Filipino Guerilla Resistance to Japanese Invasion in World War II

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Recommended Citation
Minor, Colin () "Filipino Guerilla Resistance to Japanese Invasion in World War II," Legacy: Vol. 15 : Iss. 1 , Article 5. Available at: https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/legacy/vol15/iss1/5

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At approximately 8:00 pm on March 11, 1942, General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, along with his family, advisors, and senior officers, left the Philippine island of Corregidor on four United States Navy PT (Patrol Torpedo) boats bound for Australia. While MacArthur would have preferred to have remained with his troops in the Philippines, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Army Chief of Staff George Marshall foresaw the inevitable fall of Bataan and the Filipino capital of Manila and ordered him to evacuate. MacArthur explained upon his arrival in Terowie, Australia in his now famous speech,

The President of the United States ordered me to break through the Japanese lines and proceed from Corregidor to Australia for the purpose, as I understand it, of organizing the American offensive against Japan, a primary objective of which is the relief of the Philippines. I came through and I shall return.1

While the soldiers who served under him may have understood the reasons behind it, MacArthur’s departure nonetheless left the officers and infantry behind on the Philippines feeling betrayed and dispirited, and understandably so. After all, MacArthur and his staff were now in the relative safety of Australia, preparing for a campaign for combatting Japanese forces in Papua New Guinea to relieve pressure from the Allied Forces’ Australian bases; at the same time, the American and Filipino soldiers remaining in Bataan and on Corregidor were preparing for a doomed defense of the bases MacArthur had just abandoned. While MacArthur
received the Congressional Medal of Honor and was named Supreme Allied Commander of South East Asia, Bataan and Corregidor fell on April 9 and May 6, respectively, bringing an end to direct, organized United States Army resistance to the Japanese invasion of the Philippines until MacArthur’s return in October of 1944.²

However, resistance to Imperial Japan in the Philippines did not cease while MacArthur was away. During this interregnum there were concerted, determined local resistance groups opposed to the Japanese occupying force. These forces achieved an unexpected level of success given the disparity in resources between themselves and the Imperial forces, resulting both in victories for themselves and decreased work necessary for MacArthur’s forces upon their return. It is important to note that there were American forces still in the Philippines at the time, having either evaded or escaped from the Japanese occupying forces; however, this paper looks primarily at the contributions of native Filipino in the resistance movements from 1942 through 1944. In the following pages I will attempt to outline and explain key reasons for the success of these local groups. Specifically, the methods and techniques, resistance organizations, and resistance leaders were key elements in the Filipino resistance to Imperial Japanese occupation. Accompanying these are preceding and succeeding sections providing historical context for the Filipino resistance.

**Filipino Resistance to Colonial Powers**

The islands of the Philippine Archipelago have varied cultures, languages, and histories. These distinct peoples were involved with Southeast Asian trade and the cultures and religions prominent in the area, particularly Islam. The history of Western contact with the Philippines began when Ferdinand Magellan claimed the islands for Spain on his voyage of circumnavigation in 1521. Colonization did not begin until 1565, and Spanish colonists quickly established control of the archipelago. Over the next three centuries, Spanish overlords faced sporadic resistance
from the Muslim population chafing under Catholic rule and Filipino groups seeking independence.

The Philippine Revolution beginning in 1896 and the Spanish-American War of 1898 offered opportunities for Filipino independence, but imperialist ideas and American racial beliefs saw the Philippines remain subjugated at war’s end, now as an American territory. Horrendous treatment of the native population rekindled Filipino resistance and sparked a third conflict, the Philippine-American War, which lasted until 1902. Small remnants of the unrecognized First Philippine Republic continued to combat the newly installed Philippine Constabulary for close to a decade. American colonial incursion onto the lands of the Moro Muslims on Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan continued local resistance there as well but slowed significantly after a mandatory disarmament in 1911, and guerrilla forces would not be prominent in the archipelago again until the Japanese invaded the islands over thirty years later.

