

however, and it is folly to frighten people when nothing is to be gained by it. The substitution of new and untried maxims of government for those which have been defined by a process of court decision might very well complicate instead of simplifying our legal problems. Unless we are sure that we have something better we may well hesitate to throw overboard the results of one hundred and thirty years of judicial experience. In changing constitutions our motto should be "Safety first."

AN AUTONOMOUS UKRAINE.

BY AN UKRAINIAN.

WHEN in 1863 a Russian minister of state declared that "there never has been and never will be an Ukrainian language or nationality," he did not foresee the tragedy of the last Romanoff and the apparently accomplished disintegration of the empire of the Czars. In point of fact the very arrogance of his utterance was but a reflex of that will to conquer which has characterized the house of Romanoff from the time when it first took control of Great, or better, Muscovite Russia and added one subjected people after another as jewels to its crown. Among these was a former nation once of great power, later an object of contention between medieval Poland and Muscovy until in 1654 a political blunder on the part of its ruler, the Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki, put this wealthy but politically weak state first under Muscovite tutelage but later under the conqueror's heel of the Czars, so that it preceded its enemy Poland which fell a victim over a century later.

For one hundred and fifty years the wrongs of Poland have aroused and obtained the sympathies of the non-Russian world, but rarely has the voice of justice been raised in behalf of a people whose only crime has been the misfortune of its undefended geographical situation between rapacious neighbors. The English world has forgotten the stirring *Mazeppa* of its greatest nineteenth-century poet, Lord Byron, and the present political situation will hardly allow any Englishman to take up the pen in defense of a nation whose rebellion seems to jeopardize the cause of the Entente by weakening the aggressive strength of Russia against her enemies of Central Europe. But putting aside the question of abstract justice, is such a stand even politically expedient? Cannot the aims of the new Ukrainian nation be utilized to the advantage of a strong Russia, so as to make her a potent force once more in the

cause of democracy? Would it not be better to conciliate an oppressed people and win their grateful cooperation than to wear away the strength of Great and Little Russia in civil war? The anomalous position of the western democracies in alliance with autocratic and despotic Czarism was immeasurably strengthened by the triumph of the people in Russia, which was acclaimed nowhere with more pronounced satisfaction than in the great Republic of North America, whose distinguished President has made himself the champion of the little nations. But the Ukraine is more than a little nation. Allow us, please, to state our claims.

In the first place, we do not ask for armed intervention. After asking the Great Russian government, or succession of governments, for an autonomy which was denied, our country set up the standard of independence and established a government and a state which we expect to maintain unless the interests of the Entente or of the Central Powers at the final peace congress should sacrifice us as was the fate of Poland after the fall of Napoleon. In the name of a people of 33,000,000 souls for whom the sacred bell of liberty is now pealing like the one which sounded for a new republic in 1776, we implore the present citizens of that great republic to take us into the family of nations.

Take your map and draw a line from Brest-Litowsk to Przemyśl and the Carpathians for the western boundary, from Brest-Litowsk along the Pripet River to the Dnieper, roughly along parallel $50^{\circ} 30'$ to a point one hundred miles east of the Don River, from thence to the mouth of the Don, leaving the Black and Azoff seas, the Dniester and the Carpathians to the south, and the included territory, which may be called Ukrainia, is equal in area to the states Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana and Ohio, or as large as the German empire plus Illinois, certainly enough for a seventh or eighth power in Europe's future concert.

But what of the Ukrainian people? you ask. Are they not Russians, dialectically different from the Great Russians to be sure, but still Russians? No, we answer. Our language is as different from Great Russian as Portuguese is from Spanish, and Portugal has a long history as an independent nation. It is as remote from Polish as Spanish or Portuguese are from French, notwithstanding that the Pole claims for his fatherland all of Austrian Galicia, including and east of Przemyśl where the Ukrainians form 66% of the population. In all the territory claimed by Ukrainians, they form on an average 72% of the population, and the figure is 98% for the large areas along the Dnieper. And yet this suggested state

does not include debatable areas on all its borders, where the percentage of Ukrainians is considerable, even large. It is a compact, homogeneous territory, possibly more uniformly Ukrainian than any state of the American Union is uniformly Anglo-American.

