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THE DECLINE OF THE SENATE.

BY M. M. TRUMBULL.

In the *Forum* for November, 1893, are two articles by Prof. H. Von Holst, under the attractive titles, "Shall the Senate Rule the Republic?" and "The Senate in the Light of History." The essays will command attention, because Professor Von Holst has achieved a national reputation in this country as the author of a "Constitutional and Political History of the United States" and a "Life of John C. Calhoun." He is also Professor of History at the University of Chicago. These credentials entitle him and his opinions to respectful consideration, and those who admire the severe castigation of others will be satisfied with the highly seasoned scolding that Professor Von Holst administers to the Senators of the United States. The article is caustic, and in language hard as nails.

Professor Von Holst evidently felt an ardent, and, in his own opinion, a patriotic interest in the repeal of the silver-purchasing clause of the Sherman Law, and he became angry and impatient because of the obstacles thrown in the way of that repeal by a small minority of the Senate. In that choleric temper, and while the repeal bill was yet pending, he wrote with excusable indignation, and asked the alarming question, "Shall the Senate Rule the Republic?"

When a man feels deeply concerning a political measure he is apt to write about it like a partisan, and if he writes in anger he is liable to be illogical, and perhaps miss the radical cause of the evil he condemns. In the present case, Professor Von Holst empties the vials of his wrath upon the senators, whereas the dangerous power that alarms him lies deeper down; the root of it is in the political constitution of the Senate.

It was intended from the beginning that the minority should "rule the republic" through a legislative right to defeat the will of the majority; and this right was conferred by the Constitution on the Senate. No bill can become a law except by permission of the Senate; no law can be repealed without that permission, and a majority in the Senate can at any time be formed by a combination of members representing but a small fraction of the population, wealth, industry, and business of the country.

At the present moment one-fifth of the people have a majority in the Senate.

Not by the scolding of senators can the tyranny of the minority be overthrown. If Professor Von Holst had a tongue sharp enough to cut glass, it would accomplish nothing, unless the keen edge of it were applied to the Senate as a constitutional aristocracy, instead of to the Senators as men. The Senate must be deprived of its lordly prerogatives and be made a representative assembly. That way lies reform.

Like many other statesmen who spiritualise the Constitution when the letter of it is against them, Professor Von Holst finds in that instrument "an underlying principle" that subverts its meaning and contradicts its words. He says the Senate "outrageously tramples under foot the underlying principle of the whole Constitution, if it perverts the right given by Article I, Section 5, Clause 2, to each House of Congress to 'determine the rules of its proceedings' into a privilege enabling every one of its members to prevent for an indefinite time its acting." Determining under that clause of the Constitution "the rules of its proceedings," the Senate rejected the so-called "gag-law," the time-saving expedient known as "the previous question," and allowed each of its members, not for "an indefinite time," but only for the present, such freedom of speech as he might wish to exercise, reserving to itself the right to change the rules whenever that freedom was perverted beyond the patience of the Senate. It is a striking comparison that when Mr. Reed, and the majority in that branch of Congress over which he presided, exercised the constitutional power to "determine the rules" and limit liberty of speech in order to defeat the dilatory tactics of the minority, he was called a "Czar," and the House of Representatives was vehemently accused of "outrageously trampling under foot the underlying principles of the whole Constitution." And, now, when the Senate pursues the opposite course and allows its members liberty, it is accused by Professor Von Holst of also trampling on those mystical "underlying principles."

Referring to the rules of the Senate that permit so much liberty of speech and action to each individual member, Professor Von Holst carelessly says: "The assertion that this has been done in a measure which

no European legislative body would have allowed is undoubtedly true." Now, that is not "undoubtedly true"; the House of Lords is a "European legislative body," and the House of Lords gives to each individual member the same freedom of speech and the same privilege of obstruction that are permitted by the American Senate. How the House of Lords would act in case the minority or a faction of that minority should block the wheels of legislation for many days, we do not know, but we do know that the House of Lords would hesitate long and anxiously before it would adopt the closure or any similar policy. It would very likely adopt the plan of the Senate, and protect itself at last by telling the filibusters that if they persisted in delaying the public business they would be compelled to come to order by an alteration of the rules. When the Senate, in real earnest, resolved upon that course of action, the filibustering stopped.

