The Crisis of Legitimacy: Resistance, Unity, and the Stamp Act of 1765, 1763 – 1766

Coleman Fitch
Southern Illinois University Carbondale

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Two thousand citizens marched on the streets of Boston the day of November 5, 1765, and they paraded burned effigies through them later that afternoon. Street leaders roamed the city while men of “genteel society” hid behind closed doors, fearing the destruction of their property and themselves. Massachusetts Bay Governor Francis Bernard retired to Castle William outside of the parade’s path, as he “thought it not suitable … to be present in town, when a gross affront on his Majesty’s Government at home was to be publically passed.” The gathering of such “a gross affront,” not at all unfamiliar to the city, was a Boston tradition known as “Pope’s Day.” It commemorated the failed conspiracy to destroy Parliament in 1605. Traditionally, street gangs from the city’s north and south ends quarreled by throwing stones and engaging in fisticuffs to see which side received the honor of torching the celebratory bonfires used in burning images of the Pope. However, the tensions felt surrounding the 1765 celebration stemmed from legislation—not tradition. Its reserved day, November 5, bore a close proximity to November 1: the notorious date beginning the implementation of the Stamp Act in the colonies.

Three months earlier, Massachusetts and its neighboring colonies took action in one of the first mass resistance movements in the colonies. Not even two weeks had passed since delegates in New York dismissed a convention founded to collectively voice opposition to the Stamp Act. The timing of such a brutish holiday could not have been less conducive in the eyes
of royal leaders, but despite their worst fears, the events that took place on November 5, did not culminate into the “barbarous” action that so many dreaded. Instead of capitalizing on the riotous behavior still alive in the colonies, North and South Enders set their differences aside for that occasion and marched together in opposition to the Stamp Act for local leaders to witness. The events on November 5 in Boston illustrate two opposing aspects of the Stamp Act crisis experienced in the colonies—one of violent upheaval, and one of solidarity. Both played roles in the years leading up to the American Revolution, and both of their roots grew from that crisis. The Stamp Act of 1765 simultaneously produced resistance and a foundation of unity in the American colonies.

Neither the resistance nor the unity derived from one of Great Britain’s most resounding diplomatic victories, two years earlier. The “Peace of Paris” formally ended the Seven Years’ War, and settled Europe into a brief state of peace. In the eyes of the British Parliament, the creation of the Stamp Act and the duties that preceded it necessitated the steps in governing an expanding empire on the North American continent. Britain acquired an extraordinary amount of land as the victor, gaining most of France’s North American territory east of the Mississippi River, as well as Spanish Florida and its Gulf Coast. iv The acquisition of land along the Mississippi River Valley and the trans-Appalachian area also gave Britain the resources to control and dominate most of the fur-trading business.

These businesses resided on the frontier of an expanding empire in America, predominantly occupied by a large number of Native American peoples. They benefited from a long tradition of gift-giving and generous trade agreements with the French, on French occupied lands. However, for Great Britain, the acquisition of such territory added administrative woes to those in charge, primarily due to the large scope of responsibilities that accompanied the
expansion, as well as the near fiscal deterioration of the British Empire. These shortcomings threatened many of the ways of life on which Native American peoples had grown dependent. As a result, insurrections, collectively known as “Pontiac’s Rebellion” (after the Ottawa chief that led the movement), occurred on new British frontier posts.

Although British forces ultimately put down the rebellions, the attacks made it obvious to Britain that it must maintain a peaceful relationship with Native American peoples as the French had—even at the expense of the restless colonists who were eager to cultivate the rich land that laid outside of colonial boundaries. On October 7, 1763, King George III issued a proclamation outlining the new governments created out of the newly acquired territories, namely Quebec, East Florida, West Florida, and Grenada. The last section of the proclamation aroused the most unfavorable interest from colonists. The King forbade “all our living subjects from making any purchase or settlements whatsoever, or taking any possession of any of the lands above reserved,” for the Native American peoples, “in order therefore to prevent such irregularities for the future, and to the end that the Indians may be convinced of our justice. …” Colonists, who felt a great deal of patriotism toward their mother country over the course of the war, could not reap the rewards that victory had seemingly granted Great Britain, regardless of whether they had contributed to the conquest.

