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4-1968

Volume 2, Number 2

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Recommended Citation

"Volume 2, Number 2." (Apr 1968).

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**CO-OPERATIVE RESEARCH
ON DEWEY PUBLICATIONS**

The Dewey Newsletter

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Volume II Number 2 April 1968

DEWEY'S TRIBUTE TO F. C. S. SCHILLER We are delighted to reprint here an item recently published for the first time in the *Transactions* of the Charles S. Peirce Society (Volume III, pages 51-54, Fall 1967), entitled "F. C. S. Schiller: An Unpublished Memorial by John Dewey." In connection with the prefatory remarks of Allan Shields, Dewey students will be interested in the comments of Horace M. Kallen upon reading the tribute:

I was responsible for the Memorial meeting to Schiller held by the *Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences* at the New School in 1937, and got Dewey to speak in remembrance. Mrs. Schiller was present. She was on her way back to Los Angeles and was somewhat disturbed by Dewey's suggestion that Schiller's failure to publish his logical studies earlier (he had been lecturing on both "Formal Logic" and "Logic for Use" for many years before he committed the lectures to print, and in the meantime the rise of logistics displaced Schiller's mode of approach in the attention of the pundits) resulted in these books not receiving the response and exerting the influence their originality at the time merited. I have an idea that Mrs. Schiller asked for a copy of Dewey's remarks, which were impromptu, and that Dewey wrote the statement published by the Peirce Society after refreshing his memory of Schiller's works and giving his statements a more finished form. I have the impression that not only had Dewey never met Schiller, but that he had hardly read him.

* * * *

F. C. S. Schiller: An Unpublished Memorial by John Dewey

After the death of F. C. S. Schiller in 1937 John Dewey delivered the following statement at the New School for Social Research on November 28, 1937. This brief, memorial reminiscence was found among the literary remains of Schiller, located in the Special Collections Division of the library at the University of California at Los Angeles. Although it is not certain, it is probable that Dewey sent his copy to Mrs. Schiller, who placed it among her husband's papers.

Certain basic similarities between Dewey's and Schiller's logical concerns are well known. This statement of Dewey shows an intimate and detailed knowledge of Schiller's major logical writings, FORMAL LOGIC, and LOGIC FOR USE. The

extent to which Schiller's work influenced Dewey has yet to be established. It may have been considerable.

One curiosity in this regard might be mentioned. In 1950, the writer distributed a questionnaire among international philosophers inquiring about Schiller and his philosophic writings. Dewey replied that he had never known Schiller personally, and had never met him.

ALLAN SHIELDS, San Diego State College

New School for Social Research November 28, 1937
by John Dewey

It is fitting that in a conference with the aims of the present gathering, some reference should be made to the life-work of F. C. S. Schiller. I cannot present anything worthy of the name of a Memorial but it is fitting that some explicit acknowledgment should be made on this occasion to the work which he did both in Great Britain and this country in loosening the strait jacket in which Aristotelian logic had confined scientific method. Mr. Schiller's work was not indeed directed so much against the original Aristotelian logic as against its later reduction into a purely formalistic scheme so that it followed that his lively polemic was aimed also at every attempt to isolate form from matter. He continually urged on one hand that this divorce rendered logic futile since it precluded any application in actual problems, and on the other hand that the formal logicians were constantly involved in self-contradictions since they were obliged to introduce references to considerations lying outside their professed domain.

Schiller's first noteworthy essay in logic showed his sensitiveness to contemporary intellectual movements. The idea that axioms are postulates, are resolutions and demands, rather than self-evident truths or necessary first truths, has become since he wrote more or less of a commonplace. Its recognition among professional philosophers was a novelty when Schiller first put forward his essay. I shall not make any attempt to follow out the main strands of his logical thinking. But some mention must be made of two principles which appear on almost every page of his writings on logic: the Principles of content and of purpose.

The canon of the necessity of context [*sic*] is fundamentally a derivative from his conviction that *pure form* is meaningless; that form is always the form of a subject-matter. The negative phase of his criticism is that purely formal logic is condensed to inconsistency since it defines judgment and propositions in terms of truth-falsity while "truth" and "falsity" are meaningless apart from subject-

matter. Its positive expression is the significance of relevancy. The two phases are, of course, necessarily connected. As Schiller wrote, "The central doctrine of the most prevalent logic still consists in a flat denial of Relevance and of all the ideas associated with it."

