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## JUSTICE AND LABOR.

BY VICTOR YARROS.

HAS "labor" any special reason to desire the application of the principle of justice, of equal freedom? That workmen, as citizens, are vitally interested in securing the recognition of justice, needs no demonstration. But does justice contain the promise of a solution of what is technically described as the "labor problem"? A query put in such a form is well worth considering and answering.

At the outset it is important to distinguish between the problem of labor and the problem of poverty. The solution of the former is not necessarily coextensive with the solution of the latter. The existence of poverty does not necessarily imply the presence of injustice in social arrangements, whereas the existence of a real labor grievance unquestionably does argue injustice. A respectable percentage of poverty is doubtless due to injustice, but even under justice there might be poverty. On the other hand, a "labor" problem under justice is an impossibility. We assume, then, that labor accepts the principle of justice, not in the sense of economic equality or communism, regardless of differences in mental and physical powers, but as signifying a social state in which each receives the results of his own nature and consequent actions, in which equality of liberty and opportunity is rigidly maintained, but in which inequalities in results achieved by reason of natural inequality of capacities are not arbitrarily eliminated. The only question is, Are the wrongs of labor entailed by infractions of the principle of justice?

The complaint of labor is that it does not receive its full share of the product—that it is "robbed" of a considerable portion of its earnings. But who is the "robber"; whom does labor accuse? The workman comes in contact with (1) his fellow-workman, (2) his employer, and (3) the officers of the law. It is manifest that the workman can be robbed either by his employer, by the government, or by both. Now, government can take the laborer's earnings in but one way: by taxation; and it is true, of course, that the workman pays both direct and indirect taxes. But the workmen do not regard taxation as robbery in prin-

ciple; and hence it is not by taxation that the government robs them. Moreover, capital, too, pays taxes, and is therefore in the same case with labor. Again, in countries where the law recognises no castes and classes, no rights are denied to labor which are not, theoretically, equally denied to capital. When a law is enacted which involves the breach of equal freedom, no distinction is made between workmen and capitalists in the letter of the law, although the officers charged with the enforcement of it may exhibit partiality and introduce practical inequality. A law limiting the right to motion and locomotion, or the right to property, or any other right, would seem to injure the capitalist as well as the laborer. We are bound to infer, then, that labor accuses the employers, the capitalists, of the robbery in question. It is the employers who withhold from the laborers a certain large share of their product, and the whole labor question reduces itself to this: that, in the judgment of the laborers, their own wages are too low, while the share that goes to the capitalists is too large. They want more for themselves and less for the employers. They must admit, however, that a charge such as this, without a shred of evidence to sustain it, cannot be seriously considered. How do they know that the employers get more than their due? Neither force nor fraud can be alleged against them. So far as the hiring of labor is concerned, the market may be said to be free, although, in fact, such laws as that excluding Chinese and other able-bodied immigrants restrict the supply of labor and thus raise the wages of labor at the expense of the employer. If, then, the employer offers his terms in a free and open market, and the laborer freely accepts them, how does the employer "rob" the laborer? The answer of the laborer is, that, while he is not literally forced by the employer to accept absurdly inadequate remuneration, the conditions of the labor market render it impossible for him to decline the offer. There being more men in need of employment than there are places to be filled, the employer is in a position to dictate terms, and the would-be employee is obliged, on pain of hunger and other privations, to accept the inequitable terms offered. This answer is satisfactory, but it suggests another query:

What makes the conditions of the labor market what they are? Unless it can be conclusively shown that the employers are responsible for the condition of affairs described, and that but for their conspiracies and manipulations labor could command better terms, the charge of robbery or injustice against the employers must be dismissed.

Are the employers responsible for the state of the labor market? Upon this question opinions differ widely; but there are some—and to these we address ourselves—whose talk indicates that they believe the employers to be responsible. They denounce the employers for corrupting and buying up national, state, and municipal lawmakers and getting the latter to vote them special privileges, monopolies, and gratuities of all kinds, to the detriment of the public at large. We cordially agree with this view, but we have two points to make at this juncture. In the first place, while the conduct of the employers who enrich themselves in the way stated is ethically reprehensible, the chief offenders are the lawmakers rather than the employers. Instead of directing their attacks against the employers, the workmen should exercise vigilant control over the lawmakers, who are placed in office to promote the well-being of the whole body. Secondly, if the laborer recognises that he is the victim of a conspiracy between employers and lawmakers, the proper and only thing for him to do is to insist on the *natural* condition of the labor market being preserved intact and on the cessation of the attempts to create *unnatural* conditions favorable to one side. How is it, we ask, that even those who boldly and confidently denounce the lawmakers as the tools of the monopolists or would-be monopolists, and who place the responsibility of labor's wrongs at the door of legislation, never think of freedom, of the restoration of natural conditions, in the light of a remedy? What is usually proposed is more government interference, rather than less.