**Guerilla Methods and Techniques**

One of the most important reasons for the success of the Filipino resistance movements during the Second World War was the methods and techniques that they utilized, chief among them guerrilla-style warfare. Merriam Webster defines a “guerrilla” as, “a person who engages in irregular warfare especially as a member of an independent unit carrying out harassment and sabotage.” As Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu said,

> It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if two to one, to divide our army into two. If equally matched we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.
Certainly, in an otherwise even scenario, as Sun Tzu intends, a far larger force will almost always overwhelm its opponent, if only due to reinforcements and fatigue of the superior and inferior forces, respectively. However, this maxim will not necessarily hold if certain other factors are present: superior knowledge of the local terrain provides information on strategic points and informs strategy; a distracted enemy is unable to muster its full force. Furthermore, anti-guerrilla tactics, if too harsh, can instead serve to bolster resisting forces. The Filipino guerrilla groups that fought against the Japanese occupational forces and, later, the pro-Japan Philippine Constabulary were able to use these factors to their advantage. I will use these examples to examine the tactics of the Hukbalahap and the Moro Muslim guerrillas, beginning with geographical knowledge.

The Philippine Archipelago is a series of over seven thousand islands located between the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea. The islands are categorized geographically into three major groups: Luzon in the north, Mindanao to the south, and Visayas in the center. The islands’ beautiful mountainous terrain gives way downhill to the low coastal regions that contain the majority of the Philippines’ major settlements. However, it is the rainforests on the slopes between the peaks and coast that is of most concern here. These forests served dual purposes to the guerrillas: obscuring unit movement and hiding and defending fortifications. In particular, the Hukbalahap utilized the cover the forest provided to allow for easy retreats from strikes and engagements and to hide their base located at Mount Arayat, from which they organized their operations throughout Luzon. While they were highly active and, being the most visible form of resistance, often targeted by the Japanese, what casualties they did suffer were minimal, and the Hukbalahap achieved considerable success in their actions through the use of the environment as cover in guerrilla actions.

In the case of both the Hukbalahap of Luzon and the Moro Muslims on the islands of Sulu, Lanao, and Cotabato (to name just a few), the inclusion of a distracting civilian presence was a boon
to the guerrillas as well.\textsuperscript{12} With Japanese forces and the Constabulary they instituted keeping tabs on the Filipino people, there would be times and locations where they would not and could not keep tabs on rebel forces. Nor did a distinct lack of cooperation from the local populace make Japanese efforts to keep control any easier. Refusing to believe the Japanese propaganda of “Asia for the Asiatics” and similar slogans, belligerent Moro officials and civilians provided all the more chances for guerrillas to take advantage of opportunities afforded to them to harry and sabotage Japanese forces.\textsuperscript{13} The galling treatment of those same people by the occupying Japanese led to increased support of the guerrillas by the local population.\textsuperscript{14} On both Luzon and the Muslim islands the violent methods used by Japanese forces to extract information about, find, and deal with the rebellious Filipinos may have yielded the results they wished for in the short term, but it ultimately led to the “fence sitters ... toppling in the right direction,” as Army Colonel Russell Volckmann, the American guerrilla commander in Northern Luzon, put it.\textsuperscript{15}

Another technique (or, more accurately, series of techniques) utilized by Filipino guerrillas in resisting the Japanese occupying force was the traditional Filipino martial art known as eskrima (also called Arnis and Kali, among other names). The first Western exposure to what may have been the martial practice of eskrima came on the occasion of Magellan’s death in battle with the Cebuano chief Lapu Lapu. The only written record of the event, belonging to a passenger on Magellan’s ship, states that the explorer was overwhelmed and killed by a large group who “all hurled themselves upon him.”\textsuperscript{16} Eskrimador oral tradition, however, holds Lapu Lapu as a hero who bested Magellan in single combat. The truth likely lies somewhere between the two tales; regardless, eskrima through World War II was a secretive, traditional Filipino art that emphasized the flexibility and comprehensiveness of the style.

Primarily utilizing weapons such as swords, knives, and rods, eskrima also includes joint-locks and grapples that can be practiced bare-handed. This is accomplished by using the same movements regardless of the weapon(s) at hand, with the rod or
blade seen as an extension of the limb, rather than a tool. In addition, movements are based on angle and location of attack, rather than on specific defenses for each technique. In this way eskrima is similar to Japanese *kenjutsu* (literally “sword arts”), although all forms and weapons of *kenjutsu* are taught as a single art, unlike *kenjutsu* and *aikido*, which use many of the same motions despite being separate martial arts.

