

THE OPEN COURT.

A WEEKLY JOURNAL

DEVOTED TO THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE.

No. 296. (VOL. VII.—17.)

CHICAGO, APRIL 27, 1893.

Two Dollars per Year.
Single Copies, 5 Cents.

COPYRIGHT BY THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.—Reprints are permitted only on condition of giving full credit to Author and Publisher.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DECEPTIONS.

BY M. M. TRUMBULL.

IN *The Open Court* for April 13th, Max Dessoir, writing on "The Psychology of Legerdemain" shows that in the performance of certain tricks the conjurer by exciting intense expectation in the eager observers makes them psychologically see the results that they expect to see, although the supposed reality is merely an illusion imposed on them by the performer; and thus the audience itself is compelled to assist in its own deception. Dr. Dessoir says, "That the concentration of the mind on a certain effect has that effect as its subjective result is no new fact to those conversant with hypnotism." In other words, a person by some voluntary or involuntary mental processes, having become familiar with certain causes sees purely imaginary consequences as logical realities, and they appear to him as bodily visible as a wagon or a ship.

The hypnotic trick described by Dr. Dessoir is very often practised by crafty lawyers as a part of their professional business. The eye-witness of a certain action is brought by that process of mental concentration to falsely believe that he saw some of its collateral incidents, and at last with a confidence artificially made for him he swears to them without any scruple, doubt, or hesitation. I have seen this trick successfully performed a thousand times, and the following example will do for an illustration.

Six or eight men being engaged in a rough-and-tumble saloon fight, Peter Fox was cut with a knife by somebody, and after the fight was over he said that Michael Ryan stabbed him. He could hardly have known who did it for the fighters were all huddled up together when the stabbing was done, but the next day a bloody knife was found behind a log not far from the saloon, and this knife was clearly shown to be the property of Ryan. He was thereupon indicted for the stabbing, but the prosecuting attorney wanted a witness who saw Ryan hide the knife behind the log, and here is the way he got him.

Among the spectators of the fight, although he did not know who did the stabbing, was a flighty and excitable fellow named Jemmy Shaw, and between the

time of the indictment and the trial, the prosecuting attorney in frequent interviews with Jemmy, drilled him in the rehearsal of his testimony. In these interviews the lawyer artfully concentrated the mind of Shaw on the missing link in the chain of evidence, the needed fact that Ryan hid the knife behind the log. Accordingly, pretending to be very anxious about the exact and genuine truth of the matter, he put a great many questions to Jemmy concerning what that witness actually saw, and in every question he assumed as a fact what the witness did not see, the hiding of the knife by Ryan. For instance, Jemmy having told something that actually took place, a friendly cross-examination like this would follow: "Was that before or after Ryan hid the knife behind the log?" "How long was it after the fight that Ryan went out and hid the knife behind the log?" "How long was it after Ryan hid the knife behind the log before he came back into the saloon?" and forty similar questions all assuming that Ryan hid the knife behind the log. At last this ingenious concentration of Jemmy's mind on a certain effect had that effect as its subjective result, and at the trial he swore that he saw Ryan put something behind the log.

Great causes, even trials involving life and death, have been determined by psychological tricks like those above described, and great battles have been won and lost by hallucinations equally metaphysical. Grant lost the battle of Shiloh on Sunday because being under the hypnotic delusion that his enemy would not attack him he was unprepared for battle. Beauregard failed to win the battle because he was metaphysically certain that the Union troops on Sunday afternoon had merely fallen back to their intrenchments and fortifications which it would be dangerous to attack, defences which had no existence except in his own imagination. He had concentrated his mind so long on those imaginary ramparts that as the "subjective result" he actually conjured into being the walls and trenches and guns. He saw them bodily; in his nervous excitement they were sensible to "feeling as to sight," for in his official report of the battle he explains that he halted victory on Sunday afternoon and ordered his army to fall back because he dared

not follow the enemy into his "works." And thus it is that imagination fools the intellect, and we see weasels and whales and camels in the clouds.

HOW DID HE USE HIS OPPORTUNITIES?

BY MORRISON I. SWIFT.

LAST evening a memorial service was held in Music Hall by the city of Boston, to honor the late Phillips Brooks. Since the death of Mr. Brooks I have read but one questioning criticism of him, and heard but one other. His picture is in many Boston homes and store-windows, and the articles and sermons about him have been numerous. With deference to this volume of admiration let us consider what he was not.

After Beecher died, Phillips Brooks possessed the attention of the American upper-class world and the admiration of the semi-cultivated, to the exclusion of any competitor. Talmage was heard by more millions, but these millions read Bill Nye with kindred devotion and spiritual profit. Mr. Brooks really had the hearts of his following, they believed in and loved him, what he said signified deeply.