The need for armed forces in these new territories appears as a solution agreed upon by the British Parliament before Pontiac’s Rebellion occurred. An entry in the Journals of the House of Commons, dated March 7, 1763, includes a resolve recommending provisions for troops on the North American frontier, including newly acquired Quebec. An earlier entry, dated February 23, estimated the number of garrisons stationed in these areas to reach ten thousand. Native American insurrections did not occur until later that summer, which showed
the necessity of a standing army in those territories as an essential defensive measure to maintain the safety of the British Empire—not as a simple precaution.

However, the idea of deploying ten thousand troops to the frontier did not resonate well with those already vexed by Britain’s financial crisis. In February 1763, national debt dramatically increased with the onset of the war to £122,603,336. Post-war Great Britain desperately sought new forms of revenue. Although the fertile lands of the Mississippi River Valley promised gains for the distant future, they needed to take immediate action. The new Ministry, headed by George Grenville, acknowledged the significant lack of taxation in America in comparison to that within England.

To offset the expenses of the army, Parliament resolved to levy a series of direct and indirect forms of taxation on its colonies. The realities surrounding both the need for troops in the colonies and the need to formulate ways to pay for them created a keen awareness in Grenville. When he took office, he acknowledged the preposterously low revenues accumulating from the current customs duties. This lack of revenues had resulted from an ineffective customs administration in charge of regulating colonial trade and collecting duties. Customs deputies preferred to accept duties. Even after Grenville tightened the administration, laws on the books regarding the Acts of Trade, still extremely inadequate, could not produce a sufficient revenue during such a financial crisis. Grenville determined that the Acts of Trade required revisions. On March 9, 1764, he announced his planned changes to the House of Commons in a series of resolutions that, when enacted, became known as the Sugar Act.

The resolutions added new duties affecting colonial commerce, which included new duties on wine, coffee, and pimento. In addition, the resolutions ended refunds, or drawbacks, on re-exported European and Asian textiles. However, the most controversial resolution came
with the lowering of the duty on foreign molasses, from six pence to three pence per gallon.\textsuperscript{xiv}

Due to their ability to dodge customs duties altogether under the former, weaker, customs administration, merchants dreaded this new provision, as three pence seemed unbearable. Shortly after its proposal, an amendment added to the list of resolutions called for the increased jurisdiction of the admiralty courts in the colonies.\textsuperscript{ xv} These courts, located in Halifax, could try violators of the new duties without the privilege of juries. Admiralty courts also gained clear jurisdiction over common-law courts, freeing them from local judges under the possible influence from the merchants standing trial.

It is clear that Grenville sought to strengthen the role that Britain played in regulating colonial trade. The predicted revenues expected from the Sugar Act largely failed to address the British debt or the cost of the expanding empire. In the fifteenth resolution to Parliament announced in March, Grenville introduced not only the resolves which constituted the Sugar Act, but also the possibility of another duty—a direct tax on the colonies. Grenville suggested, “It may be proper to charge certain stamp duties in the said colonies and plantations.”\textsuperscript{xvi} Although postponed for another year, the proposal for the Stamp Act became a law by March 1765, forcing the colonists to address it. The Act prescribed taxes for a number of legal documents, customs documents, diplomas, newspapers, pamphlets, even playing cards and dice. All printed materials required specific stamped parchment paper purchased from colonial stamp distributors.\textsuperscript{xvii} Unlike the Sugar Act, largely a merchant’s burden, nearly every colonist faced the possibility of the burdensome duties of the Stamp Act at some point.

