

CURRENT NATIONALISM IN THE MOSLEM NEAR EAST

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THE MOST important single factor in the development of current nationalism in Asia was the World War. This in turn was largely due to the harsh pressure of the imperialistic policies of the Great Powers upon the East. These Great Powers themselves were responsible for letting loose the forces that resulted in the organization of the new nationalistic states with their earnest zeal and fervor. During the Middle Ages Asia was the aggressor against Europe: the Arabs in Spain and Sicily, the Mongols in Russia, and the Turks in the Balkans and Hungary. This was not without its value for European culture, particularly because of the great importance of the Arab learning in the development of the Western Renaissance. Since the early part of the nineteenth century European nations have been the aggressors against Asia. Western ideas and methods have been scattered throughout the East by statesmen, merchants, missionaries, teachers, and travelers. There were a few who, in their ignorance, professed to believe that the East was an area that would resist all change. But most people in their hearts had the idea that something would happen as a result of the great outpouring of Western influence in Eastern lands. Had this not been the case, certainly we would have been driven to the conclusion that there was something the matter with the ideas as they worked, or did not work, upon the East. But now that they are "taking," many profess to be surprised that something is actually happening. And Eastern peoples are driving this thing called Nationalism through to its logical conclusion.

For the sake of definiteness it will be well to indicate what we include in the Near East. Geographically speaking it is the area that was under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This includes the Balkan peninsula south of the Danube River, Roumania, the islands in and the lands bordering the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Asia Minor, and the Arab-speaking lands of Western Asia. With the exception of the Christian States in the Balkans and the Lebanon in Syria, this area is inhabited predominantly by people who embrace the Moslem faith. The struggle for nationality among the Balkan States has in

the main come to an end, although there are still disputes due to the mixture of populations.

It is in the Moslem Near East that nationalism has had the most astonishing development in the last decade and a half. Only about a generation ago Vambéry wrote that "religion absorbs the intellect of the Asiatic; it is stronger than his feeling of nationality." That statement needs revision today, so fast has the supposedly unchanging East changed. Political liberty preceded by some time the demands for social liberty in the West. The reason why Eastern nationalism now seems to be moving at such a rapid tempo is because it is hop-step-and-jumping the political, religious and social at once. These peoples want sovereignty and independence as complete as that possessed by any of the Western States.

In his important treatise on International Law, "The Law of Nations," the Swiss writer Vattel commented upon the freedom, independence and equality of nations, and how they judged according to their own consciences. The apparent effect of this, to quote from Vattel, was to produce, "a perfect equality of rights between nations, in the administration of their affairs, and the pursuit of their pretensions, without regard to the intrinsic justice of their conduct, of which others have no right to form a definitive judgment; so that what is permitted in one, is also permitted in the other, and they ought to be considered in human society as having an equal right." That has been doctrine dear to the Western nations, and Eastern nationalism has developed the same enthusiastic affection for it.

But it should be observed that Eastern nationalism has appeared when nationalism in the West has to a large degree lost its reason for being. There was something of a noble moral enthusiasm and conviction in the Western nationalism of the century before the Great War. It undertook to liberate peoples and to combat injustice. To Mazzini, one of the greatest of the liberal nationalists, there was chiefly unselfishness in this ideal. It was the purpose of life "not to possess more or less of happiness but to make ourselves and others better." Nationalism had a duty to fulfil to mankind, to aid civilization and cultures. So far as the Western Powers are concerned, nationalism has had its fling, and its positive values have been reaped. The peculiar characteristics of the different national cultures may be retained, and the values of national boundaries for administrative purposes will long be seen. But the economic and cultural justifica-

tion for many of our national frontiers has largely passed. The nationalism of the last decade or two in the West has been chiefly negative, concerned with hostility for the foreigners, attacks upon the minorities within the gates, and attempts to develop a false economic self-sufficiency which has to be propped up by wasteful means. To have a real and peculiar affection for one's homeland is not only proper but inevitable, but this should not necessarily presuppose a hostility for the neighboring lands. It is quite apt to be an inferiority complex that leads some countries, especially some of the new nationalisms of the Near East, to fear the presence of other nationalities in their midst.

