THE OPEN COURT.

A WEEKLY JOURNAL

DEVOTED TO THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE.

No. 282. (Vol. VII.—3.) CHICAGO, JANUARY 19, 1893. { Two Dollars per Year. Single Copies, 5 Cents.

ROUSSEAU.

BY JOHN SANDISON.

It is said that there is no monument of importance to the memory of Rousseau in Switzerland, the land of his birth, or in France, where he made his home. But nevertheless he has earned for himself a place in the memory of man which cannot be lost. His writings, notwithstanding their repeated exaggeration of facts, form powerful psychological studies, and are written in such a strangely fascinating style that there is little danger of their ever being lost to view.

Rousseau formed a curious combination of rationalism and an intensely sensitive and imaginative nature, which at times seems to approach insanity, but we must allow for the fact that there was working powerfully within him that new and reactionary spirit which was bound, in the nature of things, to follow upon the unnatural and highly artificial civilization which had been developing for a considerable period in France, and which it was his destiny to overthrow.

Born in Geneva in 1712 he inherited a Calvinistic spirit and a desire for freedom from all authority of the Church, for he tells us: "in addition to the general "feelings which attracted me to the worship of my "fathers, I had a special aversion for Catholicism "which belonged to my city. I had been taught to "regard it as a frightful idolatry. The sentiment "went so far with me that I never looked into the in- "side of a church, never met a priest in a surplice, "never heard the bell of a procession without a shud- "der of affright, which, though I soon lost it in the "cities, often returned to me in country parishes "where I first experienced it."

Rousseau, by his love of natural scenery and solitude and simplicity of life, powerfully influenced his contemporaries. We can trace his influence in the outburst of popular fury in the Revolution of 1789, which, shortly after his death, shook society to its foundations. We can follow his thoughts in the poems of Byron and other writers of the early part of this century. He was the originator of the positive school of Humanity, with its ideas of equality and fraternity. He also influenced Herder, the founder of scientific socialism. Goethe, also, early in life, in his "Sorrows of Werther," exhibited Rousseau's unsettled and sensitive spirit, but his powerful mind shortly afterwards shook off its morbid effects. Rousseau, however, by his individualism, affected Goethe in another and more important way. For the greatness of Goethe, from a philosophical point of view, just lies in the fact that his monism was never abstract like that of Spinoza—it always was vitalised by an active individualism which could not be passed over or neglected in any contemplation of the "All." From Goethe's point of view, the higher ideals of life sprang from the due recognition of the relationship of man to the cosmos; and while giving due prominence to that unity he never forgot that all true work depended on the activity of man. In "Wilhelm Meister" he says: "Man's "highest merit always is, as much as possible to rule "external circumstances, and as little as possible to "let himself be ruled by them. Life lies before us as "a huge quarry lies before the architect; he deserves "not the name of architect, except when, out of this "fortuitous mass, he can combine, with the greatest "economy and fitness and durability, some form, the "pattern of which originated in his mind."

For a slight sketch of Rousseau's teachings we may divide his philosophy into three portions, viz.: Education, Politics, and Religion.

EDUCATION.

In "Emile" he shapes out the ideal environment in which the education of a child should be carried out, and he inveighs against all the artificial customs of society in his day, which tended to produce minds utterly at variance with what nature had intended them to be. He proposed that the young should be brought up in the simplest and most natural way. Starting from facts, his problem was to unfold the mind so that it should be natural in the midst of an artificial world. He did not wish to subject the child to book-learning, nor did he care how long it was before the child learned to read. "Always it must be the "facts of life that he is to seize hold of." His idea all through was to cultivate the mind and not to indoctrinate.

Rousseau's method was, accordingly, to educate as

closely to nature as possible, and there have been many attempts since his day to carry his ideas into practice.

His call to man to "return to nature" was more negative than positive, and in endeavoring to set forth the life of the "noble savage" in all its supposed simplicity, he found that his enthusiasm had carried him too far; and then he proceeded to explain that the state of nature must be supplemented by a stage of human development beyond it, in which there is the settled order of the family. In this, he says, is to be discovered a "golden mean between the indolence of "the primitive state and the petulant activity of our "selfishness, and it must be the most happy and "durable state." Rousseau shows us here that our rational nature cannot be developed in abstract isolation, and that it requires a basis of rights and duties, such as is found in family life, for realising itself.

POLITICS.

In the "Social Contract" Rousseau sets forth his views on politics.