A brief historical survey of the projected state will be of interest. In the ninth century the princes of Kiev united most of the present Ukrainian-speaking lands under their scepter and probably owed their suggestive appellation, *Russij*, or the Red, to their blond Scandinavian inheritance, forming as striking a contrast to the blackhaired, dark Ukrainians as redbearded Frederick of Hohenstaufen did to the dark Italians who gave him the nickname *Barbarossa*. Their power increased steadily until they fell before the onslaughts of the Tatars in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Kiev losing its power and the Ukrainian rulers being succeeded by the princes of Halicz, a city which gave its name to what is now the Austrian crownland Galicia. The rise of Lithuania in the fourteenth century was followed by the absorption of independent Ukraina, but the new double state soon came under the yoke of Poland, and its eastern half did not regain independence until the middle of the seventeenth century, and then only as the result of a bloody revolution. Under the Ukrainian Hetman Bogdan Chmielnicki, the greatest Ukrainian general and statesman of modern times, the country came, to be sure, under Russian protectorate but with the retention of complete political independence including the control of its foreign policy and its army. It took but a year to disillusion the patriot ruler as to the crafty purposes of his "protector," and he concluded an alliance with Sweden and *Siebenbürgen* as a check against both Russia and Poland. Unfortunately death prevented the fruition of his great plan. His successor, Ivan Wyhowski, concluded a treaty of union with Poland and Lithuania in 1658, declared war on the Muscovite Czar and annihilated a large Russian army at *Konotop*. Russia now resorted to the use of money to create a party favorable to her interests which she finally supported with large forces of troops. Hetman Wyhowski was forced to abdicate in favor of a successor who renewed the alliance with the Czar. Ukraina endured this state of vassalage until the accession of Hetman Ivan Mazeppa whose administration, at first successful, met disaster at the battle of *Poltava* in 1709, which also ruined his ally Charles XII of Sweden. Czar Peter ravaged the Ukraine with fire and sword, crucified the Ukrainians by thousands, nailed them to rafts and sent them drifting down the rivers. This victory established for two centuries the ascendancy

of Muscovite Russia. Ukrainia became the spoils of Muscovite officials, and the last semblance of autonomy vanished in 1783 with the abolition of the military organization. Nevertheless the Ukrainians did not give up their agitation for freedom, but continued their efforts with obstinate determination. Peter the Great forbade them the use of their language, and every effort was made for two hundred years to relegate it to the position of a peasant patois under the claim that it was but a dialect of Great Russian, that the people themselves were but a branch of the Muscovites. At last in 1905 the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg answered the government's demand for a decision on the case with the judgment, of which the concluding sentence reads: "The arguments given above bring the Academy of Sciences to the conviction that to the Little Russian population is due the same right as to the Great Russian—to use their mother tongue publicly and in print." Their committee established the fact that the linguistic differences between the two languages are traceable back into the eleventh century. Little Russian is as distant from Great Russian as Holland Dutch is from German.

How great are the anthropological differences between Ukrainian and Muscovite can be illuminatingly seen in Prof. W. Z. Ripley's *Racial Geography of Europe*, in his chapter on the Slavs. These differences extend to social customs as well. In the Russian family the father is a despot, in the Ukrainian the wife is his equal. Socially, the Russian is communistic, especially in his attachment to community of land, but always ready to yield to the will of his superiors in everything, whereas the Ukrainian is individualistic and democratic. In family life the Muscovite is more backward and physically repulsive to the Ukrainian who is more inclined to cleanliness and good conditions of life. So far does this sentiment go that Ukrainians along the the frontiers painfully avoid all marriages with Great Russians. The Ukrainian is artistic and has furnished a large share of Russian musicians, artists and poets.

How irreconcilable is this racial antipathy, is demonstrated by the absolute failure of the Russian government to bring about a fusion of the two peoples after all its persecution and oppression of the resistant race, which is to-day more determined than ever to attain its freedom. This was realized in the session of the Russian Duma of the 24th of February, 1914, when Professor Milukoff, who later played such a prominent role in the dethronement of the Czar, made this admission: "The Ukrainian particularism intrudes into all the forms of life. The Russian army, the Russian school,

the Russian officials do nothing but arouse national friction and spur on the national feeling of the Ukrainians. In addition the Ukrainian movement is deeply democratic, it is, you may say, conducted by the people itself; for that reason it is impossible to crush it. But to fan it into flames and to turn it against ourselves is easily possible. . . ."

