Independent Personality: National Identity Formation in Britain's Dominions and India

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RESEARCH PAPER APPROVAL

“INDEPENDENT PERSONALITY: NATIONAL IDENTITY FORMATION IN BRITAIN’S DOMINIONS AND INDIA”

By

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A Research Paper Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the field of History

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Spanning the globe, the British Empire was a political entity unlike any the world has ever seen and its decolonization was truly a global phenomenon to match. Beginning in 1931 and lasting through much of the twentieth century, the British Empire steadily began to grant self-government and full autonomy to its member states, releasing “forty-nine territories ... in the years 1947-80” alone.¹ Yet, imperial policy modifications were not the only transitions necessary for colonies to gain their autonomy. Radical changes were occurring across the Empire socially, culturally, and intellectually—including changes in the way that colonial groups thought about themselves. To elaborate, in order for nationalist movements to develop in the colonies, their populations had to redefine themselves in terms outside the British Empire; before convincing the British that they constituted a nation, a colony first had to believe it themselves. Furthermore, because this self-understanding is a necessary precursor to a nationalist movement, it is logical that a pattern in the process may exist. In order to investigate, this study establishes a theoretical framework of changes that must occur during a nationalist movement’s bid for autonomy. Through the lens of this framework, I intend to analyze the ways that colonies began to conceive of themselves as separate, distinct nations—specifically in the cases of the Dominions and India—paying particular attention to recurring processes.² By doing

¹ Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), xv. Lapping is a former professional journalist turned documentarian: *End of Empire* is a book written in tandem with his documentary series by the same title.

² In itself, the thesis of a patterned process of decolonization has been pursued by other scholars before me; however, my research is unique in its focus upon the Dominions and India within the British Empire as well as the emphasis on their similarity in spite of their considerably differing contexts. Examples of previous works that supported the existence of a pattern include Trevor Lloyd, *Empire: The History of the British Empire* (London: Hambledon and London, 2001), which suggests African colonies followed the example of the Muslim League in India, Andrew Stewart, *Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War* (New York: Continuum, 2008), proposes that the strains of the Second World War affected the Dominions through similar stages in the relationship with Great Britain, and A.G. Hopkins, “Rethinking Decolonization,” *Past & Present* 200 (August 2008): 211-47, which proposes that the Dominions were an integral part of the overall decolonization process for the British Empire. For an example of research that does not directly propose a recurring pattern across the Empire, see Robert
so, I intend to demonstrate that the changes that occurred in each colony’s understanding of their “nation” were quite similar, even though they produced widely different outcomes for the Dominions and India. In fact, despite their fundamental diversity, the Dominions and India followed a pattern of changes in national self-perception as they appealed for independence from the British Empire. This study proposes a framework of four prerequisite changes to the idea of the “nation” that preceded the achievement of independence and argues that, in spite of great diversity among colonies, the challengers to British rule did exhibit each characteristic in the cases presented. Additionally, I will also argue that the pattern is an inherently unifying force that is closely tied to nationalist leaders, whose rhetoric and political activities highlight the changing perceptions of the nation when scrutinized appropriately. Lastly, while these changes unified the populations of the Dominions, the phenomenon in India eventually resulted in the partition of the colony into the states of India and Pakistan. Nonetheless, the case still supports the overall argument as the divergence was caused by the actions of nationalist leaders who fostered lingering ideas of separate communities to which connotations of the nation became attached, causing the split. First, though, for these conclusions to be accessible, a definition of the “nation” must be established.

The term “nation” has been used in innumerable ways throughout academia and the world at large. Its meanings vary with each use, heavily dependent upon the predispositions of the user, ranging anywhere from straightforward, geographically-

Johnson, *British Imperialism* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003). However, none of these studies place the Dominions in direct comparison with India as this study does. Additionally, the framework I propose is, to my knowledge, an entirely unique application of Benedict Anderson’s and Anthony Smith’s theories of the “nation,” as detailed in Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983) and Anthony Smith, *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford, UK: Martin Roberston, 1979), respectively. So, by focusing exclusively on the cases of the Dominions and India through this original framework derived from Anderson and Smith, this study adds to the intellectual debate regarding the decolonization of the British Empire.
defined entities shown on a map to more indefinite types like ethno-cultural (e.g. the Roma or “Gypsies”) or religious (e.g. the Muslim umma). Naturally, these complexities require clarification. For the purposes of this study, the term “nation” serves as a hybridized ethno-cultural term that draws heavily upon the theories of Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith. For Anderson, a “nation … is an imagined political community” in the sense that it is “both inherently limited and sovereign.” In his interpretation, the nation is “imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” This process, in Anderson’s view, is steeped in a sense of simultaneity, which might best be described as a person’s conscious and “complete confidence” in the “steady, anonymous, simultaneous activity” of people within the nation. Put another way, by associating themselves with the nation, each member recognizes their place alongside the perpetual, parallel existence of many others. Once this “imagined” form is achieved, a nation is limited in the understanding that it has boundaries outside of which other nations inevitably exist, sovereign because all nations strive for freedom, which can only truly be achieved through complete sovereignty, and lastly a community because “it is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” in spite of “actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail.” Anderson’s vision of a “nation,” then, depends as much upon self-image as any tangible group.

Echoing Anderson in many ways, Anthony Smith’s definitions of a “nation” also revolve around intellectual understandings rather than concrete clusters of people or

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3 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 26. For a broader discussion of Anderson’s simultaneity concept, see Ibid., 22-36.
6 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7.
physically defined states. In Smith’s formulation, any “nation is distinct and unique … has its peculiar contribution to make to the whole, the family of nations … and defines the identity of its members, because its specific culture moulds the individual.”

Moreover, each nation’s culture is defined by its history, which “binds present and future generations, like links in a chain, to all those who preceded them.” Smith’s words indicate a similar understanding of the nation as a bounded entity that recognizes the presence of other nations. Each nation possesses a common historical culture that provides a sense of community as well as definition. In addition, for Smith, a nation also “entails a certain kind of solidarity and political programme,” nationalism, that “is based on the possession of the land: … the historic land; the land of past generations,” an attachment grounded in the historical culture. However, Smith distinguishes his theory by asserting that nationalists (promoters of the “political programme” of the nation) inherently “adapt the vision, the culture, the solidarity and the programme to diverse situations and interests” as a means of dissemination. Put another way, a nation is commonly expanded through “top down” processes, by nationalist leader who publicize and thereby circulate their program of identity and politics. While Anderson discusses the “top down” utility of the nation and nationalism at length, he ultimately concludes this application of nationalist rhetoric as a means of active expansion only developed as a later process in the historical lifespan of the concept of nations, rather than being an inherent component of idea from the beginning. All the same, the definitions overlap in

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1Smith, Nationalism, 2. For a later example of Smith’s ideas on nations that incorporates Anderson’s work, see Anthony Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002).
2Ibid., 3.
3Ibid., 3.
4Ibid., 4.
5In his book, Anderson discusses “official nationalisms” as a subsection of “nationalism” itself. Official nationalisms were developed in reaction to the emergence of organic nations and nationalism throughout
a number of overt ways. To summarize, then, my definition stems from within each of these academic trends. As far as this study is concerned, a nation is an insubstantial idea, within which someone associates themselves along historically based cultural ties and is connected to a geographical location that can be defined explicitly or ambiguously, but does not necessarily incorporate all inhabitants within that location nor does the group necessarily reside in that territory. Additionally, this nation is bounded by these attachments. In short, a “nation” is very much an intellectual concept that is continually subject to redefinition over time, and it is this process of redefinition from the “top down” that pertains to this study.

In order to observe and compare the redefinition of each colony’s self-perceptions, a framework of four prerequisite changes has been formulated from the characterization of the “nation.” Each prerequisite represents a fundamental part of the definition of a “nation;” therefore, the list of four prerequisites will serve as a checklist for each victorious nationalist movement and, eventually, for comparison within this framework. For instance, the most basic of these prerequisite changes to the conception of the nation is whether or not a colonial population views themselves as a distinctly unified group. Many times, sticking closely to Anderson’s theories, the transition toward ideas of unity is fostered through processes of simultaneity—e.g. repeated references to the entity in newspapers or to a perceived common heroic past. In this case, each colony had to become aware of or build an identifiable historical past that was distinguishable in

Europe in the 1820s. From this point on, Anderson attests that the ideas implied in a nation could be and frequently were adapted by leaders to address specific issues or incorporate new people. However, this phenomenon was not an inherent aspect of a nation in his definition. For further information on official nationalisms, see Anderson, Imagined Communities, 83-112; for details about the natural development of “imagined communities” (i.e. nations) prior to the appearance of official nationalisms, see Ibid., 37-46, 61-5, 67-82.
some manner from the history associated with the British Empire’s nation. Additionally, of the four, this prerequisite is arguably the most foundational, but it is difficult to say that it generally appears first as each of these criteria are fundamentally intertwined to the others. Referring back to Anderson and Smith, this prerequisite is synonymous with the idea of the nation being “imagined,” as groups must be able to recognize their membership within a unified group, whose members they could never hope to meet. So, for purposes of analysis, this prerequisite will be considered fulfilled when the rhetoric of prominent, popular political figures (e.g. leaders of majority parties that eventually assumed control of the government) or newspapers refer to the people of the group in terms of the nation or refer to that imagined community’s past or traditions. Put differently, the “imagined” prerequisite is fulfilled when popular leaders can utilize rhetoric of the nation they are promoting because the members of that nation are expected to infer that the message is for them, i.e. their inclusion in this unified entity is ubiquitous at that point.

Based in the common history and unity of the “imagined” prerequisite, the second prerequisite can most appropriately be linked to ideas of the limitations upon the nation. To elaborate, because a nation exists in a world among other nations and is therefore limited, any group striving to assume nationhood must be able to recognize the differences between their nation and external ones and thereby determine who belongs to the group. In this case, for a nationalist group or colony to gain their independence, it was necessary to recognize that their perceived nation lay outside the British Empire, in direct opposition to the idea that the colony was positioned within the national entity of the Empire itself. In many colonies, national groups often originally felt their best
interests were well represented by the British Empire’s greater interests, particularly in the cases of the Dominions. As time wore on, though, colonial nationalists came to recognize an erosion of common vested interests. In turn, these perceived disconnections between the perceived best interests of the colony and British goals and activities fuelled a sense of disillusionment with British leadership. As feelings of disenchantment with the Empire became more pervasive, groups increasingly recognized the disunity of interests between their nation and the British Empire. Clearly, this realization facilitated a shift in the idea of how their nation was related to the Empire. Whereas the colony once held common interests with the British Empire, the nationalists’ growing frustration with British leadership revealed that the British were actually outside their nation, thus reinforcing the sense of limitations by promoting an “us” (the nation) and “them” (outside groups represented here by the British) mentality. With this in mind, rhetoric that promotes this “us and them” mentality or reveals a sense of disillusionment with British leadership can be said to fulfill the “limited” prerequisite by cultivating ideas of separation between the British Empire and the growing nation.

Alongside the growing perception of divisions between the British and emerging national identity, the “community” prerequisite often emerged as a close parallel to the “limited” one. As the other processes mature, the embryonic nation begins to recognize that its internally unified interests are misrepresented by the external British. Therefore, the group must soon develop a means of presenting their common interests as a group. Concisely, the imagined and limited ideas foster desires for self-sufficiency and accurate representation that buttress the idea of “community.” Of course, the “community” prerequisite is closely linked to the perceived differences and limitations between the
nation and the British, but it is also different in that the “community” prerequisite extends one step further, to active pursuit of community goals. While the limited prerequisite can be demonstrated by the recognition of divergent interests and rhetoric of disenchantment, the “community” prerequisite is embodied by active attempts to pursue the interests that have been recognized as unique or distinct. These efforts can be manifested in a variety of ways, whether cultural (festivals attesting to national heritage or tradition), economic (strikes, protests), diplomatic (foreign relations only), or any other means of asserting the group’s reliance on itself. By actively taking up activities designed to address the specific interests of the group members, the nation assumes responsibility for its concerns and seeks to openly display their acceptance of this charge. Therefore, public exhibitions become symbolic of an emerging nation’s self-sufficiency and independent interests—thus attesting to the existence of separate nation. Certainly, by undertaking exhibitions publicly, the nation implies that it constitutes a self-reliant “community,” attempts to establish its capabilities and distinctiveness in the eyes of external nations, and satisfies the third prerequisite.

