

The Open Court

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the
Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Founded by EDWARD C. HEGELEB

VOL. XLI (No. 7)

JULY, 1927

(No. 854)

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
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LOGIC OF EMOTIONS

BY HENRY LANZ

SEPARATION of meaning from the psychological nature of ideas belongs to the most secure generalisations of modern philosophical science. It seems now quite natural that after the emancipation of logic from the control of psychology we should expect a similar reform for other branches of philosophy, especially for ethics and aesthetics. Modern philosophical literature moves unmistakably in the direction of the reform. And yet no definite results can be possibly obtained along those lines unless it is positively demonstrated—as it was demonstrated in logic—that our desires, impulses, and emotions also have an objective, “neutral” content which is in the same sense independent of our consciousness as the truth of a proposition is independent of its flash in the mind of one who discovers it. It is the purpose of this paper to advance some evidence of “neutrality” for the province of emotions, especially for certain groups of emotions which have definite artistic significance. By analysing the nature and origin of certain emotional concomitants in music and poetry along the lines suggested by Hanslick and Liddell, I believe it is possible to show that psychological bodies of emotions, such as, melodies, rhythms, and rimes, have certain a—psychological or *neutral nuclei*—an analogon of meaning—which remain constant and can be identically transmitted from one individual to another. Those nuclei are by no means simple, homogenous entities, but complex bodies showing intricate organization based on certain laws—such as the laws of harmony, for instance—which impart to them a character of specific necessity. Where “specific necessities” exist there must be a general body of principles which apply to all groups and all individual cases. And, although

the material to which this body of laws applies is—as we shall see—allogical and cannot be expressed in propositions; yet the laws themselves constitute a system which is theoretical in nature. This system then,—as applied to emotions,—may be properly called “logic of emotions”. Certain fundamental propositions from it I hope to be able to establish here.

Psychologists define emotions as a feeling of bodily changes which follow the perception of some exciting fact.¹ Bodily changes which form the psychological basis for the rise of emotions are very varied, possibly innumerable. The change of heart beats and the tempo of breathing, visserial stirring and flushing of the face, certain contractions of muscles and, above all, certain chemical changes in various glands, produce internal sensations accompanied by various shades of pleasant or unpleasant feeling. Such mental complexes we call emotions.² Recent research into the matter has shown conclusively that our emotional life depends largely on the chemistry of the organism. If this is the case, the field of emotions must be considerably wider than it is popularly believed. For, what does not cause a chemical change in our organism? Every perception, every slightest sensation must be accompanied by processes of composition and decomposition of organic substances within certain cells. And indeed, it has been a long established fact in psychology that all our sensations, and possibly perceptions, are accompanied by a slight feeling of pleasantness or unpleasantness. It is what Germans call *Gefühlston*. Every sound, every hue, every shade of red or blue, has its specific emotional appeal which by no means consists of mere pleasantness or unpleasantness. For sensations may be pleasant or unpleasant in as many different ways as propositions may be true or false. In fact, the reference to pleasure does not adequately describe the innumerable differences in our emotional response. The monotonous sound of a cricket on a still night may be just as pleasant—or as annoying if you wish—as a prolonged practice of the same musical phrase on a piano. Yet both are so totally different from each other that the slight variation in the intensity of pleasure derived from them is insufficient to express the difference. Both situations, although equally pleasant, or equally annoying display different emotional contents.

Considering these differences we must say that the range of

¹W. James, *Psychology*, Vol. 2, p. 449.

²E. B. Titchener, *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 229 ff.

emotions reaches considerably farther than our emotional vocabulary is able to follow. We have but few words referring to our emotional life. Love, hate, fear, alarm, hope, anxiety and a couple of dozen others make that portion of our emotional life which appears practically important and is discussed in the text books of psychology. The larger bulk of our emotions remain for ever nameless. And yet, it is precisely those nameless emotions which supply material for the domain of art. Of all these I shall here briefly consider (1) musical and (2) certain poetical emotions.

1. Melody is a form of emotional response. The tonal material that affects our ear is not melody. Hearing alone does not constitute what we call a musical ear. Beethoven was deaf, and nonetheless he remains the greatest master of music. But play one of his sonatas to a Bushman, who hears distinctly every single tone, and he will not be able to *hear* the melody. For strictly speaking, one does not *hear* a melody. One is able or unable to *follow* it, which means that one either has, or has not, the ability to organize the tones into a higher unity. This organization is accomplished emotionally. Emotion is the cement that binds various parts of the melody together.