On our workman's own showing, he has no case against the employer, except in so far as government intervenes to bestow upon him some monopolistic advantage or special privilege. It would seem that he ought to favor a system which strips the government of all other functions and restricts it to the enforcement of justice and the maintenance of the natural condition of things. That he does not, indicates that he has but a vague conception of the extent of the injury caused by government meddling with the natural arrangements of a free market and of the number of ways in which government can and does interfere.

Now, the share of the product which goes to the employer is called profits, and political economists divide profits into three parts, namely: Compensation

for risk, wages of superintendence, and return for the use of capital or interest. By its interferences the government enables the employer to pay himself high wages for his superintendence, a high rate of interest, and a high rate of insurance; while under a free industrial system the employer would be obliged to content himself with smaller profits and hand over a larger share to labor. There are those who affirm that under freedom interest on capital would tend to disappear entirely, and that the employer would get only compensation for risk and wages of superintendence; but this question cannot be discussed here. We are concerned here simply with the conflict between the laborer's wages and the employer's wages for the larger share in the distribution. Since, however, no arbitrary limit can be put upon either form of wages, it is manifest that free competition, unregulated supply-and-demand, must be accepted as the arbiter by both parties to the controversy. The laborers are interested in the competition among the employers, and the employers are interested in the competition among laborers. In the words of Cobden, when two employers are after one laborer, wages [of labor] rise; when two laborers are after one employer, wages fall. Any law, therefore, which directly or indirectly abates the competition among the employers or diminishes the number of labor-purchasers, injures the laborers and benefits those employers who survive. This is the test which the laborers ought to apply to all laws, irrespective of their ostensible purpose. Any law which obstructs business, impedes industry, decreases competition among the employers, is fraught with injury to labor; and as all laws "regulating" business, industry, and the relation between capital and labor necessarily discourage enterprise, the obvious implication is that all the laws on our statute books which in any way conflict with the principle of free trade or free competition are mischievous and detrimental to labor.

It is impossible to enumerate all these pernicious laws. In general, it may be said that two-thirds of our legislation, state and national, may safely be in this sense described as anti-labor legislation. Specifically, we may refer to the tariff laws, which violate the fundamental principles of social economy and divert industry from its normal course; the laws regulating banking and circulation, which place serious obstacles in the way of business and exchange; the inspection laws of all kinds, which harass the small employer and drive him out of the field; and the bounties and the gratuities, which legislatures bestow on certain lines of business and the benefit of which accrues only to the strongest companies. To this may be added the "encouragement" by government of railroad building, and similar attempts at hastening the development of the country, the effect of which

may be seen in the rapid concentration of wealth and the rise of monopolies.

If we have analysed the situation correctly, the conclusion which forces itself upon us is that labor does not receive its due simply because government steps in and "protects" a comparatively small number of the employers at the cost of the rest of the public. Some of the employer class, and the whole body of laborers, are both directly and indirectly injured by governmental interference with industry and commerce. The wage-workers and the small business man have a common cause, both being vitally interested in securing freedom and fair play in production and distribution. The violation of the law of equal freedom,—the law of justice referred to in the beginning of the article,—involved in the government's unwarrantable restrictions of the right to free exchange and free contract, creates a condition of things under which employers are able to obtain higher profits than they could obtain under free and full competition. The laborer is not robbed directly, either by the government or the employer; but the direct infringement of the right to free contract and free exchange is attended by the indirect "robbery" of labor. It follows that the recognition of this right implies and contains the solution of the labor problem.

Of course, such a solution will be regarded as incomplete by reformers who talk about "reparative justice" to labor or the poor generally, and who are not satisfied with reforms which merely put a period to the career of monopoly and legal privilege. These insist upon rectification of past inequity, upon the clearing away of the effects of the old wrong-doing. It is needless to say, however, that no one has yet succeeded in pointing out a practicable and efficacious way of accomplishing this meritorious purpose. No sane and responsible publicist has yet recommended confiscation or expropriation of the wealthy in favor of the poor, and it is difficult to see how past wrong-doing may be rectified by the annoying and petty legislative restrictions upon industry, which are favored by these reformers. Before the work of rectification can proceed it is necessary to determine who are the victims and who the aggressors,—and this is not as easy as some people hastily assume. Supposing the victims to be identified and confronted with their direct aggressors, no way of adjusting their differences can be tolerated which is fraught with danger to social wellbeing. Haphazard rectification will not satisfy the requirements of justice; nor can the door be opened wide to fresh blunders and mischief. On the whole, it may as well be understood that the altruistic hope of rectifying past inequity in the relations between labor on the one hand and capital and government on the other, has to be abandoned once for all.

