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International Regime Theory: ASEAN as a Case Study

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INTERNATIONAL REGIME THEORY; ASEAN AS A CASE STUDY

by

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"We live in an era of interdependence."
Keohane and Nye

INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVES

The objective of this study is to determine if international regime theories have any value when examining regime formation among small to mid range powers. In addressing this question I will focus this study on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

First I will overview international regime theory. Second, I will briefly discuss Southeast Asia as a region both geographically and politically. I will also describe the previous attempts at regional organization in the region prior to ASEAN. Thirdly, I will analyze the formative years of ASEAN which for the purposes of this study will be from 1967 to 1975. Additionally I will briefly discuss ASEAN activities from 1975 until 1994. After completing these portions of the paper I will determine whether or not ASEAN was or contained a regime during its formative years. Here I will be asking the additional question of how does a regime transform into an organization. I believe the data will show that ASEAN was a regime during its formative years. Specifically, it was or contained a security regime during this time period. In addition, upon determining if there was a regime, I will use appendices A and B to ask specific questions about ASEAN as a regime. Appendix A is a series of questions that allow us to compare and contrast one regime with another. Appendix B is a template of regime formation theories

to be tested. In the conclusion I will return to the central question of this study (i.e., does international regime theory have any value when examining regime formation among small to mid range powers?)

METHODOLOGY

The research methodology utilized for researching these questions is historical in nature. My primary research tool was Morris Library and other sources for published works. The templates in appendix A and B are from Oran Young's works (Young, 1989: 29), (Young and Oshernko. 1993: 263-266).

I expect the results of my study to disprove the theory that a hegemon is necessary for the formation of a regime. However, I also expect to find that individual leadership is a necessary component of regime formation, and without strong leadership by one or more individuals regime formation will be unlikely to take place.[1]

"What is most striking, ... is the sheer number of international regimes."
Oran Young

REGIME THEORY

We live in a world of increasing complexity and interdependence. But, as Robert Keohane points out, "interdependence in the world political economy generates conflict" (Keohane 1984: 243). With the rising complexity of the world political economy, it becomes even more important for nation states to find ways to cooperate. So, how do nations cooperate in this new environment of increasing complexity and interdependence? The answer to this question in many issue areas is through international regimes, which have increased dramatically in number since World War II. Quite simply, we live in a world full of international regimes and they are not going away. Realization of this fact has led to the study of international regimes by political scientists in the hope of finding explanations for regime formation, change, and decay. In addition, if cooperation is to be fostered and conflicts avoided, an increased number of regimes may be an attainable alternative to a world government.

When thinking of regimes it may be useful to think of a traffic light, which can be a nuisance at midnight when no other cars are around but extremely helpful or even life saving during the Monday morning rush. Like traffic lights, regimes can facilitate the interactions of nations during times of crisis (i.e., rush hour) and peace (i.e., midnight). However, to extend

the traffic light analogy, one of the key questions for regimes, is, who provides the traffic light? The hegemon or users of the intersection? If a hegemon provides the light, does it control the timing when the light turns from red to green (what about yellow)? Or as the hegemon wanes, do nations share the expense for the light? If the expense for providing the light is shared among nations, does the hegemon retain control or is control of the traffic light shared? These are the types of questions that the literature on regimes has addressed over the last twenty years.

The types of international regimes are almost endless, ranging from security regimes to monetary and commodity regimes. But what exactly is a regime? And how do we differentiate between an international regime and an international organization? At least four definitions of regimes have been proposed over the last fifteen years. The most influential is that of Stephen Krasner, who defines international regimes as "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area" (Krasner 1983: 1). The second and possibly the most comprehensive is Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins argument that "for every political system, . . . there is a corresponding regime" (Krasner 1983: 62). The Third and most specific definition defines regimes as multilateral agreements between nation states within a given issue area (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 495). The fourth and most recent definition comes from a conference held at Dartmouth college in 1992. At the conference fifteen scholars

studying international regimes defined them as "social institutions composed of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas" (Young and Osherenko 1993). In other words regimes are social institutions, and like many social institutions they may or may not be formally articulated or organized.

In addition to an agreed upon definition of what is an international regime it is important that there is a delineation between international regimes and other international institutions. Robert Keohane addressed this in the edited volume, Regime Theory and International Relations in which he writes; "International institutions include formal intergovernmental or transnational organizations, international regimes, and conventions. International organizations are purposive entities, with bureaucratic structures and leadership, permitting them to respond to events. International regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations. Conventions are informal institutions, with implicit rules and understandings that shape the expectations of actors" (Rittberger 1993: 28-29).

The last twenty years have seen a myriad journal articles and books published on the formation, change and decline of regimes[2] resulting in different theories from the different schools of thought (realist, functionalist, etc). In general, four theories recur throughout the literature, distinguished by

whether they are power based, interest based, knowledge based, or focused on contextual factors.[3] In addition to theories of regime formation there have been numerous attempts to explain regime change and decay (strength, organizational form, scope, and allocational modes).[4] Furthermore, there have been additional completely theoretical approaches to change which include game-theory and cognitive approaches.[5]

REGIME FORMATION

The most popular and parsimonious theory of regime formation is power based in the sense that it assumes the formation of regimes depends on the power configuration in the international system. The most widely accepted and discussed power based theory is the Hegemonic Stability theory, which postulates that the most powerful state in the global order facilitates and forms regimes. Furthermore, the hegemon not only maintains a regime(s), but its continued involvement is necessary for the maintenance of a regime(s). The theory also postulates that regime decline can be traced to the decline of the hegemon itself. The hegemon does not act out of benevolent kindness but rather sees the cost of providing for the regime as being less than the benefits received.

This theory has developed two sub-schools of thought. The first holds that a benign hegemon provides regime(s) as a public good regardless of other nation's ability to contribute because it feels the benefits outweigh the costs. The other view maintains that the hegemon uses its dominant position to impose

regimes on other actors, regardless of the consequences for the actors that the regime is imposed upon. In addition, some power based theories list other aspects that need to be taken into account when examining regime formation. These include but are not limited to the balance of power between nations, and the ideological outlook of potential regime members.
These may or may not have relevance depending on what type of regime is being examined. These factors and others connected with the power based approach are in the template for examining regime formation (see appendix B).

In addition to the power based approach, some theorists of regime formation stress factors other than power as being the prime reasons for regime formation. Arguing that only by examining the organizational form, scope or range of issues covered, and the resource allocation can the actual cause of regime formation be determined (i.e., cognitive, or interest based theories, see appendix B).

REGIME CHANGE

The approaches to regime change bear a resemblance to works on regime formation and are more extensive. The works are mostly structural and power based and utilize the hegemonic approach. Starting with the premise that a hegemon is necessary, they go on to examine the decline or change in international regimes. Most work centers around the so called period of American Hegemony and its subsequent decline.[6] Strategic and game-theory approaches have also sought to explain regime change and behavior. However, with these theories "the attended risk is

oversimplification," as noted by Haggard and Simmons. Another approach is the functionalist approach which attempts to "explain behaviors of institutions in terms of their effects" (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 506). The last approach is the cognitive approach which argues that "learning and, in a somewhat different fashion, ideology, affect international rules and cooperation by showing the merit (or futility) of certain lines of action" (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 508). The appeal of this approach is that ideological and like thinking in certain issue areas seem to have a causal relationship with regime formation and change. An example of this would be the GATT and the consensus supporting free trade. However, as Haggard and Simmons point out, sorting out the influence of ideology and the influence of shared knowledge can at best prove extremely difficult. Lastly, when examining regime change research should also take into account the domestic affairs of nations comprising the regime. This examination needs to be undertaken particularly when the regime is suspected of influencing the policy makers of a country (Haggard and Simmons 1987), (Young and Osherenko 1993).

SUMMARY

With the growing interdependence of the world and the increasing numbers of international regimes it is important that an attempt be made to understand the dynamics of international regimes. This takes on greater relevance as the borders of the world melt away with the advent of increased communication and transportation means at the disposal of both government and nongovernmental actors. This is even more important when one

considers that many transnational actors outside the control of formal governments have significant impact on regimes. An example of this would be the declining control that central banks exercise over the money regime.

However, most of the works on international regimes have centered on European/Western, hegemonic, and natural resource regimes. ASEAN does not fit in any of these categories and thus provides an opportunity to test the broader relevance of conclusions drawn from studying them. Failure of existing theories to explain the ASEAN case will raise doubts about their universality.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Strategically located between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the nations of Southeast Asia sit astride the main sea lanes between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. The significance of these maritime routes to the world economy is evident in the quantity of material that Japan alone receives via these routes. In 1982 it was reported that "Every day of the year more than 700,00 tons of crude oil and 110,000 tons of iron ore are put ashore in Japanese ports. Some 90 percent of each of these vital raw materials pass through the Straits of Malacca and the Lombok Straits" (Tilman 1987: 107). Unequivocally, the region's sea lanes are an integral part of the international economy and of vital interest to the entire industrialized world. Furthermore, mainland Southeast Asia has been and continues to be viewed as a gateway to China's southern provinces. Thus for these and other reasons the region has attracted considerable attention from extra-regional powers.