The principle of relevancy is bound up with that of purpose. For relevance involves selection, discrimination, and there must be some ground on which selection is made. Subject-matter which is relevant is such because it is relevant to the purpose which controls inquiry; for the sake of which observation, experimentation and reasoning are conducted. There were two main considerations, I think, which attracted Schiller to James. One was the freedom of the latter from the conventions which limited philosophy when James wrote--the extent of which cannot be appreciated today unless one goes back and steep himself to some extent in the prevailing temper of the time. The other and more definitely philosophical moving force was the emphasis James placed upon purpose and upon practical ends in determining all intellectual operations.

That Schiller preferred to call his general philosophy humanism rather than pragmatism may, I think, be accounted for by the fact that he was one who shared in the earlier movement which went by the name of Personal Idealism. Idealism of some sort was the almost dominant philosophy of that period. Personal idealism tended to accept the doctrine of the primacy of the mental and psychical, but it revolted against the|prevalingly rationalistic temper in which the mental was interpreted. In consequence of this rationalism, genuine moral values seemed to it to be destroyed as much by rationalistic idealism as by mechanical materialism. In his Preface to *LOGIC FOR USE*, Schiller says he has substituted Voluntarism for Humanism "in order to sharpen the antithesis to the old logics."

In the Preface to the more negative and critical work, *FORMAL LOGIC*, Schiller expressed the hope that every work might be "provisional and succeed in superseding the need for its own existence." The extent to which it has been superseded upon one side in fact is a measure of the success of his work, while upon the other side the *way* in which it has been superseded is probably a measure of his failure to accomplish what he wished to accomplish. Schiller, because of his experience as a teacher of logic at Oxford, felt acutely that logic had remained in the curriculum as a *literary* subject, and hence "exempted logicians from the salutary study of scientific knowing." That remark could hardly be made about the present status of logical theory. On the other hand, the general temper of our day is

marked by revulsion against earlier mentalism and subjectivism. The persistence of that strain in Schiller accounts, I think, for the fact that while logic has greatly changed, it has not changed precisely in the direction he desired.

The change is such, indeed, that it makes it easy, too easy, to slight the great importance of what Schiller did. He was one of the first to insist upon the intimate connection of logic with actual scientific work. He was a pioneer in insisting upon the central place of *meaning* and its primacy over the conception of truth. His emphasis upon content, relevance and purpose are as much needed today as when he wrote. We may not agree with the dominantly psychological interpretation he gave these categories. But those who do not agree nevertheless owe him a great debt, and I feel it a privilege to offer these inadequate words to a gathering whose chief purpose is to assert the claims of methods of inquiry which express free intelligence. It is as a representative of free intelligence that I like to think of him.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS Two more notes about doctoral dissertations on John Dewey: first, a letter from Lowell Nissen at the University of Arkansas, "You listed my doctoral dissertation in a recent issue of the Newsletter. It was revised and published in late 1966 by Mouton. I'm afraid it is rather critical of Dewey. At any rate, I am sending you a copy for your files." We received *JOHN DEWEY'S THEORY OF INQUIRY AND TRUTH* (The Hague, Paris: Mouton and Co., 1966. 112 pp.) soon thereafter and, once again, send thanks to Mr. Nissen for his gracious gesture.

Second, overlooking the fact that Gérard Deledalle's recently published book had also originally been prepared as a doctoral dissertation, we omitted it from our earlier listing of dissertations. Our apologies to Professor Deledalle, and for Dewey students, we include herewith a translation of the abstract (the book has not been translated into English):

Gérard Deledalle, *THE IDEA OF EXPERIENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY*. Paris: University Presses of France, 1967. 570 pp.

This work, originally presented as a doctoral dissertation at the Sorbonne, can be read in several ways.

First, with respect to the approach used, it is a horizontal study of an idea--the idea of experience--in the work of an author, John Dewey, who, passing from idealism to naturalism, maintained all the while that his philosophy had experience as its single object.