Finally, the “sovereignty” prerequisite is also a critical component of the necessary changes to the self-perception of the nation. Naturally catalyzed by the other three prerequisites, the “sovereignty” prerequisite is relatively clear-cut: a group must seek to assert its sovereignty—an indication of desires for freedom—to fully constitute a nation. Simply put, a group must pursue domestic and international political change, in the form of constitutional reform, for the prerequisite to be completed. However, the group must go beyond mere requests for such reforms in order to distinguish these efforts from the evidence of the “community” prerequisite; their demands must, eventually, be
successful in attaining constitutional reforms, thereby gaining measures of literal sovereignty. Most often, the constitutional reforms represent steps toward full autonomy for the nation and concessions from the imperial sovereign, in this case the British. Demands for constitutional measures of self-government, full autonomy, reduction of British control, or withdrawal of British bureaucracy and forces are frequent indications of progress toward completion of this prerequisite. Of course, the “sovereignty” prerequisite is only genuinely satisfied in the moment of ultimate constitutional autonomy, but, by examining the rhetoric of leaders and other evidence, the progress toward that goal can be uncovered as well, just as the combined framework reveals the overall progress.

In applying this framework, though, this study operates on several overarching assumptions. First, it is assumed that a nation must fulfill all of the prerequisites before becoming an autonomous state. Second, it is ventured that the evidence of a prerequisite’s fulfillment is manifested in an observable, public manner through the rhetoric of nationalist leaders, which contributes to the developing culture of simultaneity. Third, this study also operates under the impression that nationalist leaders are representative of their supporters’ views of the nation. In this regard, Smith’s definition suggests that the leaders promote their ideas through their positions as leaders. In turn, acceptance of this “top down” dissemination mechanism implies that a given leader would cease to be relevant in a nationalist movement if their message were not being accepted by the intended audience of the nation. Thus, a leader’s continued prominence implies a cycle of successful intellectual diffusion, thereby garnering
supporters whose ideas the leader now represents. Therefore, by combining the four prerequisites under these assumptions, a single cohesive framework is created through which the wealth of intensive studies of individual movements can be applied to expose broader, empire-wide trends or to facilitate comparisons.

Despite the potential for this framework to be applied across the entirety of the British Empire, this study is restricted to comparisons of the Dominions, India, and Pakistan for several reasons. Now, granted that the British Empire’s decolonization was very much an individualized process, the framework above attempts to circumvent many such issues by standardizing the method of analysis the ways that very different colonies identified themselves as a nation. However the Dominions and Indian colony were undeniably treated differently by the British, a situation that is emphasized by the manner in which L.J. Butler divides the colonies into three categories based on the ways that they were governed within British Empire:

The most senior members of the empire, the “Dominions” or “[white] settlement colonies” constituted a distinct group. Between the [world] wars, their sometimes ambiguous relationship with London would be clarified and given statutory form. India, long considered the most valuable “possession”, was so important in the imperial schema that it technically constituted an empire in its own right. The remainder of the dependent empire defied the taxonomer’s art, being composed of around 60 colonies, protectorates, and other constitutional abstractions.13

Clearly, the distribution of colonies across Butler’s three categories is heavily disproportionate, grouping the vast majority of colonies within the final ambiguous

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12 Of course, this cyclical formulation is not the only means by which a nationalist leader can garner new supporters, but it is the only mechanism with which this study is concerned.

13 L.J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), 1. Butler is a history lecturer at the University of Bedfordshire, formerly Luton University, in England.
group. His distinctions pay homage to the fundamentally different approaches that Britain and her officials took toward each group. The Dominions were informally allowed measures of autonomy for many years, India was carefully managed to maximize Britain’s benefit, and the other colonies were, in one way or another, controlled through measures of “indirect rule.” In addition, the method by which any imperial sovereign governs its colonial subjects can be assumed to have a critical formative influence on nationalist movements. So, because the methods of governing are fundamentally important, the British forms of colonial governance represent a necessary consideration in any attempt to explain differences between each colony’s ideas of their nation. Hence, Butler’s classification will be applied within this article to emphasize these essential dissimilarities. In particular, each of the Dominions—South Africa, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—will first be considered, as they achieved their independence at the earliest dates. Following those examinations, the analysis will shift its focus toward the Indian sub-continent and the movements that eventually created the modern countries of India and Pakistan. In this way, I attempt to effectively provide an in depth comparison without compromising a worldly perspective.

In order to execute this fusion, though, a second compromise must be made. In almost every circumstance, the changing ideas of the nation birthed numerous nationalist movements with a wide array for platforms. Of course, each of these movements provides an opportunity for researchers to gain valuable information about the colonial resistance movements that developed in opposition to the British. In fact, the prevalence of multiple groups competing to institute their conception of the nation is one of the main reasons that studies focusing on individual colonies are so valuable historically—close
examinations can examine how and why one group or a few groups achieve(s) recognition over others. However, to incorporate each of the examples effectively, many of these groups must be excluded. Specifically, in each example colony, I will focus on the activities of the major nationalist group(s), and especially the words of their leaders, to isolate the ways in which groups that took the reins from the British envisioned the nation. Because these movements successfully achieved independence, their understanding of the nation must be relied upon as an important example of the changing ideas of nation. Furthermore, this study seeks to compare successful movements as a means of determining whether a common pattern toward independence can be found; thus, peripheral groups, while useful for elaboration in more specific studies, are extraneous to this examination and can be omitted. So, by relying on the rhetoric of victorious nationalist movements, the specific examples allow us to circumvent (or at least minimize) the prominent issues raised by employing the framework above, a benefit which is well illustrated in the cases of the Dominions.

**The Dominions**

At the highest level of colonial status, the Dominions held a status that inspired jealousy in other colonies. Of Great Britain’s colonies, the Dominions were allowed the most autonomy because they were “colonies of white settlement … regarded as part of a ‘greater Britain’” settled by “agents of British civilization.”[14] In other words, as “colonies of white settlement,” South Africa, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were allowed large measures of internal autonomy, such as independently elected parliaments which could pass laws and operated strictly internal affairs of the colony, because they

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[14] Johnson, *British Imperialism*, 59. Johnson served in the British Royal Army, attaining the rank of Captain, before earning a PhD and becoming a professor of history at Warwick University in London, England, where he continues research on British imperialism to this day.
were composed of emigrant Britons. However, it should be understood such measures were not granted to the Dominions from the outset of their establishment. Actually, as was often the case with the colonies, each Dominion started as a conglomerate of unaffiliated ports, towns, and trading posts that gradually developed into individually managed colonies, like New South Wales in Australia and Ontario in Canada. Finally, in the second half of the nineteenth century, constituent states began to merge into singular entities and eventually recognized a common, centralized government. One historian, Barbara Bush, puts forth that this “trusteeship” was based on and implied “the ‘divine right’ of superior ‘Anglo-Saxons’ to rule the less civilized peoples” found in the Dominions. Undeniably, “such attitudes” on behalf of the British “endorsed white settler rule and confirmed the imperial ‘colour bar’ dividing dependent non-white tropical colonies,” such as India or the Gold Coast, “from self-governing ‘white Dominions’.”

Indeed, this consideration was a decisive determining factor in the establishment of the overall imperial hierarchy of colonial status, most notably by warranting special treatment for the Dominons.

Clearly, then, scholarly opinion maintains that “…Britain … paid more attention to cooperation with the people … who populated” the white settler Dominions, which

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15 The colonies of Ireland and Newfoundland also carried Dominion statuses at various times. Ireland has been excluded from this investigation as scholars generally do not include it in discussions with the other Dominions because it generally behaved in such drastically unique manners as to be considered entirely distinct. For example, when other Dominions dutifully (albeit with often vocalized concerns) participated, Ireland elected to remain neutral during World War II. Newfoundland has also been omitted because, after attaining Dominion status in 1907, the Dominion forfeited its self-government and accepted direct British colonial rule again in order to weather the hardships of the Depression, before being annexed into the Canadian Dominion during World War II. Further discussion of the nature of Dominion status can be found in Ashley Jackson, *The British Empire and the Second World War* (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), xi; L.J. Butler, *Britain and Empire*, 1-6; Stewart, *Empire Lost*, viii-xi, 4, 5, 9-13.

16 Each individual unification process will be elaborate upon in more detail later.


18 Ibid.
maintained a sense of good will between these colonies and the British government during this period.\textsuperscript{19} At the same time, though, while Britain allowed the white settler communities to unify and to have measures of centralized, domestic self-government, it is critical to remember that “self-government did not mean separation” and the British government actively continued policies of settlement throughout this time as well.\textsuperscript{20} Consequently, the continuous stream of incoming British immigrants nurtured a close sense of kinship between Britons in both locations by steadily adding migrants born in Britain, who thus perpetuated long established links to the British Empire. In other words, the influx of immigrant Britons to the Dominions sustained a constant, visible connection to British identities, even as they centralized throughout the mid- to late-1800s. With the combination of Britain’s agreeable disposition and the incoming waves of new settlers, it is unsurprising that these colonies held the closest ties to Great Britain.

Despite their bonds, however, the Dominions were the first of Britain’s imperial possessions to be given their independence. Originally evolving without a clear definition, the Dominion status was first articulated formally in public by the 1926 Balfour Declaration. Calling the Dominions “‘equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs … freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations’,” the Balfour Declaration was an improvement in the eyes of the Dominions, but held no technical legal power. And so, by 1931, under continuing pressure, the British again accommodated the Dominions, as the Statute of Westminster constitutionalized the status itself, ostensibly making the

\textsuperscript{19}Lloyd, \textit{Empire}, 103. Lloyd is a retired history professor, previously tenured at the University of Toronto; \textit{Empire} was his last publication before retirement, though he remains an active participant in academia in his retirement.

\textsuperscript{20}Johnson, \textit{British Imperialism}, 62. For further details, see Johnson, \textit{British Imperialism}, 59-74
Dominions their own sovereign entities.\textsuperscript{21} But how were the Dominions—the colonies most connected to Britain itself—able to achieve such independence when acts of protest were rarely met with such accommodation in other colonies? In these cases, critical answers (or components of answers) lie in the relationships developing between the Dominions and the British Empire during the First World War, the interwar period, and the Second World War. Over the tumultuous years of 1910-1945, each colony developed its own ideas of nation, at the expense of the British national identity that had been so carefully cultivated throughout the nineteenth century. In each example, the colonies developed a sense of unity and national sentiment that can be observed through the framework and suggests that a pattern may exist that occurs no matter the context. This trend toward independent self-images of the nation is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in, South Africa.

