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CHRISTIANITY AND PATRIOTISM.[1]

BY COUNT LEO TOLSTOI.

[CONTINUED.]

VII.

At one time, patriotism was necessary for the creation and the defence of strong States composed of heterogeneous populations. But as soon as Christian enlightenment internally transformed and gave to one and all of these States the same foundation, patriotism not only became superfluous, but it became the only obstacle to that union of the nations for which they had been prepared by Christianity.

The patriotism of our time is a cruel tradition of the past, and it keeps itself alive only by a sort of inertia and by dint of the efforts of the ruling classes, who are conscious that on it rests not only their authority, but also their existence. The patriotism of our time is like the false timbers of a building, which were necessary for the erection of the building, but which have not been removed because they serve a certain purpose to a few men, although they obstruct the use of the building.

Among Christian peoples there cannot exist any cause for strife. It is impossible to imagine even how and why a Russian and a German workingman living in their respective capitals and along their respective frontiers and toiling peacefully at their tasks, should ever suddenly quarrel. Much less it is possible to imagine the enmity of a Kazán peasant towards the German whom he is supplying with wheat and who, in his turn, is furnishing that peasant with scythes and all sorts of agricultural machinery. The same applies to the French, the German, and the Italian workingman. It is even ridiculous to think of any quarrel among men of science and art, or among the men of letters of the different nationalities, since all of them have the same common interests, totally independent of national or the State interests.

The governments cannot afford to let people live in peace, because the main, if not the only excuse for their existence is the pacification of the people and the adjustment of international difficulties. With that end in view, the governments provoke hostile sentiments among the people under the cloak of patriotism and then pretend to labor towards a pacific settlement of the difficulty. They are just like the Gypsies, who, having wrought a horse to a high pitch of excitement by whipping it in its stall and by other nefarious means, drag it out by the halter and pretend that they cannot manage the fiery steed.

We are assured that the governments are very anxious about preserving peace. But how do they preserve it?

People live happily along the shores of the Rhine, holding peaceful intercourse with one another, when suddenly, through the quarrels and intrigues of kings and emperors, a war breaks out, and it becomes necessary for the government of France to bring some of those inhabitants under its rule. Centuries pass, people become used to their new conditions, when again the governments commence to quarrel and go to war on the most trifling pretext, and this time the Germans deem it necessary to bring those inhabitants back under their rule. In this manner hatred is constantly kept up between the French and the Germans. Again, the Germans and the Russians are living happily along their respective frontiers, exchanging peacefully the products of their labor, when suddenly the very institutions which exist for securing the welfare of the people, begin to quarrel, and to bicker, and, for want of something better to do, and to gain a mere trivial point, or to humiliate an adversary, institute a tariff war which does not affect them in any way, but from which the people seriously suffer.

I mention these last two examples of governmental action, which have had the design of exciting mutual hatred among nations, because they are of a very recent date. There is not, however, in the whole range of history a single war which was not brought on by the governments alone, without any reference to the popular interests, to which even a successful war is always harmful.

The governments assure their people that they are threatened by a foreign invasion, or are menaced by internal foes, and that their only salvation is in an implicit obedience to the government. Every government justifies its existence and its outrages, saying that without it the people would fare worse. Having convinced the people that they are in danger, it is an

[1] Translated from the Russian by Paul Borger.

easy task for the governments to keep the people in subjugation. After gaining a mastery over its own people, the government compels it to attack another people. In this manner the people are led to believe that they are in danger of a foreign invasion.

Divide et impera. Patriotism in its simplest, clearest, and most undoubted meaning is for rulers nothing else but a means of realising their ambitious and venal ends; for the governed it is a renouncing of human dignity, intelligence, and conscience, and a slavish submission to the rulers. Wherever patriotism is championed, it is preached invariably in that shape. Patriotism is slavery. The advocates of arbitration reason thus: two animals cannot divide their prey without a scuffle. This is the way children and barbarians act. Intelligent men settle their differences by recourse to argument and persuasion and by submitting their disputes to disinterested, intelligent men. This is what the nations of our time ought to do. The logic of it seems correct. The nations of our time have reached a period of enlightenment, they experience no mutual enmity, and they could settle all their differences in a peaceful manner. But its logic is correct only in so far as it applies to the people alone, and provided also that the people are not under the influence of the government. As to people who obey the authorities implicitly, they cannot be wise, because the very act of submission to government is *per se* a sign of the greatest foolishness.

