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<title>2011</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2013 Southern Illinois University Carbondale All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011</link>
<description>Recent documents in 2011</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<lastBuildDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2013 07:20:48 PST</lastBuildDate>
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<title>The Rise of the European Corporate Elite:  Evidence from the network of Interlocking Directorates in 2005 and 2010</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/34</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 22 Jul 2011 08:33:21 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Studies of national networks of interlocking directorates across the globe reveal that since their heydays in the early 1970s, such corporate networks are in decline. During the past decade, there are indications that the cohesion between European corporate boards is actually increasing. However, the financial crisis might have well put a halt to the emerging European corporate network of board interlocks. The return of the nation state in the economic arena in response to the financial and economic crisis might have encouraged European big business to orient themselves towards the national community. Therefore this paper investigates the social organisation of Europe’s corporate elite over the past years. It compares the network of board interlocks between the largest stock listed European firms (the Eurofirst top 300) in 2005 and 2010. The findings show that by 2010, the European network of corporate board interlocks was stronger than five years before. The emerging European corporate network is increasingly becoming established. Whereas the European political elite was unable to counter the financial crisis by a common European approach, Europe is a fait accompli for the corporate elite. An analysis of the robustness of the network, its core, the central directors and the political geography reveals that corporate Europe nevertheless remains the playground of a few, heavily centred in the founding nations of the European Union.</p>

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<author>Eelke M. Heemskerk</author>


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<title>Network Structure, Interracial Contacts, and the Evolution of Social Norms</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/33</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/33</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 28 Jun 2011 10:34:42 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>In this paper I explore the underlying mechanisms of the changes in public discourse with respect to the issue of racial equality that have been observed in the United States over the course of its history, with a particular focus on the changes that occurred in the latter half of the twentieth century.  Specifically, I provide a formal model of social interactions in which agents are assigned to non-homophilic networks, are heterogeneous with respect to preferences for equality between the races, and have preferences both to express their true preferences and to not appear deviant from the group.  In a series of numerical experiments, results indicate that the probability of a transition in norms from an equilibrium around inequality to an equilibrium around equality is increasing in the size of the minority population and decreasing in the size of groups to which individuals are assigned.</p>

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<author>David J. Hendry</author>


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<title>THE TRIAD THAT BINDS: FINANCIAL ANALYSTS AND BOARD INTERLOCKS</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/32</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/32</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jun 2011 07:51:48 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>This study explores the structural embeddedness of board interlocks in financial analysts’ firm coverage ties. Drawing on the theories of triangular ties, I conceptualize the relationship between financial analysts, a focal CEO, and the interlock director as a triad and examine how the positivity or negativity of analyst stock recommendations regarding the focal firm CEO and the interlock directors influence the maintenance of the board interlock ties. The theoretical perspectives and empirical findings of this study suggest that a structural shift from open to closed triad, where the focal firm CEO and the interlock director are followed by a common set of financial analysts, makes dyad members prefer partners with similar, rather than better stock recommendations to avoid unfavorable social comparison and cognitive dissonance.</p>

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<author>Sun Hyun Park</author>


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<title>From Scientific Knowledge to Policy about Climate Change in the Great Lakes: An Analysis of Two-Mode Networks of Co-authored Documents</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/31</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/31</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jun 2011 07:51:45 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Recent work on the knowledge formation of climate change suggests that the set of ideas one holds to be true is influenced by the group of people who interacts with the same social contexts and by the views of authorities recognized by the group. From knowledge formation to political action, the mechanism not only depends upon participators' ability to integrate, but to cooperate with the public interests, policy makers, and other scientists of the verity of these claims.</p>
<p>This study explores how stakeholders in Great Lakes climate change access environmental knowledge in their networks and how that affects their decision-making.  In particular, the networks are defined by others who participate in common knowledge building experiences, public policy conferences and the writing of public documents. We employ two mode network analyses to identify clusters of stakeholders who participate in similar sets of events (Field et al., 2006; Frank et al., 2008), and we map the interactions between actor roles (scientist, policy makers, government agencies) and the focal experiences for knowledge formation (public policy events and documents) to understand how participators form their knowledge about climate change and cooperate with other scientists, governmental/ non-governmental agencies, local/ international policy maker to construct scientific consensus. Results indicate that government agencies and academics co-participate in events, but the two groups wrote papers separately. This suggests that government agents and academics are exposed to similar knowledge bases, but construct knowledge in different experiences. We also found evidence that regionally focused organizations participate in different events than national and state agencies, suggesting they access different forms of knowledge.</p>

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<author>I-Chien Chen et al.</author>