His individualistic conception of man is again stated, but not with the purpose of maintaining the individual in an abstract position, but only as a step in a process. He says: "The passage from the state of "nature to the civil state produces in man a very re- "markable change, in so far as it substitutes justice "for instinct, as the guide of his conduct, and gives to "his actions a morality which was hitherto wanting "in them . . . . Though by this change he deprives "himself of many of his natural advantages, those he "acquires in return are so great, his faculties are exer- "cised and developed, his ideas are extended, his "sentiments are ennobled, and his whole soul is ele- "vated to such a degree, that if the abuses of his new "condition did not often degrade him below that from "which he has emerged, he would have cause to bless, "without ceasing, the happy moment which forever "rescued him from it, and which, out of a stupid and "unthinking animal, made him an intelligent being "and a man."

Here we find that Rousseau, notwithstanding his apparent failure to recognise the organic idea of society in its fulness, saw the importance of the state, and its educative effects on the individual members; and he shows us that the formal freedom of the individual is attained only when he discovers that his true freedom lies not in mere subjective fancies, but in a comprehensive public life, where new duties and impulses will be continually developing.

RELIGION.

The same idea which we have seen in Rousseau's writings on education and politics, occupies also a large place in his thoughts about religion, viz.: his desire to free man from all the restraints of outward authority of whatever kind, and to allow him absolute freedom of thought.

All his religious opinions have their ultimate authority in the "sentiment intérieur," which, he states, gives to man all ideas of the existence of God and moral laws. He says: "I find in it a natural safe- "guard against the sophisms of my understanding. . . . "It is that inward voice which reclaims and brings us "back in spite of ourselves to the way of truth." This extreme subjectivity of Rousseau, so typical of his thoughts on all subjects, adhered to him all through life.

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Rousseau gives no indication of a desire to attain to a philosophical conception of a world-order, but still his efforts all tended towards a greater harmony between nature and man in an ideal sense, and prepared the way for the higher unitary conceptions of existence, which occupy so much of the philosophical thought of the present day.

The mainspring of all Rousseau's teaching is found in his idea of liberty—a liberty regarded as largely independent of the rights of others. A freedom of this kind is, however, abstract, and not long after his death his "liberty" became the watchword of the revolutionists of 1789; "his spirit walked abroad" in the bloody orgies and rioting of the Revolution, however much he, as an individual, would have recoiled from such scenes; and thus his abstract principle required to be purified and to be worked back into a more concrete and lasting form.

PROFESSOR HAECKEL'S CONFESSION OF FAITH.

Prof. Ernst Haeckel has recently published a pamphlet, bearing the title, "Monism as the Bond Between Religion and Science. The Confession of Faith of a Naturalist." (Bonn: Emil Strauss, 1892.)

This pamphlet of forty-seven pages is vigorously written and shows its famous author in one of his happiest hours. The substance of it is an extemporaneous speech delivered on October 9, 1892, in Altenburg, at the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Naturalists' Club of Osterland. Professor Schlesinger, of Vienna, had been the orator of the day; his subject being "Naturwissenschaftliche Glaubens-Sätze." The spirit of his oration aroused some objection among the audience, and Professor Haeckel was requested by several of his colleagues to make a reply. A full report of this reply was published in the *Altenburger Zeitung*, and was reprinted, with some additional remarks, in the *Freie Bühne* (III, Heft ii,) and appears now, in a more complete form, as an independent pamphlet. The author has carefully revised his speech, has here and there

emphasised his propositions, and has added valuable notes, containing further explanations and references.

The tone of the pamphlet bears witness to its origin; it is buoyant and sprightly. The main idea of Professor Haeckel's view is set forth in the title. Professor Haeckel maintains that the doctrine of monism is the bond of union between religion and science, making a reconciliation of them possible. The pamphlet contains his confession of faith, and his faith is exactly the same as that of *The Open Court*; it is faith in the religion of science.

Professor Haeckel recognises as the highest duty of our time (*das höchste Ziel unserer Geistesthätigkeit*) the amalgamation of religion and science in the sense proposed by *The Open Court*, the efforts of which journal he especially mentions in his preface. In a private letter he adds that the differences that obtain between his views and those editorially presented in *The Open Court* appear to him of secondary importance only, and should not hinder us from fighting shoulder to shoulder. We gladly agree with him, and hail him as a companion-in-arms.

The main tenet of the religion of science is the recognition of the fact that there is but one truth, and that science possesses the right method of searching for the truth. There is but one religion: the religion of truth. Religious truth must be investigated and stated not less systematically than any other truth; it must be inquired into with the best, maturest, and most scientific methods at our command.

There are some points of disagreement between Professor Haeckel's position and ours, and we do not intend to minimise them. They are, perhaps, of more importance than they seem. Nevertheless, in the face of our agreement in principle, they may be overcome, and I trust that we shall still come to a complete agreement. Our differences have been set forth in *The Monist* (January, 1893). There is no need of repeating them here.