South Africa

Largely populated by Dutch, Flemish, French, and German descended people—known either as “Boers,” derived from the Dutch word for farmer, or as “Afrikaners,” referring to the Afrikaans language they spoke — throughout much of the nineteenth century, British influence in South Africa only began to increase during the 1820s when a marked jump in Britons began relocating to the colony. While the region’s native African inhabitants vastly outnumbered the European peoples, the Boer, or Afrikaner, population in the area had established policies of slavery and exploitation from the early stages of colonization. With the appearance of the liberalizing British influence (slavery had been abolished in the Empire in 1833), the white settler populations frequently

clashed along topics of race relations as well as other topics. From the beginning, “the Boers … viewed the British with suspicion” and were particularly “uneasy about British expansion” in the region. 22 In fact, harboring fears of British oppression and traditions of racial exploitation of Africans, many Boers relocated toward the interior of Southern Africa in the middle of the century, creating the sovereign political states of the Transvaal Republic (1852) and the Orange Free State (1854). As a result, the British were left as de facto European controllers of the original coastal Cape Colony and, as such, initially respected the Boers’ autonomy. Nonetheless, by the 1870s, the British had resolved to form a South African confederation, to include the Boer Republics, on the model of the Canadian colonies. Thus, in 1877, British forces invaded the Transvaal Republic, an endeavor that ended in humiliating defeat for the British when the Boers rebelled in 1881, forcing the British out of the country and re-establishing their independence. However, with the discovery of vast deposits of mineral wealth in these Boer republics, especially gold in the Transvaal in 1886, British expansionist interests were piqued again. Thus, in 1899, the British again invaded the Boer Republics, touching off the Boer War which ended in British victory in 1902. Following the war, British migration to these colonies spiked, with nearly 220,000 Britons relocating from 1901-10, up from just 76,000 in 1881-90. 23 In the words of historian Robert Johnson, the Empire’s “plan was to accommodate the Boers, reconstruct the country economically and forge the unity between Boers and British they had envisaged as early as 1877.” 24 This process ultimately culminated in 1910 when the Transvaal Republic and Orange Free State (both now under British administration) joined with the Cape Colony and Natal to officially

24 Ibid., 73.
form the Union of South Africa. After its unification, South Africa was placed alongside the other white settler communities within the British Empire under the “Dominion” status. Despite appearances and South Africa’s technical unity, it is critically important to recognize that deep-seated cleavages (Boer-British, European-African, etc.) had been established within South African society, providing the cultural raw material on which a distinctly South African historical tradition and experience could be constructed in the nation’s imagination.

Indeed, a closer examination reveals that these schisms produced a background that unmistakably aided the transition toward independence by distinguishing the South African nation from that of the British Empire. In particular, as World War I opened, South African public opinion was highly divided in 1914 between imperial patriotism and outright opposition to the war, unsurprisingly along the British and Afrikaner division.25 For example, Prime Minister Louis Botha and Defense Minister Jan Smuts believed “that South Africa, as part of the Empire, was automatically at war.”26 These former Boer War generals turned British loyalists had anticipated full cooperation given their association to the Afrikaners.27 However, “nationalist-minded Afrikaners were outraged at being asked

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25 Interestingly, race relations were another source of division within South Africa. In actuality, race relations were calmed in South Africa during these eras, especially in World War I. Scholars claim that both groups enlisted with aspirations to win concessions from their oppressors (whites from the British and Africans from whites). It is also worth noting that whites did not allow Africans to be equipped or recruited as combat troops; therefore, few South African non-whites served in combat forces. For further information, see Jackson, *British Empire*, 242-3; David Killingray, “Labour Exploitation for Military Campaigns in British Colonial Africa 1870-1945,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 24 (July 1989): 491, 496.
27 In using the term “loyalist” to describe Botha and Smuts, I mean that they favored continued association to the British Empire. It should be noted that these sentiments, particularly in Smuts’s case as several quotes above will demonstrate, were likely fueled by beliefs that South Africa’s personal interests were best served, for the time being, within the Empire. This conclusion is based on the fact that, following
to take arms on the side of the British empire [sic], which as they saw it had so recently unjustly destroyed the independence of their republics” in the Boer War.\textsuperscript{28} As a result, “a group of leading Boer generals declared themselves in favour of independence … and launched a rebellion” shortly thereafter that Botha and Smuts quickly crushed in October, with straggling fugitives surrendering as late as February 1915.\textsuperscript{29} According to Hew Strachan, the rebellion and speed of suppression were aimed at “forcing Boers to decide where they stood.”\textsuperscript{30} Additionally, Johnson said punishments for rebels “were lenient” with “short” prison terms and no treason executions.\textsuperscript{31} In many ways, the staunchest opposition existed in the Parliament. Displeased with the South Africa Party’s support for the war, a number of politicians separated to create the Nationalist Party “in 1914, on a platform of Afrikaner nationalism, South African self-sufficiency and opposition to participation in the ‘European war’….”\textsuperscript{32} This party “raised a challenge to the imperial connection and helped to foster that siege mentality which did so much to distort South African politics in the decades that followed.”\textsuperscript{33}

Underscoring these disruptive developments, leading political figures of both the Afrikaner and British groups bickered back and forth with each other throughout the war,

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\textsuperscript{28} John Omer-Cooper, \textit{History of Southern Africa} (London: James Currey, 1987), 165. Omer-Cooper was the head of the history department at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand. He was educated in his native South Africa and originally taught at the University of Nigeria in Lusaka before moving onto Otago. He died in 1998.

\textsuperscript{29} Johnson, \textit{British Imperialism}, 140.

\textsuperscript{30} Hew Strachan, \textit{The First World War in Africa} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 71. Strachan is a Scottish military historian who has held positions at Oxford University and the University of Glasgow.

\textsuperscript{31} Johnson, \textit{British Imperialism}, 140; Johnson’s interpretation of the backlash against rebellious Afrikaners is supported elsewhere as well. For further details see J.C. Smuts, \textit{Jan Christian Smuts} (London: Cassel and Company, 1952), 143-46. In this case, the author J.C. Smuts refers to the eldest son of the former Boer general. The younger Smuts applied numerous primary materials gathered from his father’s archives and his own recollections to the biography he produced after his father’s death.

\textsuperscript{32} Johnson, \textit{British Imperialism}, 140.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 140-1.
particularly so in the first two years of the war. Though he did not participate in the
rebellion, General J.M.B. Hertzog—the main political representative of Afrikaner
opinion, a future Prime Minister of South Africa, and a veteran of the Boer War—openly
railed against imperialism. For instance, campaigning against further participation in the
war in the summer of 1915, Hertzog often repeated that “South Africa has done enough
for the Empire.”34 From the British loyalist perspective, future Prime Minister, Jan
Smuts, retorted in August of 1915, “We want one South Africa, one united people,” later
claiming he would “work with my last breath for the good of South Africa,” in
cooperation with the British Empire.35 Obviously, the two Boer generals held
dramatically differing opinions about South Africa’s role in the war.

However, while the various reactions of groups and leaders ostensibly indicate a
tumultuous society, the strength of the societal polarization actually showed that several
prerequisite changes to the ideas of nation were already occurring at this point. For
example, the past strife between Boers and British colonists provided a common (if
turbulent) historical past, an anti-British mentality (for the Boers, at least), and a cause
for loyalists to reach out to the Boers—the former two facilitating re-imaginations of the
nation and the latter emphasizing its boundaries. Similarly, the revolt and the formation
of the Nationalist Party evidenced of Boers’ belief that the British Empire did not
adequately—or never had—represent their interests. So, the Boers acknowledged the
divisions between their group’s aims and Britain’s, inspiring the officers and politicians
to act in opposition in their respective manners. This tacit acknowledgment and active

34 J.M.B. Hertzog, quoted in Smuts, Smuts, 158. The strength Hertzog’s opposition to the British is further
emphasized by the fact that he was arguing that South Africa had already contributed enough at a time
before any Dominion troops, let alone South African ones, had been committed. South Africa’s
contributions to this point had consisted entirely of financial assistance.
35 Jan Smuts, quoted in Ibid., 159.
pursuit of goals clearly complied with the expectations of the “limited” and “community” prerequisites. Furthermore, the leniency extended toward the rebels after their revolt was suppressed is indicative that the loyalists may have recognized the rebels as fellow members of South Africa and, regardless, certainly did not desire to punish them to the fullest extent of the law. This leniency thus was an overt shift away from long established Afrikaner-British friction and contempt that hints at a change in the way the groups “imagined” themselves, suggestive that the loyalists now included their former antagonists within their identity or, at the very least, no longer viewed them as stark enemies. Either way, the mercy exhibited by the loyalists insinuates that the groups’ ideas of inclusion and unity were changing, evocative of the “imagined” prerequisite. Similarly, while Hertzog’s and Smuts’s statements offer opposite opinions of the war, the rhetoric of both men referred to what South Africa should do as a single entity. These prominent politicians were not appealing to Boers or Loyalists only, but to all of South Africa. Hertzog and Smuts both identified with the Boer past and had conceived of distinct South Africans, clearly supporting ideas of unity outlined in the “imagined” prerequisite. What’s more, because both men repeatedly employed such rhetoric throughout their careers, it is quite likely that the men not only represented a consensus of their supporters (who would not have been supporters if they disagreed) but also disseminated such ideas. In turn, these observations suggest that, though not allied with each other per se, each group was acting and leaders were speaking on behalf of what they believed to be the common best interests for South Africa, rather than Afrikaners or British, as the “community” prerequisite would anticipate. As a result, it appears that, less than a decade after their official political union, Afrikaners and British had begun to
imagine themselves within a South African community larger than their respective groups.

On the other hand, the two groups had yet to recognize their common interest in World War I, which explains the total lack of appeals for constitutional reform. Perhaps in deference to the war’s priority, no unified attempts toward the “sovereignty” prerequisite’s characteristic constitutional reforms were made during the World War I period in South Africa. Only the formation of the Nationalist Party, whose platform specifically called for self-sufficiency and independence, hinted at future political efforts toward reform. Once the war had ended, though, the temperate demeanor of South African politicians changed dramatically. After their wartime contributions, grudging though they were, both groups in South Africa believed they were justified to make demands.36 In particular, Hertzog was elected prime minister in 1924 on a platform based heavily in the opinion that “it was vital that the Union’s membership … should be the result of choice, not constraint.”37 Therefore, in 1926, trying to appease post war “pressure from within the Commonwealth, particularly from South Africa …, Britain sought to clarify the meaning of Dominion status” with the Balfour Declaration.38 The document offered the following definition of Dominion status:

They are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.39

36 South African troops pursued a successful offensive campaign against German South-West Africa commanded by Louis Botha. For a detailed account of the campaign, see Strachan, World War in Africa, 62-4, 72-92.
38 Butler, Britain and Empire, 5.
As Butler proposes, this concession was, for Britain, intended as “a means of strengthening [imperial bonds] by emphasizing the equality of Britain and the Dominions.” Yet, while the other Dominions approved of the Balfour Declaration’s acknowledgment of their autonomy, South African politicians desired more. Hertzog “wanted to go much further,” seeking “the right to amend their own constitutions without” British involvement. Writing to the British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Leo Amery, Smuts articulated his belief that “the definition of Dominion status in some formal manner had become overdue” and his resolve “for full Dominion nationhood and independent status.” Still, ever the loyalist, Smuts tempered his opinion, saying “… but I equally recognize the value of the Empire as a whole and the necessity of keeping it intact.” Hertzog and Smuts, who recognized the potential benefits for South Africa, came together and badgered the British government unceasingly until the Statute of Westminster, “[a]n Act to give effect to certain resolutions passed by Imperial Conferences held in the years 1926 and 1930,” constitutionalized the Balfour Definition as well as guaranteed complete legislative and executive autonomy. Clearly, these activities constitute efforts to obtain sovereignty over the historically envisioned national territory (as well as the final unifying power of the process, allying Hertzog and Smuts); hence, the “sovereignty” prerequisite was clearly fulfilled by South Africa. Overall, because the divisions within South African society were so well-developed, it appears that conceptions of the nation were quickly

40 Ibid.
41 Lloyd, Empire, 152.
43 Ibid.
transformed from associations with Afrikaner or British self-images toward singular, unified identity by the common experiences under centralized government during the World War I era.

Canada

Comparatively, ideas of a unified Canadian nation matured less rapidly than those of South Africa. At the same time, the prerequisites do reveal changes quite similar to those in South Africa and, by the 1931 signing of the Statute of Westminster, Canada was voicing her desire for constitutional independence alongside her sister Dominion. Much like South Africa, the Dominion of Canada consisted largely of two main groups of people, French and British. While these two groups were far less antagonistic toward each other than the Afrikaners and Boers originally were, the divisions created a comparable scenario of divergent identities that came to conceive of themselves together in Canada. Also reminiscent of the South African case, Canada’s development in the nineteenth century was defined by “gradual consolidation. Four provinces had united under the British North America Act in 1867” and were joined in 1870 and 1871 by the provinces of Manitoba and British Columbia, respectively.45 As British emigration continued, “institutions had emerged to cater for the separate English and French-speaking populations,” distinctly concentrated in their own provinces, most notably with French speakers in Quebec. All the same, the unification process in Canada was completed rather smoothly and the incorporation of two groups helped distinguish a new Canadian history that, while not as volatile in South Africa, would be an important factor in changing ideas in the future. As the First World War loomed on the horizon, “Canada

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remained a federal state despite unification,” with Canadians cognizant that London still harbored “expectations of acquiescence in [their] centralised authority.”