Wherein is the wisdom of men who bind themselves in advance to do everything (including murder) that the authorities may direct—authorities who may have gotten accidentally into that position.

Men who will promise implicit obedience to persons wholly unknown to them in St. Petersburg, Vienna, or Paris, cannot be wise, while the governments, that is, the men possessing governmental authority, are even less wise; for they cannot help abusing their great authority, cannot help having their heads turned by their immense power. For this reason international peace cannot be brought about by means of conventions and arbitrations, as long as there is blind obedience to rulers.

As long as there is patriotism, there will be blind submission, i. e., readiness on the part of the people to obey every measure having in view the defence of their country against some pretended dangers.

On this patriotism stood the power of the French kings before the Revolution; on it was based the might of the Committee of Public Safety after the Revolution. The same patriotism erected Napoleon's power (as Consul and Emperor); on it, after Napoleon's downfall, stood the dominion of the Bourbons, and later that of the Republic and of Louis Philippe, and of the Republic again, and of Bonaparte again, and, lastly, of the Republic. The same patriotism came near placing Boulanger in power.

It is a fearful thing to say, but there has never been a joint outrage of this kind perpetrated by one group of men upon another, but it has been done in the name of patriotism. In the name of patriotism, years ago, the Russians and the French sought to exterminate each other, in its name now the Russians and the French are preparing to assault the Germans. But let wars alone. In the name of patriotism the Russians are crushing the Poles, and the Germans are doing the same with the Slavs; in the name of patriotism the Communists murdered the Versaillists, and *vice versa.*

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

MORALITY INDEPENDENT OF THEOLOGY.

BY GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE.

> "Religion, as dealing with the confessedly incomprehensible, is not the basis for human union, in social, or industrial, or political circles, but only that portion of old religion which is now called moral."
> —*Professor Francis William Newman.*

Bishop Ellicott was the first prelate whom I heard admit (in a sermon to the members of the British Association for the Advancement of Science) that men might be moral from other motives than those furnished by Christianity. Renan says that Justin Martyr "in his *Apology*, never attacks the principle of the empire. He wants the empire to examine the Christian doctrines." A Secularist would have attacked the principle, regarding freedom as of more consequence to progress than any doctrine without it.

Those who seek to guide life by reason are not without a standard of appeal. "Secularism accepts no authority but that of nature, adopts no methods but those of science and philosophy, and respects in practice no rule but that of the conscience, illustrated by the common sense of mankind. It values the lessons of the past, and looks to tradition as presenting a storehouse of raw materials to thought, and in many cases results of high wisdom for our reverence; but it utterly disowns tradition as a ground of belief, whether miracles and supernaturalism be claimed or not claimed on its side. No sacred Scripture or ancient Church can be made a basis of belief, for the obvious reason that their claims always need to be proved, and cannot without absurdity be assumed. The association leaves to its individual members to yield whatever respects their own good sense judges to be due to the opinions of great men, living or dead, spoken or written; as also to the practice of ancient communities, national or ecclesiastical. But it disowns all appeal to such authorities as final tests of truth."[1]

[1] I owe the expression of this passage, whose comprehensiveness and felicity of phrase exceed the reach of my pen, to Professor Francis William Newman.

Morality can be inspired and confirmed by perception of the consequences of conduct. Theology regards free will as the foundation of responsibility. But free will saves no man from material consequences, and diverts attention from material causes of evil and good. Under the free will doctrine the wonder is that any morality is left in the world. It is a doctrine which gives scoundrels the same chance as a saint. When a man is assured that he can be saved when he believes, and that, having free will, he can believe when he pleases, he, as a rule, never does please until he has had his fill of vice, and is about to die,—either of disease or by the hangman. If by the hangman, he is told that, provided he repents before eight o'clock in the morning, he may find himself nestling in Abraham's bosom before nine. Free will is the doctrine of rascalism. It is time morality had other foundation than theology. The relations of life can be made as impressive as ideas of supernaturalism. But in this Christians not only lend no help, they disparage the attempt to control life by reason. When Secularism was first talked of, the President of the Congregational Union, the Rev. Dr. Harris, commended to the Union the words of Bishop Lavington of a century earlier (1750): "My brethren, I beg you will rise up with me against mere moral preaching."[1] A writer of distinction, R. H. Hutton, writing on "Secularism" in the *Expositor* so late as 1881, argues strenuously that moral government is impossible without supernatural convictions. The egotism of Christianity is as conspicuous as that of politics. No ethic is genuine unless it bears the hall-mark of the Church. Secularism does not deny the efficacy of other theories of life upon those who accept them, and only claims to be of use as commending morality on considerations purely human, to those who reject theories purely spiritual.

