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## THE DRAGON AND ITS FOLK-LORE.

BY L. J. VANCE.

THOSE who have seen Joe Jefferson in the play of "Rip Van Winkle" (and who has not?) will remember the scene where, surrounded by his cronies, he holds his goblet aloft and says, "Here's to your health and to your family's, and may they live long and prosper!" But how many people at the theatre know that the actor unconsciously showed the origin of the use of stimulants? How many ever connect Rip's toast with a prayer? Not very many persons; and yet there is a connection between the two things.

Thus it may be, as Major Powell thinks, that when the mind of the inebriate is inflamed with the fire of drink, and he sees snakes and dragons and impossible monsters, then "inherited memories haunt him with visions of beast-gods worshipped by his ancestors at the very time when the appetite for stimulants was created." No doubt the *belief* in dragons dates back to the time when animals were objects of worship. For, it is certain that the wild and unrestrained imagination of savages filled the material and spiritual world with dragons and monsters of yet other kinds,—hippogriffs, chimæras, minotaurs, devils, and so forth; the world thus containing a menagerie.

In the lowest stage of culture man draws no line of demarkation between himself and the beasts of the field. Thus, to quote Dr. Tylor, "first and foremost, uncultured man seems capable of simply worshipping a beast as beast, looking on it as possessed of power, courage, cunning beyond his own, and animated like a man by a soul which continues to exist after bodily death, powerful as ever for good or harm." Of course, people in this mental stage do not distinguish between the real animals of nature and the monsters of their own imaginings. To savage thought one kind of animal is as likely as any other kind—and this not only with regard to form and size, but also with regard to habits and endowments. Thus, a dragon with the body of a serpent and the wings of a bird is no more unlikely than behemoth, which eateth grass as an ox, or the leviathan breathing fire and smoke, described by Job.

At a higher level of culture, the savage believes himself to be descended from the animal which is his Totem.

He worships foxes, bears, and bulls, and takes their names. He thus has a tribe of foxes, a tribe of bears, a tribe of bulls, and so on. After a while certain harmful animals, such as serpents whose sting is death, wolves, tigers, etc., are no longer regarded as objects of worship. The beast-gods are dethroned, and they become beast devils. Thus, we find Fenris the wolf and Jormundjandur the serpent in Norse mythology. So, too, the dragon becomes a beast-demon, and, as such, we find him in the lore of folk no more civilised than the Chinese, the ancient Greeks, the Germans, and European peasants in the Middle Ages.

The inquiry as to the *origin* of the belief in dragons is not so easily settled. The early students of Comparative Mythology had a ready answer. They readily reduced the dragon to a solar myth. They regarded the myth as an allegorical representation of some phenomenon of nature. To illustrate the theory: the sun was observed to disappear below the western horizon; *something* must have swallowed it; monsters were supposed to be the cause of its disappearance; and, as these monsters must be larger and different from any on earth, they were imagined to be dragons. Thus, we do find stories that represent the setting sun as being swallowed by some monster. Many people have believed that eclipses were caused when great beasts devoured the sun and moon. In the language of the Tupis, the word for eclipse means, "the jaguar has eaten the sun." The natives of Sumatra imagined the sun swallowed by a great snake. The Chinese have a story about the dragon which swallows the sun or moon, and so causes the eclipses. The superstition still lingers in China, where the ignorant folk at the beginning of the eclipse throw themselves upon their knees and beat gongs and drums to frighten away the hungry dragon.

Here we may say that the solar theory fails to explain these facts; first, it does not account for dragon-stories which are not nature-myths at all, and secondly, it does not tell the origin of dragons, but assumes their actual existence.

Another plausible explanation is that there were real, live dragons ages ago, "when the earth was young." Those who hold this theory base their argument on the former existence of flying reptiles. Thus,

they point to the creatures called *pterodactyls*—animals, half-lizard, half-bird-like, with wings like those of the bats. The apparatus for flying was a broad fold of skin, stretching from the last digit of the forelimb to the full length of the arm. In the *Rhamphorhynchus* the wing was continued to the tail. These animals were of different sizes, some no bigger than a crow, and some as large as an eagle, measuring twelve feet from tip to tip.\*

The above theory is certainly ingenious, and has many points in its favor. There may be an element of truth in it. The fatal objection is that the dragons of myth and fable do not resemble in the least the dragons of nature. Movement by flying, which is still a dream for our scientists and inventors, has always been a mystery and a wonder to men in all ages. Whenever they wished to assign extraordinary powers to animal or beast, they gave it wings; as, witness the winged horse Pegasus, the winged lions of the Assyrians, the great roc of the Arabians, and so on. That is probably the reason why there are so many superstitions about birds. Indeed, the religious fancy of man insisted on fastening wings to the collar-bones of their gods, genii, angels, cherubim, and seraphim. In all the hieratic traditions of dragons, wings are symbolic of supernatural power.