Various notable eskrimadors and grandmasters participated in the guerrilla movements in World War II, several of them from the famed “Doce Pares” school tree, including the Cañete brothers and Teodoro Saavedra. While Cacoy Cañete (and his brother) would survive the war and use the combat experience he gained to modify the Doce Pares style, Japanese forces captured and killed Saavedra, regarded as one of the best in his generation. Despite this, his story, as passed down by the Doce Pares and Balintawak schools and told by grandmaster Crispulo Atillo, provides a useful, if most likely exaggerated, case of eskrima in the Second World War. A visit to town by Saavedra coincided with an attack on a Japanese convoy. In response, occupational forces arrested various Filipinos in the area. Saavedra utilized his skills in eskrima to combat seven Japanese troops, but he was ultimately unable to escape. As he was being tortured, Saavedra freed himself and fought four sword-wielding Japanese soldiers with his bare hands. Atillo says his attacks were “so fierce, they had to shoot him to death in order to prevent the death of their poorly trained soldiers.” While at least some of the story is likely hyperbole, or even outright false, the tale of Teodoro Saavedra provides insight on how a skilled eskrimador and the art in general contributed to the Filipino resistance movement.

**Guerilla Groups and Organizations**

Another key reason for the success of the Filipino guerrillas was the groups and organizations of the resistance. It is important to note that while the Filipino guerillas were not structured as traditional military forces are, they still had distinct organizations
whose structure contributed to their overall success. While these groups had very different backgrounds, *modus operandi*, and dispositions, all held the same shared goal: the expulsion of Japanese forces from the Philippine Archipelago. I will discuss the actions of three particular groups active in the fight against the Japanese: those under the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), the *Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon* (or *Hukbalahap*, for short); and the Moro Muslims.

While there were American forces serving under MacArthur that either evaded capture or escaped captivity, there were also a fair number of Filipinos who did the same. These guerrillas, and those who later joined them, fell under the purview of the United States Army Forces in the Far East and reported, through intermediaries and COs, to General MacArthur. Under the command of officers such as Colonels Wendell Fertig, Russell Volckmann, and Hugh Straughn, and Captain Robert Lapham, the groups that collectively formed the guerrilla forces of the United States Army Forces in the Far East served as the eyes, ears, and hands of the United States Army between MacArthur’s departure and his return.

One of the marquee Filipino outfits under the USAFFE banner were the Hunters ROTC. Formed by and initially comprised of cadets from the Philippine Military Academy, the Hunters ROTC (also known as “Terry’s Hunters” after Eleuterio “Terry Magtanggol” Adevoso who took control following the capture of the unit’s commanding officer Hugh Straughn, and executive officer and founder Miguel Ver) were regarded as one of the most successful guerrilla units on Luzon. Of particular note were their intelligence contributions and their role in the raid on the Los Baños internment camp to free American and Filipino prisoners. The Hunters, along with other Filipino guerrilla groups, provided information on the region, slowed the arrival of Japanese reinforcements, and eliminated guards of the camp.

Another notable guerrilla raid had occurred less than a month earlier. Guerilla Captain Juan Pejota, serving under Robert Lapham, executed the raid on Cabanatuan to free prisoners of war from the Bataan Death March of 1942 in conjunction with the
forces of Colonel Henry Mucci. The information provided and the planning done by Pejota led directly to the success of the operation; adding to this the defense of the POW’s retreat more than earned Pejota and his men Bronze Star Medals for their service, making them one of the most decorated Filipino units in the war.