There are surely some areas, both East and West, where present movements can be explained on the basis of the inspired liberal nationalism of the earlier decades. When the Chinese seek to defend themselves against the plundering of their territory by military and aggressive nationalisms, that seems to justify a valid national enthusiasm. That is also the case with the Turks when they are fired with national vigor to defend valiantly the heart and center of the old Ottoman Empire, and preserve what is unquestionably their own. The very words of Mazzini cry out against the efforts that have been made to Italianize the people of the Austrian Tyrol. There is much more valid reason for the currency and tide of nationalism in the Moslem Near East at the present time, than there is for its continued artificial stimulation in the well-established countries of the Western world. For some time the Eastern lands may stand to gain from their nationalist thought and feeling, provided it is reasonably restrained and tempered with justice. They are justified in their nationalist fervor as long as it helps to preserve a national culture. The new Near Eastern nationalisms may be urged to learn from the West what the Western nations have not been able themselves to see clearly; namely, that when nationalism has patriotically aided in obtaining the organization and security of the State and the development of its culture, it should exercise care not to condemn in others what it approves in itself, should not outlast its usefulness by negative and destructive purposes, but should be a refining influence among the nations.

No part of the Moslem Near East has failed to respond to the stimulus of modern nationalism, but the result of this response has varied greatly in the different sections, whether viewed from the success or failure of a movement to secure national independence, or

the degree to which a community has become modernized. The magic slogan of "self-determination" was a siren call to which these peoples gave ready heed. They all had definite grievances which could have been righted years earlier had it not been for the greedy imperialism of the Great Powers. It was the feeling of having been restrained and unjustly treated for long years that led the Arabic and Turkish peoples to embrace nationalism with such avidity. It became a force the strength of which many leaders did not realize. They have been carried along by this ferment of nationalistic feeling not knowing just where it was taking them, and not risking to stem the tide at times for fear that they would lose their power.

In this new day when the Orient has been again awakened, conflicting motives appear to be urging them. They are anti-Western in the sense that they sacrifice and struggle to throw off the political control of the Western States, but at the same time, with one or two exceptions, they eagerly strive to become as nearly like Europe as possible. Fortunately these Moslem States do not appear to be interested in slavishly copying the West, but in trying to adapt Western methods and techniques to suit their ends. This is especially true in those fields which the Easterner believes have contributed to the material power and prestige of Western civilization. Social and religious influences from the West are not nearly as acceptable as are the evidences of organizational and scientific advance. This is natural because the East has ever excelled in the contemplative and peaceful rather than in the material and the mechanical.

Turkey has been the most successful State in the Moslem Near East in its efforts to throw off foreign control and develop a modernized national country. Her leaders have been more quick to adapt themselves to and understand the meaning of the changes necessary in her life. No other people has followed insistent leadership so readily in throwing overboard almost everything Oriental and breaking with the most deep-rooted traditions of the past. It has been suggested that this was probably easier than in the case of Arab lands, because there was less of an indigenous Turkish civilization from which to break away. There were earlier attempts in the time of the Ottoman Empire to reform the State, but they were superficial and did not strike at the root of the problem. Islam presupposed a theocratic State, in which religion was the source of law and order, and this was not consonant with the modern nationalist

State. The despotic sultan, Abdul Hamid II, feared nationalism as the forerunner of a worse evil, democracy. He sought to strengthen his own position at home and threaten the European countries as well by Pan-Islam, a movement to unite all the Moslems under the influence of the Sultan-Caliph at Constantinople, as the present city of Istanbul was then called. The Young Turks overthrew Abdul Hamid II in 1909, and proclaimed a new nationalism based upon iraternity of all the peoples of the Empire. They failed sadly because they were unwilling or unable to develop a just nationalist movement that would satisfy the non-Turkish elements. They yielded to the fatal idea that national cultures should be suppressed and not nurtured. Only a decentralized state based upon a recognition of the needs of the different cultural groups in the country could have developed Ottoman unity, and then staved off the ravages of Western imperialism against the Turkish Empire.