The agreement between Professor Haeckel's position and ours also appears in his opposition to the attempts to preach pure ethics—ethics that leaves the religious and philosophical questions out of sight. He says in one of his notes (on p. 45):

"All ethics, theoretical as well as practical, stands as a branch of the normative sciences in an immediate connection with our world-conception, and, therefore, also with religion. I regard this maxim as very important and have defended it in an article entitled 'Ethics and World-Conception,' written with special reference to the lately established German society for ethical culture. The society for ethical culture attempts to teach and further ethics without any reference to a world-conception or religion. (See the new weekly, *Die Zukunft*, Berlin 92, No. 5–7, edited by Maximilian Harden.)*

* *Die Zukunft* is the same journal of which a late number, containing an article on the education of princes, was confiscated by the imperial authorities.—Ed.

The time is ripe for a great religious reform. Even the trials for heresy, as they are prosecuted to-day, bear evidence of the fact that light is beginning to penetrate into the very darkest nooks of our churches. The bats and owls flutter about in dismay, and the whole process, so terrible in former times, has become pleasantly ridiculous.

The generation of to-day is on the very brink of recognising the truth that the God of Moses and the God of Christ is after all different from the God of the presbytery and of the various confessions of faith; he is the same God as the God of Science.

What is the authority of these formulæ of faith? They are not based upon evidence, not upon proofs that can be revised; they were declared to be infallible truths by a majority vote of some bigoted, narrow-minded old fogies, who had not the slightest inkling about the nature of truth and science and still less any authority to pronounce their utterances as the voice of God. How childish it is to reject the revelations of God in nature, wherever it happens to be in conflict with the blundering opinions of a few elders! But their time has come. Man-made religions will pass away, and the religion of truth will prevail.

There is but one God, and this one God is the God of the religion of Science. P. C.

IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN AND DESTINY.

1. COMPOSITES OF BLENDED MEMORIES.

Mr. Francis Galton, in order to procure truly representative faces, contrived the method of composite portraiture; to wit, he photographed a certain class of persons upon the same photographer's sensitive plate, adjusting the different faces to the same size, and laying one upon the other so that all their eyes fell upon the same horizontal, and their noses upon the same vertical line. The results which he obtained are, as is well known, remarkable. They "bring into evidence all the traits in which there is agreement, and leave but a ghost of a trace of individual peculiarities. There are so many traits in common of all faces that the composite picture when made from many compounds is far from being a blur; it has altogether the look of an ideal composition."

Now, suppose that the photographer's sensitive plate were actually endowed with sentiency. We should in that case have an instance similar to that which actually exists in the brains of living beings. Similar impressions are made through the different sense-organs and registered in their respective sensory centres. Registrations of the same kind are not made side by side; they are not independent single pictures associated among themselves; they are placed one upon the other, all forming a peculiar new formation, viz., a composite memory-structure or an ideal image of all

the objects of the same kind that have come under observation.

The generic images of the mind are, according to Mr. Galton, the product of blended memories, and he suggests that the term "cumulative idea" would be more appropriate than "abstract idea."

The composites of blended memories, built up by successive sense-impressions, acquire meaning and come to represent the various objects of the surrounding world. As such, i. e., as meaning-endowed composite images of living feelings, they form the elements of the soul.

II. THE NATURE OF PERCEPTIONS.

Perhaps everybody has sometimes in his experience been puzzled by the sight of an object the character of which he was unable to recognise. We see a certain something and do not know what it is. The outlines are perhaps clear, the colors are distinct. Nevertheless, we cannot make out what kind of a thing it is.

What can this psychical phenomenon teach us?

It proves that a sense-impression is quite a different thing from a perception. A sense-impression that is felt is called a "sensation"; and a sensation may be perfect and yet a perception need not be brought about. A perception is only effected if the sense-impression is transmitted to the memory-structures of its class so that it can be interpreted as a certain object, so that it can be identified with former impressions of the same kind, so that it can be recognised as such and such a thing.

That which has been called the cerebral centre of vision, is nothing but the place in which the composite memories of sight-impressions are contained. A creature whose centre of vision has been destroyed has lost the repository of those impressions which it has received through the eye. It is soul-blind, or *seelen-blind*, as it has been called by German savants. Again, that which has been called the centre of hearing is nothing but the place in which composite memories of auditory impressions are contained; and a creature whose centre of hearing has been destroyed can no longer recognise sounds. It is soul-deaf, or *seelen-taub*. And the same is true of all the so-called different centres of soul-life.

