\textsuperscript{150} The over-developed nationalist sentiment evident in October proved to be too obvious a target for the staff of \textit{Simplicissimus} and it devoted its entire 20 October issue to satirize the \textit{Kaiserreich}’s interpretation of 1813. It would do so through a series of clever subversions of the state’s fifty-year long attempt to create a unified national history.

The cover of this issue featured a charcoal drawing of a stock image of the nation in arms by Wilhelm Schulz. In the cartoon, the population of a Napoleonic Era German town emptied out into the street. A butcher holds a banner, while at his side a young drummer boy beats the population to the colors. A youthful gymnast links arms with a soldier while both young and old participate in this mass movement. While this cartoon presented an almost quaint stereotype of a patriotic image, the poetic text beneath the cartoon turns the scene into a cruel joke: Good people, you must rise up./ Not for freedom, not for your rights,/ But honest, loyal and dutiful/ For the princes and for their race!\textsuperscript{151} The juxtaposition of this text with the joyous scene of a people subverted the ideas behind the official celebrations of the state and presented a counter-memory of the \textit{Befreiungskriege}, wherein the people’s forthright patriotism blinded them to betrayal.

Hans Heinrich Chrier’s poem “1813” also expressed this transgressive vision of German memory. Chrier used the Grimm brothers’ legend of seven sleeping brothers who lie in an enchanted slumber on the coast as a metaphor for Germany before the advent of Napoleon. In this fantastical poem, Germany slumbers before being awoken by the French: And see, it was one \textit{Volk}, a German \textit{Volk} arising/ Where Princes and Prelates otherwise only found subjects.\textsuperscript{152} Napoleon thus acted as a transient force, once dispatched he no longer mattered for a nation aware of the rule of law and citizenship. For this service, Germans in 1913 should extend their

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{150} Jefferies, \textit{Imperial Culture}, 188.
  \item \textsuperscript{151} Wilhelm Schulz, “Das Volk steht auf” editorial cartoon \textit{Simplicissimus} October 20, 1913, 481.
  \item \textsuperscript{152} Hans Heinrich Chrier, “1813” in Ibid., 482.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
arms over the Rhine River and call the French their brothers. As in the cover, the poem drew a sharp line of division between the common decency of the people and their predatory rulers.

Perhaps the most damning portrait in this issue was another Schulz cartoon, “Leipzig”. This cartoon depicted the carnage in the aftermath of October battle. In the background the whole city was on fire while in the left foreground contained a soldier’s corpse lay next to a spent cannonball. In the middle of this carnage both Frederick William III and the Austrian Emperor Francis II kneel in abject reverence. The faces of the two rulers wear stern expressions as if the two fully appreciate the import of this fateful battle. As with Schulz’s earlier cartoon, the accompanying text subverts this stock patriotic image. “O Lord God,” both men say “you have helped us against Napoleon. Now help us against our own people!” What is significant is that the satire in this issue was incredibly minimalist. All it would take to render Schulz’s cartoons indistinguishable from the mass of commemorative patriotic literature published in 1913 would have been the substitution of its captions. Furthermore, the text required a token amount of historical background for contemporaries to perceive the target of the satire. In “Leipzig” for example, the text did not need to explain the long period of censorship and authoritarian rule practiced by the victors of 1815 to highlight the hypocrisy of the past and a present that venerated the former.

Gerhart Hauptmann’s Festspiel in deutschen Reimen, translated into English as Commemoration Masque, also relied on the Kaiserreich’s extreme historicism to make its satire work. The Silesian city of Breslau commissioned the Nobel laureate for their celebration of the centennial. Hauptmann’s play utilized proto-Brechtian theatrical elements to satirize the contemporary portrayals of the Befreiungskriege. In this single act play, the character of the Director tries to render a highly complex period of history comprehensible but his subjects keep

---

interrupting his attempts. The German heroes of 1813 are often a highly fickle and cacophonous lot in the play. For example, after Jahn, Scharnhorst, Stein, Gneisenau, and Kleist each swear a “Schilleresque” oath to defeat Napoleon, the stage directions call for the character of John Bull to enter with a bag of gold and address the audience with characteristic crudeness:

You Proosians are a fine lot o’ ‘eroes, I say
You’ve got brave monarchs, and many a square ‘un
Augustus the Strong- now he was a rarew ‘un.
They all found out, long, long ago
That the Britisher’s pounds myke the German mare go.\(^\text{154}\)

Like *Simplicissimus*, the humor relied upon a carefully constructed juxtaposition of opposites, in this case the direct bluntness of John Bull that money makes war possible clashes with the loquacious patriotism of Jahn. Napoleon himself emerges as a sympathetic character in *Commemoration Masque* who cannot understand why individual Germans such as Schill are attacking his armies. In light of the centennial’s commemoration of these martyrs as heroes, Hauptmann’s dialogue is strikingly blunt:

My word, they don’t know what they do,
These poor, down-trodden German peons,
That sweat for princes and lords, and in aeons
Get a fowl once a decade to make a stew.
I free them from service ever lasting,
I make them disused to sweating and fasting,
End their hereditary feudalty,
Bring them back to humanity from old bestialty,
And like these hussars, they return me but evil.\(^\text{155}\)

As Napoleon reaches the end of his reign, he becomes more cold and cruel with stage directions calling for him to be dressed as Zeus while his army collapses. The climactic battle scene reintroduces Jahn and his men, but the plot’s main focus is a group of anonymous men and


\(^{155}\) Ibid., 77-8.
mothers trying to secure the lives of their loved ones amid the fury of war. The play ends with the character The First Mother transforming into the personification of Prussia’s victory, Athene Germania, making a plea for peace and love over war and hate. As the curtain closes, The Director returns to make his peace with the audience, only to be interrupted by Blücher, who neither realizes that the war is long over and that he is dead. The Director uses his director’s wand to command Blücher “To your place you gray-bearded sire/but your word shall live though you expire./ To you country I give it, as destiny’s foreword-/ Not your joy of battle; but- your Forward!” By appropriating Blücher’s message of forward movement but leaving behind his jingoism, Hauptmann indicated a need for Germany to abandon living in the glories of the past and embrace its future.

Not surprisingly, Hauptmann’s idiosyncratic play ran afoul of powerful conservative critics and ended its production run early. But the existence of it and the critiques of Simplicissimus indicate that the memory of the Befreiungskriege was far from homogenous on the eve of the First World War. Ironically, this occurred despite the unprecedented scale of monuments such as the Völkerschlachtdenkmal and public ceremonies surrounding them. The fracturing of memory in this final phase represented the byproduct of this over-determined vision of the past. Previous attempts to create a universal German memory relied on a carefully constructed narrative that erased ambiguities, but Wilhelmine state nationalism tried to go a step further. It attempted to channel memory along lines that specifically glorified the state and its monarch. The 1913 ceremonies inaugurating the Völkerschlachtdenkmal tried to present a vision of a people acting as one to venerate the Kaiser. The state’s use of mass ceremony only helped foster alternative visions of the past as Kaiserreich could never quite reach its goal of a unified society. Cultural critics like Hauptmann merely had to observe the Kaiserreich’s ceremonies for

156 Ibid., 98.
comedic fodder. Additionally, youth culture like the Wandervögel could now disseminate alternative images of Germany’s past and future. Yet these critics’ vision of the past was similar in many ways to that of earlier memory in that it exalted the people and used the lessons of history to demonstrate the power of a nation united. Although state nationalism failed to achieve its ambitious goals, it was also able to animate an increasingly vocal hyper-nationalism. However, as indicated in the *Im Neuem Reich* editorial, this nationalism’s support of the state could be highly conditional.

In the case of Germany, the attempt to keep the memory of Waterloo alive presented the exact opposite problems as Britain. In the British case memory developed along highly-informal patterns as the century progressed. Early attempts by George IV to appropriate Waterloo such as his commissioning of George Jones to paint two large battle paintings of Vittoria and Waterloo and then placing them between his own portrait fell flat for a British public that knew who really won these battles.\(^{157}\) The early appropriation of the *Befreiungskriege* by the smaller German states reflected the relatively weak status of German generals when compared to Wellington. Blücher may have been the epitome of that era’s fighting general, but unlike Wellington he eschewed politics post-1815 in order to spend his retirement drinking and gambling. Despite its greater size and wealth, nineteenth-century Britain never attempted to create a national memorial for the Napoleonic Wars on the scale of the Bavaria’s *Befreiungshalle*. As Prussia assumed control over Germany, it could incorporate these early exercises in state memory into its own state-building project as seen in the addition of Prussian *Gründerzeit* heroes into *Wahlhalla*.