His life-achievement consisted in obtaining this potent veneration. His life-failure consisted in doing so little with it when he had it, and the failure was far beyond the success. The period in which he was supreme as preacher was one of the most critical of the century; the class to which he spoke, the well-to-do, the ruling class, were decaying; they needed to be led literally out of that intellectual wilderness in which they were, to a new moral country of fresh and fruitful standards.

To have tried this was worthy of a very great brain and character, the man who could have done it would have ranked with Washington, Wendell Phillips, and Lincoln. To have used the power he owned over the convictions of the sinning class to attempt this, was Phillips Brooks's regal opportunity.

We cannot think that he failed to feel the claims of this course, his brain was too clear for that; but it required a courage and size of soul which he did not possess. He must have sacrificed many friends by it, must have exchanged the serene life of an aristocratic prophet for the pick and blouse of the militant pioneer. He must have walked along the slippery brink of failure and camped there cold nights, perhaps to the end of his life. He preferred not to. A more delicious thing was to stir the ecstatic eddyings of religious consciousness, to awaken the miniature whirlwinds of humane emotion, vortices of charitable intention, to discourse to sacred and satined admiration, rather than face frowns and doubt and defiance.

He was the Daniel Webster of the pulpit. Inestimable personal service he rendered to many—if life is to go on as it is, slavery unabolished. But he did

not grapple with primary problems, did not side with the weak against the strong, temporised and broke no chains.

Hence I question if those whom he has influenced are not worse instead of better for him. They perhaps reason that if this "wise and good man" saw and felt no deeper and sterner duties than he beautifully tendered to them, there are no greater duties than these; and their conversion to light and action may be long postponed by this loving, fallacious reverence.

Let us grant that Phillips Brooks was a sweet and kindly force in his plane of life, amid the fellowship of the successful; but let us not depart from truth nor anchor ourselves to average ideals, by calling him heroic, original, or grand.

THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE, A CATECHISM.

THE SOUL.

What am I? Whence do I come, whither do I go, and what is the substance that constitutes my being?

My fellow-beings appear to me, like all other objects of my surroundings, as material bodies, which are in motion; and so I appear to them and to myself. But the nature of my own self is different. I am a living and feeling being. My own self manifests itself in consciousness. I am aware of my own existence; and the whole range of my existence in so far as I am directly aware of it, is called the soul.

What is the nature of our soul?

Our soul consists of impulses, dispositions, and ideas. I am a living, willing, and thinking being.

Impulses are tendencies to act, naturally called forth in irritable substance by all kinds of stimuli. Habits are acquired by the frequent repetition of impulses. Impulses grown strong by inveterate habits are called passions.

Inherited habits constitute dispositions or propensities which awake to activity on the slightest provocation. They form the foundation of the various functions of the organs of the organism, and also of the tenor of conscious soul-life. The latter is generally called temperament.

Ideas are representations of things, or of qualities of things, or of relations among things. When ideas enter into the causation of action as the determinant element, they are called motor-ideas or motives.

The elementary impulses of our soul are not clearly and distinctly perceived. They mingle into one common sensation, which is quite general and vague. Sometimes only by special disturbances do some of the elementary impulses rise into prominence, appearing as hunger or thirst or pain of some kind.

The realm of the activity of our elementary impulses constitutes what we feel as our life.

Every impulse is a tendency to move; and in so far as impulses are called forth by stimuli which act upon the living substance, they are called "reactions."

As soon as impulses become clearly conscious they are called will. Will, accordingly, is a very complex kind of impulse. Will is an impulse in which a clear conception of the result of the motion constitutes the main factor of the tendency to move. In other words, will is an impulse which has developed into a motor-idea.

How do ideas originate?

Ideas develop out of feelings.

That which characterises the soul of thinking beings, is the significance which its feelings possess. Certain sensations are produced by certain stimuli, the same sensations always by the same stimuli; and these peculiar forms of various feelings become indicators of the presence of the various conditions that cause them. Thus they acquire meaning, and meaning produces clearness. Meaning changes dim feelings into consciousness.

The origin of meaning in feelings is the birth of mind.

Sensations which take place inside the organism are, through habits and inherited dispositions, projected to the outside, where experience has taught us to expect them. Sensations are signs, indicating objective realities, and when through the mechanism of language sentient beings develop word-symbols, which are signs of signs, representing whole classes of realities, they rise into the sphere of human existence.

What is thought? What is rational thought? What is reason?

The interaction which takes place between ideas is called thought.

All sensations enter into relations with the memories of former sensations; and thus sentient beings naturally develop into thinking beings. Human thought which discovers and utilises the presence of universal features in reality is called rational thought; reason being the norm of correct thinking.

The soul consists of many various impulses, but it possesses at the same time a peculiar unity. How are we to account for the unity of the soul?

A man can think incompatible ideas, but he cannot act according to them, at least not at the same time. He can, to be sure, successively obey motives that are self-contradictory, but he will have to stand the consequences; so that a man will have to regret his actions as soon as wiser and better ideas become dominant in his soul.