Professor Goltz has succeeded in keeping alive a dog whose entire hemispheres have been removed. While all other organs, especially his senses, are in perfect order, he has lost all his memory-structures, and with them the composite images shaped by former experiences. Thus he is a perfect idiot, a soulless creature, capable of receiving sense-impressions through all his sense-organs, but all the various sense-impressions remain meaningless to him.

A perception is the simplest act of cognition, for a perception is a sensation that has reached and revived its analogous memory-structure. There it is, so to say, subsumed. Having the same or a similar form the sense-impression fits into the form of the memory-structures and is felt to be of the same kind. This classification of things belonging to the same kind is the essential nature of cognition: perceptions are primitive judgments.

III. GENERALISATION PRIOR TO COGNITION.

There has been much controversy concerning the priority of general or of particular ideas. On the one hand, general ideas were said to have sprung from particular ideas: the *primum appellatum* and *primum cognitum*, it was maintained, were concrete objects. And on the other hand, it was objected that the very first act of naming, and indeed every act of cognition, presupposes the existence of a general idea. The latter view is quite correct; yet, when this view is adduced to prove the mysteriousness of cognition, hinting that there is a break in nature between that which is mind and that which is without mind, we must seriously protest.

When we keep before our minds the physiological process of perception, the reason is obvious why every idea must be at bottom a general idea, and why every act of cognition presupposes some general notion under which a particular notion is subsumed. Every sense-impression is a particular, while the analogous memory-structure, which is ready to receive any sense-impression of the same kind, is, or at least, stands for a general, notion. And this notion is the more vague, the more primitive it is.

Generalisation, accordingly, is not one of the highest faculties of the mind, but its very lowest. Mind begins with generalisation.

The first particular sensation is a particular act; yet it is no notion. Only the first composite of memories partakes of the nature of generalisations, of generic images, of cumulative ideas; and therefore the first perception, i. e., the first and most rudimentary act of cognition is a subsumption; it presupposes already the existence of a general notion.

IV. APPERCEPTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS.

A perception is, in turn, the most elementary act of apperception; and apperception is the function of consciousness.

When analysing the nature of consciousness, we find that it consists of coördinating, centralising, and intensifying feelings in a focus. A single and isolated feeling cannot exist as an actual feeling. It becomes an actual feeling only when it meets another feeling by which it is felt. Thus feelings are possible only in those organisms in which feelings are so organised or

systematised that sensations are referred to the memories of former sense-impressions. The organ of systematising feelings is called the nervous system.

Suppose a sense-impression were made upon a sentient organism void of memories—i. e., an organism which has never as yet received prior sense-impressions. The isolated feeling produced by a first sense-impression (if feeling it can be called) is very different from later feelings, for its scale of consciousness is not merely extremely low, but actually zero, there is no other feeling to apperceive it. The second sense-impression of the same kind, however, meets with and revives the trace left by the first one. It is received in the memory-structure of the first sense-impression and there it is felt. This act of the memory-structure is the weakest kind of apperception imaginable.

Isolated feelings may be called feelings, but they are not felt. Several or at least two feelings must meet for being felt.

The stronger and the more manifold the memory-structures grow, the more cognisant does apperception become. A sense-impression will in higher stages revive several memory-structures, and their feelings will be concentrated upon it. The object of attention is now focused and the act of its being felt is intensified by a coördination of feelings. Thus dim feelings develop by coördination into clear consciousness, and the organised memory-structures form a more and more definite basis of psychic life constituting a certain character, which when it reaches the domain of human life, is called personality.

V. APPERCEPTION AND WILL.

The question has been raised whether or not apperception is an act of the will, and the answer depends upon the meaning we attach to the word "will."

The most elementary kind of a will is to be found in the spontaneity of the simplest processes in nature. The actions and reactions of chemicals, the ether vibrations of light and electricity, and also the gravitation of a stone are motions that take place because the moving object possesses a certain quality which under special conditions makes it act in a certain way. These motions are self-motions or spontaneous motions. Schopenhauer uses the word "will" in this sense.

By "will," however, we generally understand a peculiar kind of that inherent quality of things which makes them move: will is the spontaneity only of intelligent beings. A tendency to pass into motion is called will only when it is accompanied by consciousness. Will is the incipient motion the motive cause of which is a representative image (generally called motor idea) in the agent's mind; the object represented in this representative image being the aim or end to be attained.

Primitive apperception is a spontaneous action, for the act of apperception takes place because of the peculiar qualities of the acting organism. It is an activity of the feeling substance: it is an apprehending and not merely a passive state of receiving impressions.