Yet the *Kaiserreich*’s project to recruit historical memory for its own purposes did not proceed smoothly over the long-term. Alon Confino has pointed out that in Württemberg Sedan

\(^{157}\) Milkes, *A Battle’s Legacy*, 276-78.
Day was hugely unpopular outside of middle-class circles. ¹⁵⁸ Other incidents in the Kaiserreich suggested that unification had not transcended local loyalties. Military exercises between Prussian and other principalities’ armies sometimes devolved into brawls. Within this context then, the regime’s effort to capitalize on the centenary appears as much more than the quasi-feudal dream of Wilhelm II. The Napoleonic Wars did have the benefit of a historical narrative of a united German lands against a common enemy. Yet the state could not play up that latter angle too much or lose control of Germany’s increasingly vocal right-wing. But by opting for such a carefully stage-managed memory, the Kaiserreich opened itself up to withering criticism. It remains unclear as to how where this stalemate in public memory was heading as the centennial of Waterloo approached because war intervened and historical memory became drafted into the war effort.

CHAPTER 3
THE MOBILIZATION OF MEMORY: WATERLOO IN A TIME OF GLOBAL WAR

The 12 January 1915 issue of *Simplicissimus* published a cartoon that commented on the recent defeats Russia had suffered in the winter campaigns of 1914. Entitled “1812-1914” and illustrated by E. Thoeny, the cartoon juxtaposed current military situation with that of Napoleon’s ill-fated invasion of Russia. In the background a long line of beaten Russian troops retreat in the harsh winter conditions of Eastern Front. Several wounded soldiers are visible and the army does not march in any coherent fashion. In the foreground lie two skeletal soldiers of Napoleon’s army, their uniforms strangely intact from when they died in 1812. One of them comments on the scene behind them. “I would never have imagined it,” he tells his companion, “that the Prussians would be the ones to avenge us.” Thus the memory of Napoleon’s defeat represented a hope that history had repeated itself.

Aside from demonstrating *Simplicissimus*’s trademark wit, “1812-1914” acknowledged the irony inherent in using memory of the Napoleonic Wars as a signpost for the First World War. The shifting pattern of alliances seemed to render moot any attempt to draw historical parallels to the current conflict. Russia, one of Napoleon’s most intractable foes, was now the ally of France. In a reversal of the situation in 1815, Britain and France were allies fighting in common cause against Germany in the Low Countries. For both Germans and Britons the approaching centenary of Waterloo posed a conundrum for intellectuals and artists as to how to celebrate the centennial without inadvertently eulogizing the present enemy. Many of the planned celebrations ended up cancelled. The *London Times* reported that the traditional Waterloo festivities such as regimental dinners were called off and the Royal United Services

---

Institution had abandoned its planned museum display. The battlefield itself was under German occupation and only narrowly avoided being the scene of more fighting during the 1914 invasion of Belgium. The gravity of the war situation in both countries also created a highly serious atmosphere that precluded any public celebrations as on a scale seen during the Völkerschlachtdenkmal’s dedication ceremony two years prior. Britain found itself adjusting for a massive war on the continent. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) sent to France in 1914 had suffered severe losses and needed to replace its losses. Secretary of State for War Herbert Kitchener instituted a massive volunteer drive but some feared that Britain would have to resort to the unprecedented move of conscription. Germany was undergoing a similar level of mobilization. The war had submerged the political tensions seen during 1913 and public intellectuals tried to maintain a collective front known as the Burgfrieden (fortress peace).

Having failed to achieve victory in the Western Front, the high command elected to build upon the victories in East Prussia achieved by Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg the previous year. Behind this confidence there was a great deal of apprehension. The pressures of having to sustain a strong defense in the West coupled with the need to support of its weak Austro-Hungarian ally put the German war effort under a serious strain. In spite of this grim milieu, the memory of Waterloo still demonstrated a degree of potency in both countries as the centennial approached.

The persistence of the memory of Waterloo in the public discourse was due to a number of factors. Although a number of historians of the First World War have questioned the existence of a popular enthusiasm for war among ordinary citizens, it was clear that intellectuals were among the most animated by the war during these early stages. The needs of the wartime economy meant that the celebrations of the centennial had to be mental exercises, thus giving

---

public intellectuals a central stage in 1915. Furthermore, the popular histories of the nineteenth century fed the expectation that a properly conducted battle would be decisive. This created a demand that the historical Waterloo should reveal its secrets. A correct interpretation of Waterloo was essential in a situation where the stakes were so high. Lowenthal noted “the prime function of memory is not to preserve the past but to adapt it so as to enrich and manipulate the present.”

What emerged in 1915 was a highly-charged memory along the lines laid out by Lowenthal. In this tense time both the German and British memories of Waterloo became inextricably linked to the wartime situation.

The wartime memory of Waterloo can be seen as developing into four interconnected strains. The first iteration of this memory was one of orientation. Already in 1915 there were clear signs that the war presented a situation unparalleled in recent history. Therefore, like their counterparts in the mid-nineteenth century, Germans and Britons alike would naturally turn to the last instance of a pan-European war for guidance. By drawing a firm connection between the past and present, the authors of this memory could provide their audience solace by claiming a national ownership over history. This utilitarian approach often involved the use of history as an advocate for their authors’ opinions on the direction of the war effort. Hero worship, the second variation in memory, also had a clear parentage from the nineteenth century. This form of popular memory sought to draft the heroes of 1815 into the war effort. The exaltation of generals such as Blücher and Wellington or the bravery of ordinary soldiers defending their nation had the effect of extolling the armies then serving in the field. Using history to draw a continuous line between the armies of 1815 and 1915 would metaphorically reincarnate the conquerors of Napoleon. The cartoon “1812-1914” should serve as an indication that this involved a great deal of creativity to create a coherent memory. In mining the past for contemporary heroes, the

---

commemorations of Waterloo also sought to use history to blacken the nation’s current enemy. This chauvinistic memory had a twofold purpose. First, it would seek to find evidence that the current enemy’s misdeeds had a clear antecedent in the past. The second purpose behind this chauvinism was to denude the enemy of any reflected glory from Waterloo. The final development of memory in this period involved the commemoration of the dead of 1815 through small, but symbolic acts. This discrete form of ancestor worship would seek to accentuate the importance of the link between past and present in a time of national emergency.

FIRST ITERATION: WAR HISTORICISM

It has become a commonplace assertion in historiography to state that the magnitude of wartime mobilization in 1914 dwarfed that of previous wars. Much statistical information confirms this truism. David Silbey notes that between late 1914 and the establishment of conscription in January 1915, the monthly enlistment rate in Britain averaged 145,101 volunteers.\footnote{David Silbey, *The British Working Class and Enthusiasm for War, 1914-1916* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 27.} Although among historians there exists a considerable debate to the rationale behind this volunteerism, the numbers are high for a United Kingdom population estimated to be approximately 45 million in 1914.\footnote{For the rationale for British enlistment see Ibid. and Niall Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), esp. 199-207.} Germany conducted an economic war mobilization that reached far into the German hinterland. Roger Chickering relays a story that the Black Forest watchmakers’ cuckoo clocks contained essential parts for the manufacture of timed fuses.\footnote{Roger Chickering, *Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 36.} Although accurate, this statistical picture obscures some of the realities of national wartime experience, especially for the first two years of the war. Even though modern communications made the battlefield a far less remote experience than in previous wars like the Crimean or Franco-Prussian Wars, the events on both fronts still had to be conveyed mostly via print media.
Furthermore, the static nature of the Western Front warfare and the expansive size of the Eastern Front meant that a majority of civilians often did not have a direct experience with the war.

There also existed a considerable synergy between the wartime governments and public intellectuals during this opening stage of the war. Public intellectuals found that their ideas carried a deeper weight than during the prewar environment; they could now be the voice of the nation. For example, the Berlin historian Otto von Gierke wrote about the initial celebrations in an editorial in the newspaper Der Tag, “I seemed to lose my personality. A higher patriotic individuality had taken full possession of the consciousness of all [society’s] members. I had seen the ‘spirit of the people’.” Even though Gierke claimed to be part of this national unity, he became the mediator to his readers whom did not have direct experience with the celebrations. More importantly intellectuals like Gierke could use their position to place events into their conception of the grand scheme of world affairs. In the case of the latter process, historical memory was one of ideal venues for such an intellectual mobilization.

Using the historical memory of Waterloo as part of the war effort dovetailed with how the profession of history had evolved in the nineteenth century. Historicism, the intellectual school that believes the present is the culmination of past events governed by historical laws, dominated the mindset of both nations’ professional and popular historians. George Iggers astutely observed that nineteenth-century historicism saw itself as fulfilling a public need. This outlook meant that “history needed to be written by specialists, but not only or even primarily for them, but for a broad educated public. History was to be both a scientific discipline and a source of culture.” This elevated vision of history meant that in wartime the historical discipline become a means to advance a vision as to why war broke out while reassuring its audience about

---

166 Otto von Gierke, quoted in Verhey, 67, emphasis mine.
167 Iggers, Historiography, 25, emphasis original.
its inevitable conclusion. For example, *The Spectator*’s 1915 review of A. F. Becke’s study *Napoleon and Waterloo* ended its positive assessment of this campaign history by noting that “from 1815 to 1915, history is repeating itself. It was again the miscalculation of British power and the magnificent tenacity and coolness of British troops that foiled the Prussian plan, as it had foiled Napoleon’s.”  

This war historicism could also manifest itself on local dimension as well. In the case of German schools, Andrew Donson has found that educators in 1915 would encourage students to write their own historical essays for local publication but only provided they write on topics such as “France’s Old Hate and the Desire for Revenge” and “The Apotheosis of Prussia in 1813 and the Mobilization in 1914.”  

