GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES.

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The accession of the present German emperor to the throne, or rather Prince Bismarck's dismissal, marks a new era in the political life of Germany. The people of the fatherland have since then generally learned to see that their empire, in order to remain and to become one of the leading powers of the world, must grow considerably both in territory and population. At the same time Captain A. T. Mahan's book on The Influence of Sea-Power Upon History has done more than any other single factor to call the attention of the Germans to the extraordinary advantages which transmarine enterprises have offered in the past, and has greatly assisted in converting a nation, that only a short while ago ridiculed their advocates of transmarine expansion as colonial cranks, into ardent expansionists. This is the more remarkable, as the colonial aspirations of the Germans, so far at least as they have assumed definite shape in the public mind, are opposed to certain vital interests of the United States and have threatened to bring about a war between the two countries.

In attempting to point out these aspirations to my fellow-citizens, I have to state beforehand that I am not in possession of any state-secrets. All I have to communicate are ideas that have been publicly discussed by more or less prominent writers in the press of the fatherland. They were little heeded on this side of the Atlantic and have come into the foreground only of late when the time seemed ripe for action. I likewise know that those men, though influential in the highest circles, by no means exercise any direct influence upon the foreign policy of the German Empire. The fact ought never to be lost sight of that public opinion in Germany does not control the actions of the government to such an extent as with us. German statesmen are not necessarily compelled by popular
clamor to pursue a course which is in their opinion against the best interests of their country, nor will they thereby be induced to act before they are sure that the proper time has arrived and all preparations have been finished. Nevertheless, in Germany as everywhere else, the men at the helm have to consider public opinion carefully and will endeavor to satisfy its hopes and expectations, if possible.

In order to form a fair and appropriate judgment on Germany's colonial aspirations we have first of all to understand her home conditions. For that purpose we shall compare the German Empire, with regard to area, population, and past development, with the other great powers, namely, the United States, Great Britain, and Russia.

The German Empire has an area of 208,670 square miles, while the area of the United States comprises not less than 3,501,000 square miles, not to speak of her recent acquisitions. The population of Germany amounted in 1890 to 49,428,470, or 236.7 per square mile; whereas the inhabitants of the United States in 1890 numbered 62,622,250, or 21.3 per square mile. The population of the territories which are at present included in the German Empire was 24,831,396 in 1816, when the total population of the United States was about eight millions. The exact figures for the census of 1810 and 1820 are 7,239,881 and 9,633,822.

In 1816 the population of European descent in the United Kingdom and its dependencies amounted to about eighteen millions. On account of the bloody Napoleonic wars which were waged between 1811 and 1816 Germany's population must have been about the same in 1816 as in 1811, that is, about twenty-five millions. In 1890 however the European inhabitants of Greater Britain had become equal in number to those of the German Empire. But those forty-nine millions of Englishmen controlled an area of 11,371,391 square miles and more than three hundred and eighty millions of dependent people.

The same thing is to be observed in Russia. That country had in 1815 a population of forty-five millions, which had increased in 1896 to one hundred and twenty-nine millions. The area at the disposal of the Russians is 8,660,394 square miles.

The preceding figures show that Germany, about eighty years ago, had thrice as many inhabitants as the United States, almost one third more than the British Empire, and fully five-ninths as many as Russia. In the course of little over seventy years the United States have become almost one fourth more populous than
Germany, the British Empire has equalled it, and Russia's population has grown to be a good deal more than twice that of Germany. Moreover, that development has only entered upon its initial stages. The extensive and fertile domains of the United States, the density of whose population was not quite one eleventh of that of Germany in 1890, invite and foster a much more rapid increase in population than the overcrowded corners of the fatherland. The British Empire as well as Russia enjoy the same conditions. A very great part of the British colonies offers splendid homes to European emigrants, and the development of Canada and Australia for instance can hardly be said to have fairly started. There can be no doubt that the English-European population of Greater Britain will continue to grow steadily and leave that of the German Empire far behind. In like manner there is no conceivable limit for a continuous growth of the number of Russia's inhabitants who are still sparsely scattered over an immense territory. The inevitable result of this comparison is—and it may be added that it is well recognised in Germany itself—that the United States, Great Britain, and Russia will in the coming century number their populations of European descent by hundreds of millions; and that the German Empire, unless the natural course of events is yet to be changed in favor of Germany, so to speak in the eleventh hour, will cease to be a first-class power and to exercise political influence beyond the pale of its narrow boundaries. Nay, even Germany's political independence seems to be threatened by her neighbors' growing overpowerful.

