

A QUESTION FOR ENGLAND.

BY ROLAND HUGINS.

WHY are you in this war? You are the English; you are now, and will continue to be, a great people. You are at present united, with the exception of a few ineffective intellectuals, in a resolve to "crush" Germany, to beat her to her knees, to punish her. Hate, when it permeates a whole people, becomes a terrible political fact. Yet there is no reason why neutrals should sanction and condone British hate any more than German hate, or Mohammedan hate. Hate always blights, never creates, and should hate rule the peace and the settlement, whichever side wins in the field, we shall have a worse Europe than before. It is not, therefore, to your half-crazed wartime mood that I appeal, but to whatever measure of cool reason remains among you. In every crisis a few Englishmen keep their heads; that is one of the sources of British strength. Let me ask them, without rancor, one question.

What are you fighting for?

You may say that the answer is simple; you are fighting for democracy, for liberty, for civilization, for humanity. Permit me to point out that these vague phrases in themselves mean exactly nothing. Each of the belligerents believes it is fighting for "civilization." The idealism of the German people is as sincere, and their earnestness as intense, to say the least, as your own. High-sounding pretensions must be translated into concrete terms to gain significance.

An explanation would come from you in good grace. For, on the face of it, your position in the war is peculiar. You are fighting on the side of Russia, a despotic and half-Asiatic power which has little in common with Western civilization, and whose interests are in no way identical with those of the British Empire, and you are fighting against Germany, a people of the same stock as yourselves, with the same general social purposes, whom the deeper racial and

cultural forces would seem to mark as your natural ally. Indeed, your choice of sides in this struggle is a great historical anomaly, second only to the anomaly of the war itself. How did that alignment come about? Of course there are reasons. But are the reasons those which have been alleged by your statesmen and publicists? Behind this question lies another: What are you striving to accomplish in this conflict? What purposes do you hope to achieve by that victory of which you are still so confident?

This is not an academic discussion. These are political questions of the greatest urgency, both for Englishmen, and indirectly, for citizens of the United States. It is of the first importance that we think rightly on these issues, not merely that we may save our own souls by finding the truth, but that, having embraced the truth, we may save Europe and the world.

II.

Are you fighting for Belgium?

You must admit that for many of the British public Belgium was England's *casus belli*. Hundreds of thousands of your best young men have enlisted in the service of the King, believing that they are taking up arms to defend a little country against a brutal aggression. From your press and platform have come the strongest assertions that England is fighting a righteous war to vindicate the sanctity of treaties and uphold the rights of small nations. No consideration has won you sympathy in neutral countries more readily than this plea.

Do you still insist on the pose of the knightly rescuer? Let me call your attention to two or three incontrovertible aspects of your relation to Belgium.

1. Sir Edward Grey had, in secret commitments, unconditionally pledged the naval and military forces of the Empire to France in case of a European war. These secret agreements, contracted as far back as 1906 and frequently renewed, known to only a few members of the Cabinet, were not announced to Parliament and the British nation until August 3, 1914, when the armies of the Continent were already on the march. They would have thrown you into war in any case, Belgium or no Belgium. It is said on good authority that Sir Edward Grey planned, in event of repudiation by his own Cabinet, to form a Coalition Cabinet in August 1914—as was done months later—and proceed to carry out his “obligations of honor.” That these agreements were contracted in secret, without the knowledge of the British people, does not alter the fact that they were a binding action of the British government.

2. Germany made a definite bid for your neutrality on the score of Belgian integrity. If your Government had been actuated by any idealistic concern for small nationalities why did it not intervene to preserve Belgium when it could? Sir Edward Grey was asked point blank by Ambassador Lichnowsky whether he would keep Britain out of the war if Belgian neutrality were respected (celebrated dispatch No. 123, British White Paper). Your Foreign Secretary answered, no, his hands must be free,—meaning, of course, that his hands already were tied. When war came, Great Britain's action was mortgaged. "If France became involved we should be drawn in" (No. 111). England might have, indeed would have, saved Belgium had Belgian welfare been a primary object of British statesmanship; but it was not.