There is yet another and more important item to be taken into consideration; namely, our myth-making ancestors utterly failed to invent forms of animal life, which were in every way and part novel. In fact, they simply combined a number of pre-existing organisms into one form and called it a dragon, minotaur, hippogriff, or whatever name suited them. Man's imagination was not equal to the task of making a new departure. Thus, to quote the testimony of that sharp-eyed naturalist, Dr. Romanes, "the animal morphology of myth for the most part consists in joining together in one organism the parts which are distinctive of different organisms—the body of a man to that of a horse, the body of a woman to that of a fish, the legs of a goat to that of a boy, the wings of a bird to the shoulders of a bull, and so on." Read the bible, or any ancient book, if you doubt it. Even the wonderful wheeled creature of the prophet Ezekiel was a composite form. There were four living creatures, each with four faces—the faces of a man, a lion, an ox, and an eagle—the hands of a man, and their wings were joined one to another.

I have before me now the illustration of three winged dragons taken from a manuscript of the fourteenth century. The figure on the right has the head and horns

of a goat, the feet of a lion, the body and wings of a bird. The middle figure has a half-lizard-like body, the head of a dog, and no wings. The figure on the left has a strange head, the body and wings of a bird, claws or talons, and a long tail ending in another head. The carved and painted dragons of mediæval art are awkward monsters; if living, they would find their wings more of a hindrance than a help.

Finally, the probable origin of the belief in dragons may be referred to certain mental phenomena; for example, in dreams and in many diseases man seems to wander into strange lands, where he sees grim monsters. Now, the savage takes stimulants in order to induce visions; he uses vegetable drugs or narcotics; he resorts to fasting and to bodily torture. His medicine-men, priests, and prophets fall into an ecstatic state for divination and other subtle purposes. In religious practices the visions of ecstasy are ascribed to invisible spirits, and the act of drinking potions is usually accompanied by some kind of an invocation or prayer. The subject is interesting, and might be followed out further.

Dragons have played an important part in the religious beliefs of mankind. They occupied the chief place in Chinese lore. The common people of the Flowery Kingdom are still ruled by the ancient superstition. Mr. Coryell gives a striking instance. One evening, while he was out for a boat ride on the Pearl River where it passes through Canton, he saw a little girl fall overboard from a boat that was anchored in mid-stream side by side with perhaps a hundred other boats. As the struggling girl was swept along by the ebbing of the tide, she tried to catch the anchor ropes of the boats. What do you think the idle men and women on the decks of the other boats did? Nothing; not a hand was outstretched to save the drowning child, not a move made to save her. However, the little creature caught a rope, climbed into a boat, whereupon the owner of the boat scolded her, and passed her on to a second boat-owner, who also shook and scolded her, and so on until she reached her father, who flogged her with a rattan. "It was about as sad a thing," says Mr. Coryell, "as I ever witnessed in all sad China. The idea was that the river dragon must have wanted that particular little girl, or she would not have fallen overboard; and that, desiring her, he would have visited with misfortune any person daring to come between him and his wish by rescuing her."

Classical scholars need not be told about the dragon in Greek mythology. The stories of the hundred-headed dragon that guards the golded apples of the Hesperides, and of the Golden Fleece in the grove of Ares watched by a sleepless dragon, is familiar to all. It does not appear that the Romans were frightened badly by dragons.

\* The only existing flying reptiles are the little saurians, which are still found in the forests of India, the Malay Archipelago, and the Philippine Islands. There are several species. The *Patagium*, as Cuvier says, flies by means of its ribs; the first six pairs of false ribs are drawn out so as to form the framework of a kind of umbrella. The membrane of skin is spread out and used as a parachute.

Traces of the dragon belief may be found in Teutonic mythology—even in Norse lore. Sometimes it is a hero who is swallowed and rejected, or who gives battle, as in the old Norse story of Eireck and the dragon. In the Middle Ages the dragon was the emblem of evil. Thus, the mediæval devil had horns, hoofs, and a tail—relics of the old satyr combined with the Biblical dragon. It was such a fiend that Christian met in the Valley of Humiliation. Apollyon had “wings like a dragon, feet like a bear, and out of his belly came fire and smoke, and his mouth was as the mouth of a lion.” The Saints had many contests with dragons, and, of course, the dragons always got the worst of it. St. Augustine says that “the dragon often rests in his den; but whenever he feels the moisture of the air he is able to raise on his wings and fly with great impetuosity.” Dragons have often been introduced into romance and poetry. The hero of the Nibelungenlied, Sigfried, slays the dragon that guards the golden treasure.