From a German standpoint it does not appear very difficult to realise such a change in favor of the German Empire. There is nothing required but to direct the large stream of German emigration into German colonies, where the German immigrant will preserve his language and customs as well as close commercial and political connexions with the fatherland. The number of people that have emigrated from Germany is indeed astonishingly great. From 1871-1896, in the course of twenty-five years, not less than 2,404,782 Germans have left their country, that is, an average of nearly 100,000 a year. From 1820-1896 the German immigration into the United States amounted to 5,230,000. These German immigrants together with their descendants are to-day very probably equivalent to about fifteen millions of our population. For immigrants, as a rule, stand in the prime of their life, and multiply accordingly much faster than the whole population. Besides our last census shows very clearly that our foreign-born population has
more children than our native population. In 1890 our native white population represented 73.24 per cent. of our whole population. Our native children of native parents however amounted to only 54.87 per cent. of our total number of children. Our foreign-born white population at the same time amounted to 14.56 per cent. of our whole population, while our children of white foreign-born parents formed 18.37 per cent. If those five millions of German emigrants had therefore founded new homes in German transmarine possessions, there would now exist German colonies with about fifteen million German inhabitants. These were of course to be added to the European population of the German Empire and to be deducted from the population of the United States, with the result that the population of Germany would by far surpass that of the United States.

It is of course much easier to avoid mistakes than to repair losses which have been caused by them; and we should consider it Germany’s first task to obtain possession of territories that present new homes to her emigrants. But it looks as if Germany had joined too late in the partition of the earth. She has indeed from 1884–1890 gained control over extensive parts of the dark continent, namely Togoland, Cameroons, German South-West Africa, and German East Africa, an area of 920,920 square miles. But the latest statistics accessible to me, those of the Gothaer Hofkalender, state that in 1897 Togoland had only 110, Cameroons 253, German South-West Africa 2,628, and German East Africa 922 European inhabitants of all nationalities. It is certainly not encouraging that in a period of thirteen years Germany has settled in her own colonies only 3,963 European inhabitants, while it has sent during the same time about a million and a half of Germans to other countries. Some foreign critics have called attention to this fact as sufficient proof that Germany does not know how to establish colonies. But Africa has always and everywhere proved a rather inhospitable continent, as far as European settlers are concerned. In the French colonies on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea the European population is said to be actually decreasing. The Cape Colony at the southern extremity of the continent had in 1891 an area of 221,311 square miles. Its European population, although the first European settlement dates back to the year 1652, numbered only 376,987 souls. It has grown since 1875 rather rapidly; but there is nothing to warrant the hope that Africa will ever become a white continent. If the number of Europeans has increased, the number of negroes has multiplied much more. Accordingly the Germans seem to
have abandoned all hope and intention of inducing their emigrants to go to the German possessions in Africa.

The only continents where the necessary room and proper climate for European agricultural and industrial communities is found are Australia, South America, and North America. Among these Australia has received but an insignificant share of Germany's surplus population. Moreover it belongs to the British Empire, and Germany would first have to break Great Britain's supremacy as sea-power, before it could dream of conquering Australia. South America on the other hand is composed of quite a number of weak and impotent states which Germany might overpower without any difficulty; and North America has always received the lion's share of German emigration. For these reasons the patriots of Germany have of late turned their eyes eagerly in the direction of both North America and South America, with a view to espying there an opening for a German colonial empire.