The peculiar qualities of an organism, which make apperception possible, are (1) psychical, for the memory-structures are endowed with sentiency, and (2) mental, for they possess representative value, they are endowed with meaning. Thus apperception is (in its primitive appearance, and of course in a very rudimentary way) at once a psychical and a mental process. But it does not become an act of will until the memory-structures grow strong and independent enough to exercise a choice and give preference to a certain kind of sense-impressions. By a neglect of any other sense-impressions all available sentiency is focused upon one object or upon the search for one kind of object. This phenomenon, best observable in the hunt for food, is called attention, and attention is "apperception guided by will."

Whether or not amœbas and protozoa exhibit an elementary will when hunting for food is simply a question of terminology. According to Schopenhauer they possess will; according to the customary usage of the term, not. Their tissues demand a restoration of their waste products and they seek to satisfy this want. Their tendencies are much more complex processes than the affinities of chemical substances, but there is no radical difference between the two actions. Dr. Max Verworn has proved that the protrusion of pseudopods in the amœba is caused by their chemotropy for oxygen, while their contraction, (i. e. the return of the plasma to the nuclear substance), after an irritation of some kind which changes their chemical constitution, is due to a chemotropy for the nuclear substances. Their motions are tendencies; they are not actions of a will. We can speak of a will as soon as the irritation which causes a contraction of living substance is a commotion possessing a representative value. There must be memory-structures which not only feel the want for a restoration of the waste products in the tissues of the organism but have also a recollection of its prior satisfaction. This recollection is the primitive form of a motor-idea. It serves as an irritation upon the motor organs of the organism to hunt for food. Thus the cause of the action is a mental state, and the action is planned, however vaguely it may be. The aim of the action is the realisation of the motor-idea. There is no action of the will without either a motive, which is the motor-idea, or without an end in view or purpose, which is the object represented by the motor-idea.

That there is no definite line of demarcation where

tendencies become purposive acts of a will is a matter of course, which, as in all analogous cases of evolutionary products, detracts nothing from the distinction to be made between these lower and higher phenomena of organised life.

VI. IDEAS AND THE LIFE OF IDEAS.

Perceptions are the simplest acts of soul-life. But in the course of evolution a higher activity of soul-life grows from them as soon as sounds are employed to designate certain composite pictures. These sound-symbols create a new sphere of mental life with higher possibilities. Meaning-endowed sound-symbols are called "words," and the mechanism of words or articulate speech creates the domain of rational thought, which in its highest perfection is called science.

The meanings of words and of combinations of words are called ideas.

And what wonderful things are ideas, these highest kinds of meaning-freighted feelings! Every idea possesses an individuality of its own. Ideas grow and develop, they migrate from one brain into another, being transferred through the word-symbols of spoken or written language. Ideas adapt themselves to new environments; they struggle among themselves; some of them are victorious, others succumb. Some are exterminated, others survive. Those that survive suffer changes from assimilation among themselves. Some are powerful, others are weak, and a few assume dominion over their companions.

Ideas are real living beings: each one of them possesses a special individuality and all of them are, as it were, citizens of that wonderful commonwealth which is called "the soul."

It has been said that states, churches, and other superindividual beings do not exist. We do not intend to discuss the problem now; but it appears that ideas would have at least the same right to deny the existence of human personalities, for a human personality is only a society of ideas.

We may compare ideas (without going astray or being fantastical) to real persons. At least the idea we have of persons is after all the most appropriate simile we have to characterise their being. Think only of moral ideas, of ideals, of religious sentiments! They enter the souls of men and take hold of their entire existence often in spite of their will. And what a profound truth lies in the dogma of resurrection! Jesus the crucified has actually risen from the dead. Historical investigations have been made as to whether the apparitions of Christ as seen by his disciples, according to the gospels, were not hallucinations; and the possibility of his bodily resurrection has been denied. It is true, and let it be true, that corpses cannot be revived. But what of that? We need not mind the fate of the body in the face of the truth that the soul possesses immortal life. Christ is actually a living presence in humanity, and his spirit was and is still the most dominating power in the evolution of mankind. The dogmatist, so-called, and exactly so his adversary, the infidel, so-called, imagine that Christianity must be a fraud unless it can be proved that the corpse of Jesus became reanimated. The conception of both the orthodox as well as the infidel are materialistic; both overlook the reality and importance of soul-life.

Ye of little faith and of still less understanding! It is a pagan notion to build a religion on the resurrection of corpses. True religion is based upon the immortality of the soul; and the immortality of the soul is no mere phrase, no empty allegory, no error or fraud: it is fact provable by science; it is a reality without which no higher soul-life, no progress, no evolution would be possible: it is the corner-stone of religion and the basis of ethics. P. C.

CURRENT TOPICS.