Yet, the World War I period in Canada caused dramatic changes in the ways that settlers in the Dominion considered their place in the British Empire. Unlike the reaction in South Africa, Canada’s reaction was one of unified loyalty to Britain and the Empire at the outset of World War I. Throughout the Dominion, a sense of voluntarism driven by Canadian desires to “do their bit” and prove their value to the Empire rapidly created a “patriotic consensus in English-speaking Canada.” This voluntarism was seen in both recruiting numbers, as “young Canadians were eager to enlist,” and financial donations throughout the war, with the Canadian Patriotic Fund accruing some $47 million in 1919, the last year of the war. According to military historians Desmond Morton and J.L. Granatstein, “Canadians, that August [1914], were united” as even Parliament called “a party truce for as long as Canada was in danger” and “[d]issidents … agreed to hold their tongues.” This truce is important because the suggestion that “Canada was in danger” discloses the proximity with which Canadians associated themselves with the British nation, so closely that danger to England was synonymous with direct danger to Canada. One Canadian parliamentarian was paraphrased as declaring “that Canada was of one mind and one heart: supportive of Britain.”

Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian prime

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46 Ibid., 71.
48 For further details about enthusiasm for enlisting and recruitment statistics, see Desmond Morton and J.L. Granatstein, *Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the Great War 1914-1919* (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1989), 30-1; for greater explanation of civilian contributions, both financial and other, see Ibid., 23-5. It is also noteworthy that Canada never instituted a conscription program at any point during the war, which also attests to steady voluntarism.
49 Morton and Granatstein, *Armageddon*, 6. Morton is a veteran of the Canadian army and the Hiram Mills professor of History at McGill University. Granatstein also served in the Canadian military and later became a professor of history at York University, before retiring in 1996.
minister, illustrated this sense of unified duty to Britain repeatedly too, often situating the Dominion within the British Empire’s community quite clearly. In a speech delivered in December 1914, Borden stated that “our citizens may be called out to defend our own territory, but cannot be required to go beyond the seas except for the defence of Canada itself … voluntarily the manhood of Canada stands ready to fight beyond the seas in this just quarrel for the Empire and its liberties.” 51 Two weeks later, he proclaimed, “It is hardly necessary to emphasize the unity of purpose which actuates the entire Empire in this struggle.” 52 All of these factors certainly demonstrate a sense of unity, but the unity was behind a British conception of the nation. However, as demonstrated in South Africa, with this pre-existing unity in place, radical changes in perceptions of the nation could occur at any time.

As the war persisted and casualties mounted, Canadians discovered that Britain was not the perfect leader they had envisioned and, as reports of Canadian soldiers’ heroism trickled in, many began to acknowledge differences between British officers’ faults and their troops’ valor. As a result, many people began to recognize the war as “Canadians’ baptism of fire, and they made a name for themselves,” internationally as well as domestically. 53 By creating this impression, the conflict acted as a catalyst for the transition from identification within the British Empire to viewing Canada as its own group. In particular, people in Canada—especially the political leaders—soon

53 Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War, 1917-1918, vol. II (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008), 4. Cook, also Canadian born, is a historian at the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa, Canada.
recognized that their contributions to the war effort during and after “[the Second Battle of] Ypres gave Canada a direct stake in a war the British seemed to be bungling.”54 Naturally, the realizations that British commanders were sending Dominion troops into bloodbaths shattered conceptions of the infallible British Empire and raised numerous doubts about British control. As a result, it is unsurprising that by 1917, a time in which “British forces were often portrayed as floundering in the mud,” portrayals of Canada’s “elite shock troops … thrown into battle … to deliver victory time and time again” became regular in Canada.55 Further highlighting these doubts, Robert Borden commented years later that “the chief constitutional question that arose related to the sufficiency of Dominion legislation for the control and discipline of Canadian forces overseas.”56 Throughout the war, Borden adamantly pursued direct control of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, an endeavor he found largely fruitless. Simultaneously, as casualties mounted, writers publicized that “Canada’s sons have freely given their lives to save us … with unabated courage and determination,” praising troops for “their devotion and … spirit of patriotism and self-sacrifice.”57 This type of portrayal saturated the Dominion’s print culture during the Great War. Repeated throughout the war, the theme of dutiful sacrifice served “as the common bond of national identity” by cultivating a sense of common hardship in the name of Canada, rather than the Empire.58

54 Morton and Granatstein, Armageddon, 134. For specific details of British officers’ “bungling” of the battle, see Ibid., 110-15.
55 Cook, Shock Troops, 4.
58 Johnson, British Imperialism, 139.
Undeniably, then, in both the political and public spheres, ideas of the nation had certainly shifted toward a Canadian identity. Concerns about the quality of British leadership evidenced the changes in several ways. First, Canadians were largely unified in their understandings of themselves from the beginning of the war but their vision arranged themselves loyally within the British Empire. However, the concerns with British leadership facilitated the realization that British interests were not necessarily synonymous with the concerns of Canadians. Hence, many Canadians became disillusioned with the Empire and called for increased control of their troops abroad, most notably demonstrated through Robert Borden’s objections. This recognition of disjointed interests is indicative of the “limited” and “community” prerequisites. Moreover, unlike South Africa, where the people needed no help recognizing their identity outside the Empire, the war provided Canadians with an opportunity to build a reputation that belonged solely to Canada. Coupled with the concerns over British leadership, the resulting heroic images of Canadians in the field helped the Dominion’s citizens to build a joint Canadian historical identity and thus to disconnect their unity from Britain, thereby channeling their unification toward Canada itself under the “imagined” prerequisite. In the end, for a colony consisting of large “English- and French-speaking communities …, it is understandable that Canadians wanted to see the war as a common sacrifice and the crucible of a national identity.”\(^{59}\) However, Britain provided few measures of control to Canada. Somewhat intuitively, Borden lamented in 1921 that “[u]ntil the Dominions participate more fully and effectively in directing foreign policy [sic] it is improbable that” continued cooperation within the Empire “will appeal strongly

\(^{59}\) Johnson, *British Imperialism*, 139.
to their people.”60 The years following the First World War would prove his observation accurate.

In many ways, the interwar years represented the earliest origin of Canada’s nationhood. After the British leadership’s gaffes in World War I, Canada had—in some scholars’ opinions—become “so mature politically … that Canadian politicians … largely jettisoned imperial issues as topics of debate” during the inter-war period.61 Simultaneously, politicians grew progressively more vocal, likely in response to the new national identity and disillusioned cynicism that developed toward Britain in World War I. During this period, Canadian politicians—like Borden, William MacKenzie King, and R.B. Bennett—“continued to push for a reappraisal of the constitutional relationship between Britain and the dominions,” acting as a contributing catalyst for the Balfour Declaration and Statue of Westminster.62 Reflecting in his diary several years after the Balfour Declaration, King especially resented British stonewalling, believing “… Churchill & others did not like [the idea of division between] His Majesty Br. Govt. & H.M. other Governments they wanted only H.M. govt. in England.”63 The increased political demands and King’s bitterness insinuates that Canadians had formulated their own interests that the politicians were now expected to represent independently of British control, achieving the “community” prerequisite. Furthermore, in securing their autonomy constitutionally, Canada fulfilled the “sovereignty” prerequisite too.

61 Jackson, British Empire, 58.
Curiously, even after the Statue of Westminster, Canadian politicians “remained highly suspicious … about Britain’s intentions.”\textsuperscript{64} Specifically, King, after being elected prime minister, emerged as the greatest defender of Canadian autonomy within the Commonwealth. As World War II loomed on the horizon, King’s “fear … that the war would be used as a pretext to challenge the idea of Dominion autonomy” became quite prolific.\textsuperscript{65} Canada insisted “that its declaration of war” be viewed as “a Canadian, not an imperial decision” and “was much more assertive in its military relationship with Britain than were the antipodean Dominions”—demanding direct control of Canadian contingents.\textsuperscript{66} Even during the war, King harped on Canada’s choice to participate, preaching that “Canada’s war effort is a voluntary effort. It is the free expression of a free people … we entered the war of our own free will, and not as the result of any formal obligation.”\textsuperscript{67} Such a strong front from King likely served more to calm Canadian fears that Britain would attempt to encroach upon the Dominion’s newfound independence, and certainly shows that the processes in changing self-images did not simply start and stop at any point; they were evolving movements with momentum that carried on beyond the achievement of autonomy. Equally, Canada’s excursions in foreign policy, foremost with the United States, likely reinforced both political confidence and “a sense of independence that would not … be surrendered” after the war.\textsuperscript{68} Clearly, then, Canada’s initially unified sense of enthusiastic patriotism was transformed during World War I into distrust of Britain’s leadership and a fledgling national identity. World War I made

\textsuperscript{64} Stewart, \textit{Empire Lost}, 165.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} Jackson, \textit{British Empire}, 62, 60.
\textsuperscript{68} Stewart, \textit{Empire Lost}, 158.
“Canadians … deeply conscious of a national identity … they no longer felt it necessary to adopt without question usages, manners and behavior simply because they were British.”69 The First World War had “created a new sense that Canadians had done something important together,” nurturing a sense of national identity and kick-starting a process of nationalist evolution toward autonomy, comparable to South Africa’s, that overcame previous divisions and matured during the interwar years with the Statute of Westminster and continued to solidify through the Second World War.70

Australia & New Zealand

For South Africa and Canada, Dominions with multiple large European-descended populations, the process of recognizing their distinct histories happened rapidly because their citizenship and ensuing consolidation provided them with ready supplied of non-British background. Comparatively, the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand were heavily dominated by British settlers in terms of Europeans and centralized into singular colonies later than either South Africa or Canada. For instance, while Canadian provinces unified for the first time in 1867, Australians were still establishing provinces as late as 1850 and 1859 in Victoria and Queensland, respectively. This lag was further underscored by the fact that local self-government was not adopted until 1856 in the various provinces, and that “New Zealand did not become a single state until 1876 and Australia was unified only in 1901.”71 Unsurprisingly, this tendency to trail behind was repeated again in the changing conceptions of the nation, as Australia and New Zealand largely followed in the footsteps of its sister Dominions from the First World War onward.

69 G.R. Stevens, quoted in Cook, Shock Troops, 628.
70 Cook, Shock Troops, 630.
71 Johnson, British Imperialism, 62.
In the previous cases, at the time of World War I, changing perceptions of the nation were rapid because South Africa and Canada each possessed mixed European populations that, when amalgamated, distinguished them readily from their British counterparts elsewhere. As a result, the unified identity(-ies) of each Dominion were quickly detached from Britain because the roots of a unique history already existed by the war era. However, in Australia and New Zealand, where the populations were almost exclusively British immigrants, no such distinguishing characteristics were present. As a result, when South African and Canadian notions of the nation were briskly transforming, Australia and New Zealand initially lacked qualities that discerned them from Britain and were thus fiercely loyal to the British. In fact, one scholar even proposed that early nationalists believed that “…Australia itself had so short a white history … that it was not thought a suitable medium to inculcate patriotism or national unity.”