Our census of 1890 showed that there lived in that year not less than 2,784,894 persons in the United States who were born in Germany, and it has been figured out by statisticians that about one third of the population of the United States is of German descent. In view of these facts some Germans deem it possible to carve out from the present North American dominion of the United States a German empire. For instance in May 1896 an article appeared in the well-known Preussische Jahrbücher on Deutschland und die Weltpolitik (Germany's aspirations as a world-power). The author of that article, after having stated that under present conditions the Germans in the United States and still more their descendants are lost as to the fatherland, continues page 328:

"Those Germans could only be saved, if they had the good sense to unite in adjoining settlements; to form one or more German states within the Union, and to secure thus as one solid body political influence and preserve their nationality. There is nothing in the constitution of the United States that is in the way of such an undertaking, nor are they lacking the room. As soon as a leader were found, the work would become possible. The rest depends upon the future development which can but result in forcing by and by hostile differences between the states to the foreground by which the ever more artificial and unnatural unity of the great republic will be destroyed."

The author goes on to say, page 331:

"In the British Dominion of Canada of to-day there live about 1,300,000 Frenchmen, and of 211 representatives of the Canadian Parliament not less than 55 are Frenchmen by descent and language. Besides, the attempted revolts of 1838, 1869, and 1885 have proved that this French population has by no means lost consciousness of its past and its national rights. If thereto be added those Frenchmen
who to the number of about 500,000 live scattered, but as Frenchmen, in the United States, there exists in case of a French-English conflict a reserve of French strength upon which a resolute French policy can build with hope of success. Then however the moment would have arrived when it should be the task of Germany, in co-operation with France whose sphere of influence would be the eastern half of British America, to attempt to gain a foothold from the west in the regions on the Pacific Ocean and to try whether it be impossible to arouse the two and three-quarter millions of Germans in the United States from their 'national lethargy,' and to induce them to lay with the assistance of the fatherland on British ground the foundation of a colony on the Pacific Ocean."

We may be inclined to smile indulgently at such wild flights of the imagination which to Americans demonstrate nothing but an encyclopædic want of acquaintance with American conditions. But such vague ideas represent according to all appearance the ripest public opinion in Germany about the United States, otherwise they would never have been published in the Preussische Jahrbücher. Their author, who signs as "Vindex," is very likely a member of the class of high government officers in Germany, because a writer occupying a private station would never have thought of hiding his individuality behind a pseudonym. We are therefore also unable to decide in how far those views are shared by the German government. In any case we shall do well neither to despise nor to overlook such significant utterances.

Only recently a Frenchman, M. Francis Laur, is reported to have made in all earnest a similar prophecy about the future of the United States. I quote from The Literary Digest of July 15, 1899, as follows:

"The concentration of Germans in the Northern States will form there a German Empire. The French in the South will join together and form a kingdom of Orleans. And who knows whether the Chinese of the Pacific coast may not ask for the protection of the Celestial Empire? Then too we shall see Mexico retake the provinces torn from her in the time of her weakness. The poor Indians too will aspire perhaps after well-won independence."

"All this," is added by the editor of The Literary Digest, "is not from a humorous journal, but is put forth as a genuine deduction from sociological premises." Even the best educated scholars and men of affairs in Europe are from their European experiences absolutely unable to see in the people of the United States a homogeneous nation, striving after a common national ideal. In their eyes we are nothing but an agglomeration of individuals, differing from one another in nationality, language, customs, etc., and being ready to cut each other's throats at the least provocation.

Such forecasts on the political development of the United
States are the excrescence rather of prejudice than of ignorance. The nations of continental Europe, France included which is but a republic in name, do not believe in fostering personal independenee. The initiative and control in all public, and to a great ex teng even in private, affairs, belongs to the State that is, to the ruler and his officers. If they for example wish to found a colony, they send there first of all an imperial governor with a large staff of officials and a military force in order to establish in the would-be colony law and order, peace and security, and regulate commerce and land-tenure, long before a single actual settler has arrived. This paternal care for their subjects goes to very great lengths. They openly prevent ambitious people from emigrating to their newly acquired territories, until the government officials have discovered by careful observation and scientific experiments not only that the climate is not hostile to colonisation, but also what agri cultural products are best raised, and how the land is to be culti vated to that end, etc. Accordingly there remains nothing else to be done by the colonist but to faithfully follow and obey the advice and orders of the government.

