NO PROTECTORATE BUT AN ALLIANCE.

BY THE EDITOR.

Names are not as indifferent as they would seem. Romeo's argument, "A rose by any other name would smell as sweet!" does not agree with facts. Names have associations in the minds of the people, and there are words, like "liberty," which, bare of meaning though they may be in some cases, possess nevertheless an electrifying power. The significance of names must also be considered in dealing with the populations of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, which have recently fallen into our possession by right of conquest.

It is true that the control of these islands is a matter of great importance to the United States, and to leave the possession of their main harbor defences to chance would be a criminal neglect of proper foresight. Should Cuba, Porto Rico, and Luzon forthwith become independent states, their main harbors might be suddenly seized by some powerful nation either on a flimsy pretext, or even for actual cause, while to recover them would cost thousands of lives, hundreds of millions of dollars and might become in the progress of time an imperative duty. Should the harbors of Cienfuegos and Havana fall into the hands of a European power, there would be practically an end to the American control of any Isthmian canal; and in case we should be involved in a naval war of any kind, we should deeply regret having surrendered Cavite and the harbor defences of Manila.

Thus the desirability of holding these points cannot be denied. But here the question comes in, Shall we for the sake of holding them reduce the entire islands to submission and establish a state of sovereignty over the populations? Here lies the difficulty of the situation. We can easily grant the inhabitants perfect liberty with unrestricted home rule, and it is the avowed purpose of our government to do so. But in doing so we ought to be careful to
avoid names that are or may become odious to the people. It will be necessary to protect these islands against foreign aggression, not so much for their sake as for our own, lest they become a prey to some powerful rival. But the word protectorate suggests the idea of vassalage and other feudal institutions. How much easier would it be to keep a foothold in these islands by gaining their good-will and preserving their friendship? Let our connexion with them, which is as desirable to them as it is to us, be in the form of a friendly alliance, and barring difference of size and power let it be stated in terms of equality. We should accordingly replace the words "protectorate," "sovereignty," etc., by the term "alliance" and call these islands officially "allied republics." We should thus gain the sympathy of the populations, and in critical times the sympathy of the inhabitants may be worth more than the guns of our soldiers.

Let us grant to the populations of our new possessions home rule and liberty on the condition that our alliance be indissoluble and let the management of the harbor defences be removed as much as possible from political influence, both in the United States and in the Islands. Let the territory be regarded as neutral ground, belonging to the allied nations, the control of which can be strictly regulated according to the interests and safety of both parties, and for the sake of serving the ends of their alliance; but let the arrangements be made in terms of an alliance.

All the complications that arise from the difficulty of the islands being subject to the United States and yet not part of them are thus avoided. It would be impossible for us to transform the inhabitants at once into citizens of the United States just as it would be unfair to make Christians of the Mohammedans in the Sulu Islands. But our responsibility for their institutions ceases when we treat them as allies, not as subjects, and recognise their right of regulating their home affairs according to their own notions—which of course does not exclude the advisability of exercising a moral influence and of persuading them to introduce reform and to change those customs of theirs which are evidently marks of an inferior civilisation.

The character of the relation between the United States and the allied republics could be such that citizens of our country might acquire, by change of residence, the right of citizenship in the Islands, and vice versa the inhabitants of the Islands might become, as soon as they lived in the United States, citizens of the
United States, and neither the former nor the latter should for that reason lose the citizenship of their original homes.

All these details may fairly be left to a consideration of the practical demands made by the contracting parties. Manila, being a conglomerate of diverse nationalities, should be divided into a number of independent states of which the United States government might be one, owing the territory of Cavite and other points of strategical importance. These states might enjoy perfect home rule and be as sovereign as are the states of our own Union, but should be united into a confederacy for the sake of harmonising their particular interests, of regulating their interstate relations and of attending to the administration of the whole. By not claiming the right of sovereignty and by avoiding all terms that savor of subjection and vassalage, we shall truly become more powerful in the Islands, for we shall gain their good-will, and instead of holding in possession so many million slaves we shall receive that many friends. *Quot servi tot hostes; quot socii, tot amici.*