Ukraine means "borderland," and the name was originally applied to that part of the "steppes" along the southern Polish frontier to which the Little Russian peasants fled from the tyranny of Russian "boyars" or Polish nobles. In constant conflict with hostile neighbor, the Tatars, they formed roving bands of splendid horsemen accepting the Tatar appellation of Kazak, which the English spell Cossack. As Cossacks they have formed in recent times, along with those from the Don, in whom there is a more or less prevalent Mongolian strain, that redoubtable cavalry which has been the most faithful reliance of the Russian Czars. In Galicia they are called Ruthenians, but wherever they dwell they prefer to be called Ukrainians.

The Russian Czars have pursued a consistent policy of denationalization of the Cossack-Ukraine state from the edict of Peter the Great in 1720 which prohibited the use of Ukrainian in print, followed by the abolition of the office of Hetman later on, and the abolition of the separate military organization in 1783. But the sternest of measures did not stifle nationalist aspirations, and in 1831 the Czar yielded to a demand of the Ukrainian peasantry for the formation of Cossack corps after the old model. When it was seen that the renewed organizations were fanning the agitation for political freedom they were banished to service in the Caucasus and kept there for eighteen years. In the previous century the land had been divided into a number of governments of which Kiev and Cherson came so near to a revolt in 1855 that the agitation could only be put down by armed force.

In the forties the idea of Pan-Slavism led to the formation of the "Brotherhood of Cyrillus and Methodius" among our people, who now hoped for a grand federation of Slavic peoples, one of which should be an autonomous Ukraine. To this brotherhood belonged all of that class to whom we may be allowed to give the name of "intellectuals," including the poet and martyr, the illustrious Schevtchenko, who had returned from his exile in the Ural after 1847. Chapters of a secret organization sprang into life immediately all over the Black Earth Region, of which the most important was that of Kiev, which found able support in a similar union in the

capital. Their activities alarmed the Czar's government and brought down the Ukas of 1876 which prohibited the printed use of Ukrainian, dispersed the Ukrainian Scientific Society in Kiev and banished its most prominent members to Siberia, but it could not destroy the success of a movement, now become the passionate expression of a people's longing.

Disappointed in their realization that Russia had been using Pan-Slavism merely as a cunning cloak for Pan-Muscovitism the Little Russians commenced to see their hope only in absolute independence, and the new century saw a separatist movement of great proportions which culminated in the Peasant uprising of 1902, especially in the governments Charkov and Poltava, followed by the election of fifty-two Ukraine Nationalists to the first Russian Duma in 1916. The efforts of Stolypin, however, merely reduced this showing in the next Dumas, but the movement had caused the prosecution of about two hundred members of the Ukraine Revolutionary Organization in 1907, on the ground that five governments had organized the elections to the Duma with the aim to a separatist agitation. Though they were driven from the next Dumas, the work of the patriots went on just the same.

In 1904 Lithuanians and Poles had been granted the right of instruction in their own language, but not so the Ukrainians, although they obtained the permission to print newspapers and books, a concession which was soon so hampered by censor and public prosecutor that but little good came from it. Since instruction was given only in Russian, which was not understood, there were over fifty percent of Ukrainians unable to read or write before the war, and yet the twenty newspapers, of which the strongest was the *Rada*, appearing in Kiev, and the great circulation of Ukrainian books, demonstrate the devotion of the people to their mother-tongue. The Ukraine leaders used the occasion of the funeral of the composer Lissenko in 1913 to stage a great political manifestation in Kiev, which was attended by over 200,000 people from all the governments. For not preventing this the Governor of Kiev was punished by removal.

In 1905 the Ukrainians deluged Count Witte with petitions containing the certainly modest request for a single Ukrainian professorship in the university of their capital Kiev, and when the General Association of Elementary School-Teachers for all Russia met in St. Petersburg in 1914, the numerous Ukrainian representatives succeeded in getting the adoption of a resolution calling for the introduction of the native language into all Ukrainian schools.