Any one familiar with controversy knows that Christianity is advertised like a patent medicine which will cure all the maladies of mankind. Everybody who tries reasoned morality is encouraged to condemn it, and is denounced if he commends it.

It is a maxim of Secularism that, wherever there is a rightful object at which men should aim, there is a secular path to it.

Nearly all inferior natures are susceptible of moral and physical improvability, which improvability can be indefinitely advanced by supplying proper material conditions.

Since it is not capable of demonstration whether the inequalities of human condition will be compensated for in another life, it is the business of intelligence to rectify them in this world. The speculative worship of superior beings, who cannot need it, seems a lesser duty than the patient service of known inferior natures and the mitigation of harsh destiny, so that the ignorant may be enlightened and the low elevated.

Christians often promote projects beneficial to men; but are they not mainly incited thereto by the hope of inclining the hearts of those they aid to their cause? Is not their motive proselytism? Is it not a higher morality to do good for its own sake, careless whether those benefited become adherents or not?

Going to a distant town to mitigate some calamity there, will illustrate the principle of Secularism. One man will go on this errand from pure sympathy with the unfortunate; this is goodness. Another goes because the priest bids him; this is obedience. Another goes because the twenty-fifth chapter of Matthew tells him that all such persons will pass to the right hand of the Father; this is calculation. Another goes because he believes God commands him; this is theological piety. Another goes because he is aware that the neglect of suffering will not answer; this is utilitarianism. But another goes on the errand of mercy because it is an immediate service to humanity, knowing that material deliverance is piety and better than spiritual consolation; this is Secularism.

One whose reputation for spirituality is in all the Churches says: "Properly speaking, all true work is religion, and whatsoever religion is not work may go and dwell among the Brahmins, the Antinomians, Spinning Dervishes, or where it will. Admirable was that maxim of the old monks, *Laborare est orare* (Work is worship).[1] In his article on Auguste Comte, Mr. J. S. Mill says he "uses religion in its modern sense as signifying that which binds the convictions, whether to deity or to duty,—deity in the theological sense, or duty in the moral sense. This is the only sense in which a Secularist would employ the term. Religious moralism is a term I might use, since it binds a man to humanity, which religion does not." "Without God," said Mazzini to the Italian workingmen forty years ago,—"without God you may compel, but not persuade. You may become tyrants in your turn; you cannot be educators or apostles." One night, when Mazzini was speaking in this way, in the hearing of Garibaldi, arguing that there was no ground of duty unless based on the idea of God, the General turned round and said: "I am an Atheist. Am I deficient in the sense of duty?" "Ah," replied Mazzini, "you imbibed it with your mother's milk." All around smiled at the quick-witted evasion.

In one sense Mazzini was as atheistic in mind as orthodox Christians. He disbelieved that truth, duty, or humanity could have any vitality unless derived from belief in God. Devout as few men are, in the Church or out of it, yet Mazzini believed alone in God. Dogmas of the Churches were to him as though

[1] *British Banner*, October 27, 1852.

[1] Carlyle, *Past and Present*.

they were not; yet there were times when he seemed to admit that other motives than the one which inspired might operate for good in other minds. In a letter he once addressed to me there occurred this splendid passage:—

"We pursue the same end,—progressive improvement, association, transformation of the corrupted medium in which we are now living, the overthrow of all idolatries, sbams, lies, and conventionalities. We both want man to be, not the poor, passive, cowardly, phantasmagoric unreality of the actual time, thinking in one way and acting in another; bending to power which he hates and despises; carrying empty popish or Thirty-nine Article formulas on his brow, and none within; but a fragment of the living truth, a real individual being linked to collective humanity,—the bold seeker of things to come; the gentle, mild, loving, yet firm, uncompromising, inexorable apostle of all that is just and heroic,—the Priest, the Poet, and the Prophet."