Professor Von Holst complains that "the legislature of Nevada, with a population barely sufficient for a good-sized third-class city, has the constitutional power to delegate to two men the infrangible right of condemning the seventy millions of the United States to be a stagnant pool in regard to vital questions." The metaphor is not quite clear, but through it we may perceive that Professor Von Holst complains, not that Nevada has any senators at all, but merely of their behavior. This is a trivial matter in a debate involving the whole character of the Senate, its attributes and powers. The supreme injustice lies in the Constitution itself, which allows a population barely sufficient for a third-class town to have two senators, and will not allow New York, with six millions of inhabitants, to have any more than two. This is a solecism in American politics, and it cannot be perpetual. The Constitution must eventually be amended, and such inequality become impossible. The ludicrous character of the anomaly appears when the two senators from Nevada "pair off" with the two senators from New York. Forty thousand people "pairing" on a political question with six millions is a comedy. It is true that the two senators from Nevada have the power to delay the public business by talking against time, by motions to adjourn, and all sorts of dilatory tactics, but this is not an "infrangible right"; it may be broken at any time by an alteration of the rules. And in the late contest over the Silver Bill, the "courtesy of the Senate," in allowing to its members liberty of speech until the abuse of the privilege became intolerable, increased, rather than diminished, the dignity of the Senate.

Speaking of "The Senate in the Light of History," Professor Von Holst endeavors to show that the moths have been eating it for more than forty years, and that it has been perishing of "dry rot" ever since 1849, which in his opinion was the exact period when the Senate was in the meridian glory of its "ability and dignity." He says: "That the Senate has greatly deteriorated is a commonplace remark—a matter of universal knowledge—but how greatly it has deteriorated can be shown in no other way so forcibly as by a comparison of its members in 1849 and its members in 1893." He then "calls the roll" of the Senate of 1849, and selects from "this wonderful body of men" twenty-one as the most eminent exponents of its "ability and dignity." Awkwardly enough, among this immortal twenty-one is Henry S. Foote, who contributed so much to the ability and dignity of the Senate, by drawing a pistol on a brother senator and attempting to shoot him in the Senate chamber for "words spoken in debate." Since 1849 the Senate "has greatly deteriorated," so that revolvers as weapons of debate have become obsolete. We all know that "the good old times" is a sentimental myth, and yet we love to hear their praises chanted in the good, old, grandmotherly way. A glamour of romantic interest sparkles about the old Forty-niners of California, and why should it not irradiate the old Forty-niners of the Senate. It is kindly in young men to pay this tribute of affection to a generation gone; and an old man always takes a little of the flattery to himself when he hears his little grandson explain to him in a recitation from the Lays of Macaulay, how well Horatius kept the bridge "in the brave days of old."

In order to show how greatly the Senate has deteriorated, Prof. Von Holst classifies the senators by name, and separates them into five groups as if they were ethnic specimens in the museum of the Chicago University, and with critical discrimination labels them in the following order: "(1) Senators of the old type who most nearly represent the true theory and traditions of the Senate. (2) Senators who are professional politicians, and owe their elevation to political manipulation. (3) Senators who have reached their present eminence, mainly, if not entirely, by reason of their wealth. (4) Accidental senators and oddities. (5) Old fogy senators."

It will readily appear to men at all familiar with American politics and politicians that the above classification is partial and unfair. Some of the models in cabinet No. 1 might very properly be put in either of the other groups, while some of the specimens in cabinets 4 and 5 might very justly be transferred to cabinet No. 1. The danger of making those mistakes ought to have prevented the classification of the senators by name in the pages of a public magazine, and indeed it appears that Professor Von Holst himself had misgivings; for he shifts the responsibility from himself to the shoulders of six anonymous men "of most excellent

judgment, some of whom are Democrats and some Republicans, some of whom have a personal acquaintance with most of the senators and have opportunity to know them close at hand." These six men were the committee appointed by Professor Von Holst to make the classification. Before his explanation can be accepted, Professor Von Holst ought to name his authorities. The men who make such statements ought to be brave enough to let themselves be known, for it is not chivalrous to break in secret safety the laws of "personal acquaintance" and label and libel friends.