The region consists of ten nations that are divisible into two distinct geographical divisions. First is the mainland group composed of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. A second geographical division is the insular cluster consisting of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. The region can be further subdivided into three political groups. First is Indochina composed of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. A second is the self imposed isolation of Burma. The third and largest political subgroup is the six nations that comprise the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (i.e., Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore).

In order to understand the region's politics and current borders a historical understanding of the region is necessary. The region has had a long period of European colonization with the first being the Portuguese possession of Malacca in 1511. Shortly thereafter the Spanish claimed the Philippines and the Dutch claimed Java. In 1641 the Dutch ousted the Portuguese from Malacca. The French and English arrived in the late eighteenth century interested in the China trade and turned their attention towards mainland nations of Thailand, Burma and Indochina. The British took Malacca from the Dutch then occupied Singapore. In addition the British colonized Burma, North Boreno and part of Brunei. The French first began their contact in Southeast Asia with missionaries in Indochina. This led to an interest with the China trade as they began their occupation of Indochina. Upon completion of the French colonization of Indochina only Thailand remained independent. Thailand was allowed to retain its independence to serve as a buffer state between the French and British. In 1896 the Spanish lost the Philippines when the Filipinos revolted for independence with American support. However, after defeating the Spanish the United States continued the period of colonization by occupying the Philippines.

Thus, from the start of the twentieth century until World War II, all the nations of Southeast Asia had been colonized by the Europeans except Thailand. World War II changed the political face of the region. The defeat and expulsion of the

Europeans and Americans by the Japanese marked the end of the colonial era and sparked the struggle for independence. It took numerous years for all the foreign powers to relinquish their claims to the region, but the aura of the invincibility of the Europeans and the subservience of the region was ended. Some results of the colonial era and World War II were a distrust of the Japanese and an awakening of nationalism in the region. The first nation to gain independence after 350 years of foreign rule was the Philippines. Indonesia gained its independence after a bloody struggle with the Dutch in 1949. Malaysia negotiated peacefully with the British and gained independence in 1957. Singapore received independence in 1963 and united with the Malaysian federation. Shortly thereafter, in 1965 Singapore left the Malaysian federation and became fully independent. Burma gained independence from the British in 1948 after a short period of violent opposition to the British. The Indochinese states had a much rougher road, with Vietnam achieving reunification as a nation in 1975. Laos ended its violent civil war in 1975 and accepted a special relationship with Vietnam. Cambodia continued to be a zone of intense turmoil and conflict well into the 1990s.

When considering regional cooperation it must be noted that prior to the arrival of the Europeans the idea of nationalism was an unknown concept. The political power in the region centered around the capitols and their rulers. These rulers lost their influence as the distance from the throne increased with no clear boundaries, only frontiers between nations. Even today this concept of a loss of control as the distance from major cities

increases is still evident in the region. Examples include the outlying islands in insular Southeast Asia and the highlanders versus the lowlanders on the mainland.

Additionally, foreign drawn borders are not always reflective of pre-existing geographical and ethnic and religious boundaries. This colonial legacy of foreign drawn borders has proven to be a difficult problem both in Southeast Asia and other areas of the world. The region also has to deal with religious prejudices, ethnic conflicts and animosities, and numerous territorial disputes. These factors combined, make the concept of regional cooperation difficult.

Following World War II Southeast Asia was again thrust into an extra-regional conflict. With the rise of the Cold War the nations of Southeast Asia became a de facto battle ground between the capitalistic free world and revolutionary communism. The Soviet Union, China, and the United States have each influenced the region differently as their views of the region changed. In response to this quagmire of hegemonic conflict the nations of Southeast Asia found themselves having to decide what path to take. Briefly, by the early 1960s Burma had chosen isolation. The Philippines after a previous period of close ties with the United States chose to continue their relationship with the United States. Indonesia chose an independent, left leaning course under Sukarno with the PKI (the Indonesian communist party) gaining considerable influence. Following the demise of Sukarno in 1965, General Suharto (later president) continued an independent course but destroyed the communist presence in

Indonesia. North Vietnam aligned first with the Chinese, then with Soviets, and South Vietnam with the United States. Thailand aligned with the United States and like the Philippines allowed American troops to be stationed there. Malaysia supported U.S. regional policy as did Singapore. Under Prince Sihanouk, Cambodia took a middle of the road path trying to play one side against another, Laos was split and embroiled in a civil war in the 1950s and 1960s. Brunei was still a British protectorate and remained so until 1984. One factor that each nation shared in the post World War II period was an active communist presence. Both the Soviet Union and China supported the revolutionary activities of these groups.

In summary, "Geography, history, language, and culture have all conspired against the countries of ASEAN to make their tasks of nation building and economic development more difficult. Of the five countries considered here only Thailand has any reasonable claim to nationhood, described in its ideal form by Rupert Emerson as "a single people, traditionally fixed on a well-defined territory, speaking the same language and preferably a language all its own, possessing a distinctive culture, and shaped to a common mold by many generations of shared historical experience." Within the ASEAN states, the search for nationhood has been and continues to be, a major concern of every regime" (Tilman 1987: 154).

EARLY ATTEMPTS AT COOPERATION

The first attempt at a regional organization and cooperation in the region was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization founded in 1954 (SEATO). SEATO was not initiated by the region's nations themselves, but rather it was initiated and backed by the United States in line with its containment policy against Communist China. SEATO lasted until 1977, but was never more than a security alliance with the U.S. and had no real affect on regional cooperation (the only actual Southeast Asian members were Thailand and the Philippines). The second attempt at regional organization and cooperation and the first without extra regional membership was the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). ASA, initiated in 1961 by Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines, "was intended to be an embryonic alternative rather than a substitute for SEATO" (Leifer 1989: 28). ASA's goal was to promote economic and cultural cooperation. The organization had a brief life lasting only six years, collapsing over the conflicting claims to Sabah by both the Philippines and Malaysia. Maphilindo was another attempt at regional organization undertaken in 1963. This attempt was a proposed confederation of the three Malay speaking countries of Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Maphilindo also proved to be short lived, collapsing as a result of armed conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia. Though these two attempts at regional organization collapsed, they showed that the leaders of the region perceived a need for regional cooperation. It seems that these organizations failed for four reasons:

- Lack of membership (particularly Indonesia the largest of non-communist nations)
- The governments were immature and unstable
- The nations were not ready to commit to an organization
- The norms and principles necessary for cooperation were not ingrained by the regional leaders

Nonetheless, these attempts at regional cooperation proved valuable for ASEAN. ASA in particular served as guide for cooperation while Maphilindo provided declaratory inspiration (Leifer 1989: 29). Moreover, each of the nations that were to form ASEAN faced a similar set of problems that their governments wanted to resolve or at least mediate. The most important of these shared problems was the need for internal stability on which to build not only the individual nations but to preserve the power bases of national elites. These elites all had an inclination towards at least some form of capitalism. The nations that were to comprise ASEAN also were all anti-communist. Some elites were anti-communist for purely ideological reasons, but what they all feared most was the continued instability that the communist insurgencies were causing in each of their nations. Yet none of them, though desiring a stable environment, were ready to sacrifice any sovereignty to a higher goal such as an international organization.

"ASEAN exists because it serves a need."
Malaysian Prime Minister

ASEAN

1967-1971

Within the aforementioned climate a consensus emerged among the non-communist nations was reached that a regional organization was necessary. Thus, the Association of Southeast Asian Nation was established in 1967 with the signing of the Bangkok Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (Brunei became a member in 1984). Drawing on the principles of ASA, the ASEAN declaration stated its primary purpose and aims were to:

"To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirt of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations" (appendix C).

However, the implied purpose was to promote political stability and regional security in response to the perceived communist threat.

But what were the bases of cooperation? The record shows that no nation was willing to sacrifice national interests for the sake of a regional institution. Still each member must have perceived at least some potential gains from joining.

Yet after signing the Bangkok Declaration was ASEAN a regime or an entity that contained a regime? On initial examination and utilizing Krasner's and Keohane's definition of international regimes (see above), ASEAN seems to have constituted a regime. Specifically it constituted a security regime because the

specific issue area on which ASEAN primarily focused attention was the achievement of internal security through regional peace and stability. At the macro level each of the founding members desired this, but in the beginning the shared "principles, norms and decison-making procedures" that are defining characteristics of a regime were absent (Krasner 1983: 1). However, the nations that founded ASEAN realized that this lack was a hindrance to regional cooperation and therefore to the achievement of a core value for each of them.

"The five founding governments of ASEAN were drawn together by a recognition of the self-defeating and wasteful nature of contention among neighboring states ... " (Leifer 1989: 1). The leaders of the nations realized these fundamental problems and hoped to establish some principles and norms that they could agree on. This is why the foreign ministers met in Bangkok, taking the first step towards cooperation by agreeing to disagree. This view of ASEAN's formation was clearly articulated by the Prime Minister of Thailand at the 1976 Bali Summit. "The Association has given our respective countries the framework within which to strengthen social, economic and cultural ties among ourselves, and to develop cooperation where, hitherto, none had existed" (ASEAN 1978:103). This objective of trying to find issues were cooperation could take place is contained in the preamble of the Bangkok declaration:

> "Mindful of the existence of mutual interest and common problems among countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation" (appendix C).