Mazzini saw in the conception of God the great "Indicator" of duty, and that the one figure, "the most deeply inspired of God, men have seen on the earth was Jesus." Mazzini's impassioned protest against unbelief was itself a form of unbelief. He believed only in one God, not in three. If Jesus was inspired of God, he was not God, or he would have been self-inspired. But, apart from this repellent heresy, if Theism and Christianism are essential to those who would serve humanity, all propaganda of freedom must be delayed until converts are made to this new faith.

The question will be put, Has independent morality ever been seen in action?

Voltaire, at the peril of his liberty and life, rescued a friendless family from the fire and the wheel the priests had prepared for them. Paine inspired the independence of America, and Lloyd Garrison gave liberty to the slaves whose bondage the clergy defended. The Christianity of three nations produced no three men in their day who did anything comparable to the achievement of these three sceptics, who wrought this splendid good, not only without Christianity, but in opposition to it. Save for Christian obstruction, they had accomplished still greater good without the peril they had to brave.

None of the earlier critics of Secularism, as has been said (and not many in the later years), realised that it was addressed, not to Christians, but to those who rejected Christianity, or who were indifferent to it, and were outside it. Christians cannot do anything to inspire *them* with ethical principles, since they do not believe in morality unless based on their supernatural tenets. They have to convert men to Theism, to miracles, prophecy, inspiration of the Scriptures, the Trinity, and other soul-wearying doctrines, before they can inculcate morality they can trust. We do not rush in where they fear to tread. Secularism moves where they do not tread at all.

Ethical Certitude.

"You can tell more about a man's character by trading horses with him once than you can by hearing him talk for a year in prayer meeting."—*American Maxim.*

A FORM of thought which has no certitude can command no intelligent trust. Unless capable of verification, no opinion can claim attention, nor retain attention, if it obtains it.

If a sum in arithmetic be wrong, it can be discovered by a new way of working; if a medical recipe is wrong, the effect is manifest in the health; if a political law is wrong, it is sooner or later apparent in the mischief it produces; if a theorem in navigation is erroneous, delay or disaster warns the mariner of his mistake; if an insane moralist teaches that adherence to truth is wrong, men can try the effects of lying, when distrust and disgrace soon undeceive them. But if a theological belief is wrong, we must die to find it out. Secularism, therefore, is safer. It is best to follow the double lights of reason and experience than the dark lantern of faith. "In all but religion," exclaims a famous preacher,[1] "men know their true interests and use their own understanding. Nobody takes anything on trust at market, nor would anybody do so at church if there were but a hundredth part the care for truth which there is for money."

Mr. Rathbone Greg has shown, in a memorable passage, that "the lot of man—not perhaps altogether of the individual, but certainly of the race—is in his own hands, from his being surrounded by *fixed laws*, on knowledge of which, and conformity to which, his well-being depends. The study of these and obedience to them form, therefore, the great aim of public instruction. Men must be taught:

"1. The *physical laws* on which *health* depends.

"2. The *moral laws* on which *happiness* depends.

"3. The *intellectual laws* on which *knowledge* depends.

"4. The *social* and *political laws* on which *national prosperity* and *advancement* depend.

"5. The *economic laws* on which *wealth* depends."

Mr. Spurgeon had flashes of Secularistic inspiration, as when engaging a servant, who professed to have taken religion, he asked "whether she swept under the mats." It was judging piety by a material test.

There is no trust surer than the conclusions of reason and science. What is incapable of proof is usually decided by desire, and is without the conditions of uniformity or certitude.

Duty consists in doing the right because it is just to others, and because we must set the example of

[1] W. J. Fox.

doing right to others, or we have no claim that others shall do right to us. Certitude is best obtained by the employment of material means, because we can better calculate them, and because they are less likely to *evade* us, or *betray* us, than any other means available to us.