As will presently be seen, Professor Von Holst's mysterious cabinet council betrayed him into a very illogical and embarrassing position, for in the persons of the classified senators the "six men of most excellent judgment" contradict the praises that Professor Von Holst bestows upon the Senate of 1867. In admiration of that assembly he says, "The Senate realised its old ideal as a check on popular folly when it blocked the outrageous attempt to impeach Andrew Johnson, and thus to establish a precedent which would put the executive at the mercy of the legislative branch. In every great crisis since that time it has failed."

The statement is altogether incorrect. Professor Von Holst cannot be ignorant of the difference between impeachment and conviction, yet he carelessly confounds those terms as if they meant the same thing. An impeachment is nothing but an accusation; more dignified and stately than an indictment which applies to ordinary criminals, but it is only an indictment after all. Impeachment is the prerogative of the House of Representatives, but conviction must be by the Senate. Andrew Johnson *was* impeached by the House of Representatives, and "the Senate that realised its old ideal" actually declared him guilty by a majority of thirty-five to eighteen. Not only was the impeachment not "blocked" by the Senate but that body approved it and thereby vindicated the House of Representatives. The prosecution failed because the vote for conviction was one less than the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution; and so Andrew Johnson escaped punishment for attempting to reconstruct the southern states in defiance of the will of Congress; an "outrageous" attempt to put the legislative at the mercy of the executive branch.

Not being very familiar with the history of the statesmen of his time, Professor Von Holst allowed himself to be led into an awkward predicament by his invisible "six men," for while he was denouncing the Senate for certain acts of wickedness, they were putting the very delinquents who did the mischief into class No. 1, composed of "Senators of the old type who most nearly represent the true theory and traditions of the Senate." It is a comical complication but Professor Von Holst must blame the "six men" for it, that among the senators in class No. 1 are some who were in the Senate in 1867, and actually voted Andrew Johnson guilty, while others in that same class were members of the House of Representatives then and voted enthusiastically for that "outrageous" impeachment; and one of them, Mr. Wilson of Iowa, was a member of the impeachment committee appointed by the House to prosecute the President.

Professor Von Holst gives a catalogue of legislative acts that mark the degradation and decay of the Senate, and yet nearly all the senators put by the secret council into cabinet No. 1 voted for those reprehensible bills. Professor Von Holst says that "for twenty years the Senate has been steadily, and of late rapidly degenerating," and it is very awkward for him that the men whose votes have caused this degeneracy are classified by his committee of six among the "Senators of the old theory and traditions of the Senate." It is a melancholy thought that even including the men who voted for those bad bills only nineteen senators were worthy to be classed as No. 1, while thirty-six were left out of any classification whatever, because they are "Senators who seem to belong to no logical category—simply commonplace men of no decided characteristics." Among these, of course, are Voorhees, Vest, Hale, Mitchell of Oregon, and others, who certainly deserve to be classified somewhere.

Some persons will agree, and others will disagree, with Professor Von Holst, in the opinion that the existing Senate is "a commonplace body in comparison with the Senate of any preceding time." He tempers the verdict with a recommendation to mercy, saying: "Due allowance, of course, must be made for misjudgment in every comparison of a contemporaneous body with a body in the past, whose real greatness may have been magnified by its distance from us." He agrees that "allowance must be made," but he does not make it; for if he did, he would hardly place among the great senators of 1849, Henry S. Foote, W. P. Mangum, Arthur P. Butler, J. M. Berrien, and David L. Yulee. Surely, it is nothing but the kindly magic of time and distance that can make these men great. While the number of great men in every legislature varies according to the opportunities of their era, there never was a Senate that was not composed in the main of commonplace men, with a sprinkling of orators and statesmen thrown in to give it character; giants in those days, mighty men which were of old, men of renown, like Cicero, Mirabeau, Chatham, Burke, and Webster. The critics of the next generation will be contrasting their own degenerate senators with the "Old Romans" who adorned the Senate in 1893.