The declaration established ASEAN as loose and decentralized with the foreign ministers of each member making up the highest decision making authority. A standing committee consisted of the Foreign Minister and the resident ambassadors of the four other members in the host nation for the year, and so the chairman and membership rotated annually. Structural machinery was established for committees to study specific areas but these were primarily ad-hoc. Further highlighting the decentralized structure of ASEAN during this period was that each country had its own national secretariat. The reason for adopting such a decentralized structure in 1967 was the fear of a loss of control or sovereignty to a centralized institution. The founding members had common fears and concerns, but no consensus existed among the region's leaders on how to resolve them. This was due to national perceptions of both internal and domestic problems. But what were each nation's reasons for joining ASEAN?

Indonesia played a pivotal role in ASEAN's founding as the largest and most populous nation of Southeast Asia, and it is arguable that without its acquiescence and leadership the organization would have never came into being. After the demise of Sukarno following a coup attempt in 1965, Indonesia under Suharto "renounced radical nationalism" but did not want to ally with either the communist or the free world (Leifer 1989: 1). The assumption of power by Suharto had the effect of "expanding significantly a pattern of conformity in political outlook already encompassing Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines" (Leifer 1989: 1). Further, "In 1966, Suharto's New

Order government, dominated by the armed forces, but with the advice of Western-educated technocrats, embarked on a program of economic rehabilitation and development" (Palmer 1987: 32). These priorities moved Indonesia to seek regional stability and thus to see advantage in joining a regional organization. Suharto also envisioned Indonesian leadership in the Association, evident by both the choice of location for ASEAN's headquarters (Jakarta) and the first meeting of ASEAN leaders in 1976 (Bali).

Malaysia's motivation for joining ASEAN was the view that the region's best prospects for growth and stability hinged on removing extra-regional powers from Southeast Asia. This view was understandable after the long fight with a communist insurgency that was rumored to be supported by China. Malaysia saw in ASEAN the opportunity to promote the concept of neutralizing the region from great power interference. Thus Malaysia become the prime mover behind ASEAN's eventual adoption of a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1972.

Singapore, severed from Malaysia by irreconcilable ethnic differences only two years after joining the federation, was striving in 1967 to develop a Southeast Asian identity. Sandwiched between Malaysia and Indonesia, and both promoting some type of regional cooperation, Singapore had little choice but to go along with the regional tide. Joining ASEAN also helped to ease the fears and suspicions of other nations who saw Singapore as a Chinese outpost. In addition Singapore's leader Lee Kuan Yew saw in ASEAN a vehicle to gain additional support of the island republic's sovereignty status. However, Singapore's

strong anti-communist bent and sense of vulnerability caused Singapore to support a U. S. military presence in the region. This later led to resistance by Singapore to Malaysia's proposal for neutralizing the region from great power involvement. The relationship between Indonesia and Singapore also was strained but after realizing the importance that President Suharto placed on ASEAN, Lee Kuan Yew took great pains to establish a close personal relationship with Suharto (Leifer 1989: 40).

Thailand, with the longest land borders of any ASEAN state, was deeply concerned with the communist insurgencies both at home and in its neighbors Laos and Cambodia. The Thais' also feared the long term consequences of the Vietnamese conflict. Under military and strongly anti-communist governments, Thailand not only supported U.S. involvement in Vietnam but allowed the basing of U.S. troops within her own boundaries. Furthermore, in response to President Johnson's "Many Flags Program" and to ensure continued defense support from the U.S., Thailand dispatched its first contingent of troops to South Vietnam in September 1967 (Leifer 1989: 84). Nevertheless, Thailand saw security advantages to joining ASEAN and hosted the delegation of foreign ministers to formally sign the ASEAN Declaration.

The Philippines security was guaranteed by the U.S. and so it joined less for security reasons than for long term economic prospects. In addition the Philippines shared the concern of other members for communist movements within their own borders.

Though all the founding members had various reasons for seeking membership they all shared some commonalties that

ultimately helped to make the Bangkok Declaration possible. First, the governments of each nation were conservative in nature and held "a common belief that political stability and continuity of leadership should assume priority over political participation in order to create the necessary climate for rapid economic growth" (Job 1993: 152).

Still, even with the desire to cooperate ASEAN, narrowly averted collapsing during the first two years of its existence because the Philippines revived a claim to Sabah. In addition, tensions existed between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia over control and accesses to shared maritime routes. Thailand and Malaysia had to contend with a border drawn during the colonial era that did not reflect the actual human geography (i.e. the ethnic Muslim population) which was a source of friction between the two.

From ASEAN's founding in 1967 until 1971, the annual Foreign Ministers meetings did not accomplish anything concrete other then to agree to continue consultations. The communique released after Fourth Ministerial meeting in Manila in 1971 failed even to mention the widening war in Indochina or the fall of Cambodia's government under Prince Sihanouk (Leifer 1989: 53). Nevertheless support continued for ASEAN because if nothing else the uncertainty of the region forced them to continue to make attempts at cooperation.

By Keohane's definition of international institutions (see above), until 1972 ASEAN was neither an international organization nor a regime. It was not an organization because

the loose structure did not provide for clearly articulated purposes, bureaucratic structures or leadership which would have permitted them to respond to events such as the fall of Cambodia's government. As discused above, during this period no issue area or even norms or principles existed to classify ASEAN as a regime. But, by the actions and movement towards agreement in certain issue areas, ASEAN might be considered an embryonic regime, although it was not shaping the expectations of its members. In addition in 1971 ASEAN had not received recognition from any of the great powers, nor had ASEAN as an entity met with other international organizations. It was not until 1972 that the ASEAN delegates to the United Nation held their first caucus (Leifer 1989: 53). In retrospect just holding together as an entity was a significant accomplishment 1967 until 1972. This period helped to establish relationships between the ruling elites of the different nations, which according to knowledge based regime formation theories is necessary for effective regime formation.

1972-1977

The turning point for ASEAN came in 1972 in response to regional events. The most significant of these events was Henry Kissenger's visit to Beijing, which precipitated the above mentioned first caucus of ASEAN delegates at the United Nations. However, the delegation was unable to define a common stand on the People's Republic of China taking China's seat at the United Nations (Leifer 1989: 53). The assumption of the United Nations seat by the People's Republic in October 1971 and President

Nixon's decision to disengage from Vietnam forced the members of ASEAN to improve cooperation. Though not in complete agreement on how to proceed, action was undertaken on the Malaysian proposal for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. The initial Malaysian proposal called for guarantees by the great powers but this was rejected in favor of a watered downed version. The dilution was necessary because Thailand and the Philippines, close allies with the U.S., supported the U.S. presence not only in the region but in South Vietnam. Nonetheless, all member in November 1971 at Kuala Lumpur, ratified the ZOPFAN declaration (appendix F). The declaration contained the collective commitment that:

> Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, respect for, South East Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free form any form of manner of interference of outside powers; that the South East Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of co-operation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship (appendix F).

The most important result of this meeting was not the declaration itself, which even the signatories knew was unobtainable, but that ASEAN cooperation was increasing. "It indicated the semblance of a diplomatic community as it became increasingly necessary for regional partners to forge a common response to common regional problems" (Leifer 1989: 58). Yet even with this accomplishment ASEAN was still not a united group. One could argue that at this point the leaders of ASEAN viewed it as a club for senior officials to meet and discuss various

regional issues but it had no impact on the decision making processes. The cease-fire talks between North Vietnam and the United States in Paris and inevitable fall of South Vietnam highlighted the need for increased cooperation in order to be prepared for the post-war situation.

In 1971 the United Nations issued a report on ASEAN cooperation which had the effect of increasing cooperation between the member nations. In the area of economic cooperation the report had a catalytic effect on the organizational efforts of ASEAN. The United Nations report showed that "clearly, the organization could not continue to operate under the direction of the foreign ministers, particularly in the economic field" (Palmer 1987: 42). The impact of the report was important for ASEAN's evolution because it focused attention on the association's stated purpose, of economic cooperation. This was significant because even though the permanent committees had no real impact on the decision making process it increased consultations at many other levels. A significant step towards the reality of an organization was taken in 1973 with the holding of joint strategy sessions to prepare for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) meetings (Palmer 1987: 43). Consequently, by 1973 cooperation had increased and at the Seventh Ministerial Meeting the issue of establishing a Central ASEAN Secretariat was discussed. The Singapore Foreign Minister stated "Unless we consolidate ourselves in economic cooperation, it would be difficult for others to regard ASEAN seriously" (Palmer 1987: 44). Thus by 1974 it could be argued that ASEAN

had evolved dramatically toward becoming an international organization, and may have at this point contained a regime. A regime with the norm that member nations should undertake joint consultations prior to approaching other international entities such as the GATT. However internal drift remained high. An example, was the decision by the Philippines and Thailand to establish diplomatic ties with the Peoples Republic of China, which was not received with enthusiasm in Jakarta (Leifer 1987: 65). Moreover, the Indonesian decision to annex East Timor received an adverse resolution from the United Nations with Singapore abstaining from a vote of support. Singapore felt it could not support this move for fear of its own sovereignty (Leifer 1987: 65). The primary reason that ASEAN did not collapse during this period can be traced to the continued communist insurgency in the region and the fear of becoming dominos in the Cold War battles between communism and the free world.