Those ravages were real indeed, although it was the ineptitude and misgovernment of the Ottoman Sultans, as the present Turkish leaders themselves now state, that were in large part responsible for the encroachment of the West. On the other hand the European Powers were not interested in helping the Sultanate to be strengthened and improved, but rather in pushing it down so that they could participate in the inevitable distribution of the spoils. In the last two or three centuries the Ottoman Empire lost territory in every succeeding generation, and in the long reign of Abdul Hamid II, the Turkish State became entangled in a maze of enforced concessions and financial loans to European interests, that constituted virtual economic enslavement. This process was facilitated by the capitulations, or extraterritorial rights, that granted foreigners in the land special privileges. These had originally been voluntarily given by the Sultan to certain foreign states, but in the days of Ottoman decline and weakness had been twisted by the Powers into instruments of unfair advantage for themselves. At the end of the Great War no state was seemingly at such a low ebb as the remnant of the Ottoman Empire. With its capital, Constantinople, in control of the Allies, the Sultan's representatives were told to sign the severe Treaty of Sevres. Meanwhile the Western Powers authorized the Greeks to occupy Smyrna and its hinterland in western Asia Minor on a temporary basis, but the Turks feared that this was the beginning of the end of their own control over this fair western part of what

they regarded as an historical homeland. A sweeping nationalist movement, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, an able military commander, flared up in Asia Minor, and rapidly carried all before it.

Aroused by a dual hostility to Greek nationalism and British imperialism, the Turkish struggle was remarkably successful. In January, 1920, a brief National Pact that had earlier been accepted by the nationalist Assembly at Angora was adopted at the last meeting which the Turkish Parliament ever held in Constantinople. The Pact was a succinct and reasonable statement of the "maximum of sacrifice," which the Turkish people would be willing to make as a guarantee for their national independence. Its principles became the basis of the negotiations that resulted in the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and the Western Powers in 1923. This Declaration of Independence, as the Pact may be called, presupposed the continuance of the Ottoman Sultanate, and demanded the recognition of an independent Turkey, consisting of those lands that contained an Ottoman Moslem majority, free from foreign yoke and the capitulatory restrictions. If there was any sense in which the Lausanne Treaty was an imposed treaty, it was imposed by the Turks upon the Allies, for practically all the terms of the National Pact were fulfilled.

The nationalists soon overthrew the Sultan and established a Republic and then ousted the Caliph because they wished to make sure of no hindrance in organizing a completely secular and lay State. The leaders wished their people to press on quickly to modern life, by which they meant a Western mentality. To reject the Asiatic and virtually transplant the institutions of the West to Asia Minor became almost a passion. It was a case of adopting European tools with which to make permanent the newly gained freedom from European control. Gradualness was a word foreign to the vocabulary of the Turkish nationalist. Following the abolition of the capitulations, the Sultanate and the Caliphate, there came in rapid succession a series of religious, social, cultural, and legal reforms which thoroughly altered the very foundations of Turkish traditions and life. If there are principles or practices of modern nationalism, whether valid or questionable, which the people are slow to accept, it is not because the leaders have not furnished an insistent example. The national compactness of the population has contributed to the

success of the movement. The country is inhabited almost exclusively by Moslem Turks, except in Istanbul, where there are some Christian minorities and Jews, and in Eastern Anatolia, where there are still Kurds who have not yet been settled in other parts of Asia Minor by the Government. The keynotes of Kemalism have been to consolidate the Turkish elements in the state, to throw off foreign influence and control, and to construct in Turkey an independent, modern nation. Whatever has come down from the past that seemed to block those aims, has been rigorously discarded; whatever there is in the present that would appear to further those aims, has been speedily accepted. In this respect no modern ruler has been more consistent, more purposeful, or more thorough than Mustafa Kemal Pasha, whose new name is Ghazi Kemal Ata Türk.