We must be content, perforce, with terminating the career of injustice and looking forward rather than backward.

An exception, however, must be made in the case of the landless against the land-owners. The question of rectifying past injustice in this relation cannot be so easily dismissed. But the land problem is not strictly a branch of the labor problem, and may be more conveniently discussed in a separate article.

#### THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE, A CATECHISM.

##### IMMORTALITY.

Is the life of our soul limited?

Every personality consists of a definite idiosyncrasy, of impulses, dispositions and motor-ideas, the peculiarity and relative strength of which admit of innumerable variations. Now the question arises, Whence do the constituent elements of a man's soul come, what is the part they play, and whither do they go?

Our soul is partly inherited from our ancestors, (viz., its dispositions,) partly planted in us by education, (viz., mainly our ideas,) partly acquired by imitation, (viz., our habits,) partly formed under the impression of our own individual experience, (viz., mainly our convictions,) and partly worked out through reflection, (viz., mainly our theories). Thought, i. e., the interaction that takes place among the elements of the soul, enables us to make new thought-combinations out of the stock of ideas that live in our mind. Thought allows our souls to grow.

Our soul, accordingly, has a long history, which neither begins with our birth, nor ends with our death. We existed wherever the ideas of which we consist were thought, and shall exist wherever they are thought again; for not only our body is our self, but mainly our ideas. Our true self is of a spiritual nature.

Our life is only a phase in the evolution of a greater whole, and the spiritual existence of ourselves, our soul, is a precious inheritance of the past, which will evolve in future generations to higher and ever higher planes of being and to nobler and ever nobler destinies.

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The continuity of our soul-life beyond death has been expressed in many various ways. In the mysteries of Eleusis it was allegorically represented by a torch which went from hand to hand and by ears of wheat which symbolised the reappearance of vegetation after its death in winter; while Christianity expresses it in the dogma of the resurrection of the body.

Among Benjamin Franklin's manuscripts was found an epitaph which he had written in 1723, when he was twenty-three years of age. The many corrections found on the page were added, as we may fairly suppose, in later years, and show that Franklin had pon-

dered on the subject, and that he had given much thought to it. The epitaph\* runs as follows :

" The Body  
of  
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN  
Printer  
(Like the cover of an old book  
Its contents torn out  
And stript of its lettering and gilding)  
Lies here food for worms.  
But the work shall not be lost  
For it will [as he believed] appear once more  
In a new and more elegant edition  
Revised and corrected  
by  
The Author."

The allegory that compares man to a book is very good, as it sets the nature of the soul in a true light. We are inclined to regard the binding, the paper, the presswork as the essential things of the book ; yet we must be aware that they are not the soul of the book.

The soul of the book is its contents. That All-being, in whom we live and move and have our being, publishes one edition after the other, and when one copy is destroyed, the book itself, i. e., the soul of the book, is not lost. If but the contents of the book are valuable, if they contain truth, it will reappear in a new edition, perhaps in a more elegant binding, but certainly revised and corrected and enlarged.

What are the contents of the soul ?

The contents of the soul form, in a word, a world-picture, the most important part of which, for human beings, is the relations that obtain and that ought to obtain in human society.

The world-picture in the soul of man, however, is not a mere image of his surroundings painted in the glowing feelings of his sensations, but a systematic conception of the facts of nature so as to behold the laws of their being.

The world of which we are parts is permeated by law. All events are concatenated and interrelated by causation, and every act of ours has its definite consequences. We have come to be such as we are in a long process of evolution. Our surroundings have impressed themselves upon our sentiency and have moulded all the ideas we think and the various motives which prompt us to act. Our ideas and motives are the quintessence of our being ; they are our veriest self, our soul. If and in so far as our ideas are true

\* We may add that Franklin did not make use of this proposed epitaph. He directed in his last will to have a simple stone with nothing on it but the names of himself and his wife. The passage in the testament reads thus :

" I wish to be buried by the side of my wife, if it may be, and that a marble stone, to be made by Chambers, six feet long, four feet wide, plain, with only a small moulding round the upper edge, and this inscription :

BENJAMIN }  
AND } FRANKLIN.  
DEBORAH } 178-

to be placed over us both."

and our motives are right, they are the highest and best and most precious part of our existence, they are the divinity of our being, they are the incarnation of God in us, they are the soul of our soul.