Another key organization in the fight against the Japanese was the *Hukbalahap*. An abbreviated form of the Filipino translation for “the nation’s army against the Japanese,” the *Hukbalahap* was originally created by the leaders of groups of poor farmers, and it numbered just 500. Under the leadership of Luis Taruc, the organization grew to over 15,000 by 1943, drawing primarily from agricultural regions of Luzon. The “Huks” were not just a group of farmers, however. As the military branch of a growing Marxist movement in the Philippines, Taruc and the *Hukbalahap* had political ambitions as well, frequently putting them at odds with American forces, particularly when it came to recruitment and materiel. Despite low initial numbers, Taruc’s forces found success, often by any means necessary. Unable to work out an agreement with American forces regarding supplies, the Huks raided USAFFE arms caches. Talented recruits were given the option to join or suffer. Japanese raids resulted in the loss of soldiers and officers, but despite the Huk’s disorganization, their survival only strengthened their resolve.

Key to Huk success was the organizational system, with a base unit of hundred-man squadrons. At the outset, the *Hukbalahap* consisted of only five such groups; by March of 1943 the organization was 10,000 strong, split into at least forty detachments. The focal point of system was Taruc himself, who oversaw and directed the movements of the organization, particularly the information network, and strengthened the territory already acquired as the war progressed. By the end of the war, the *Hukbalahap* had established a legitimate presence within the Philippines, even if the USAFFE and the Philippine Republic did not wish to recognize them as such.

A third group resisting the Japanese occupation was the Moro Muslims native to the southwestern islands of the
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Philippine Archipelago such as Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. The Moros have come into conflict with every imperial power that claimed their land since the fall of the Sulu Sultanate, and the Japanese occupational force was no different. The strength they showed in their struggle with Imperial Japan was noted, with reports of them forcing Japanese troops to retreat to their ships at night for fear of attack. Furthermore, Moro Muslims had already reclaimed much of their land by the time American forces returned to the Philippines.

As mentioned previously, a sizable contingent of the Moro citizenry and leadership did not buy into the Japanese propaganda such as “Asia for the Asiatics.” Unlike the USAFFE and Hukbalahap, however, Moros did not utilize counter-propaganda, as it was unnecessary. Whether this was due to Japanese actions or the Moros’ history of chafing under imperial rule (and whether it is any imposition of rule, or simply non-Islamic) is unclear; what is clear is that the Constabulary, and thus the Japanese occupational forces, had a far harder time in controlling the Muslim population. Furthermore, this difficulty spread to the local non-Islamic populations too, as Moro and Christian forces frequently collaborated in opposing the Japanese.

This is not to say that there was no difficulty, however, as there were various cases of Moro hostility toward Christian Filipino and American forces as well. Nor, curiously, was there frequent collaboration between separate Moro communities. Unlike MacArthur for the USAFFE or Taruc for the Hukbalahap, there was no central figure in the Moro resistance, possibly due to the difficulty of communication between islands. The Philippine Archipelago is home to more than 140 separate, recognized local languages, in addition to English, Spanish, and Arabic. While a single national language, Pilipino, was developed and adopted in the 1930s, its spread was not yet complete or even assured, thus preventing effective communication or cooperation. Each fight was a separate, individual struggle for the liberation of that community, making the success each group had that much more impressive.
Postwar Filipino Resistance

Just as combat continued after the brief conflict that was the Spanish-American War, many of the World War II resistance movements did not necessarily put down their arms following the Japanese Empire’s surrender. In particular, Luis Taruc and the Hukbalahap, continuously denied a voice in government, continued hostile actions well after the end of the war. With their violent methods already losing public support following the recognition of Filipino independence and the Third Philippine Republic, and without the threat of Japanese occupation, the organization was fully subsumed by the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas as part of the PKP’s struggle against the government beginning in 1948. In addition, the murder of the widow and daughter of former president Manuel Quezon in 1949 did few favors for Hukbalahap public support. Coupled with similar attacks and raids on civilians and ostensibly allied forces, both during the war and in the years following, the Hukbalahap were seen as outlaws and terrorists and combated the Filipino Battalion Combat Teams under Minister of Defense and former USAFFE guerrilla Ramon Magsaysay. The conflict would continue through the surrender of Taruc in May of 1954, finally concluding in 1955.30

