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SPIRITUALISM.

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In answer to the two letters, and according to the wish of the Editor lately expressed in these columns, I will in a few words explain my attitude with regard to spiritualism. I confine myself entirely to the so-called facts; for between expanded spiritualistic views and a sort of religion and sleight-of-hand there exists, naturally, no connection. But even of the facts a considerable number must at once be set aside, viz., all those occurrences, which lie visible only on psychological ground and present no physical interest. The "indirect mediumistic" or rather "automatic" writing, the trance-speaking, the seeing or hearing of "spirits"—these and several others belong to the psychological manifestations, with which we will not occupy ourselves to-day. Concerning the other group of mediumistic apparitions, I can myself dispose of an experience of about three hundred séances with thirtyseven different mediums, amongst whom are Slade and Valesca Toepfer. The number of séances is for a period of eight years, certainly not a long time, but here in Berlin we cannot go to the next street-corner in order to get a medium; on the contrary, it needs considerable application of time and money. I have sacrificed both sufficiently to the causes of objectiveness, and I blame nobody now for refusing to waste precious time with spiritualistic séances. For nine-tenths of what I have seen, was manifestly sleight-of-hand.

Let us consider the following: Most of the phenomena can be very easily produced, provided the medium can move, although apparently held fast or bound; or in the case of slate-writing, when the medium somehow gets access to the slate. The apparent difficulty disappears upon closer contemplation; if only certain conditions, for instance, the freedom of movement, are fulfilled, then the performance becomes easy. Whether or not this supposition can be made, only a man technically educated in this line is competent to say. A "logical" impossibility, such as has been asserted of certain reported occurrences, does not exist, for logic has only to do with the *form* of our thoughts, and here we have to deal with the substance of observations involving mistakes, which lie in the contents of a verdict or a combination of verdicts.

It seems to me quite unreasonable that many spiritualists expect the sleight-of-hand performer to imitate the tricks at once with the same finish. The latter does not have the advantage of such a specialised education as the medium, and he is not accustomed to operate under the conditions, which are allowed to the medium.

On the other hand, it may be pointed out that some of the spiritualistic phenomena appear even without a medium, while others are connected with mediums who are above every suspicion of conscious fraud. It must be granted, however, that the reports of haunted places are one and all not proof against a close examination; they admit of no certain conclusion, but leave, at most,-I here remind you of the documents published by the Society for Psychical Research-the indefinite idea that besides the extraordinary number of subjective and epidemic transferable illusions there may exist some trivial thing of objective reality. Further, when in certain persons there can be no suspicion of conscious fraud, it still remains possible and is psychologically considered quite probable that some selfillusion may have led to the delusion of others.

But enough of negative criticism. In the course of many years we have seen that it has no effect upon the adherents of spiritualism. The fanatics and the scoffers still remain unreconciled. In order to make any progress at all the following three conditions must, in my opinion, be fulfilled. First the experiments with professional mediums should be so arranged that the proceedings and possible success should not be witnessed merely by the participants of the séance. For just as it befell Dr. Crookes, it will befall Professor Lombroso; it will be said: they are clever people, they have accomplished much that is praiseworthy in their province, but in this case they have allowed themselves to be duped. With complete justice science has a right not to accept incredible things as proved on the sole authority of a learned man. Spiritualistic experiments, accordingly, must be made quite independent of the reliability and credibility of a few spectators.

For this reason I had, when Mr. Slade was in Berlin, two tubes filled with reagent fluids that would affect each other if mixed. They were closed and placed in a glass globe which was also closed. The tubes and the globe had been accurately weighed and the places in which they had been fixed were marked. All this was seen by a large number of persons. Now it is, according to the science of our time, impossible that any fluid should get from one tube into the other without breaking or injuring the globe or the tubes; but if there is any truth in the penetration of matter, which Mr. Slade claims for his spirits, it must be a trifle for the dear friends of the summer-land to bring a drop out of tube A into tube B, and by so doing to cause a plainly visible change of color in B. That we can afterwards examine on the scales the amount that has been transferred from A into B may be mentioned incidentally; yet I regard it as very important, that in such a case the medium may do whatever he likes with the globe, keep it for hours under the table or take it with him into his cabinet, for the success of this experiment does not in the least depend upon the faculty of observation of those present, and the result can even be confirmed by such as remain at a distance.

What happened? Nothing, simply nothing, even after Mr. Slade had kept the apparatus for two days at his house !

Upon another occasion I had a leather thong cut in such a way that the ends remained joined and the organic connection was nowhere interrupted. I was impertinent enough to ask a particularly strong medium to make in it the celebrated Zoellner knot. We had for this purpose six séances, of two hours each. The room was thoroughly darkened and to enhance the "harmony" (and I must confess also to while away the time) I played the violin. After the sixth séance I had the leather returned to me intact and inviolate.