3. Belgium was used shamelessly as a pawn in the great game between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. Your little neighbor, by the accident of its position, is of the greatest strategic importance, either for an offensive against France or an offensive against Germany. Your Foreign Office urged the Belgians to "maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality" (White Paper No. 115). France pressed armed aid on Belgium before its course was announced. British and French strategists for years had been hatching secret military plans with the Belgian General Staff. These plans did not, it is true, foreshadow direct aggression on Belgium, but surely they indicated the most cynical willingness to use the Belgian army as a first line of defense for the Entente. When war broke out the "plucky Belgians" rendered you a most valuable service in delaying the march of the Teutonic hosts. What, I ask you in all frankness, did you do for Belgium? Belgium was desolated; she was caught and ground to pieces between the huge rival alliances of Europe. The action of your government, playing the game of the balance of power, amounted to nothing less than a ghastly betrayal of Belgian interests.

The above observations, I submit, are based on facts; I do not admit that they are disputable. I give them thus briefly because they have been emphasized already by many British writers. I need mention only the names of Dr. F. C. Conybeare,¹ E. D. Morel,² H. N. Brailsford,³ Ramsay Macdonald,⁴ and Bernard Shaw.⁵ Even the London *Times*, in a leader of March 12, 1915, repudiated chiv-

¹ Conybeare, Letter in *Vital Issue*.

² Morel, Letter to Birkenhead Liberal Association.

³ Brailsford, "Belgium as 'The Scrap of Paper.'"

⁴ Macdonald, Statement in the *Labor Leader*.

⁵ Shaw, "Common Sense About the War."

alry for Belgium: "Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is quite right. Even had Germany not invaded Belgium, honor and interest would have united us with France."

Yet I know what reply you, the better class of Englishmen, would give to the foregoing. You would say: "This indictment of the past is all very well. I dare say our statesmen juggled with Belgium, and I have never been a partisan of secret diplomacy. That is no reason why we should forsake Belgium now. The bald fact remains that she has been trampled under foot by Germany, that she is now invaded and held in subjection. It is England's duty to fight on until the last invader is cleared from Belgian soil."

I give you full credit for honesty in this sentiment. Your aim is generous; but you have chosen futile means. You wish to avenge Belgium by force of arms. It cannot be done.

Suppose you are successful; that you drive back the Germans, yard by yard, to their own territory. What does that mean for Belgium? Merely a second devastation more terrible than the first. By again making Belgium the world's battlefield, you will scorch her bare. There is a better way out. Why should Germany care to retain Belgian territory? Only as a weapon against *you*. "Antwerp is a pistol pointed at the heart of England." Strategically Belgium has value; politically and financially she would be a liability. As soon as you convince the Germans that England is not perpetrating a huge aggression to destroy her, Belgium will be evacuated without cost to the Belgians; not before. I agree that no settlement of this conflict can be satisfactory which does not restore Belgium's independence and make her such measure of reparation as may be possible. But in that reparation you have a share to pay as well as Germany.

Let us, in the name of decency, drop this twaddle about the rights of small nationalities. Consider your allies. You stood calmly aside when Russia throttled Finland, and when she crushed Persian independence with atrocities more gruesome than the alleged German atrocities. You applauded Japan in violating China's neutrality to march on Kiao Chou. Your Foreign Office actively supported France when she tore up the public law of Europe as embodied in the Act of Algeciras and subjected Morocco to military terrorism and financial strangulation. Do you insist on one moral code for your enemies and approve an opposite for your friends? Your own record in Ireland should close your lips against pious platitudes about small nations. You did not enter this war to protect Belgium. You will never render her effective service until you are

prepared to bargain concessions or colonies to secure her interests. That, apparently, you are not ready to do.

What are you fighting for? Not Belgium!

III.

Possibly you are in this war to safeguard France. *La belle France!* You could not bear to see your closest friend crushed to earth. If that is your motive it is a laudable one. The whole world holds France precious.

You will admit, however, that this deep affection is rather a sudden attachment. For centuries the French and British peoples fought and snarled at one another. You hated France when France was strong. Even within the last quarter century there were three occasions when you stood on the brink of war with her,—over Siam, West Africa, and the Nile Valley (Fashoda). But in 1904 your Foreign Office reached a general agreement with France on all outstanding disputes. In 1906 it came to an understanding with Russia, and so the *Entente Cordiale* was formed. From that day on the peace of Europe was never safe. While the Triple Alliance was the most powerful military force in Europe the dogs were chained, but when a stronger combination (presumably) arose, the politics of Europe steadily underwent a sinister transformation. Let us see what happened.