Yet, the World War I experience would fill that vacuum by creating a tradition on which to base Australian and New Zealand history and unity. In Australia and New Zealand, the war years were defined by the creation of unique identity—embodied in the ANZAC myth—and its ensuing consolidation. In true white settler colony fashion, Australia and New Zealand were wholeheartedly attached to the British nation initially; their people were mostly British, emigration from Britain was continuing in large numbers, and the populace fundamentally associated themselves with their British heritage with solidarity unrivalled by other Dominions. From the war’s outset, the two Dominions were colonies looking for greater recognition of their value within the larger Empire and therefore, as in Canada, greeted Britain’s declarations of war in 1914 with great shows of imperial patriotism. Citizens “hailed England’s declaration of war on Germany with the most

72 Andrews, ANZAC Illusion, 33.
complete and enthusiastic harmony in their history.”\textsuperscript{73} In Australia, this loyalty was furthermore demonstrated by the fact that “[a]ll of Australia’s troops were volunteers, conscription having been rejected.”\textsuperscript{74} Australians and New Zealanders clearly “hoped … to see their country attain partnership status within the Empire” and showed their enthusiasm while shouldering their share of the war’s burdens.\textsuperscript{75} However, as the early stages of the war passed, these attitudes began to change.

Much like the phenomenon in Canada, the staggering casualties absorbed in the war shattered the Dominions’ blind faith in the British Empire, as stories of recurring mistakes and blunders attributed to British military incompetency streamed into the Dominion. Again mirroring Canada, images of the heroic soldiers of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, or “ANZACs”, began to appear and the “myth of ANZAC” became a major vehicle for national identity and disillusionment with Britain during the war. In one scholar’s opinion, writers and politicians consciously cultivated the ANZAC myth to replace the illusion of British invincibility by giving the ANZACs supposedly unique, non-British qualities like ruggedness and egalitarianism.\textsuperscript{76} The myth was first conceived after the ANZACs participated in the disastrous Gallipoli campaigns, where they were first exposed to poor British leadership at the expense of thousands of lives.

For example, one newspaper reported that British leadership had guided “the position of

\textsuperscript{73} Bill Gammage, \textit{The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War} (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1974), 4. It should also be noted that, while Gammage set out to focus on the experiences of Australians, he often referred to ANZACs or compared Australians with their neighboring Dominion’s residents. Consequently, Gammage’s general conclusions regarding the ANZAC veterans and myth have been applied to both nationalities here, except where Gammage explicitly referred to Australians. Currently, Gammage is the deputy chair of the National Museum of Australia and works as a professor at Australian National University.

\textsuperscript{74} Johnson, \textit{British Imperialism}, 137.

\textsuperscript{75} Gammage, \textit{Broken Years}, 277.

\textsuperscript{76} Andrews, \textit{ANZAC Illusion}, 53. It is worth noting that although Andrews fervently rejected the ideas of ANZACs’ unique qualities, he nevertheless agreed that the Gallipoli campaign was the origin of disillusionment with the British military that would later mature during World War II.
the troops” so poorly as “to be unique in military history. They possessed every possible military defect, and were completely subjected to the artillery fire of the Turks … the communications were insecure … There was no means of concealing or of deploying fresh troops ….”

After such portrayals of Gallipoli, the British were permanently associated with military ineptitude and ANZAC soldiers came to resent the Brits for the atrocious casualty rates throughout the war, as many developed “strong, often bitter, anti-British feeling” during World War I. As this image of British incompetence became prominent, so, too, did portrayals of Australian and New Zealand heroism at Gallipoli. Stories of ANZAC heroism strongly juxtaposed the portrayals of the British.

Recognizing the selling power, members of the Dominions’ press scrambled to identify qualities that made the “ANZAC” so much superior to his British counterpart. For instance, in the first few months of the Gallipoli campaign, The Brisbane Courier reported that Turkish counterattacks were viciously repulsed “owing chiefly to the gallantry and dash of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps … the troops have inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.” Echoing these sentiments, another writer wrote of “the Anzac character, which to-day typifies the best that we know in dash, courage, and grim determination … that sporting spirit” amongst the troops. Soon, the stereotypical ANZAC came to be known for utilitarianism, determination, egalitarianism,


“mateship,” and other qualities supposedly instilled through rugged frontier lifestyles only available in Australia and New Zealand.81 Gallipoli had become “sacred soil . . ., the ground of their nationhood, the origin and proof of their Imperial partnership.”82 In the Dominions, citizens reveled in their troops’ reputation for “courage, their manhood, and their sheer dogged determination . . .” all the while taking the "greatest comfort from their mates . . .”83 Australian Prime Minister William Hughes, during a visit to England to commemorate the first ANZAC Day, offered the following to assembled ANZAC veterans of Gallipoli and an assembled mass of British civilians:

We who knew them, who had lived their lives, who were steeped with them in environment in which courage, resource, endurance, love of freedom, have been for generations the common heritage of the people, we who had seen the resolute and unflagging strides with which the Australian people had set out to achieve their destiny. . . . On the shining wings of your valour we were lifted up to heights we had never seen; you taught us truths we never knew; you inspired us to a newer and wider and nobler concept of life. . . . The deathless story of the Gallipoli campaign will be sung in immortal verse inspiring us and generations of Australians and New Zealanders, yet unborn, with pride of race, courage, tenacity of purpose, endurance, and that casting out of fear . . . teaching us that through the spirit of self-sacrifice alone can men or nations be saved.84

Quite clearly, this passage defines the characteristics of ANZACs, positions the Gallipoli story as the start of a purely Australian and New Zealand martial history, and alludes to a national “destiny.” Taken with the press’s favor for descriptions of ANZACs, these examples reveal the seminal role of the Gallipoli campaign and World War I in the fulfillment of the “imagined” prerequisite as Australians and New Zealanders perceived their own distinct national heritage, history, and characteristics for the first time.

81 Somewhat ironically, some of these qualities, e.g. determination and self-sacrifice, were also heavily promoted as “Canadian.”
82 Gammage, Broken Years, 17.
83 Ibid., 263.
In addition to building a national history, their World War I experiences taught Australians and New Zealanders “their own worth, which formerly they had doubted, and” revealed “faults and cankers at the heart of their Empire, which once they had imagined great above every imperfection.” Still, while they undeniably possessed a new, developed idea of their individual nations, Australia and New Zealand apparently continued to believe their interests coincided with those of the British and sought recognition within the Empire as a result. Despite the perceived blunders of the British during World War I and the consequent disillusionment that had caused such political uproar in South Africa and Canada alike, “there was little demand for change in constitutional arrangements,” as “Australia and New Zealand did not adopt the Westminster Statute until 1942 and 1947, respectively.” This inactivity can largely be attributed to the fact that the Australians and New Zealanders had yet to fully complete the “limited” and “community” prerequisites, processes which began in the years preceding World War II. To elaborate, as conflict loomed closer and closer, the Dominions memories of World War I inspired great consternation that forced them to reconsider their continued trust in the British in relation to their imagined nations’ best interests. By early 1937, “… Australia and New Zealand were acutely aware that the deteriorating situation in Europe would have implications for their own security,” and Australia was particularly vocal about its concerns. Still, both “Australia and New Zealand took it for granted that they would enter the war as part of the empire” and joined the war long before the Japanese threat materialized, as a “collapse of Britain

85 Gammage, Broken Years, 209.
87 Butler, Britain and Empire, 26.
would have been a disaster for them.”

Nevertheless, Britain “knew they would be unable to support Australia.”

In fact, the situation grew so dire that British Dominions Secretary Clement Atlee informed Australian Prime Minister John Curtin that Australia’s and New Zealand’s “greatest support in this hour of peril must be drawn from the United States.”

This prompted Curtin to reply that “Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom.”

With their “confidence in British protection shattered” by Atlee’s blunt statements and the collapse of France, Australia and New Zealand were forced to seize control of their own defense, which “resulted in much closer defence ties between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States,” from which Britain’s relationships with its Dominions never fully recovered.

These forays into foreign affairs diplomacy strengthened the confidence of Australia’s and New Zealand’s politicians in their self-sufficiency and implied that the Dominions had finally recognized and undertaken to pursue their personal interests, surpassing the “limited” and “community” prerequisites.

If World War I was critical for establishing the ANZAC myth as a basis for reimagining their nations, World War II drove Australia and New Zealand completely away, as their wartime treaties had made it clear that “they would no longer accept the British view of the post-war security system…,” and had become nearly self-reliant.

Indeed, the ratifications of the Statute of Westminster by Australia (1942) and New Zealand (1947) combined with their independent management of war time defense and

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88 Lloyd, Empire, 162; Jackson, British Empire, 471.
89 Johnson, British Imperialism, 182.
90 Clement Atlee, quoted in Johnson, British Imperialism, 182.
91 John Curtin, quoted in Ibid.
92 Butler, Britain and Empire, 38.
93 Stewart, Empire Lost, 115. Stewart referred to treaties signed with the United States and between the two Dominions. Most notably, he cited the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty and Australian-New Zealand Agreement as evidence.
foreign affairs highlighted that neither Dominion trusted British leadership to represent their concerns and acted in their own interests. As a result, the Second World War precipitated the changes in the Dominions’ ideas of the “nation” that had been forestalled by continued loyalty in the interwar years. However, Australia and New Zealand were notable in that the changes were slower in coming than in South Africa and Canada, almost to the point of having been forced upon them. For instance, acknowledgment of the disconnect between British and Australian/New Zealander’s interests was forced by the Atlee-Curtin exchange, even though Australia and New Zealand had desired further collaboration. Suddenly pushed to assess their situation with newfound realism, the Dominions had no alternative other than to recognize the unavoidable split in defense priorities. In turn, the denial of significant British support forced the Australians and New Zealanders into the realm of foreign affairs, resulting in several defense pacts with each other and the United States. These negotiation and signing processes were conducted completely independent of the British government and gave critical experience to politicians from both Dominions while building confidence in their own self-reliance under the “community” prerequisite. By the end of the war, one scholar described “Australia’s attitude to Empire” as “love and community on the one hand … frustration … on the other.”94 Lastly, the “sovereignty” prerequisite was finally realized in Australia and New Zealand when each Dominion ratified the Statute of Westminster, a change they had refused to make prior to World War II. Already acting independently during the war, the Dominions fittingly completed the transition to autonomous nationhood almost as an afterthought, years later than their sister Dominions.

94 Jackson, *British Empire* 475, 474.
Ultimately, then, Britain’s inability to assist in the defense of Australia and New Zealand had destroyed any remnant faith in the British Empire, consolidated their ideas of independence, enhanced their confidence in their foreign affairs abilities, and created closer ties to the United States. All of these factors contributed to the realization of national identity in Australia and New Zealand. Liz Reed summarized the general opinion nicely, saying World War I provided the means by which a national identity “could be ‘imagined’ by the generations who followed.”

Furthermore, World War II was “a time in which the national identity, traceable to … Gallipoli, was consolidated” by soldiers who “in the spirit of the Anzacs, fought and saved Australia.” Tellingly, to the exclusion of other catalysts for identity, “Australia and New Zealand are …the only countries in the world whose most popular national day commemorates the death of citizens in a war fought abroad,” strongly emphasizing the battle’s importance with their historical tradition.

With Australia and New Zealand cementing their autonomy late in World War II, some scholars attest that Britain’s “victory came at a price: a loss of prestige, … and ultimately, the acceleration of the process of decolonization.” The “story of Anzac,” when combined with “events during the Second World War,” meant that “the days of Empire in Australia were numbered.”

Similarly, when considered together, each Dominion’s example hints at a pattern of transitioning ideas and strong final unifying tendencies, as even the least divided populations of Australia and New

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95 Liz Reed, *Bigger Than Gallipoli: War, History, and Memory in Australia* (Crawley, Western Australia: University of Western Australia Press, 2004), 50-1. Reed is the senior history lecturer of Australian Indigenous Studies at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia.

96 Ibid., 143.

97 Ken Inglis, “The Anzac Tradition,” *Meanjin Quarterly* 24 (1965): 44. Inglis is referring to ANZAC Day. Inglis, a native Australian, was a major influence in early ANZAC scholarship and has held a professor’s position at the Australian National University and the University of Papua New Guinea.