Orthodox religions are pale in the face now. They still keep the word of material promise to the ear, and break it to the heart; and a great number of people now know it, and many of the clergy know that they know it. The poor need material aid, and prayer is the way *not* to get it; while science, more provident than faith, has brought the people generous gifts, and inspired them with just expectations. What men need is a guide which stands on a business footing. The Churches administer a system of foreign affairs in a very loose way, quite inconsistent with sound commercial principles. For instance, a firm giving checks on a bank in some distant country—not to be found in any gazetteer of ascertained places, nor laid down in any chart, and from which no person who ever set out in search of it were ever known to return—would do very little business among prudent men. Yet this is precisely the nature of the business engaged in by orthodox firms.

On the other hand, Secularism proposes to transact the business of life on purely mercantile principles. It engages only in that class of transactions the issue of which can be tested by the experience of this life. Its checks, if I may so speak, are drawn upon duty, good sense, and material effort, and are to be cashed from proceeds arising in our midst—under our own eyes—subject to ordinary commercial tests. Nature is the banker who pays all notes held by those who observe its laws. To use the words of Macbeth, it is here, "on this bank and shoal of time" upon which we are cast, that nature pays its checks, and not elsewhere; which are honored now, and not in an unknown world, in some unknown time, and in an entirely unknown way. By lack of judgment, or sense, the Secularist may transact bad business; but he gives good security. His surety is experience. His references are to the facts of the present time. He puts all who have dealings with him on their guard. Secularism tells men that they must look out for themselves, act for themselves, within the limits of neither injuring nor harming others. Secularism does not profess to be infallible, but it acts on honest principles. It seeks to put progress on the business footing of good faith.[1] Adherents who accept the theory of this life for this life dwell in a land of their own—the land of certitude. Science and utilitarian morality are kings in that country, and rule there by right of conquest over error and superstition. In the kingdom of Thought there is no conquest over men, but over foolishness only. Outside the world of science and morality lies the great Debatable Ground of the existence of Deity and a Future State. The Ruler of the Debatable Ground is named Probability, and his two ministers are Curiosity and Speculation. Over that mighty plain, which is as wide as the universe and as old as time, no voice of the gods has ever been heard, and no footsteps of theirs have ever been traced. Philosophers have explored the field with telescopes of a longer range than the eyes of a thousand saints, and have recognised nothing save the silent and distant horizon. Priests have denounced them for not perceiving what was invisible. Sectaries have clamored, and the most ignorant have howled—as the most ignorant always do—that there is something there, because they want to see it. All the while the white mystery is still unpenetrated in this life.

But a future being undisclosed is no proof that there is no future. Those who reason through their desires will believe there is; those who reason through their understanding may yet *hope* that there is. In the meantime, all stand before the portals of the untrodden world in equal unknowingness. If faith can be piety, work is more so. To bring new beauty out of common life—is not that piety? To change blank stupidity into intelligent admiration of any work of nature—is not that piety? If our towns and streets be made to give gladness and cheerfulness to all who live or walk therein—is not that piety? If the prayer of innocence ascend to heaven through a pure atmosphere, instead of through the noisome and polluted air of uncleanness common in the purlieus of towns and of churches, and even cathedrals—is not that piety? Can we, in these days, conceive of religious persons being ignorant and dirty? Yet they abound. If, therefore, we send to heaven clean, intelligent, bright-minded saints—is not that piety? It is no bad religion—as religions go—to believe in the good God of knowledge and cleanliness and cheerfulness and beauty, and offer at his altar the daily sacrifice of intelligent sincerity and material service.

We leave to others their own way of faith and worship. We ask only leave to take our own. Carlyle has told us that only two men are to be honored, and no third—the mechanic and the thinker: he who works with honest hand, making the world habitable; and he who works with his brain, making thought artistic and true. "All the rest," he adds with noble scorn, "are chaff, which the wind may blow whither it listeth." The certainty of heaven is for the useful alone. Mere belief is the easiest, the poorest, the shabbiest device by which conscientious men ever attempted to scale the walls of Paradise.

[1] See *Secularism a Religion which Gives Heaven no Trouble.*

DEMONOLOGY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

THE free thought movement of the eighteenth century and a better scientific conception of nature relieved mankind of the unnecessary fear of the Devil, and the nineteenth century could begin to study the question impartially in its historical and philosophical foundation.

Kant found the principle of evil in the reversal of the moral world order. "The Scriptures lay down," he says, "man's moral relation in the form of a history, representing the opposite principles in man as external facts, as Heaven and Hell. The significance of this popular conception, dropping all mysticism, is that there is but one salvation for mankind, which lies in his embracing in his heart the moral maxims."