For ASEAN the impetus to transform into a bonafide international institution was the success of revolutionary communism in Indochina in 1975. Though scheduled earlier, the eighth ASEAN ministerial meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur only two weeks after the fall of Siagon. It was at this meeting that the foreign ministers "took up the agenda of economic cooperation and issued a mandate to the ASEAN permanent committees to give high priority to projects that would enhance trade liberalization and industrial complementation" (Palmer 1987: 45). At this meeting the ministers also agreed on a draft proposal for an

ASEAN Secretariat and a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation to be considered by their governments.

Shortly thereafter the Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik proposed a summit of governmental leaders be held. However, there was disagreement on how far economic cooperation should be taken at this time. Singapore had made tremendous economic strides and advocated increased economic cooperation and reduced tariffs barriers. However, Indonesia, still making the transformation from import substitution and heavily dependent on the export of raw materials, particularly petroleum was not enthusiastic about the idea. Though Singapore realized that they could not be the regional leader, Lee Kuan Yew used his position to keep ASEAN focused on achieving real progress in the area of economic cooperation (Palmer 1987: 46). As the organization became "a growing realty" the economic foreign ministers who had previously not been involved in the decision making process became an integral part of the pre-summit planning. (ASEAN 1978: 81).

The first Summit meeting of Heads of State was held in Bali, Indonesia, in February 1976. ASEAN in its own ten year history stated: "This historical event will prove to be an important turning point in the history of ASEAN; ...bring new hopes and brighter prospects for its future" (ASEAN 1978: 82). The Summit confirmed the commitment of the member nations to the original goals of ASEAN. To that end three documents were signed: the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and the Agreement on the Establishment of an

ASEAN Secretariat. The most important of these documents from an organizational view was the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. The treaty took the basic principles enunciated in the Bangkok declaration and expanded them to twenty articles (appendix D). In addition this treaty established a dispute resolution mechanism. The key principle enunciated was: "mutual respect for the interdependence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations (appendix D)." The Treaty also reiterated the ZOPFAN concept with the statement: "The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion" (appendix D).

The declaration of ASEAN concord was also a key affirmation to increase both political and economic cohesion. Yet, though the underlying reason for ASEAN's existence was security the only mention to that issue was that cooperation should continue on "a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests" (appendix E). This decision was made because they did not want to be viewed as a security alliance. This was in hopes of not antagonizing Indochina and leaving the door open for reconciliation between the Indochinese states and ASEAN. But even if reconciliation was to have taken place the difference in both ideology and economic systems would have prevented the Indochinese states from becoming members. Furthermore, "Vietnam steadfastly refused to acknowledge ASEAN as a corporate entity." ... Also "at the time of the Bali summit, Vietnam's position was not only hostile but also alarming because of open support proffered to revolutionary

movements in the region" (Leifer 1989: 73). The summit also established the ASEAN Secretariat. However, the Secretariat itself was given limited power; and the Secretary general was not Secretary General of ASEAN but only of the ASEAN Secretariat.

Still upon completion of the Bali conference ASEAN had finally transformed into international institution. The success of revolutionary communism in Indochina and the fear of same by the membership of ASEAN made the Bali summit possible. Yet, without the preceding years of development it is unlikely that an institution such as ASEAN and the level of cooperation attained by the non-communist members of their region could have been obtained.

With renewed commitment to the principles of promoting economic cooperation the ASEAN economic ministers met in Kuala Lumpur in March of 1976. The economic ministers proposed setting up five economic committees under their control rather than the foreign ministers to further economic cooperation. "In fact the economic ministers proposed that they directly report to the heads of government rather than through Foreign Ministers" (Palmer 1987: 54). The economic ministers also established a group of experts to study the concept of industrial production "under ASEAN auspices: urea in Indonesia, urea in Malaysia, superphosphate in the Philippines, diesel engines in Singapore, and soda ash in Thailand" (ibid). The most significant proposal of this second meeting of economic ministers was the decision to establish procedures for dialogues with third countries. However, the proposal to have the economic ministers report

directly to heads of government was rejected at the ninth meeting of Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Ministers stated that they retained control of ASEAN policy and would conduct all external relations.

Results in increased economic cooperation were forthcoming with next meeting of foreign ministers approving preferential trading agreements at a special meeting in February of 1977. The next summit of ASEAN heads of state was held at Kuala Lumpur in August 1977. The primary purpose of this meeting was to celebrate ASEAN's tenth anniversary. In comparison to the 1976 Bali summit, this meeting produced less dramatic results. Organizational problems were resolved at this meeting, as the economic ministers received authority to report directly to the heads of government. But the heads of state reaffirmed the annual foreign minister meeting as the principal policy making organ of ASEAN. President Marcos dropped the Philippines claim to Sabah, removing an obstacle to further regional cooperation.

The summit's most distinctive achievement was the international recognition that ASEAN received. The summit was attended by the Prime ministers of Australia, Japan and New Zealand. Attendance by other foreign heads of state added an aura of respectability to ASEAN it hitherto had not had. "Of special significance was the presence of Takeo Fukuda marking a major Japanese reappraisal of the importance and role of the association" (Leifer 1989: 81). Previously Japan had been skeptical about both the success and credentials of ASEAN and expressing concern in 1971 over the concept of ZOPFAN. But the

success of communism in Indochina caused Japan to rethink its views. Michael Leifer notes that "the presence of Malcom Fraser from Australia and Robert Muldoon from New Zealand was encouraged ... by a concern not to make Mr Fukuda's visit the prime object of the post-summit occasion" (Leifer 1989: 82). The Summit also marked the formal establishment of dialogue partners.

Even with the success of revolutionary communism in Indochina, the final communique made no mention of security concerns. Rather the communique expressed "the desire to develop peaceful and mutual beneficial relations with all countries in the region, including Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam" (ASEAN 1978: 195). The communique also expressed a desire to further the concept of ZOPFAN with the unification of Vietnam and the withdrawal of the U.S. ground combat forces from Indochina.

In the first ten years of its existence ASEAN transformed from a desire to seek out a means for regional cooperation among the non-communist nations of the region to a recognized regional institution. Highlighting this transformation was the establishment of relations and dialogue by 1977 with the EEC, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Japan, and the United States. Group participation in the United Nations had extended to the conference on Trade and Development and the United Nations Development Program. The first ten years also saw genuine strides towards ASEAN economic cooperation with the establishment of preferential trade agreements and a swap arrangement (swap is a standby credit agreement).

In summary, ASEAN had advanced from an embryonic concept with roots in ASA and Maphilindo into a viable regional organization with international recognition. However, it must be noted that even in 1977 the underlying reason for the association's existence was the security. By uniting under the banner of ASEAN the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia had pursued the concept a security alliance. The nations that comprised ASEAN knew that alone or collectively they could not defend against external aggressor. But by uniting under a common banner they effectively presented themselves as an organized collective force. International recognition of this collectivity was seen in the number of dialogue partners who began to consult with ASEAN as the regional representative of non-communist nations.

1977-1994

CAMBODIA

One effect of the Second Indochina War was to divide Southeast Asia into two ideological blocs, with Burma abstaining from either. But with the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Thailand in 1976, Vietnam began to reach out toward ASEAN. Following Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien's tour of the region, Hanoi established diplomatic relations with each of the ASEAN governments. Simultaneously, ASEAN also attempted to improve relations with Laos and Cambodia. ASEAN and particularly Thailand felt comfortable with Cambodia's taking a path independent from Vietnam and thus acting as a buffer between Vietnam and ASEAN. It seemed that the concept of ZOPFAN could possibly come to fulfillment and membership for the Indochinese states in ASEAN was openly discussed.

This feeling of comfort proved to be short lived as tensions between Vietnam and Cambodia, and between Vietnam and China, escalated. Anxieties mounted further in November of 1978 following Vietnam's signing of a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. Vietnam's decision to become a member of COMECON also caused concern in the ASEAN capitals. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia shattered any hope of reconciliation with ASEAN; moreover, the Sino-Russian and Sino-Vietnam hostilities further exacerbated the situation. Consequently, China supported Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese. Thus, the region's conflicts were again internationalized, and the region thrust onto the stage of great power competition. This sequence of

events greatly troubled ASEAN, as once again a common threat acted as a catalyst for greater cooperation.

The invasion frightened the Thais into seeking quick improvement of relations with China. Secret negotiations with China in January of 1979 "paved the way for material provision for a Khmer Rouge insurgency and withdrawal of support for the Communist Party of Thailand" (Leifer 1989: 91). The other nations of ASEAN did not feel as threatened as Thailand, yet ASEAN's credibility would have been damaged or destroyed without a collective response to Vietnam's invasion. China's punitive attack across Vietnam's northern border widened the conflict and unnerved all the ASEAN members, as did the prospect of another huge wave of refugees from the fighting. This fear caused considerable alarm in the ASEAN capitals, which feared that a large refugee population would further exacerbate internal instability.