The British Foreign Office definitely abandoned Salisbury's policy of a Concert for a system of rival military groups. The *Entente* did not confine itself to a defensive league against a possible attack, but began openly or clandestinely to balk and bully and injure its rivals in time of peace. Sir Edward Grey at once signed a general Anglo-French declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco, in which the French government averred that it had no intention "of altering the political status of Morocco." This was followed by the publication of a Franco-Spanish declaration of similar tenor. At the same time that these public declarations of good faith appeared Sir Edward Grey entered into *secret* agreements with France and Spain which provided for the partition of Morocco between the two latter countries and rendered the integrity of the Moorish kingdom a sham.⁶ Germany had vast economic interests in Morocco. What became of them? They were wrested from her. Germany was robbed, underhandedly, and furthermore was humiliated, insulted,

⁶ The Moroccan intrigue served more than anything else to embitter Anglo-German relations, and helped to usher in the present war. The authority for the statements in the text is to be found in *Morocco in Diplomacy* by E. D. Morel, first published in London in 1912, and reissued as *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy* in 1915. Mr. Morel presents the history of the affair with such a

slapped in the face. Morocco, whose independence was guaranteed not only by the public declarations of 1904, but also by the international Act of Algeciras of 1906, signed by all the powers, was ruthlessly reduced to a French dependency. Morocco in time of "peace" was treated worse than Belgium in time of war.

To all this Germany did not submit without a protest. She intervened twice, once at Tangier in the person of the Emperor, and again at Agadir with the Panther. In these interventions she was entirely within her rights, and in accord with what Mr. Morel calls "the fundamental legality of her attitude." And both times Europe nearly plunged into war because Britain interfered to back up France in an aggression where she was morally and legally wrong. In both instances, mind you, your Foreign Office did not interfere with merely diplomatic weapons, but with the threat of the whole military and naval forces of Great Britain,—offered, in the event of a Franco-German rupture, to mobilize the fleet, seize the Kiel canal and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. These facts were laid bare in the Lausanne disclosures of 1905 and the Faber revelations of 1911. One immediate effect was to leave the whole German nation rocking and seething with indignation, and to convince Germany that England would precipitate a European war on the first pretext.

In the end Germany lost all of her interests in Morocco, though a slice of land in the interior of the French Congo was thrown to her as a sop. The secret clauses of the 1904 Declarations finally were revealed in *Le Temps* and *Le Matin*, November, 1911. But Germany had wind of them as early as October, 1904. Says Mr. Morel (remember that he wrote in 1912): "Thenceforth dated the situation which for more than seven years has poisoned the whole European atmosphere, embroiled British, French, German, and Spanish relations, and placed an enormous and constantly growing burden of added expenditure upon the peoples of those countries. Thenceforth dated the situation which Sir Edward Grey, instead of seeking to improve by orienting his policy after Algeciras in a more friendly spirit toward Germany—retaining what was good but rejecting what was bad in the policy of his predecessor—has aggravated and worsened to such a degree that only yesterday we escaped a general conflagration. Veritably the process of being a party to the stealing of another man's land brings with it its own Nemesis. Unfortunately it is the people in whose name, but without whose wealth of detailed proof, with such evident impartiality and with so genuine a concern for the best interests of England and of Europe that I venture to state no fair-minded man can read the book unconvinced.

sanction, these things are done, who have to pay." And again: "I understand that in the current jargon of diplomacy that sort of thing is called 'high politics.' The plain man may be permitted to dub it by one word only—dishonesty."

Yes, it was dishonest diplomacy, just as it was dishonest statesmanship in 1914 to deny in the House of Commons that the country was pledged to France, and then to reveal, after war actually had broken out, secret obligations of honor. England's naval and military power has been mortgaged to France in case of a war with Germany for the last ten years, unconditionally, and without reference, apparently, to the nature of the quarrel and the crisis. It was so in 1905, it was so in 1911, and it was so in August, 1914. The British Foreign Office had become saturated with anti-German feeling, with suspicion and unfairness. This anti-German cabal, typified by such men as Tyrrell, Nicholson and Bertie, did all it could to stultify international good-will, and, through the press, to prejudice and embitter public opinion. Sir Edward Grey worked hand and glove with this cabal, although his anti-Germanism seems to have been diluted with a pale pacifism which made him shudder, at the last moment, on the edge of that catastrophe he had done so much to make inevitable. The culpability of Britain is no less because these machinations were carried on behind the scenes and without the overt sanction of the British people. In foreign affairs the Foreign Office was Britain. And when the great test came it was able to carry the country into war.

