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The 2014 Illinois Governor Race: Quinn vs. Rauner

By: John S. Jackson

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The 2014 Illinois Governor Race: Quinn vs. Rauner

Introduction

The 2014 Governor's race in Illinois featured two candidates who are the epitome of campaigns for high office in America today. In addition, the race also illustrated the major trends, driven by big money and big media, which are shaping our politics in the 21st century. This paper examines and analyzes the governor's race in order to learn what it teaches us about politics in Illinois, and in the United States midway through the second decade of this century.

In Pat Quinn the voters of Illinois had the choice of a candidate who was in many ways a classic big city Irish pol. He had been in politics in Chicago and Illinois all of his adult life, and he had never really done anything else outside a career in public service. He was a graduate of Georgetown University and Northwestern University's School of Law. He started his career in the 1970s as a political operative for former Illinois Governor Dan Walker. After working for Walker, Quinn repeatedly sought, and often won, political office or worked near government for a brief stint in a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) which he founded to advance his causes.

The fact that Quinn spent his formative young adult years working for Dan Walker is significant. Walker was a maverick who never got along with the regular Democratic Party organization and he fought the Daley Machine in Chicago with a crusader's zeal. He used that opposition to Daley to catapult himself to an upset victory over Lt. Governor Paul Simon in the 1972 Democratic Primary.

Walker then beat Republican Richard Ogilvie, the incumbent, in the general election in November, 1972. This victory ushered in a stormy and conflict-ridden single term in the governor's office for Walker where he often fought with Mayor Richard J. Daley and the leaders of both parties. Walker also did not work well with the General Assembly, either Republicans or Democrats, during his term in office. As a result, he was not considered to be an effective governor and was rather handily beaten by the party organization's candidate, Michael Howlett, in the 1976 Democratic Primary. Howlett was then beaten by James R. Thompson in the general election, and this victory, the first of seven for the GOP, initiated a stretch of twenty six consecutive years of Republican rule in the governor's office.

In numerous characteristics, Pat Quinn was an apt disciple of his original mentor, Dan Walker. He was always known as a reformer and something of a lone wolf who cultivated the outsider image. Quinn was also considered to be a loose cannon by the party establishment. He frequently had difficulty in getting along with and reaching compromises with the other leaders of his own party and with the Republicans in government.

After he left the Walker Administration Quinn was the head of the Campaign for Political Honesty which he founded. Using this platform he pushed through the "Cutback Amendment" which reduced the size of the Illinois House from 177 to 117 seats and eliminated the state's unique cumulative voting, or multi-member districts plan (Illinois Blue Book, 1993-94, 31). Most practical politicians on both sides of the aisle opposed this amendment, and its passage was seen as a sharp rebuke to the state's political establishment and a populist uprising against the

entrenched powers in Springfield and Chicago. This interpretation was fine with Quinn since he wanted to be known as the reformer who constantly promised to shake up the status quo. It is somewhat ironic that much later, after he had been elected governor in his own right in 2010, he was charged by Bruce Rauner with abuses of power in the operation of a neighborhood violence grants program and with the same kinds of patronage politics Quinn had always fought against throughout his career.

The fact that Quinn billed himself as an outsider did not prevent him from almost constantly seeking public office or serving in appointed and elected offices. In 1982 he was elected to the Cook County Board of Property Tax Appeals and was also appointed by the late Mayor, Harold Washington, to the position of Revenue Director for the City of Chicago (Illinois Blue Book, 2013-2014, 21). The stint with the Washington Administration also came back to dog Quinn during the Democratic Primary in 2010 and again during the general election in 2014 when his opponents used some of Harold Washington's negative quotes about Quinn against him in their television commercials.

Quinn then utilized his notoriety as a reformer and the champion of the Cutback Amendment to mount a successful race for State Treasurer where he served from 1991 to 1995. In 2002 Quinn won the Democratic Primary for Lieutenant Governor and in the general election he was paired with Rod Blagojevich who was elected governor. In that era, unlike now, the Lt. Governor and Governor candidates did not have to run as a team, and Quinn was on the Blagojevich ticket by virtue of winning the primary on his own. That turned out to be fortuitous for him later when Blagojevich was removed from office via impeachment and conviction by the Illinois House and Senate, an unprecedented milestone for the State of Illinois. In the meantime, Blagojevich and Quinn won re-election handily over Republicans Judy Barr Topinka and Joe Birkett in 2006.