On January 9, 1979, Indonesia's Foreign Minister and Chair of the ASEAN standing Committee issued a statement condemning the escalation and enlargement of the conflict between the two Indochina states. On January 12, a special meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers convened in Bangkok, calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia. The choice of Bangkok expressed solidarity with what had become ASEAN's front line state and marked a shift away from Jakarta as the focal point of ASEAN activity. In November 1979, ASEAN successfully sponsored a United Nations resolution calling for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops for Cambodia.

ASEAN also insisted that the People's Republic of Cambodia under the leadership of Heng Samrin was illegitimate. Following the initial ASEAN response to the Vietnamese action, ASEAN effectively focused international attention on Cambodia by sponsoring resolutions at the United Nations and appealing to their dialogue partners. ASEAN argued that there was a linkage between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Vietnam's actions in Cambodia. Additionally, ASEAN led the effort to prevent the Heng Samrin regime from taking Cambodia's seat at the United Nations, supporting instead the credentialing of a coalition of Cambodian resistance fighters. Although ASEAN stayed united diplomatically against Vietnam, there was concern in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta about China's increasing regional influence. Thus, when China launched its punitive attack against Vietnam's northern border, ASEAN issued a statement calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from areas of conflict in Indochina.

Another result of the Vietnamese action was to shift the focus of the ASEAN armed forces from internal security to external threats. The reason for this shift to external threats was the withdrawal of American forces from Indochina and the subsequent down sizing of the American military presence in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Navy also had started to make regular appearances in the region's waters and had signed access agreements with the Vietnamese. In response, cooperation between ASEAN states in the area of military cooperation increased dramatically. Military cooperation was not undertaken under the

auspices of ASEAN, but it did take place bilaterally because ASEAN did not want to be perceived as a security alliance (ASEAN as an entity has never held joint military operations). Additionally, Thailand's improving relations with China were not viewed enthusiastically by Indonesia or Malaysia. Instead, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta considered China to be the long term threat to regional security. Nonetheless, ASEAN remained diplomatically united in seeking a solution to the Cambodian situation, collectively proposing numerous solutions. By utilizing international forums for their proposals, ASEAN was able to keep the Cambodian problem high on the political agenda in other capitals of the world. These collective efforts increased overall cooperation among the ASEAN states.

The turning point in the Cambodian crisis stemmed from the changing aspects of the Cold War, and Vietnam's decision in 1986 to purse Doi Moi or economic renovation. Hanoi knew that in order to improve its economic prospects Vietnam could not continue to support an expensive occupation force in Cambodia. Though by 1984 some troops had been withdrawn, Vietnam's leadership was also aware that in order to attract western support and investment they would have to resolve this crisis. The rise of Mikhael Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and the turmoil in the Eastern European communist nations also influenced Vietnam's leadership. Consequently, after a decade of occupation, Vietnam withdrew its remaining forces from Cambodia in September of 1989.

In this environment, peace talks began in Paris to resolve the Cambodia problem. An important preceding event to the Paris talks were the "cocktail parties" hosted by Jakarta in 1988 and 1989. Therefore, the success of the Paris peace talks, subsequent elections, and the installation of a coalition government headed by Sihanouk in Phnom Penh can be considered a success for ASEAN.

However, with the resolution of the Cambodian situation and the collapse of the Soviet Empire the principal threats to security and regional stability that united ASEAN dissipated, allowing other regional conflicts that were on the back banner to resurface. Examples of these include the territorial disputes over the Spratly Islands, which also involve China. Other maritime and territorial disputes throughout the region are also resurfacing.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Though ASEAN has existed as an entity since 1967, there was no serious effort at economic cooperation until the 1976 Bali summit. Combined with the summit of 1977, the proposed framework for economic cooperation seemed substantial (i.e., preferential trading agreement, industrial projects and a SWAP agreement). However, the reality of economic cooperation between the members of ASEAN has proved elusive. For example, only two of the five industrial cooperation projects approved by the ASEAN economic foreign ministers in 1976, were completed by 1988. One reason for the lack of success was Singapore's decision to drop the

diesel engine plant project after Indonesia's decision to undertake a similar non-ASEAN project of its own. This lack of progress in economic cooperation was evident at the third Summit of ASEAN leaders in 1987, (held to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Bangkok Declaration). At this Summit, a call for greater economic cooperation was again voiced and the agreement for joint industrial projects was revised.

When considering economic cooperation among ASEAN states one must recognize that the size, level of industrialization, economic policies and links with the global economy differ for each ASEAN state. The two highest hurdles that ASEAN has yet to cross are the pre-existing economic ties with the rest of the world, mainly former colonial rulers and Japan. The second and highest hurdle, which may prove insurmountable, is the competitive rather than complementary nature of the ASEAN economies. All the nations of ASEAN (except Brunei) produce and export similar goods that are often in direct competition with each other in the global market. Even Singapore now faces increased competition from Malaysia and Thailand for technologically advanced manufactured goods. One of the most significant hindrances to increased economic cooperation are the domestic industries in each nation. Many of these industries enjoy government protection (and are often members of the governing elites themselves) and as such do not enthusiastically view increased economic cooperation or reduced tariff protection. Thus, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines continue to have high tariffs for many industries that would

fail if free trade and increased economic cooperation became a reality.

Still differing levels of economic cooperation exist within ASEAN. The best example of intra-regional cooperation is between Singapore and the adjacent Malaysian provinces. Long term prospects for increased cooperation, however, remain elusive. Highlighting this fact is that Thailand is increasing economic cooperation with Laos at a much faster rate than with the ASEAN states. This level of cooperation should increase dramatically this year with the opening of the first bridge across the Mekong river linking the two nations.

In summary, although the nations of ASEAN remain competitive rather then complementary, ASEAN has achieved economic success by negotiating as a regional bloc for reduced tariffs and favorable trade terms with the United States, Japan and the European Economic Community.

CONCLUSION

Although composed of six quite dissimilar members ASEAN has survived in a highly volatile environment for a quarter of a century. This proven durability itself constitutes ASEAN's greatest achievement. Evolving from two failed attempts at a regional organization, ASEAN has become Southeast Asia's regional forum for both intra- and extra-regional issues. Yet, even after two decades ASEAN still does not constitute an international organization, regime or convention, but has metamorphically impersonated each. Rather, ASEAN has transformed itself over the last twenty-five years, taking the form of an organization, regime or convention as circumstances have required. With each successive crisis ASEAN has adapted its form to the prevailing environment. Yet upon resolution of the crisis ASEAN reverts to its original form - an agreement to disagree.

ASEAN can best be described as a club, more specifically a club comprised of the elites from the member nations. Southeast Asian diplomats themselves use the club metaphor when describing ASEAN to outsiders. Examination of ASEAN's history highlights its shape-shifting abilities. For example, following the unification of Vietnam, at the Bali Summit, ASEAN assumed the form of a regional organization by establishing a Secretariat and setting down a dispute resolution mechanism. But previously, following the ZOPFAN declaration, ASEAN could best have been described as an embryonic regime that tried to establish the norm of great power non-interference in the region. Though it never came to fruition, ZOPFAN was an attempt by ASEAN to establish not

only an intra-regional regime, but an international regime by attempting to expanded membership to the world's great powers. Following the Summit of 1977, ASEAN's shape took the form of a convention, a loose organization with implicit rules as the ASEAN states attempted reconciliation with the Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. ASEAN altered once again following Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, assuming the shape of an international organization by strengthening its ability to respond collectively to events. This alteration permitted ASEAN to respond to the invasion with a unified front and to internationalize the conflict. There are other instances of this adapting form to the circumstances, but again ASEAN continually returns to its club-like form.

Currently, ASEAN is in another transition period. Following its success in helping to resolve the Cambodian problem, the members of ASEAN no longer face a common threat. This lack of consensus within the institution was evident at the Fourth Summit of ASEAN Heads of State in 1992. Although Laos and Vietnam attained observer status, and China and Russia attended for the first time, internal drift was evident by the rejection of Singapore's proposal that an invitation to sign the Treaty of Amity and Concord be made to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Malaysia's proposal for an economic bloc with the Japanese was also rejected. The most significant of these two was the rejection of Singapore's proposal that theoretically would have furthered the goal of ZOPFAN. Furthermore, in response to the formation of free trade

zones in Europe and North America, ASEAN approved an ASEAN Free Trade Zone to be implemented by 2008 at the 1992 Summit. But as of 1994 no concrete steps toward implementation have been undertaken. This is because as noted above the ASEAN members are economic competitors and subsequently ill-suited for economic integration. Similarly, at the Foreign Ministers meeting in 1992 a call was made for ASEAN, China, and Vietnam to negotiate peacefully on issues of sovereignty and economic exploitation in the South China Sea, but no headway was made toward settlement of conflicting claims among the members themselves. Notably, at this meeting China and Vietnam signed onto an ASEAN proposal for joint development (Barnett 1993: 47). Therefore at this juncture ASEAN may be transforming into a convention once again.

Thus, ASEAN has evolved as an institution whose ability to take on various forms has served the interests of its members extremely well for the last twenty-five years. Yet, ASEAN as an institution can be viewed as either a success or a failure. If one bases evaluations on the Bangkok Declaration and its emphasis on economic cooperation, then ASEAN has not achieved success. The success of ASEAN lies in its aforementioned ability to transform itself in response to changing regional circumstances. Yet, what explains this ability to survive twenty years of existence? If ASEAN has at one time or another constituted a regime, does regime theory have value when examining ASEAN? These questions are even more interesting when one considers the numerous other attempts at regional cooperation around the globe that have failed.