In spite of these failures I see in experiments of that kind the only possible way of arriving at a scientific treatment of the so-called spiritualistic facts—always supposing that a possibility exists at all.

There is another condition. The spectators should first concentrate their attention upon the phenomena and not upon the intelligence in them. When from the inside of a table, rapping and crackling sounds seem to proceed, one must not begin at once with the usual questioning, but with an examination of the conditions. There may be connection with electric batteries, etc., etc.

Experience has taught us that with the methods that so far have been employed we can make no headway, therefore we have to try some other way.

The third point which I insist upon, is connected with this. The now prevalent interpretation of the spirit-hypothesis must be dropped, as it is the most nonsensical and the crudest. Indeed, Sir David Brewster was right when he said : "Spirits would be the last thing that he would give in to."

"The true scientific spirit "—to use Mr. Grumbine's expression—consists in this: to advance such hypotheses only as are alone capable of covering all the pertinent facts and that do not contradict other experiences of ours. Neither is compatible with the spirit-hypothesis. Even if we believe all the phenomena of mediumism to be real, they can be explained otherwise than by the activity of disembodied folks. That the theory of spiritualists flatly contradicts all other knowledge and conceptions, every right-thinking and well-educated person must, I think, grant without hesitation.

I grant that some of the alleged manifestations are events that lie still within the scope of scientific progress; yet decidedly I deny that the hypothesis offered has any right to scientific consideration.

PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS.

In consideration of the importance of a clear, welldefined, and consistent terminology, we present the following psychological definitions and explanations :

Sense-impression is the effect of an event upon a sentient being.

Sensation is the feeling that takes place while a sense-impression is made. It is the sense-impression felt. Sensations are the simplest psychical facts and the ultimate units of our conscious subjectivity. They are, as it were, the atoms of our soul.

Sentiment is the degree of intensity as well as the mixture of pleasurable and painful elements, which, as it were, give color to feelings.

Feelings, when strongly tinged with sentiment, are called *emotions*.

Traces are such modifications of the feeling substance produced by sense-impressions as will persist.

Memory signifies that quality of sentient substance through which sense-impressions leave traces.

Memories are the feelings of the various traces when revived.

Image is the common name given to sensations and also to the traces of sensations, which latter become again sensations as soon as they are revived; as such they are called "memory-images." There are visual images, acoustic images, images of taste, of smell, of touch, and of temperature.

Composite images are combinations of the traces of many sense-impressions of one and the same or of a similar kind, superimposed the one upon the other.

Perception is the feeling that attends the entrance of a sense-impression into the composite image of its class. A sensation, while it is perceived, is called a percept. Every perception is an elementary judgment. It is equivalent to a verdict that a sense impression belongs to that class of traces among which it is registered.

By *person* we understand the totality of memorystructures and composite images, interrelated among themselves in an individual organism.

An isolated sensation, viz., a sensation which has not become a perception, which has not been registered in its respective composite image, may be called a feeling, but it certainly is not felt by the person who has the sensation. Feelings *are felt* by being interrelated, and the interrelation of feelings alone can produce perception. If a perception is interrelated with the most important memory-images of a person, including that idea which represents the person himself, it is called *apperception*.

The peculiar nature which characterises all the various apperceptions is called *consciousness*. Thus consciousness is feeling systematised or focused in a centre. It is a coördination of sentient images and an intensification of sentiment.

The pronoun "I" stands for the whole person of the speaker, and its Latin equivalent "ego" has been used to denote the unity of a person as it appears in consciousness.

Since we understand the nature of perception and apperception, the ego has ceased to be a mystery.

The objects of the surrounding world (whatever may be their other differences) must obviously differ in form, and this difference of form naturally produces an analogous difference of sense-impressions, of sensations and feelings. This accounts for the various kinds of feeling, which are appropriately called *forms* of feeling.

Memory traces, being of various forms analogous to the various forms of objects, come to represent or symbolise that class of objects or events through a contact with which they have originated. They acquire meaning, and their feelings, having acquired meaning, are called *sentient symbols*.

Ideas are the meanings of sentient symbols.

Thought or *thinking* is the interaction that takes place among sentient symbols.

Impulses are feelings which tend to action.

Passions are strong sentiments tending to action.

Will is a conscious impulse, brought about after a longer or shorter deliberation by the verdict of a consensus of the most powerful ideas.

Purpose is an idea willed, i. e., a plan, the execution of which is determined.

Action is the motion of an organism, performed after a conscious deliberation; it is purposive motion.

The term *psychical* applies to feelings as feelings. The term *mental* applies to thought-operations.

The term *spiritual* applies to the representative value of feelings.

Soul is the name given to the whole system of sentient symbols.

Soul, mind, spirit, and character are synonyms with different shades of meaning.

When using the term *soul*, we think mainly of the feeling element and the various forms of feelings, of sentiments, passions, and emotions.