Such ideas are cherished as infallible truth by the brightest and most prominent men of continental Europe; and we cannot fail to perceive that they must be looked upon as such by monarchs and their bureaucracy. They prove their raison d'être and inspire them with a high and edifying sense of their own necessity and indispensability. On the other hand, they cannot help looking upon a commonwealth like the United States where the individual appears to recognise no other authority than his own sweet will, and which seems to be torn by internal dissentions, with the deepest distrust and the most gloomy forebodings. Their honest conviction concerning our present and future development is best expressed by citing Milton's description of the realm of Chaos:

"To whom these most adhere
He rules a moment: Chaos umpire sits,
And by decision more embroils the fray
By which he reigns; next him high arbiter
Chance governs all.—This wild abyss,
The womb of nature and perhaps her grave,
Of neither sea, nor shore, nor air, nor fire,
But all these in their pregnant causes mixed
Confusedly, and which thus must ever fight,
Unless the Almighty Maker them ordain
His dark materials to create more worlds."

Of such prejudices, which nothing but time can remove, we
must not for a moment lose sight, in our dealings with the powers of continental Europe. We must know that by presenting them a weak and unprotected side we invite their attack, because, very far from realising our immense strength and abounding resources, they are unable to imagine us otherwise than rotten to the core.

Still it is rather on account of their curiosity that I have mentioned the hopes on which German patriots base their ideas of the political attitude and the "national duty," as they call it, of the German element in the United States. Those expectations are certainly extravagant and will never be fulfilled. Their South American plans however are to be taken quite seriously. For it is there that the Germans confidently expect to acquire their first colonies. Of the German emigrants that did not come to the United States the greatest part went to Brazil. Their number has indeed not been very large. For, while from 1871–1896 the total emigration from Germany to the United States has been 2,370,958, only 48,444 settled in Brazil. Besides the number of German immigrants into Brazil, as into all other South American Republics, has always been much smaller than the number of Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish immigrants. But most Germans going to Brazil settled in the three southern States of Paraná, Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande do Sul. These three States, which have an area of more than 200,000 square miles, are almost as large as the German Empire itself. Their population amounted in 1890 to about one and one-half million. Although the Germans formed less than one fourth of this sum, people in Germany thought and think it possible to give them within a few years a majority by directing the whole stream of their emigrants to those states. That looks quite feasible as a simple problem of arithmetic. For Germany has sent for many years annually 100,000 emigrants to transmarine countries.

To this end the German Diet passed in 1897 a new emigration bill, which became a law on the first of April 1898. Of this emigration law Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia of 1897 states:

"The Government carried through an emigration bill in furtherance of its policy to deflect the stream of emigration from the United States to countries of South and Central America, where large agricultural and industrial colonies will develop autonomous institutions, preserve their language and customs, and preserve a commercial and political connection with the fatherland; or to the Transvaal or other regions where the colonists can advance the political prestige of the empire; as far as possible also to German transmarine possessions. Companies undertaking to settle such colonies will be aided by grants of money and by political protection wherever required. Such a company was organised in Hamburg to take over a tract of 1,700,000 fertile acres in the Brazilian state of Catharina, with a
railroad leading to the German colonies already established there. Permission to transport German emigrants will have to be obtained after April 1, 1898, from the German Chancellor, acting with the assent of the Federal Council, and can only be granted to German subjects or companies operating in German territory. A license granted to a navigation company or emigration agent can be cancelled by the same authorities. The bill provides that consuls shall be appointed in ports of debarkation approved by the Government to protect the interests of emigrants; that the Government shall facilitate the discharge of their military obligations by Germans living abroad; that an official bureau of information shall be instituted to direct the stream of emigration to territories where the conditions are favorable for prosperity, and where there is the best prospect of the German nationality being perpetuated and relations to the mother country being maintained.