A crucial test of the correctness of the assumption that melody is a form of emotional response consists in the psycho-physical analysis of its origin as it is given by Helmholtz. His theory briefly stated is this: Simple musical tones do not exist in nature; every tone is accompanied by a series of the so-called overtones. Therefore, listening to a musical sound we never perceive a single note, but a whole chord. If "do" is intoned by voice or any musical instrument we can clearly detect "sol" in its sound. "Mi" is heard less distinctly, although quite audibly, even without assistance of any tone-intensifying device. Thus, natural concomitants of "do" are "sol" and "mi" which together with the original "do" form the so-called major chord. In the infancy of music, therefore, a transition from one tone to another was most probably determined by the fact that the second tone was indistinctly heard together with the original. For this reason the most natural melodic transition is from "do" to "sol". This transition is indeed the foundation of all melodic motion, so to speak, the *model melody*. But as soon as the second note of the interval is actually taken, or even heard, a strong impulse is born in our mind to return to the original tone. *This impulse is the real origin of melody*. It may be immediately satisfied in the most

primitive way by a direct return to the tonic, or else the motion may be executed by means of another note that would lead the voice to the original tone. In the later case a feeling of suspense is produced that modifies the original craving for return. This craving can be intensified and varied in many different ways producing innumerable melodies from the sweetest Italian tunes to the most phantastic intuitions by Skriabin. Psychologically, therefore, melody is nothing else than a variety of desire, a longing or craving. It is not—I am aware—an expression of some heterogeneous desire, such as love, longing for God, or moonlight, or what not, which the composer is supposed to transmit to us. He does not transmit anything except his immediate and perfectly *unique desire to move from one tone to another*, which is melody.

There are till now, and—I am afraid—there always will be, many dilettantic enthusiasts of music who maintain that when they hear Beethoven's Moonlight Sonata they visualise a sort of lonely landscape flooded with moonlight. One would say that the landscape is lonely, the other would insist that you are supposed to see angels moving about, etc. It is popularly believed that it belongs to the intelligent listening of musical compositions to have stories connected with them. And thus forgetting music people fabricate their stories. Romantic aesthetics contributed much to this popular misunderstanding bestowing upon it the air of philosophical profundity. Even Hegel,—the sanest of all—, believes that music is a form of expressing truth, namely the inner truth of the subjective.³ For Schopenhauer music becomes the language of the universe. And following Schopenhauer, Wagner,—this protagonist of philosophical music,—declares that music is of feminine character in that she conceives and bears a meaning that is given to her from the outside.⁴ In all these theories there is very little new. They are all but variations of an idea handed over to us from grey antiquity which, with the words of Plotinus, says that "music dealing with rhythms and harmonies is but a copy of the real music, which in the realm of

³Hegel defines music as a "romantic art" characterized by a complete retirement into the subjective: *Die Hauptsache der Musik wird deshalb darin bestehen nicht die Gegenständlichkeit selbst, sondern im Gegentheil die Art und Weise wiederklängen zu lassen in welcher das innerste Selbst seiner Subjektivität und ideeller Seele nach bewegt.* (Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik*, p. 189.

⁴Wagner, *Das Wesen der Opera* "Allez musikalische Organismus ist Natur nach weiblicher; er ist nur ein gebärender, nicht aber zeugender; die zeugende Kraft ausser ihm" (p. -83). Wagner maintains that it lies in Drama.

mind, deals with the ideal rhythm."⁵

In contrast to this romantic interpretation Hanslick advances his formal and objective interpretation of melody. In his work "Vom Musikalische Schönen" he assumes that the principle of music must be "specifically musical" i. e., it lies exclusively in the relation and affinity of tones involved and not in any ideas or emotions that, being foreign to the tonal material, are somehow expressed in it. "If one asks what is expressed in the tonal material of a melody, the answer is: musical ideas. And a wholly actualized musical idea is an independent manifestation of beauty and end in itself, and not merely a means or material for expressing thoughts, or feelings". Under the stress of polemic Hanslick goes to the extreme saying that the content of it is purely "tonal". It is, however, emotional; not in the sense that it brings to expression some human emotions, such as love, joy, etc., which exists independently of music, but in the sense that it forms itself a group of specific emotions which do not, strictly speaking, find their expression in music, but *simply exist as music*.