As the probability of stamp duties levied in the colonies became more plausible, colonists believed that their implementation violated the very nature of the relationship between Great Britain and the colonies. The nature of that betrayal found roots in the question that many people,
British and American alike, attempted to answer time after time in the coming years: did the sovereignty of Parliament imply the right to directly tax the colonies? Grenville recognized that the proposal of the Stamp Act sparked controversy within Parliament itself.\textsuperscript{viii} However, he appealed to the notion that Parliament, as an authority, could levy duties on the colonies. According to Edmund S. Morgan, Parliament “was not likely to reverse its opinion when asked to exercise the right.”\textsuperscript{ix} Parliament’s assertion of its authority added another element to the Stamp Act. Aside from raising a revenue, the Act reinforced the notion that Parliament held sway over the colonies’ charters.\textsuperscript{xx} From the colonists’ perspective, the Stamp Act reflected disregard of the very nature of colonial assemblies and representative government as a whole. Since the founding of their colonial charters, assemblies had acquired some level of home rule. Each colony, whether headed by a royal governor or a popularly-elected one, enjoyed the right to administer itself. Due to the absence of colonial representation in Parliament, this became the only method by which English citizens living in the colonies found representation by a governing body.

While introducing his intentions to impose stamp duties on the colonies, Grenville half-heartedly gave the opportunity for colonial assemblies to raise money themselves, as opposed to Parliament levying the Stamp Act. In March 1764, Grenville postponed any action regarding stamp duties until Parliament’s next session. The postponed action came as a means “to consult the ease, the interest, and the good will of the colonies … to offer any objections they might have to the tax, or to suggest some more satisfactory tax.”\textsuperscript{x} The colonies, more than willing to submit their own forms of taxation, lacked correspondence from Grenville and his secretaries as to the extent to which their alternative taxes would be sufficient. Neither Grenville nor any person assigned to draft a potential bill provided the assemblies with any instruction. Various assemblies
addressed these grievances to their colonial agents in Parliament, partially the ill-manner in which Grenville announced the opportunity for alternative measures.

These colonial agents met with Grenville at least three times in an attempt to inquire the means necessary for colonial assemblies to devise their own forms of taxation. However, each meeting concluded with the same realization: Grenville, perhaps from the beginning, had no intentions of allowing the colonies to tax themselves, as he willingly withheld information from the colonies preventing them from doing so. Instead of distributing the necessary information, Grenville told the agents during a meeting on May 17, 1764 that the assemblies should instead “signify their assent to such a bill in general.” Grenville also made clear in these meetings that Parliament felt little sympathy, and that petitions or protests concerning financial responsibilities would not be tolerated. It became apparent to the colonists that formal means of voicing opposition to Parliament were not going to change the nature of the deteriorating relationship. If the colonists wished to stand firmly behind what they regarded as important values of the British Constitution, such as taxation under clear representation, unprecedented measures must take place. Over the course of several months, these measures incited both resistance and unity within the colonies.

The passage of the Stamp Act resulted in the first collective resistance movement in the American colonies. Long before discussions about colonial taxation began, colonists implemented lasting traditions of exerting civil authority when formal means of policing failed to defend local interests. Uprisings, though, as Pauline Maier put it, “were extra-institutional in character more often than they were anti-institutional.” They acted in part due to the absence of a law, or when local leaders’ ability within the constraints of the law failed to cope with a problem. No matter the cause, because interpreting the legality of the uprisings found no
precision in practice, Parliament did not respond with any legal action. Should a conflict emerge, distinguishing which party exerted force lawfully and which did not, proved difficult. xxv

However, only conflicts that truly needed them allocated such means. The more authority exerted, the more it spoke of the shortcomings on behalf of a government. xxvi

During the 1760s, the notion of citizens with the right to exert force became a strong unifying element in the colonies, both in the North and South. The use of extra-legal authority paralleled the political philosophies of those who considered themselves “Real Whigs.” A definitive principle in Whig justification concerning uprisings consisted of people, creators of government, were free to reclaim political authority if lost to failed magistrates. xxvii Although followers of Whig ideology believed in the exertion of force, its purpose consisted of strengthening current governments—preventing them from further decay. Force used as an initial response to tyranny found no acceptance. According to Whig ideology, every means possible to rid spoilages in government found primacy before resorting to force. Submission was the sign of good government, and the end result for which people should fight. In the context of the Stamp Act, however, not many people in the colonies wanted to fight for submission under this particular act of government. Colonial assemblies originally pursued the route of appeasing the “Real Whigs.” Through petitions and protests sent to their colonial agents and presented to Parliament, they met with no real address or debate whatsoever. A different approach voicing opposition was needed.