Professor Von Holst censures the senators for the manner in which they exercise the power given to them by the Constitution, but he approves the power

itself that enables the minority to rule, and he concludes his article by saying: "The organisation of the Senate, and even the method of the election of senators, vindicate the wisdom of the fathers; its present *personnel* simply marks the decline of politics as one of the noble professions." He thinks it wise that Nevada should have as many senators as New York, and then censures the thistle for not bearing figs.

IS REINCARNATION A NATURAL LAW?

BY THOMAS WILLIAMS.

No question is of more interest or of greater importance than that relating to the origin and future of a human soul. Is it as Christianity maintains, brought into existence by human agency and the grace of God, or is there any truth in that archaic belief in reincarnation which gives to every man and woman a past directly connected with the progress of the human race? The side lights which this latter theory throws upon the causes of good and evil which affect us during life and the connexion which it shows between physical evolution and the human soul are certainly very strong inducements to believe that it is the true and proper theory for a human life, but in these days theory which cannot find its explanation in modern science is not likely to take a permanent hold on modern thought, and however reasonable reincarnation may appear to the few who have gone deeply into the question, it is requisite that a basis should be shown to exist in natural law to induce the many to take the necessary steps which lead to a clear comprehension of its truth.

Let me briefly explain the theory of the re-birth. By it every human soul passes successively through many lives upon this earth in order to evolve the latent possibilities of its own perfection. Man, instead of, as is generally supposed, dropping into the line of physical evolution for a score or so of years and then vanishing for ever from the progress of events with which he has so accidently become associated, has an individual progress of his own upon the spiritual plane of being, which like a human thread knits together successive eras of personal evolution. These countless lines of individual progress stretching from the earliest periods of earth-life into the future of our race weave themselves into a continuous background of causation for that physical development which we have learnt to recognise as the method of natural evolution, for by this theory physical life with all its visible effects is the result of an invisible and spiritual activity. In fact the reign of natural law is the objective expression of subjective and spiritual causes of which man in the abstract is the chief agent. It is not my intention here to defend this theory but to endeavor to show how modern research into the atomic and molecular structure of the human frame has reached to the knowledge of certain simple facts which prove, first, that man is possessed of an immaterial ego; second, that this ego must be re-born upon this planet.

Let me define the ego in such a way that it may be recognised at once as an indisputable fact. It is that consciousness of individual identity which we all possess and which is distinct from our recognition of ourselves as a particular person. "I am," and this knowledge requires no expansion as to the nature of this *I*, whether complex or simple, shaped or shapeless, male or female, to convince us of its absolute reality.

This is what is meant by the ego of a human being. As an intangible perception of the mind this ego appears at first sight to afford but a slender basis on which to found a proof of the nature of the connexion between earth-life and the human soul, yet when we examine into its relation to the body it informs, we shall, I think, so clearly discern its presence and its distinctive quality as to realise it as a reasonable necessity, a *thing* beyond dispute.

Whence comes this sense of individual identity? Does it proceed from any particular grouping of the brain-cells? Since there is not a single molecule or atom in the whole mass of cerebral substance which does not submit to constant change, our sense of permanent identity does not proceed from this. But if the grouping of atoms and molecules does not produce it, is it not perhaps an innate attribute of matter? To this question science answers that during an average life not only the particles of the brain but of the entire body are changed completely several times. Therefore if our identity persists throughout this period of change it cannot belong to matter.

Therefore, as neither matter nor the grouping of the cells possess identity, this latter must proceed from something which is distinctly separate from the physical man; and since an individual's identity is one and the same for all his life we must believe first that it is an immaterial unit or ego, then that its relation to the body through which it manifests is that of permanence to impermanence.

This distinction, arrived at as the result of scientific investigation, places us at once upon firm ground. We see that our individuality or permanent identity is fixed by its contrast to our personality or visible form whose particles are ever on the change, and this distinction is fatal to any attempt which may be made to deny the separateness of the consciousness of the ego from the consciousness of the body. For, while my personal consciousness is always changing in answer to the variations of atoms and molecules of which I am made, the individual consciousness of selfhood remains ever the same.