To conclude: the dragon myth has followed a general law of mental evolution, namely: that a serious belief in one stage of culture survives only as a matter of amusement, or of æsthetic feeling in succeeding stages. Just as in the royal insignia of China or in Wagner's opera, we see the survivals of a primitive natural history; so, we have the survival of the practice of ecstasy expressed in Rip Van Winkle's toast, “Here's to your health and to your family's; may they live long and prosper!”

#### SIGNS AND SYMBOLS.

BY DR. ERNST SCHROEDER.

[CONTINUED.]

##### II.

The first step in the use of the sign was—to say it plainly and frankly—an artful act of *dishonesty*. In the place of the thing itself we put something different, something of less value, a mere trifle: the name or the *sign* of the thing—it may be, as a spoken word, a mere sound, or, as the printed word, a pair of dark spots on a bright background. It could easily have happened, for example, that when the commissary-general of the Persian army that invaded Macedonia under Xerxes (480 B. C.) computed in advance the quantity of provisions the army had to take along, when he “calculated” this quantity, that—to make a literal truth of the Biblical simile—he was first compelled to make stones, little limestone pebbles, or “calculi,” take the place of bread. “The giving of stones for bread,” as the sign of the quantity to be received—this is an occurrence that in all probability frequently happened in the early ages of the race.

But the dishonesty mentioned must, if the sign is to fulfil its purpose, if it is not to be degraded into a

mere instrument of fraud, be compensated for and equalised by its user substituting *in thought* for the sign at the proper time the thing itself; by his constantly associating with the sign, with absolute logical consequence, the notion of the thing. Logical consequence in the employment of the sign is thus the first and highest demand to be made in connection with its use. Any departure from it, in itself a *lapsus consequentiæ*, is like a declaration of insolvency by a bank or by a merchant who does not cash on presentation the notes or drafts issued by him. Logical inconsequence in the use of the sign is the same thing as, or at least will eventually lead to, intellectual bankruptcy.

The animal, as a rule, is too stupidly honest to take the risk of this first step in the construction of signs. To him the sign, at least the visible sign, always remains the unmeaning, lifeless, and ineffective thing that in its origin it really is. And although horses voluntarily stop at the signs of taverns and inns, yet it will hardly ever be brought to pass that horses will regard the signs of “Look out for the locomotive” at the railway crossings, if their drivers do not do it.

However, it must be admitted that the differences between man and animal, even in this domain, are not of a qualitative character, but must be regarded as one of degree, as quantitative and graduated. And attention may be called to the fact that a few years ago Sir John Lubbock, a famous English biologist, successfully taught his dog, an intelligent poodle, “to read,” so to speak, at least *one* word; for he managed to train the animal to pick out from a waste paper basket before meal times, from amongst a great number of pieces of paper written upon in the most various ways (some bearing indeed but one word, and others not written upon at all) the particular piece upon which the word “food” was written. But when we compare the great pains and patience which were employed in training the dog to such a pitch, with the trivial character of the result, the magnitude of the quantitative difference between man and animal will be rendered all the more plain.

When once we have completed the venture of this first step of elevating a sign—for instance, a word, a group of syllables,—to that which it will ever afterwards be to us, the representative and surrogate of a thing, we have then come into the possession of a *name* for a thing. To define what a name is, is scientifically not a very easy task, and the establishment of a definition has been variously attempted by philosophers (by Hobbes and others). The poet says:

“Names are mere sound and smoke  
Obscuring heaven's clear glow.”

I shall spend no more time upon the explanation of the notion of name, which is the common possession of us all, but will simply mention that a name ap-



pears as a proper name in so far as it designates an absolutely determinate thing or object of thought. Thus "The Death of Julius Cæsar" is a proper name, although a polynomial one. The naming of every conceivable thing that it might appear desirable to designate, or of which we might have occasion to speak, could not be accomplished by the formation of ever so many proper names. On the contrary, the necessity soon evinces itself that a language should also form names that embrace a great number of things, of names that are competent to represent and to designate now this thing and now that thing. The indispensability of *common* names is thus also obvious.

A common name of this kind is for instance the name "planet." It embraces the Earth, Venus, Mercury, Mars, and every one of the 301 known asteroids; it is applicable with equal propriety to Jupiter, to Saturn, to Uranus, and to Neptune.