REGIME THEORY

Still, labeling ASEAN proves elusive. On close examination what one finds is a web of interconnected relationships among the member nations that constitute a hybrid of Keohane's three types of institutions: "International institutions include formal intergovernmental or transnational organizations, international regimes, and conventions." (Rittberger 1993: 28). But, what explains ASEAN's success? I argue that international regime theories provide valuable insight into understanding how ASEAN has managed not only to survive, but flourish.

Regime formation theories attempt to understand the process by which effective regimes are created. By extension they provide valuable insight into regime preservation and maintenance. Further, if regime formation theories make plausible assumptions about regime creation, it follows that if these factors decay a regime may collapse, although the point at which a regime begins to decay and collapse is a topic of scholarly debate. For the purposes of this paper, I will extend the basic tenets of the regime formation theories contained in appendix B to cover formation, maintenance, and decay. The following section will examine point by point the theories covered in appendix B and the explanations they might provide for ASEAN's success.

The first and most widely debated group of regime formation theories are power based. As previously discussed the most popular of this group emphasizes the role of hegemony. But as discussed above, no global hegemon (i.e., the U.S., or the Soviet

Union) was involved in the creation of ASEAN. As such the hegemonic hypotheses is not applicable to ASEAN's case. Other power based theories also fail to explain ASEAN. However, in Southeast Asia itself, Indonesia could be considered the regional hegemon. The relevance here is that previous attempts at intra-regional cooperation failed until Indonesia under Sukarno decided to support the concept of ASEAN. Still, in the strictest sense, the power based theories offer little in the way of explaining ASEAN's creation or success.

The next subset of theories is the interest based hypotheses. The concepts contained in these theories do provide valuable insight in attempting to understand why ASEAN has thrived. Scrutiny of the motives behind the first ten years of ASEAN's existence clearly are articulated by the basic premise of the interest based theories: "Social institutions, including international regimes arise from the interaction of self-interested parties endeavoring to coordinate their behavior to reap joint gains that may but need not take the form of public goods (Appendix B)." Young has separated the interest based hypotheses into ten variables that may explain successful regime formation.

Five of these ten variables considered necessary for effective regime formation by the interest based hypotheses apply at one period or another to ASEAN, the relevance of two other variables is debatable (see appendix B for further discussion of each point):

1. Integrative bargaining and a veil of uncertainty.
A veil of uncertainty has surrounded events in the entire region since the end of World War II. Thus a veil of uncertainty has affected each of the founding members of ASEAN throughout their histories. The most significant uncertainty for the founding members of ASEAN in 1967 was internal security. Additionally, the continued uncertainty of events in Indochina contributed to ASEAN's continued cooperation. Arguably these two factors have been important in holding ASEAN together.

2. Equity. "The availability of institutional options that all participants can accept as equitable (rather than efficient) is necessary" for regime formation has not been a major factor for ASEAN. Though it should be noted that the chair of the ASEAN standing committee is rotated annually, which may not be efficient, but can be considered equitable.

3. Salient solutions. For its members ASEAN has provided solutions to regional concerns. Examples include the unified front ASEAN takes when dealing with extra-regional entities, particularly in the area of trade.

4. Exogenous shocks or crises. This tenet of the interest based hypotheses refers to the catalyst of each successive step towards greater cooperation within ASEAN. Arguably without the common crises faced by the ASEAN membership the association might have ceased to exist. Responding to shocks has also been the cause for ASEAN's frequent transformations.

5. Policy priority. The literature contains two divergent views: "Success in regime formation can occur only when the issue at stake achieves high-priority status ..." "Alternatively, it is easier to from a regime when the subject matter is not high on the political agendas of the parties." ASEAN in its twenty-five year history has shown both views to be valid. ASEAN has effectively acted when a crisis has threatened the member nations and resolving or mediating the threat has been high on the political agenda. Yet, when there are no common threats ASEAN's reversion to club status has helped it to remain viable.

6. Common good. "A willingness to set aside narrow national interests in favor of some broader conception of the common good is necessary to achieve success in regime formation." This may have been the case in response to the Cambodian invasion. However, this easily could have been an anomaly, because the members of ASEAN jealously guard their sovereignty, and it is doubtful that the member nations would have come to Thailand's aid if invaded by Vietnam. This was evident in the Thai decision to reach out to China and Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur's wariness of this move. Thus it is arguable that the association's members will not set aside "narrow national interests in favor of the common good." As such this aspect of the interest based hypotheses may have no value when examining ASEAN.

7. Science and technology. Not relevant to ASEAN's formation or continued survival.

8. Relevant parties. The second Indochina war broke Southeast Asia into ideological blocs, communist versus anti-communist, with ASEAN comprising the regions anti-communist bloc. Yet this may or may not be relevant to ASEAN's success in that some extra-regional powers (i.e., the U.S.) could also be considered relevant parties in the fight against communism.

9. Compliance mechanisms. ASEAN has yet to establish any type of compliance mechanisms.

10. Individuals as leaders. The leadership of ASEAN from its formation until the present has remained remarkably stable. Further, politics in each nation are dominated by a national elite who's perception of both regional and extra-regional events more closely match the elites of other nations rather than their own countrymen. This factor may be the single greatest contributor to ASEAN's survival. However, as the older generation passes the reins of power and democracy takes a firmer hold in the region, it is uncertain that the new elites will remain as committed as their predecessors have been to ASEAN.

The knowledge-based hypotheses about epistemic communities and cognitive factors lacked explanatory power in 1967. But, in attempting to understand the longevity of ASEAN, these factors take on greater significance. One result of the last twenty-five years is the matrices of regular and frequent consultation among governmental elites of the member nations. This has established personnel contacts and relationships at numerous levels which are

now expanding to the private sector. In addition a common ASEAN jargon and ASEAN community also has developed. Though hard to examine these shared values and learning experiences may translate into the strongest of all the factors that bind ASEAN together.

Returning to the original question of whether international regime theories have value when examining regime formation among small to mid-range powers, the answers is yes. Although classifying ASEAN has proved elusive, regime theories explain the forces behind the success of ASEAN over the last twenty-five years. Of the three main classifications of regime formation hypotheses the two with the greatest value are the interest based and knowledge based. However, the power based theories could have some significance if one considers Indonesia to have played the role of a regional hegemon in ASEAN's formation and continued success.

In conclusion, as the world seeks to foster greater cooperation, there are important lessons to be drawn from ASEAN's experience. In the area of regime formation and increased international cooperation the concepts proposed by the interest based hypotheses seem the most relevant. For ASEAN leadership, a veil of uncertainty and exogenous shocks or crises were the most important factors. However, explanations for the survival of an international institution seem to be contained in the knowledge based approach. The cognitive concept that shared contacts and learning experiences lead to effective regime formation may contain the answer for long term institutional survival. These

cognitive factors have definitely influenced ASEAN and contributed to its success. Quite simply they they have become the glue that binds ASEAN together when it reverts to its club-like status and maintains the commitment to cooperate even when internal drift is high. But the most important lesson to be learned from ASEAN may be contained in the words of Malaysia's Foreign Minister "Make Haste Slowly."

Appendix A

Five questions that should be asked of every regime.

1. Institutional Character. What are the principal rights, rules, and social choice procedures of the regime? How do they structure the behavior of individuals actors to produce a stream of collective outcomes?

2. Jurisdictional boundaries. What is the coverage of the regime in terms of functional scope, areal domain, and membership? Is this coverage appropriate under prevailing conditions?

3. Conditions for operation. What conditions are necessary for the regime to work at all? Under what conditions will the operation of the regime yield particularly desirable results (for example, economic efficiency, distributive justice, ecological balance)?

4. Consequences of operation. What sorts of outcomes (either individual or collective) can the regime be expected to produce? What are the appropriate criteria for evaluating these outcomes?

5. Regime dynamics. How did the regime come into existence, and what is the likelihood that it will experience changes in the foreseeable future? Does the regime include transformation rules that are likely to be effective?

(Young 1989: 29)

Appendix B

Template of Hypotheses to Be Tested

A. Power-based hypotheses
Basic Premise: Institutions, including international regimes, are structured by and reflect the distribution and configuration of power in international society.

1. Hegemony. The most widely discussed hypothesis in this set, which arises from hegemonic stability theory, states that the presence of a hegemon (that is, an actor possessing a preponderance of material resources) is a necessary condition for regime formation in international society.

a. Benign hegemony: the hegemon, functioning as the dominant member of a privileged group, supplies institutional arrangements to others as public goods.

b. Coercive hegemony: the hegemon exercises structural power to impose institutional arrangements favorable to itself, regardless of the consequences for others.

2. Other power-based hypotheses are possible. Here are some examples to consider:

a. A bipolar or bimodal distribution of power (producing a balance of power) is necessary for success in regime formation.

b. The greater the degree of symmetry in the distribution of power, the more likely efforts to create regimes are to succeed.

c. The existence of a small group of great powers in a given issue area (that is, a directorate) enhances prospects for regime formation.