When using the word *mind*, we think first of all of mental or intellectual qualities, of thought-operations, logical conclusions, judgments, or ideas.

When using the word *spirit*, we leave out of sight all the corporeal relations of a feeling organism, and think mainly of the meaning residing in psychic symbols, of ideas and ideals.

When using the word *character*, we think of the peculiar nature of the impulses, of desires, inclinations, and the will of a man.

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Faculty is the name given collectively to the various features of psychical, mental, or spiritual operations.

The old doctrine, that the soul possesses faculties which have their distinct seats and well-defined provinces, is exploded. Every faculty is a collective term to designate a certain kind of mental activity, or a certain quality of thought-operations. Thus we speak of memory, of cognition, of judgment, of imagination, of attention, etc., as faculties.

Imagination is (1) the free play of ideas; (2) that quality of thinking beings which allows images or ideas to enter into all possible combinations.

Attention is a concentration of the soul; it is that state of mind in which one impulse or will predominates, either suppressing all other impulses, or making them subservient.

Cognition is conscious and deliberate perception. It denotes especially all complex processes of perception, the analysis of complex ideas, and the classification of their elements in the respective categories to which they belong; in brief, all acts of acquiring knowledge.

Intellect is the presence of such conditions as make the acquisition of knowledge possible.

Intelligence is the ability of practically applying one's intellect.

Understanding is that quality which makes thinking beings find explanations. It is the recognition of changes as transformations, or, in other words, the tracing of causation.

Reason is, (1) that quality of sentient beings which

makes thought-operations possible. In short, it is the faculty of thinking.

Being especially methodical thinking, reason is, in its strict and proper sense, (2) the method of thinking, the purpose of which is the economy of thought.

Reason denotes also the means by which the economy of thought is accomplished. Economy of thought being possible through a systematisation of the uniformities of experience, reason means (3) abstract thought, or the ability of making and employing abstractions, and also those most important products of abstraction—generalisations.

Lastly, we understand by reason (4) the norm or criterion of thought-operations, by which we judge their correctness. P. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY CONDEMNED BY THE FACTS?

To the Editor of The Open Court:

I have just read with great interest Mr. Victor Yarros's essay on "Individualism and Political Economy," published in *The Open Court* of March 16th. Permit me, however, to point out to him that he has forgotten the principal cause of the discredit now attaching, in the opinion of the masses, to political economy, the principles of which, very far from being weakened by the facts, are on the contrary demonstrated superabundantly by the entire social evolution of the last hundred years.

The masters and founders of economic science were pure savants, students, seeking exclusively the truth, as revealed by examination of the facts, without bias or private interest on their part, except the very legitimate ambition to enrich humanity with new truths, indicate the causes of its present miseries, and show the way to the best social condition realisable in a world which they have never deemed the best possible, Mr. Yarros being in error when he lays this reproach at their door. Their pretension has been simply to teach that, the world being what it is by virtue of inexorable fatalities, it imposes its laws upon man, who is himself subject to the fatalities of his own nature, more incapable of modifying himself than of reversing the law of gravitation.

Given, then, human nature, with all its selfish and brutal characteristics, as well as with its highest qualities; given the physical and physiological laws of the world and their powerful fatalities—the economists have maintained, and rightly, that the greatest possible good for humanity, whether considered in its entirety or from the standpoint of each separate nation, can be realised only by the greatest possible individual liberty; that every hindrance, every restriction placed upon this individual liberty, the object and more especially the effect of which is not to guarantee the equal liberty of all, can only injure the interest of all and diminish to some extent the realisable sum of human happiness.

Hence we have this law of *laisser-faire* and *laisser-passer*, so much assailed in these days by the masses, ignoraut of their own interests, because ignorant of the laws which govern the world, which govern these masses themselves, but which can never be violated by them with impunity.

What is the origin of this error of the masses of to-day? It is to be found solely in the fact that each desires his own liberty, but, being embarrassed by that of another, would like to restrain it for his own benefit; in the fact that each would like to enjoy the advantages of *laisser-faire* and *laisser-passer* without suffering the disadvantages to his personal interests that may accompany them; in the fact, in short, that in every-day life, setting aside all moral hypocrisy, each prefers his individual interest to the general interest, about which indeed he concerns himself but little, and the conditions of which he scorns to study, ready even to deny these conditions when they are or seem to him contrary to his petty personal welfare of the moment, without suspecting that in most cases he thereby compromises his interest of the morrow, his permanent interest, his own general interest,—that of his family and posterity.

On one side, then, a few rare men of science, personally disinterested in the questions of which they treat, and whose sole aim is to find the truest, most general scientific formulas, those most absolutely conforming to the reality of things.