For France, then, are you fighting? For the France of gaiety, of beauty, of philosophy? What did your diplomatic intriguers care for the ideal France? They were playing a high and baleful game, the game of the Balance of Power, in which Germany was to be outmatched, the game of the ring-fence. England's creation of the Entente, or rather the way she manipulated her influence after it was accomplished, had an evil influence on the politics of both her allies. In Russia the loans of British gold strengthened a weakening bureaucracy; the decline of the Duma dates from that sinister aid.⁷ In France it caused the fires of *La Revanche* to burn brighter. It gave political power to the French Colonial Party and threw the Republic into the hands of adventurers. It thwarted every movement toward a Franco-German *rapprochement*, inspiring, for example, those influences which brought about the overthrow of Caillaux. Was ever game more stupid, or in the end more

⁷ See *Persia, Finland, and our Russian Alliance*, pamphlet of the Independent Labour Party.

disastrous? As it was diplomacy without honesty, so it was statesmanship without enlightenment. What price Britain pays we already begin to see. It served directly and needlessly to undermine what is one of the greatest interests of true statesmanship, the peace of the world.

And mark you! This France to which you so effectively allied yourself was bound by the strongest of agreements to Russia. Her war policy was part and parcel of Russia's policy. Why is France now at war? Is it because she was wantonly invaded by Germany, or because she is fulfilling her pledges to Russia? Let there be no mistake in this matter. France came into the struggle automatically as Russia's ally. Though there was some silly pose at the beginning—what Americans would call "a grandstand play"—about withdrawing ten kilometers behind the frontier, there never was any doubt as to France's action. "France is resolved to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance."⁸ Yet this quarrel was at first a Russian affair. It was a dispute over the Balkans between Servia and Russia on one side and Austria and Germany on the other. Let me quote another Englishman. G. Lowes Dickinson says:⁹ "So far as Russia is concerned, I believe Germany to be on the defensive." Well, if that is so, then Germany is on the defensive against the world. The nations had strung themselves on a single cord, the handle to which was the Franco-Russian Alliance. When Russia jerked that handle, the nations were all pulled in,—France, Great Britain, Belgium. France was a link; you are really the ally of Russia.

To be the ally of unregenerate, medieval Russia is a national infamy. But you cannot see that.

The attitude of cultivated Englishmen toward Russia illustrates how the partisanship of war warps the mind. At one time you understood the real Russia and dreaded and abhorred that reign of the Secret Police called its government. But an ally can do no wrong. So far as possible Englishmen now mentally turn their backs on Russia, and whenever they are forced to look at her they put on rose-colored spectacles lest they see the truth. Arnold Bennett, in one of the most unsportsmanlike defenses¹⁰ of British diplomacy which has been published, declares that so far as England is concerned, Russia is an accident. An accident! An accident composed of 170,000,000 people which increases at the rate of 3,000,000 a year,

⁸ Statement of Viviani to the French ambassadors at St. Petersburg and London, July 30, 1914. French Yellow Book, No. 101.

⁹ *The War and the Way Out*, p. 16.

¹⁰ "Liberty."

with all those millions conscripted and marshalled by the most soulless, oppressive, unscrupulous autocracy in the world! For the Germans this vast Tatar nation is no accident. "We in the West," as Marcel Sembat pointed out some months before he entered the French Cabinet, "have never quite realized how Germans regard Russia. For us she is a safely distant power. We can afford to think of her novels and her music. We can personify her as a nation which produced Tolstoy and Kropotkin."¹¹ We know her through her exiles. For the Germans she is the semi-barbarous neighbor across the frontier, with the population which is eighty per cent illiterate, and those Cossacks whose name still recalls the devastations of the Seven Years War."¹² Yet the truth about Russia is not hard to ascertain. Since the war started all the forces of reaction have been strengthened. The labor leaders, every liberal element, have been terrorized; the Jews, already ground under heel, have been subjected to new and horrible indignities; all constitutional rights in Finland have been stamped out. The Duma has been prorogued and silenced. Russia uses the support of her liberal allies to slump further back into despotism. This war is the great catastrophe; it overshadows all else. But the next greatest crime against civilization is the fact that the three greatest cultural nations of the West, England, Germany and France, instead of standing shoulder to shoulder against the Asiatic powers, are tearing at each other's vitals, with two of the three arrayed against the third at the behest and in the interest of this unspeakable bureaucracy. Who is responsible for this irrational, this unholy alliance? I leave the answer to you.