B. Interest-based hypotheses
Basic Premise: Social institutions, including international regimes arise from the interaction of self-interested parties endeavoring to coordinate their behavior to reap joint gains that may but need not take the form of public goods. It follows that the availability of joint gains or, in other words, a contract zone or zone of agreements constitutes a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for the formation of international regimes. There is, however, no need to assume that the parties possess full or complete information regarding the extent or precise nature of the feasible or joint gains at the outset. (In some situations parties dispute or disagree regarding the existence or scope of joint gains.) Efforts to construct theories about the resilient interactions address the following question: Why do actors in international society succeed in forming international regimes to reap feasible gains in some cases but not in others? The processes leading to success or failure are ordinarily

conceptualized as bargaining or negotiation; the hypotheses of interest to us identify determinants of success or failure in the resultant institutional bargaining.

1. Integrative bargaining and a veil of uncertainty. Institutional bargaining can succeed only when the prominence of integrative bargaining and/or the presence of a veil of uncertainty make it easy for the partners to approach the problem under consideration in contractarian terms.

2. Equity. The availability of institutional options that all participants can accept as equitable (rather than efficient) is necessary for institutional bargaining to succeed.

3. Salient solutions. The existence of a salient solution (or focal point describable in simple terms) increases the probability of success in institutional bargaining.

4. Exogenous shocks or crises. Shocks or crises occurring outside of the bargaining process increase the probability of success in efforts to negotiate the terms of international regimes.

5. Policy priority. (a) Success in regime formation can occur only when the issue at stake achieves high-priority status on the policy agenda of each of the participants. (b) Alternatively, it is easier to from a regime when the subject matter is not high on the political agendas of the parties.

6. Common good. A willingness to set aside narrow national interests in favor of some broader conception of the common good is necessary to achieve success in regime formation.

7. Science and technology. (a) The greater the tendency for parties to concentrate on scientific or technical considerations as opposed to political issues, the greater the likelihood of successful regime formation. (b) The greater the role of negotiators with scientific or technical competence in relation to those with political credentials, the greater the likelihood for successful regime formation. (c) It is easier to form a regime when the issues at state are highly technical.

8. Relevant parties. All parties with an interest in the problem must participate in the negations for regime formation to succeed.

9. Compliance mechanisms. The probability for success in institutional bargaining rises when compliance mechanisms that the parties regard as clear-cut and effective are available.

10. Individuals as leaders. Institutional bargaining is likely to succeed when individual leadership emerges; it will fail in the absence of such leadership.

C. Knowledge-based hypotheses

Basic Premise: Shared perceptions, beliefs, and understandings of causal mechanisms among the relevant parties as well as identifiable communities, including epistemic communities and advocacy organizations, that arise to propagate this knowledge are important determinants of regime formation. Some would argue that cognitive considerations - including ideas, values and learning shared through transnational alliances, nongovernmental organizations, and groups of experts - constitute a more significant factor in regime formation than power or the interests of states. Two alternative accounts of how cognitive concerns influence regime formation are identifiable in the literature.

1. Scientific convergence. Agreement or consensus within the scientific community regarding causal relations and appropriate responses is a prerequisite for regime formation. (Values are less important, though not irrelevant, to this hypotheses than to the next hypothesis.)

2. Epistemic communities. A group of individuals (whose membership usually transcends national boundaries and includes both scientists or experts and policy makers) who share a common view regarding causal mechanisms and appropriate responses and who have a common set of values emerges in conjunction with the issue in question. For a regime to form some mechanism (possibly an international organization but in some cases a less formal network) arises to link the members of this group. The resulting epistemic community is able not only to promote its own preferred arrangements but also prevent opposing views and values from becoming influential or dominant at the domestic level in each of the relevant states.

D. Contextual factors

National and world circumstances and events seemingly unrelated to the issue area under consideration play a major role in determining if and when international cooperation to address a particular problem or issue area occurs and in shaping the content of any regime that forms.

(Young and Osherenko 1993: 263-266)

Appendix C

The ASEAN Declaration
(The Bangkok Declaration)

The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand:

MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interest and common problems among countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation;

DESIRING to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirt of equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region;

CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best maintained by fostering good understanding, good neighborliness and meaningful cooperation among the countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture.

CONSIDERING that the countries of South-East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form as manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspiration of their peoples;

AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development;

DO HEREBY DECLARE:

FIRST, the establishment of an Association for Regional Cooperation among the countries of South-East Asia to be known as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Second, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be:

1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirt of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations;

2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among

countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;

3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields;

4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational , professional, technical and administrative spheres;

5. To collaborate more effectively for greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communication facilities and the raising of living standards of their peoples;

6. To promote South-East Asian studies;

7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organization with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves.

THIRD, that, to carry out these aims and purposes, the following machinery shall be established:

(a). Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required;

(b). A standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of the host country or his representative and having as its membership the accredited Ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry out on the work of the Association in between Meetings of Foreign Ministers;

(c). Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects;

(d). A national Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the Association on behalf of that country and to service the Annual or Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other Committee as may hereafter be established.

FOURTH, that the Association is open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes.

FIFTH, that the Association represents the collective will of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and

sacrifices, secure for their people and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity.

Done in Bangkok on the Eight Day of August in the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-Seven.

Appendix D

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia

PREAMBLE

The High Contracting Parties;

CONSCIOUS of the existing ties of history, geography and culture, which have bound their people together;

ANXIOUS to promote regional peace and stability, friendship and mutual cooperation on matters affecting Southeast Asia consistent with the spirt and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African Conference in Bandung on 25 April 1955, the Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed in Bangkok on 8 August 1967, and the Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971;

CONVINCED that the settlement of differences or disputes between their countries should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitude which might endanger or hinder cooperation;

BELIEVING in the need for cooperation with all peace - loving nations, both within and outside Southeast Asia, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;

SOLEMNLY AGREE to enter into a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as follows:

CHAPTER I
PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

Article 1

The purpose of this treaty is to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.

Article 2

In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following principles:

a. Mutual respect for the interdependence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;

b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;

c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;

d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;

e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;

f. Effective cooperation among themselves.

CHAPTER II
AMITY

Article 3

In pursuance of the purpose of this treaty the High contracting Parties shall endeavor to develop and strengthen the traditional, cultural and historical ties of friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation which bind them together and shall fulfil in good faith and obligations assumed under this Treaty. In order to promote closer understanding among them, the High Contracting parties shall encourage and facilitate contact and intercourse among their peoples.

CHAPTER III
COOPERATION

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties shall promote active cooperation in the economic , social, technical, scientific and administrative fields as well as in matters of common ideals and aspiration of international peace and stability in the region and all other matters of common interest.

Article 5

Pursuant to Article 4 the High Contracting Parities shall exert their maximum efforts multilaterally as well as bilaterally on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and mutual benefit.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate for the acceleration of the economic growth in the region in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of nations in Southeast Asia. To this end, they shall promote the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade and the improvement of their economic infra-structure for the mutual benefit of their peoples. In this regard, they shall continue to explore all avenues for close and beneficial cooperation with other States as well as international and regional orgainisations [SIC] outside the region.

Article 7

The High Contracting Parties, in order to achieve social justice and to raise the standards of living of the peoples of the region, shall intensify economic cooperation. For this purpose, they shall adopt appropriate regional strategies for economic development and mutual assistance.

Article 8

The High Contracting Parties shall strive to achieve the closest cooperation on the widest scale and shall seek to provide assistance to one another in the form of training and research facilities in the social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields.

Article 9

The High Contracting Parities shall endeavor to foster cooperation in the furtherance of the cause of peace, harmony and stability in the region. To this end, the High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts and consultations with one another on international and regional matters with a view to coordinating their views, actions and policies.

Article 10

Each High Contracting Party shall not in any manner or form participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of another High Contracting Party.

Article 11

The High Contracting Parties shall endeavor to strengthen their respective national resilience in their political, economic, socio-cultural as well as security fields in conformity with their respective ideals and aspirations, free from external interference as well as internal subversive activities in order to preserve their respective national identities.

Article 12

The High Contracting Parties in their efforts to achieve regional prosperity and security, shall endeavor to cooperate in all the fields for the promotion of regional resilience, based on the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation and solidarity which will constitute the foundation for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia.

CHAPTER IV
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 13

The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination and good faith to prevent disputes from arising. In case disputes on matters directly affecting them shall refrain from the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations.

Article 14

To settle disputes through regional processes, the High Contracting Parties shall constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council comprising a Representative at Ministerial level from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognizance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony.

Article 15

In the event no solution is reached through direct negotiation, the High Council shall take cognizance of the dispute or the situation and shall recommend to the parities in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High Council may however offer its good offices, or upon agreement of the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council shall recommended appropriate measure for the prevention of a deterioration of the dispute or the situation.

Article 16

The foregoing provision of this Chapter shall not apply to dispute unless all the parties to the dispute agree to their application to that dispute. However, this shall not preclude the other High Contracting Parties not party to the dispute from offering all possible assistance to settle the said dispute. Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards such offers of assistance.