The necessity of action imperatively imposes upon the soul a unity which would otherwise scarcely originate. The whole organism has to act as a unity; con-

flicting impulses and contradictory ideas must come to an agreement. And thus the necessity of harmonious action exercises a wholesome and educating influence. It tests ideas in practical issues; it matures them by bringing incompatible motor-ideas into conflict, thus establishing consistency in the soul.

If situations arise in which several various impulses and conflicting motor-ideas tend to be realised in action, a struggle will begin among them and continue until the strongest one gains the upper hand. This strongest motive, then, is executed by the organism.

The power of passions is all but irresistible in the savage, while rational ideas gradually gain in strength with the advance of civilisation. Long experience, inherited habits, and to a great extent, also, repeated regret for rash actions, accustom man to act only after sufficient and careful deliberation.

The habit of suppressing passions until all conflicting motor-ideas have measured their forces against each other becomes easier and easier, and its exercise is called self-control.

The character of a soul depends upon the impulses and motor-ideas that are dominant in it. They are the decisive elements which determine the actions of a man.

The decision which is the final outcome of deliberation is comparable to a motion carried in a legislative body. It is like the majority vote adopting a plan upon the execution of which the whole body of voters is now resolved, and these resolutions of the soul are called the will of man.

What is the name of the unity of man's soul?

The idea which represents the organism as a whole is called the "I" or ego, and it is a matter of course that the I or ego always regards the final outcome of deliberations as its own resolutions.

The ego, by itself, is an empty symbol. Its contents are those which the ego stands for, viz., the qualities of the whole soul; that is, of the impulses and motor-ideas of the personality which the ego represents.

We say, "I have ideas"; but we ought to say, "I consist of ideas." My ideas are real parts of myself.

The phrase, "I have an idea," can only mean that this idea stands in connection with the ego-idea, representing the whole personality of myself. It is at the moment present in the focus of consciousness.

The contents of the ego of a man, viz., the constituents of his personality, are changeable. He wills now this, now that, and his actions at different times are often very incompatible with each other. But there is a continuity in his acts which is recorded in a chain of memories called recollections, in all of which the act-

ing person regards himself as a constant factor and is called by the same pronoun "I." The expression "I" being for a continuous series of acts the same in spite of many changes, produces the illusion that the acting person himself remains the same throughout.

However, we know for certain that the acting person, our organism, and the ideas of which we consist, do by no means remain unchanged. In the same way that our surroundings change, so we ourselves, our thoughts and desires, our organism, and our very souls change. We call the rose-bush which blooms in June, and is a dry, thorny stick in December, the same rose-bush. We call our body the same body, although the materials of which it consists are comparable to a complex whirl of atoms, the unity of which consists in the preservation of its form, for new materials are constantly pouring in, while part of the old ones pass out. And finally, we call our spiritual self by the same name "I," viewing it as a unity so long as the continuity of its existence is preserved, although our ideas do not remain the same, either in strength or in their contents. The changes in our character at an advanced age may be comparatively slight, but there are, nevertheless, changes, which are not less real because they remain unheeded. Our self being the measure of things, they appear to change when we change, and we seem to remain the same; yet this unalterable sameness of our self is a fiction.

There is an error very prevalent that the ego-idea is the real soul. The existence of an ego-soul, however, has been abandoned by science. Need we add that all those whose views and sentiments are closely intertwined with the conception of an ego-soul, look upon its surrender as a destruction of the very root of religion and of all religious hopes?

What is the effect upon religion of surrendering the conception of an ego-soul?

Our conception of the nature of the human soul has been as thoroughly altered through the results of modern scientific research as our view of the universe since the times of Copernicus. Copernicus abandoned the geocentric, and psychology the egocentric standpoint; and future religious development will be influenced in no less a degree by the latter than it has been by the former.

New truths appear at first sight always appalling. They come to destroy the errors which we have accustomed ourselves to cherish as truths. Thus the truth naturally appears to be destructive. But look at the truth closer, and you will find that it is after all better and greater and nobler than the most beautiful fiction woven of errors.

Appalling, and destructive of the very foundations of our religious conceptions, as the surrender of the

ego may seem at first sight, a closer acquaintance with the subject will show that the scientific solution of the problem of soul-life does not annihilate but elevates and purifies religion. It dispels the mystery of religious doctrines and preserves their ethical kernel.

There is no metaphysical ego-soul, yet there is the real soul of our ideas and ideal aspirations, and the value of the latter is not less because the former has proved to be an error.

All the religious enthusiasm which men have professed to have for their ego-souls, and of which they have proved the earnestness in deeds, expresses the natural sentiments for their real souls.

Facts are often misinterpreted, and misinterpreted facts are rejected by many. We must reject the misinterpretation and accept the facts.