IV.

"But away with all this talk of policies and politics," you cry. "Let us get down to the fundamental issue, Germany herself. Why are we at war? Look at our foe for your answer! We could not abide a world forever overawed by this menace of Prussianism! These barbarians! These veritable Huns! This modern Attila! This perverted nation of militarists! This incarnate blood-lust and egotism! This—"

Save your vocabulary. We have heard more than enough of vituperation within the past year. I know that you, the better class of Englishmen—and that is the only sort I am addressing—have had no part in the shameless and cowardly abuse of Germans which has filled your press during the war period. Still it is true, I believe,

¹¹ Kropotkin by all means. See his *The Terror in Russia*, 1909.

¹² H. N. Brailsford in *The New Republic*, July 24, 1915.

that your conception of Germany is compounded in part of fictions. How could it be otherwise? For a decade certain sections of British opinion have made it their interest to slander and misrepresent your great Teutonic neighbor. Within the last months these defamers have used their blackest colors; they do not picture a people at all, but a grotesque caricature of something which started out to be superhuman and ended in being inhuman. Out of the fog of war they have fashioned a bogey, a monster which bears no more resemblance to the Germany across the North Sea than does an image of Moloch to a man. All Englishmen appear to share, in greater or less degree, this bogey-belief.

To refute each canard, to strip bare and expose each fiction, would be impossible. But some categorical statements should be made. Germans are *not* inhuman brutes, delighting in atrocities; in the conduct of this war they have shown themselves no more cruel and brutal than the French, and far less so than the Russians and your brown and black native troops. The Teuton is *not* by nature bestial, bloodthirsty, or merciless any more than is the Briton or any other civilized European, and he yields to the evil passions of war no more readily. Germanic civilization is *not* inferior to French or English or Italian civilization, though different; on the contrary it might well be maintained that the only nation which has abolished poverty, the one whose educational system is the best in the world, whose municipal governments are models, which outstrips all nations in scientific and industrial energy, shows distinct elements of superiority. The Germans are *not* mad with military ambition, nor bent on any career of world conquest, determined to impose the German language and German institutions on unwilling peoples. They asked for a place in the sun. But a place in the sun is not the whole earth.

Come, let us be reasonable. In plain justice you must admire the Germans, even though you do not love them. If Anglo-Saxon civilization is musk in your nostrils, Teutonic civilization cannot be stench. In the arts of peace the Germans challenge emulation. In war they are the astonishment of all history. No other people could have withstood so overwhelming a coalition. Not only in a military and technical manner are they proving their strength, but in a moral and intellectual way too. In England you have an oppressive censorship; and you have lost for the time being many of your constitutional rights. In Germany the censorship confines itself to its proper duty of suppressing military information; there the most unfriendly news is published, including the daily British and French

war bulletins ; in any German city one may read the current English and French newspapers, and buy the books and pamphlets written to expose German guilt. Is it so with you? Or in Russia or France? Does this mean anything except that the German people, alone among the belligerents, are allowed freely to face the truth? And there are Englishmen who still speak of this as the Kaiser's war, or a Junkers' war!

For the Germans this is a people's war, in the fullest sense of the term. The great spiritual fact of the struggle is this flaming, unbroken conviction of the German people that they are right. Though your statesmen may have been successful with Russia, France and Italy, they have done very badly with Germany. They have not left a single German, high or low, with the smallest doubt that Britain engineered a conspiracy to destroy its rival. The explanation is simple. The Germans look to history, remote and recent. Englishmen work themselves into a great consternation over what Prussian militarism is *going* to do; and they try to frighten neutrals with pen-pictures of its future depredations. But Germans point to the actual performances of Prussian militarism, and contrast them with the concrete performances of British imperialism.

They point out, for example, that this terrible menace of Prussianism, to which you impute such evil designs, has kept the peace in Europe since 1870; that it never seized a favorable opportunity to precipitate war, and neglected to attack Russia when crippled by Japan, France during the Dreyfus affair, England when the Boers disclosed her weakness. They recall that the German government, in the face of a hostile press at home, sacrificed German interests in Morocco in order to avoid a European conflagration. And they ask, has British imperialism ever refrained from aggression when its "interests" were involved? England has formed coalitions successively against Spain, Holland and France; she has swept from the sea every fleet which dared to rival her own. Her recent attitude toward Germany has been of a piece with this historic policy; the efforts of her statesmen have aimed consistently at the enfeeblement and the isolation of Germany.