Quinn's Record as Governor

Upon Rod Blagojevich's removal from office by the Illinois General Assembly, Pat Quinn was sworn in as governor on January 29, 2009. He was re-elected to his first full term on November 2, 2010. During his first years in office Quinn took on a host of challenges for Illinois government the most notable of which had to do with the state's having too little money and too much debt. For years critics had been warning that Illinois had a "structural deficit" which simply meant that the state was committed to more programs and personnel than the income the state generated each year could cover. This imbalance resulted in a series of stop-gap measures which allowed the state to temporize with its deficit and move along to the next fiscal year but never honestly face the problem and fix it. Quinn promised to do something real about the structural deficit and the backlog of unpaid bills. Early in 2011 with the crucial support of the Democratic leadership in the Illinois House and Senate, Quinn persuaded a majority of his colleagues to go along with a tax increase, and the new revenue it generated allowed the state to start addressing some of the deep stack of accumulated bills which it did with new revenue for FY2011 through half of FY2015 (Long, October 16, 2014, 26-27). The new tax rate was billed as "temporary" although many observers believed that it would never be allowed to expire at the end of 2014 since it was the only plan the state had for finally addressing the structural deficit that had haunted Illinois for decades.

The passage of the personal and corporate income tax increase conditioned almost everything else in the campaign and was the major topic of conflict between Quinn and Rauner in the 2014 election. Nothing more starkly divided the two candidates and this issue was certainly one of the defining conflicts of the campaign (The New York Times, March 22, 2014, A23).

The personal income tax had been increased from 3.0 to 5 percent and the corporate rate had increased from 4.8 to 7 percent. The increase was scheduled to expire on January 1, 2015 with the rates contracting to 3.75 percent for individuals and 5.25 for corporations on that date (Long, October 16, 2014, 26-27). The resulting hole in the budget of approximately two billion dollars for FY 2015 and of over four billion dollars for FY2016, beginning July 1, 2015 was the major difference between Quinn and Rauner as they fought for the governor's office in the summer and fall of 2014. Quinn vigorously defended the increase as absolutely necessary and fiscally responsible. Rauner and the Republicans and many of their allies in the business world attacked it just as vigorously as the critics charged that Illinois was a high tax state with a declining economy steadily losing jobs to its neighbors.

Added to that conflict was a deep disagreement over the Illinois public employee pension system. The system was widely reported to be approximately \$100 billion in deficit which was the nation's worst deficit for a state system. For many years, under both parties, Illinois governors and legislators had failed to pay the state's share of the pension obligations, which they called "taking a pension holiday" or had borrowed money to make the required payments. The General Assembly and the governor finally passed a bill in 2012 which was supposed to start on the pay back and reduction of the deficit. It was declared unconstitutional by a lower state court and the issue was before the state supreme court during the governor's race. This conflict also divided the two candidates as Quinn stood for the current law and maintained that it was constitutional and essential to the financial health of Illinois while Rauner denounced it although his own plans for what to do if the court threw the plan out were ambiguous. Almost the entire conversation in the 2014 governor's race boiled down to the budget, taxes and pensions. Quinn had a record and legislation that he had supported and campaigned for while Rauner had a vague plan to depend on future revenue growth driven by the economic growth and increased employment that he contended his policies would produce.

So, Quinn came into the general election contest with a host of liabilities. He had managed to alienate many members of the Illinois General Assembly especially when he put their pay checks on hold in a heavy-handed attempt to pressure them into passing the pensions bill. The pensions bill was deeply opposed by the public employee unions and state retirees. The tax increase, like all tax increases, was overwhelmingly unpopular with the public (Jackson and Leonard, June 2014). Quinn had closed numerous state facilities and reduced the size of the state's employment rolls significantly. In fact, Illinois had the lowest number of state employees per capita in the nation and Quinn further reduced their numbers. All of this was done in a quest for budget savings. While the legislators all said they wanted to address the deficit, when it came to closing state facilities and losing state jobs in their own areas, they were vociferous in their condemnation of the governor's actions. The mass public, particularly those who had jobs and

families affected by the closings, also were clearly not supportive of the closings and the claimed cost savings.

In short, the election agenda driven by both candidates and the mass media turned out to focus almost entirely on taxes, the budget, the pension problem, jobs and the overall economic situation in Illinois and governmental management in general. All of these were agenda issues that favored Rauner instead of Quinn.