The welfare of our souls is the mission, or rather the ultimate object of life; for what shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?

How shall we value souls?

The worth of a man does not consist in his titles, not in the honors he receives from his fellow-men, not in his possessions, not in his knowledge nor in his talents, not in any of the externalities of his life, but in his soul; and the soul of the poorest servant is not less than the soul of the wealthiest man, the most learned savant, or the most powerful monarch. Indeed, the soul in the bosom of the serf that is of the sterling quality of an Epictetus is, without qualification, superior to the soul of a Nero, in spite of the dazzling talents, which made this imperial monster, in the beginning of his reign, appear as a genius on the throne.

We do not say that worldly possessions are worthless, nor do we consider knowledge and talents as an indifferent adjunct; on the contrary, all the gifts and blessings of life possess their values, for they are instrumental, and almost all of them are, in a greater or less degree, indispensable for the furthering and quickening of the life of the soul.

Yet the worth of a soul depends first of all upon the moral stamina of a man's character, and the nobility of the sentiments that dominate his being.

THE AUTHORITY FOR CONDUCT.

Is there any authority for conduct? How do we know of it, and what is its nature?

Truth is a correct statement of facts; not of single facts, but of facts in their connection with the totality of other facts, and, finally, with all facts, so that we can see the regularities that obtain as well in one as in other cases; or, popularly speaking, that we can understand their why and wherefore.

Truth, accordingly, is a description of existence under the aspect of eternity (*sub specie aeternitatis*). We have to view facts so as to discover in them that which

is permanent. We must dig down to that which is immutable and everlasting, to that which will be the same in the present instance as in any other instance, so as to behold in facts the law of their being. We can make or mar almost all objects with which in our experience we come in contact; but that peculiar feature of facts which we describe in laws, the everlasting, the immutable and eternal, that which will be the same in the same conditions, is beyond our control. We cannot alter or fashion it. It is as it is, and we have to mind it in all things which we do or aspire for.

These wonderful features of facts, which we call laws, have shaped the world and man, and the moral ideals of man. They are shaping the fate of the universe still, and will continue to shape it for all time to come. They are the everlasting in nature, and if, in a figurative sense, we personify nature, we can speak of nature's laws as that which constitutes her character.

When reflecting on this peculiar character of reality, we are overawed by its grandeur, but the most wonderful thing about it is that the laws of nature are ultimately not mystical, but easily intelligible.

Science teaches us, step by step, that all laws form a harmonious system of laws. They are all corollaries of an all-pervading regularity. We have to regard all special laws as applications of general laws and learn thus why they must be such as they are and cannot be otherwise.

If science were, or could be perfected to omniscience, the laws of being, we have no reason to doubt, would be pellucid as glass, and even in their most complicated instances as obviously self-evident as $2 \times 2 = 4$, and the all pervading plan would appear strikingly simple.

Yet how prodigious and portentous are the results of this intrinsic harmony! What strict uniformity and what astonishing variety! What rigidity of law, and yet what a free play for all possible variations! A stringent and irrefragable order in constantly changing conditions!

The everlasting in existence is the ultimate authority for our conduct, and, as such, it has, in the language of religion, been called by the name of God.

The evolution of social beings takes place as all other events of nature according to law, and this law is briefly called the moral law of nature. The moral law is as stern, implacable, and irrefragable as any other law. Wherever it is heeded it will bring blessings; wherever it is disobeyed it will be followed by curses.

All religious commands are human formulas designed to inform people how to live in accord with the moral law. Not the authority of religious commands, but that of the moral law, is ultimate. Reli-

gious commands derive their justification from the moral law of nature. They are right if they are in agreement with it, otherwise they are wrong.

The authority for conduct is a reality, the existence of which can be established by scientific investigation. The moral law of nature is as undeniable as the existence of gravitation and as the reliability of mathematics.

What has science to say of God?

* * *

Science does not speak of God, and need not speak of God, because it employs another terminology than religion. Moreover, it does not search for the eternal of nature in its totality, but in its various and particular manifestations only, and expresses abstractly the results of its investigations in formulas called natural laws.

While science does not speak of God, it teaches God; for every law of nature is a part of God's being. Every law of nature is in its sphere an authority for conduct; it is a power which can be adapted to our wants only when we adapt ourselves to it. It is independent of our wishes and cannot be infringed upon with impunity.

All the great religions of the world which (with the sole exception of Buddhism) have called the ultimate authority for conduct "God," have represented him in the image of man. Religious Theism is almost without exception anthropomorphic.

* * *

The various views of God are briefly denoted by the following terms:

Theism, or the belief, without any qualification, that God, whatever be his nature, exists.

Atheism, or the view that rejects any conception of God.

Polytheism, or the belief in many gods.

Monotheism, or the belief that there is but one God.

Anthropotheism, or the belief that God is a personal being like man.