The initial stirrings of resentment toward Parliamentary authority came in part with elite leadership. Before massive crowds would take the streets, privileged men took to the halls of colonial assemblies beginning the resistance movement that gained momentum in the following months. In Virginia, May 1765, during a meeting of the House of Burgesses, the newest member
of the body, Patrick Henry, waited until the majority of Assemblymen were on their way back to their plantations before he began the great debate. He then submitted a series of resolutions against the Stamp Act to the House, citing that colonists carried as many rights as if they were subjects living in Great Britain, and that taxation by colonial assemblies would be less burdensome on the people, given that assemblies knew what their constituents could bear. When leaked to the press, the four original resolves now contained an additional three resolves more radical in language. These additional resolutions claimed that Virginia’s assembly had the sole right to tax colonists, its habitants were not bound to yield to any form of taxation not created by the assembly, and that any person sympathizing with Parliament’s measures of taxation would be deemed “an enemy to His Majesty’s colony.” These resolves served as a catalyst for other colonies to write their own resolutions, and publish them in various newspapers. Every other colony, aside from Georgia, New Hampshire, and North Carolina, produced resolves against the Stamp Act. Some resolutions, such as ones in Rhode Island, contained even more radical language.

Opponents to the Stamp Act not only objected to the taxation but also derailed the weaknesses in arguments defending the Act. None was as widely read as the pamphlet written by Maryland lawyer and member of the Governor’s Council, Daniel Dulany. Although not printed until October, his famous piece Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies became the most popular form of literature in the colonies criticizing Parliament’s defense of the Stamp Act. Dulany attempted to prove Grenville wrong, who ironically shared the belief that no one should bear taxation without their consent or the consent of their representatives. Dulany and Greenville disagreed on the notion of virtual representation—the idea on which Grenville rested the legitimacy of the Stamp Act. Throughout his pamphlet,
Dulany intentionally avoided challenging Parliament’s authority as far as the more radical writers, but the idea of virtual representation prompted a strong response.

Not bound to any one constituent, virtual representation assumed that a legislator represented the entire nation. In other words, no individual actually bound legislators, but “virtually” everyone bound them.\(^{xxxii}\) Furthermore, Dulany compared taxation without consent to thievery, writing, “[T]o give property, not belonging to the owner, is such evident and flagrant injustice, in ordinary cases, that few are hardly enough to avow it.”\(^{xxxiii}\) Dulany’s writings resonated with many colonists who rarely, if ever, felt a direct connection to Parliament.

By August 1765, after various resolves circulated through newspapers across the country, riots against stamp distributors in almost every colony proved the most effective way to evade the Act’s implementation, which was set for November. Governor Bernard of Massachusetts credited the circulation of resolves as the primary instigator for resistance, writing that “[T]he publishing [of] the Virginia resolves, proved an alarm bell to the disaffected.”\(^{xxxiv}\) In other words, the circulation of the various resolves stirred up profound resentment toward the Act for locals affected by the duties imposed on items used in their daily lives. The violence began in Boston on the morning of August 14 when at five o’clock “the effigy of a gentleman sustaining a very unpopular office, viz. that of Stamp Master”\(^{xxxv}\) was found hanging in a tree outside of his home. The effigy represented Andrew Oliver, the newly appointed stamp distributor for the colony. The Sheriff, along with a group of men, attempted to take down the effigy, “but could not do it without imminent danger of their lives.”\(^{xxxvi}\) Shortly after the sun came up, a crowd of South Enders pulled the image down and paraded it to Oliver’s dock, where a new brick building, suspected as the new Stamp Office, was demolished and “thoroughly effected in about half an hour.”\(^{xxxvii}\) After the mob returned to inflict damage onto his house and garden, Oliver responded
to the mob by saying the next day that he “absolutely declined having any concern in that office.”