Carefully perusing "Vom musikalisch Schönen" one comes to the conclusion that the author anticipates the realistic point of view in aesthetics. He objects to "feeling", not because he wishes to defend the sensualistic point of view reducing melody to the acoustic sensations, but rather because he finds in it something more definite and more permanent than both sensations, and feelings. He demands for beauty the same thing as Bolzano demanded for truth: an existence "*an sich*", an objective validity that would be independent of our consciousness. Quite in accordance with the Husserlean phenomenology Hanslick says: "*Das Schöne, ist and bleibt schön, auch wenn es keine Gefühle erzeugt, ja wenn es weder geschaut, noch betrachtet wird*". And—going a bit farther—we may say that melody remains melody even if there is nobody to listen to it. As a neutral entity it retains its musical content. For, to be sure, it does not spring into existence every time it is performed, and does not vanish into nothingness every time a performer ends his programme. As a beautiful form it is valid all the time, or rather out of time,—eternally.

2. Another large class of emotions is produced by words. Words affect us emotionally in four different ways: by sound, by rhythm, by meaning, and by associations. The latter two, meaning and asso-

⁵Enn. 5; 9, 11.

ciations, are generally considered the most vitally important. Transmission of meaning is, of course, the chief function of words. Yet there are emotional concomitants connected even with the most abstract meaning. Every logical form throws its shadow into the land of emotions. It is those shadows that make our driest abstractions appear beautiful. Even geometrical theorems are not entirely deprived of this subtle beauty. For do not mathematicians often speak of the intrinsic elegance of their proves and beauty of geometrical constructions? And, perhaps, it is the purest, barest form of beauty, that made a modern poet, in a humble resignation, exclaim:

Euclid alone has looked on Beauty bare. . .

Great mathematicians are great artists even in spite of themselves.

Yet meaning is the business of words. And it is the business of business to be unemotional. The largest part of emotions stimulated by words come not from meaning, but from associations. An idea may be expressed in a business like form in which only those words are used as are necessary to convey the meaning desired. Or the same idea may be expressed in what we call a poetic form which appeals—to use Liddell's phrase—to our human interest. Thus, the content of every verbal expression is not merely logical, but logical plus emotional, or in Liddell's abbreviation:

X=HI

This however, is not sufficient to express the emotional content associated with a linguistic form. With every phrase there are connected not merely those emotions which are caused by associations and which are remembered from our previous experience, but also those subtle and transient emotional fragments which are connected with the sound, rhythm and physiognomy of words.

Reason has moons, but moons not hers
Lie mirrored on her sea,
Confounding her astronomers,
But, oh, delighting me!

Every poem, every phrase has such satellites of alogical formation that revolve around the meaning and the sound of words. Liddell calls it verse form, VF. In our every day conversation, where meaning stays in the foreground, those emotional satellites are ordinarily too small and are too far removed from the center of attention to be noticed.

The words of most men kiss
 With satiated familiarity

says the poet in Bodenheim's "Impulsive Dialogue". Yet there are means to make words emotionally more prominent. Those means consist largely of rhythm and rime.

(a) Rhythm in poetry does not exactly coincide with what is called metre. The latter is but a dead, academic form that is never followed in real poetry. From metrical point of view the first two verses in "Paradise Lost":

Of Man's first disobedience and the fruit
 Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste. . . .

are iambic pentametre which counts five unaccented and five accented syllables. In actual reading, however, the accents of the second foot of the first line are reversed, for "first" is no doubt accented. The fourth foot has no accent at all, for nobody would read "and" with an accent. "That" of the second line is but slightly accented; in ordinary speech it would not be accented at all. Such interruptions of regular rhythm are by no means exceptional. They exist in all languages. Reading of poetry would be unbearably monotonous, if we strictly followed the metrical scheme. The reading quality of a verse depends largely on distribution of such interruptions. There are lines that move with solemn dignity; others that read with ease and playful elegance; some that are sung, and others again that move heavily, with almost alarming gravity, as for instance, the first line of "Paradise Lost". A five-foot iambic verse with a trachee on the first foot such as:

Sing, Heavenly Muse, that on the secret top
 is quite different in its rhythmic character, than the one that has a throchee on the second foot, such as the first line of the "Paradise Lost". A line that has no accent on the second foot reads differently from the one that has a similar interruption on the fourth. The difference in rhythm causes, and largely determines, the difference in our emotional response to a line as a whole. And this emotional response depends, not merely on the metre, nor even on the fact that there are interruptions, but largely on *where those interruptions take place*.