Quinn's Campaign

At the outset Quinn needed to duplicate his 2010 victory and improve on his razor thin margins if at all possible. Quinn had only beaten State Senator Bill Brady of Bloomington by approximately 31,000 votes statewide in 2010. Quinn carried only Cook County, and three downstate counties, Alexander, Jackson, and St. Clair. Ironically, Quinn then closed prisons or other state facilities in Alexander and Jackson counties in order to save money and move toward a balanced budget. However, those specific actions were deeply unpopular in those counties where the closures took place and were widely condemned by all of the legislators from southern Illinois. If Quinn was running for office for a second elected term, it was hard to discern the political strategy undergirding these choices.

Quinn also had some assets. He had passed a thirty-one billion dollar capital improvements plan through the General Assembly in 2009. This allowed him to cut a lot of ribbons over the next four years. He also claimed that it had created more than 430,000 jobs. The Illinois unemployment rate fell to 6.6 in October which was progress even though that rate was still almost a point above the national average of 5.8 which was the lowest it had been since before the Great Recession of 2008-09. Illinois, like the nation, was clearly coming out of the dark days of the recession, although like the nation also, the rate of recovery was frustratingly slow. This provided ammunition to the critics who continued to emphasize the shortcomings in the economy and apparently dissuaded the Democrats from trying to capitalize on the undeniable upturn in most economic indicators when 2009 is compared to 2014. People consistently listed jobs and the economy as their number one concern and the narrative took over that both were sadly lacking in comparison to past recoveries and the Democrats consistently failed to counter that dominant narrative about the economy.

As the fall of 2014 approached, Quinn was often found out and about in the hinterland of Illinois announcing some new facility, a new stretch of highway, a bridge to be built or some new state program which he maintained would increase jobs and bring prosperity. He was also able to announce a number of private sector company expansions or relocations, and these were often accompanied by state tax rebates, infrastructure improvements, or worker training incentives paid for by the state. Perhaps the splashiest announcement was of a new 1.4 billion dollar fertilizer plant for Champaign County which came the week before the election. All of these new plants and job announcements gave Quinn some real accomplishments to tout as a part of his case for re-election, and the Governor was never shy about claiming credit for his administration. Nationally and in Illinois the Democrats had an objective case which could be made about economic progress and jobs growth since the Great Recession of 2008 and 2009, but

they simply failed to make it persuasively enough to help their ticket in the mid-term elections and thus they lost almost all the closely contested races.

Stewardship of the state's budget and management of the economy became the overall themes for both candidates. Whether Illinois was well on the way to economic recovery or mired in debt and steadily declining were the competing narratives for this race, and the negative narrative won out.

Rauner's Campaign

No one could argue the case for the decline of Illinois better and more forcefully than Bruce Rauner. He was a private equity investor who had amassed a vast fortune through his company, GTCR. Data he reluctantly released during the campaign season showed that his income for 2013 had been \$60.1 million for that one year alone. He was reported to own nine homes in a collection of states. He had a long time record of philanthropy and civic activity in the Chicago area, but he had never run for public office before and had never received much public scrutiny. Outside elite circles in Chicago, he was virtually unknown downstate and by average voters when he started the race.

This did not prevent Rauner from winning the Illinois Republican Primary in March of 2014. In that race there were three current office holders who were also political insiders versus one outsider who had made his name and personal fortune as a businessman. Bruce Rauner, the CEO and business mogul won against the three respected and veteran Republican politicians thus setting up the highly contentious and enormously expensive race for governor in the general election on November 4, 2014.

Rauner is a model of a kind of new candidate both parties, but especially the Republican Party, are recruiting for high level office including governor, senator and president. He is a self-made business man and mega-millionaire with no prior governmental experience and no record of having run for office previously. Thus he had no public record to defend. He wanted to start at the top rather than patiently working his way up through a series of successive offices as most traditional high office holders have been required to do. He was also quite willing to self-finance much of his own campaign particularly in the crucial early campaign period when money is usually scarce and hard to raise. He put a reported \$27 million of his own money into his campaign. To these super rich candidates investing in one's own campaign is just another venture in financing a "start-up" even though in this case the start-up is the candidate's own drive for office and control of public power.

The Republicans are the party of business and they constantly claim that "government should be run like a business". The current governor of Florida, Rick Scott, and the current governor of Michigan, Rick Snyder, are good examples of this model. Former New York City Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, who at the time he ran for Mayor was reputed to be the wealthiest man in the city, spent over \$70 million to capture city hall the first time. He then came back for a second term victory fueled by even more millions of his personal fortune. He went from CEO of Bloomberg News to CEO of New York City in one leap.