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<title>Skill Specialization and the Formation of Collaboration Networks</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/30</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/30</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jun 2011 07:51:44 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Problem solving and innovation are important in many contexts, including academic research, policy-making, product development, and entrepreneurship. Broadly speaking, innovators come in two varieties: specialists and generalists. Specialists are people who have a deep knowledge of a very narrow subject area. Generalists are people whose knowledge ranges across multiple subject areas. In this paper, I examine the role of skill specialization in collaboration network structure, and individual position in the collaborative community. Using a model of skill specialization and collaboration network formation, I show that as disci- plines become less insular, the collaboration network becomes increasingly domi- nated by a small number of individuals. I compare specialists and generalists with the same number of skills and show that specialists will tend to have more links in the network than generalists with the same number of skills. However, I the show that generalists are more likely than specialists to occupy key central positions in the network.</p>

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<author>Katharine A. Anderson</author>


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<title>Democratic Repression of Non-Violent Activist Groups and the Likelihood of Political Violence</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/29</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/29</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jun 2011 07:38:56 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p><strong></strong>Does silencing a group’s peaceful expression of radical ideology prevent further radicalization and political violence in democracies? How might a democracy’s use of repressive measures against non-violent political dissenters affect the likelihood of subsequent political violence? How do repressed activists groups adapt in a democratic environment? This project investigates how repressive measures are associated with the subsequent likelihood of radicalization and political violence in a democratic context. I argue that when democratic states use repressive measures to constrain the behavior of non-violent activist organizations, the activists resort to informal channels for reorganization and recruitment. These informal channels (such as anonymous web forums, chat rooms and personal friendship networks) are both decentralized and in use by those affiliated with other proscribed groups. When repressed activists adapt by using such informal channels in democracies, their personal networks increasingly overlap with those of individuals affiliated with other proscribed groups, including violent organizations. Thus as social solidarity seekers who are unable to organize openly, once-peaceful activists are more likely to experience radicalization and support or even carry out acts of political violence when they are repressed in democracies. I argue that this phenomenon occurs both domestically and internationally, because the fluidity of informal channels leveraged by repressed activists transcends borders. As a result, proscription of one group domestically can also lead to an unintended consequence of radicalized activist proliferation abroad. To test these arguments, I take advantage of a natural experiment and measure variation in repression of the non-violent Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HBT) across four democratic countries from 2002-2010. Known Islamist organizations are coded on an ordinal scale that differentiates those that are peaceful from those that are violent. Cutting-edge automated text analysis methods are then used to facilitate the extraction of network data from open source materials and archived Islamist web forum posts. After approximating the HBT network, dynamic network analysis is used to measure changes in the organizational affiliations of HBT members over time. Membership affiliations with violent Islamist organizations are expected to increase as a function of repression within democracies. This paper thus combines comparative case study research with cutting edge analytical techniques in order to demonstrate that democratic repression is not only associated with the further radicalization and potential violent behavior of political dissenters, but is also associated with the proliferation of radicalized political dissenters abroad.</p>

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<author>Peter Vining</author>


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<title>Trade Blocs, Interstate Conflict, and the Collective Impact of Economic Integration</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/28</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/28</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 17 Jun 2011 07:44:19 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Economic integration agreements – also called preferential trade agreements or regional trade agreements – have dramatically expanded in scope since World War II.  While the proximate goal of economic integration is to increase commercial exchange between member states, there are strong reasons to believe integration influences relations across economic agreements as well.  I argue that economic agreements foster enclaves of regional interdependence at the expense of multilateral, global interdependence.  As a result, highly central economic agreements are partially insulated from the ill-effects of militarized conflict with other agreement areas.  Furthermore, the coveted markets of highly central trade blocs afford them a degree of economic leverage that increases the effectiveness of non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms.  Ultimately, these dynamics suggest highly central agreements will tend to engage in conflict with other central agreements due to the mutual isolation of said agreements.  Relations between central and marginalized agreements, however, will be more peaceful given the latter’s dependence on access to central agreement markets.  Using eigenvector centrality scores as my primary measure of agreement centrality, I test my theory using a large-N statistical analysis.  I ultimately find support for the notion that dyads with more central agreements are more conflict prone other types of dyads.</p>

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<author>Matthew D. Shaffer</author>