In the new Turkey, the nation replaced religion in the State. The heterogeneous Ottoman Empire had developed a system in which religious feeling was the expression of nationality; with the practically homogeneous population in the Turkish Republic, national solidarity took the place of religious feeling. It was significant that the Sultanate was overturned before the Caliphate. The former affected Turkey only, but the latter the entire Moslem world, at least supposedly. Is there anything which shows the driving force of this nationalist feeling so conclusively as that in 1924 it accomplished in a twinkling the overthrow of the Caliph of Islam as if he were but a mere subaltern, when a decade before the Caliph had been seriously regarded as a world-power, who could array the hosts of Islam in battle against the Western Allies? The Turkish Constitution of 1924 declared, "The religion of the Turkish State is Islam," but this Article was removed from the Constitution four years later. Some have declared that the Turkish leaders were bent upon repudiating Islam in favor of atheism, but there is hardly confirmation for this belief. It is sufficient to suppose that they wished to leave no doubt about the lay character of the State. The Government has not neglected the services in the mosques, which are carried on in the Turkish language and not in the Arabic of the original Koran. For the people this brings distinct advantages. There are Turkish leaders who believe that the new relationship between religion and the State will give new vitality to Islam, and that Turkey will act as a guide for other Moslem lands to follow. There does not seem to be, however, any sufficient source, or training school, from which the

Turkish religious leadership of the future will come. There is a law against religious propaganda, and legally there is religious freedom for all adults. Religious equality does not exist, and there has been practically no increase in the true spirit of religious tolerance toward non-Moslem faiths during the period of the Republic. In these respects, however, the new Turkey is probably not far behind some other nations, whose cultures are supposed to have been more highly advanced for a long period of time.

The nationalist Government is organized with all the forms of a modern republican State. The franchise is still very narrow, and wisely so, because the percentage of illiteracy is high in the land, despite the great progress that has been made since the adoption of the Latin characters for the language. Political leaders in the land declare their earnest support of democracy, but believe that the new forms of their government can be filled with content only after the people become better educated and able to use them. Organized political opposition is not tolerated, and there is only one political party in the country, the People's Party. It has a relationship to the Government similar to that in other states, which are dominated by the single-party system. The names of candidates for election to the Grand National Assembly are submitted to the President of the Republic, who chooses a certain number from among them, and the deputies are chosen from his list. The courage and earnestness of the leaders has been noteworthy, and with the continuance of these virtues, progress in the nation may be conditioned only by their ability and wisdom.

The Turks are probably no more instinctively anti-foreign than are other people. Having smarted for so long under the real injustices of foreign subordination, they were inclined at first to believe that the foreigner was responsible for all, instead of only a part, of their ills. To them it is axiomatic that whatever other nations are entitled to do, they are entitled to also, both as a matter of right and prestige. This is nicely illustrated in the case of the Egyptian capitulations. Turkey had complained bitterly, and with justice, that the capitulations were unfair and worked unjust hardship upon her. After she had freed herself from the onus of the capitulations, however, Turkey demanded that Egypt should grant her capitulatory privileges in that country as long as other foreign powers had them!

The Turkish attitude toward foreigners and foreign influence is colored by the fact that this period of trying to substitute new values for radically different old values is critical for the leaders. Because of the character of their past experiences, they want to control the foreign assistance which they secure. The Turkish Government has employed many foreign experts, and in general finds this method satisfactory, for they can "hire and fire" the expert according to the terms of a definite contract. The Turkish authorities are becoming increasingly suspicious, if not intolerant, of foreign institutions in the country, which parallel institutions which they have, or may have in the future, whether the institutions are schools, hospitals, banks, or establishments of more modest scope. There are many Turks who recognize the values, comparative and otherwise, of the foreign institutions, but they cannot wield a commensurate amount of influence at this time.

Like the other nationalisms, particularly the new ones of this day, the Turkish is complete, sweeping and thoroughgoing. It presses on to a logical conclusion, even if the results appear at times to show contradictions. The progress that the Turkish Republic has made was clearly shown when the completion of the first decade of its existence was celebrated in October, 1933. In her domestic concerns, the great task of putting "on modern foundations the bonds of social life, of giving a new ideal and a new direction to society," as one of the Turkish intellectuals has expressed it, has been carried on with substantial progress; in foreign policy, the Turkish statesmen have shown great wisdom, especially in the work of conciliation in the Balkans. That Turkey should take her effective place among the modern nations not only in name, but in spirit as well, is of great importance.