Following the example of Kant, theologians began to give a rational explanation of the Devil. Daub, a disciple of Schelling, attempted to construct a philosophical devil, in his book *Judas Iscariot, or Evil in its Relation to Goodness*, defining Satan, the Antichrist and enemy of God, as the hatred of all that is good.

Schenkel regards the Evil One as a manifestation that appears in the totality of things and characterises him as that which is collectively bad. "Satan, accordingly, is a 'juridical person,'" and this explains his extraordinary and superindividual power; but he has not as yet succeeded in becoming a single, concrete personality, and let us hope that he probably never will. Hase does not deny the possibility of an influence of spiritual powers, good as well as evil, upon man, "but," says he, "the Devil appears only when he is believed to exist; and the effects of his influence being explicable only in the light of man's nature, the reality of such beings remains problematic."

Reinhard, although inclined to supernaturalism, doubts whether the Scriptural Devil is to be taken seriously; and De Wette speaks of the Devil as a popular conception (*Volksvorstellung*). Schleiermacher in his famous work *The Christian Faith According to the Doctrines of the Evangelical Church* (1821; fourth edition, 1842) declares the idea of the Devil, as historically developed, to be "untenable" and "unessential to a Christian's belief in God."

Martensen believes in the Devil not as an idea, but as an "historical person." He is in the beginning only the principle of temptation; as such he is a cosmical principle. He is not yet bad, but the potentiality of badness. He does not really become the Devil until man has allowed him to enter his consciousness. Man, accordingly, gives existence to the Devil. Lücke opposes Martensen: "The Devil as a symbol is absolutely bad, but as a fallen creature he cannot be absolutely bad. We have no other conception of the Devil than as the representative of sin." This is an attempt to conciliate the theological conception with the philosophy of his time.

David Friedrich Strauss did not consider it necessary to refute the doctrine of Satan's personality, which he regarded as utterly overthrown, while modern mysticism shows an inclination to emphasise the importance of the traditional Satanology.

Dogmatic theologians in the ranks of English and American Protestants endeavor to preserve the traditional views of hell and Devil, without, however, making much practical use of these doctrines. They no longer discuss the problem at length but still uphold the belief in the personality of the Evil One. For instance, Professor Schaff scarcely enters into a detailed exposition of the subject, and Dr. William G. T. Shedd, who devotes in his great work *Dogmatic Theology* one or several chapters to every Christian dogma, omits a particular discussion of Satan. Passages in the chapter on hell nevertheless prove that he believes in both a personal Satan and an eternal personal punishment on the ground of scriptural evidence.

The liberal theology of to-day urges that Jesus makes thirst for justice, love of God and man, the conditions for entering into the Kingdom of God. A belief in the Devil, it is claimed, is nowhere demanded and can, to say the least, not be regarded as essential; it is not so much Christian and Jewish, as pagan; it is a survival of polytheistic nature-worship and of pagan dualism, quite natural at a time when the sciences were still in their pre-scientific period characterised by astrology and alchemy, and when the irrefragability of nature's laws was not as yet understood. The belief in a personal Devil, accordingly, and all the practices resulting therefrom, were rather due to ignorance than to religion.

There are still plenty of believers in a personal Devil, but their influence has ceased to be of any consequence. Vilmar regards the belief in an individual devilish personality as an indispensable qualification of a real theologian, saying: "In order rightly to teach and take charge of souls, one must have seen the Devil gnashing his teeth, and I mean it bodily, not figuratively; he must have felt his power over poor souls, his blasphemy, especially his sneer." Similarly, another German theologian, Superintendent Sanders, shows a great zeal in his defence of the Biblical Devil in his pamphlet *The Doctrine of the Scriptures Concerning the Devil* (1858), and Dr. Sartorius, following Hengstenberg's orthodoxy, says that, "he who denies Satan cannot truly confess Christ." Twesten, however, although accepting the belief in a personal devil, concedes that the necessity of his existence cannot be deduced from the contents of our religious consciousness. Fr. Reiff (in *Zeitfragen des christlichen Volkslebens*, VI., 1, 1880) declares that

there is a Kingdom of Evil as much as there is a Kingdom of God. The belief in a personal Prince of Darkness is the counterpart of a personal God. And Erhard wrote an apology of the Devil, not so much for the sake of the Devil as for the traditional idea that the nature of evil is positive and not merely negative.