Meg Whitman, who was the CEO of Ebay, ran for the governorship of California in 2010 and put \$144 million of her own personal fortune into the race. If she had won, Whitman would have been another such high level CEO example, but she lost to Jerry Brown who had already been governor previously and who is the kind of career politician Pat Quinn epitomizes. So, in some respects, the Illinois race pitted the old model veteran pol versus the new model business entrepreneur turned office-seeker looking for a second career, and both tend to represent their own party's distinctive values and approach to winning office and governing.

The Study

This paper documents and analyzes the race, how Rauner won and where. It also provides data on the Illinois Primary and demonstrates how the primary was related to and foreshadowed some of the results for the general election. The unit of analysis here is the county and the county level voting returns were provided by the Illinois State Board of Elections, information which is available at (<http://www.elections.il.gov/electioninformation/VoteTotalList.aspx?>). The aggregate data are supplemented by poll results and by media coverage where they are appropriate and available.

The Democratic Primary Results

Quinn's campaign faced an uphill slog from the beginning. He also got off to something of a slow start in the Democratic Primary. He had what was supposed to be only token opposition in the form of Tio Hardiman who was an African-American community activist from Chicago. Hardiman had no name recognition, no money, and no prospects for defeating a sitting governor. However, in spite of mounting a virtually invisible campaign, outside a few Chicagoland media events, he managed to win 125,000 votes which was 28 percent of the total. This was an unprecedented number of votes for such an obscure contender to receive against an incumbent governor.

As can be seen from Map A, Pat Quinn won Cook County and the all-important Collar Counties in the primary although not without some difficulty. Hardiman managed to carry 30 counties total, mostly in central and southern Illinois, where the voters had no idea who Tio Hardiman was (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2014, 5-8). The vote for Hardiman was widely interpreted as a protest vote indicating the real difficulties Pat Quinn faced in his re-election campaign for the fall. (See Appendix A and Map A for the results of the Democratic Primary).

Quinn's total vote and the number of counties he carried against an unknown opponent were unimpressive. His vote total would have him place second, not far ahead of Kirk Dillard, if he had been in the Republican Primary. It was almost unheard of for a sitting governor to lose thirty counties in a Democratic Primary against only token opposition. Quinn could ill-afford to cede thirty counties Downstate to a totally unknown candidate like Hardiman without being in real jeopardy for the general election. These results presaged the very steep hill he had to climb if he was going to win against a well-funded opponent in the general election.

The Republican Primary Results

In the Republican Primary Bruce Rauner ran against three veteran Illinois office holders who were all widely respected. All had run statewide before and all had served in the Illinois General Assembly. Bill Brady was a State Senator from Bloomington who had run for Governor against Pat Quinn in 2010 and had come agonizingly close to defeating him. To get the 2010 nomination, Brady defeated five other candidates in the Republican Primary, and some of the people he beat were very experienced and credible candidates. Kirk Dillard was a State Senator who had been Chief of Staff for a popular former Governor, Jim Edgar. He came in second to Bill Brady in a very close Republican Primary in 2010, and based on that Dillard decided to run again in 2014.

Dan Rutherford was the current Treasurer of Illinois who had won his first statewide race handily in 2010. Before that he had been in the Illinois legislature with ten years of service in the Illinois House and seven years in the Illinois Senate (Illinois Blue Book, 2013-2014, 31). Thus in 2014 there were three deeply experienced Republican office holders, all of whom who had run statewide before, pitted against the newcomer, Bruce Rauner.

Rauner won the Republican Primary with 329,934 popular votes which was 40.13 percent of the total. He was hard pressed by Dillard who was second with 305,120 votes or 37.22 percent of the total (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2014, 5). Dillard seemed to surge in the last two weeks of the campaign when several interest groups, especially some of the state's public employee unions and other labor unions put up a last ditch fight to stop Rauner who had conducted his campaign partially based on reining in and reducing the power of the public employee unions and attacking union bosses. Bill Brady came in third with 123,708 votes or 15.09 percent. Dan Rutherford, whose campaign seemed to collapse in the last month amid headline-grabbing charges filed against him by a former employee, finished last with 61,948 popular votes, or 7.56 percent (Ibid). (See Appendix B and Map B).