Pantheism, or the belief that identifies the All with God.

Deism, or the view adopted by the Freethinkers of the eighteenth century, who rejected miracles, but held that God is a personal being, the Creator and legislator of the universe.

Entheism, or the view that regards God as inseparable from the world. He is the eternal in nature.

Which conception of God is adopted by the religion of science?

The religion of science is not Atheistic, but Theistic.

Monotheism, as it is commonly held, is the belief in a single God. In this sense monotheism is actually a polytheism that has reduced its gods to one in number. Yet God is neither one single individual God no

many Gods. Number does not apply to him. God is one not in the sense that there is one kind of Godhood. There is not one God-being; but there is divinity. God is one in the same sense that there is but one reason and but one truth.

The religion of science rejects Anthropotheism and also Deism, which is only a peculiar kind of Anthropotheism.

The God of the religion of science is not a person. However, he is not less than a person, but infinitely more than a person. The authority for conduct which the religion of science teaches is divine and holy. We should neither call God personal nor impersonal, but superpersonal.

The religion of science does not accept Pantheism. It does not regard nature and all parts of nature or all aspects of nature as identical with God. The eternal of nature only is God. Those features alone are divine which serve us as authority for conduct. We do not look up with reverence to the forces of nature which we utilise, but only to that power which moulds worlds, which fashions our being, and which moves onward in the progress of evolution.

This view we call Entheism.

CURRENT TOPICS.

"The old flag is down. The stars and stripes no longer wave over the Sandwich Islands. Flag of the monarchy goes up as 'Old Glory' is hauled to the ground." That burst of bathos is copied from the headlines of a partisan journal, announcing to its readers with affected grief that the President of the United States had ordered the American flag to be lowered from the government building at Honolulu, where for two months it had exercised a filibuster sort of authority, which nobody pretends was legal either in morals or in politics. The raising of it was the blunder of our own ministers, which could only be corrected by lowering the flag ourselves. It was in a false position, from which nobody but the President could release it. He has courageously done so, and yet this rescue of the banner is deplored as a national catastrophe and a sin to be expiated in a flood of theatrical tears. An achievement intended to be heroic, became ludicrous through the perversity of actors who balked their parts and stubbornly refused to go on to the stage at all. England and Germany were to "protest" and "demand," and move their war-ships up to Honolulu, but they did not. Had they kindly played the parts assigned them, they would have given dignity to our flag, because it would then be floating over the Sandwich Islands in defiance of those powerful and warlike nations; but when they most ungenerously cared nothing about it and paid no attention to it, the flag had nobody to swagger over but a few Kanakas, Coolies, and Japanese. It soon became ashamed of that and anxious to be lowered from a very uncomfortable and almost ignominious eminence. In lowering it, the President restored it to its historic place of honor without subjecting it to the least humiliation.

* * *

When President Harrison and his Minister of State repudiated the act of Mr. Stevens in raising the American flag over the government house at Honolulu, they should have ordered him at once to haul it down; but under the belief that the *de facto* title it gave us might help the annexation treaty through the senate, they al-

lowed it to remain. They left an awkward international puzzle to be solved by Mr. Cleveland, according to luck or statesmanship, as the case might be, well satisfied that the solution either way could be made liable to censure, and that it could be stored away in the cellar as political capital for the next campaign. Without waiting to see whether the road they were taking was a thoroughfare or not, they drove our diplomatic wagon into a blind alley and left it there, and there Mr. Cleveland found it when he came into power. As there was no passage through, and no room to turn round, he was compelled to back the wagon out of the blind alley and into the national highway. He first lightened the wagon, by withdrawing the Hawaiian treaty from the senate, and then backed it on to solid ground by restoring the flag to its legitimate province, where it can give us no unfair advantage over the people of Hawaii in any negotiation we may enter into with them, concerning annexation, commercial treaties, or any other business.

* * *

That no quality of melodrama may be wanting to the Hawaiian incident, the tearful critics of Mr. Cleveland affectionately patronise the national flag with a pet name, as though it were a favorite poodle or a domesticated parrot, and they wail in counterfeit hysterics over "Old Glory," their tawdry nickname for the flag. They have not spiritual vision strong enough to see the poetic and descriptive beauty of "Star-Spangled Banner," and so in maudlin gush they weep for poor "Old Glory." The title is puerile and meaningless, because it specifies no quality, and any people who have sufficient self-conceit may use it for any flag. I have a special objection to it, because it is a second-hand bit of clap-trap, borrowed from the dilapidated stock in trade of an English politician who was member of parliament for Westminster when I was a boy. Sir Francis Burdett was a rich aristocrat, who early in the present century chose the radical revolutionary side, and I think he was the last political prisoner confined in the Tower of London. He represented Westminster for nearly thirty years, and his pet name was "Old Glory." I can remember hearing the title sung about the streets in doggerel poetry at election times, when Sir Francis was a candidate. Cobbett converted the flattery into a nickname, by making a prophetic pun upon it, saying, "Old Glory will turn Tory," a prediction which came true. I can understand how an Englishman, writing for an American paper and remembering the history of Sir Francis Burdett, might, in a morbid moment, borrow the pet name of that theatrical politician and bestow it patronisingly upon the American flag, but that American editors by the hundred should catch on to it as if it were the measles is a phenomenon I cannot understand.