Geographical conditions greatly favor the German plan in Southern Brazil. The states of Paraná, Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande do Sul form a kind of spur extending southward away from the solid mass of the empire. Means of inland communication are little developed. There is no road passable by wagons connecting the three southern states with the north; especially Paraná is covered with mountains. All intercourse is carried on at present by sea. If therefore Germany should be opposed alone by Brazil, when making an attempt upon Southern Brazil, she could with her powerful navy easily prevent the Brazilians from coming to the aid of their oppressed countrymen; whereas she herself would be absolutely unhampered in transporting thither all the soldiers and all the material of war she wanted.

The German settlers in Southern Brazil or at least some of their spiritual and intellectual leaders, do not appear to be averse to such ideas. Towards the end of 1896 and in the beginning of 1897 several papers, written by Rev. Dr. Rotermund of São Leopoldo, R. G. D. S., on the "Prospects of the German Element in Southern Brazil," were published in the Deutsche Post. The author declared in the course of his discussions for instance:

"The statement that we wish to preserve our nationality does not mean anything. The Status Quo cannot be maintained for any length of time. Here also it is an "either—or;" either the Germans agree to being absorbed or they absorb whatever suits them; hammer or anvil! We have made our choice long ago; it only remains to look steadfast at the goal! A German South Brazil!"

He further says:

"We have given our articles the heading: 'The Prospects of the Germans in Southern Brazil,' and that not alone, because we Germans have our main strength in the three southern states, but also, because these three states, as we think, will not stay united with Brazil for ever. Their secession from Brazil can but be a question of time." "We are able to observe quite distinctly how love for one's own state is growing at the expense of Brazil's unity; and we should not wonder, when,
especially in consequence of the maladministration at the federal capital, Paraná, Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande Do Sul should some day declare for secession and independence. Then however a new outlook will be opened to the Germans.

The United States have certainly neither a right nor the least desire to become entangled in the internal affairs of any South American Republic. If in South America any number of states or provinces should deem fit to renounce their present allegiance in order to form an independent republic of their own, the United States would as a matter of course recognise the new republic, as soon as it had firmly established its independence. The United States will likewise under no circumstances trouble themselves about the language an independent South American Republic may prefer. The present Brazilian states of Paraná, Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande Do Sul may therefore, as far as the United States are concerned, sever their connexion with Brazil at any time they choose and prove able to do so. They may enter into a league with one another and, as the Germans think possible, with the Republics of Paraguay and Uruguay. They may even compel the Argentine Republic to give up its provinces east of the river Paraná, so-called "Mesopotamia Argentina," and to permit them to join the new republic, which is perfectly entitled to adopt the German language as its public language, if a majority of its citizens decides in favor of such an important change.

Yet it is more than doubtful whether the German settlers in Southern Brazil will ever become numerous enough to gain control of their states in the manner which has just been described, and which has been defined as perfectly legitimate from the standpoint of the United States. It is indeed only a question of numbers, and Germany is absolutely able to pour a continuous stream of emigrants at the rate of 100,000 per annum into the three Brazilian states and the neighboring republics, Paraguay, Uruguay, etc. But those countries are under present conditions not capable of absorbing and accommodating so great a multitude of new arrivals. It is very difficult for people that have never been outside of Europe to understand the reasons why those regions cannot at a moment's notice feed and clothe and house any number of "greenhorns." They will answer all objections by the following calculation: In Germany there are more than 250 persons to the square mile. In Paraná you find only 2.9, in Santa Catharina 10.3, and in Rio Grande Do Sul 9.7. Hence there is plenty of room for hundreds of thousands of colonists in those countries. While that has to be admitted as true, practical experience has nevertheless demonstrated that, if
vacant land and people willing to settle there are given, it requires first of all proper means of communication and sufficient centers of trade and industry to fill the vacant land with prosperous homesteads. One hundred thousand German emigrants dumped upon the shores of Southern Brazil in a single year without the most careful and expensive preparation for their immediate accommodation would unfailingly ruin the labor-market of that country as well as the market for all agricultural and industrial products and cause untold misery. Accordingly the German Government will hardly dare send all its emigrants to Southern Brazil; and I should not be surprised the least bit, if after a while statistics should demonstrate that the relative proportion of German colonists to that of Latin settlers in Southern Brazil as well as elsewhere in South America has not materially changed. Then however Germany may be strongly tempted to seize by force of arms what it cannot obtain in peaceful competition; and that is the moment when the United States will have to take a lively interest in Germany's colonial policy.