As the events contributed too much discussion around the city in the following days, it became apparent that the Oliver riots were unique and well-organized compared to former uprisings. The effigy burnings and the looting of the Oliver home captured public attention, and for the most part people supported the mob’s actions and participated in the mob action.

The possibility of evading the Stamp Act came with the notion that without stamp distributors to implement the tax, no one would enforce the Act. Other colonies soon followed Massachusetts’ example. On August 27, the Rhode Island distributor resigned and two days later the Maryland distributor, Zachariah Hood, fled to New York out of fear from seeing the hanging of his effigy. On September 19, a crowd met Jared Ingersoll in Wethersfield, Connecticut to demand his resignation. He first “refused to comply, but it was insisted upon, that he should resign his office of Stamp-Master, so disagreeable to his countrymen.” He eventually capitulated, and after reading his resignation aloud Ingersoll “went into a tavern, and dined with several of the company.” Ingersoll, targeted for his associations with the Act and its administration, not for his connections to the British government in general, feared little after his resignation.

The New York riots of October 31 and November 1, 1765 saw a great number of seamen participating in them, making up one fourth to one fifth of the rioters. Following the war, thousands of discharged sailors relied heavily on the shipping industries of New England for employment. The post-war Acts that threatened these industries also threatened their livelihood. Boycoting efforts, intended to hurt British businessmen, affected these sailors as well. Instead of acting out against New England merchants, they opposed England’s new attitude on colonial
Most of the riots throughout the colonies consisted of burning distributors in effigy, staging mock funerals, tearing down buildings (future offices and colonial agents’ homes), and posing threats towards the Act’s sympathizers.

If physical resistance failed to assert the colonists’ opposition effectively, a collective effort of boycotting British goods did not. Boycotting efforts began as early as 1764 with the passage of the Sugar Act. Merchants, hit heaviest by the Act, urged colonists to replace British manufacturers with American. They attempted to dissuade women from wearing expensive dresses imported from Europe. Widows should stop wearing luxurious black gloves to mark the mourning process, and American brew should be preferred to British ale, for example. After the Sugar Act passed, a post-war depression settled in the colonies. The effects of it rippled to England as well, and the boycotts resulting from the Act only made things worse. With the implementation of the Stamp Act, merchants again saw an opportunity to display economic resistance. The greatest account of merchants uniting together to combat the Act occurred when a group of two hundred New York merchants met in October of 1765 to discuss a solution on their behalf. After deliberation, they published their own resolves intended for their business correspondents in England. Regarding orders sent to Great Britain, they resolved to “direct their correspondents not to ship them, unless the Stamp Act be repealed” and that “orders already sent home, shall be countermanded by the very first conveyance.” It is difficult to determine the success of those boycotts, but proof of their effects exist in two different writings from London merchants.

The first one, a petition written to Parliament in January of 1766, tells of the hardships that creditors and merchants experienced due to the decline of trade after the passage of the Stamp Act. The petition informed Parliament “that this commerce, so beneficial to the state, and
so necessary for the support of multitudes, now lies under such difficulties and discouragement, that nothing less than its utter ruin is apprehended, without the immediate interposition of Parliament.” Colonists, who collectively owed “several million sterling” declared to business correspondents that “it is not in their power, at present, to make good their engagements, alleging, that the taxes and restrictions laid upon them” were too burdensome to pay off their debts. The second proof of the boycotts’ effects is a letter from the Committee of London Merchants addressed to the Lord Mayors in England, dated March 6, 1766. The merchants called a general meeting to address “the present state of the British Trade to North America, and the Prospect of increasing embarrassments, which threaten the loss of our depending Property there and even to annihilate the Trade itself.” Colonists, ironically, capitalized on the delicate state of Britain’s financial crisis—the catalyst for passing such Acts in the first place.