Rauner's victory was somewhat scattered across the state, but the center of gravity was across a band of counties in northernmost Illinois near the Wisconsin border and in Cook and the suburban Collar Counties. Rauner carried Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry and Will. Beating these Republican establishment candidates in the Collar Counties, and most notably besting Kirk Dillard in his home county of DuPage was quite a feat and indicated that Rauner would be a strong candidate in the general election. Rauner's victory presaged some real strength for him for the fall election since those are the crucial suburban counties where Bill Brady fell short in his narrow loss to Pat Quinn in 2010. Rauner also won in counties scattered across parts of central and southern Illinois and this gave him some hope for winning Downstate in the fall.

Rauner's challenge for the fall is also clearly indicated in Map B where it is evident that he lost most of central and southern Illinois to Dillard. (See also Appendix B). Those are the Downstate counties, typically bastions of Republican strength, he had to add to his column if he was going to have a good chance against Quinn in the fall. He also had to hang onto the suburban Collar Counties and gain at least twenty percent of the vote in Chicago to be competitive with Quinn.

Overall these victories, a narrow one for Rauner against three very creditable opponents, and a wider one that was still unimpressive for Quinn, indicated both the strengths and the weaknesses

each candidate carried into the fall campaign. Quinn had to struggle to overcome the anger and dissent in his own party that resulted from his first five plus years of governing and some of the highly controversial decisions he had made. If he could unite the party base and win a decent percent of the Independents, and perhaps a few Republicans, he might just pull out another squeaker in the fall.

Rauner faced the same challenge in reverse. He had to win over the elements of the Republican Party base who had voted for the other three candidates in the March primary. Since he had not engaged in many negative attacks against the three primary opponents, and since they all really strongly opposed Quinn, this seemed doable. Nevertheless, there are not enough Republicans in Illinois to win a statewide race. Rauner also had the nagging challenge of a Libertarian candidate on his right who was likely to draw away some of the most conservative Republican voters who did not completely accept Rauner's conservative credentials. So, it was especially important for Rauner to win the majority of the Independents and to lure disaffected Democrats over to his side. Given the muttering in the ranks of the Democratic Party, and the many controversial budget, pensions and facilities closing decisions that Quinn had made as governor, this seemed somewhat feasible at the outset.

The Polls and the Press

Perhaps reflecting this scenario the public opinion polls at the outset showed a considerable margin for Rauner. Early polls had him up by comfortable margins, sometimes even double digits, over Quinn (Dietrich, June 12, 2014). It appeared the Governor was in trouble and had a long way to go to put together a coalition that could carry him to victory.

Then in September the polls started closing up somewhat. Quinn narrowed the gap to a range of only five to seven points. By early October Quinn had closed the gap and for the first time achieved a modest lead over Rauner (Dietrich, October 7, 2014). It seemed that Rauner was having difficulty closing the deal with the voters. This doubt about the Republican was aided materially by the hard-hitting television commercials the Quinn campaign saturated the airways with in the summer and early fall. Again and again they reminded the voters that Bruce Rauner "is not one of us". In other words, he is a very rich guy with nine homes, with several of those located in other states. How can Rauner have any idea how your life feels when he is so insulated by his vast wealth, the Quinn ads asked repeatedly. Indeed Quinn's running mate for Lieutenant Governor, Paul Vallas, suggested at one point that Rauner was too rich to be a good governor, a quote which nicely captured the populist approach adopted by the Quinn campaign.

In addition, Rauner was a private equity investor who had bought and sold numerous companies. Some of these companies had experienced legal problems; some had gone bankrupt; some had outsourced jobs overseas; and some had fired top executives in a harsh manner. If all this sounded like Mitt Romney redux, it was not by accident. The general strategy worked for Barack Obama in 2012 against a very rich opponent, so why not for Pat Quinn in 2014 against an even richer candidate? Rauner responded by adopting an "everyman" attitude and persona. He ostentatiously wore jeans and a Carhartt barn coat and emphasized his humble roots and the hard work which had gotten him to the top. He put a twenty year old Volkswagen van front and

center in one of his campaign ads and joked about his frugality. Rauner certainly recognized the potential for Quinn's attack ads to be effective in defining him in the minds of many Illinois voters and he took every precaution to try to adjust his image.

Perhaps no other single event symbolized the pitfalls of trying to control and remake an image than one in late August when Rauner was featured in a candid photograph published in the Chicago Tribune picturing him with Mayor Rahm Emanuel of Chicago, as they vacationed in a posh resort on the Yellowstone River in Montana. Emanuel was carrying a bottle of wine which was identified as a very expensive and rare label. It turned out that Rauner belonged to an exclusive wine connoisseurs' club where the entrance fees were \$100,000 to \$150,000 per year and that did not include the wine (Chase, Heinzmann, and Cohen, Aug. 29, 2014).