* * *

While grieving over the destruction of many towns by cyclones and tornadoes, it is comforting to read about the spiritual redemption of a city; a feat rarely done in modern times, although frequently performed by the prophets in the olden day. Dispatches from Bowling Green, Kentucky, dated April 18th, proclaim the glad tidings that "A religious wave has swept over Bowling Green and has carried everything before it. The most hardened sinners have become converts, and the most interesting results have followed." Considering the former character of Bowling Green, this news is very gratifying, and the most encouraging part of it is that the miracle was performed by contract, just like the cleaning of the streets, as appears by the following description of the work: "Sam Jones was hired by some of his admirers to come to Bowling Green and rescue it from its depths of sin. For \$2,300 he undertook the job and seems to have earned his money. He preached ten days, and during that time more than 2,400 people made professions of religion." This included nearly all the inhabitants of Bowling Green who were in "the depths of sin," and considering the difficult nature of the contract, nobody will deny that Mr. Jones honestly "earned his money." Ninety six cents a

head for the conversion of "hardened sinners" is cheap enough, and if Mr. Jones will agree to redeem Chicago at the same rates, he can have the job in a minute. We thought that the election of Mr. Allerton for mayor would convert the city and sweep it with a "religious wave," but having been disappointed in that by the election of Mr. Harrison, there appears to be no salvation remaining for Chicago, except in the evangelistic energy of Sam Jones.

* * *

A New York potentate by the name of McAllister, a high authority on fashion and fad, is having a good deal of imbecile amusement at the expense of Mr. and Mrs. Velvet and Miss Velvet. Velvet of Ormolu Avenue, Chicago, for the awkward manner in which those recently rich people try to imitate the ways of good society. In fact Mr. McAllister in a tone of supercilious pity intimates that none of us here in Chicago knows how to behave in company. He pretends that we do not yet perceive the artistic difference between the Apollo Belvedere and a wooden Indian; that we estimate the value of books by the bindings, and of pictures by the square yard. He enviously says that we have not refinement enough to frappe our wine as it ought to be frapped, and that we know no more about the etiquette of dining than a mock turtle. Fortunately for us, we are now in a position to return the sneers of Mr. McAllister, for our artistic judgment has recently been tried in the Custom House crucible, and has come out of the fiery furnace as reliable as it went in. The critical test was made by thirteen pictures received at the Chicago Custom House from Paris, and the question was whether or not they were liable to tariff duties under the McKinley law. If they were modern pictures they were liable, but if painted by the "Old masters" they were free. The appraiser and the collector being in doubt about it, they called for the opinion of "several Chicago gentlemen of recognised competence," and they promptly decided to the satisfaction of those officers that the pictures were ancient classics, painted by Rembrandt, Rubens, Teniers, and Van Dyke. Chicago people have devoted so much of their lives to the cultivation of the fine arts that they can classify an invoice of pictures just as easily as they grade a cargo of wheat, or bacon, or tea. They can instantly tell a Rubens from a colored photograph, and Mr. Prang himself would not be able to persuade them that one of his most brilliant chromos was a genuine oil painting by Teniers or Van Dyke. We are proud to say that our appreciation of high art is of that western kind so finely illustrated by my old friend Governor Kirkwood of Iowa, who, when a member of the United States Senate, offered the following amendment to a bill admitting classic sculptures and paintings duty free:—"and also all salt used in the curing of meat."

* * *

In addition to their pay and material emoluments, admirals, generals, commodores, cabinet ministers, ambassadors, senators, governors, and a multitude of other dignitaries, to say nothing of presidents and kings, are entitled on special occasions to a certain allowance of noise and sulphurous incense according to their greatness, rank, and quality, so many explosions for this exalted personage, and so many for that one, while national flags, as representing sovereignties, are entitled to the same salute as the sovereigns themselves, the clamor of twenty-one guns. This thundering comedy of compliments has been played so elaborately in Chesapeake Bay for the past ten days that the terrified fish have all fled away to the outside ocean, and the American people are beginning to laugh at this mutual admiration-spectacle as the boy's play of little tin sailors in a carnival of buttons and cocked hats. There was enough of it last week to excite the emulation of an earthquake but this week excels the other both in saltpetre and in sound. On Monday the English cruiser "Blake" came in, followed on Tuesday by the German warship "Kaiserin Augusta," and on Wednesday the French frigate "Arethuse" marched proudly in to its assigned posi-