During the long years of domination by the Ottoman Empire, the Arabs had been stirred by nationalist feeling. Islam was the religion of both Arabs and Turks, but they had widely varying conceptions of this religion. Furthermore the Arabs believed that theirs was a culture and a civilization far superior to that of their political overlords. In 1905 an Arab National Committee had urged the union of all Arab tribes, under a liberal monarchy with an Arab as Sultan. The Ottomanization policy of the Young Turks after 1908 helped fan the flames of Arab nationalism. Arabs hoped that the World War would bring a federal union of Arab countries and

a return of ancient glory. But these hopes for union were blasted due to secret agreements and treaties made by the Allies which conflicted with promises that had been made to the Arabs.

Arab nationalism had first developed thus as a protest against the authority of the Turks, but since the Great War it has been fired by hostility to Western control, and a stern belief that France and Great Britain did not play fair by them in establishing administrations, which, according to a promise made by these two Powers as late as November, 1918, would derive "their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations." There were two currents in Arab nationalism, in each of which the religious strain was felt differently. The Bedouins of the desert, especially the Wahhabites, were deeply stirred by religious feeling. In the towns the Arabs had been more exposed to the political and other influences from Europe, with the result that they were more opposed to Turkish domination. With the townsmen the enthusiasm for their religion rated second to political influences in the development of nationalism, and with them Arabs of differing religions could cooperate better together.

Syria was the first Arab land to feel the surge of modern nationalism. It was particularly exposed to outside influences, notably the French. Just before the World War the policies of the Young Turks stirred the Syrian consciousness deeply, and the different races and religions in that country felt a more common bond in their Arabic speech. Earlier religious hatreds came to be displaced by political and social interests that developed a common nationality. After it became clear in the early part of 1919, that a confederation of the Arab States would not be formed, the Syrian nationalists at least hoped for a united Syria. They opposed being put under a mandate, and aimed at a constitutional monarchy with Emir Feisal at the head. Such a plan was disallowed by the Allied statesmen, who awarded to France the mandate for Syria, despite the expressed opposition of the people. In assuming the mandate, the French ignored the fact that a rather strong national consciousness had developed in recent years and was beginning to overcome sectional and religious differences. The mandate was organized under several separate units, the French justifying this division on the ground of administrative necessity and religious differences.

From the very beginning the French have had trouble with their

Syrian mandate. The High Commissioners were changed frequently, and with one or two exceptions they have not been men of ability sufficient to cope with the situation. They have been accused of treating the country as a backward colony, instead of a Class A mandate. The most serious trouble was a rebellion of the Druses in 1925 as a result of which the great city of Damascus was bombarded by the French forces and a large area was ruined. The Lebanon, with its predominantly Christian population, was proclaimed a Republic in 1926, and this has not smoothed the problem of attaining a united Syria. The Syrians wish to establish a treaty relationship with France similar to that arranged between Great Britain and Irak, but the negotiations to this end carried on by the French with the Syrian Parliament at Damascus have repeatedly failed. The country has been pacified at great expense in money and wounded feelings, but discontent is strong because of the denial of real independence and the continued division of the country. With patience and restraint on the part of the Syrians and more wisdom and better administrators on the part of the French, time should correct most of the grievances of the nationalists and also stimulate the French to substitute for the mandate a treaty that will honorably guard the interests of all. Even then the question of the status of the Lebanon will be a special problem. If Syria were only more prosperous, the French might be having an easier time.

As to Irak, or Mesopotamia, the Allied secret agreements had provided that Northern Mesopotamia should be a part of a projected post-war Arab State, and that the Southern part should be under British protection. The nationalism of the Irakis was expecting a Kingdom of Mesopotamia, as declared at a 1920 Congress in Damascus. Instead the San Remo Conference awarded Irak to Great Britain as a Class A mandate. A revolt followed this news and the mandate never actually came into legal existence, but was superseded by an Anglo-Irak Treaty. An Arab monarchy was established with the Emir Feisal, who had just been overthrown by the French as King of Syria, as King of Irak. With Arab nationalism in the ascendant, the Irakis at once began to agitate violently and otherwise for complete independence. Different treaties were negotiated, but they were unsatisfactory to the nationalists because they resembled a mandate. League of Nations obligations made it necessary for Great Britain to insist on exercising certain international

and financial controls, that clashed with the Irak ideas of independence. Great Britain promised to recommend Irak for admission to the League of Nations as soon as sufficient progress toward preparedness for independence had been made.