The question now arises, What things shall be designated by the *same* common name. In answering this question, we must refer the inquirer to the faculty which the human mind possesses of making distinctions; we are able to distinguish things that are different, and in similar things, to observe similarities. We are accustomed to denominate those things by the *same common name* which, owing to the fact that they resemble each other in some one feature or definite group of features, recommend themselves, so to speak, of their own accord to us as fit objects for investiture with the same name.

Inseparably connected with this process of denomination, and also with the employment of the common name created by the process, is, on the other hand, the second absolutely necessary process that the congruent features of the things denominated shall always enter into the foreground and central province of the attention. For these features are the sole elements that constitute the bond of connection between our changing conceptions of the individually different things which the common name embraces, and the permanent, ever same remaining name. Growing in with and becoming a part of the common name, they are the hoops of the barrel that hold together the staves of the individual objects.

With all this there takes place in the mind a peculiar psychological process which culminates in our associating with the common name an *idea* or *notion*. The congruent features of things, which we, our attention being called to them, designate by the same common name, mutually *intensify* each other in consciousness, and, as they are again and again placed before the mind, especially when the common name is used, are more and more intensively and vividly thought of: as a result of which the non-congruent features, changing as they constantly do, retreat into the background

of consciousness and grow dim. In the phraseology of Kant we *reflect* upon, hold in view the congruent features of things, and neglect or *abstract* from the others.

In our brain there may correspond to this operation a process which can fittingly be compared to the deepening of a furrow in a field, as this is accomplished by repeated plowing. Schopenhauer employs as a simile the tendency a piece of cloth gradually assumes through repeated and protracted bending along the same creases, of lying in definite folds. In view of the great delicacy of the brain-processes, that accompany our mental acts—processes as yet not well known and whose investigation lies in the domain of physiology—these similes are to be looked upon as simple make-shifts.

As shown, there is, then, a second capacity of the human intellect, which enters, in the formation of ideas, into reciprocal co-operation with the faculty of distinction, and supplements it, so to speak. This is the faculty of *abstraction*. We are able to concentrate our attention upon certain features of a thought-of thing; to bring these features prominently forward into the field of our attention and there more or less completely to isolate them by neglecting totally, or as much as possible, other features.

This capacity, or power of the human mind, is, on its part, developed and practiced and strengthened by the profuse and constant formation of ideas; and, subsequently, by its own demands upon itself, the acquisition of new ideas as well as the extension and generalisation of already existing ones, are facilitated, aided, and promoted.

Such conscious augmentation of the process of abstraction, unconsciously brought about in its origin by the common name, is especially practiced, out of motives of a division of labor, in the sciences. In the domains of science the mind is wont, as the result of extensive practice, to acquire a veritable virtuosity in the neglecting of features unessential to the investigation in question, in the disregarding of all adventitious circumstances, in the ignoring of them for its own disburdenment, and, thus liberated, in devoting its full powers to the things that are essential.

We have seen that the formation of ideas goes hand in hand with the introduction of common names indispensably necessary to the creation of a language; the former has its roots in the latter. And *vice versa*, whenever we acquire a new idea we at once feel the necessity of an appropriate name or an appropriate symbol for it. Designation, or the bestowing of names, and the formation of ideas reciprocally condition one another.

By the idea, as is well known, comparisons are made; points of agreement are comprehended under a single head, and points of non-agreement are elided.

But the perception of all differences that exist, and the perception of all agreements that exist—in the aspect of relations, such as ground and consequence, cause and effect—constitutes a knowledge of the totality of the world. Whence it appears that the intellectual aim of humanity will consist in the perfection of our system of ideas. Or, to speak with Sigwart, in a homogeneous arrangement, for all thinking beings, of the multifarious contents of the picture-gallery of the mind, and consequently in the thorough and systematic perfection of what language in the very efforts of unconscious reason originally sought to accomplish. Particularly, however, is it incumbent upon science, to acquire the most appropriate and fittest ideas by the help of which, and by the designation of which, the greatest possible simplicity and abbreviation of our knowledge can be attained, and the most valuable and comprehensive general judgments rendered possible.

In view of all this it will not be a subject of surprise to any one that with the progress of science there goes hand in hand a development, an extension, and an enriching of human systems of ideas, and as a result of all this, an increase in the number of our signs and symbols, an expansion of our terminology, and a constant growth of language, with the constant and successful aim in view of advancing the art of describing reality.

On one aspect of this tendency I desire to lay especial emphasis.

*Observation and inference* are the only means at our disposal to extend the field of knowledge; and according as they need or do not need the first of these means, according as they find the central motive of their operations in the first or in the latter, the sciences are divided, as we all know, into inductive and deductive.