Following the methods used by a Russian scholar-poet, Andrei Belyi, for recording rhythms, I am giving here a table for a comparative study of English, Russian and German rhythms. I have selected thirty verse-lines in each language taken respectively from

Milton's "Paradise Lost", Goethe's "Faust", and Pushkin's "Boris Godunov", all of which are written in iambic pentameter. Each verse-line is represented by five cells corresponding to the number of feet contained in it. If a line follows correctly the metrical form retaining alternating accents on each foot, all five spaces are left blank. A foot that lacks accent is marked by a ·. A cross stands for a spondee, and trochees are represented by circles. An added syllable (anapestic foot) is marked by a triangle.

Table 1 represents the first thirty verses from "Paradise Lost". It contains a very large number of trocheeic feet (reversed accent) which for the most part fall on the first foot. Of the thirty lines twelve have trochees and six spondees.

Table 2 represents thirty lines from Goethe's "Faust".

Ich grüsse dich, du einzige Phiole!
Die ich mit Andacht nun herunterhole,
In dir verehr' ich Menschenwitz und Kunst.
Du Inbegriff der holden Schlummersäfte,

The number of trochees is considerably smaller. The number of syllables which have but a very slight accent is considerably increased. Those interruptions fall largely on the second and third feet which makes a line symmetrical, and gives it a swing. Such lines as:

Und froh ist wenn er Reaenzwürmer findet

which is superbly Goethean, affording greatest rhythmical satisfaction on account, no doubt, of the symmetrical distribution of accents.

Table 3 represents a part of the fountain scene from "Boris Godunov" which in English transliteration, reads:

Ten Groznovo menya usynovila,
Dimitri' em iz groba narekla,
Vokroog menya narody vozmutila
I æ shertvu mne Borisa otdala.

The trochees are entirely absent. There are neither spondees nor dactyls. The rhythm is perfectly clear and transparent. It consists exclusively of interruptions which are quite distinct and well pronounced.

Comparing these three tables one can clearly see the difference in the rhythmic structure of different languages. English rhythms are exceptionally rich, and offer to a poet a wider range of possibilities. German and Russian rhythms are less complex, but more

symmetric and musical. Each horizontal line in our diagram indicates a rhythmic figure which tends to produce a special emotional response. In many cases two or three lines are symmetrically arranged so that they form larger rhythmical units. Thus, for instance, the 10th, 11th, and 12th lines of the first diagram form a "figure". The 14th, 15th, and 16th lines form another symmetrical figure. This symmetry unconsciously felt, gives in reading a great deal of satisfaction, such as:

Thát with no middle flight inténds to sóar
Above th' Aónian móunt, while it pursúes
Thíngs unattétempted yet in próse and ríme

Good German poetry is full of such symmetrical figures. It is sufficient to compare graphically, Goethe with some minor German poets in order to see how much Goethe's verse gains by constant recurrence of symmetrical figures. In reading, our emotional response to each different figure is different. Those differences cannot be expressed in propositions. Their meaning and emotional significance can be grasped only by listening to the words as actually pronounced. Each five-space line of the diagram represents a specific rhythmical figure with a *specific emotional content attached to it*. But it has no *logical* value, for it abides with the sound and not with the meaning of words.

(b) Another group of emotional contents associated with words are introduced by rime.

It is well known that human vowels are tone-clusters in which each component sound has a specific intensity. Among the variously intoned over-tones, however, there is for each vowel one characteristic frequency constant to which falls the larger part of the energy of the sound. It is the tone which is intensified by the sympathetic vibration of the mouth cavity. It has been proven by experiments that this tone remains constant for every pitch of voice. Thus, in a very precise, and not at all metaphorical sense our vowels produce music. When we speak, the vowel-tones produce a gentle accompaniment to our speech which only lacks certain unity, or organization to become a melody. It is a continuous flow of subdued musical sound, a sort of "infinite melody" in Wagnerian sense, that is gently whispered into our ear by the vanishing vowels. If we agree to neglect the disturbing influence of consonants, we may represent the musical content of a phrase in common musical signs. The analysis of the following lines from Wordsworth may serve as

an illustration:

Hail, Zaragoza! If with unwet eyes
 We can approach, thy sorrow to behold,
 Yet is the heart not pitiless nor cold;
 Such spectacle demands not tear or sigh.