tion in the congregated fleet. The reception of the Frenchman describes the welcome given to all the others; here it is. "The Arethuse began to fire the national salute when opposite the fort and continued the firing under way. Then the fort came back with its twenty-one guns, and the Arethuse followed with its fifteen guns for the Vice-Admiral on the Blake, the big Britisher arousing all Hampton roads with its mighty return. The Philadelphia joined in to answer the salute of thirteen paid Rear Admiral Gherardi's pennant. The Jean Bart let loose thirteen explosives for its rear admiral, and then the Giovanni Bausan and the Van Speyk opened fire until the whole fleet was drenched in smoke." There was more of it, but the sentiment of the occasion, stunned by the clamor, grew stupid, and the refined exhilaration of a joyful meeting became by repeated stimulants the very drunkenness of ships.

* * *

If nations must have guns and gunpowder they cannot employ them better than in paying high-sounding compliments to the flags of one another; and ceremonial salutes become ludicrous only when they are overdone in an interchange of exactly equal flatteries between men, for every man of the same rank the same number of guns. To the average common sense mind this firing of blank cartridges in salutation of men is a silly and vain glorious piece of hero worship, but the men who laugh at it know nothing of the pleasure it gives to the man who gets the homage, the thrill of pride, the rapture of intoxicated self-conceit. Once, I had occasion to visit a military post that happened to be within the limits of my own command, and as I rode into the town the artillery fired a salute of eleven guns, the full ration allowed me by the regulations. I could not help laughing away down in my boots, but upon my face I wore a look of calm imperial dignity, and as I rode slowly along, with a couple of staff officers behind me and a cavalry escort behind them, I carried myself in spite of the burlesque with an air that said plainer than words to the soldiers and the gaping citizens, "I was born to this; such honors were common in my family; and really, instead of eleven guns I deserve a salute of twenty-one." Speaking from experience, I think that nothing will so effectually make a brevet fool of a man as a salute of eleven guns, unless it may be a salute of thirteen, fifteen, or a larger score. "Too much honor, Cromwell; too much honor, for a man that hopes for heaven."

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SWINGING THE ARMS IN WALKING AS SURVIVAL.

To the Editor of The Open Court:

I do not know that attention has been called to the swinging arms in walking as a survival of quadrupedal motion, but some evidence for this view is that young children, I believe, are, as a rule, more vigorous than adults in these movements, which are instinctive; and further, the nature of the action is quadrupedal, the arm on one side being thrown forward as the leg on the same side is thrown backward, and *vice versa*, alternately.

As has been remarked to me by a friend, the visitor looking down from the thirteenth story of the Chamber of Commerce, Chicago, sees the movements of the crowd walking below thus projected upon a flat surface, and the "reptilian stride" is most suggestive. Four legs propel faster than two, and it seems not unlikely that swinging the arms for the acceleration of pace is an instinctive tendency towards quadrupedism, and thus this motion is rightly recognised by cultivated society as undignified and vulgar. It seems to me that the graphic registering for comparative study of the self-propulsion by quadrupeds, by young children, by adults, also of the movements of professional pedestrians, might lead to results of considerable interest and importance.

HIRAM M. STANLEY.

NOTES.

The Oriental Review, edited by Merwin-Marie Snell, under the advisory board of Dr. W. T. Harris, Prof. William Dwight Whitney, Prof. C. P. Tiele, Prof. Jean Réville, and Prof. John S. Stuart-Glennie, is a popular magazine of Oriental science and comparative religion, which is to appear every second month. The first number is very promising, and the announcements for the March-April number promise to be even an improvement upon the first number.

"*The Oriental Review* is intended to be a medium for the general diffusion among the cultured reading public of the results of the labors of specialists in the field of Oriental science and of comparative religion."

The prospectus declares:

"In the first place, it is not a "theosophical" magazine, any more than it is a Jewish or Catholic or Protestant or pagan one; neither is its editor an adherent of the theosophical system. It does not represent that school of thought to which its editor belongs, or any other; and it has no religious or irreligious complexion, its interest in religion being purely scientific, and in no wise either a practical or speculative one.

"Secondly, it is not intended primarily for specialists, but rather as a medium of popular instruction.

"Thirdly, it does not concern itself with the truth or falsity of the religious or moral notions, or the excellence or evil of any of the ceremonial or other religious practices with which it deals; it treats them purely as scientific facts, to be recorded, classified, and exploited, with perfect impartiality.

"Fourthly, it does not include within its scope anything of the nature of occult science or psychical research, as such, though of course it does not exclude descriptions and explanations of magical ceremonies and feats, considered as elements of certain religions.

"Fifthly, all matter of a distinctly polemic character, whether directed for or against any particular religion, or religion in general, is expressly excluded, as utterly contrary to the spirit and aims of the publication."