The United States are very proud of their Monroe Doctrine, which represents a solemn promise never to permit any European power to encroach on the South and Central American Republics, and especially to establish new European dependencies on American soil. The simple proclamation of this doctrine proved sufficient to deter the Holy Alliance from making any attempt to restore the rule of the Bourbons over the Spanish-American Republics. The same doctrine, backed by the veteran army and navy of the Civil War, compelled Napoleon III. to renounce his intention to set up the Austrian prince Maximilian as emperor of Mexico and to withdraw his troops from Mexico. It was the Monroe Doctrine that guided President Cleveland's conduct, when he sent his ultimatum in the Venezuela controversy to England. In view of such precedents it is not to be doubted for a moment that, whenever the German Empire shall stretch out its mailed hand for the purpose of laying hold on South American territory, the United States would enter the lists as the champion of South American independence. No American administration could hesitate to take up this task.

The people of Germany are not unacquainted with these facts. As soon as the South American projects were publicly discussed, even before the emigration bill was passed, the Monroe Doctrine became the object of intense interest. The German newspapers hastened to proclaim that the Monroe Doctrine had never been adopted as a principle of international law, either by Germany
or by any other European power, and that consequently none of them was bound by it. Of Prince Bismarck it was related that he had called the Monroe Doctrine a piece of sheer impudence. As late as July 15, 1899, a German writer declares in an article on Die nationale Aufgabe der Deutschamerikaner (the national duties of German-Americans), published in the Gegenwart of Berlin:

"The famous and impudent Monroe Doctrine the Yankees have renounced on their own initiative by overstepping the boundaries of a policy strictly confined to America, and by inaugurating an aggressive imperialistic policy the consequences of which cannot yet be overlooked."

Another German paper criticised the phrase "America for the Americans," saying that the United States mean "the whole of America for the North Americans," suggesting that it ought to be changed into "North America for the North Americans."

The long and the short of it is that the Monroe Doctrine is in fact not a universally recognised principle of international law, but simply and exclusively a question of might. It means that the United States want the new world reserved for the republican form of government; they would regard it as a threat to their own institutions, if some monarchical power of Europe should establish itself on American soil, and thus they declared that they would regard such an attempt as a hostile act and a menace to their own safety. The political pretensions of the United States defined in the Monroe Doctrine will be respected just so long as the United States are resolved and able to prove and demonstrate the good right of their pretensions by force of arms.