On the other, entire humanity absorbed in the struggles of life, the ignorant, blind, passionate, restless, impatient mass, with all its rival egoisms, all its individual interests, more or less united by the identity of their economic situations, in larger or smaller groups and collectivities.

And these primary groups and collectivities ally themselves, syndicate themselves, federate themselves in larger groups and collectivities, in vast organisations, whose blindness is proportional to their size. For all these units, formed into coalitions and hierarchies, seek, not the common interest of all, but each an aspect of its personal, actual, daily interest: that is to say, they seek solely their professional interest, always hostile to professions aside therefrom, always opposed to the universal interests of the human community which the men of science have had exclusively in view, precisely because they could impartially study the play of all these special interests in antagonism.

Thus it is, for instance, that, each profession aiding the others to increase the sum of its wages or its profits, each loses in its exchanges with all the others much more than the increase of profit or wages which it has obtained, thanks to their coöperation. The only result is a rise in prices, a relative diminution of exchange for those who have retired, for those who have made savings, without any real improvement in the condition of the laborers. The terms of the relations have been changed, the relations remain the same.

Meanwhile, from this federation of special or partial egoisms has inevitably arisen the denial of the very principle of social science elaborated by the few disinterested and independent minds who have laid the foundations thereof. The existing state of things,—the general ill-being from which we suffer; the imminence of the social cataclysms which all anticipate, or summon, in endeavoring to precipitate them,—all this is the result of the general blindness, which the clairvoyance of a few sages is powerless to dissipate. They are not believed, they are no longer listened to. And the flood goes on, continually swelling, sure to multiply the evils which it prétends to cure. A fourth, a third of the civilised population of the globe may disappear within a few generations in the course of this social revolution, which, it is claimed, is to make earth a paradise.

Is it true that facts have thus far contradicted the fundamental principles of political economy? When and to what extent have they been applied? What have been the results of their partial applications?

Political ϵ conomy was born in the eighteenth century. It was horn, in fact, with the Physiocrats, whose formula was too narrow; not because they were too optimistic, but because they took into consideration only one of the forms of wealth,—alimentary wealth. In one view of the matter, however, they were right; for after all, the entire annual revenue of human labor resolves itself into the aliments consumed annually by the race. Capital alone represents profit, accumulated savings; not only, as is believed, in money or other exchangeable materials, but especially in true fiduciary values, really fictitious, representing labor consumed without real intrinsic value, and which would lose all their utility if commercial activity should stop. These are what we call the instruments of labor, useless in the absence of labor. This part of wealth would be annihilated by what is known as the social revolution, since there can be no production when consumption ceases. Everybody will go on eating voraciously; but for each industry devoted to the production of luxuries that shall be ruined, a certain number of laborers will surely be suppressed, there being no power in the world that can prevent it. Even though the state should be charged with dressing and feeding everybody, it could do it only with the labor accumulated by somebody. The mistake of the Physiocrats lay in their failure to understand this, and it is this that relates them more closely to the Socialists of today than to their successors, the liberal economists, who inspired our first revolutionary generation. It was on the strength of their principles that the Constituent Assembly lifted the barriers placed in the path of human liberty, of the liberty of labor and contract, by class distinctions or guilds. In destroying all privileges it conceived of equality only as an equality of liberty and rights, an equality of starting-points. To proclaim equality in fact, would have been to deny liberty, the fertile principle par excellence, and the sole source of all progress.

In 1789 France had a population of twenty-four to twenty-six millions at most, by far the greater number of whom, perhaps twenty millions, could be called poor, living from hand to mouth, without security for the morrow.

Our entire rural population lived then on black bread, made of barley, buckwheat, and sometimes a little rye. Not a farmer tasted the little wheat which he raised only on choice land. Each family killed one pig a year, two when it was numerous and the holding was large, requiring many laborers. Meat appeared on the table only four or five times a year, on holidays. The peasant drank water, a little milk or *piquette*; the wine or cider were sold, like the butter or eggs, save in harvest-time. The whole population went barefooted or in wooden shoes.

I can state on the evidence of my own eyes that in my childhood, from 1839 to 1848, in several cantons of the departments of Mayenne and Sarthe, such was the *régime* of the French peasants. I can affirm, on the evidence of other direct witnesses, that a similar state of things prevailed in the entire west and centre of France and in the whole vast region enclosed between the Loire and the Gironde and beyond as far as the Pyrenees, and that in Brittany conditions were even worse, the peasants living almost exclusively on buckwheat. Only in the north and east had they begun to experience some small degree of comfort. The wages of the men scarcely exceeded one franc a day, while the women received only thirty or forty centimes, besides their board.

Yet at that time rents were at least fifty per cent. lower than they are to-day, when our peasants eat wheat and meat, drink cider or even wine, and are decently clad and warmed.