That story seemed to summarize the Quinn case against Rauner in one simple and easily grasped tableau. From then on, the Quinn advertising stressed the themes of Rauner's wealth, the heartless character of some of the business decisions he had made, and his record in the dog-eat-dog world of high finance. A big part of the Democratic Party base started going home and closing ranks with the incumbent governor no matter what their past disappointments and conflicts with Quinn had been, and the polls closed up to indicate a very close race. The public employee unions, which had deep disagreements with Quinn and who felt completely betrayed by some of his actions, swallowed their grievances against him and moved to back his campaign against what they thought was an even worse and more adversarial alternative.

Rauner was not devoid of ammunition in the negative advertisements war however. His ads featured a series of charges against Quinn criticizing the way he had managed the state in the previous five years. Quinn's record on jobs and the budget and taxes was particularly vulnerable, and Rauner went after it with a vengeance. Illinois had been somewhat slower than other Midwestern states in its recovery of jobs after the Great Recession of 2008-2009. It has lost some businesses in well publicized moves to other states, and several other very loud and high profile business executives had threatened to move to other states or to never build any other facilities in Illinois if the corporate tax rates were not reduced. A large percentage of voters will always oppose a tax increase and the Republicans mined the income tax increase effectively in their indictment of Quinn and the Democratic Party's stewardship of state government (Jackson and Leonard, June, 2014).

In addition, Quinn's credentials as a true reformer were besmirched by highly public disclosures about an Anti-Violence Program his administration had launched just before the 2010 election. This program funneled \$54.5 million to central city Chicago, supposedly targeted to some of the city's most violent neighborhoods to fight crime and especially the gun violence which was roiling the city. A subsequent investigation by the respected Illinois Auditor General, Bill Holland, revealed that many of these funds did not go to the most violent neighborhoods and the whole program seemed to have been mismanaged from the start. Then the Department of Justice announced that a federal investigation had been opened by the U. S. Attorney. Word that the grants were targeted by Chicago Aldermen did not help the credibility of the Quinn Administration and the media had a field day with the charges. Rauner was happy to give the critics a megaphone that he paid for in his saturation advertising. The story became ironic when

one poll showed that the voters of Illinois considered Bruce Rauner to be more of a reformer than Pat Quinn who had made that label his signature claim over a long political career. Pat Quinn the reformer had become the incumbent holder and abuser of power and handy target for those who wanted change.

So both sides had their problems and vulnerable spots. After September the polls seemed to show this. They almost all indicated that Quinn had made a comeback and that he was now competitive with Rauner. Several polls showed a virtual tie in the governor's race (Pearson, September 14, 2014; Merda, October 23, 2014; Merda, October 27, 2014; Merda, November 3, 2014). Others showed Quinn with a modest lead over Rauner, but the statistical difference between the two candidates in almost all of the late polls remained within the margin of error. About all any commentator could say near the end was that this was going to be a close race, and that a lot depended on which campaign was able to do better on the always important ground game. "It could all come down to turnout" was the conventional wisdom over the last weekend before the November 4th vote.

The Results

Election Day dawned with generally good weather across the state and with both sides having high hopes for a victory. The polls had been close and Governor Quinn and Bruce Rauner both pointed to optimistic signs in their favor. Both voted in the ritualistic photo opportunity, Rauner in Winnetka and Quinn in Chicago, and then retreated to their appointed hotel suites to await a victory speech or concession statement.

It was not too deep in the election watch night that the returns built up indicating a clear win for Rauner. He declared victory early and congratulated his cheering crowd of supporters while talking about his campaign theme of "a new day dawning for Illinois". Quinn refused to concede until Wednesday when it became obvious that there was no way for the totals to change the outcome no matter where the late count votes were and how many more he could theoretically receive. Pat Quinn had lost his bid for re-election and it appeared that his life-long quest for public office in Illinois had ended, at least for now.

Bruce Rauner also rode a Republican wave that swept the nation and the state and ensured victory for Republican candidates in almost all the competitive races. They took over the majority in the U. S. Senate with a net gain of nine votes and padded their already outsized majority in the U. S. House. They also increased by three their number of governor's seats held and increased the number of state legislatures they controlled. The Republicans were swept into office nationwide partially on the weaknesses of Democratic turnout. The total turnout was the lowest it had been since the mid-term elections held in 1942 at the height of World War II (The New York Times, November 14, 2014). Turnout was under fifty percent of the eligible voter population in 43 of the states, including Illinois. The vaunted Democratic Party ground game had failed them as usually pro-Democratic constituencies stayed away in droves and the total electorate took on a decidedly Republican hue as it was markedly older, whiter, and more conservative than the total national electorate.