98 Inglis, “Anzac Tradition,” 44.

99 Gammage, *Broken Years*, 277.
Zealand became closely tied through the shared ANZAC tradition. Yet, by rule, Britain intended to withhold autonomy from colonies other than the Dominions in the years after World War II. Of course, no rule is without exceptions and, in this case, the British Empire would make an especially large exception indeed: by 1947, the “jewel” of the Empire would be partitioned into the autonomous states of India and Pakistan.

**India & Pakistan**

In the entirety of the British Empire, no colony was more valued than India under the British Raj. Encompassing, among others, the modern day states of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and portions of Myanmar, British India was the foundation of the Empire’s international influence. India provided the British Empire with seemingly bottomless reserves of manpower, a vastly profitable trade center full of products and huge markets for exploitation, and a hub from which to operate a system of sub-imperialism in Southeast Asia. The obvious, irrefutable value of the colony had wide-ranging effects upon the relationship between the Empire and India that, in turn, fundamentally affected the dynamics of changing national perceptions. Most prominently, as the jewel of the Empire, India occupied its own tier of status between the Dominions and the remaining “dependent” colonies. To elaborate, Indians were allowed to maintain representative groups like the Indian National Congress and, later, the Muslim League, which articulated their desires to the British through resolutions and political activities. Despite these institutions, final decision making powers were vested in the British viceroy, who oversaw all activities in British India and possessed overall approval and veto abilities, severely restricting the abilities of Indians to effect changes of their own. In turn, these restrictions caused considerable friction between the Indian population and the British,
periodically erupting into massive protest or violent unrest. Additionally, the sheer size of the Raj meant that numerous minority groups presented many cleavages within the colony, including divisions derived from the Hindu caste system. Nevertheless, changing perceptions of the nation again acted as a unifying stimulus. Unlike the scenarios in the Dominions, though, the pattern in Indian society would not produce a single national identity, but multiple. Above all, the religious divisions between the Hindu majority and the large Muslim minority that was highly concentrated in regions like the Punjab and Bengal came to dominate Indian political life by the time India was awarded its independence in 1947. Fittingly, these divisions were the greatest determining factor in the eventual political fate of the Indian subcontinent, resulting in its ultimate partition—against Britain’s steadfast objections—into the modern political states of India and Pakistan.

To understand this process, though, a preliminary understanding of British involvement in the subcontinent is necessary first. Under the influence of the British East India Company from as early as the seventeenth century, India was originally controlled through the Company’s policy of “divide and rule,” which sought to exploit the pre-existing social and religious cleavages. By maintaining these differences, the British East India Company prevented major unified opposition very effectively. Nonetheless, by the 1850s, Indians had grown restless and, after a string of violent protests culminating in the Indian Rebellion of 1857, British imperial troops were called in to re-establish order alongside the Company’s troops. Recognizing the potentially disastrous implications of prolonged political upheaval in the colony, the British government officially brought India into the Empire following their intervention, ushering in the era of the British Raj.
After the transfer, the British ruled through the station of the British viceroy, who directly presided over the Company’s former territories, while instituting indirect rule through the Indian princely states. With this system, the British achieved direct control, allowing them to minimize the extent of unrest (which was still prevalent) in the colony up to the start of the First World War.  

For India, involvement in the World Wars radically changed the domestic political topography and the relationship between the colony and the Empire. While the relationship between the Empire and the Indian colony had always been tumultuous, the First World War instilled a sense of distrust toward the imperial sovereign that had previously been lacking. In doing so, the war drastically worsened the British-Indian relationship by eliminating any faith Indians reposed in the British and encouraging cooperation between Indians in spite of the subdivisions in their culture. At the beginning of the war, “modern emancipation movements … were taking shape, bringing to an end both the pre-nationalist opposition of those in power before colonization, and the more or less willing acceptance of colonial domination by a new elite.”  

Nonetheless, much like the reactions seen in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand,

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100 This brief overview is drawn from several sources. Primarily, information was taken from Lloyd, Empire, 89-96, 133-40. For a more detailed discussion of the administration of the British East India Company, see Johnson, British Imperialism, 24-38. It should be noted that throughout the period discussed in this paper, unrest was essentially a constant reality of Indian politics. For the sake of brevity, many transgressions have been overlooked. For more specific examples of such social upheavals during the First World War years, see Upendra Chakravorty, Indian Nationalism and the First World War 1914-18 (Recent Political & Economic History of India) (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1997), 253-69; for examples from the inter-war years, see Tim Moreman, “‘Watch and Ward’: The Army in India and the North-West Frontier, 1920-39,” in Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers, c. 1700-1964, edited by David Killingray and David Omissi (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999), 137-42, 146-51; or Allen Merriam, Gandhi vs. Jinnah: The Debate Over the Partition of India (Columbia, MO: South Asia Books, 1980), 18-9; and for Second World War unrest, see Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies: The Fall of British Asia, 1941-1945 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2005), 25-6, 42-5,67-8.

Indians greeted the declaration of war with widespread “manifestations of loyalty and readiness to give” assistance to the war effort.\textsuperscript{102} However, India’s contributions were not based on a pure sense of imperial voluntarism or on desires to prove themselves worthy of imperial partnership, as was the case in those Dominions. Instead, Indian cooperation was grounded in their own hopes for autonomy from the very beginning, as many Indians “believed that the Empire would give India home rule” if they cooperated with the British effort and, under this logic, many Indians believed “the Empire must therefore be saved.”\textsuperscript{103} In one member of the Congress’s words, “the condition of India’s usefulness to the Empire is India’s freedom.”\textsuperscript{104} Returning to India from South Africa in 1915, Mohandas Gandhi commented that India’s “freedom is situated on French soil … If we could but crowd the battlefields of France with an indomitable army of Home Rulers fighting for victory for the cause of the allies [sic], it would also be a fight for our cause.”\textsuperscript{105}

These statements reveal important insights into the Indian understanding of their place within the Empire and of their ideas of nationhood. Differing significantly from the ‘white settler’ Dominions, Indians had already “imagined” their group separately from the British prior the First World War. For a number of reasons, this difference is unsurprising: Indians lacked the basic connection to Britain as a result of continued settlement, practiced different religions, were already conscious of their “ancient history,” and were unavoidably differentiated racially.\textsuperscript{106} Yet, on the other hand, the

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{103} Lapping, \textit{End of Empire}, 36.
\textsuperscript{105} Mohandas Gandhi, quoted in Lapping, \textit{End of Empire}, 36.
\textsuperscript{106} Both Gandhi and Mohammad Ali Jinnah referred to this history throughout their political careers. For examples of Gandhi’s use, see Mohandas Gandhi, \textit{My Appeal to the British}, ed. Anand T. Hingorani (New
“limited” and “community” prerequisites were a different matter altogether. While members of the Indian National Congress frequently stressed that their participation in the war effort came with expectations of reward, the British government exacerbated the situation by encouraging optimism in the Indian nationalists with ambiguous policy. Above all, Edwin Montagu’s speech in the British House of Commons inspired great hopes for Indians, when he claimed the “policy of His Majesty’s Government is the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as part of the Empire.” Montagu’s use of the terms “gradual development,” “progressive realisation,” and “responsible government,” while ostensibly quite reassuring to Indians, are noticeably vague in terms of implementation. Consequently, as Gandhi’s statement revealed, many nationalists (or “Home Rulers”) still believed that Britain’s overall goals coincided with theirs and thus promoted cooperation with the British war effort as a means of achieving both groups’ aims. Therefore, Indians cannot be said to have fulfilled the “limited” or “community” prerequisites, as they perceived a lingering unity of interests with the British Empire and—much as Australia and New Zealand after the war—continued to pursue common ends, trusting in the British to make good their seemingly benevolent promises. Unfortunately for them, their trust in British intentions was misplaced, as the ambiguity of British rhetoric proved to be the undoing of their lofty hopes.


Nevertheless, still unaware of the divergence between Britain’s intent and their own hopes, Indian politicians remained supportive of the recruitment efforts throughout the war. Over the course of the war, the Indians not only furnished massive numbers of troops, but had also “paid the cost of providing a million men to fight for Britain,” a gesture unique to India’s war contributions.\textsuperscript{108} As a result, as late as 1919, Indians remained optimistic, expecting significant changes to the structure of imperial government in India. In that year, two significant events occurred that irreparably disillusioned the formerly cooperative Indians, just as World War I had disillusioned the Dominions, and set the tone for Indian politics in the interwar years. First, instead of receiving the measures of autonomous control they anticipated, Indians were rewarded for their wartime contributions by the 1919 Government of India Act, which pioneered the system of dyarchy. Under the system of dyarchy, “Indians were given a considerable role in government at a provincial level” over comparably peripheral areas like education, agriculture, and public health, “leaving Britain responsible for central government, above all for those areas such as security and finance, which reinforced the existence of the Raj” rather than weakening it.\textsuperscript{109} Therefore, these policies that the British viewed as concessions were received with outrage by many members of the INC, prompting a number of congressmen, most importantly Mohammed Ali Jinnah, to leave the Legislative Council in protest. Worse yet, the Indians were destined to be shockingly disappointed by the British again.

The second devastating event occurred in April 1919: the Amritsar Massacre, named for the town in the Punjab in which it occurred. Initially an organized protest

\textsuperscript{108} Lapping, \textit{End of Empire}, 43.
\textsuperscript{109} Butler, \textit{Britain and Empire}, 11.
against recent arrests and mistreatment by the British, the amassed Indians eventually escalated into a violent mob, looting and burning banks and shops. In the process, three Englishmen were murdered and two women were assaulted. Attempting to restore order, British troops moved into the town under the command of General Reginald Dyer and established marshal law. Several days later, Dyer and his contingent marched throughout the town reading a proclamation that deemed any meeting of more than four males to be an unlawful assembly that would be dispersed by force, if declared necessary. Later that afternoon, at the Jallianwala Bagh (Amritsar’s principal meeting grounds), a religious festival was taking place to mark Baisakhi, the opening of a Sikh religious festival.

Marching a column of troops into position on an embankment overlooking the recessed gathering area, Dyer commanded his men to open fire, resulting in some 380 civilians deaths. No one ordered the crowd to disperse or any warning at all. Worsening the situation, after the shooting started, the crowd of thousands rushed to evacuate the area through the three narrow roads leading into the area and created a gridlock in which numerous people were injured and trampled as well as targeted by the soldiers.

Justifying his orders, Dyer later reported that “my force was small and to hesitate might induce attack. I immediately opened fire and dispersed the mob. … My party fired 1650 rounds.”110 After the Massacre, the British government could have defused the situation by punishing Dyer appropriately for his shortsighted brutality, but instead “the British saw this as a praiseworthy pre-emptive measure to maintain law and order, whatever the

110 Lapping, End of Empire, 38. This narrative of the Amritsar Massacre is paraphrased from Lapping, End of Empire, 37-8. Additional information can be found in Lloyd, Empire, 150-1. Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Armies, 278, 373 offers examples of how the Amritsar Massacre was used by groups other than the Congress in propaganda designed to incite violent resistance to the British as late as the Second World War.
cost,” understandably infuriating Indians across the colony.111 For obvious reasons, Indians were furious and, when taken with Britain’s apparent intransigence in terms of political concessions, began to seek their own solutions.

Much like effects of disastrous British leadership for the Dominions’ perceptions, these events were critical in the transition of national thought in colonial India toward nationalist identity during the interwar years. After 1919, Indians had lost all confidence in the British government’s promises of gradual reform, shattering their misconceptions of common interests. In the eyes of Indians, the 1919 Government of India Act had exposed Britain’s true intentions for India: retain as much control for as long as possible regardless of Indian cooperation. Furthermore, the Amritsar Massacre undeniably demarcated the British as outside the boundaries of the Indian nation under the “limited” prerequisite, since the British applauded an outright atrocity as an acceptable, even integral, part of maintaining imperial control. In the wake of these revelations, Indian “[n]ationalist organizations and parties began to demand … a relaxation of authoritarian rule and an increasing share in government and administration. … excessive paternalism … was rewarded by demonstrations and acts of sabotage.”112

Politicians who had vocally promoted the British war effort felt especially scorned. In particular, Gandhi was deeply offended. Reflecting upon his former stance of cooperation as a means to gain concessions from the British, Gandhi lamented that he “clung to British rule because, in my ignorance, I attributed to it strength for undertaking the great task of smashing this civilization. But now I see that British rule is perhaps

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111 Lloyd, Empire, 150.
more Satanic than what Germany does.”