This separation between these two sources of con-

sciousness is still more apparent if we look at the method by which self-consciousness is produced. Every action of body or mind is accompanied by a consciousness that "*I* am acting," "*I* am thinking," and this self-perception is the result of a corresponding modification in physical substance, so that the invisible permanency of identity makes itself felt by destroying the identity of matter through which it manifests. Thus, while the change produced amongst the particles of my body takes the form of some mental perception or physical sensation, each is always accompanied by that other sense of changeless identity which comes from the immaterial (spiritual) ego.

Here, then, we have established the duality of man consisting of a physical being with a physical consciousness manifesting by the means of change and the immaterial ego whose whole existence depends upon the exact opposite of the other, a changeless permanency throughout a life. The question which we have to solve is whether science can afford a proof that it must be subject to re-birth upon this earth. Let us seek for a solution in the law of heredity. Controversy is still active as to how far environment affects the offspring of a human being and how far natural selection is responsible for those initial peculiarities which form the basis of a human character, but even if we take heredity in its most limited senses as defined by Galton and by Weismann we shall, I think, have sufficient left to prove that re-birth is necessary to the human ego.

A man's character may be said to be the representation of his mental and physical condition, and both these states are expressed objectively by activities productive of corresponding changes in material or in the grouping of atoms and molecules in the brain or body. But every one of these changes is accompanied by an emission of self-consciousness which is inseparable from them, and it becomes therefore a question as to whether physiological derangement is the cause of this self-consciousness or whether the latter is the cause of the former. We know that self-consciousness is the result of the ego identifying itself with every one of these simple or complex modifications in the physical substance of the human body. We also know that this act of identification leaves the identity of the ego unaltered while it gives to the atoms and molecules which are manifesting it an identity which does not really belong to them. In fact the effect of identification is only operative on the substance identified and not on the ego, and therefore the ego must be the cause of these modifications and changes in the physical man. It follows from this that every sensation and thought is caused by the ego bringing to bear upon the atoms and molecules of brain and body its power of identification in order to manifest self-consciousness in the physical man. In this way it becomes the direct cause of the manifestation of personal character and our problem narrows itself down to this: is there any portion of a personal character which we know to be a permanent basis for the rest? Undoubtedly the law of heredity offers such a basis and therefore we have established the fact that personal characteristics are partly permanent and partly subject to change, and since we have seen that matter is incapable of furnishing anything in the shape of permanent identity it becomes evident that it comes direct from the ego, while the former is found in the physical man as an external and mutable consciousness evoked out of matter by the power of an inner and changeless egoity. Thus the basis of character exhibited by the law of heredity lies in the soul, while those characteristics which are derived from environment and are identified with the ego belong to the ever changing and physical personality. But if heredity is the expression of egoity it implies that the ego must have evolved, and since its evolution takes the form of heredity it must have evolved upon this earth. Therefore birth is a re-birth and the evolution of physical man is based on the permanent characteristics acquired by the evolving soul. The whole proof of reincarnation from this point of view lies in the fact that heredity comes from the ego itself and not from the physical man, and is based on the impossibility which the atoms and molecules of physical substance lie under of furnishing anything like a permanent and unbroken identity. But in this we are brought face to face with what seems a contradiction: for if the soul evolves what becomes of its characteristic of immutable permanency? But on closer analysis this objection is found to be superficial. That which distinguishes one human being from another is force of character; sometimes it is feeble so as to cause him or her to be put down as colorless and lacking in individuality; sometimes it is so prominent that the possessor becomes marked off and separated from the crowd; and between these two extremes it exists in countless gradations of power appropriate to the diversity of character exhibited by different persons. Now force of character represents a greater or less degree of individuality and it is active in us as a more or less vivid perception of self as unfolded in our self-consciousness. It is therefore dependent on the sensitiveness which the outer consciousness of the physical man possesses to answer to the power of identification exercised on the atoms and molecules of the body by the ego within. But this increase in identity does not change it; and if, as we have seen, the degree of force of character possessed by the ego is manifested in physical man as definite hereditary characteristics, this simply means that certain permanent peculiarities accompany the exercise of definite degrees of individuality. So that the evolution of a human soul is found to consist in its ob-

taining a stronger or weaker capacity for individualisation in matter and according to its acquired individuality, so will certain well-defined and appropriate characteristics accompany every manifestation of self-consciousness which appears in the physical man.