The same was generally true in Illinois where the Republicans won not only the Governor and Lt. Governor's race but also took two congressional seats away from the Democrats. Turnout was abysmal for the Democrats in Illinois with a total of only 49.18 percent of registered voters who bothered to show up statewide. Compared to 2010, the last mid-term election, turnout was down by 1.35 percent and was down in total votes cast by 102,299 votes (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2010 and 2014). This was bad news for the Democrats.

Turnout is always crucial for the Democrats and with turnout this low, nationally and in Illinois, the results were likely to be punishing for them, and their losses and Republican gains actually exceeded anyone's expectations on Election Day. As in the 2010 mid-term elections, the national results promised to derail most of President Obama's policy agenda for the last half of his term and to exacerbate what was already a deeply polarized and gridlocked government. No one could tell whether the same partisan gridlock was in store for Illinois due to its suddenly deeply divided state government.

Illinois, which has come to be considered a deep blue state had resoundingly voted for divided government whether they realized it or not. In the General Assembly, House Speaker Mike Madigan held onto his supermajority of 71 seats and in the Senate, President John Cullerton lost only one seat from his strong Democratic majority. After almost two weeks of counting the late ballots it was also finally revealed that the very close race for Treasurer between former House Republican Minority Leader, Tom Cross, and Democratic State Senator, Michael Frerichs, had been won by the Democrat. When all the constitutional officer races were settled, the Republicans held three and the Democrats held three. Illinois was deeply divided ideologically and geographically statewide and in the composition of its new government. The Republicans had taken control of the executive branch for the first time since 2002 while the Democrats maintained a strong majority in the legislative branch. The previous Democratic control of state government would give way to divided government in January of 2015. (See Map 3).

Rauner did not just ride a national Republican wave into office. His campaign and his massive personal expenditures of campaign cash had help create his own wave. After it was over the estimates were that Rauner had invested some \$27 million of his own funds in what became the most expensive governor's race in state history. Rauner not only made a significant direct investment in his own campaign, he also used his money strategically to help other Republicans and he leveraged his considerable influence with other very wealthy people to raise funds from them as well.

Table 1 shows the results. Rauner beat Quinn by a margin of 50.27% of the total statewide vote compared to 46.35 % for Quinn. Rauner won a total of 1,823,627 votes compared to 1,681, 343 for Quinn. This constituted a 142,284 total vote margin for Rauner. In 2010 Quinn eked out a 31,834 victory total over Bill Brady. In 2014 Rauner improved on Brady's performance statewide by 110, 242 votes. That was more than enough to win since Quinn actually lost 63,876 total votes in 2014 compared to his statewide performance in 2010.

Region	Rauner	Quinn	Winner's % of 2 Party Vote	% of 2 Party Vote
Cook County	447,388	870,866	66% Quinn	38%
Collars	537,299	342,340	61% Rauner	25%
Downstate	838,940	468,137	64% Rauner	37%
Total State	1,823,627	1,681,343	52% Rauner	

Rauner won 101 out of the 102 counties, that is, every county except Cook. Since Blagojevich's initial victory in 2002, the Democrats' county total had inexorably declined as they lost more and more counties during the subsequent elections. The bottom was almost reached in 2010 when Quinn only won four counties; however, the bottom was definitively reached in 2014 when Quinn only managed to carry Cook out of the 102 total counties in Illinois. At this point the state could hardly have been more polarized geographically than it was in 2014.

Rauner also did better than Republican candidates usually do in Chicago and Cook County. In Chicago 2014 turnout was down 33,470 total votes compared to 2010. Quinn's total in the fifty wards of Chicago was down by 12,600 and Rauner's total in 2014 was up 15,321 compared to Brady's total in 2010. Rauner received 20.63 percent of the Chicago vote in 2014 compared to 17.41 for Brady in 2010 (Chicago Board of Elections, 2010 and 2014). So, Rauner slightly exceeded the targeted 20 percent marker which Republican candidates shoot for in the Chicago vote if they want to be competitive statewide.