Though he immediately backpedalled from his comparison, the fact that Gandhi even ventured to compare Germany—still embattled with negative connotations as a result of the First World War—and Britain is revealing of the deep sense of distrust and betrayal that he felt after the Empire reneged on their promises. Undeniably, “the Amritsar Massacre of 1919 disillusioned Indians about British intentions,” creating an environment of frustration among Indian politicians and people.

So, in a period when the white Dominions were receiving constitutionally supported independence in the 1926 Balfour Declaration and the 1931 Statute of Westminster, India was radicalizing politically. The events of 1919 had, in the minds of Indian politicians, drawn the “line in the sand” and more radical changes to the ideas of the nation began to occur in the 1920s. For instance, whereas each of the Dominions had undergone unification processes prior to changing their ideas of the nation, India did not. First of all, because the regions defined by the British were largely foreign constructs established in the nineteenth century, the Indians themselves associated themselves with the regions as much (or as little) as they did with the nation. As Sunil Khilnani explained, in India, “a sense of region and nation emerged together, through parallel self-definitions,” which contributed to the “distinctive, layered character of Indianness.”

Because “regional identity only came into being as people tried to define a large ‘Indian’ community,” the two identities (regional and national) were generally not seen as

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113 Gandhi, “Gandhi Presents Himself to India,” *Gandhi in India*, 5.
114 Merriam, *Gandhi vs. Jinnah*, 32. Merriam has been a professor of Speech Communication at several universities and colleges, including Missouri Southern State College at the time of his writing *Gandhi vs. Jinnah*.
115 Khilnani, Sunil, *The Idea of India* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1997), 153. Khilnani is the Starr Foundation Professor of Political Science and Director of the South Asia Studies Program at Johns Hopkins University.
contradictory, but rather as corresponding parts of each other. As a result, the regional and ethnic unifications that were necessary in the Dominions did not occur in India. However, while the potential problems of regional divisions were avoided, Indian nationalism would experience a significant divergence, unseen in the Dominions, based on religion.

The interwar years in India were critically important to the Indian nationalist movement because, in the wake of the events of 1919, the developing movement split along religious cleavages, eventually evolving into two large, religo-nationalist groupings, a conversion in which the role of nationalist leaders cannot be overstated. Specifically, nationalism in India “developed strong religious and cultural elements” along Hindu and Muslim divisions that affected the ways people revised their ideas of nation. The first step in the emergence of religion as a nationalist fault-line was the re-emergence of the Muslim League under Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the former Congress member who had vacated his seat in protest of the 1919 Government of India Act. Having joined the Muslim League in 1913 while still a member of the INC, Jinnah’s departure from the Congress allowed him to focus his political life on the League exclusively. Over the course of the 1920s, Jinnah campaigned for legal protections of minority rights, specifically for Muslims, who comprised approximately a quarter of the population. During this time in the mold of a true lawyer, Jinnah believed that minority groups could achieve security for themselves through legal and constitutional processes in collaboration with the Congress after achieving independence from Britain. However,

116 Ibid.
117 Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918-1968* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 60. Hyam is a professor at Magdalene College as well as Emeritus Reader British Imperial History at the University of Cambridge.
Jinnah’s crusade for minority protections highlighted the disparities between the two religious groups and the League’s emergence made religion an inherent part of national definitions because by openly restricting membership to only Muslims. Nonetheless, for the time being, the two groups’ upper echelon politicians saw the potential benefits of collaboration.

Indeed, although religion determined the limits of the nation for Gandhi and Jinnah, this fact did not initially imply to the two nationalist groups that they pursued different goals. In actuality, they viewed the British as their common opponents and thus originally cooperated, reminiscent of the cooperation between Hertzog and Smuts to pursue South Africa’s interests, which took precedent over their respective party affiliations. In this case, though, Gandhi’s and Jinnah’s suggests that their perceptions of their separate communities were underdeveloped and suggests in the framework that the Indian nationalists still believed in their overall unity, while recognizing the disconnect from the Empire. After all, like the Boers and British in South Africa, both groups ultimately wanted independence from the Empire and might have ended up within a unified state too. Even so, each group conceived of their nation in slightly different ways that would become entrenched in their psyches. For example, to Gandhi and his followers, the final national interest was independence from Britain, to be achieved through inclusion of both Muslims and Hindus within a united India. Writing in 1929, tired of British intransigence in awarding India the Dominion status, Gandhi stated that “the unexpectedly unanimous Indian demand,” put to the British was “now Complete Independence.”

Throughout the rest of his political life, Gandhi emphasized “communal unity, which is as dear to me as life itself,” as a fundamental aspect of his

rhetoric, believing that India’s greatest strength could be achieved through unity despite its great diversity and the defined religious groups.\textsuperscript{119}

Similarly, Jinnah’s conception of the nation at this time was steeped in religious terminology, but religious differences did not inherently preclude broader cooperation with Hindu Indians. He held the opinion that the “essential requisite condition to achieve Swaraj is the political unity between Hindus and Muslims.”\textsuperscript{120} In reality, then, Jinnah’s words indicated similar intent for the Muslim nation in 1928 as he claimed “… there is no progress for India until the Mussalmans and the Hindus are united, and let not logic, philosophy, or squabble stand in the way of coming to a compromise and nothing will make me more happy than to see a Hindu-Muslim union.”\textsuperscript{121} Reiterating this sentiment in April 1936, Jinnah observed that “eighty million Muslims of India are willing and even more anxious … to fight for the freedom of mother India, hand in hand with other communalities.”\textsuperscript{122} Without a doubt, while the groups understood the boundaries between their groups along religious terms, the Muslim League and INC each saw their community’s interests as analogous. The continued ideas of communal interests indicate that, at this time, the third and fourth prerequisites had yet to be realized and suggested that Indian nationalism took priority to religious loyalties. In fact, Jinnah summarized the viewpoint concisely in 1934, saying “I am an Indian first, and a Muslim afterwards.”\textsuperscript{123} However, much as the events of 1919 had incited radical changes, so too would those of 1935.

\textsuperscript{119} Mohandas Gandhi, “Statement to the Press,” April 22, 1938, in Ibid., 252.
\textsuperscript{120} Mohammad Ali Jinnah, speech at the 1924 Muslim League Annual session, Lahore, quoted in Merriam, Gandhi vs. Jinnah, 40.
\textsuperscript{121} Mohammad Ali Jinnah, speech at the 1928 All-Parties National Convention in Calcutta, quoted in Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Mohammad Ali Jinnah, speech at Jamiat-ul ulema Conference, Delhi, April 1936, quoted in Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} Mohammad Ali Jinnah, quoted in Ibid.
In the meantime, despite the nationalists’ cooperation with each other, the British continued to stifle Indian nationalist appeals. Through the 1920s and 30s, the two sides played something of a game of cat and mouse: the Indians would demand concessions, the British would stonewall before desperately attempting to mitigate the damage, but it would be too late and the Indians would increase their demands. To illustrate, in 1929, the British viceroy, Lord Irwin, announced that Britain’s ultimate aim in India was to establish Dominion status; however, by that time, Indian nationalists had largely abandoned demands for raised status which had occupied much of the decade and replaced them with calls for complete independence. Then, the British made another effort to placate the Indians that changed everything. Intended to appease the nationalists (again), the Government of India Act of 1935 built upon the reforms of 1919, “by extending dyarchy to full provincial self-government.”\(^{124}\) The new act also contained a framework by which the Indian provinces and princely states could be united into a federation. Expecting this process of consolidation to be a lengthy, complex affair, the British sought to prolong their control, enabling them to protect the colony’s minorities (their greatest concern in public) and maintain key positions of power, “while nationalism would be distracted by the opportunities created by provincial self-government.”\(^{125}\)

While this intent was not lost on him, Gandhi supported the Act as a means of increasing the numbers of Indians involved with government, assuming they would operate free of British influence, and providing a forum for Muslims and Hindus to coexist within the government. In 1937, amidst widespread debate “over whether congressmen should stand for election” to the new positions, “Gandhi surprised his followers by favoring such

\(^{124}\) Butler, *Britain and Empire*, 12.

\(^{125}\) Ibid.
However, Gandhi’s hopes for cooperation would ultimately be disappointed.

In spite of Gandhi’s hopes for amelioration, the 1935 Government of India Act eventually drove a wedge further between the Muslim League and other nationalists. In fact, the elections of 1937 were pivotal in hardening the Muslim League’s desires for partition by eliminating any desires to cooperate with the INC. During the elections, many Muslim League and Congress candidates ran in the elections, but “the Muslim League did poorly in winning only 4.6% of the vote” while the INC candidates won many of their seats. In the aftermath of their disappointing showing, Jinnah repeatedly approached the Congress to secure participation in the provincial ministries for non-Congress Muslims, but was denied each time. The landslide success of the Congress had instilled a keen sense of self-confidence in Nehru and other congressmen. Believing their political position secure, the INC rejected opportunities to accommodate the Muslim League, setting in motion the chain of events that culminated in the creation of Pakistan. Summing up the effect, S.K. Majumdar posited that, “had the Congress handled the League more tactfully after the elections, Pakistan might never have come into being … Jinnah certainly created Pakistan. But the Congress by its sins of omission and commission also helped to make it possible.” This rejection was the single greatest catalyst for Pakistan’s “community” prerequisite. Afterwards, Jinnah and the League emphasized the divergences between their interests and those of the INC, precipitating a second shift in the understandings of the League’s national self-image that was entirely

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126 Green, *Gandhi in India*, 240.
unique to India as opposed to the Dominions. The Congress’s steadfast denial of Jinnah’s requests made it painfully clear that, in Jinnah’s opinion, the INC only truly desired to further its own cause, rather than pursuing the common best interests of all Indians. Consequently, after this point, the Muslim League and Jinnah in particular grew increasingly disinterested in any system that could potentially render them subject to the Hindu majority that had denied their calls for coalition. By rejecting them, the INC had tried to “drive the League into political wilderness, but” instead Nehru’s party inadvertently helped “to strengthen Jinnah’s hands as the foremost champion of Muslim claims and rights.” With this seismic realignment, the Muslim League now had two enemies against which to juxtapose their national boundaries, the British as well as the Indian National Congress, and Jinnah prominently emphasized those boundaries. In turn, Jinnah’s radical reversal directly altered the previously unified path of Muslims and Hindus by rallying the groups to religious affiliations and away from the ideas of a unified Indian nation, like those achieved in South Africa and Canada prior to autonomy. Thus, Jinnah’s changing outlook attests to the centrality of nationalist leaders within their movements by showing how quickly radical alterations can be implemented.

This shift in mentality was clearly visible as early as October of 1937, as Jinnah quickly adopted religo-political rhetoric designed to unify Muslim support behind the League. Indeed, Jinnah’s new rhetoric appeared as early as his annual Presidential Address for the Muslim League’s 1937 session, in which he blasted the Congress for “alienating the Mussalmans of India … by pursuing a policy which is exclusively

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129 Francis R. Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography (New York: MacMillan, 1956), 268. Moraes was formerly an editor for various Indian newspapers, including The Indian Express, before pursuing this biography of Nehru in the years after India’s independence.
Later in the speech, Jinnah urged Muslims to “establish your solidarity and complete unity,” arguing that only “a well-knit, solid, organised, united force can face any danger.” His repeated references to organization, unity, and solidarity are obvious attempts to bring together Muslim support behind his party, an effort designed to allow the Muslim League to challenge what Jinnah believed to be the Hindu dominated INC. While he had not yet begun to call for partition, Jinnah’s mental shift was very clear. The League had already viewed their nation as restricted to Muslims only, but had formerly observed a sense of shared interests with other Indians in their desires for independence from the British Empire. Now angered by the INC’s rejection, the League perceived that the INC did not seek to accommodate the League’s interests. As a result, the League began to purely pursue their personal interests and unity under the aegis of Islam, independently fulfilling the “community” prerequisite and now fully constituting a separate fledgling nation. Therefore, what on the surface was a division in Indian nationalists, the League’s new position actually buttresses the unifying tendencies first observed in the Dominion. However, while simultaneously stressing the effect leadership can have in consciously guiding and shaping that unity, in light of the Dominion examples, the dramatic reversal of position toward divisive politics orchestrated by Jinnah appears to have been an exception rather than the rule in perceptions of the nation promoted by successful movements.