The impatience of the nationalists for Great Britain to fix "the time" was extreme, and at times led them into indiscreet action. As criteria for independence, the British stated that there must be stable government, settled frontiers, and "a sincere intention to fulfill" international obligations. In 1929 Great Britain announced that Irak would be recommended for League membership in 1932. In the first case of its kind to arise, the League of Nations studied the question of the fitness of Irak for independence, and, chiefly because of the British recommendation, admitted this Arab State to the League in 1932. Irak was required to subscribe to certain guarantees. This change in the status of Irak was of international importance. To the Iraki it meant the culmination of their nationalist struggle, and they expressed the hope that other Arab States would not be much longer delayed in their admission to the League.

After the World War only the kingdom of Hejaz was organized as an independent Arabian State. Including the Holy Places of Islam, Mecca and Medina, this was the heart of Arabia. British support gave the throne to the Emir Hussein, Sherif of Mecca, who dreamt of an Arab Federation. His sons, Feisal and Abdullah, were rulers over Irak and Transjordan respectively, and this gave a family or personal union to three Arab States. When the Turkish Republic overthrew the Caliph, King Hussein believed that the keeper of the Holy Places of Islam was a natural successor to the Caliphate, and that this office would also aid him in shaping Arabian political unity. He thus assumed the title of Caliph. Hussein's plans failed chiefly because the powerful Moslem leaders in Egypt did not support him, and because his neighbor and enemy, Ibn Saoud, the strongest man in Arabia, now attacked and defeated him. King Hussein abdicated in favor of another son, Ali, but by the beginning of 1926, Ibn Saoud, Sultan of Nejd, had seized control of the Hejaz. Since 1932 the combined Hejaz and Nejd has been called the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saoud has continued his conquests, has recently conquered the Imam Yalya of the Yemen, and has brought still nearer the union of the Arab tribes..

In Arabia proper nationalism is of a different stamp than in the

other Arab states that have been mentioned. The communities are more primitive, and the personal dictation of a dominant chieftain, such as Ibn Saoud, determines its character for the time. As chief of the Wahhabi sect, Ibn Saoud speaks for the most puritanical and fanatically unitarian Moslem sect in the Near East. It is theocracy complete with the orders of the day based on the laws of the Koran. But Ibn Saoud is a wise and powerful ruler, the most astute of the Arabs. The precepts of religion and the traditions handed down must be observed, but likewise there are relationships that must be carried on with the foreigners, and with the other Arab states. Rigid though the Moslem world is sometimes claimed to be, it has discriminating and successful ways of change that tend to progress. Ibn Saoud is seeking to consolidate his immediate authority over practically all Arabia proper. He has declared himself as hopeful for a Federation of the Arab states, a grouping which he promises to support, and also as a believer in Pan-Arabism. This Cromwell of Arabia is not yet old, and he may take many steps toward the headship of a united Pan-Arab world.

Egyptian nationalism has been a clear-cut struggle against British imperialism. The English have often declared that the Egyptians would be trained through liberalism to independence, but to the impatient Egyptian nationalist it was taking far too long. Large numbers of the people experienced real prosperity, but prosperity was not political independence. Years before the Great War, the Egyptians had made demands for constitutional government with the high offices in their own hands, for a greater diffusion of education and with more emphasis upon the Arabic, and for a prohibition upon the grant of concessions to foreigners. These demands were made at a time when the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan still held over Egypt, but when years of British administration had given security and excellent administration to the country. The English declared a protectorate over Egypt, when Turkey joined the German Powers in 1914. The example of the Arab world, the doctrine of self-determination, and opposition to foreign rule urged Egyptian nationalism onward during and after the Great War. The most outstanding and uncompromising nationalist leader in Egypt was Zaghlul Pasha.