As the centennial heightened public awareness of Waterloo these wartime historians would use their visions of memory to enlist Waterloo for the purposes of the war.

One of the earliest manifestations of this development in the context of Waterloo was Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff’s speech “Die geschichtlichen Ursachen des Krieges” delivered at the Charlottenburg city hall between 5 and 10 September 1914. This prominent Royal Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität professor of philology explained to his audience that history demonstrated that the Entente’s malfeasance demonstrated Germany’s innocence for the advent of war. The twentieth-century alliance of France, Russia, and Britain was the convergence of three separate historical trends. French culture proved inimical to any sense of national honor thus allowing the Republic to march with tsarist Russia and the same nation that burned Joan of Arc. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff argued that the rationale behind Russian alliance was a consistent, but misinformed, pan-Slavism. Russia after 1815 became convinced of its mission to

---

free its Slavic brothers in the Hapsburg empire, despite evidence that these Slavs were quite content to remain subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The mortar holding together this coalition in 1914 was Britain. From the age of Louis XIV onwards, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff argued, Britain had a consistent grand strategy which sought to prevent the emergence of any economic rival. From 1643 to 1815, Britain’s main enemy was France. Britain used its naval supremacy in this period to augment its economic strength which it then used to buy German proxies. It was during this period that the British character revealed itself. “[The British] purchased for themselves substitutes for entire regiments from our German petty-princes, but in their eyes our great king [Frederick the Great] was little more than a petty-prince, who fought against the French for subsidies and they would rely upon him as long as they got their money’s worth,” Wilamowitz-Moellendorff told his audience. In this formulation, history showed that Britain acted in only the vainest fashion; its martial glory tainted by a love of money.

This casual dismissal of Germany’s military worth even extended through Waterloo. Despite the heroic presence of Blücher, neither Wellington nor his nineteenth-century decedents would ever acknowledge Germany’s rightful place in the defeat of Napoleon. Blücher’s desire to call the battle Belle-Alliance was a sign of comradeship and partnership, which the British characteristically refused. By naming the battlefield Waterloo, the British erased Prussia from this moment in history. Britain was then able to use the prestige of banishing Europe’s oppressor to redraw Europe in ways beneficial to its trade, which included the creation of an independent Belgium to prevent Germans access to the sea. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff offered his audiences two alternatives for the future. Evoking both memories of Napoleon and the

171 Ibid., 26-7.
172 Ibid.
Congress of Vienna, Wilamowitz-Moellendorff concluded that “far away lies before us the idea of a Napoleonic world-empire that degrades and enslaves unwilling nations, and it shall remain far from us. We will certainly wish in the future for a concert of different nations and among them will not be the pair, England and France.” Wilamowitz-Moellendorff’s view of history amounted to explaining how history had gone wrong since 1815, but more importantly how it now offered a guide to redress the errors of the past.

Wilhelm Hausenstein’s article “Das Zeitalter von Waterloo” appearing in the bimonthly left-liberal journal *März* used a historical model similar to Wilamowitz-Moellendorff’s but dealt with Waterloo in a much more direct fashion. Hausenstein’s loose Marxist-interpretation of history argued that Waterloo did not so much represent a British triumph over tyranny, but as a victory for British capitalism over its potential French rival. By using its trade and naval supremacy to enlist client states, “English diplomacy helped put together the first alliance against the revolutionary bourgeoisie.” Looking at the Napoleonic Wars as a whole, Hausenstein claimed that Britain’s avaricious mercantilism helped it not only to prevail in its struggle against Napoleon but to put its stamp on the postwar order. At the Congress of Vienna, Britain made an economic alliance with the clerical absolutism of the Austrian Empire. This resulted in Britain’s acquisition of a global network of trading colonies in Tobago, Saint Lucia, Ceylon, South Africa, Malta, and Helgoland. Against this relentless British drive to acquire and defend its economic hegemony, Napoleon needed to constantly maintain a string of military victories. Waterloo, like Sedan in 1870, proved one defeat too many for an imperial ideology that was unable to exploit its citizenry’s revolutionary energies.

---

173 Ibid., 35-6.
175 Ibid., 223.
Hausenstein’s examination of this era projects an image of a Napoleonic regime that was highly ephemeral, whereas the British economic empire was a durable and far more sinister polity. For example, Hausenstein described Wellington’s career as an exemplar of service to the British Empire by stressing the global dimensions a military career that spanned from India to Europe. This has the effect of rendering Waterloo into a narrow imperial victory; one of many steps in Britain’s economic victory. In this formulation, current events demonstrated that the adaptation of name Waterloo over Belle-Alliance was particularly apt despite Blücher’s aid:

If one places this question [of who won 18 June] politically, as one must, there cannot possibly be the slightest doubt about it, that the victory was an English victory; it is true that the name “Waterloo” was political and not that of “Belle-Alliance” which was so greatly championed by Bismarck. If the 18 June was a German political victory, then 1914 and 1915 would have been impossible: 1914 and 1915 is the name of the war of England and its vassalage against Germany.

In this view, Germany, and Europe by extension, lost the Napoleonic Wars to a global economic empire. This prevented Europe from developing along natural lines. In one case outlined by Hausenstein, Prussian Prime Minister Stein was unable to secure German borders when Wellington used his Waterloo-derived prestige to block Prussian acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine. By drawing up such a stark historical portrait of British mercantilism, “Das Zeitalter von Waterloo,” presented its audience a hope that Germany would emerge victorious now that its people knew the historical basis for the entire continent’s true enemy: Britain.

In Britain, many writers would suggest that history vindicated Britain’s current system of alliances. In its special coverage of the centennial, *The Times* avowed that:

Waterloo made possible the development of a new France, enlightened and disciplined by all the rich experiences of the revolutionary epoch, of a France which, since the lines of her progress were henceforth set on the principles of ordered liberty, was brought

---

176 Ibid., 227.
177 Ibid., 228.
inevitably into closer sympathy with Great Britain, whence the inspiration of these principles had originally been derived.\footnote{Anonymous, “A New France,” \textit{The Times} June 18, 1915, 9.}

In this formulation, the sacrifices of the British at Waterloo made France safe for democracy. Furthermore, the military heroism of 1815 could translate into extolling its \textit{Entente} descendents. Herbert Maxwell’s article “Waterloo” in June 1915 \textit{Cornhill Magazine} illustrated this approach. This Scottish intellectual and retired Tory MP stated intent was explain to his readers the “certain points which have become controversial, or of which the importance has been underrated or misunderstood,” but his narrative had the effect of extolling Britain’s current Belgian ally. For example, he relayed the incident in which a Belgian contingent, acting without orders at Quatre-Bras, managed to secure Wellington’s flank. Maxwell then posed the rhetorical question “is there not some parallel between this dislocation of Napoleon’s offensive and that of the German Emperor’s offensive in August 1914?”\footnote{Herbert Maxwell, “Waterloo” \textit{Cornhill Magazine} 38 (Jan.-Jun. 1915): 734.} Maxwell’s attempt to restore Belgians’ reputation was at odds with British historiography on the Waterloo campaign, which typically asserted that the Belgian troops were unreliable and desired a restoration of French rule. Maxwell acknowledged this preconception but explained that among the Belgian units, the most cowardly regiments were Nassau Germans amalgamated into the Belgian forces.\footnote{Ibid., 735-36.} By challenging the historiography in this fashion, Maxwell illustrated how Belgium’s current stand against Germany was an event with a clear historical precedent.

The above articles may have explained something of the current war’s long-term origins to their readers, but they do not offer them any guidance for how to defeat their enemy. Not all examples of war historicism were as vague about what to do with history. In two instances the centennial memory of Waterloo would be used by British writers to resolve the vexing issue of

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\end{thebibliography}
national conscription, which Silbey noted was one of the most contentious domestic political
issues in 1915.\textsuperscript{181} The Nation’s 12 June 1915 editorial “Waterloo Tits” argued for the
continuation of Kitchener’s volunteer army on the basis of its analysis of Wellington’s 1815
army. “Waterloo Tits” was the northern England name for an 1815 veteran. The editorial
outlined the main features of the daily life of one of these volunteer rankers. They had to carry an
identical load as a contemporary British soldier, drank heavily, and could be capable of the worst
excesses such as the sack of Badajoz.\textsuperscript{182} Despite their imperfections, these were the men that beat
Napoleon’s mass-conscription army at Waterloo. The editorial’s conclusion described the parallels
between the “Waterloo Tits” and the current BEF. After drawing upon the testimony of
Napoleonic Era generals such as John Moore the author asserted “we may compose a fairly
accurate portrait of our present ‘Tommy’s’ natural ancestor-more drunken, more brutal, capable
of appalling crimes…but possessing in himself the roots of all that is best and most characteristic
of our present battalions- the unshaken endurance under danger and suffering, the kindly humor,
and ironic stoicnsm.”\textsuperscript{183} In this reading of history, the adaptation of conscription would import a
foreign element that would alter the natural character of the British Army and thus prevent
another Waterloo victory.