THE EGO AS IDENTITY OF SELF.

Mr. Thomas Williams asks, "Is reincarnation a natural law?" and answers the question in the affirmative. Like him, we also believe that reincarnation takes place, and that it takes place according to natural law. In fact, heredity is reincarnation, for heredity is a transference not only of bodily, but also of spiritual, peculiarities; it is a preservation of psychical not less than of physical qualities; it is a continuance of soul-forms.

We may add, incidentally, that the human soul is preserved, not only by heredity, but also by education. Heredity, however, is and will always remain the broad basis of any and all soul-transference, for heredity transmits the dispositions without which any amount of instruction would be as hopeless as the attempt to teach a monkey writing and reading.

Reincarnation, being the reappearance of souls in the bodies of new generations, must, together with heredity, be taken as a fact. Not the fact, but its interpretation, can be subject to doubt.

The main objection to the term "reincarnation" lies in its having been too frequently used in the service of dualistic conceptions of the soul. When a man died, his soul was supposed to leave his body, to hover about in the air, or in some unknown region, and then to re-enter another body, from which it could again be separated only by death. These fantastic notions must, of course, be dropped, and we need not even take the trouble to refute them in the shape in which they were and are still held by the people of India, who take the mythology of their religion for literal truth.

There is perhaps no one among us who would accept the idea of a migration of souls, such as the ancient Hindus believed in. Nevertheless, that soul-conception upon which this view is based has still many advocates, and may even be regarded as the most popular one among the people, in the churches, and also at our universities. The soul is still regarded as an entity which has an independent existence, and which, after leaving the body on death, will, like a material thing, remain for a while in a particular place. This soul-entity is supposed to produce the continuity and unity of our psychical life. The notion of a separate ego-entity is based upon that consciousness of identity which refers all the feelings we experience, the thoughts we have, and the acts we perform to one and the same being, called by every one speaking of himself, "*I*." This hypothetical being, supposed to be at the bottom of all psychical acts as their agent or *primum movens*, may be briefly called the ego-soul.

We say that the belief in an ego-soul is the basis of the old Hindu mythology of metempsychosis or soul-migration; indeed, there is no material difference between the one and the other view; and we add that it must be rejected as a wrong interpretation of the facts of reincarnation.

Mr. Thomas Williams presents with great lucidity and vigor in his article the reason which to me has always appeared as the strongest argument in favor of an ego-soul. The argument is not new; it is as old as our scientific materialism. When Baron d'Holbach came out with his famous work, "Le système de la nature," in which he analysed man and declared that his whole being consisted merely of material particles in motion, he and men of his kin received the answer that the soul continued even after the changes of the body's material particles and must therefore be regarded as something different from matter in motion.

J. P. Hebel, the famous calendar-writer, who as such, and in his style, but not in his conception of life, greatly resembles Benjamin Franklin, summed up the whole case in a brief little article, entitled "An Argument in Favor of the Immateriality of the Soul."*

"The physicists have demonstrated that the body of man is in a constant state of transformation; that in the course of a few years it is a totally changed and new body in all its parts. That is to say, after a lapse of ten years we possess, so far as component elements are concerned, different nerves, and, of course, different nervous fluids, and yet the same old soul. The soul, consequently, cannot consist of matter.

"My body has, then, in this point of view, wholly changed at least three times in my life, and I have not noticed the change in the least; I have always had the same consciousness, and feel that I still continue the same individual. Now, what is that part of my being that feels and knows this? What fixed point of my unchangeable existence is it in me by means of which I, despite all the triturations and evaporations of my material parts, am still always the same? Must it not be something unchangeable, and, thus, something immaterial?