And withal, in 1870, less than a century after the establishment of this *régime* of *laisser-faire* and *laisser-passer*,—at least, in the interior,—upon which to-day all forms of malediction are heaped, the French population had risen from twenty four or twenty-six millions to forty-two millions, including our provinces on the Rhine,—an increase of more than fifty per cent.

During the same period, all the other European nations which have established the same principles of liberty have multiplied even more rapidly. All statistics show it.

An economic *régime* which gives such results cannot be bad. But, even during this century of such magnificent development of human life, have all the principles of political economy been rigorously applied?

Far from it!

These principles condemn war, as a useless destruction of men and capital. Yet during this century wars have been incessant. They have caused the death of several millious of men and created a debt of more than a hundred billion francs. The interest on this enormous debt and the appropriation for war or for armed peace have to be furnished by taxes so tremendous that it has been impossible to levy them directly,—the only method defensible from the economic standpoint. To meet these expenses, it is necessary to resort to the fiscal lie of indirect taxation, which ruins labor and commerce.

What, then, would have been the increase of population and public prosperity, if on this point the teachings of all the economists without exception, from Vauban and Adam Smith to J. B. Say and Stuart Mill had been followed?

Political economy, in the name of the general interest, condemus all forms of fiscal protection. Now, throughout this century protection has continually existed, in various forms, in all States, even constitutional or republicau, where parliaments, composed for the greater part of landed or industrial proprietors, have constituted veritable syndicates of private interests, agreeing to protect each other at the expense of the public interest. Thus they have levied on the poorest, for the benefit of the richest, taxes more than ten times as large as the revenue derived therefrom by the State. The recent laws protecting cereals in France will not bring thirty millions to the State; they will cost the people more than three hundred milliors, which will go to increase the net product of the land to the benefit of its proprietors, who but for this would it e forced to reduce reuts.

After a century of such a $regime_i$ should we be astonished that, with a total increase of wealth unprecedented, this wealth is not well distributed? Should we be as onished that, while the rich have grown richer, the poor have grown poorer and more numerous? Is it the fault of political economy if so much misery has resulted from the violation of its principles?

Certainly not! But the people who suffer because these principles have been violated lend a willing ear to the advice of physicians whose remedies would be worse than the disease. In their profound ignorance of the real laws of nature, life, and society, they curse this political economy which they have heard spoken of vaguely by the very persons who have least appreciated its doctrines and done most violence to its formulas. They think they see in it the cause of evils which it might have prevented. If the teachings of its masters had been followed ; if the role of the State, reduced to the minimum necessary to the security of person and property, had left every one free to put forth his activities under the sole condition of not hindering the activities of others,—we should have really witnessed the realisation of the best of possible worlds, considering the physical fatalities which govern it and over which science is continually achieving greater triumphs.

So far, only one statesman, Mr. Gladstone, has been bold and logical enough to apply the fundamental rules of political economy to taxation. In recently conferring upon England the benefit of cheap bread, he has done more to retard the social revolution than all the measures of coercion attempted elsewhere against its apostles, as blind as they are fanatical.

Let us confess, however, that the economists have not been infallible; that many of them have yielded to the influence of established prejudices, to the habits of mind and education of which even the most learned find difficulty in ridding themselves; that they have sometimes generalised their principles too hastily; that by faulty analogies they have extended them to problems to which they are inapplicable.

It is certain, for instance, that they have not clearly distinguished landed property, which by its nature is inevitably a monopoly, from personal property, whose inexhaustible source permits each to enrich himself without depriving others. They have not, with Ricardo, recognised the distinction between eminent domain, property in the net product and social plus-value of the soil, which, resulting from the increase of the population, is its inalienable property, and the share of the gross product which belongs to him who possesses this soil and cultivates it by virtue of grants always revocable

Ricardo, then, on the contrary, bas, better than any other economist, demonstrated the right of the social collectivity over the part of the globe which it occupies,—that is to say, the principle of national ownership of the soil.

It is the great misfortune and the great mistake of the century that the young nations of America have followed in this particular in the footsteps of their elders; that their legislators, still biassed by the traditions of the Roman law, have not made this distinction between individual possession of the soil, in the form of a temporary concession in consideration of rent, and domanial property in rent and plus-value; that in abandoning to first occupants a perpetual title they have started the young nations in the fatal path which led the Roman Empire to ruin, as it will lead to ruin all the existing nations of Europe which have followed it, and which are condemned thereby to perish in the crisis of that transformation of their system of land-ownership which has become inevitable.

But this special problem of property in land, analogous to all the other necessary forms of State monopoly, does not at all imply the falsity of the general principles of economic science which have been applied to it in a wrong way. It is, on the contrary, a consequence of these principles that land, by nature limited in extent and incapable of expansion, possessing a value of situation more variable than its intrinsic value as raw material and instrument of labor, remains the collective domain of the nation, the perpetually indivisible property of all its members and families from generation to generation; that nowbere may it be perpetually alienated, into the bands of individuals, with that right of use and abuse which the Roman law proclaimed and which killed Rome by the *latifundia*.