The vowels of this fragment, when pronounced, contain the following melody:



Such, or approximately such, melody is actually contained in the above lines. If by some appropriate physical device we were in position to intensify the characteristic over-tones of every vowel, we might be able to hear the melody directly at its source. By playing it on the piano, or some other musical instrument, one may obtain but a very imperfect reproduction of it.

If, as we have seen, an harmonic deviation, from a well perceived musical tone is bound to produce in our mind a feeling of alienation and a desire to go back to the original tone, there are reasons to believe that an indistinct musical tone, such as perceived, for instance, in a vowel, will produce the same effect, only in a smaller degree. The phenomenon of assonance or inner rime, corroborates this view. There is a great deal of satisfaction connected with the return to the same vowel. As I have shown elsewhere,⁶ the tendency to repeat the same vowel at the end of the next line (or alternatively) i. e., the desire for rime, is from the musical point of view nothing else than a tendency to close a verse in the same key in which it was begun. This tendency finds its expression psychologically in a slight emotional excitement which becomes decidedly "pleasing" and "satisfying", if the phrase ends in rime. Thus, rime may be properly defined as the *unity of key in a melody of vowels*.

It is quite obvious that rime is not concerned with the meaning of words, but with its form, which is emotional. It lies within the plane of a-logical cross-section of the verse. Just for this reason it often appears "mysterious",—a "work of genius", which is too dazzling

⁶Henry Lanz; "The Physical Basis of Rime. (Publ. of Language Association of America, 1926).

for our intellect to follow. The fact is, however, that being itself not intellectual it is not at all unreasonable. It belongs to the form, the external appearance,—poets call it “dress”—of a poem, which is in the same time the innermost substance of poetry. Deprived of this charming dress a poem often becomes ugly and ridiculous,—a direct contrast to what one would call poetical. At any event, if not completely distorted, the general tone of a poem deprived of rime becomes quite different from the original. Here is what O. W. Holmes says on poetry:

And most of all, the pure ethereal fire,
Which seems to radiate from the poets lyre
Is to the world a mystery and a charm,
And Aegis wielded on a mortal's arm,
While reason turns her dazzled eyes away;
And bows her sceptre to her subjects sway;
And thus the poet clothed with godlike state,
Usurped his Maker's title—to create;
He, whose thoughts, differing not in shape, but dress,
What others feel more fitly can express. . . .

Now take the “rime dress” from this charming fragment! I shall ask my condescending reader to have patience to read the same lines once more without rime:

And most of all the pure ethereal flame
Which seems to radiate from the poet's lyre
Is to the world a mystery and a lure,
And Aegis wielded on a mortal's arm,
While reason turns away her dazzled eyes
And bows her sceptre to her subjects sway;
He, whose thought differing not in shape, but dress
What others feel more fitly can pronounce.

I have changed only three words in the above fragment selecting those which are equally, or even more poetical. (substituting “flame” for “fire”, and “lure” for “charm”.) And yet it sounds almost as a caricature on Holmes poetic eulogy.

Thus, the emotional effect produced by the melody of vowels is far from negligible. Homeopathic doses are sometimes the most effective ones. Think how many private lives were ruined by inner rime quite accidentally contained in the harmless formula: “seven—eleven”. It is sufficient to remind one on such expressions as: “freedom and liberty” or “cash and carry”, so show that rhythms

and rimes quite powerfully interfere with the affairs of our political and practical life. They are fit to electrify masses.

* * *

We have considered three groups of emotional contents: melody, rhythm and rime. They particularly fit to serve our purposes of proving that emotions—like ideas—also have neutral content; for they not merely have a content, but allow their content to be symbolically represented in signs. One reason why the content of “ideas” was so early crystallised into “concepts” was that the meaning of ideas was attached to words. The symbolic value of words makes the neutral nuclei of ideas stand forth more prominently. Emotions on the whole lack this advantage. The path that leads our mind from “Satz to sich” to “Warheit an sich” was not available for those who ventured into the field of emotions. That is the reason why their neutrality remains largely obscured even now. And for the same reason those groups of emotions which allow sematological treatment are very important.