The formation of the Stamp Act Congress in 1765 proved the most significant step toward colonial unification in the years leading up to the American Revolution. The concept of the Congress, devised in June 1765, followed a lively debate in the Massachusetts Assembly that focused on the Stamp Act and other “objectionable legislation enacted by Parliament.” Following the debate, Assembly members decided that “letters be forthwith prepared and transmitted to the respective speakers of the several Houses of Representatives and Burgesses in the colonies” in order to conduct a meeting “to consult together on the present circumstances of the colonies, and the difficulties to which they are and must be reduced. …” Sent on June 8, the Speakers of each of the colonial assemblies received drafts of the circulating letters advising them to select a committee of representatives to participate in a convention. The convention’s organizers sought an October 7 beginning date, for a meeting that was set to take place in New York. It is important to note that the concept of this Congress began after Henry passed his
resolves in Virginia in May. However, virtually no one outside of the colony knew of their
existence as their publication came in late June, approximately three weeks after the
Massachusetts Assemblymen began to circulate the letters. This shows a growing opposition
movement within the colonies, yet absent of a collective unity that the convention hoped to
build.

The delegates first sought to take “into Consideration the Rights & Privileges of ye
British American Colonists with the several inconveniences and hardships to which they are and
must be subjected by the Operation of several late Acts of Parliament.”¹⁴ They advocated three
main issues: trials by juries, the right to tax themselves, and the reduction of the authority
bestowed upon admiralty courts. They debated for the first ten sessions before agreeing on a list
of declarations that reflected their “Humble Opinion respecting the most essential Rights, and
Liberties of the Colonists.”¹⁵ The declarations reflected their belief that they held the rights of
Englishmen who lived within Great Britain, including the absence of taxation without their
consent given their lack of representation in Parliament. The right to a trial by jury, self-taxation,
and a claim of loyalty to the British crown were also included in the resolves.¹⁵ Delegates sought
to strengthen and uphold what they regarded as values of the British Constitution; they saw
themselves not as revolutionaries, but as English subjects fighting to preserve their endangered
rights. This reinforced the Whig ideology that stressed purifying government, not dismantling it
altogether.

The Stamp Act Congress fostered a sense of colonial unity that transcended regional
boundaries. Although they did not know each other and relatively unaware of the problems the
Stamp Act caused in other colonies, members traded information thus growing an awareness of
similarities concerning their situations. They identified a common target for their protests—the
wrongful acts of Parliament. It allowed colonists to come together to express dissatisfaction in a singular voice, one more powerful than individual expression. According to C.A. Weslager, it seemed obvious “that the colonies would accomplish more by acting in concert instead individually, that it would appear to have been the natural course to follow. But in the context of the period it was an innovative approach … and the originator of the idea of an intercolonial congress made a significant contribution to American political history.”

As momentum continued to grow in opposition to the Act, colonists recognized a need for communication and to coordinate a movement of opposition. In Boston, during the onset of the August 14 riot, a group called the “Loyal Nine” created and hanged the effigies of Andrew Oliver and made him resign from the office of Stamp Master. Social clubs like the Loyal Nine organized outside of New England, as well. The “Charleston Fire Company,” comprised of local volunteer firemen, resisted the Stamp Act in South Carolina, and members of the Dutch Reformed Church made up a resistance group based in Albany. They viewed themselves as “sons of liberty” opposing what they regarded as unconstitutional acts of Parliament. The need for unity among the groups emerged independently. According to some scholars, New York held the role as the chief instigator for such a movement. Towards the end of 1765, organized meetings took place in country fields in order to accommodate the large crowds wanting to join the opposition. By early 1766, associations of the Sons of Liberty emerged in both Maryland and New Jersey. They sought not only to establish correspondences with other colonies, but also to organize associations at the town, county, and colonial levels. Southern colonies, such as Virginia and North Carolina, saw a more gradual emergence of similar associations. They shared correspondences with those in the North, as well.
The movement to unite people who identified with the Sons of Liberty transcended both economic class and gender. Those who led the group were typically of the mercantile and professional classes, but laborers, making up the majority of their ranks, worked extremely close with the merchants and lawyers that lead them. The Sons of Liberty generally consisted of artisan workers, shopkeepers, day laborers, carpenters, seamen, smiths, and other members of the working class. The British Parliament’s infringement of their rights united this diverse group of workers. This, of course, allowed the Sons of Liberty to win a mass base as they strove to convert an entire population into a body that sympathized with the group’s motives. New York groups founded by independent tradesmen who worked for their status contrasted with the groups in Rhode Island that prominent men had formed. The Sons also did not exclude women from their ranks. They founded their own auxiliary in the Daughters of Liberty—women permitted to sit in the same meetings and celebrate the same victories as their male counterparts. Including women proved absolutely crucial in the efforts of nonimportation. Women wove homespun cloth for clothing, drafted the standards of the nonimportation agreements themselves, and refused to let their families consume any of the boycotted items. The Sons of Liberty welcomed them with open arms in their movement. Samuel Adams often stated, “With the ladies on our side, we can make every Tory tremble.”