When each nation shall retain eminent domain over its soil, the net product or rent of which will suffice to meet the national expenses, labor, thus relieved of all fiscal burden, may be free without danger to free competition, which alone can defend the general interest against the always disastrons combinations of partial and private interests. Undonbtedly there will always be those who fail, since, with a territory incapable of expansion, population cannot indefinitely increase; but the number who fail must always be very small in comparison with the number who succeed. This is all that can be hoped for in the least had of possible worlds under terrestrial conditions.

If, under the régime of war and fiscal protection to which we bave been subjected for the last hundred years, interest on capital, thanks to liberty, thanks to laisser.faire and laisser-passer in internal relations, has fallen from 10 or 12 per cent., the prevailing rates in past centuries, to 312 and even 3 per cent., there is reason to believe that with complete liberty of production and exchange the same capital, growing more and more abundant and competing with itself, will fall to a price so low that there will be no longer any advantage in dividing it. Then, in the interest of all, to avoid its destruction and dispersion with each generation, it will be necessary to constitute an hereditary and inalienable property in each family, possessed indivisibly by its members in a direct line, as a homestead title, guaranteeing the children against the condition of pauperism into which they might at any time be plunged by imprudent speculation, or the vices of their fathers, or even those mischances to which all are liable.

But all the social doctrines now current among the masses deceived by cranky social theorists, ignorant or perverse, blind leaders of the blind, could do nothing but turn humanity back into patbs already travelled in the age of barbarism. Far from pushing it on to further progress, they would condemn it to pass through a new period of degeneration.

In reality, all these doctrines, put forward as new, are very ancient errors, whose origins are to be found thousands of years ago in the old Oriental religions. They might be described as Christianity or even Buddhism gone to seed. They all start alike from the belief in a primitive equality of all human beings, which never existed, and in a providence which, governing the world with justice, cannot place a living creature in it without providing a place for it at the banquet of life.

If these same economic errors have sufficed to arrest the evolution of the old Asiatic peoples; if they have cost the Christian world a thousand years of barbarism,—under the new form given them by the present apostles of optimistic socialism, they would inevitably lead to another thousand years of depopulation, servitude, and misery, from which humanity would emerge only through new disruptions and rebeginnings.

The only social formula in harmony with the principles of economic science, the natural laws of the family, and the aspirations of the peoples for justice, is then :

1. Absolute liberty of labor, of circulation of its products, of contracts or exchanges, national or international, without any fiscal obstacle.

2. Inalienable national ownership of rent or eminent domain over the soil, administered by communes, under the supervision of the State.

3. Individual possession of the national soil by grants or leases, emphyteutic in character, running not longer than a century, with conditions guaranteeing good use thereof and preservation of its productive power.

4. Absolute ownership by the individual of the fruit of his labor, economy, acquisitions, and conquests, in the usual forms of constituted capital or chattels.

5. Constitution of the family or *gens* and descent of the name in a maternal line exclusively, with retention of the father's name as a surname during life.

6. Absolute liberty for men to dispose by will of half their possessions of whatever nature, and of the other half within the limits of their direct descendants, masculine or feminine, natural, legal, or adopted.

7. In case the father dies intestate, the natural, legal, or adopted sons to inherit each a child's half-share, and the natural, legal, or adopted daughters each a full share.

8. The right of women to dispose of their property by will to be limited to their personal possessions, to the fruit of their industry, to their acquisitions and conquests, in the usual forms of constituted capital or chattels.

9. In the absence of a will, the natural, legal, or adopted sons to inherit from their mother each a half-share, the daughters each a full share.

10. Capital acquired by women through dowry or inheritance, in the form of buildings or fiduciary titles yielding revenue, to constitute for them and their posterity a *homestead* or matronal property, inalienable or capable of reinvestment, and hereditary in an undivided form for their direct descendants in a feminine line.

11. The matronal homestead to be administered in each generation by the matron or maternal bead of the family, except in case of physical or moral incapacity duly established, and under the supervision of a family council formed of all its adult members, presided over by a magistrate whose signature must be obtained before the decisions of the council can be executed.

12. The revenue of the matronal capital to be divided annually, per capita, among all the representatives of the family in a direct maternal line, healthy adult male children being excluded from the division.

13. In case of extinction of the direct maternal line, the ma-

tronal capital to revert to a fund for the endowment and assistance of abandoned children.

r4. Every individual to be allowed, during his lifetime or by will, to establish a matronal homestead in favor of one or more living women, or to add to their already established homesteads by gifts or legacies to be used as an inalienable capital, hereditary for their descendants in a feminine line.

15. Each direct maternal family possessing a homestead to be under obligation to assists its aged, infirm, and orphaned members, and to assure them shelter and care.