The Moros, too, have rebelled against the government since the end of the war. On March 18, 1968, roughly 60 young Muslim Filipino military recruits were executed by training officers on Corregidor, with only one survivor escaping.31 The outrage sparked by the massacre led to the creation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) by Professor Nur Misuari of the University of the Philippines in 1969, calling for a separate Bangsamoro state in the Philippines.32 Fighting came to a head when, in a government effort to reclaim the Jolo, Sulu from the MNLF in 1974, combat resulted in the destruction of much of the city. A peace accord in 1976, which pacified the MNLF, although it did not allow a separate Islamic state, gave them autonomous control over much of Mindanao. The MNLF has not been the only active Moro group, however. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) split off from the MNLF in 1977, taking a more militant stance on the issue of obtaining a Bangsamoro. And in 1991 the Abu Sayyaf Group was formed in part from radical members of both the MNLF and MILF. These latter groups have proven to be more militant than the modern MNLF, having been party to hostage crises and violent takeovers. The conflicts between these groups and the Filipino government still continue, though negotiations are underway to create a new autonomous region in Mindanao under MILF supervision.33

When General Douglas MacArthur left the Philippines in March of 1942, the Allied American and Filipino forces under his command had retreated to the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor Island and would soon be subjected to the torture of the Bataan Death March. Ever on the defensive and on the verge of being overrun, MacArthur, ordered to retreat, effectively surrendered the Philippine Archipelago to the Japanese invaders, although he promised to return. By the time that he finally returned on October 20, 1944, it was the Japanese who were on the back foot, with their naval forces severely crippled from the Battle of Midway. Following the destruction of four Japanese aircraft carriers, Imperial forces proved unable to counter the American strategy of leapfrogging via island hopping;34 preparations were already underway for the now famous amphibious attack on Iwo Jima. On the Philippines, too, the situation was vastly different. While the Japanese forces still controlled the islands, they had been harried by guerrilla forces across the islands for more than two years. Guerrilla groups both communist and capitalist, Muslim and Christian, American and Filipino worked to weaken the Japan’s grip on the islands, using a variety of methods, led by the next generation of Filipino leaders. When General MacArthur landed on the beach at Leyte, his first time on Filipino soil in two-and-a-half years, he had this to say:

This is the voice of freedom, General MacArthur speaking. People of the Philippines: I have
returned. ... Our forces stand again on Philippine soil—soil consecrated in the blood of our two peoples. We have come, dedicated and committed to the task of destroying every vestige of enemy control over your daily lives, and of restoring ... the liberties of your people. At my side is your President, Sergio Osmeña. ... The seat of your government is now therefore firmly re-established on Philippine soil. The hour of your redemption is here. Your patriots have demonstrated an unswerving and resolute devotion to the principles of freedom. ... I now call upon your supreme effort that the enemy may know from the temper of an aroused and outraged people within that he has a force there to contend with no less violent than is the force committed from without. ... Let the indomitable spirit of Bataan and Corregidor lead on. As the lines of battle roll forward to bring you within the zone of operations, rise and strike! For future generations of your sons and daughters, strike! In the name of your sacred dead, strike!\(^{35}\)

The general meant this as a rallying cry to push the Japanese off the islands, but MacArthur knew that through the guerilla and military techniques used by the Hukbalahap, Moro, and USAFFE forces, the people of the Philippines had been doing so ever since he had left.

**Notes**

2. Marshall was awarded the Medal of Honor to MacArthur to stem the potential loss of confidence caused by his retreat.


11 Ibid., 15


13 Ibid.


18 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
22 Ibid. Also of note is Ramon Magsaysay, eventual President of the Third Philippine Republic. Serving as Captain in Brigadier General Frank Merrill’s outfit, “Merrill’s Marauders,” Magsaysay was not necessarily as highly decorated or influential during the war as Pejota, but he would go on to serve as a Military Governor, Secretary of Defense, and president after the war and is remembered as one of the great leaders of the Philippines.
24 Ibid., 17-19, 21.
25 Ibid., 20.
28 Yegar, *Between Integration and Succession*, 233.
Bangsamoro (from bangsa, “people”, and moro, “Muslim” from the Spanish word for “Moor”) refers to the Muslim people of the Philippines, particularly of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan.


That is, avoiding heavily fortified positions in favor of tactically superior, less defended ones, thereby also cutting off the supply lines for the former.