The popular military historian Cecil Battine offered an alternative interpretation of
Waterloo that lent support to the establishment of conscription. Battine’s “How to Celebrate the
Centenary of Waterloo” argued that Napoleon’s blunders and the British superiority in
combined-arms merged to ensure Britain’s victory. Although Battine acknowledged the Prussian
contribution to the battle, he dismissed this “starveling kingdom’s” effort as meaningless when

\textsuperscript{181} Silbey, The British Working Class, 34-7.
\textsuperscript{182} Anonymous, “Waterloo Tits,” The Nation June 12, 1915, 347.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 348.
contrasted to the superb defensive capabilities of British troops. Both the British government and society allowed this mixture of success to atrophy during the nineteenth century. Yet this particular lesson of history was not lost on the Prussians who maintained and expanded their army. The result was that only by a “miracle of good luck” that the BEF was able to fight off this modern army. Because of this reprieve, the “best way of celebrating the centenary of the Battle of Waterloo will be the enactment of conscription in the United Kingdom, thus restoring it to the position which it held among European states one hundred years ago, and which had been lost in the interval by suicidal apathy and indifference to our national interests.”

Behind Battine’s hectoring was the notion that history carried with it an objective lesson made more urgent by wartime events.

German intellectuals could also use Waterloo to advocate or justify specific war policies, as evidenced by two anonymous articles appearing in the Social Democratic Party-affiliated journal Die Zukunft. The 1914 article “Wir sind Barbarei” claimed that Germany’s current conquests of Liège, Brussels, and Namur “are the announcement of a new Waterloo. One in which Germany smashes its enemies to pieces.” The article went on to illustrate how the previous incarnation of Waterloo also displayed Germany’s native martial valor. Blücher managed to save Wellington despite his personal injuries the Prussian had suffered Ligny. Wellington repaid this generous act by refusing to accede to the name Belle-Alliance and instead naming the battle after his own headquarters, where no fighting had taken place. The article cited the battle report of Gneisenau, which confirmed Wellington’s duplicity “to which every Briton’s

---

185 Ibid., 1319.
cheeks, especially those of Kitchener’s, must redden with shame.”187 The new German Army in Flanders has the same heroism as its predecessor a century before, but it also possessed the benefits of the *Burgfrieden* where millionaires and day-laborers united in common cause. The result was that the German Army should adapt a Carthaginian campaign and replay the role played by their Teutonic ancestors who destroyed the tyranny of Rome.188 The 1915 *Zukunft* article “Wer hat es besser?” used the events of 1815 to justify German occupation of Belgium. After bravely vanquishing the French, both German statesmen and soldiers wished to remove the fortress system established by Louis XIV that was a perpetual “thorn in the side of the German borders, but also to plant the Germanic pinion in the land of the Flemings and Walloons. If this wish would have taken root, then the England of Wellington would have striven to hinder it with as much zeal as the one of Kitchener’s.”189 The article repeated what was quickly becoming the stock narrative of Germany’s Waterloo experience: chivalrous German heroes like Blücher saving Wellington at the right moment on 18 June, only to have Britain betray her ally for a narrow-minded desire to dominate the continent economically. The author of “Wer hat es besser?” concluded that given this trade-centered mindset of Albion, Germany’s decision to a submarine fleet was well-founded.190

Despite both nations’ use of war historicism to explain the wartime situation, there was a fundamental difference between German and British approaches to 1815. The German variant of memory was preoccupied with how Germany never reaped the proper benefit for her contributions to victory in 1815. This memory presented a vision in which history turned in the wrong direction because Britain’s greed prevented the expansion of German trade and

187 Ibid., 285-6.
188 Ibid., 291.
190 Ibid., 358.
prosperity. British memory, however, focused much more on the battle itself. These writers thus tried to present Waterloo as an ideal battle wherein both British and their Belgian allies eventually found kindred spirits among the French, paralleling the current conflict. When the Germans emerge in British accounts, it was either as interlopers trying to steal Wellington’s glory or dilettantes committing grave military errors. Neither side wished to abandon the glory of Waterloo, but both had to explain how such a great victory created the preconditions of an inevitable war.

SECOND ITERATION: HERO WORSHIP

As both Germany and Britain gradually progressed towards a wartime state in 1915, their respective military commanders assumed a greater degree of political power. In a particularly telling case, Wilhelm II found himself shunted away from military decisions, even though the Kaiserreich’s constitution granted him the emperor the title Supreme War Lord. Although Britain had a long-established system of civilian control over the military, Kitchener’s appointment as Secretary of War was the first time an active-duty soldier had received a cabinet position. On the battlefield, commanders such as John French or Helmuth von Moltke the Younger became widely known figures. Few wartime generals, however, achieved as much fame as Hindenburg, the venerable Prussian commander approaching his seventies who cemented his celebrity from a series of battles on the Eastern Front in 1914. These generals became something of early media stars. This growing presence of the military in the public discourse meant that both German and British society looked to soldiers of the past to contextualize the present.

This enlistment of the heroes of the past was particularly easy in the case of Waterloo because both publics had been socialized with the protagonists of the 1815 over the course of a century. Eulogizing the soldiers of Waterloo also helped justify the war effort. Richard Frankel
observes that German celebrations of Bismarck during the First World War helped demonstrate the value of using a military solution to resolve a crisis.\(^\text{191}\) In the case of the memory of Waterloo, Frankel’s premise is even more persuasive. As seen in the previous two chapters, both nations had long cultivated the memory of Waterloo as an ideal decisive battle. Beyond their military acumen, novels such as *Napoleon and Blücher* and Fitchett’s popular history extolled the officers and men of the Napoleonic Era as paragons of personal virtue. This iteration of memory built directly upon the imagery and motifs that developed during the nineteenth century to create a sense that the Waterloo’s heroes were a distant reflection of the current combatants.

The early comparison between Blücher and Hindenburg was a relatively easy analogy during the initial war years. Both men possessed a number of parallels. They were both of advanced age and their generalship tended towards offensive actions. Hindenburg and Blücher also both relied upon a young, energetic chief of staff to translate their offensive spirit into action. One of the earliest panegyrics of Hindenburg, *Bei Hindenburg: von seinem Leben und seinem Wirken* relayed to its German audience how Hindenburg’s men saw him as a reincarnated Blücher. After making a tactical retreat from Warsaw, the biographer reports his troops’ opinion of his methods: “If Hindenburg ordered us to retreat, we were confident that he was ordering us to a new way to a new victory. We named him anew ‘Marshal Forwards the Second’, because we knew that he is advancing even when retreating.”\(^\text{192}\) In this account, the memory of Blücher developed during the nineteenth century helped to sustain confidence in his spiritual successor’s Fabian strategy during early 1915.

The BEF commander John French won no equivalent battle on the scale of Hindenburg’s 1914 victory at Tannenberg. Yet that would not stop some British writers to draw a connection


between French and his more successful 1815 forbearer. George Herbert Perris’s military history
_The Campaigns of 1914 in France and Belgium_ adapted a highly novelistic view of the BEF commander and where he fit in the context of Waterloo. As French first entered into Belgium, Perris informed his readers that Waterloo was firmly on the BEF commander’s mind:

> When John French faced north from Mons, a few miles from the field of Waterloo where, a century before, Wellington faced south against the greatest of adventurers, he showed England once more stepping aside from her own paths to help the small peoples of this middle tract of the Old World, and casting her weight against the challenge of an upstart imperialism.

Through his use of direct analogies, Wellington faced south and French north, Perris creates a symmetrical convergence between these two historical figures that is easy for his readers to understand. Perris then uses this metaphor to further embellish Britain’s current nobility, already established in 1815. A notable aspect of these portraits of Hindenburg and French was that these reports from the front were very recent events, but their authors ensured that Waterloo’s memory imbued these events with a meaning that fit neatly into the broader stream of history.

A common subgenre in both nations was to have Waterloo commanders return to earth in spectral form to aid their descendents. For example, in 1914 the Canadian-born editorial cartoonist Boardman Robinson published a sketch featuring the ghosts of Napoleon and Wellington pointing to a storm on the horizon over the caption “This time we come side by side.”

Gustav Hochstetter’s comedic poem “Kaffee Walhalla: Phantastische Szene aus ernster Zeit” opened up in a strangely empty Valhalla. The two valkyries marvel at why the halls are so empty. As the poem progressed the whole pantheon of German heroes appeared to inform each other of the current condition of their homeland. Blücher informs his Napoleonic Era colleagues

---


Scharnhorst, Yorck, and Gneisenau of the situation, “A real spectacle for heroes and heaven!” he says. He then describes the changed state of affairs to his friends:

Blücher: If my old mind understands it right,  
Then it seems that things go differently.  
The Frenchman and Rus’ have a third ally.  
Yorck: What?  
Blücher: Naturally, the beloved British!  
Yorck (doubtfully): Your old friend from Waterloo?  
Blücher: Yes, England stands now on another side.  
Gneisenau: I shall not know this Wellington,  
What do you call him?  
Blücher: The modern Briton is a different person  
His Wellington of today - Mr. French.