It may be objected, however, that strictly speaking it is not the emotional content that can be expressed in signs, but only a certain arrangement and sequence of sense-qualities. In writing down a melody, for instance, musicians merely indicate the sequence of tones in time; emotional content remains beyond their reach, and does not even belong to their intention.

And yet we nevertheless assume that in musical books, not merely the sequence of tones, but *melodies* are written. And melody, no doubt, is something more than a mere sequence of tones. It has a content that goes beyond our acoustic sensations. Buying, for instance, a piano transcription of “Boris Gudonov,” I do it for the sake of harmonies and melodies it contains, and not for the acoustic material; for opera as performed on the stage has the same melodies, but certainly different acoustic material as orchestra and singing is quite different from what I am able to produce on my piano. If it were the correct reproduction of tonal material, nobody would ever buy piano transcriptions. It is evident that melody as a whole including its specific emotional tension finds its expression in musical signs. The content of musical emotions are there. They are as Germans would say “*mitbezeichnet*”. The same holds true with regard to our symbolic representation of rhythms and rimes.

There is, I think, as much reason to believe that content of emotions remains constant as there is reason to believe that logical

meanings never change. For even if it were true that our response to the sound of a melody is different every time, yet to know and feel the difference we have got to have a standard of identity. Otherwise the difference could not be seen or comprehended. This identity does not imply, however, that the content of each emotion is altogether "immutable". For we can not say that of our ideas either. It is, for instance, quite impossible to live through emotional content of given rime without in the same time considering rhythm and meaning. The melody contained in a verse is never given in an isolated form. And the impression produced by a given rime depends largely on the general impression derived from the whole poem, on the expressiveness of reading, musical quality of the voice, as well as the temporary mood of the reader or listener himself. It seems that at every particular moment we can have only one emotion in which various emotional contents fuse together. And yet that is no argument for refusing to admit the existence of fixed and constant emotional contents. Rime may be differently perceived at different times, for each time it is forced to co-öperate with a different emotional state of mind,—it is differently prepared, we may say. Yet—if it is active at all—it affects any state of mind in a definite way that never changes. It is not exactly a special mood or an isolated emotion that is forever connected with the given rime, but a certain mode of emotional coöperation, *certain fixed and definite way of modifying other emotion*.

What has been shown with regard to music and poetry can be easily applied to other emotions. Every emotion must have a content. This may be regarded as the fundamental axiom of the logic of emotions. Further on, the evidence that was obtained for the emotional contents which appear in music and poetry can be easily generalised. It can be shown in a general way that (1) the content of emotions is independent of our consciousness, and (2) it is of an a-logical character.

Proposition 1. (Declaration of Independence). Although the content of emotions is given to us through mental processes, it is not dependent on those processes for its being, or nature.

This proposition may be supported by the following argument: It is axiomatically, and without reservations, admitted by psychologists that "fear", "love", etc., are mental processes, or manifestations of consciousness. And yet what is consciousness? Psychologists till now can not agree as to the meaning of the term.

Every psychological school—and they are very numerous—has its own conception of what mental process or consciousness should be. Behaviorists refuse to admit that consciousness exists at all. An average man knows nothing of mental processes. And yet, every one knows what fear is, and knows it very definitely without the inherent vagueness of the psychological theories. We have the testimony of an ancient fairy tale that a man who knows not what fear is, is but a fool. Nobody in the days of fairy tales would regard a man particularly foolish for not knowing what “mental process” means.

Psychologists claim that our mental processes are “immediately given” to us. There is revealed in this assertion a remarkable inability of philosophical minds to draw a line between facts and theories,—remarkable especially in view of their incessant argument about this very distinction. There is nothing surprising that men of science grow suspicious whenever a philosopher begins to speak of “facts”. It is quite possible that men of science often commit the same fallacy; yet there is nothing surprising in it as it is not their business to know the distinction. A philosopher ought to be more cautious. Speaking of mental processes he ought to remember that they appeared comparatively late in the history of human knowledge, that ancient Greeks knew nearly nothing about those “facts”, and that there was a great deal of thinking necessary to grasp the distinction between the inner and outer world. Till now the distinction is very far from being clear, and every philosophical school, nearly every individual psychologist, have different conceptions of what inner life, consciousness, or mental processes should be. That shows that “consciousness” is, not a given fact, but a doctrine, a theory obtainable only through learning, and a great deal of learning. It is not a “sensation” that is immediately given to us, but red and blue rough and smooth, loud or soft. “Sensation” is a psychological theory (and not a very clear one) that is superimposed upon those immediate facts. Consciousness is a giver that in itself is never given.