Deduction, correct logical inference, is thus one of the first and most important of arts. It is certainly of the highest consequence everywhere to separate the truth from error. To reach this aim with the greatest possible saving of mental labor, we shall also be obliged, inasmuch as our thoughts are joined to signs, to bestow great care upon saving methods, upon provident economy, with the signs of things—upon the realisation of a system of naming which is the most appropriate possible.

But things which are the objects of complicated inference must generally be thought of and reflected upon again and again; they must be brought into comparison with one another and placed, that is, viewed, in the most manifold relations and connections with themselves and with other objects. They must be mentioned, if only in the mind, again and again. Long or circumstantial names, therefore, will never find easy resting places. And thus we see ourselves

forced to abbreviate as much as possible even the names of things, to designate names simply and wholly by *letters*, and to introduce also, for the most important relations and connections between things, new and peculiar signs of relation and connection.

This means that deduction in its highest forms takes the shape of *computation*, of *calculation*, in which "the taxis and thesis of literal or numeral space-pictures" upon a plane surface henceforth form the sole object of contemplation.

The inductive sciences also now exhibit, as a rule, the tendency to pass from the inductive stage of their development to the deductive stage that geometry, mechanics, and theoretical astronomy have already reached. They strive, namely, to replace the difficulties of the study of the things themselves—of the things which we do not always have at hand and which generally we can not hold fast to or fix and manipulate without any further ado—by the study of the signs of things which are always at the disposal of the investigator, and admit of being handled with incomparable facility. In these sciences also, the signs of things will, in the end, frequently form the sole subject of consideration.

Now that we have passed in review the first origins of the creation of a system of names, of a language, I am obliged, in view of the briefness of the time at my disposal, to renounce the further pursuit of this interesting theme and of the manner in which verbal speech met the additional demands of the formation of judgments—a feat which was accomplished by means of the ten well known parts of speech, nouns, adjectives, verbs, etc., and particularly by the formation of words which, like conjunctions and prepositions, are incompetent to furnish names except in connection with other words. It will be sufficient to state that the various languages of the earth—calculated by Max Müller to be about nine hundred in number—have met these demands in the most various ways, but that none have done it in a perfectly satisfactory or in a thoroughly rational manner.

In the first place, in only a very slight number of cases does any ascertainable connection exist between the sign and the thing designated, between the sound of the name and the contents of its image; as in the case of the so-called onomatopoeic words like "cuckoo," "uhu," etc. ("Thunder," "Donner," "tonnerre," "tonitru," are also commonly cited as an instance of onomatopoeia, but Max Müller claims that these words are derived from the same Sanskrit root TAN, to stretch ("dehnen," to extend), which appears in the French "tendre," in the Latin "tenuis," the German "dünn," and the English "thin.")

The language-forming genius of the nation always connects, it is true, with the sign, some very promi-

nent feature of the thing designated; but the association of such features with the contents of what is comprehended by the sign is one-sided and accidental, it does not suggest any sufficiently definite inference as to the full contents and the entire character of the concept. The significant stamp of the sign, however, wears away with time, and the original impression is often in whole languages entirely effaced. The different languages of the world, in fact, designate the same thing with all imaginable different kinds of words. The sound arouses within us the image which has clothed itself by blind habit, as a fact and not logically, in this particular sign and no other.

A second chief imperfection of all word-languages consists in the varying usages of its words, in the double or multiple meaning of nearly all its names.

Multiple-meaning words, however, are not to be confounded with words susceptible of a great number of interpretations, nor words of two meanings with words which are equivocal.

Every common name may be said to be a name susceptible of a number of interpretations. When I say, for example, my hand has five fingers, the name "my hand" is ambiguous, as it can just as well mean my right hand as my left. If we should say, the normal human hand has five fingers, the subject of this sentence would be a name susceptible of an indefinite number of interpretations. The use of multi-interpretable names is therefore not only legitimate, but is, for the purposes of the expression of our thoughts, as already seen, absolutely indispensable.

But when, on the other hand, we first say, metals are chemical elements, and again, brass is a metal, we observe that the word metal at once takes its place in the category of words of double meanings, as in the first sentence it is used in a different and much narrower sense than in the second. And a person who will compare and connect the two judgments will hardly be able to escape the false inference that brass also must be a chemical element. Double meanings lurk in the vacillations of usage. They are a permanent violation of the fundamental demands of logical consequence or discipline in the use of the sign, and are pregnant with great dangers for thought.

To all this must further be added a great variety of logical imperfections and irregularities in the word-languages of the world, which as yet greatly differ from one another in the laws for the construction of sentences, in the usages of the cases and prepositions, etc., etc.