Second, as a chronological treatment of Dewey's work, this study traces the development of Dewey's thought from 1882

to 1950. It became apparent very early in the study that any other manner--synthetic or global--of presenting Dewey's philosophy would have led to interpreting diverse periods in Dewey's philosophy in the context of the one period considered most important, however one defines that importance: the last state of his philosophy (philosophy of transaction); the label history has assigned to his philosophy (instrumentalism); or the permanence of an early influence--recognized (T. H. Green's philosophy of self-realization) or hidden (Trendelenburg's philosophy of "constructive movement"). But John Dewey's philosophy of experience paralleled from the outset the continuity of his own experience. It is that experience that one must relive with him if one wants truly to comprehend John Dewey's philosophy.

Third, because he was born in 1859, the same year Darwin's *ORIGIN OF SPECIES* appeared, and died in 1952, Dewey lived the long history of American thought from the introduction of Hegelianism in the United States before the Civil War to logical positivism and analytical philosophy before and after the Second World War, passing through the great turmoil over evolution as well as those movements that were specifically American--pragmatism, neo-Realism, critical realism, and naturalism. Moreover, because he was a philosopher of commitment, a public figure, Dewey also exercised considerable influence: from 1904 to 1945 he was the thought-master and conscience-director of America. The history of all of American thought is engraved in Dewey's work.

Finally, the analysis of Dewey's writings, article by article, book by book, in the chronological order of their publication and in the perspective of American philosophy, reveals numerous facts hitherto unperceived or forgotten that should be helpful to historians of psychology, pedagogy, and philosophy, as well as numerous points of view that are stimulating for the logician, the moralist, and the metaphysician. As a matter of fact, this analysis leads to a more precise view of the respective contributions of Dewey and the pioneers of modern psychology: Stanley Hall, James, Mead, Baldwin, Münsterberg, Watson; the exact place of Dewey's pedagogic work in the vast reform movement of the late nineteenth century; the originality of his logic as compared with that of Hegel, Lotze, Peirce, and all the symbolic logicians stemming from Russell; the meaning of his theory of value in a philosophy of experience which is a committed experience. In short, this analysis stresses the continuing importance of the Deweyan description of experience--without the transcendent, without the phenomenal, without the subject, but a view of experience which is nevertheless creative, esthetic and democratic, even religious.

JOHN DEWEY'S WORKS The careful work of Robert Andresen, Research Assistant at the Dewey Project, with an able assist
IN TRANSLATION from Burton Raimer of the University of Illinois, has resulted in a preliminary tabulation of translations of Dewey's works into all languages. The last count (working from one hundred thirty-nine bibliographic sources, many foreign correspondents, and co-operative librarians)--mid-March, 1968, yielded the following interesting statistics: Number of languages into which Dewey's works have been translated--33; language accounting for largest number of separate items--Japanese, followed by Spanish; number of separate *editions* (not printings) of his major books in other languages--304; number of articles translated, 61.

In alphabetical order, with number of translations in each, the languages in which readers have had access to Dewey are: Arabic, 16; Armenian, 1; Bulgarian, 17; Chinese, 22 (excludes the lectures first published in Chinese); Czechoslovakian, 9; Dutch, 1; Finnish, 1; French, 18; German, 16; Greek, 3; Gujarati, 1; Hebrew, 7; Hindi, 3; Hungarian, 6; Indonesian, 1; Iranian, 5; Italian, 42; Japanese, 63; Kannada, 1; Korean, 7; Latvian, 1; Malayalam, 1; Marathi, 3; Polish, 8; Portuguese, 21; Rumanian, 1; Russian, 13; Serbo-Croatian, 4; Spanish, 54; Swedish, 16; Tamil, 2; Turkish, 8; Urdu, 2.

DEWEY Of interest to Dewey scholars is the current issue of *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, the regular, once-a-year bibliography issue, with a listing of addenda to the *CENTENNIAL BIBLIOGRAPHY* of M. H. Thomas. Just in case some of our readers do not receive or have access to *Studies*, we plan to have these addenda here in the *Newsletter* in our July issue.

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