A PASSIONATE appeal to Congress is made by a Philadelphia paper against a right which I thought was quite secure from legislative interference, the blessed privilege of wearing rags. In a fit of newspaper hysterics the organ exclaims: "Keep out the rags—this is the first duty of the government. Cholera is certain to reappear in Europe. It is sure to spread along lines of travel. It will come to this country unless it is kept out. It will travel as it always has done by way of the rags. Keep out the rags." This presents to me a dread alternative; and on whichever horn I sit I find it very uncomfortable, but if there is a shade of difference in the danger it is in favor of the cholera. I think it will be safer for me to risk that, than to do without rags. Wool is already kept out; and if rags are to be kept out also, what's to become of me? By the laws of my country I am already forbidden to wear wool, and as a law-abiding citizen, I have adopted shoddy. They now propose to deprive me of that by shutting out rags. This will put me in the situation of Tim Burke of Marbletown, who was asked one day by a shopkeeper to buy a trunk. "What for?" says Tim. "To keep your clothes in," said the trader. "And then," says Tim, "if I keep my clothes in a trunk, what will I wear?" I repeat the question of Tim Burke, and say, If rags are to be kept out of the country, what will I wear? Cotton makes a very good substitute in the summer time, but it is twelve degrees below zero in Chicago to-day, and when the temperature is that low, a blizzard from the North goes through cotton like a knife. I will propose this compromise to Congress; I will agree that you shall keep out rags, if you will agree to let in wool.

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They have lately formed in Philadelphia an "Educational Club," composed of men engaged in the work of teaching or of superintendence in the schools of that city. The object of the club is to advance the standard of the profession of teaching, through the discussion of educational topics, and by means of the work of various committees. The enterprise is praiseworthy, and it might well be imitated in Chicago, because any plan to elevate the standard of teachers and teaching deserves encouragement. No doubt many teachers have much to learn about the science of teaching, and a comparison of methods by means of Educational Clubs must prove useful, not only to the teachers, but also to the pupils in the

schools. At the very beginning, it would be well to examine the methods by which teachers are appointed and removed; because the office of teacher ought to be secure, and reasonably independent; free from outside influences, and especially from the hopes and fears of political rewards and punishments. When teachers are appointed and discharged at the demand of an ignorant saloon keeper who happens to be an alderman, the standard of the profession is lowered so as to meet the lesser stature of an ordinary city council, or something like that. Will the Educational Club give its early attentain to the vast quantity of precious brain energy wasted by little children in the study of spelling; in the paragraph system by which they are made bad readers for life; in the copy-book system by which they are taught at the cost of immense time and labor to write a cramped and crippled hand; and in the geography torment which compels them to commit to memory the names of all the towns, counties, kingdoms, islands, continents, mountains, valleys, lakes, rivers, oceans, gulfs, and seas? If the Educational Clubs will become societies for the prevention of cruelty to children, and will stop that awful waste they will deserve everlasting fame.

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In a letter which I have just received from Mr. George Julian Harney, now in England, he says, "Albert, the last of the Provisional Government of 1848 is dead. A noble man, if ever there was one." That is all; and yet the kindly tribute at the end may last a long time, perhaps longer than a marble monument, for a printed word is nearer to immortality than any other mortal thing. To die, and be called "a noble man" is a triumph over death. Who knows anything about Albert now? Or cares? Noiseless as a bubble on the water, he dissolves into the eternal sea; and yet this man had once the powers of a king in France. He was one of the animating and directing forces of a brave and mighty people in a revolutionary time; a picturesque figure, he stood forth, in bold relief, among "The Men of Forty-Eight." He helped in overturning the throne of Louis Phillippe, and in laying upon its ruins the foundations of a promising republic, only to find, what Cæsar found, how fickle are the Gauls. I have before me now the roster of the Provisional Government;—eleven Governors France had then—and amongst them some historic men, like Arago, Louis Blanc, and Lamartine. At the very bottom of the list is Albert (ouvrier), or Albert (working-man). It is a weird coincidence that Albert (ouvrier), is the last on the list of the Provisional Governors, and he was the last of them to die. I have before me also some proclamations of the eleven Governors, in which they command the Sun to stand still on Gibeon, and the Moon in the valley of Ajalon; or in other words, the proclamations in which they decree all sorts of possible and impossible things; the price of bread, for example; redemption by the government, and the restoration to their owners of all the goods pawned by the poor; work and wages for everybody; and wages without work for those who had moral scruples against labor. They thought they could establish an inexhaustible fountain of prosperity in the Faubourg St. Antoine, and connect it by invisible pipes with an imaginary reservoir somewhere in the Delectable mountains; a reservoir which "the rich" would everlastingly keep full. Albert, (ouvrier), was truly "a noble man," but he was a dreamer of dreams; as was, indeed, his colleague, Lamartine, and his other colleague, the famous man of science, Arago, well enough in physical astronomy, but a political astronomer who saw stars in the heavens that were not there; as also did Lamartine, and Albert, (ouvrier). They thought that a people could become dependent on Government for a living, and be at the same time free.