In brief, a stupendous task arises before our eyes; the task of still further perfecting the sign, to which the human mind already owes so much, of freeing language of its imperfections, and, by the appropriate fashioning of the sign, of bringing the sign and the

thing into perfect and law-governed correspondence (or, as Trendelenburg says, "into an immediate connection"). This we do by inventing and substituting in the place of the words that accidentally happen to be used in the languages of the world, signs which shall stand for and represent, in point of distinction and in point of comprehension, the features distinguished and comprehended in the mental notion of that word.

A designation of this character, if extended over the whole field of the objects of thought, will, in contrast to the verbal sign, in its present greater or less indifference to the contents of mental images, be a *figurative* language of the ideas of the mind, an ideographic language, and, as opposed to the special languages of the nations of the world, a universal language of the thing, a pasigraphy.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

#### CURRENT TOPICS.

To sell or not to sell intoxicating liquors at the World's Fair, was the question before the national commission yesterday; and the decision was a compromise, forbidding saloons and open bars, but permitting restaurants and cafés to sell that rather indefinite refreshment which goes by the name of "a light stimulating beverage"; something not in too conspicuous contrast with the sabbatarian character of the show. There is in this country, and in some other countries too, for that matter, a large and very respectable class of persons, who are most religiously opposed to every sin that has no profit in it; and this element was well represented on the national commission. It was delightfully edifying to hear the commissioner from California expose the wickedness of selling intoxicants at the World's Fair; although he "really could not see any objection to light California wines," a moral sentiment that made a great impression, for when he uttered it the honorable commissioner beamed upon the company like Ah Sin, with a smile that was childlike and bland. An irreverent person, who very likely preferred the vintage of Peoria, the crystal spirit of corn, contemptuously replied, "If we have anything, it must be something better than your tough California wines." It seemed really sacrilegious to call the sparkling brew of California, "tough," and only the memory of many headaches justified the word, but it vindicated the democracy of drinks, and compelled the California stimulant to take its chances on terms of equality with every other. In some features of it the World's Fair may be rather local and provincial, but in the matter of drinks it will be cosmopolitan and magnanimous.

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The highly moral tone of the commissioner from California, who was willing to compromise with his conscience on the basis of light California wines, reminds me of Deacon Modlin, who kept the only store they had in Marbletown when I first "located" there. He was a very enthusiastic temperance reformer, and he religiously refused to sell any intoxicating liquor to anybody except for communion purposes. The consequence of that was that every man who lived within a ten mile radius of the village was a communicant in some denomination or other; and they were continually taking the sacrament. The deacon thought that if there was profit in the business there was also piety. On my last voyage to the Old World, I made the acquaintance of a philosopher who had travelled in many lands, and we became intimate friends on board the ship that carried us over. He was a profound student of man-



kind and he gave me valuable instruction for which I am very grateful. I parted with him at Glasgow, and as he affectionately shook my hand in a fervent farewell, he magisterially said, "When travelling, always drink the liquor of the country you are in." This was the last bit of advice he gave me, and I think I can improve upon it now. In a qualified form I give it to the millions from all nations who will visit us next year. I advise them not to take our sabbatarianism or our teetotalism seriously. We like to indulge occasionally in the humor of the pharisees, but there will be no scarcity of liquors at the fair. Although I have no official authority from the board of directors to do so, I think I may take the liberty to say to every visitor from every nation, "Call for the liquor of the country you are from, and you shall have it."

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The speech delivered by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States at the banquet of the Fellowship club, appeared to be rather patriotically diminutive when contrasted with the grandeur and magnitude of the Columbian dedication. In the presence of ambassadors from twenty nations he lowered the stately grandeur of our national union until the consolidated republic shrank to the inferior stature of a "federal" government. The Chief Justice reminded me of poor old Mrs. Wilson, dear good soul who lived near the little town of Kirksville in Missouri. It so happened that a regiment of us, wearing blue, marching through that country in the summer of '61, fell in with a contradictory regiment wearing gray, and we drew up in line of battle with our left flank resting upon Mrs. Wilson's house. There we waited for the attack of the enemy, who, however, fell back from the shots of a piece of artillery we had with us, which, by the way, would not have killed one of them in a week. As Mrs. Wilson's house was the most conspicuous object in the neighborhood, our boys planted the flag on that, a proceeding which greatly offended the old lady, and she fiercely demanded that we take down that "federal" rag. This, of course, could not be done; and shortly afterwards, noticing that some of the soldiers were stealing tomatoes from her garden, she complained of the wrong, and pointing proudly to the banner floating upon her house, she said, "I claim the protection of 'the National flag.'" The Chief Justice resembles Mrs. Wilson. So long as he has plenty of cakes and ale, and can sit in safety under his own vine and fig tree, he may deign to recognise the "federal" government; but if peril should threaten the existence of his great office with all its perquisites, he would claim as lustily as Mrs. Wilson ever did, the protection of the "National" flag.