Thus the lives and safety of women and children would be assured against all the uncertainties of speculation, against the vices or mischances which now afflict entire families, often through the fault of their head or through the various accidents which at any time may happen.

Thus would disappear all the conventional lies of our laws on filiation and marriage and all the scandals to which they give rise. Women, assured of the support of the family, would not be forced to remarry against their will and could choose husbands more freely with a view to the more rapid improvement of the human race.

Thus there would be no more children without family, no more old people abandoned to the always inadequate and unintelligent care of the State.

Thus pauperism would be reduced, from generation to generation, to those isolated individuals only whose families had become extinct. The existence of their last children would be guaranteed by the endowment fund established out of the estates of wealthy families which had likewise died out.

Thus each city or village, proprietor of its territory farmed out emphyteutic leases, would derive therefrom a revenue sufficient to meet public expenses without needing to close its gates by duties or establish taxes, always burdensome to the poor and heavy even for the rich.

Thus the rent of the land of each nation would suffice to balance the budget both of the communes and of the State, paying the cost of administration and of public works, without recourse to taxation, without needing to close its frontiers to imports or exports to the great detriment of commerce and laborers.

With such a social constitution we should see individual activities develop freely, wealth accumulate in the hands of those best fitted to make it fruitful, and ease and security prevail in the household, where man would represent especially the productive, woman the conservative, element of wealth

It would prevent the progressive accumulation of landed property in a few hands. The formation of sterile *latifundiæ* would become impossible, and no more would ownership of the soil by a few families end in the disinheritance of future generations.

Clémence Royer.

CURRENT TOPICS.

It is a pleasure to notice among so many modern improvements an increasing respect for the sanctity of human life. When I was last in England, I happened to be sitting one summer evening in front of a friend's house in company with half a dozen Englishmen and an American citizen. We were enjoying ourselves in peaceful conversation, when an organ-grinder planted himself directly in front of us and began to unwind about five hundred yards of torment from his diabolical machine. After enduring the discords for some time, the American citizen said : "You Englishmen are too squeamish about little things like manslaughter. I suppose if I should kill that organ-grinder I would be fined for it, instead of being complimented by the jury, as I would be in my own country." That was fourteen years ago; and human life is more sacred in America now than it was then, at least in the neighborhood of Chicago Men who recklessly commit homicide are no longer complimented by the jury. Far from it; last week the coroner's jury at Lemont, after finding that the deceased came to his death by a gun-shot wound, sternly recommended that "contractors Locker, Jackson, and Mayer be censured for shooting defenseless men without cause or warrant of law." The effect of this verdict will be wholesome. It will dimin ish the catalogue of murders, because people will not be so fond of shooting defenseless men without cause, when they run the risk of heing "censured" for it by the jury. We have made a great advance, partly owing, let us hope, to the educational influence of the World's Fair.

* *

The labyrinthine logic of the conflicting opinions left the idolaters of "law and order" in a puzzled frame of mind, because what one set of judges thought was law last week, another set said was not law this week, and what will be law next week nobody knows. It is a perversion of language to give the dignity of law to the illegitimate union of Church and State attempted in the mercenary bargain made between Congress and the Fair. With the people's own money Congress bribed the Directors to shut the people out of the Fair on Sundays, and this arrogant usurpation we are called upon to venerate as "law." The parties to the contract on both sides were disloyal to the American Constitution when they made the bargain. Where one party says to the other, "We will help you to cheat the people out of their money, if you will help us to cheat them out of their liberties," a contract formed on the basis of such a proposition is against good morals, contrary to public policy, and hostile to the Constitution.

* *

While the Sunday-closing question has developed some very interesting chimney-corner law, its "exhibit" of antiquated theology deserves a premium. Such rare fossils have not been seen of late. Placing our old acquaintance, the Devil, on the Appellate Court, by the side of the Chief Justice, was a Gothic bit of ecclesiastical sarcasm worthy of the mediæval time, and the credit of it is due to the Rev. Dr. Henson. It was the same old fossil Satan, and when Dr. Henson introduced him last Monday at the Ministers' Meeting, his horned majesty was greeted by the brethren with a cheer. "I believe in a personal devil," said Dr Henson, "and I can even imagine a personal devil squatting like a black toad on the bar of justice dictating a decision, and after the decision had been promulgated, slapping the promulgator on the shoulder, with the remark : 'I could not have done better myself.' " And the "promulgator" of that kind and Christian flattery of the Chief Justice felt injured that he himself had been spoken of as a " clown." Further complaining, Dr. Henson said : "One rascally editor spoke of me as the 'end man' of the Baptist church, and he did not say which end either." This was a libel, for Dr. Henson is not qualified for either end. He is neither Bones nor Tamhonrine; they sometimes brighten extravagance with humor, which Dr. Henson was never known to do.