The struggle between the British and the Egyptians during the last two decades has been bitter and at times violent. The Egyptian demands moved from autonomy to complete independence. Eryp-

tian independence was declared in 1922, and the Sultan became King, but there was a field of authority which the British insisted on maintaining, and this has caused trouble. Egypt has insisted on its need of possessing the Sudan in order to control the Nile waters, but such political possession is denied by the British. The Egyptians wish to wave farewell to all British troops, but England maintains that the defense of the British Empire depends upon the security and control of the Suez Canal, for which purpose adequate troops must be stationed there. The abolition of the capitulations and the complete control of her internal affairs are nationalist demands, which the British have been seeking earnestly to adjust. The safety of British imperial communications also involves supervision of Egyptian foreign relations. These difficult reserved questions, as they have been called, have occasioned many conferences, much heat, and serious misunderstandings. As long as Great Britain has extensive Eastern interests, it will be necessary to harmonize, or integrate, Egyptian independence with British policies. This is very certain as long as international affairs remain so crudely organized that a completely independent Egypt, unable to defend itself might be overrun and conquered by another Power. This problem is an example of how cordial cooperation between an Eastern and a Western state might become a pattern for others to follow. The success of the attempt is still for the future to determine.

At the end of the World War, Great Britain was granted a mandate over Palestine and Transjordan. The same High Commissioner serves both areas, but it is provided that Transjordan and Palestine should be separately administered. The Arabs are opposed to having the provisions of the Palestine mandate concerning the Jewish National Home apply to the country across the Jordan, for they do not wish to chance the opening up of this land to Jewish immigration. Transjordan is a valuable link in the chain for the protection of Britain's eastern interests. The fiction of constitutional rule is maintained by King Abdullah in agreement with the mandatory Power. Transjordan is dependent upon British advice, financial and military assistance. Nationalism is present and raises its voice from time to time, but it is still too definitely connected with British policies to be bothersome or embarrassing to the controlling foreign Power. The same can hardly be said about the situation in the historic country west of the Jordan River.

The problem of Palestine is clearly that of reconciling two differing nationalities, bitterly opposed to each other, to living together in a small country in reasonable peace and security. The land has a predominantly Arab population, almost three-quarters, the Jews have both religious and political attachments there, and to the Christians it is an object of special interest and concern. The British Balfour Declaration of 1917, later approved by France, Italy, and the United States, promised a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine, on the understanding that this did not "prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities." The purpose of the League mandate given to Great Britain was declared to be to train the people of Palestine for self-government and to establish a Jewish National Home.

Despite the fact that Palestine has had High Commissioners of remarkable ability, the story of the mandate is an account of passive or violent resistance on the part of the Arabs, and complaints and frequent dissatisfaction on the part of the Jews. The Arabs have feared the entrance of so many Jewish immigrants that their own people would lose their numerical superiority; the Jews have complained that the annual immigration quotas for their people were insufficient for the economic development of the land. Arabs have declared that the Balfour Declaration makes impossible the normal development of self-governing institutions as implied in the League mandate; the Jews have charged the Arabs with carrying out a policy of obstruction against the mandatory Power. Placed squarely between these two zealous and rival nationalisms, the British Government has been in an unenviable position. The mandatory has declared that Palestine cannot become "as Jewish as England is English," that Jewish nationality will not be imposed on all Palestine, and that the Jewish National Home is to develop along with, and not to the exclusion of, the Arabs.

The Arabs are unconvinced. The Jews have the great advantage of tremendous financial assistance from the Western world. In 1929, the Jewish Agency was reorganized so that Zionists and non-Zionist organizations could assist in establishing the National Home. Zionist agricultural developments have expanded greatly, and much land has been purchased by Jews from Arabs. These have all been voluntary sales at good prices, but the Arab nationalists resent this exchange of land, feeling that with each sale a part of the

country itself is passing from their control. The Arabs have possessed the land for many years, but it is undeniable that under the new dispensation the Jews in Palestine have rights guaranteed by international promises. It is generally admitted that new Jewish immigrants should be peasants or manual workers. Tel-Aviv is a remarkable tribute to Jewish industry, faith, and vision, but Palestine cannot support many such cities, or absorb unlimited numbers of the professional classes and "white-collar" devotees.