For similar reasons the content of an emotion must be different from its psychological nature,—different precisely in the same sense in which red is different from sensation. It is not the emotion that is given to us, but “fear” or “love”, “courage” or “hate”, “hope” or “despair”. What psychologists call emotion is not at all a mere generalization obtained by abstraction from those underlying facts.

For there is not much to generalize from hope and despair. It is not a generalization, but a hypothesis. And living through a fear we certainly do not live through a hypothesis.

It may be objected, however, that "fear" is an emotion. Of course, we shall reply. But it is also true that space is a perception. And yet this proposition, though true, does not prove a single item in the system of geometry. For mathematicians in dealing with space "take consciousness into parenthesis" and forget all about their perceptions, which never appear in either their arguments or proves. Similarly a man who is in love can hardly derive anything from his knowledge of psychology that would have any bearing upon his happiness. Yet he can derive a great deal of practical and useful knowledge from literature, which deals largely with the content and genuine structure of love, and not at all with its "psychology".

Proposition 2. The content of emotions, although a legitimate subject for theoretical analysis, can not be intellectually comprehended. It can be logically discussed, but cannot be grasped by logic or expressed by a theory.

One who says "fear" attaches certain meaning to the word. Referring to this meaning, i. e., discussing fear one is not supposed at the moment of discussion to live through an actual experience of fear. One may fairly intelligently discuss fear without being actually afraid of anything or anybody. This is a purely theoretical situation in which nothing but meanings are involved. From this situation actual experience of fear is entirely different, and whoever lives through this experience knows that he, not merely means, but feels fear. There is something present in his experience that goes far beyond logic, something that cannot be logically accounted for. One who loves and enjoys music knows that no logical terms, no theory whatsoever can "explain" a melody. One must actually or mentally *feel* the melody in order to grasp it. No logical terms can possibly give it to us. One who says "Siegfried melody" attaches definite meaning to his words. Those are not merely words, but words with a definite *logical* meaning. And in the realms of logical concepts *there is* a concept that corresponds to these words. *Yet that concept itself is merely a symbol.* To indicate the Siegfried melody itself, words and concepts are not sufficient. We need musical signs. And one who reads those signs reads directly the melody itself.

Now in conclusion, let us briefly discuss the application of the above proposition to the general problems of aesthetics. The value

of the first proposition consists in establishing independence for a large realm of phenomena which otherwise appear in constant danger of psychological attacks. Psychological treatment substituting theories for facts shifts all problems to a different level, and often makes us forget the original issue; instead of analysing the structure of what is actually given to us in our artistic experience, or otherwise, we, under the effect of psychological fallacy, begin to analyze the process of experience itself. To avoid this error, in aesthetic especially, it is well to have the truth of the first proposition constantly in view.

The second proposition guarantees a correct method for dealing with many objects of art. There are three ways of enjoying an artistic work. The first is when we simply and naively enjoy a work of art without trying to "understand" anything beyond what is immediately given to us in form of enjoyment. This is, perhaps, the most adequate, and I should say, the most sympathetic way of approaching art. For that is precisely what the artist expects us to do. There is another, professional way of approaching an artistic work, which is based on training, and study of technique and history. This professional way, by no means, interferes with the naive enjoyment. It merely opens for enjoyment new points which otherwise may escape our attention, and makes our appreciation of the work more thorough and profitable. There is, however, a middle way between these two, which is neither naive, nor professional and consequently not at all belonging to the proper territory of art. It consists of "understanding" reached through "philosophy" and based on "profound interpretations". People who are dull and unartistic and unable to feel the content immediately given to them in music, or poetry, often wish to prove their "intelligent" reaction by what they claim to be mystical revelations. They substitute their cheap symbols and commonplace images for the genuine content of great works. And thus, the tragic harmonies of *Sonata op. 27*, are brought down to the level of a pictorial moonlight-melodrama that might be successfully used for advertising Ivory Soap, or Packard cars. To avoid such illegitimate substitutions it is highly important to realise that emotions can not be properly "understood", but *merely moved*, or lived through in a manner accessible only for emotions.