Slowly more deceased German heroes return from earth, informing their comrades that the Germans have renewed their spirit of old and are beating back their enemies. Richard Wagner informs them that the valkyries will have more work to do welcoming new heroes into Valhalla and Bismarck, up to this point silent, closes the dialogue by sternly expressing his pride in the German soldiers.

The song “A Slight Misunderstanding at the Jasper Gate” by Henry Lawson portrayed Saint Peter as mystified by the pantheon of British military heroes breaking out of Heaven to assist their nation. Not surprisingly, the last hero to depart to assist the BEF troops in Flanders:

It is Wellington, where French is, who has  
broken Heaven's trenches,  
With his purple-blooded captains (who  
used purple language then)  
Come to strengthen with his spirit all the  
coolness you inherit—  
He who took the scum of Europe, and who  
trained them to be Men.

---

196 Ibid., 87.
197 Ibid., 91.
198 Henry Lawson, “A Slight Misunderstanding at the Jasper Gate,” in My Army, O, My Army: And Other Songs (Sydney: Tyrrell, 1915), 70, emphasis original.
Although both Lawson and Hochsetter’s afterlife contain elements a frenetic humor, their use of the afterlife reflected a serious intent. In this time of stress and uncertainty, this use of the supernatural theme had the effect of revivifying the dead. Paul Fussell’s literary analysis of the First World War observes one of the reactions to industrial warfare was a reinvigorated mythology and a heightened sensibility of the public to superstition.\textsuperscript{199} Resurrecting these heroes fit within Fussell’s analysis because the supernatural was one way to try and make these figures relevant for the modern world. These men could then exist simultaneously in both the present and the past. Furthermore, rendering these heroes into spirits gave their authors more leeway in their depictions than a conventional history text. Alfred Gordon’s poem “Judgment of Earth, or Waterloo 1914” even managed to enlist Blücher to aid the British war effort. Addressed to Wilhelm II during the initial invasion of Belgium:

\begin{verbatim}
What auguries and portents dost thou see,
As now thine hosts to Waterloo draw near?
What spirits in the deepening night appear,
Awaked from slumber through a century?
Doth Blücher’s shade rise up and say to thee
That French by Germans first were routed here,
And those dire happenings of that fateful year
Yet once again in this our day shall be?\textsuperscript{200}
\end{verbatim}

Gordon’s use of Blücher’s shade was one of the more creative ways this variant of hero-worship could manifest itself, allowing the author to mobilize a historical figure of the enemy against his country.

Not surprisingly, Fitchett weighed in on the importance of Wellington to the current conflict. His centennial article “A Great Soldier and His Battles” celebrated both Wellington the soldier and the statesmen. “Wellington, in a word, restored British self-respect in that one field

\textsuperscript{199} Paul Fussell, \textit{The Great War and Modern Memory} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 115.
where it had suffered many wounds,” Fitchett wrote. Wellington emerges in Fitchett’s account as a supreme warlord and politician whose acumen only exceeded his modesty. In particular, Wellington’s battle dispatches were concise so as to avoid accepting undue credit for victory. He had no desire to use history for his own benefit, unlike Napoleon. In the case of Waterloo, this humility only confused the accounts of the battle as other soldiers, Germans in particular, tried to appropriate Wellington’s victory. This created a needless historical debate that obscured the simple fact that Wellington carried the day. This emphasis upon Wellington’s character had the effect of rendering any debate about his military glory meaningless. According to Fitchett, “Waterloo proved that Wellington had—mixed in with other very inadequate material—enough of that very useful ‘article’, the British private.” Fitchett’s snide discounting of German contribution, the “inadequate material”, coupled with his assertion that the historical complexities were the result of selfish vanity ensured that Waterloo remained a national victory of which Britons could be proud for it created a century of peace. Implicit in this form of hero worship is the view that if Britons all repeated this performance, another hundred years of peace may result.

Hero worship was not limited to the commanders of 18 June. Paul Kämpfe’s popular history Ligny und Waterloo celebrated the role of the entire Prussian Army in the defeat of Napoleon. In his account, Blücher is the beloved father figure of his men, able to drive them on to great victories. He is also a true German patriot that eschewed participation in the Congress of Vienna because the politicians were busy carving up Germany, to Wellington’s confusion. Kämpfe further lauds the Prussian Army by a series of contrasts to the British Army of 1815:

---

202 Ibid., 50-1.
203 Ibid., 196, emphasis original.
The British officers for the most part belonged to the high nobility and the English soldiers were no people’s army from all classes like the Prussian Army, but rather bought soldiers lured the most money and the best price. They willingly underwent corporal punishment. The English Army lacked the national feeling which held together all soldiers from the field marshal to the last camp-follower in a strong love for the Fatherland and Volksgemeinschaft, which made the Prussian so strong and unified.204

The only units in Wellington’s army to feel the same level of national feeling were the Hannoverian and Braunschweiger troops. Those units emerge as the foremost examples of bravery in Kamédia’s account of Quatre-Bras. The Braunschweig soldiers fight hard to protect their position. When their commander, the Duke of Brunswick, is wounded, three of the Braunschweigers, Corporal Külbel, Jäger Reckau, and Bugler Aue, try to desperately reach their Duke. Although they fail to save him, they carry his corpse away from the battlefield and thus prove themselves worthy subordinates of the legendary Black Duke.205 Although the Duke Frederick William became famous for his bravery, in Kämpfe’s account his ordinary soldiers are equally deserving of this honor.

When acclaiming the heroism of their Waterloo soldier, writers in both nations possessed a vast corpus of nineteenth-century historical research upon which to support their conceptions of heroism. Furthermore, the prevalence of the Napoleonic Wars in both nineteenth-century educational system and popular culture meant that First World War-era audiences had some familiarity with the subject. Therefore Robinson could depict Napoleon and Wellington’s ghosts and be certain that a sizable percentage of his readership understood his metaphor. This was an essential ingredient for this mobilization of memory for the war effort. An established military pedigree from 1815 proved highly useful as military leaders became more prominent in wartime society, as seen in the case of Hindenburg as the reincarnation of Blücher. An explanation of the heroism of the past like Kämpfe’s Ligny und Waterloo also exalted the rank and file of the

205 Ibid., 77-8.
current army. Their current descendants behaved much as their forbearers did when facing Napoleon.

THIRD ITERATION: CHAUVENISM

The war witnessed a general coarsening of the public discourse, as evidenced by many of the authors listed above. In this intense environment intellectuals were willing to entertain the worst stereotypes about their enemy. For example, before the author of “Wir sind Barberen” called for a rhetorical reenactment of the fall of Rome, he stated “England is allied with ‘yellow stink-apes’ [the Japanese] and revels in the news that that German men are mangled, and German women were shamed by drunken Cossacks.”¹²⁰⁶ Nor was this tendency limited to Germany. One of the most intractable rumors that enjoyed wide currency among Britons was that the Germans wantonly crucified a Canadian soldier in full view of his unit.²⁰⁷ Both countries saw the other as the basis of the conflict and thus a feeling of indignation fed this chauvinism. While this British conception of German guilt was due to the latter’s position as the titular leader of the Central Powers, German Anglophobia’s roots lie in the conjunction of prewar geopolitical and cultural factors that could be arranged to fit into a narrative of British perfidy. This trend cemented itself in the wartime milieu despite the significant contacts between the two countries before the war. As the war escalated both Britain and Germany found themselves ready to believe the worst about their enemy.

Chauvinistic interpretations of Waterloo were the inverse of the memory of its heroes. Whereas a commentator such as Fitchett or Kämpfe peered back to 1815 to see a martial display of the finest national characteristics, this iteration of memory would require the use of 1815 as a venue to exhibit the enemy’s vile nature. This differed slightly from war historicism because it

---

tended to portray its villains as static figures interchangeable with the present instead of part of
an evolutionary process. This variant of memory also used 1815 to degrade the present enemy.
The Battle of Waterloo became an important metaphor; it would either be a symbol of the most
atavistic nature of the enemy, or a yardstick from which to gauge the foe’s current inadequacies.
If the memory Waterloo was to remain viable in this environment it would become necessary to
denigrate the other. The ultimate purpose of this disparagement would be to remove any glory
from the rival’s historical participation in Waterloo.

One curious example of this iteration of memory was when both nations engaged in a
loose dialogue with each other around a curious rumor about the Lion’s Mound at Waterloo. *The
Times* reported that 1,500 German soldiers were at work to dismantle the 31-ton bronze lion atop
one of the most prominent landmarks of the battlefield, the massive artificial earth embankment
erected to honor the Prince of Orange in 1820. The article cited an anonymous source for this
story and treated it as a straightforward example of German destruction of Belgian monuments
such as the destruction of Louvain the year before. In reality, the Lion’s Mound remained intact
during the war and the *The Times* story has all the symptoms of typical wartime atrocity rumor.
Such accounts frequently combined an unsubstantiated report from a few witnesses with a strong
tendency to believe in the enemy’s worst instincts. Rather than let this bit of wartime gossip
lie fallow, the German magazine *Jugend* published a comedic retort to this British atrocity story.
After reassuring its readers that the story is false, the magazine published a poem “Der Löwe von
Waterloo” by A. D. Nora wherein the lion itself had abandoned the field due to the behavior of
the British:

When he saw Wellington’s heirs allied [with the French]
Murderously full of hate and anger

---

209 For more detailed analysis of these rumors, see Fussell, *The Great War*, 120-123.
towards the grandchildren of Blücher’s
German blood, the Germanic blood of
The noble lion seized
Such loathing of today
That he tucked in his tail
And with animalistic haste
Descended from its heights
And no one knows whither he fled
Yes, that I could understand well
Poor Lion of Waterloo!^{210}

Although comedic in tone, the poem insinuated British malfeasance when they elected to side with the French. The lion’s disgust with this choice amounted to an assertion by A. D. Nora that contemporary Britons had relinquished their birthright to the battle.