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<title>Could Legislatures Be Structured to Make Pareto Optimal Policy Decisions?</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/27</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/27</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 17 Jun 2011 07:44:17 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Ideological adversaries outside government have sometimes reached consensus on controversial issues — negotiating agreements that all parties have described as meeting their needs. These episodes suggest there may be ways to structure legislatures to reach equivalent results.</p>
<p>For instance, under the Negotiated Rulemaking Acts of 1990 and 1996, most federal agencies, when grappling with a divisive issue, can invite all the interest groups involved to jointly write a regulation on that subject. The process begins with the relevant agency asking each interest group to appoint a spokesperson. The representatives then meet, with the understanding that if, over time, they can negotiate a regulation they all support, the agency will likely adopt it. By this process, opposing interest groups have agreed on regulations for issues such as nuclear waste disposal, student loans, food safety, public housing, and fuel economy standards for cars and trucks.</p>
<p>Participants in negotiated rulemakings have consistently evaluated the outcomes as superior to standard procedures in terms of “economic efficiency” and “cost effectiveness” to the public, costs and benefits to their own interest groups, the “quality of the scientific analysis” and “incorporation of appropriate technology.”</p>
<p>This paper therefore presumes that negotiated rule-making is Pareto superior to conventional policymaking procedures.</p>
<p>We analyze negotiated rulemakings and similar episodes to try to discern what factors make Pareto optimal outcomes likely. Based on these findings, this paper suggests a way to structure legislatures to reach comparable outcomes.</p>

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<author>Sol Erdman</author>


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<title>A Social Network Analysis of Interest Group Contributions and Partisan Behavior in the 2006 House of Representatives</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/26</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/26</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 16 Jun 2011 11:28:51 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>This project examines how interest groups create partisan connections among U.S. House members.  Although the rise of ideologically motivated groups has been identified as a potential cause of legislative partisanship, there is very little research on how interest groups affect the nature of partisan coalitions.  We consider how interest group donation strategies create connections between legislators and how the resulting networks affect the nature of lawmaking in the House.  We use a combination exploratory social network analysis and traditional statistical methods to examine the contribution network and voting behavior of legislators in the 2006 House of Representatives.  The results the interest groups create significant connectivity among legislators, particularly in a way that is consistent with support centralized partisan conflict. However, we find that the consequences of this relationship are complex|it sometimes supports partisan conflict and sometimes discourages it.</p>

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<author>Scott D. McClurg et al.</author>


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<title>Network Polarization</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/25</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/25</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 16 Jun 2011 07:49:08 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Zeev Maoz</author>


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<title>Cross-Pressures and Political Participation</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/23</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/23</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 14 Jun 2011 08:05:04 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Early researchers of political behavior coined the term <em>cross-pressures</em> to describe conflicting influences on individuals' political preferences, and suggested that cross-pressured citizens were less likely to participate in politics. In recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in the relationship between cross-pressures and participation, but a lack of consensus about both the measurement of cross-pressures and their mechanisms has led to a wide array of conflicting results. We aim to bring clarity to this debate by comparing these various measures and mechanisms side-by-side, in order to better understand which pathways show the greatest potential in linking cross-pressures with participation. We consider the effect of both <em>social cross-pressures, </em>which stem from interactions with others in one’s social network, and <em>issue cross-pressures, </em>which arise from holding policy preferences across issues that do not fall along traditional ideological lines.<em> </em>We employ data from the 2000 US presidential election to ascertain how best to quantify each type of cross-pressures, then evaluate which proposed mechanisms show the most promise for explaining the connection between cross-pressures and participation. We find that, when modeled appropriately, both issue and social cross-pressures are associated with decreased participation. Our evidence most strongly supports the notion that both types of cross-pressures make individuals more indifferent between candidates and thus less motivated to participate, but also suggests that the potential social costs involved in more public forms of participation play a role in individuals’ calculations as well.</p>

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<author>Andrew Therriault et al.</author>


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<title>Policy Coordination in an Ecology of Water Management Games</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/22</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/22</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 14 Jun 2011 06:17:28 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>Policy outcomes in all but the simplest policy systems emerge from a complex of ecology of games featuring multiple actors, policy institutions, and issues, and not just single policies operating in isolation.  This paper updates Long's (1958) ecology of games framework with Scharpf's (1997) actor-centered institutionalism to analyze the coordinating roles of actors and institutions on the context of the ecology of water management games in the San Francisco Bay.  Actors participating in multiple institutions are analyzed using exponential random graph models for bipartite networks representing different assumptions about policy behavior, including geographic constraints.  We find that policy coordination is facilitated mostly by Federal and state agencies, and collaborative institutions that span across geographic boundaries.  Network configurations associated with closure show the most significant departures from the predicted model values, consistent with the Berardo and Scholz (2010) "risk hypothesis" that closure is important for solving cooperation problems.</p>

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<author>Mark N. Lubell et al.</author>


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<title>Testing Policy Theory with Statistical Models of Networks</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/21</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 14 Jun 2011 06:17:27 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p><strong>Abstract</strong></p>
<p>This paper presents a conceptual framework for clarifying the network hypotheses embedded in policy theories and how they relate to macro-level political outcomes and micro-level political behavior.  We then describe the role of statistical models of networks for testing these hypotheses, including the problem of operationalizing theoretical concepts with the parameters of statistical models.  Examples from existing policy research are provided and potential extensions are discussed.  This paper is forthcoming as the introduction to a special issue of the Policy Studies Journal on statistical models of policy networks.</p>