In this connexion we must not neglect to notice that the remarkable increase of Germany's naval armament is in the popular German mind intimately related to the colonial aspirations of the empire. The public demand for a stronger German navy arose indeed immediately after the Emperor had despatched his famous telegram to Oom Paul of the Transvaal. That the German Emperor had helped to twist the British Lion's tail so audaciously rendered him at once very popular among Germans the world over. But when Great Britain assembled a squadron of mighty warships in the English Channel, it became all at once clear that Germany, notwithstanding her powerful army, was no match for England. Then the Germans grew loud in their clamor for a larger navy. Everywhere public collections were instituted with the intention of presenting men-of-war to the government. Some time however elapsed, before the German government had worked out its plan and could lay a naval bill before the Diet.
Meanwhile international conditions had somewhat altered. The first enthusiasm for the political independence of the Boers or rather for the idea of bringing South Africa, the English colonies included, where a majority of the European population is of Dutch and German descent, under the paramount influence of the German Empire had cooled off considerably, if it had not entirely subsided. Great Britain and Germany had reapproached and come to terms, as was publicly demonstrated by the German annexation of Kiao Chau Bay in 1897 when the German war-ships on their way to China were furnished with coal at the British coaling stations. The attention of the Germans had been called away from Africa, perhaps by the English themselves who immediately after the Venezuela Message could not entertain too friendly feelings towards the United States, to the advantages offered to German colonial enterprises by the conditions in South America. But while the prospect of South American colonies was appearing above the horizon, the spectre of North American interference loomed threateningly in the background. The increase in naval armament which the German government demanded and obtained from the Diet accordingly provided for a navy that was to be stronger, not than the navy of Great Britain, France, or Russia respectively, but than the navy of the United States. In the spring of 1898, immediately before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the naval bill was passed. It authorised the construction of a navy, which was to be completed within a term of six years, that is, by 1904, and was to consist of 19 battle-ships, 8 armored coast-defense vessels, 9 first-class cruisers, 26 second-class cruisers, and of a reserve of 2 battle-ships, 3 first-class cruisers, 4 second-class cruisers, together with quite a number of gunboats and torpedo-vessels. Hand in hand with building the ships was to go a corresponding increase in the personnel of the navy. In 1897 the personnel consisted of 960 officers and engineers, 5,069 petty officers, and 15,592 men and boys, making a total of 21,835 men, including surgeons, paymasters, etc. The total of the personnel of the United States navy in the same year amounted to but 13,659 men. But hardly six months having passed, cries for a still greater naval armament became loud in Germany. This time they want a navy which is to comprise not less than 57 battle-ships, 15 first-class cruisers, and 36 second-class cruisers. This immense number of warships, which would make the German Empire by a single stroke the foremost naval power of the world, is to be built from 1904–1920 at a cost of $425,000,000 and an annual naval budget of $75,000,000. They also
propose to accomplish that end without having recourse to additional taxation.

What is the meaning of such almost unlimited warlike preparation? The German Emperor some time ago told American visitors that his strong navy is to serve the same end as his large army, namely, the preservation of peace. These imperial words however have to be construed in the light of historical facts. The German army never was intended simply as an instrument of peace. It was in the first place organised by Gneisenau for the war of independence against Napoleon I., and reorganised through William I. under the auspices of men like Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon. While it was still the army of Prussia, it conquered an adequate position for the kingdom of Prussia, first among the German states and next among the nations of Europe. It fought in pursuance of this its task many a bloody battle. No one can blame Germany, for the policy of conquest was forced on the nation by circumstances. But, having obtained what the army had been created for, it became necessary to preserve the peace of Europe, that is to say, to guard and keep what Germany had gained in war, if possible, by the mere existence and ever watchful readiness of the German army or, if need be, by crushing the bold aggressor on the field of battle.

The German Empire has up to the present time not made any transmarine conquests which could arouse the envy and revengeful hatred of other powers so that they would have to be guarded and defended by a strong navy. Its geographical position in Europe is such that Germany can keep her own without the assistance of numerous warships, as was convincingly illustrated in the course of the Franco-Prussian war. Although the French in that war were in possession of a navy in comparison with which the few Prussian war-vessels were insignificant, they were powerless against the German sea-coast and had very soon to recall their ships from their blockade-stations off the German harbors in order to employ both marines and sailors in the defense of their native soil. The only explanation which under these circumstances the extraordinary efforts of Germany to secure a first class navy admit of is that they evidently intend to overawe, when occasion offers, any opponent the empire may encounter, while it pursues its course of national aggrandisement in countries lying beyond the sea.

Having arrived at this conclusion, we shall find it to our advantage to briefly recapitulate what we have learned about the straits and aspirations of the German Empire. We behold Ger-
many confronted by the desperate problem, a mere question of self-preservation, how to maintain its present standing and rank among the nations of the world. Being in desperate circumstances, we may look for desperate actions from her. For the chances are that she will be left behind in the race forever for want of elbow room. We find even the general public of Germany aware of these conditions, and her statesmen and lawgivers seeking for new countries suitable for propagating the fertile German race and arming their warriors to snatch these countries away from any possessor and defender. We can but sympathise heartily with their eager resolution and strong efforts to turn the tide of events. We may even, as strong and healthy men, rejoice at the prospect of the gigantic struggle between Germany and the power which will be caught standing in her way. But we must not be unmindful of the ominous fact that the United States may be and in all probability is that power with which Germany will fight for life and death.