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From one proclamation of the Provisional Government I quote the following sensible decree: "Royalty, under whatever forms it assumes, is abolished. No more Legitimacy—no more Bonapartism—no Regency." This decree was hailed by the French people with delirious joy, and yet in a few days they relapsed into Imperialistic idolatry and chose for their national chief a most inferior type of Bonaparte. When Albert (ouvrier) saw, or thought he saw, the revolution going backward, a trick that revolutions have in spite of the proverb otherwise; when he saw the republic sliding down, he tried to arrest its reaction by a counterplot in the form of a supplementary amendment to the February revolution, and for two or three hours on the fifteenth of May it looked as if he might succeed; but the middle classes—without whose aid no revolution can succeed in any country—the middle classes, thinking that they saw in Albert (ouvrier) a resurrection of "the terror," fought for the National Assembly, suppressed the new rebellion, arrested Albert (ouvrier) and carried him to prison, where they kept him for ten years. When he came out he saw the Bonapartism that he had abolished, cheered by the ignoble acclamations of the French people, riding rampant over France. Weary at heart, he withdrew, with becoming dignity, to some very humble work that gave him an honest living. From his retirement he watched the mad procession through all its crooked policies and through its treacherous paths of simulated glory to the catastrophe of Sedan. He never stooped for place or power, nor did he ever coin his great political opportunities into money. And so, farewell; a long farewell, to Albert (ouvrier)!

* * *

On the tenth of January the Governor of Illinois took the oath of office at the capitol, and the inauguration ceremonies will excite the wonder of the world. They show us a patriotic occasion diminished by the intolerance of party. A pageant of mutual forbearance and good-will was twisted into a festival of swagger, wherein the triumphant side exulted over the other. An official ceremony of high dignity, in which Judges, Representatives, Senators, and others of opposing politics took part, shrunk to the moral size of a party celebration. When the election of a Governor is ratified and confirmed by both houses of the legislature, by Democrats and Republicans alike, in the form of a solemn inauguration, the very ceremonial itself proclaims that the commonweal is greater than any faction; but the managers of this inauguration evidently think that there is, outside and above the commonweal, a corporate existence known as the Democratic party; and that the claims of that corporation must be considered before the public welfare. It is hardly a matter of civic pride to any of us that in the very middle of the proceedings the Cook County Marching Club, a strictly partisan organization, raising tumultuous yells and "bearing aloft their gorgeous banner," filed into the hall. We can hardly believe it, but the papers tell it, that a big rooster was provided, whose duty it was to crow at a certain stage of the solemnity, which he valorously did. In manner, voice, and style he was the most representative person there, and he spoke for his constituents—the majority. The two most conspicuous actors in the play did much to relieve it of its coarseness. These were the two governors, Altgeld and Fifer. Neither of them said anything or did anything that was not refined and dignified. Considering the magnanimity of Governor Fifer in gracing the triumph of his rival, nothing could have been in more deplorable taste than a glee club greeting him with doggerel songs, explaining how "Joe Fifer's goose was cooked;" and reducing to poetry the additional information that "Altgeld is the man who put him in the soup."

* * *

During the late "campaign," a Republican lawyer of Chicago, conversing with some friends, remarked that he should vote for Altgeld; whereupon one of the party rebuked him and asked him if he had ever read Altgeld's dangerous book and if he knew its character. "No," said the other, "I know nothing about it, but I think it will be such a rare luxury for the people of Illinois to have a governor who knows enough to write a book about any-

thing." The inaugural message of Governor Altgeld seems to justify that reason for supporting him. This message is so eminently direct and practical; so earnestly occupied with "live questions," instead of dead ones, that we painfully miss our venerable friends, the commonplace generalities of old. The Governor is aware "that few people pay attention to inaugural addresses," for which neglect there has hitherto been good reason; but this message will be read, for it will compel the attention of men. It strikes at wrongs that have become despotic, and its accusations must be answered; for instance, this: "Practically, there is neither Magna Charta nor the Bill of Rights for the poor of our great cities." Nothing so bold as that has been said in messages of late, and it is uncomfortably non-partisan. It impeaches Democrats and Republicans alike, for if the specifications that accompany the charge are true, it is very clear that our executive magistrates and our judicial magistrates of high and low degree, of both parties, are all guilty together and equally responsible for the wrong. Both Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights are embodied in the Constitution of the United States and in the Constitution of Illinois, and if those constitutions have been suspended in Chicago, for the oppression of the poor, by the officers and courts appointed and sworn to maintain them, what security have the rich that it may not be convenient some day to foreclose *their* interest in Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights? The judges, at least, ought to be examples of "a law-abiding people."