"That the scarred wound on the arm that I now have still pains me as it pained on the day on which it was made and healed, is intelligible. The scar itself informs me that the parts here are arranged in a defective and unnatural manner; that the normal organic action of nature cannot return until the scar is gone. So, too, new parts arrange themselves defectively, and as long as this goes on I must continue to feel new pain. Not the wound that I received twenty years ago, nor the scar that formed in its place now pains me, but the scar that I now have, for the very same reason that the original one pained me. This is intelligible enough.

"But, that I can recognise a sermon, a poem, or a piece of music that I hear with the ear I now have, as the same that I learned by heart fifteen years ago, or listened to at that time with special sympathy and pleasure; or that these fingers can now play a piece upon the piano which I have perhaps not thought of in an equal number of years—such a feat would be unintelligible if there

*Hebel was a contemporary of Napoleon I. The article quoted is found in *Hebel's Werke*, II, p. 310, Berlin, G. Grote.

were not something in me that had not suffered since that time a change of its parts, and is therefore immaterial."

Hebel's argument proves indeed that the soul is immaterial, but it does not prove the existence of an ego-soul. Hebel claims that there is a difference between the scar and the memory-trace of a melody or a word. The memory of the pain of the wound, which continues to be felt in the scar, is comprehensible, but the memory of such brain-impressions as are left by words is, as he claims, incomprehensible. Is this consistent? Is not the continuity of the one as easily understood as that of the other; and if the pain of the wound, as a peculiar kind of feeling, is preserved in the scar as a peculiar misformation of the tissues, why should not in the brain, also, the form of a feeling be preserved with the form of its cerebral structures? The material particles of our body change, but the form is preserved; and the form of an organism is that which constitutes its soul.

It is apparent that the assumption of an identity-preserving soul-centre is gratuitous and redundant. There is in every organism a continuity of form. In the constant flux of matter through our body the traces of impressions are preserved; and the organism thus acquires the disposition to reproduce the feelings of former sense-impressions, whenever their forms are revived by some agitation.

Souls are the forms of feelings, of thoughts, of impulses, of aspirations. The feelings which I have are at the same time brain-motions; the former are the subjectivity, the latter the objectivity of my existence. No subjectivity is, according to the monistic world-view, thinkable without its objectivity; and *vice versa*, every objectivity is conceived of as having a subjectivity corresponding to its form.

This view seems to do away with the soul, but it only does away with the hypothesis of soul-substantiality and of the ego-soul. The facts of soul-life remain; that interpretation only which assumed the existence of a hypothetical soul-entity or identity-creating centre has been abandoned. We might as well assume an identity-creating substance for the fountain which remains the same by preserving its form in the constant flux of its waters. He who denies that there is in the fountain such an identity-creating thing which would exist even if there were no water, a kind of fountain-in-itself, does not as yet deny the existence of the fountain. There are no fountains-in-themselves, nor are there souls-in-themselves; yet there are souls and there are fountains, and the form of a fountain can be renewed as well as souls are reincarnated in coming generations.

Truly, there is a migration of soul. It is a transfer, not of mysterious soul-monads or ego-entities, but of soul-forms; it is not material, but spiritual. Wherever you impress your ideas and aspirations, there you insert your soul. You make your own being migrate, and it will continue to exist and to live and to grow. The continuity of our personality during our own life, and also the immortality of our souls, are brought about by the preservation and transfer of soul-forms.

We have to learn that forms are not nonentities; they are the most important realities in the world. To say that souls are forms does not mean that souls do not exist, but only that they are unmaterial.

It is quite difficult to understand that something may be unmaterial and yet real. Therefore all the teachers of mankind who for ethical purposes have had to instruct people concerning the nature of the soul, (for ethics is mainly a dietetics of the soul,) have resorted to parables, in which the soul is represented as an entity. The parable is a vehicle for conveying a truth to those who are not as yet able to grasp it. The immature can feel the truth in a parable and may be benefited by it as though they had understood it.

Those who have abandoned the errors of the substantiality of the soul, of the ego-entity, and similar conceptions, should know and bear in mind that the reality of the soul remains the same as before. The preservation of soul-forms, called memory; the continuity of life, which is the basis of personality; the immortality of psychical being; and the reincarnation of souls—are actualities. They may lose in the light of science the glamor of mysteriousness, but at the same time they will gain in importance, grandeur, and dignity the better they are known. P. C.