"It will open to the dilettante the wonderful fairy-land of Oriental poetry, and drama, and art, and philosophy, and quaint fascinating customs; it will introduce the student of philosophy to the most ancient and abstruse of metaphysical systems, the ethnologist to the deepest and most significant strata of ethnic remains, the archæologist to the most interesting problems and solutions of his science, the historian to the only really venerable historical records, the sociologist to the social usages and adjustments which have stood the severest test and cemented the most solid and persistent of social structures, the biblical student to the enduring records which confirm and illustrate the sacred texts, the theologian to the doctrines and history of the religions which he must refute and explain, and the theosophist to the very fountains of his creed."

The first number opens with an article by the editor on "The Nature of the Science of Comparative Religion," which is part of a lecture delivered before the theological students of Howard University, Washington, D. C., setting forth in brief outlines its materials, aims, and methods. Mr. Isaac Myer contributes selections from the Qabbalistic writings. The subject is of special interest to Christian readers, in so far as Mr. Myer discusses the quotations concerning the creation of the world by the word, which are of interest as being a parallel passage with the Logos idea of Philo and St. John.

Another article by Mr. Merwin-Marie Snell presents us with an account of the seven poets of Persia, containing translations from Firdusi, Nizami, Hafiz, and others. We quote the following passage, as of special interest to New Testament scholars, because it may throw light upon the much-mooted interpretation of a camel going through a needle's eye.

"A camel was feeding in the field, with a cord fastened to his foot. Accident brought a mouse to the same spot, who saw the camel was without any keeper. A thought occurred to the mouse, which was to take the cord and drag it to his hole. The camel followed the mouse without any reluctance, in conformity to his disposition, which is perfectly free from any kind of stubbornness, never resisting or opposing anything. When he came to the hole of the mouse and saw so narrow an entrance, he exclaimed, 'Well, indeed! you foolish little creature! What have you been about? The hump on my back cannot be diminished, and neither can your den be enlarged. What society or friendship do you imagine can subsist between us?'

"Strophe. By whatever plan you set out on the journey towards eternity, or in whatever manner you attempt to gain that point, if I see you loaded with the burden of desires, I must consider you in the same light as I did the camel loaded with the burden of his hump. Throw off this load, for the entrance will not admit, and the narrow tenement of the grave will not contain it."

The concluding article is a little romance, "The Kismet of Leyla," by Minnie Andrew Snell.

The translations of two interesting original documents, "The Precepts of Ptah-Hotep," and "The Dhamma-kakka-ppavattana Sutta," are appended to this number.

The editor promises for the next number an article on "The True Method of the Study of Folk-Lore," by Prof. John Stuart-Glennie; "Notes on Contemporary Chinese Literature," by Mr. Weston Flint; an editorial on "The Theoretical Value of the Science of Hierology"; another romance, "The Rose of Shiraz," by Mrs. Snell; and as original documents, translations of "The Gâthas of the Zend Avesta," and "The Descent of Ishtar Into Hades."

The price of *The Oriental Review* is \$2.50 a year, and fifty cents a copy, each number containing sixty-four pages.

We sincerely hope that the editor will find sufficient response to continue the publication of his valuable magazine. [Washington, D. C.: Merwin-Marie Snell.]

We have recently received from Madame Clémence Royer a small pamphlet entitled *Les variations séculaires des saisons et leurs causes astronomiques*. It is a purely technical performance. The outcome of Madame Royer's views of the astronomical causes of the seasons are opposed to the hypothesis of Laplace which "removes many difficulties, but on the whole explains none." This hypothesis, says the author, is like the turtle of the Hindus which supports an elephant who supports the world. But what supports the turtle? So if the solar system sprang from a nebula, whence did the nebula spring? (Brussels: *Veuve Monnom*. 1892.)

THE OPEN COURT.

NIXON BUILDING, 175 LA SALLE ST.,

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, Post Office Drawer F.

E. C. HEGELER, PUBLISHER.

DR. PAUL CARUS, EDITOR.

TERMS THROUGHOUT THE POSTAL UNION:

\$2.00 PER YEAR.

\$1.00 FOR SIX MONTHS.

N. B. Binding Cases for single yearly volumes of THE OPEN COURT will be supplied on order. Price, 75 cents each.

CONTENTS OF NO. 296.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DECEPTIONS. GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL.....	3639
HOW DID HE USE HIS OPPORTUNITIES? MORRISON I. SWIFT.....	3640
THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE, A CATECHISM. EDITOR.....	3640
CURRENT TOPICS: The Flag Lowered. Backing Out. National Pet Names. Converting a City by Contract. Western Taste for Art. A Carnival of Buttons. Stimulating Vanity. GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL.....	3644
CORRESPONDENCE.	
Swinging the Arms in Walking as Survival. HIRAM M. STANLEY.....	3645
NOTES.....	3646