* *

There is fitness and proportion in a lawsuit between two mighty nations concerning an animal so interesting and important as a seal, for a seal-skin sacque is a treasure coveted by queens, and worthy to be the subject of international dispute; but it seems hardly possible to give rank and dignity to an international controversy about such an insignificant insect as a frog. Nevertheless, the next case on the docket of the International Court is the suit between the United States and Great Britain as to the mercantile value and political standing of the Canadian frog. Seven or eight years ago diplomatic relations between the two nations were strained by the Canadian frog, because the Custom Honse officers were undecided whether he was meat, fish, or preserves, the Americans contending that he was a fish, and liable to a duty of five cen's a pound, or whatever the tariff was; while the British held that he was a reptile entitled to enter the United States duty free. The naturalists were not able to agree, nor the lawyers either, but before the nations came to blows the American Secretary of the Treasury scientifically solved the question by a compromise worthy of American diplomacy. He decided, if I rememher the case correctly, that the frog was neither a reptile nor a fish, but a bird, and therefore free. Thus, war was averted for the time.

And only for a time, for Major McKinley put a prohibitory tariff on the Canadian frog by special name and definition so that there can be no mistake about him. On the boundary line between the two countries he gives the Custom-house authorities a great deal of trouble owing to his activity and his ability to travel either by land or water. It is not always possibly to tell whether a frog who has just hopped or swam across the line into the United States is a Canadian frog, or an American frog who has just been over to Canada on a visit, and this uncertainty causes the present complication. Captain Dwelle who runs a steamboat between Sandusky, Ohio, and Canada, has been arrested for giving a free passage to seventy-two live frogs from Canada to Saudusky, and the defense, if I understand it, is, that they are American frogs who merely went over to Canada on business, without any intention of becoming permanent residents of that country. The case is exciting international interest because Captain Dwelle's vessel has also been arrested and held to bail in the sum of \$5,000 while the Captain himself is liable to a fine of \$500, or about seven dollars a frog. At the first glance the whole proceeding looks rather diminutive when the greatness of the American Republic is considered, but on reflection we behold how necessary it is to protect the high-toned American frog against the pauper frog of Canada.

According to the schoolbooks moonshine is reflected light, not flashing from any virtue inherent in the moon itself, but a pale glory borrowed from the sun. So, the ambition to shine conspicuous above our neighbors, and to classify ourselves as a selec "order" prompts us to imitate the moon, and to radiate from our own vain personalities reflected light, some glory borrowed from our ancestors if we happen to have no fame within ourselves. The other day I saw a procession of men arrayed in martial splendor tramping proudly behind a band, to the measure of a quickstep known as "Marching Through Georgia." The rays of their bravery dazzled the eye, but when I saw their titles on their banners I said, "moonshine." They composed a division of an army called "The Sons of Veterans," and "the sheen on their spears" was borrowed, for it was their fathers who had marched through Georgia. Psychologically, of course, they were on that famous march, if it is true that every man carries his unborn posterity within him, but their share in its renown is "moonshine." It entitles them to nothing but a metaphysical pension, and even to a division of that the "Grandsons of Veterans" will soon present a claim. It is well to be proud of a noble ancestry, but it is better to do something that will make our own posterity proud.

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If the pale glory of the "Sons of Veterans" was mere moonshine, what shall we say of that other select and mystic order called "The Sons of the Revolution"? Its light is paler than the other, because it comes from a greater distance by about a hundred years. "The Sons of the Revolution" held a glorious festival of moonshine in Chicago on the 17th of June in honor of Bunker Hill. The dazzle of the parade was moonshine, and the splendor of the speeches was moonshine too, except those delivered by the

men who themselves had imitated their revolutionary fathers and had fought for the preservation of the Union in the war of '61. The light of their speeches was not moonshine; it was not borrowed : it was their own, bright, clear, warm, and beantiful as that of the sun. There was present at the festival a tonguester of renown, a phrase-maker fluent as a mocking-bird, and he made a speech rhetorically fine, but the glow in it was moonshine, for the orator himself would not have done the deeds that he glorified his ancestor for doing. When he was done talking I saw his venerable ancestor, "an old continental in his ragged regimental," glide quietly up to him, and plainly as I ever heard the ghost of Hamlet's father, did I hear him say, "My beloved great-great-grandson, that was an inspiring speech, but where were you in the awful battle-days from '61 to '65, when the republic was in greater danger than it ever was during the revolutionary war? Where were you?" And the Son of the Revolution answered, "I was looking for a substitute." I am aware that everybody could not go to the war; nor was it necessary, for there were duties to be done at home, and somebody had to work to keep our armies in the field. I have never had any criticisms for those who did not go, but I must have a little amusement at the expense of those who claim a share of martial glory because their ancestors did go in 1861, or in 1812, or in 1776.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

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