Is there a prototype of the soul ?

Rational beings might, in many respects, have developed otherwise than they did here upon earth. It is not impossible that rational creatures on various other planets are in possession of different physical constitutions than we. They may have developed wings ; they may have tong-like organs for taking hold of and handling things different from our hands, etc., etc. Yet it is certain that they cannot develop another kind of reason. Their arithmetic, their mathematics, their logic must be the same as ours. Nay, more than this, the basic maxims of their ethics can in all its essentials not be different from those which are the factors underlying the growth and evolution of human society upon earth. In other words : The constitution of the universe is such that certain features of man's soul are necessarily such as they are and cannot be different in any other kind of rational beings. There are not prototypes of beings, as Plato maintained, but there is, nevertheless, something analogous to prototypes. The nature of rational beings is foreordained and conditioned by the very nature of things, and thus the biblical saying appears in a new light, that man has been created in the image of God.

The eternal in nature, the universal in the changes of the world, the law that pervades facts, has taken its abode in man ; briefly, it is the truth which appears in his soul, and the truth is a correct representation of reality, it is a picture of God.

Religious truth is not merely a scientific cognition of the parts of the world and a comprehension of all the details of natural laws ; religious truth is a comprehension of our being in its relation to the whole, to God. And this comprehension must not be theoretical, it must permeate all our sentiments, it must dominate our entire being and find expression in all the acts of our life.

Why is the scientific view of the soul not readily accepted ?

There is one great difficulty in this theory of the soul, of its divinity and of its immortality, as the religion of science propounds it. There is no difficulty about its truth. We can readily see that it is undeniable ; it can positively be proved. The facts upon which it rests are beyond dispute.

The difficulty is of another nature. We have great trouble, not so much in understanding, but in feeling that our soul is not our individual self, but God in us.

We are so engrossed with materialism that we look upon the externalities of life as our real self, and this

materialism finds expression in the forms of traditional religions now. The binding, paper, and general appearance of a book is in the sight of most people that which constitutes its essential and entire being. Man finds it very hard to rise in his emotional life to that purity of abstraction which distinguishes between the contents or soul, and the present make-up or body, of a book, of a man, of ourselves.

The question of immortality is a moral question. It takes a man of moral fibre to see the solution in its right light. It is not enough to understand the problem; we must live it. Our natural habits still tend to regard the unessential of our bodily existence as our real self, and all our emotions, our hopes and fears are exclusively attached to this present copy of our soul.

We have not only to change the mode of our thinking, but also the mode of our feeling. We must develop the higher emotions, which are in sympathy with the true essence of our being. We must unlearn to lay too much stress upon incidents that have only a mere passing value, and must regulate our actions from the standpoint of our spiritual nature. We must feel ourselves to be not the make-up of the present edition of our soul, but the soul itself.

What is the natural standpoint of the unreflecting man?

That attitude of a man in which, heedless of his soul, he takes his present make-up as his true self is called egotism; and the man with egotistic tendencies views the world from a standpoint which does not show matters in a correct perspective.

The whole world and his own self are pictured to the egotist in distorted proportions. All his feelings, his sympathies, and antipathies, too, become perverted.

Why must we abandon the standpoint of egotism?

It is apparent that all the purposes of a man which are designed to serve his egotistic desires only, will be vain, and if he were ever so successful in his efforts, death will step in, in the end, and annihilate the very purpose for which he lived.

Nature does not want egotism. She suffers it with forbearance, leaving a man time to find the narrow road to life, but then she cuts him down and selects from the harvest which he had gathered in for himself that which she can use for the progress of mankind, leaving him only the bitterness that the fruits of his work are taken from him and that he has sowed what others shall reap.

Unless a man's entire emotional life be centred in his soul, his life will be a failure.

Is the abandonment of the egoistic standpoint a resignation?

This view of the soul appears to those who still cling to the conception of an ego-soul as a resignation; and in a certain sense it is a resignation. We have to give up the idea that our real self belongs to ourselves. Our soul is not our own, but it is mankind's; and mankind in its turn is not its own; the soul of mankind is from God, it develops in God, and all its aspirations and yearnings are to God.

Yet the characterisation of this view of the soul as a resignation will produce an erroneous impression. There is as little resignation about it as when in a fairy-tale a shepherd-lad finds out that he is a prince. The resignation consists in resigning an error for truth. What we regarded as our self is not our self, but only a fleeting shadow, and our true self is much greater than we thought it was. The shepherd-boy in the fairy-tale might with the same reason say that his very existence had been wiped out, as some psychologists speak of the annihilation of the soul, when only the ego-conception of the soul is surrendered.