The Roman Catholic Church of to-day still holds in theory the same views as in the Middle Ages; but the secular authorities will never again allow themselves to be influenced in their legal proceedings by the opinions of inquisitors.

Görres,[1] one of the ablest and most modern defenders of the Roman Church, complains about the purely medical view which regards witch prosecution as a mere epidemic in disregard of what Görres is pleased to call "the facts of witchcraft." He finds the ultimate cause of witchcraft and sorcery in the apostacy from the Church, which had become fashionable in those days. Dr. Haas, another Roman Catholic, takes the same view in his inquiry into witch prosecution.[2] He concedes that witchcraft is a revival of pagan notions mixed with a false conception of Christianity (p. 68), but he still shares with the inquisitors of yore and with Pope Innocent III. the belief in the actuality of witchcraft. Like Görres, Haas regards "witchcraft as the product of heresy" and calls the former "a cousin" and "a daughter" of the latter. Both to him "result from unbelief, unclearness, pride, eccentricity." Both are manias or illusions (*Wahngeschöpfe*); "they maltreat and are maltreated, and thus they increase, until they are opposed with reason and vigor." The only trouble was that the remedy of inquisitorial reason and vigor was worse than the disease. Haas continues: "For the minds of many were not yet free from error (i. e. heresy), and when the house was swept and cleaned, worse spirits entered, and matters were worse than ever."

The Inquisition, the natural result of a belief in the Devil, is now powerless; "still," says the Rev. G. W. Kitchin, in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*:

"Its voice is sometimes heard; in 1856 Pius IX. issued an encyclical against somnambulism and clairvoyance, calling on all bishops to inquire into and suppress the scandal, and in 1865 he uttered an anathema against freemasons, the secular foes of the Inquisition."

The Rev. Mr. Kitchin sums up the present state of things as follows:

"The occupation of Rome in 1870 drove the papacy and the Inquisition into the Vatican, and there at last John Bunyan's vision seems to have found fulfilment. Yet, though powerless, the institution is not hopeless; the Catholic writers on the subject, after long silence or uneasy apology, now acknowledge the facts and seek to justify them. In the early times of the 'Holy Office' its friends gave it high honor; Paramo, the inquisitor, declares that it began with Adam and Eve ere they left Paradise; Paul IV. announced that the Spanish Inquisition was founded by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; Muzarelli calls it 'an indispensable substitute to the Church for the original gift of miracles exercised by the apostles.' And now again, from 1875 to this day a crowd of defenders has risen up: Father Wieser and the Innsbruck Jesuits in their journal (1877) yearn for its re-establishment; Orti y Lara in Spain, the Benedictine Gams in Germany, and C. Poullet in Belgium take the same tone; it is a remarkable phenomenon, due partly to despair at the progress of society, partly to the fanaticism of the late pope, Pius IX. It is hardly credible that any one can really hope and expect to see in the future the irresponsible judgments of clerical intolerance again humbly carried out, even to the death, by the secular arm."

Roman Catholic authors are, as a rule, too worldly wise to precipitate or provoke a discussion of the history of either the Inquisition or the doctrine of the Devil, but whenever they cannot avoid a discussion of the subject they claim that the Inquisition was a secular institution (so Gams of Ratisbon and Bishop Hefele), or defend the measures taken by the Inquisition. They have not as yet acquired sufficient insight, or, if they have the insight, they do not possess the moral strength to condemn the whole institution, and with it the policy of the Popes Innocent III., Gregory IX., Urban IV., John XXII., and others whose names are compromised in matters of witch prosecution.

Devil exorcism is not yet extinct in Roman Catholic countries. The exorcism performed in Germany by Father Aurelian on Michael Zilk, the son of a Catholic father and Protestant mother, with the especial permission of the Bishop Leopold von Eichstadt, is a sufficient evidence of the Egyptian darkness that still penetrates the minds of a great mass of our Christian brethren, among them members of the higher clergy.[1]

Mr. E. P. Evans, who quotes the curious occurrence,[2] furnishes another interesting fact. He says:

"Pope Leo XIII. is justly regarded as a man of more than ordinary intelligence and more thoroughly imbued with the modern spirit than any of his predecessors, yet he composed and issued, November 19, 1890, a formula of an '*Exorcismus in Satanam et Angelos Apostatas.*' His Holiness never fails to repeat this exorcism in his daily prayers, and commends it to the bishops and other clergy as a potent means of warding off the attacks of Satan and casting out devils."