Present conditions may of course change at any time. Germany may after all decide to seek in the future as in her glorious past, expansion by land, namely, in Europe, Asia Minor, Syria, etc. This seems to us the wiser course which promises success. The Germans in the Austrian Empire are threatened in their nationality by their Czechic, Polish and other compatriots. The death of Francis Joseph which may occur at any moment may unchain there a revolution that will give ample employment to Germany's surplus energy and recall her from a wild-goose chase across the Atlantic Ocean. There are indications too that Great Britain is more than willing to welcome the German Empire not alone as the rightful heir of the House of Hapsburg, but also of the sick man at Constantinople. The present German ambassador at Washington who is favorably known for his clear insight and sound judgment has also in all probability supplied his government with the necessary information as to the inadvisability of its colonial policy in both Americas. Still it behooves us as prudent and cautious men to arrange betimes for the proper safe-guards, lest we should be involved in a dangerous war at a moment when we are least prepared for it.

A war with Germany would be the greatest misfortune that possibly could befall us, and ought to be rendered impossible. A very large percentage of our adopted and native citizens are of German descent and would in such a war very naturally vacillate in their sympathies between their old and their new country. In our opinion even a higher percentage of German-Americans would stand by
the stars and stripes in case of war with Germany than ever English-Americans did in war conflicts with Great Britain; but their loyalty would be suspected, and that would result in bitter recriminations. Modern German immigration into the United States before 1870 was quite different from what it has been since that year. The great bulk of German immigrants has indeed always been impelled by purely economical considerations to leave their native land. But their intellectual leaders in the period before the Franco-Prussian War were confirmed republicans, even before they arrived here. Since the establishment of the German Empire, however, the educated Germans that have come to this country as a rule no longer believe in a republican form of government. That may, for instance, be learned from the article on "The Germans and the Americans" by Hugo Münsterberg in the September number of The Atlantic Monthly. He declares, page 406:

"If I say that I have never been a more thoroughgoing monarchist than during my stay in America, I can really not claim to be an exception."

It would lead us too far, if we should attempt to explain that phenomenon. For our purposes it is sufficient to point out the fact that it requires, so to speak, a special education, an intimate acquaintance with our national history, and a vivid consciousness of our national destiny to render educated Germans that have lately settled among us true Americans. As long as they look upon monarchy as the best form of government, they will fail to perceive that it can at all be our duty to prevent the German Empire from propagating their monarchical system in South America, and will accordingly oppose such a policy on the part of the United States to the best of their ability.

The only and best as well as cheapest means to ward off all that trouble consists in keeping our navy always and in every respect, in number and quality of ships, in armament, in personnel, in discipline and training, well abreast, if not ahead, of the German navy.

Our Spanish war ought to have taught each one of us at least one thing, namely that the old adage is still as true as ever. Si vis pacem, para bellum. If we had had a stronger navy, before the war broke out, Spain would have surrendered Cuba for a reasonable cash indemnity without drawing the sword; and we should have been saved all our trouble with the Philippine Islands, so loudly lamented by our anti-expansionists.

An imperfect, unfinished warlike armament will always tend to
produce war. As the conditions were, all European countries, with perhaps the sole exception of Great Britain, confidently believed and predicted that the United States, although probably victorious at the end, would suffer severe reverses at the beginning. Germany was so strongly convinced of the weakness of both belligerents that she ordered almost her whole Asiatic squadron to Manila Bay in order to be ready to protect her interests in those regions herself. To avoid such and similar occurrences in future, to uphold our national dignity, to secure prompt recognition of our national rights, and to preserve internal peace, we are in urgent need of a navy strong and powerful enough and ever ready to meet on favorable terms any foreign power that may be forced by sheer despair to risk a war with us, as long as there is the least hope of success.