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The rollicking way in which our magistrates of high and low degree repeal the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Illinois is another proof of our fearless originality and enterprise. A dignitary of some importance explained it thus to me: "True, the law says *that*; but custom, which is better law, says *this*; and therefore we follow the custom in Chicago, because we find that it works better than the law." I dispute not the reason, but I think the practice is a little anarchistic in its way. There is a story in this morning's paper theatrical enough to stimulate a novel, and only in a novel such a story ought to be. A notorious woman, well known to the police, was arrested and taken to the station, whence in a mysterious way she made her escape, marching through a squadron of police out into the air of liberty. There is nothing so very remarkable about that, but the story unwittingly exposes a system of false imprisonment against which the Constitution and the law give suspected citizens no protection at all. Speaking of the woman's escape, the paper says, "The orders of the Chief of Police were to lock up all known thieves during the dedication ceremonies and not to book them. This last order was to prevent bail sharks from releasing such prisoners as Nora." In other words, a mere policeman, a ministerial officer of the law, suspends the law of his own motion, and orders accused persons

to be imprisoned without bail. The furtive way of doing it is "not to book them," so that if any friends come to bail them out, or offer them any other assistance, the officers, having locked the victims down in the dungeon underground, can say, "There are no such persons on the books." A custom such as that may be better than the law, but it invites and encourages the exercise of arbitrary power. It is not original in Chicago; it formerly prevailed in France, where the king or the prime minister would order the police to imprison a citizen in the Bastille, but "not to book him." In Chicago, the growth of private spirit and the decay of public spirit seem to run together; and for evidence of this I offer the Exposition on the one hand, and the policeman's illegal order on the other. There is as yet no public protest heard against official anarchy.

\* \* \*

So poetically splendid was the burial of Tennyson in Westminster Abbey that the mourning dirge resounding among the Gothic arches overhead was like a song of triumph chanted at the coronation of a king. England, though in tears, was glad, that another of her sons, the greatest in his day, had come safely home to his inheritance in the abbey where the grand old mother guards the ashes of her poets, her statesmen, her warriors, and her kings. Solemn, dignified, and mournful, as every part of the funeral was, there was also an air of spiritual exultation in the anthem, as if the poet himself were singing it. Surely his living genius was in the notes of the great organ when it said:

"Twilight and evening bell,  
And after that the dark;  
And may there be no sadness of farewell  
When I embark.

For though from out our bourne of time and place,  
The flood shall bear me far,  
I hope to meet my Pilot face to face,  
When I have crossed the bar."

Only a great spirit, innocent, and therefore fearless, could say "face to face" as the harbor of eternity appeared before him, and he could almost hear the moaning of the breakers on the bar. It was all characteristic and harmonious, for "face to face" is a very English phrase, as Tennyson was a very English man. Willing to meet "face to face," whomsoever or whatsoever might be "across the bar," serene as a philosopher, he died with Cymbeline in his hand; and with poetic fitness they buried the book in his grave, open at the dirge he read when he was dying:

"Fear no more the heat o' the sun,  
Nor the furious winter's rages;  
Thou thy worldly task hast done,  
Home art gone and ta'en thy wages.  
Golden lads and girls all must,  
As chimney sweepers, come to dust."

They buried him at the feet of Chaucer, the first man, as Tennyson himself was the last man, to show what the English language was able to do in poetry. Browning, Dryden, Dickens, and Macanlay, are close by, and not far away is the grave of Spenser, from whose tomb I copied the following words the last time I visited the abbey. I quote them here because I think they will apply to Tennyson: "Heare lyes (expecting the second commynge of our Saviour Christ Iesus) the body of Edmond Spenser, the prince of poets in his tyme, whose divine spirit needs noe othir witnesse than the workes which he left behinde him." So the works of Tennyson will be the witness of his divine spirit so long as men shall speak in the English tongue.