British chauvinism frequently clustered around historical accounts that postulated a German responsibility for Napoleon’s return because of an unchecked “Teutonic” instinct for revenge and destruction. *The Times* article “A New France” summarized the complex period of 1814-15 as one in which both Wellington and the Russian Tsar Alexander II tried in vain to support the Bourbon monarchy. “Clearly this could not have been done had the clamor of the Prussians for vengeance and of the German princelings generally for ‘compensations’ been listened to,” according to *The Times*’s presentation of history.\(^{211}\) The return of Napoleon was only a matter of time because the Prussians, Bavarians, and Austrians each tried to humiliate a proud nation despite the best efforts of Wellington’s statesmanship. Not only did “A New France” give its readers a vision of a proto-Entente; but it also argued that there existed a precursor to the Central Powers. The main difference between the two was that the former, as exemplified by Wellington and Alexander II, were models of a nationally-minded chivalry, whereas avarice and a brutal desire for reprisals characterized their German counterpart.


William Henry Skaggs also utilized a vision of this proto-Central Powers in his screed *German Conspiracies in America, From an American Point of View*. He noted that “Wellington had no illusion as to the character of his allies… and [was] scrupulous to respect the rights of non-combatants, as the bad men of his armies learned to their cost; and the disregard of these rights by the Germans revolted him.”\(^{212}\) Skaggs located these atrocities within a typical form of German warfare, which from the Thirty Years’ War all the way through to their current depredations in Belgium had consistently failed to respect culture and the rights of noncombatants.

A related trait of British chauvinism was to argue that the ego and militarism of Napoleon found new life in Wilhelm II, albeit without his predecessor’s genius or supported by the noble chivalry of French armies. The popular historian J. Holland Rose would articulate this vision in a series of centennial-themed articles in *The Contemporary Review*. “Their imitation of Napoleon’s harshness,” according Rose, “has led to brutalities as stupid as they are revolting. Finally, while pressing on his plans for domination with scientific thoroughness in the mechanical sphere, they have utterly failed in inspiring the sentiments of admiration and regard which alone can bind together a World-Empire.”\(^{213}\) Wilhelm II’s world strategy mimicked Napoleon in the sense that he tried to strike out at all sides to gain world domination, but only succeeded in creating a vast coalition against him. Rose reassured his readers that this world-empire would fail like the last one. “The year 1915, as in the year 1815, will decide whether an imperialist militarism, endowed with superb resources in men and material, shall prevail over the

---

\(^{212}\) William Henry Skaggs, *German Conspiracies in America, From an American Point of View* (London: T.F. Unwin Ltd, 1915), 118.

nationalist aspirations which have been the glory of the nineteenth century,” Rose concluded. When coupled with the previous accounts of German tendencies towards violence in 1815, the result is a picture of a childish people that do not understand the full gravity of warfare as the British.

German historians would respond to this denigration by asserting that the British historical profession had engaged in a loose conspiracy to defame the German history. Karl Bleibtreu sought to document in voluminous detail the biases and deceptions in which British and French historians have engaged in over a century to defame Blücher. “The world is cheated and the ink blushes, when the English clergyman Fitchett calls Wellington’s war in the Peninsula the noblest fight for freedom against military despotism…England fought simply for its trade monopoly,” Bleibtreu wrote. Building on the work of German historians, Bleibtreu asserted that the British duplicity in erasing the German contribution at Waterloo started with Wellington and continued through to the twentieth century. Ernst Reventlow’s Der Vampir des Festlandes also argued that British historians have cloaked their nation’s blatant strategic objectives within a language of liberty and freedom. As soon as Prussia had secured the Allied victory at Waterloo, then Britain sided with France at the Vienna Congress to help fortify its trade gains by preventing the ascent of a strong Germany. In the case of both Bleibtreu and Reventlow, the dominance of British-led historiography obscured the Germans’ understanding of their own history. It was only with the start of hostilities that the mask came off of Britain’s self-centered historiography.

---

216 Ernst Reventlow, Der Vampir des Festlandes; eine Darstellung der englischen Politik nach ihren Triebkrafalten, Mitteln und Wirkungen (Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1915), 66.
Perhaps one of the most creative uses of chauvinism was *The Crimes of England* by Gilbert Keith Chesterton. This author fell into the radical tradition of British politics that held that the defeat of the French Revolution was a historical mistake detrimental to the development of democracy. Chesterton’s pro-war treatise argued that the French Revolutionary Era “first, last, and forever, was a duel between the Frenchman and the German; that is, between the citizen and the barbarian.” Britain’s involvement against France was the result of a British archaic social order unable to comprehend the French Revolution’s transformation of humans from subjects into citizens. Britain’s “crime” in this era was to ally itself with the barbaric German resistance to the progress of the French Revolution. Referencing Maclise’s painting, Chesterton argued that the victory over Waterloo was a tragic error. “Our middle classes did well to adorn their parlors with the picture of the *Meeting of Wellington and Blücher*. They should have hung up a companion piece of Pilate and Herod shaking hands,” he concluded. Only through the recognition of the baleful influence of Germanic culture, the treatise concluded, could the current war restore the progress of humanity begun in 1789.

Chesterton’s rather original use of chauvinism should serve as a reminder that this form of historical memory was not limited to the right-wing during this period. Nor was chauvinism a necessary result of patriotic memory. Scherenburg’s nationalist epic dismissed the controversy over the battle’s name by making his Blücher say the line “The battle is named Waterloo, The victory Belle-Alliance/ The day can support more than one name!” Yet in the context of wartime such largesse was rare. The attempts to use historical memory of Waterloo to denigrate and despise the other proved too irresistible in a milieu where the national risks of an incorrect version of history were so high.

---

218 Ibid., 59-60.
219 Scherenburg, 67-8.
FOURTH ITERATION: COMMEMORATION OF THE 1815 DEAD

Although the Napoleonic Wars marked some of the first attempts for a nationally-orientated commemoration of the war dead, the First World War presented European societies with a number of war dead on an unprecedented scale. Public announcements of the dead, although carefully regulated by the state, became a part of the wartime’s daily routine. Thomas Laqueur contends that January 1915 was a paradigm shift in which “a new era of remembrance began: the era of the common soldier’s name or its self-conscious and sacralized oblivion.” Although perhaps a bit hyperbolic, the general contours of Laquer’s assessment are correct in that the war dead became collective symbols of the nation due to the death of millions of young men. Jay Winter notes that the places memorializing the dead acted as sites of a “fictive kinship” that could transcend social boundaries as people honored the dead. In both Germany and Britain the fourth iteration of the memory of Waterloo became an important bridge for this process.

Because wartime events had forced the cancellation of parades and celebratory reenactments of Waterloo, both Britons and Germans had to devise creative means to mark the occasion of the centennial. Aside from war historicism, hero worship, or chauvinism, one avenue for the memory of Waterloo to manifest itself was in the celebration of the dead of 1815. This was especially prominent in Britain where there was no access to the battlefield itself. The German variant proceeded along slightly different lines since the German state developed which favored a local interpretation of history. Although small-scale in both countries, this form of remembrance illustrates this development of the larger scale processes of remembrance.

220 Thomas Laqueur, “Memory and Naming in the Great War,” in Gillis, 152.
Two weeks prior to the centennial, the Royal Artillery elected to honor the graves of its Waterloo fallen. Eventually they found forty-one graves and placed a small wreath on them. At a Waterloo Day luncheon in Woolwich the Royal Artillery officers present marked the event with a quiet remembrance. According to a publication put out by the Royal Artillery, the officers were asked to “honor the names and memories of Artilleryman of all ranks, who fought at Waterloo and to remember those men of today who are fighting with the same bravery as our men of 1815.” At Wellington College, annual Waterloo Day Banquet, originally funded by a subscription from Wellington himself, had been cancelled in lieu of a memorial service for the alumni killed in the current conflict. *The Times* reported that before the ceremony, the current Duke of Wellington planted an acorn taken from the grave of Copenhagen, Wellington’s famous horse. Both the Wellington College ceremony and that of the Royal Artillery prefigured that of the postwar commemorations of the war which involve gestures and solemnity to properly honor the dead.