When our sphere of being becomes widened we should not speak of annihilation, and when we grow beyond that which at first blush we seem to be, we should not represent it as a resignation.

He who regards this view of the soul as a resignation only indicates that his sympathies, his hopes and fears are still with the externalities of our existence. The moment the very consciousness of our selfhood is transferred into our soul-existence, we shall cease to feel any resignation in this change of view.

What objection is made to the abandonment of the ego-soul?

The objection has been raised that there is neither satisfaction nor justice in the idea that others shall earn the fruits of our labors. But this objection has sense only from the standpoint of an ego-conception of the soul. The truth is that the future generations of mankind are not "others"; they are we ourselves. We have inherited in the same way not only the blessings of former generations, but their very being, their souls: we are their continuance.

It is not an empty phrase to say that the former generations of mankind are still alive as a part of ourselves. For suppose that the soul-life of the past were entirely annihilated and no vestige of it left, would not our own existence at once sink to the level of mere amœboid existence? The thought of this will convince us how truly real is the continuance of soul-life after death! The souls of our beloved are always with us and will remain among us until the end of the world.

What does the new conception of the soul imply?

Our spiritual nature imposes duties upon us; it teaches us to regard our life as a phase only of a greater and a more complete evolution, and demands

us to rise above the narrowness of our transient and limited existence.

As soon as we rise above the pettiness of our individual being, the boundaries of birth and death vanish, and we breathe the air of immortality. But this change of standpoint is of great consequence. It affects our entire existence and brings about a radical change of our world-conception. It is like a new birth which will above all be felt in our conduct. The higher standpoint of immortality introduces a new principle which will almost reverse our former habits and introduce a new criterion of what is to be regarded as right or wrong.

The moral commandments are rules of action which appear as a matter of course to him who has been born again, who has raised himself to the higher plane of soul-life, and whose sentiments and expressions of this attitude are what Christianity calls "love."

The moral commandments are forced upon the egotist, and the egotist naturally regards them as impositions. However, he whose attitude is that of love, does not feel in this way. He fulfils the commandments of his own free will.

Our sympathies must be the sympathies of our better self, and if they are, our course of action will, without any interference of the law, lead us to do anything the law and the rules of equity can demand.

There is no resignation in truly moral conduct. Moral conduct should be the expression of our character; it should flow naturally from the nature of our being.

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#### CURRENT TOPICS.

SOME guilty soul, tormented by remorse, has anonymously paid over to the government of the United States twelve cents as "conscience money," and the receipt of it has been acknowledged by the Secretary of the Treasury. The penitent explained in his confession that he had cheated the government in the matter of postage stamps to the value of twelve cents; and in order that he might get some sleep at night he had been driven by self-condemnation to take twelve cents out of his own pocket and "cover it into the treasury." Please find that amount enclosed herein. Now, I do not believe that the size of this anonymous conscience is to be measured by the amount restored, but by the motive that prompted the restitution, although I once had something to say in a church-trial at Marbletown, where the size of a conscience came incidentally under consideration. The brother on trial had ostentatiously insisted on paying into the county treasury three dollars and a half, as taxes on some property which had escaped the assessor, but he had at the same time stolen a farm by treacherously entering at the land-office a forty-acre tract on which a brother in the church had not only made a "claim," but also had put improvements on the land to the value of a hundred and fifty dollars. The intruder was on trial for "jumping the claim," and a neighbor testifying, said that he knew Brother Noble well, and that he had a very sensitive and punctilious conscience, but he held it under such admirable discipline that it never exceeded the dimensions of a five-dollar gold-piece. I would not lightly esteem even a five-dollar conscience, but how much I admire and envy the man who

for the trifling sum of twelve cents is able to balance the books between his conscience and the world.