Thereupon the assembly was officially dispersed, and Count Menschikoff wrote in the *Novoje Vremja* that the entire teaching body of the Ukraine was affected with nationalistic sentiments and would therefore have to be replaced by Russian teachers.

With such a history, it will cause no surprise if we admit that all opposition to Russian aggression has had to borrow the cloak of secrecy, helped by vigorous and resolute organization. The clergy, the industrials, the tradespeople, and the most of the nobility, who have but lately seen the light of duty and right, belong to the National Ukrainian Party, whose principal association is in Kiev with local branches in all the larger cities, of which the *Rada* is the official organ. This party has established a scientific Schevtschenko-Union which publishes a literary-scientific monthly magazine, and has founded educative clubs for the peasantry in all the larger towns, though these with few exceptions have been suppressed by the Russian government.

It may be noted that the lesser nobility are rather numerous east of the Dnieper—that the industrials are especially represented in the South, that even a whole railroad in Kuban is in the hands of Ukrainians, and finally that the clergy is strongly represented in Western Ukraine, especially in Podolia. The growth of nationalist sentiment among the younger clergy is due especially to secret societies in certain theological seminaries, where, however, many have been discovered in recent years and suppressed by the Russian ecclesiastical officials. Bishop Parfeny of Kamenetz in Podolia, who was secretly especially active was removed because of his nationalist sentiments, and his place assigned to a Pan-Russian.

The "intellectuals" are ably supported by the very numerous and strong agricultural societies, granges we might call them, or cooperatives, to whom they supply able leaders. These usually carry on their correspondence in Ukrainian and they also publish their local organs in that language. The Kiev Exhibition, or Fair, of 1913 brought them a consciousness of their power, and since then their opposition to the Great Russian societies, to whom their aims are no longer a secret, has been pronounced.

Finally, there is the Union of Industrial Laborers, who are organized as Social Democrats with their own press. They are strongly represented in Kiev and Jekaterinoslav, where the important iron works are.

In view of the organized potentiality of these various socio-political bodies, not to speak of the "Bond for the Liberation of Ukraine" operating across the border in the Austrian crownland

Galicia, it will be readily seen why the events of the last weeks have resulted in the establishment of a Republic of Ukrainia, even though it be but for a brief time. The republic is a reality, but can it last? This raises the question of its relation first of all to Great Russia, second to Europe in general. An Ukrainia independent of Russia must always be *en vedette*, ready to defend its liberties. It will by force of circumstances be driven into the arms of Germany and Austria. Will the rest of Europe tolerate this? Would such a solution not amount to holding a lighted fuse near a powder-keg? Is not Ukraine so valuable to Russia that she would always strive to get it back? Let us see.

The limits of the new republic would be practically conterminous with the "black earth belt" of Russia, a land literally flowing with milk and honey, the granary of Russia, indispensable to the subsistence of Great Russia's teeming millions, producing not less than one-third of all the agricultural produce for the 175,000,000 of 1914. This explains the persistence and weight of all Russian offensives along Eastern Galicia and Bukowina during this war.

In 1912 seventy percent of all Russian coal was raised from the Donec Basin in the heart of Eastern Ukrainia. The same figure applies to the production of pig iron, while the figure for iron and steel together is still sixty percent.

The sugar industry of Ukrainia produces eighty-eight percent of the Russian total, and the tobacco production is about the same.

For foreign export the surplus streams to the great Ukrainian Black Sea port of Odessa, from which it may pass to the outside world especially through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Russia must either hold Ukrainia as a vassal state or at least control through a customs alliance, similar to the Zollverein which founded the union and the industrial greatness of the German federation. It is inconceivable that Russia would ever allow the only other alternative, that its former subjects should strengthen the economic alliance of Central Europe. Therefore, in the interest of justice to a numerous and capable but downtrodden people, in the name of that humanity which we hope has not disappeared as the result of this war, for the purpose of future peace and security, we urge our claims to such an autonomy within the Russian federation, which must replace the old Muscovite despotism of the departed Czars, as shall conserve the full rights of Great Russia while at the same time bringing freedom, nationalistic development and economic prosperity to a people who are destined to be second to none in the reconstruction of the new Europe.