M. M. TRUMBULL.

BOOK REVIEWS.

STORIES FROM THE GREEK COMEDIANS. By *Rev. Alfred J. Church, M. A.* With sixteen illustrations after the antique. New York and London: MacMillan & Co. 1892. Pp. 344. Price, $1.00.

The Rev. Prof. Alfred Church is known as the author of a large number of works designed for the popularisation of ancient literature. The present volume from his hand is made up of representative plays from the three recognised periods of Greek comedy—the old, the middle, and the new. The plays of the first and second period are from Aristophanes ("The Acharnians," "The Knights," "Peace," "The Wasps," "The Clouds," "The Birds," "The Frogs," "The Parliament of Women," and "Plutus"). The plays of the third period are from Philemon, Diphilus, Menander, and Apollodorus, being translations of Terence and Plautus ("The Buried Treasure," "The Ghost," "The Shipwreck," "The Brothers," "The Girl of Andros," and "Phormio"). The book is adorned with sixteen beautifully executed illustrations after the antique, is prettily and appropriately bound and printed on excellent paper. Its cheapness is remarkable.

Professor Church has, in parts, well accomplished his task. Some of the refrains in "The Clouds," "The Birds," "The Frogs," are exceedingly well done and may be read with enjoyment and with the perfect unconsciousness that they were originally Greek. In other parts he has not been quite so successful. Some points are strained and too much emphasised. What should be left ancient is sometimes modernised, and that which should be modernised is sometimes left ancient. But this work of reproduction is very difficult. It can never be the work of one man. Its fulfilment will require perhaps centuries and call into requisition the labors of scores of collaborators. Each shall contribute his mite, each will elaborate some little point; till ultimately a master mind, guided by the efforts of all, fully appreciating the spirit of the production of which he is at work, and possessed of the power of expression of that modern Greek who wrote "Iphigenia auf Tauris," will give to the world a production which will make us forget that Greece and Rome existed thousands of years ago and are not now living among us. μκρκ.

THE DYNAMIC THEORY OF LIFE AND MIND. By *James B. Alexander.* Minneapolis, Minn.: The Housekeeper Press. 1893.

The sub-title of this work tells us that it is "an attempt to show that all organic beings are both constructed and operated by the dynamic agencies of their respective environments." It is a large heavy book of 1067 closely printed pages. It may be designated as a compendium of the general facts of the following sciences: Anatomy (comparative and human), Physiology, Embryology, Physics, Geology, Chemistry, Psychology, and Anthropology, Mineralogy, and the Science of Evolution. The author, in this compilation, has made good use of the best authorities, and has, so far as we can judge, faithfully reproduced what is found in them. The book contains 400 illustrations. Its production must have been a matter of some expense. And in view of this fact we think it might have been supplied with a better binding. In the main, little objection may be found to the author's method of procedure. We think, however, that it would have been much better had he confined his expositions to the simple statement of his own peculiar views and left the work of detail for the text-books of the special sciences. The tendency of his doctrine is somewhat towards mechanicalism. He is inclined to see in the physical antecedents of mental phenomena the direct causes of these phenomena. He believes that "mental action is a form of physical energy," that the ether is "the soul of the universe," "the soul of things," and so forth. We think that if the author had combined some philosophical studies with his scientific reading he would hardly have ventured to put forth such hypotheses. Another view which in our judgment mars the work, is the author's belief in telepathy. The medium of the transference of thought, he thinks, is the ether. It is true, the thoughts of the mind are accompanied by motions or vibrations of feeling brain-substance: but it is not the objective fact of motion that constitutes the thought; there is no "meaning" in the simple mechanical fact of motion. How then can any purely mechanical medium like the ether be the vehicle of thought? The ether is an instrument of physical research, not of psychical. Its rôle is motion, not thought. On these grounds we think that the position of the author is, philosophically, an uncritical one, though some of his points of view—for example, his criticism of Bain's theory of pleasure and pain—are well taken. μκρκ.

THE OPEN COURT.

PUBLISHED EVERY THURSDAY BY

THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.

EDWARD C. HEGELER, PRES. Dr. PAUL CARUS, EDITOR.

TERMS THROUGHOUT THE POSTAL UNION:

$2.00 PER YEAR. $1.00 FOR SIX MONTHS.

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