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Inspiring to every lover of liberty was the great meeting held in Chicago on Sunday, April 23d, to protest against the extradition treaty agreed upon between the United States and Russia. According to the newspapers, "the protest was splendid, emphatic, and patriotic. It was the voice of three thousand American citizens jealous of their liberties and unwilling to be made the tools of a European despot holding arbitrary sway. Incidentally the czar and his method of governing came in for a share of vigorous and well-rounded denunciation." This gives us all occasion to rejoice, because men cannot condemn Russian despotism without incidentally sprinkling some of their denunciations upon English despotism, and German despotism, and American despotism, and despotism of every character and kind. A judge of eminent rank was in the chair, and among the speakers were a Jewish rabbi, a Protestant bishop, and a Baptist clergyman. Their eloquence was animated by the holy passion for liberty, and the chairman proclaimed a chivalrous principle when he said, "A wrong done to the humblest Russian peasant because of his efforts in the cause of liberty is a wrong done to you and to me and to every lover of liberty throughout the world." That is a sentiment from the religion of universal brotherhood, and I hope that in a spirit of reciprocity it will be re-echoed back to us from great meetings in St. Petersburg and Moscow, protesting against the despotism of Illinois. Tyranny is not a form of government, but any act of political oppression, whether done by an absolute monarchy or by a democratic republic. A free charter confers no freedom unless the magistrates obey it; and the man must have a cheek of brass who can look a Russian in the eye and tell him that the great charter of American liberty is obeyed and respected by the magistrates in Illinois. Liberty is not a phrase, but a fact; not a piece of parchment, but a living soul.

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Speaking of paper liberties, reminds me of a dispute I once heard between a mutinous crew and the captain of a ship, who was explaining to them the criminality of their conduct and referring to the "articles" they had signed when they shipped for the voyage. To me those "articles" appeared upon the face of them to be very liberal to the sailors, until the leader of the rebellion said, "Ain't molasses in the articles?" "Yes," the captain said, "they are." "Well," replied the mutineer, "we don't get the molasses!" So it is with some of us in Chicago. A certain ration of political freedom or inalienable molasses is allowed us by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Illinois, but "we don't get the molasses." By way of a text for the orators of the meetings at St. Petersburg and Moscow, I will recommend this verse from a message delivered three months ago by the governor to the legislature of Illinois: "Practically, there is neither Magna Charta nor the Bill of Rights for the poor of our great cities." This is not the seditious cry of a labor agitator, nor the reckless exaggeration of a political stump-orator; it is the deliberate utterance of the governor, in a carefully prepared state paper, read by the governor himself to the Senate and the House of Representatives at Springfield. Eighteen hundred years ago, a social reformer who was in the habit of speaking on the "lake front" in Judea, said: "First cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote that is in thy brother's eye." Up to the present moment, neither the judge, nor the bishop, nor the rabbi, has called a meeting to demand for the protection of our own poor a restoration of Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights; although the judge very certainly knows, even if the bishop and the rabbi do not know, that the Bill of Rights is a part of the Constitution of the United States and of the Constitution of Illinois. Liberty, like charity, should begin at home.

Taking us on the average, I believe that by nature I am not more timid than other men, but as I grow older I notice that my nerves are not the strong, tough bits of string that they were some thirty years ago. I find that I am sensitive now to terrors and alarms that formerly gave me little or no concern. As I sit serenely smoking my pipe, comfortable in the belief that the world is behaving better and better as time rolls on, it gives me a galvanic shock to be suddenly told by a prophet of dire omen that I am smoking in a powder magazine, and "dancing on a volcano." My pipe goes out, and I mechanically obey him when he tells me to "put my ear to the ground" and listen to the rumblings of an earthquake shaking the social strata into a conglomerate chaos that is to leave nothing but a nebular hypothesis behind. Warning me to "prepare for the convulsion" he leaves me in a dilapidated mental state, and ready to be frightened in a minute by conspiracies like this which has been exposed by dispatches from New York dated April 16th. "The Liberty Dawn Association had another midnight meeting to-night to consider their grievances." Reading those tidings of dark portent, in my excited state I saw for a moment bands of conspirators with red caps on their heads and black masks on their faces, assembled in midnight conclave swearing vengeance and flourishing tin daggers as I had seen them on the stage; but reading a little further on, my fears gave way, for I found that those dark traitors were harmless hack drivers of New York demanding nothing but "the inalienable right of every American citizen to wear beards, whiskers, or mustaches, or not, as he pleases." This is a comical object for a midnight meeting, and yet it is not all comedy. There is a strain of melodrama in it that is not laughable. Driving a hack for a living is an honest business, but marking a man for doing it is not. The demand of "society" that hack drivers dispense with beards is additional evidence that "society" itself is but the corruption of the body social, an envious caste of useless people setting marks of inferiority upon every useful man. The hack driver having shaved his chin, will then be required by "society" to shave his head.

