BOOK NOTES


The series inaugurated by the present volume aims to present the story "of man's reflection upon the general course of his own history and upon the value of those achievements of his which have been most distinctive of that history"; it aims, in other words, to set forth and to interpret the appraisals made by men (chiefly in the Occident) throughout the course of time both "of the historic process in general and of the predominant tendency which was manifested in it—the tendency which we call the progress of civilization." Following a penetrating discrimination between and classification of the principal types of such theories, this first volume turns to expressions of chronological primitivism found in Greek and Roman mythology and historiography and to a portrayal of the genesis of the conception of 'nature' as norm; attention is then given to the relevant doctrines of the cynics and Epicureans, of Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius, Cicero, and the Stoics; chapters are introduced on "Anti-Primitivism in Greek Literature: Eighth to First Centuries B.C.," "The Noble Savage in Antiquity," "Anti-Primitivism and the Idea of Progress in Later Classical Literature," and "The Superiority of Animals." The supplementary chapters deal with primitivism in ancient Western Asia and in Indian Literature. As the title of the series indicates, the views of the writers considered are presented through the citation of their own words, careful translations of which, however, are given for the benefit of those who require them. The nature and the scholarly qualities of the volume are such as to make it indispensable for those who are interested in the history of ideas and in the philosophy of history.


This brief text signifies another of an increasing number of recent attempts to convert the study of logic into something at once attractive and useful. From the conception of it as the "art of discovery" and the formulation of "rules for arriving at new truths," logic is to be thoroughly weaned: "it is only by keeping men from going astray, by disabusing them when they think they have reached their destination, that logic helps men on the road to truth." Logic is primarily the study and analysis of argument; its main burden is the systematic exploration of the various errors and fallacies to which our thought is heir. Pursuant to this end only the irreducible minimum of expository matter is retained.


The author is doubtless correct in his belief that "few in this age would willingly base their lives on a philosophy which to the man of science is demonstrably false." From this, however, we may by no means draw his conclusion that "science thus takes the place of the foundation on which the structure of our lives must be built if we wish that structure to be stable." The interest of this book lies in what its distinguished writer has to say about the significance of the concept of indeterminism for physics, and in the revelation he gives of his own religious and metaphysical credo. What he says concerning the foundations of the latter (over and above showing that modern science imposes no veto on it) must to philosophical minds seem in part naive and on the whole unconvincing.