After the repeal of the Stamp Act in March of 1766, and despite a growing sense of unification, these associations had every intention to disband. Their very purpose lay in opposition to what they regarded as Parliament’s extra-legal assault on their rights. Once Parliament repealed the Act, most abandoned their associations, but leaders in New York warned, “[I]f hereafter any attempts should be made to deprive us of our invaluable Freedom, or Religious Rights,” they would “not be backward in joining … with Hearts and Hands to oppose
such Measures.” The events of the following years proved that these levels of unity and resistance lasted longer than they anticipated, as colonial opposition awakened again over the Townshend duties in 1767. A continuing and growing opposition only further strengthened the associations’ causes, preparing the colonies for revolution.

Notes

6 Ibid., 236.
7 *New Commission of the Governor of Quebec; and Other Instruments of Authority, Derived From the Crown Relative to America*, London, 1779, 17.
8 *New Commission of the Governor of Quebec*, 19-20.
9 *Journals of the House of Commons*, XXIX, March 7, 1763, 530.
10 *Journals of the House of Commons*, XXIX, 506 (February 23, 1763).
11 Ibid., 432 (February 3, 1763).
13 *Journals of the House of Commons*, XXIX, 934 (March 10, 1764).
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 940 (March 12, 1764).
16 Ibid., 935 (March 10, 1764).
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 64-65.
21 Ibid., 56.
22 Jasper Mauduit to the Massachusetts Assembly, May 26, 1764, in Morgan, *Prologue to Revolution*, 27.
23 Charles Garth to the Committee of Correspondence of the South Carolina Assembly, June 5, 1764. *Prologue to Revolution*, 28.
26 Ibid., 26.
27 Ibid., 28.
30 Newport Mercury, June 24, 1765.
31 A complete list of colonial resolves is printed in Morgan, *Prologue to Revolution*, 50-62.
33 Daniel Dulany, *Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies, for the Purpose of*
34 Bernard to the Board of Trade, August 15, 1765. The Papers of Francis Bernard II, 301.
35 Supplement to the Boston Gazette, August 19, 1765.
36 Bernard to the Board of Trade, August 15, 1765.
37 Supplement to the Boston Gazette, August 19, 1765.
38 Ibid.
40 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 55.
41 Maryland Gazette, October 10, 1765.
42 Ibid.
45 Morgan and Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, 33.
46 Ibid., 32-33, 65.
47 Pennsylvania Gazette, November 7, 1765.
48 Journals of the House of Commons, XXX, 462 (January 17, 1766).
49 Ibid.
50 “The Committee of London Merchants to the Lord Mayors in England,” March 6, 1766, in Prologue to Revolution, 129.
53 Ibid., 198.
54 Ibid., 200.
55 Ibid., 201-202.
57 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 85.
58 Ibid., 82.
59 Ibid., 81.
61 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 87.
62 Foner, History of the Labor Movement, 36.
63 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 111.