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The persevering way in which the office seeks the man is exhibited free of charge by Mr. Frank Lawler of Chicago. On the 8th of November about 9 o'clock in the evening it was known that Mr. Cleveland was elected Post Office Distributor General for the whole United States, and bright and early the next morning Mr. Lawler was out with a petition for his own appointment as postmaster at Chicago. By patriotic industry he secured sixty-six thousand signatures to the document before the 4th of March; and "as soon thereafter as counsel could be heard" Mr. Lawler brought the Chicago Post Office to the attention of the President; and so close to his attention, that he has never been allowed to forget it for a moment since. Figuratively speaking, Mr. Lawler "sat down" like an army in front of the White House, and put it in a state of siege. Every day he broke himself into platoons and surrounded the President, and every day under a flag of truce he held parley with Mr. Cleveland and demanded his immediate surrender, agreeing to accept the Post Office as a ransom for his prisoner. The President is permitted to go to New York and Chicago, but only on parole. Mr. Lawler will follow him to both cities, and shadow him like a detective. He has maintained the siege in Washington for nearly two months, and this morning's paper says that "his bills for telegrams alone, covering a short period of his stay, amounted to \$86.00. This was but one of the many items, for he has waged the contest so vigorously, and has watched the opposition so unceasingly that it required heavy expenditures." Mr. Lawler's maxim is that all the ability a democrat needs for an office is the ability to get it; and having a delicate regard for the feelings of Mr. Cleveland, he fears that when the chief magistrate comes to Chicago, the opposition to Mr. Lawler "will embrace the opportunity to pester the President." He does not want to see

the President pestered, especially by the opposition. Mr. Cleveland may as well surrender first as last, for the office is hunting the man, and will very likely get him.

\* \* \*

"Liberty be on guard, thine enemy never sleeps!" Especially is this warning timely when that wakeful enemy by deceitful stratagem tries to undermine the common school system of America. Under the existing order of unequal social opportunities, the level floor of the common school is the last refuge of American democracy, and that sanctuary is to be invaded now. Pretending to reform the scheme of studies adopted for the schools, the enemies of popular education in Chicago are trying to cripple the schools as much as possible by abolishing those modern and more enlightened methods of instruction which they classically ridicule as "fads." Appealing to the sordid spirit of the rich they seek to abridge the educational rights of the poor. Taking advantage of their own wrong they plead that the tax payer's money should not be thrown away on "special studies," like the making of "mud pies," while there is actually a scarcity of schools. That is not an argument, but an additional reproach. The children are entitled to more schools, and the "special studies" too. There is no danger that they will receive too much learning, or too much of any other useful thing, and the great World's Fair is a colossal solecism in a city deficient in schools. Build more schools, and let the city cease to grow until the schools catch up. Outside the common school there is hardly any field of endeavor where the poor man's child and the rich man's child can meet on terms of unconditional equality; where brains are the test of merit; and where the prizes are above the reach of bribe, favor, or partiality. It is a grand thing to be old, if the memory holds out, and I can remember that nearly forty years ago when we were trying to introduce the common school system into the western states we were told by the fathers of the men who are now so jealous of "special studies" that the common school system itself was a "fad."

M. M. TRUMBULL.

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## CORRESPONDENCE.

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### LEGERDEMAIN AND SPIRITUALISM.

*To the Editor of The Open Court:*

I should like to call the attention of Dr. Max Dessoir to an article by Van Cullen Jones, "A Chapter on Mediums," which appeared in *The Dolgeville Herald*, of April 6th. Having become interested, through discussion with Herbert Burrows, and a slight correspondence with Du Prel, in modern miracles, or perhaps rather in some of the modern believers in the "supersensual," I noted the article in question, hoping at some future time, when I have leisure for practical investigation of spiritualism and theosophy, to communicate with Mr. Jones; since I notice that he hints at having discovered an explanation for phenomena for which I have never yet seen any explanation—for instance, the lifting of a chair containing a heavy occupant, by the apparent mere placing of the hands upon (not under) the arms of the chair. Perhaps you will kindly forward this letter to Dr. Dessoir. Yours truly,

C. M. W.

*To the Editor of The Open Court:*

The writer of the article on "The Psychology of Legerdemain" makes, as is usual with thinkers who confine all reason and explanation of phenomena to the realm of natural causation, and seek, by a certain show of knowledge, to explain everything in heaven and on earth by scientific formulæ, the exit out of the dilemma by a frank denial of the existence of persons after death, or of spirits, who could exercise a power which the old formulæ of science could not reduce to legerdemain. And yet manifestations are occurring everywhere and of such variety of kind which are