The Arabs came to their "Philistia" and the Jews to their "Land of Israel" as conquerors, centuries ago, the latter having preceded the former in the land. But for the purposes of today and the future, both peoples should emphasize less the possession of the past and turn to the indispensable cooperation necessary for the present. Jewish enthusiasm and the development of special projects in Palestine, such as the splendid new port at Haifa, the Jordan Hydro-Electric Works, and the exploitation of the Dead Sea Salts Concession, largely account for recent material progress in spite of all the nationalist disturbances. This progress is beginning to affect the standard of living of the Arabs, and hence their social life. It seems axiomatic that for a contented Palestine it is necessary that the Arabs comprehend that self-governing institutions can be secured only through cooperation with the Jews, and that the Jews realize that they cannot by unlimited immigration become a majority in the land, but rather that the "Land of Israel" should be to them a great center for the renewal and restoration of what is finest in their cultural and religious life. British policy is seeking to build a bi-national State in which two nationalities living side by side have absolutely equal rights and privileges. It is to be questioned if there is, or ever has been, a more difficult place in which to bring such an experiment to a successful reality. Truly has someone said that Great Britain will deserve well of the world, if in the Holy Land there is developed a firm Palestinian nationality of "awakened Arab and home-loving Jew."

It is thus seen that the easily explainable struggle of the Arabs to secure the realization of their nationalistic aims and ambitions has left the Arab World at the present time in an exceedingly unhappy state. The problem is insoluble to the satisfaction of the great majority as long as at least two conditions remain. The first condition is the continuance of foreign imperialistic policies which

have been responsible for keeping the Arab World divided into a large number of units. The second is the lack of union among the Arabs themselves and the common character of current nationalism which often makes it almost brutally careless of the rights of others. But grant the absence of these conditions, with the result that Arab union or federation developed in some form, even then it is quite probable that for an unknown number of years Great Britain would need to remain in a special relationship to Palestine and France to the Lebanon.

Life in the midst of the current nationalisms of the Moslem Near East does bring one face to face with certain stern facts, the appreciation of which might help both East and West. The bitter and suspicious attitude which the struggle for national satisfaction aroused among these Near Eastern peoples has been due to the harsh experience which they had in exploitation by the imperialist Powers. There is much in our Western life which is unworthy for the Eastern States to copy, but in seeking to use nationalism with which to combat Western control, or assert authority over others, they have used not only its worthy elements, but also the same kind of technique, which, when applied toward them, they have described as unfair and intolerable. The success of nationalist movements in the Near East has been varied but still remarkably rapid since the Great War, and these new nationalisms should in patience and restraint realize that Western institutions, which they are seeking to copy or adapt, developed only through sacrifice and long experience, and did not come full-blown.

But the Western Powers must realize the necessity of freeing the awakened Near East from imperialistic pressure. The excuse for continued control on the ground that these peoples are not capable of self-government is becoming palpably unjustifiable. In view of the lack of success that democratic self-government has been experiencing in large areas of the Western world, it borders on hypocrisy and self-conceit to prejudge too dogmatically the capacity of others in this respect. On that basis of equality of judgment and treatment of which both East and West stand much in need, we should not at this present hour regard the sheeplike support of a single leader, or of a few, a proof of incapacity for self-government. In reconciling the demands of modern nationalism with the injunctions and spirit of Islam, the Moslem communities have shown

that they can be sufficiently ingenious and adjustable, but probably no more so than have been the Christian communities in their attitude toward imperialism and militarism. Present-day nationalism in the Near East has no virtues, and probably no vices, which cannot be found in the nationalism of the West. Our patience and help should be extended to those who are seeking to build the new nation-states of the Near East. Our sympathy must consider the fact that this building has been taking place at a time when their leaders did not have the finest period of Western nationalism to serve as a model and when they were too urgently pressed to study the history of the past, so that it could serve as a guide.

It is said that Iraki leaders once told Gertrude Lowthian Bell in the early years of the British control of that country that liberty as between nations is never given, but is always taken. In stating some of his views to Ameen Rihani, the puritan Ibn Saoud declared that the Germans merely expressed the views of all Europe in their estimate that treaties were mere "scraps of paper," and that the Arab rulers should take care not to imitate the European Powers in this respect. If the Moslem Near East at times displays the childish qualities of supersensitiveness to criticism and a kind of petulance, the West needs to study its own past and quash any manifestations of superiority.