CHAPTERS FROM THE NEW APOCRYPHA.

THE PARABLE OF THE BLIND MAN.

BY HUDOR GENONE.

And Jesus spake again a parable unto them, saying, Behold, there was a certain rich man which had a vineyard;

And when the time came for the ripening of the grapes there were few laborers to be hired.

Then the rich man saith unto his steward, Go ye into the market-place and hire men to gather my grapes;

And if ye find not them whose business it is to gather the fruit of the vine for the wine-press, hire others also, and whoever will come to gather my grapes forbid him not.

So the steward did as his lord commanded, and went into the market-place and hired laborers, and others also;

And he came with them whom he had hired unto his lord and saith unto him, The harvest truly is plenteous, but the laborers are few.

Yet have I done as thou hast commanded: I have

hired others also, the halt, and the aged, and even this blind man.

And the rich man saith unto his steward, Thou hast done well; give therefore to every one a basket, and send him into my vineyard, that he may gather grapes for the wine-press.

So every one of them that had been hired went forth unto the vineyard and toiled all the day.

And at nightfall they came and brought the grapes which they had gathered unto the wine-press.

And of the laborers, some brought an hundred baskets, and some sixty, and some thirty.

And when my lord reckoned with them he commanded his steward to give unto every man according to his work,—unto him who gathered an hundred baskets, ten farthings,—unto him who gathered sixty baskets, six farthings, and unto him who gathered thirty baskets, three farthings.

Then came also the others, the halt and the aged; and some had ten baskets, and some five, and some three.

And my lord commanded his steward to give unto every man according to his work,—unto him who gathered ten baskets, ten farthings,—unto him who gathered five baskets, five farthings, and unto him who gathered three baskets, three farthings.

Then the steward saith unto my lord, Lo! now will I do as thou commandest; but on the morrow, when the laborers come again to gather thy grapes, they will murmur against thee.

And will say among themselves, what doth it matter if we be idle? And he that gathered an hundred baskets will gather ten,—and he that gathered sixty will gather six, and he that gathered thirty will gather three.

Then my lord saith unto the steward, Do as I have commanded thee, for the work of the day shall reckon for itself.

And again my lord saith unto the steward, Where is the blind man? And even as he spake, the blind man, standing afar off, lifted up his voice and saith, Here am I.

Again he saith, (because he heard the voice,) I come quickly. And when he drew nigh, the steward saw that he had gathered no grapes;

And he was angry, and saith unto the blind man, Thou wicked and slothful servant; thou hast been idle all the day and hast gathered nothing. Go thou away empty.

Then the blind man lifted up his voice and wept, and saith, Say not that I have been slothful, but rather that I have toiled all the day and have gathered nothing. Let it be as my lord commandeth.

Then the lord rebuked the unjust steward, and saith unto him,

Give unto the blind man ten farthings, and let him go his way, for he hath done what he could.

Verily, I say unto thee, the laborer shall indeed be judged by the fruit of his labor;

And the halt and the aged likewise, each according to his ability.

For of a truth I require of no man more than he is able, and of this blind man do I require nothing, for thou didst hire him to work in my vineyard, knowing that he was blind.

NOTES.

The Commonwealth Company, New York, 28 Lafayette Place, has published an English translation, from the third German edition, of Dr. Arnold Dodel's "Moses or Darwin; A School Problem for All Friends of Truth and Progress." (Price, $1 00.) The book consists of a series of free lectures delivered before popular gatherings at Zürich and St. Gall, Switzerland, on the subject of evolution, and is intended to disseminate among the unscientific public the principles of this doctrine as opposed to those of the traditional religions. The same company also publishes, (price, fifty cents,) "A History of Religions," by Elizabeth E. Evans, which is, as its sub-title informs us, a condensed statement of the results of scientific research and philosophical criticism. It is a short and meagre statement (128 pages) of some of the results of the history of comparative religions and of critical biblical research, which can hardly justify the title of "A History of Religions," being rather an attempt to show that Christianity is of natural, not divine, origin, and that it is incompetent to cope with the problems of modern times.

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