The holy coat of Treves is still exercising its power over the minds of many credulous people and works miracles that are seriously believed, while the dancing-procession of Echternach is not only not abolished but encouraged by the Church. Pope Leo XIII. has granted a six years' absolution to all those who would take part in the performance. There are on an aver-

[1] *Die Hexenprocesse, ein culturhistorischer Versuch.* Tübingen. 1865.

[2] Quoted by Roskoff, p. 239, from *Christliche Mystik*, III., 66.

[1] *Die Teufelsaustreibung in Werndive.* Nach den Berichten des P. Aurelian für das Volk critisch beleuchtet von Richard Treufels. Munich, Schuh & Co. 1892. This curious treatise can no longer be obtained in the bookmarket.

[2] *Popular Science Monthly*, December, 1892, p. 161.

age about ten thousand persons who annually join in this stupid survival of the Middle Ages.

The personal Devil is dead in science, but he is still alive even in Protestant countries among the uneducated; and the number of those who belong to this category is legion. The Salvation Army is still in our midst singing:

"Come join our army, the foe must be driven;
To Jesus, our captain, the world shall be given.
If Hell should surround us we'll press through the throng.
The Salvation Army is marching along."

The following vigorous verse reminds one of Parseeism:

"Christian, rouse thee, war is raging.
God and fiends are battle waging,
Every ransomed power engaging,
Break the Tempter's spell.
Dare ye still lie fondly dreaming,
Wrapt in ease and worldly scheming,
While the multitudes are streaming
Downwards into Hell?"

A good illustration of their personal attitude toward the Evil One appears in these lines:

"The Devil and me, we can't agree,
I hate him and he hates me.
He had me once, but he let me go,
He wants me again, but I will not go."

The Devil of the Salvation Army proves that there is still a need of representing spiritual ideas in drastic allegories; but though Satan is still painted in glaring colors, he has become harmless and will inaugurate no more witch prosecutions. He is curbed and caged, so that he can do no more mischief. We smile at him as we do at a tiger behind the bars in a zoölogical garden. P. C.

NOTES.

The Outlook of June 27, 1896, says with reference to *The Gospel of Buddha* that "the unlearned reader" ought to be told "that no life of Buddha is contemporary; none was written for over a thousand years after his death;"—in reply to which we have to say, that the narrations of Buddha's life, like the Christian gospels rose into existence gradually. The first personal recollections written down were the Thera-Vâda, the words of the elder, which are analogous to the λόγια τοῦ κυρίου. The Buddhist canon was settled at the second council and may be considered as established in the times of Ashoka, who lived in the third century before Christ, for the books regarded as canonical are enumerated in some of the rock-inscriptions. That lives of Buddha were written before the beginning of the Christian era may be proved by the fact that the first Buddhist missionaries to Thibet and China carried with them various important sacred books and among them lives of Buddha. Prof. Samuel Beal, formerly a Christian missionary to China and the translator of the Fo-Sho-Hing-Tsan-King writes in his Preface to the *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XIX., page xvii: "We may conclude therefore that such a life of Buddha was in circulation in India in a written form at or before the beginning of our era. It was brought thence by Ku-fa-lan, and translated into Chinese A. D. 67–70. M. Stanislas Julien, in the well-known communication found on page xvii n. of the translation of the Lalita Vistara from Tibetan by M. Foucaux, speaks of this work as the first version of the Lalita Vistara into Chinese.". In addition to these lives of Buddha we ought to mention that the most important philosophical book of Buddhism "The Questions of King Melinda" was written, as says Prof. T. W. Rhys Davids, "a considerable time before Buddhagosha and after the death of King Meander," who lived in the second century B. C., that is to say shortly before or about the beginning of the Christian era. While it is true that "no life of Buddha is contemporary" there can be no question about it that at the beginning of the Christian era all the most important Buddhistic scriptures existed in the form or nearly in the form that we possess them now.

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