Throughout the rest of the interwar era, both the INC and Muslim League continued to gather support around their parties and each grew increasingly disinterested

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130 Mohammad Ali Jinnah, “Presidential Address at the All India Muslim League 1937 Session,” in *Pakistan Movement: Historical Documents*, ed. Gulam Allana (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1967), 143. The entire address covers pp. 140-51. Alana is a former Vice Chancellor and professor at Sindh University in India.
131 Ibid., 144-5; 150-1.
in cooperation with the other. Gandhi continued to preach the importance of non-violent cooperation and the League, under Jinnah’s guidance, grew increasingly antagonistic with their rhetoric. It was during this time that Gandhi came to be associated as the INC’s leader, largely as a result of Jinnah’s propagandizing. For instance, in his 1938 Presidential Address before the Muslim League, Jinnah attacked the Congress as “nothing but a Hindu body” intoxicated with its power and Gandhi as “responsible for turning the Congress into an instrument for the revival of Hinduism and for the establishment of Hindu Raj in India.”\(^{132}\) Clearly, in little over a year, the League, with Jinnah as the main catalyst, had evolved a new view of the nation that defined both British and Hindu (represented by the INC) interests as oppositional to their own. So, much like the events of 1919 had forced Indians to recognize the divergences between their interests and those of the British, the 1937 election emphasized the difference of interests between the INC and Muslim League, resulting in the League’s first independent pursuits of their interests, thus completing the “community” prerequisite for the Muslims. It would be another ten long years before either group would fulfill the “sovereignty” prerequisite.

Now that the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League openly competing against each other as well as the British, the political scene in India became more complex and progressively more volatile. Notwithstanding the social instability, it took an experience as traumatic as the Second World War to finally set in motion the departure of the British from India. After the British declared war on Germany in 1939, the viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, notoriously announced without consulting either the

Congress or Muslim League that, as a dependency in the British Empire, India was now at war. Naturally, members of Congress were incensed by the humiliating rebuke and their response was expectedly swift and furious, as they “demanded to be included in central government, and when this was denied, the Congress provincial ministries resigned in protest.” Recognizing the potential political benefit for Muslims, Jinnah “sought to turn the British-Congress cleavage to his own advantage” by avoiding open denunciations of the war effort and even “hinting support for the war effort.” These different reactions to the declaration of war further highlighted the differences between the two groups. The INC’s actions indicate their primary concern for Indian independence, while the Muslim League’s alternative approach, designed to garner leverage that could insure Muslim rights, reiterated that independence was secondary and only acceptable if accompanied by protective measures, thus highlighting the differing platforms and visions of the two groups. Soon, Jinnah’s shrewd political maneuvering produced leverage that would blossom into full-blown demands for a separate, partitioned Muslim state.

On March 22, 1940, Mohammad Jinnah delivered his Presidential Address to the Muslim League in the Lahore session and, for the first time, articulated his desires to see Hindus and Muslims partitioned into separate independent states. The speech employed rhetoric that echoed the three prerequisites and was the first step toward final sovereignty for the League. In his speech, Jinnah declared that “Muslim India is now conscious” and “we are now … very apprehensive and can trust nobody,” reminiscent of the imagined,

133 Butler, *Britain and Empire*, 41.
limited, and community prerequisites while emphasizing internal cohesion.\textsuperscript{135} Two days earlier, on March 20, Gandhi had published a statement in the most recent issue of \textit{Harijan}, in which he had referred to Jinnah as “my brother” in another appeal for overarching Indian unity.\textsuperscript{136} Two days later, during his address, Jinnah joked about the comment, saying that the “only difference is this, that brother Gandhi has three votes and I have only one vote,” a criticism proposing Gandhi and other Hindus held more sway with the British than did Jinnah. The jab might also be interpreted as an accusation that the Congress was only interested in cooperating with the Muslims in order to achieve an independent government because the Hindus were aware that their majority could subjugate the Muslims through a Constituent Assembly.\textsuperscript{137} Either way, the most critical passage was yet to come, and it proved to be one of the most influential passages in the era. Jinnah continued that

\begin{quote}
[t]he problem in India is not of an inter-communal character but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such. So long as basic and fundamental truth is not realized, any constitution that may be built will result in disaster and will prove destructive and harmful not only to the Mussalmans but to the British and Hindus also. … the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into ‘autonomous national states’….

… our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders, and \textit{it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of your troubles … The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures … neither intermarry nor interdine together and … belong to two different civilizations … To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction …}\textsuperscript{138}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{135} Jinnah, “Presidential Address at the All India Muslim League Lahore session, March 1940,” in \textit{Speeches and Writings}, 146-7.

\textsuperscript{136} Mohandas Gandhi, \textit{Harijan}, March 20, 1940.

\textsuperscript{137} Jinnah, “Presidential Address 1940,” in \textit{Speeches and Writings}, 151.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 159-61. Emphasis mine.
The pattern for Jinnah’s rhetoric over the next seven years is laid bare in this passage that, in 1940, was met with a thunderous ovation by the assembled Muslim League. The next day, the League adopted the “Lahore Resolution,” which stated that “no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed … that geographically contiguous units … [in] the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority … should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent States’.”\(^{139}\) Obviously, these demands were a drastic departure from previous propositions of affiliations through constituent representation or federal models and demonstrated the first demands for partitioned independence in the Pakistan Movement. These demands would not be met until 1947.

In the seven years between the Lahore Resolution and independence for India and Pakistan, one event occurred that finally precipitated the completion of the “sovereignty” prerequisite through the ultimate partitioning of the two groups. By March of 1942, Britain was wholly concerned with conducting the war. Yet, the tensions between Hindus, Muslims, and the British could not be ignored without risking serious conflicts that could disrupt vital supplies and troops coming from India. Unwilling to compromise but unable to ignore the situation any longer, Churchill dispatched Sir Stafford Cripps, a left-wing politician from the Cabinet, to resolve matters. Unfortunately for Cripps, Churchill’s staunch refusal to offer full independence, effective immediately, meant that Cripps “was empowered only to repeat the proposals already made in 1940, that is to offer India full Dominion status after the war (or the option to secede from the Empire-Commonwealth), in return for Indian co-operation during the war and a moratorium on

further political advance for its duration.”140 Of critical importance, the offer secondarily included a clause that dictated that “no part of India could be forced to accept membership of the post-war state, whatever form this took.”141 Worse yet for Churchill and Cripps, the INC had long ago lost interest in Dominion status and refused to abandon demands for an immediate control of the central government, a demand that was quickly denied. Aware of Britain’s predicament and at Gandhi’s encouragement, the Congress passed the “Quit India” Resolution. “Quit India” was designed as a nationwide non-violent protest with the singular objective of forcing the British out of India by making simultaneous administration of India and the war impossible. At first, the campaign promised to be a highly effective disruption in light of the outrage directed at the British and unity of Congress opinion. However, by the next day, the British government had arrested Gandhi, many of the members of the Congress, and thousands of non-violent dissenters. With Gandhi and most of the leaders of the Congress imprisoned for the rest of the war, “a dangerous political vacuum” had been created that allowed many members of the Muslim League to ascend to provincial administrative positions. Similarly, without Gandhi presenting counter-arguments, Jinnah pitched his ideas of a separate Pakistan to the British. In particular, Jinnah argued that, under the Cripps clause that had reserved the right for any group to refuse membership within the post-war state, the Muslim League would simply refuse to participate with any British plan that did not provide for a separate Muslim state, at which point, according to Jinnah, the Muslims would be effectively autonomous anyway. By the time, Gandhi was released from prison in 1944, it was apparent to the British, who were still unconvinced on the issue of

140 Butler, Britain and Empire, 41.
141 Ibid.
partition, “that there was a real threat … of large-scale anti-British disorders, … aiming to expel British by paralyzing the administration” much as Gandhi’s Quit India had attempted in 1942.\textsuperscript{142} Coupled with the perpetual “communal strife between Hindus and Muslims,” the British recognized the volatility of the situation. Still occupied by the war, though, Churchill’s government continued to procrastinate on the issue. Finally, in 1945, the post-war Labour government of new Prime Minister Clement Attlee set about appeasing the demands of the two major nationalist groups. Unfortunately for them, the British representative sent to reconcile the Congress and the Muslim League soon found that “Gandhi was indeed a tough negotiator” and, given Jinnah’s characteristic intransigence on the issue of partition, “[i]t proved impossible to bring Congress and the Muslim League together.”\textsuperscript{143} Both men clung adamantly to their positions with Gandhi demanding Britain’s departure from a united India and Jinnah demanding partition, thereby stalemating any proposal. In the end, then, “Pakistan … owed everything to Jinnah.”\textsuperscript{144} Because of his steadfast support for partition and the unity of Muslim support behind him, the British came to recognize that “Muslim determination … was so great that chaos and maybe civil war would follow [partition’s] denial. To unite India against Muslim wishes would necessarily involve force, while dividing India against the wishes of the Hindus would not. And that was in the end the deciding consideration.”\textsuperscript{145} Consequently, on August 15, 1947, the British colonies of India and Pakistan passed into independent membership within the British Commonwealth of Nations, alongside the white settler Dominions

\textsuperscript{142} Hyam, \textit{Britain’s Declining Empire}, 106.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., 107.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 110.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 111.
Conclusion

In the end, then, very similar transitions in national identity occurred in both the Dominions and India; however, in India, the transition resulted in a divisive conclusion, due in large part to the intransigency of Gandhi and Jinnah, as opposed to the overall unifying effects seen in the Dominions. As the theoretical framework of this study highlighted, each national movement redefined its perceptions of unity, its limits, sense of community, and constitutional sovereignty on the way to gaining full autonomy from the British Empire. In the British Dominions of South Africa and Canada, ethnically mixed populations (of European descent) solidified into singular national groups with separate identities during the 1910-45 era. Comparably, in Australia and New Zealand, where the settler population was almost singularly of British descent, the same processes inspired great unity as well, but was initially entrenched in support of the Empire. As a result, these Dominions’ unity was more gradually disconnected from British loyalties than elsewhere. Furthermore, in each case, the political leaders of the various groups were critical reflections of their colony’s changes, such as Jan Smuts and J.M.B. Hertzog in South Africa, who overcame Boer-British enmity to cooperate against the British or Robert Borden in Canada who grew increasingly disillusioned and concerned about Britain’s management of the First World War and thus British leadership in general. As a result, the cases of the Dominions strongly suggest a pattern in the specific kinds of changes that must occur for nationalist movements to succeed as well as indicating that the process is fundamentally a unifying phenomenon. Additionally, the transformations of Indian nationalists’ thought also supported the prerequisites pattern shown in the Dominions. However, the pattern in India ended entirely differently than in the
Dominions due in large part to upper echelon disagreements between Mohandas Gandhi and Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Interestingly contrasting Smuts and Hertzog in South Africa, Gandhi and Jinnah originally sought to cooperate with each other’s group before the Indian nationalist movement split along religious divisions. In addition, Jinnah’s critical part in the creation of this nationalist Hindu-Muslim cleavage is another powerful indication of the central role that nationalist leaders occupy in the evolution of nationalist movements toward statehood. Ultimately, then, while each case presented its own distinct context, a pattern of changing self-perceptions in successful nationalist movements against the British Empire is evident and suggests that a larger Empire-wide process may have existed. Future research would do well to explore this possibility.


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