In the context of the *entente*, one of the more obvious ways to simultaneously memorialize Waterloo and serve the war effort was to stage commemorations of the battle as symbols of international reconciliation with France. For example, on the June anniversary witnessed *The Times* recorded several instances of reconciliation on both a state and private level. In Paris, the oldest British residents “placed a wreath in the new cemetery at Neuilly-sur-Seine, where lie many French and British soldiers who fought and fell in the Battle of the Marne.” The London authorities placed a heart-shaped ivy wreath, wrapped with a *tricoleur* ribbon, around Wellington’s equestrian statue in Hyde Park. Paris matched this courtesy by attaching bouquets of red, white, and blue carnations around the wax statues of Napoleon and

---

223 Quoted in Ibid., 391-2.
Wellington in Madame Tussard’s museum.\textsuperscript{225} Furthermore, the centenary memory would develop further the idea that Waterloo represented a titanic military struggle between two equals.

A \textit{Times} editorial stated that:

To remember [Waterloo] is to praise [French] qualities; for we should recall this victory with less pride had it been gained over an army less glorious and a captain less renowned; and for all our appreciation of Wellington’s genius and of the courage and tenacity of our soldiers, we know well how easily victory might have been turned into defeat had not Napoleon’s good fortune deserted him on the field of battle.\textsuperscript{226}

Although these ceremonies had a clear wartime goal of expressing solidarity, the also presage one of the critical developments in twentieth century diplomacy in which nations once on opposing sides honor the war dead of their former enemies, such as Ronald Reagan and Helmut Kohl’s 1985 visit to Bitburg cemetery to observe the fortieth anniversary of V-E day. Although small scale and with under the duress of wartime, these ceremonies of Waterloo marked the start of the modern war commemoration.

In the case of Germany, the manifestation of this memory was far more discreet and involved the concept of the \textit{Heimat} (Homeland). This popular genre evolved as an alternative to the \textit{Kaiserreich}’s Hohenzollern-centered nationalism, \textit{Heimat} posited a German identity rooted in the local German countryside. In Confino’s formulation “the \textit{Heimat} image was democratic and equal, not in the sense of legal and political rights, but because it was an image of Germany that excluded no one, and, in theory at least, included all.”\textsuperscript{227} One of the \textit{Heimat} journals the \textit{Niedersachsen} bimonthly published a special centennial issue. The expressed hope of this issue’s editor was the erection of a worthy monument for the King’s German Legion will be erected in

\textsuperscript{227} Confino, \textit{The Nation as a Local Metaphor}, 169.
Hannover when the chance of an honorable peace is near.\textsuperscript{228} This issue celebrated the heroes of Lower Saxony, including luminaries like Duke Frederick William and the general Christian von Ompteda, but the issue also delved into the life of the ordinary soldier as well. For example, the issue reproduced the silhouette of sergeant in a minor militia battalion.\textsuperscript{229} Although not completely free of the wartime-era bombast, the commemorative issue reproduced many of the existing monuments and gravesites of the Lower Saxon Waterloo heroes, thus grounding the memory into local culture. The issue closed with a use of commemorative memory that drew an indirect but distinct comparison to the current wartime environment: a list of the dead and wounded officers from Quatre-Bras and Waterloo, arranged by unit, rank, and name.\textsuperscript{230} In this circuitous way, this \textit{Heimat}-centered centennial of Waterloo draws upon the power of the dead by recreating a more modern form of remembrance.

The problem with this instrumentalized memory was that the actual course of the war from 1915 onwards directly contradicted what Waterloo’s ostensible historical lessons predicted: battles were indecisive, generals did not directly sway the outcome, and individual courage counted for little in an industrial total war. This highly constructed form of memory, accentuating earlier exercises in memorialization of the battle, was inherently unstable because of the realities of wartime experience of 1914-18. In a strange twist, the First World War came to resemble a distorted mirror of Napoleonic Wars in both nations’ popular conceptions. For example, the stoic and formal leadership exemplified by BEF commander Douglas Haig, bear a striking resemblance to earlier depictions of Wellington, but Haig’s generalship became emblematic of an unimaginative commander who cared little for the welfare of his troops.

\textsuperscript{229} Anonymous, “La Haye Saint” in Ibid., 301.
\textsuperscript{230} Anonymous, “Namenliste,” in Ibid., 304-306.
Although Hindenburg was able to develop an unparalleled cult of personality during the First World War, that did not translate into victory. First World War battles such as the Somme or Verdun offensives were similar to depictions of Waterloo in that they represented a meticulous match between clockwork efficiency and geographic maneuvering, but were ultimately quixotic endeavors. Finally, the British popular memory of the trenches emphasized the pluck and courage of the common soldier, but this trope stressed a tragic sacrifice verging on the senseless rather than a heroic one. German memory of the veteran diverged to emphasize the industrial fighter as exemplified in Ernst Jünger’s writings, but the German cult of the fallen soldier could fuse the concept of *Heimat* to chauvinism with potentially fatal results.
CONCLUSION
THE FADING MEMORY OF WATERLOO

This is not simply a question of national pride or regimental commemoration. It is about saving a fundamental part of world history, and we simply must not fail.\textsuperscript{231}

As Waterloo approaches its bicentennial, the stone chateau of Hougoumont is in a serious state of disrepair. According to Project Hougoumont’s chairman Richard Holmes, the multinational charity tasked to preserve the building, the walls of the farm are crumbling and despite previous preservation work, the site looks like “increasingly like a half-forgotten rural building site.”\textsuperscript{232} The charity’s website makes it explicitly clear that it seeks to preserve Hougoumont to sustain the legacy of all Waterloo’s combatants for the sake of a global heritage. Furthermore, the site will honor the British, German, Dutch-Belgian, and French soldiers who fought and died. This desire to preserve a site of memory encapsulates how Waterloo has evolved into an uneasy twilight memory. Its remaining cultural power simultaneously spans both national and international realms of identity but lingers on the verge of being forgotten.

British memory of Waterloo proved to be the most lasting after 1915. The British had of course invested a considerable amount of time and effort in cultivating a national memory of the battle and its commander over the nineteenth century. In this case the strength of Waterloo’s memory was that it had a fully-developed cultural legacy upon which to base post-First World War depictions of the battle and its commanders. Wellington himself became the protagonist of the 1934 film \textit{The Iron Duke} where he managed to save Europe from Napoleon despite the hindrance of unscrupulous politicians. Yet in this new age of mass communications, Wellington’s stern demeanor and pedestrian love life did not make him a particularly cinematic hero, especially when compared to his other Napoleonic Era rival Horatio Nelson. \textit{The Iron Duke}

\textsuperscript{231} Richard Holmes, \textit{Project Hougoumont}, http://www.projecthougoumont.com/
\textsuperscript{232} Ibid.
had to embellish Wellington’s political war by adding a *femme fatale* antagonist in the form of Louis XVIII’s niece. Depictions of Trafalgar gradually displaced Waterloo in British cinema; naval battles were not only easier for British filmmakers to shoot, but the Atlantic-centered metaphor of a Royal Navy hemming in an aspiring hegemon had more relevance after the Second World War. Spectacular depictions of Waterloo itself no longer possessed the iconic draw that they once enjoyed in the nineteenth century. *Waterloo*, a 1970 film produced by Dino De Laurentiis, featured a cast of thousands and included an epic staging of the Scot’s Greys charge directly lifted from Lady Butler’s painting. The Wellington in the film is a model military commander concerned with both victory and the welfare of his troops, while Napoleon prefigures Hitler whenever he berates his marshals for their lack of faith in final victory. Despite the film’s ambitious scale and seeming relevance, it was both a critical and commercial failure.

Margaret Thatcher tried to reinvest some of the power and prestige of Waterloo and Wellington during her tenure as Prime Minister by prominently displaying portraits of Wellington and Nelson in both 10 Downing Street and her personal residence.233 This was a sign of Thatcher’s anachronistic politics that was culturally out of line with the trajectory of British society. More in line with Britain’s post-nationalist environment were the bicentennial celebrations of Trafalgar. Although the spectacle of a naval review proved highly popular, the mock battle between the Franco-Spanish and British fleets were politically renamed the “red” and “blue” fleets to avoid any untoward jingoism.

In the British context, Waterloo is not so much forgotten as it is misremembered in popular culture. The Swedish pop group ABBA’s first UK hit, the love song “Waterloo” first stanzas contain a highly inaccurate version of Waterloo: My, my, at Waterloo Napoleon did surrender/ Oh yeah, and I have met my/ destiny in quite a similar way/ The history book on the

---

Not only is ABBA’s song historically inaccurate with regards to Napoleon’s “surrender”, but it reinforces the popular canard that history repeats itself therefore there is nothing to learn from it. In a similar vein, the Rowan Atkinson’s 1999 comedy Blackadder: Back & Forth has its roguish protagonist Edmund Blackadder accidentally killing Wellington before Waterloo when he travels back in time to steal the Duke’s eponymous boots. To Blackadder’s chagrin, when he returns back to Britain, he finds out that France has ruled the island for nearly two centuries. As absurd as these two examples of Waterloo memory are, it is likely that they have received far more public attention than the vastly more historically-minded Project Hougoumont. Furthermore, both the ABBA song and the Blackadder film do acknowledge the historical tropes of Waterloo first encoded during the nineteenth century:

Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo and Wellington was the chief British commander. Even Blackadder’s Gallic dystopia is a manifestation of the idea developed as far back as Astley’s Amphitheater that all that stood between Napoleon and domination of Europe was the Duke and his band of men.