One of the British prophets of this war was Professor Cramb. In his book he wrote: "'France,' said Bismarck in September, 1870, 'must be paralyzed; for she will never forgive us our victories.' And in the same spirit Treitschke avers: England will never forgive us our strength. And not without justice he delineates English policy throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as aimed consistently at the repression of Prussia."

What are you fighting for?

Here is your answer. The repression of Prussia! Since Germany became a power, and particularly since she began to build a navy, she aroused increasing dislike and distrust amongst you. In 1897 the *Saturday Review* announced the slogan *Germaniam esse delendam*, and that program has been steadily backed by a powerful element of British opinion. Your statesmen have pursued the old, unimaginative politics of annoyances and curbs; they have done their utmost to balk every German attempt at expansion in Africa or in Asia, and sometimes their interference has been nothing short of wantonly malicious, as in the instances of Morocco and of the Bagdad Railway. Militarism in Germany? Of course there is militarism there, and some of its aspects are not bright. But why not? British policy for a decade and more has done all in its power to create a military temper in Germany, to throw her into the hands of the war party, and to lash into being that tigerish ferocity with which she now fights you. Commercial jealousy and irritation in manufacturing circles, blended with imperialistic voracity and certain calculations (or miscalculations) of high politics, have led Great Britain into an anti-German policy and an anti-German war.

You will resent this answer to our question. To declare that England is fighting, not for Belgium, not for France, not for the sanctity of treaties or human rights, but merely for selfish imperialistic reasons, and rather ill-conceived reasons at that, strikes you, I am sure, as grossly distorted. When you look into your own souls you find no such sordid motives. You find only an intense love of England and of England's honor, and a sense of British quality and worth. I know how you feel and I know that the things you cherish are realities. But these noble realities, I submit, have very little to do with the beginning of this war, or its end.

And you could see this too, were you able, even for one brief hour, to throw yourselves into complete sympathy with your opponents, and look at the world through their eyes. Had you attempted any such sympathetic understanding of Germany two years ago, this war, I am convinced, never would have happened. You would have seen that the very future existence of Germany depends on her overseas markets, and that she must be able to guard these at all costs. As it is, you have been applying one logic to Germany and another to England. You have looked upon the German navy as an impertinence and a threat, even though the growth of the German navy has been accompanied by a constant demand for the freedom of the seas (i. e., the abolition of the capture of private

property at sea). But you have never been able to see that the British navy, nearly twice as large, is a threat (to Germany and possibly to others) especially when accompanied by a stubborn and effective refusal to have the seas neutralized. You could denounce colonial greed in Germany, and stand ready to fight her if she acquired an African colony, or a naval base in the Atlantic; but British expansion, though unlimited, seemed justified, no matter at whose expense; and you could applaud when Bonar Law announced in July, 1915, that the Entente Allies had torn from the Teutons 450,000 square miles of colonial possessions. What is meat for you, you declare to be poison for Germany. You tried, in your supremacy, to enforce a dictation on others to which you would not submit for a moment. The worst you can properly say of Germany is that she challenged that supremacy, and that she may yet force you to treat her as an equal.

The vital question remains: What of the future? The past is past; it must bury its dead. To fix the blame, to point the accusing finger, to try to anticipate the condemnation of history, is in itself a fruitless task. After all, the stupidest people in the world are they who—on whichever side—wish to “punish” some one for this war,—this ultimate calamity in which each belligerent shares a portion of the guilt. What strikes one in this gigantic struggle between the British and German nations is not so much its wickedness and its fierceness, as its needlessness, its utter irrationality. Germany is, as I said before, your natural ally; there are a thousand valid reasons for friendship to one valid reason for hostility. Is it too late to hope for a reconciliation between these two great peoples which are so alike in their virtues, however much they may differ in their faults? I think you begin to see what a task you have on your hands in seeking to humble a nation so strong and so indignant as Germany. However the war results, neither Germany nor England can be annihilated. And that is well, for there is room for both in the world. The highest ideal of international development is not a level uniformity, but many divergent cultures, each intensifying its own peculiar merits. Will it be impossible for the English to put their pride—even though it turn out to be a wounded pride—behind them, and make that great effort toward a sympathetic understanding of Germany which should have been made long ago? We may hope that the effort can be made, for in the final restoration of Anglo-German friendship lies one of the world’s best hopes, and the strongest guarantee of future peace.