\* \* \*

Once upon a time a regiment of soldiers demanded eagerly to be led into battle, but the colonel said "We have no arms"; to which the men replied, "We will take them from the enemy," and proceeding bravely to do so, they were themselves captured. "We have no money for campaign purposes," says the colonel of the

Democrats, while the Republicans have millions"; and up comes this answer from the rank and file, "Let us capture it." When the colonel inquires how, they say, "By betting." The scheme is to despoil the Republicans by offering odds on Cleveland. So strong is the temptation to accept those odds that, as we are informed by the New York dispatches of this morning, "A syndicate of rich Republicans is being formed to cover the large wads of Democratic money now awaiting betterers in the Fifth Avenue and Hoffman hotels." The financial middleman who will negotiate the wagers on the part of the syndicate is a colonel bearing the extremely martial name of Swords. He will have the money all ready next week; and here is his defiance, as it flashed across the wires yesterday, "Next week I shall run all the Democratic speculators into their holes; I'll drive them out of the field." That he is very likely to do it appears from the following credentials which are indorsed by the Democrats themselves: "Colonel Swords is the amiable and accomplished bluffer of the National Republican Committee who wagered most of the gambling part of the Wannamaker fund of 1888." When I reflect upon it that this proceeding won in 1888, it appears to me that Colonel Swords is a very good man for the Democrats to let alone. In a purely non-partisan and friendly way I would like to ask this question, If the Democrats have no money for campaign purposes, where do they get the "large wads" now awaiting betterers at the Fifth Avenue Hotel? To encourage gambling on candidates is good politics, because men can be relied on to vote as they bet.

M. M. TRUMBULL.

## BOOK REVIEWS.

LE NIHILISME SCIENTIFIQUE. II. Correspondance entre l'Étudiant Ti et le Professeur de Philosophie Ousia. I. Sources du Nihilisme. By P. Van Bemmelen. Leide: E. J. Brill. 1891.

The first part of M. Van Bemmelen's "Scientific Nihilism" was noticed in Vol. II, No. 2, of *The Monist*. Here the learned author continues the imaginary correspondence between Professor Ousia and his pupil Ti, and after formulating the nihilist's creed, on the basis of the world being Maya or illusion, proceeds to show how science, while in search of the *real*, has become enamoured of "nothingness." This result is due to the influence of certain currents of thought which have diverted science from the right path. These are described as ideophobia, materialism, monism, agnosticism, evolutionism, and "the passion for universal abasement." The monism of the author is the passion for unity and simplicity; it resolves the qualitative differences of things into quantitative differences of their constitutive elements, and it affirms that all elementary forces are derived from a single force, which is original and universal; thus leading to the effacement of all proper character and all diversity in the universe, and finally to the *unity of nothingness*. Agnosticism leads to nihilism, because what is absolutely and necessarily unknown ceases to exist for us. The theory of evolutionism, which is essentially that of Spencer, constantly reduces the value of superior phenomena to that of inferior, and thus depreciates life and mind, by regarding progress as not real but as simply an increase of complexity.

Owing to its importance, a separate letter is devoted to "the movement which tends to depreciate man and the universe." This current of thought is fed by the other streams already referred to, but in itself it is a powerful reaction against the optimistic views of all kinds which preceded it, and it is exhibited as a pessimism whose joyousness and fervency shows it to be without precedent in human history. The reaction against the Hegelian philosophy led first to man being deprived of his privileged position among living beings, and then to the dethronement of God himself. The debasement of religion which followed was accompanied by that of morality, and it was extended even to the realm of aesthetics, so

that the world, so far from being beautiful, was declared to be essentially ugly, and human nature itself to be depraved. This depreciation predisposes to nihilism, since we do not care to defend what is not worthy to exist.

There appears to be considerable force in M. Van Bemmelen's criticisms, particularly in relation to evolutionism and pessimism. The author promises a further communication from Professor Ousia on space and time, matter and motion, and when this appears, we shall be able to judge of the value of his constructive work.

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## NOTES.

Several months ago there was a great deal of talk about a literary discovery of unusual importance, relating to Victor Hugo. M. Octave Uzanne, editor of *L'Art et l'Idée*, and one of the best literary authorities in France, has been granted the exclusive privilege of examining carefully the two thousand pages of this unpublished manuscript, called the "Journal of Exile" of Victor Hugo, covering the years 1852 to 1856 of the poet's residence on the Island of Guernsey. These papers were sold as wastepaper, for eight or ten shillings, a little time after the death of Hugo, and it is only recently that their importance was discovered. They are really conversations and opinions of Victor Hugo and his friends, recorded from day to day by his son, François Hugo, and carefully revised in the hand-writing of Victor Hugo himself. M. Uzanne is an expert on all matters relating to Victor Hugo, and he has made a most judicious selection of interesting matter from the journal, which now appears in the November number of *Scribner's Magazine*, with portraits and a fac-simile of a page of the journal.

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