While popular British memory of Waterloo since 1915 has receded into dimly remembered lessons of history, German memory of Waterloo and the Befreiungskriege has followed a more politically charged path. The Kaiserreich’s Prussian-centered narrative of Waterloo found itself reeling from the dual blows of defeat in war and the Weimar Republic’s hostility any memory exalting the monarchical regime. The old regime’s heroes and myths found themselves now enlisted by Germany’s populist far-right parties such as the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DVNP) or the National Socialists. Hitler’s dictatorship proceeded to use this memory to exalt the regime along similar patterns as its monarchical predecessor but with subtle differences. As Robert Gerwarth observed in his study on the use of Bismarck’s memory, the

---

234 ABBA, Waterloo, Polygram Records compact disc B00000768F.
National Socialist state was very leery of exalting any potential historical rivals.\textsuperscript{235} In the case of the Napoleonic Era, the state tried to rework men such as Blücher or Gneisenau into prototypes of an ideal National Socialist. For example, Josef Goebbels’s 1943 film \textit{Kolburg} depicted the town’s 1806 siege by the French through the lens of Nazi ideology where its population gleefully mobilizes for a total war and eschews love and family for the security of the Fatherland. Other methods of commemoration served to explicitly serve needs of the state. The heavy cruiser \textit{Blücher} and battlecruisers \textit{Scharnhorst} and \textit{Gneisenau} may have been the regime’s monuments to Germans of the Napoleonic Era, but the ships were also clear indicators of the state’s rearmament and military power.

The end of the Nazi state resulted in a bifurcated memory of this era and its battles. Mustafa notes that in the Federal Republic of Germany “did simply foreswear militarism; they generally avoided the study of most military topics.”\textsuperscript{236}Ironically, even though the Red Army destroyed Blücher’s East Prussian crypt as a symbol of German militarism, the memory of Blücher and the \textit{Befreiungskriege} became an important one to the German Democratic Republic (GDR). GDR General Secretary Walter Ulbricht held a mass rally which rededicated the \textit{Völkerschlachtdenkmal} in 18 October 1953 complete with patriotic speeches extolling the true heroes of German history, a mass parade of Communist youth, ceremonies honoring the Russian 1813 dead, and fireworks.\textsuperscript{237} Much like its imperial predecessor, the GDR sought to claim a vital link between German heroes of the past and the current regime. The GDR also struck several hundred Blücher Orders. These medals were to be the highest award given to GDR’s

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{236} Mustafa, \textit{The Long Ride}, 286.
\end{footnotesize}
Nationalvolksarmee (NVA) in the event of a war with NATO. Fortunately the NVA did not have to emulate Blücher’s 1814 drive towards the Rhine and the GDR never issued the medals before its dissolution.

German reunification ended this Wilhelm II-like state relationship with the Befreiungskriege. In a stark inverse of educational trends of nineteenth century textbooks, most German history textbooks pay scant attention to the Napoleonic Era and even laud the progressive features of Napoleonic rule such as secularization, a common European vision, and the emancipation of Jews. In this new German constellation of memory, there seems little room for Germany’s contribution to Waterloo. Even the recent “Prusso-mania” which celebrates Germany’s Prussian past avoids militaristic topics, preferring to highlight Prussia’s historical contribution to humanistic culture and the Enlightenment. For example, in 2010 Charlottenburg Palace held an exhibition to honor the deceased heroine of Mühlbach’s Napoleon and Blücher, Queen Louise. Called “Miss Prussia 2010” and advertised with posters such as “It Girl,” “Working Mom” and “Fashion Victim,” the exhibition tries to get at the heart of Queen Louisa the mother and wife and the public image of her crafted both during and after her life. The exhibition depicts her role in the resistance to Napoleon as only one dimension to her life.

As the twentieth-first century seems to confirm how much little remains of the memory of Waterloo it is tempting to see this fading memory as confirmation of both Germany and Britain’s rejection of highly narcissistic nationalism. With few exceptions, many of the portrayals of Waterloo such as Scherenburg’s poetry or Henty’s fiction do not stand up the criterion of even decent art. Constance Cain Hungerford summed up this pejorative mode of

---

239 Mustafa, The Long Ride, 287.
dismissal exceptionally well in his examination of the nineteenth-century French military painter Ernest Meissonier:

Meissonier represents the polar opposite of the heroes of the canon: repetitiveness and sterility, rather than originality; craft and the literal imitation of material appearances, rather than nature viewed through a temperament, stylized, abstracted; modest and highly marketable, rather than defiantly public scale; refined and historicizing subjects, rather than the rude and the contemporary; the patronage of the rich, powerful, and conventional, rather than those congratulated for venturesome taste; and affirmation of politically conservative values like prosperity, militarism, and patriotism, rather than destabilizing analysis of social norms.  

There is much truth to this analysis, but there was more to this mobilization of memory than a narrowly-defined economic and political class seeking to mentally perpetuate their cultural hegemony in a highly self-congratulatory fashion.

The people described in this study lived in a time of immense change. Historical memory of Waterloo was one way they could understand their own identity in such an era. The Napoleonic Wars affected the whole of Europe beyond just military occupation, as seen in this thesis it had an effect upon European culture long after Napoleon’s exile in Saint Helena. Memory was one way to orientate the individual in such a confluence. For example, Ludwig I’s obsession with dates and symbols of liberation from France reflect a man trying to master the past rather than being mastered by it. Even if this memory manifested itself in an archaic quasi-medieval nationalism as in the case of Ludwig I, it still represents an effort of a human being to locate his own place in the world. Although this tenuous teleology grew more unstable as the centennial approached, its use even during the First World War illustrates the grip this unsteady memory still held.

The importance of Waterloo is that as a site of memory the battle still has some resonance in the twilight of its relationship with the European public. Not even historians are immune to

---

this process. One of the consequences of a century-long mental refighting of Waterloo by Germans and Britons was to firmly cement the year 1815 as an epochal turning point in European history along with such years as 1648, 1789, and 1914. Starting in 1976, one of the most ambitious collections of nineteenth-century British periodicals appropriately chose the name Waterloo Directory of English Periodicals and Newspapers, 1800-1900. By recognizing memory as a historical process integrally related to its parent society and analyzing its evolution, historians can unravel the complex maze people wrap around themselves when constructing a national identity. While acknowledging the potentially baleful influences of this process, historians should also see memory as a fundamental aspect of humanity’s relationship to its past.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTERNET SOURCES, TWENTIETH CENTURY MUSIC

ABBA. *Waterloo*. Polygram Records compact disc B00000768F

http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/biogs/A080533b.htm


Explore Parliament. “*The Meeting of Wellington and Blücher*” by Daniel Maclise.
http://www.explore-parliament.net/nssMovies/06/0647/0647_.htm


Orders and Medals Society of America, *Blücher Cross*


Schiwago. *Universitätsplatz Rostock, Blücherdenkmal Detail, Johann Gottfried Schadow 1819*.

SECONDARY SOURCES: GENERAL


SECONDARY SOURCES: WATERLOO, 1815


SECONDARY SOURCES: MEMORY AND COMMEMORATION


---“Identity, Heritage, and History.” in Gillis, 41-57.


SECONDARY SOURCES: BRITISH HISTORY


SECONDARY SOURCES: GERMAN HISTORY


**PRIMARY SOURCES: BRITISH BOOKS, PAINTINGS, AND POETRY**


Bennett, W. C. *Queen Eleanor's Vengeance and Other Poems.* London: Chapman and Hall, 1857.


---, *Scotland Forever!* 1881, Leeds Art Gallery.


**PRIMARY SOURCES: BRITISH PERIODICALS**


“Every Englishman will rejoice in the honours.” *The Times*, August 28, 1890, 7.


“There must be something strangely attractive in the story of Waterloo.” *The Times*, June 27, 1865, 11.


**PRIMARY SOURCES: GERMAN BOOKS AND POETRY**


PRIMARY SOURCES: GERMAN PERIODICALS


“Vor dem Denkmal.” *Berliner Tageblatt*, 18 October 1913.


Chrier, Hans Heinrich. “1813.” *Simplicissimus*, October 20, 1913, 482.


---“Leipzig,” editorial cartoon. Ibid., 495.


VITA

Graduate School
Southern Illinois University

Kevin Pryor Date of Birth: December 31, 1976

410 Southern Hills Drive, Apt. 1, Carbondale, Illinois 62901

607 North Rome Avenue, Rockford, Illinois 61107

k-pryor-1@hotmail.com

Millikin University
Bachelor of Arts, History, December 1999

Special Honors and Awards:
    Sigrid A. Stottrup History Award, 1998
    Stanley Zucker Paper Prize, 2010

Thesis Title:
    The Mobilization of Memory: The Battle of Waterloo in German and British Memory, 1815-1915

Major Professor: S. Jonathan Wiesen