Article 17

Nothing in the Treaty shall preclude recourse to the modes of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations. The High Contracting Parties which are parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives to solve it by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

CHAPTER V
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 18

This treaty shall be signed by the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand. It shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each signatory State.

Article 19

This treaty shall enter into force on this date of the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification with the Governments of the signatory States which are designated Depositories of this Treaty and of the instruments of ratification or accession.

Article 20

This Treaty is drawn up in the official languages of the High Contracting Parties, all of which are equally authoritative. There shall be an agreed common translation of the texts in the English language. Any divergent interpretation of the common text shall be settled by negotiation.

IN FAITH THEREOF the High Contracting Parties have signed the Treaty and have hereto affixed their Seals.

Done at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.

(signatories for each nation are as follows:)

Soeharto, President of Indonesia
Datuk Hussein Onn, Prime Minister of Malaysia
Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Philippines
Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore
Kukrit Pramoj, Prime Minister of Thailand

Appendix E

DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD

A COMMON BOND EXISTING AMONG THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS,

The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Prime minister of the Republic of Singapore and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand,

REAFFIRM their commitment to the Declaration of Bandung, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, and the Charter of the United Nations;

ENDEAVOR to promote peace, progress, prosperity and the welfare of the peoples of member states,

UNDERTAKE to consolidate the Achievements of ASEAN and expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and political fields;

DO HEREBY DECLARE:

ASEAN cooperation shall take into account, among others, the following objectives and principles in the pursuit of political stability :

1. The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.

2. Member states, individually and collectively, shall take active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.

3. The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy is a primary concern of member states. They shall therefore intensify cooperation in economic and social development, with particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the improvement of the living standards of their peoples.

4. Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the pace of development of member states. They shall extend, within their capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in distress

5. Member states shall take cooperative action in their national and regional development programmes, utilizing as far as possible the resources available in the ASEAN region to broaden the complementarity of their respective economies.

6. Member states, in the spirt of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences.

7. Member states shall strive, individually and collectively, to create conditions conducive to the promotion of peaceful cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit.

8. Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of regional identity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN community, respected by all and respecting all nations on the basis of mutually advantageous relationships, and in accordance with the principles of self-determination, sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of nations.

AND DO HEREBY ADOPT

The following programme of action as a framework for ASEAN cooperation:

A. POLITICAL

1. Meetings of the Heads of Government of the member states as and when necessary.

2. Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

3. Settlement of intra-regional disputes by peaceful means as soon as possible.

4. Immediate consideration of initial steps towards recognition of and respect for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and neutrality wherever possible.

5. Improvement of ASEAN machinery to strengthen political cooperation.

6. Study on how to develop judicial cooperation including the possibility of an ASEAN Extradition Treaty;

7. Strengthening of political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of views, coordinating position and, where possible and desirable, taking common actions.

B. ECONOMIC

1. Cooperation on Basic Commodities, particularly Food and Energy

(i) Member states shall assist each other by according priority to the supply of the individual country's needs in critical circumstance, and priority to the acquisition of exports from members states, in respect of basic commodities, particularly food and energy.

(ii) Member states shall also intensify cooperation in the production of basic commodities particularly food and energy in the individual member states of the region.

2. Industrial Cooperation

(i) Member states shall cooperate to establish large-scale ASEAN industrial plants, particularly to meet regional requirements of essential commodities.

(ii) Priority shall be given to projects which utilize the available materials in the members states, contribute to the increase of food production, increase foreign exchange earnings or save foreign exchange and create employment.

3. Cooperation in Trade

(i) Member states shall cooperate in the fields of trade in order to promote development and growth of new production and trade to improve the trade structures of individual states and among the countries of ASEAN conducive to further development and to safeguard and increase their foreign exchange earnings and reserves.

(ii) Member states shall progress towards the establishment of preferential trading arrangements as a long term objective on a basis deemed to be at any particular time appropriate through rounds of negotiations subject to the unanimous agreement of member states.

(iii) The expansion of trade among member states shall be facilitated through cooperation on basic commodities, particularly in food and energy and through cooperation in ASEAN industrial projects.

(iv) Members states shall accelerate joint efforts to improve access to markets outside ASEAN for their raw material and finished products by seeking the elimination of all trade barriers in those markets, developing new usage for these products and in adopting common approaches and actions in dealing with regional groupings and individual economic powers.

(v) Such efforts shall also lead to cooperation in the filed of technology and production methods in order to increase the production and to improve the quality of export products, as well as to develop new export products with a view to diversifying exports.

4. Joint Approach to International Commodity Problems and Other World Economic Problems

(i) The principle of ASEAN cooperation on trade shall also be reflected on a priority basis in joint approaches to international commodity problems and other world economic problems such as the reform of international trading systems, the reform of international monetary system and transfer of real resources, in the United Nations and

other relevant multilateral fora, with a view to contributing to the establishment of the New International Economic Order.

(ii) Member states shall give priority to the stabilisation (SIC) and increase of export earnings of those commodities produced and exported by them through commodity agreements including buffer stock schemes and other means.

5. Machinery for Economic Cooperation
Ministerial meetings on economic matters shall be held regularly or as deemed necessary in order to:

(i) formulate recommendations for the consideration of Governments of members states for the strengthening of ASEAN economic cooperation;

(ii) Review the coordination and implementation of agreed ASEAN programmes and projects on economic cooperation;

(iii) exchange views and consult on national development plans and policies as a step towards harmonizing regional development; and

(iv) perform such other relevant functions as agreed upon by the member governments.

c. Social

1. Cooperation in the field of social development, with emphasis on the well being of low-income group and of rural population, through the expansion of opportunities for productive employment with fair remuneration.

2. Support for the active involvement of all sectors and levels of the ASEAN communities, particularly the women and youth, in development efforts.

3. Intensification and expansion of existing cooperation in meeting the problems of population growth in the ASEAN region, and where possible, formulation of new strategies in collaboration with appropriate international agencies.

4. Intensification of cooperation among member states as well as with the relevant international bodies in the prevention and eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal trafficking of drugs.

d. Cultural and Information

1. Introduction of the study of ASEAN, its members states and their national languages as part of the curricula of schools and other institutions of learning in the members states.

2. Support of ASEAN scholars, writers, artists and mass media representatives to enable them to play an active role in fostering a sense of regional identity and fellowship

3. Promotion of Southeast Asian studies through closer collaboration among national institutes.

E. Security

Continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests.

f. Improvement of ASEAN machinery

1. Signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat.

2. Regular review of the ASEAN organizational structure with a view to improving its effectiveness.

3. Study of the desirability of a new constitutional framework for ASEAN

DONE at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.
(signatories for each nation are as follows:)

Soeharto, President of Indonesia
Datuk Hussein Onn, Prime Minister of Malaysia
Ferdinand Marcos, President of the Philippines
Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore
Kukrit Pramoj, Prime Minister of Thailand

Appendix F

Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration

We the foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and the Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand:

Firmly believing in the merits of regional co-operation which has drawn our countries to co-operate together in economic, social and cultural fields in the Association of South East Asian Nations;

Desirous of bringing about a relaxation of international tension and of achieving a lasting peace in South East Asia;

Inspired by the worthy aims and objectives of the United Nations, in particular by the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, abstention from threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self-determination and non-interference in the affairs of States;

Believing in the continuing validity of the declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation of the Bandung conference of 1955 which, among others, enunciates the principles by which states may coexist peacefully;

Recognizing the right of every state, large or small, to lead its national existence free from outside interference in its internal affairs as this interference will adversely affects its freedom, independence and integrity;

Dedicated to the maintenance of peace, freedom and independence unimpaired;

Believing in the need to meet present challenges and new developments by co-operating with all peace and freedom loving nation, both within and outside the region, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;

Cognizant of the significant trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones, as in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Lusaka Declaration proclaiming Africa as a nuclear-free zone, for the purpose of promoting world peace and security by reducing the areas of international conflicts and tension;

Reiterating our commitment to the principle in the Bangkok Declaration which establishment ASEAN in 1967, that the countries of South East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development and that they are determined to ensure stability and security from

external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their people;

Agreeing that the neutralization of South East Asia is a desirable objective and that we should explore ways and means for bringing about its realization; and

Convinced that the time is propitious for joint action to give effective expression to the deeply felt desire of the people of South East Asia to ensure the conditions of peace and stability indispensable to their independence and their economic social well-being;

Do Hereby State:

1. that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, respect for, South East Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free form any form of manner of interference of outside powers;
2. that the South East Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of co-operation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.

Done at Kuala Lumpur on Saturday, the 27th of November 1971.

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[1]Oran Young reached similar conclusions in his study of Polar Politics.

[2]See Stephen Krasner's Structural Conflict, the third world against global liberalism and International Regimes, also Keohane's After Hegemony and Young's International Cooperation.

[3] See Oran Young's recent work on regime formation; Polar Politics and Haggard and Simmons 1987 article "Theories of international regimes".

[4] Haggard and Simmons 1987 article "Theories of international regimes".

[5]ibid

[6]Note there is much disagreement here as to the decline of American power; see Kennedy's Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Joseph Nye's Bound to Lead, Susan Strange "The vanishing myth of American hegemony," Keohane and Nye Power and Interdependence, and Krasner After Hegemony.