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<author>Mark N. Lubell et al.</author>


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<title>Is Influence Mightier Than Selection? Forging Agreement in Discussion Networks During a Campaign</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/20</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 13 Jun 2011 07:09:10 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>To what extent do social networks shape a person's vote choice? Using data on political networks gathered during a novel, multi-wave panel study conducted during the 2010 election cycle in the UK, we argue that although people may choose to discuss politics more often with those who hold similar political views, remaining disagreements in political discussion networks can still have a substantial impact on vote choice. Our study is the first large scale, general population sample survey to track changes in an individual's named political discussion partners over the course of an election campaign, and thus provides a unique opportunity to study the simultaneous processes of selection and influence in campaign-related political discussion. We use these data to identify two social processes at work during the 9 months prior to the election: "selection'', or the likelihood that people choose discussion partners based on their political views, and "influence'', the convergence of views between discussion partners. We find limited evidence that people select like-minded political discussants, but clear support for social influence on vote choice.</p>

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<author>Meredith Rolfe et al.</author>


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<title>The Politics of Communist Economic Reform: Soviet Union and China</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/19</link>
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<pubDate>Sat, 11 Jun 2011 08:53:17 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>John F. Padgett</author>


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<title>Social Network Hierarchy and Rational Group Decision Making: An</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/18</link>
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<pubDate>Sat, 11 Jun 2011 07:33:21 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Sean Richey</author>


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<title>Networks of Mobilization: Student Involvement in a Municipal Election</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/17</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 10 Jun 2011 08:09:20 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>An enduring issue in the study of political participation is the extent to which political awareness and engagement are socially or individually motivated.  We address these issues in the context of a municipal election which generated a high level of political engagement on the part of college students for whom the election was relevant.  An effort was made to interview all these students using an on-line survey, and the students were asked to provide information on their friendship networks.  The paper demonstrates that awareness and engagement are not simply a consequence of individually defined interests and awareness, but rather that individuals are informed and engaged based on their locations within structured networks of social interaction.</p>

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<author>R Huckfeldt et al.</author>


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<title>Competition in Collaborative Networks?</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/16</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 10 Jun 2011 08:09:17 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>This paper provides a framework for the study of a whole network. I review and operationalize network level variables that may impact the outputs from a network. The author asks do structural relationships of a network impact the work of a network?</p>

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<author>Josie Gatti</author>


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<title>Networks and Language in the 2010 Election</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/15</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 09 Jun 2011 07:34:24 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>The midterm (2010) election in the U.S. presented a unique opportunity to study the online social media strategy of various political groups. Although candidates had previously leveraged social media, the prevalence of use during this election allows us to study a significant percentage of candidates and a novel glimpse into their networks and messaging. In combination, the networks and associated content reflect positioning of candidates both structurally and in framing in relation to other politicians. In our work, we study the use of Twitter by House, Senate and gubernatorial candidates during the midterm elections in the U.S. Our data includes almost 700 candidates and over 460k tweets that they produced in the 3.5 years leading to the elections. We utilize graph and text mining techniques to analyze differences between Democrats, Republicans and Tea Party candidates, and suggest a novel use of language modeling for estimating content cohesiveness. Our findings show significant differences in the usage patterns of social media, and suggest conservative candidates used this medium more effectively, conveying a coherent message and maintaining a dense graph of connections. Despite the lack of party leadership, we find Tea Party members display both structural and language‐based cohesiveness. Finally, we investigate the relation between network structure, content and election results by creating a proof‐of‐concept model that extends incumbency models to predict candidate victory.</p>

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<author>Avishay Livne et al.</author>


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<title>Local Connections: Electoral Institutions, Social Networks, and Local Politicians in a Developing Democracy</title>
<link>http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/13</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/pnconfs_2011/13</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 08 Jun 2011 07:14:15 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>This paper explores the impacts of electoral institutions on citizens’ social networks and political engagement, using the case of Brazil. Brazil’s combination of open-list proportional representation and extreme multipartism leads to high numbers of connections between citizens and local politicians and activists. Survey data from a 2008 city council race reveal that a very high percentage of respondents know both politicians and activists. Such connections serve as an important source of political socialization and mobilization. Using coarsened exact matching, I show that these ties affect campaign learning, turnout, and clientelistic dispositions, and that they often have a more powerful effect than do respondents’ closest discussants. This paper thus illuminates a hitherto unrecognized consequence of Brazil’s much-studied and distinctive institutional arrangements, while at the same time developing a new framework for theorizing and measuring the ways in which citizens’ networks incorporate politicians.</p>

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<author>Amy E. Smith</author>


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