not explained by legerdemain, that it seems to me incomprehensive that his rather interesting article should have been marred by the omission of an examination of the real phenomena and a recognition of the facts in the case. He concedes somewhat to the idealists and spiritualists the belief that an atom of probability of a genuine basis for certain spirit manifestations might exist—at least, *he* cannot explain some things, yet he adds after all that perhaps they are subtler expressions of jugglery. Max Dessoir is perhaps another Sir David Brewster, who said that "spirits would be the last thing that he would give in to." Yet, is this the scientific spirit? Are we, as seekers for truth, to set up our standards of jugglery, etc., and seek to explain what cannot be disposed of by *ridicule* and *denial* by our preconceived notions of formulæ? Is this the way to get at and measure truth? Does truth not rather destroy than make standards of the kind which Max Dessoir sets up? I personally challenge this writer to bring forth one single argument of legerdemain that will account for the manifestations of D. D. Home (a name he mentions), as testified to by the leading scientific men of his day. While I am not a spiritualist, I believe in fair play, and I feel that I am correct in saying that, judging from these, his published articles, such a man as Max Dessoir has not the true scientific spirit, nor is he qualified to pass judgment upon things about which his article proves that he has been neither a witness nor investigator.

For the truth,

J. C. F. GRUMBINE.

[Our correspondents' criticism of Dr. Dessoir's position is not justified. Dr. Dessoir is one of the few exceptions among our savants\* who show an inclination to believe in spiritualistic phenomena. Dr. Dessoir has a decided leaning towards dualism, traces of which appear in his article, "The Magic Mirror," † and also in his "Psychology of Legerdemain."

He is not as uncritical as fanatic believers usually are, but careful readers will find in his articles indications in which he betrays his tendencies.

We have omitted, with Dr. Dessoir's permission, the following footnote, which was attached to the fourth paragraph of the conclusion of his last article on the "Psychology of Legerdemain," and I now gladly take occasion to publish it.

"Zöllner's table is a noteworthy exception. The leg of the table, wrought in one piece, is so thick in its upper and lower parts that the ring which has been placed in a mysterious way upon the thinner middle cannot have been shoved upon it, either from below or from above, because the leg of the table consists of one piece only. Thus there exists an objective and lasting testimony for the phenomena in Slade's *séances*. But what shall we do with such an isolated fact? There is also one unquestionable case of a deflection of a magnet by the human hand; but science has gained nothing thereby."

These remarks do not convince me. The fact that Mr. Slade, or any other medium, or any prestidigitateur, was once or twice so extraordinarily successful as in the instance adduced by Dr. Dessoir, proves nothing in favor of spiritualistic phenomena.

I must plead guilty to a lack of confidence in the investigations of spiritualism or theosophy. Such investigations will lead to no noteworthy results. I have published an article on the subject in reply to Mrs. Bodington, in No. 229 of *The Open Court*, and I hope to take up the subject at some future time. As to Dr. Dessoir, who is not guilty of this same offense, I expect that he will speak for himself. A reply of his may be expected in four or five weeks. —P. C.]

\* He is a physician and *Privatdocent* at the University of Berlin.

† See *The Monist*, Vol. I, No. 1, and also Mr. R. Meade Bache's criticism, *The Question of Duality of Mind*, Vol. 1, No. 3.

## BOOK REVIEWS.

INSTEAD OF A BOOK. By a Man Too Busy to Write One. New York: Benjamin R. Tucker, 1893.

Mr. Benjamin R. Tucker, of Boston, has here collected and published in a volume a number of articles from *Liberty*. He states in the preface that being too busy to write a systematic textbook of Anarchism, he presents this collection "instead of a book." Mr. Tucker defines state socialism as "the doctrine that all the affairs of men should be managed by the government, regardless of individual choice." According to the socialistic plan "every man will be a wage-receiver, and the State the only wage-payer. He who will not work for the state must starve, or, more likely, go to prison. All freedom of trade must disappear. Competition must be utterly wiped out. All industrial and commercial activity must be centred in one vast, enormous, all-inclusive monopoly. The remedy for monopolies is monopoly." Mr. Tucker does not accept the theories of state socialism, but takes the opposite road,—"the road of liberty." He proposes Anarchism, which he defines as "the doctrine that all the affairs of men should be managed by individuals or voluntary associations, and that the state should be abolished." By Anarchism Mr. Tucker understands not necessarily absence of order, as is generally supposed, but absence of rule. "Nor does the Anarchistic scheme furnish any code of morals to be imposed upon the individual. 'Mind your own business' is its only moral law. Interference with another's business is a crime and the only crime, and as such may properly be resisted. In accordance with this view the Anarchists look upon attempts to arbitrarily suppress vice as in themselves crimes. They believe liberty and the resultant social well-being to be a sure cure for all vices. . . . This is an ideal utterly inconsistent with that of those Communists who falsely," as says Mr. Tucker, "call themselves Anarchists, while at the same time advocating a régime of Anarchism fully as despotic as that of the state socialists themselves."

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