Quinn took 69.24% of the Cook County two party vote in 2010 and only 66% in 2014. His Cook County total in 2014 was 29,966 votes below his 2010 total and Rauner's 2014 Cook County total was 47,103 votes better than Brady did in 2010. Quinn won Cook County by a 423,478 total vote margin in 2014; however, he beat Brady by 500,547 in 2010. That is a vote deficiency that is very difficult for a Democratic candidate to make up elsewhere and the only places to look are the Collar Counties and Downstate. Both of those areas provided significant geographic advantages for Rauner. Rauner ran extremely well in the Republican leaning Collar Counties which are now so essential to a successful campaign in Illinois politics. Rauner won all five of the Collar Counties, and by a substantial margin. Rauner also exceeded the usual Republican benchmarks for Downstate.

In 2010 Quinn had essentially won the race against Bill Brady by doing somewhat better than Democrats usually do in the suburban Collar Counties. His totals there spelled the difference between the narrow defeat of the Democratic candidate for the U. S. Senate, Alexi Giannoulas, against Republican Mark Kirk compared to Quinn's close victory over Brady that year. In 2014 the outcome was different and Rauner ran substantially better than Brady did in the Collar Counties in 2014. As Table 1 indicates, Rauner captured 61 % of the two party vote in the Collar Counties compared to 39% for Quinn. This was the most critical deficit overall for Quinn compared to his performance in 2010. (See also Appendix C).

Downstate the news was even worse for Quinn. In 2010 Quinn had only won four counties, Cook, St. Clair, Jackson, and Alexander, and he then lost all of those except Cook in 2014. Rauner took 64% of the Downstate vote in 2014 compared to 36 percent for Quinn. Since Downstate constituted 37% of the statewide two party vote total in this election, Quinn's almost two to one loss in the 96 Downstate Counties was too deep a hole to climb out of in 2014.

As Map C indicates, there were thirty two counties in 2014 where Quinn improved on his percentage of the two party vote compared to 2010. Those counties were mostly in central, west central, and northern Illinois. In 2010 Brady represented part of Bloomington and a state senate district centered in McLean County and it is not surprising that he showed real strength in central Illinois compared to Rauner in 2014. None of the counties where Quinn's 2014 performance in 2014 was better than in 2010 was in southern Illinois. The Quinn improvement counties were predominantly smaller and more rural counties and Quinn's improvement percentage was small, all in the range of one to five percent. On the other hand, there were several counties where his losses in 2014 compared to 2010 were in the ten to fourteen percent range.

Most importantly, his loss of ground in Cook County alone at 3.18 percent was close to a fatal blow to Quinn's re-election campaign. That loss had to be coupled with Quinn's losses in the Collar Counties compared to 2010 including DuPage at minus 3.83 percent; Lake at 5.09 percent; McHenry at 5.12 percent; Kane at 3.58 percent and Will at 2.20 percent. (See Appendix C and Map C).

In the postmortems on the 2010 race, many experts observed that Quinn essentially won the governor's chair through his victories in Chicago and Cook County and doing better than expected in the Collar Counties. This result was attributed to Brady's hard right conservative stance on the social issues which did not play well in some suburban areas, and particularly among women voters. The same case could be made for Quinn's loss to Rauner in 2014 when Rauner did better than Republicans usually do in Cook County and did what Republicans need to do for a victory in the Collars. It is notable that Rauner took great pains to stay away from the social issues during his campaign and he rarely mentioned any of those more divisive issues. In addition, he often put his wife front and center during the campaign and took the unusual step of claiming that she was essentially a Democrat and that she had supported several prominent Democratic candidates in the past and that she was also pro-choice. The fact that both Rauner and his wife had also been active in good government and school reform circles in Chicago gave some credibility to this attempt to moderate Rauner's image, especially in the Chicago media market. No Democrat can lose the Collar Counties as badly as Quinn did in 2014 and still count on Chicago and to keep them competitive. Chicago has too small a percentage of the state's total vote (18.35 in 2014) to constitute a realistic guarantee of Democratic victories in future statewide races. Downstate has increasingly become Republican and counter-balances Chicago and Cook County.

In retrospect it turns out that the March primary was a prelude of the trouble to come for Quinn in the fall. The results conveyed by Map 1 from the Democratic Primary in March should have been a real red flag for Quinn and the Democrats. For a sitting governor to lose thirty counties

Downstate to an unknown candidate from Chicago who had no money, no media, and no campaign staff indicated that the governor was in serious trouble from the beginning and that he had a very deep electoral hole to dig out of by November 4th. In the general election Quinn lost all thirty of those downstate counties that had gone for Hardiman in the primary. In twenty seven of those counties, Quinn's percentage of the two party vote was less than his 2010 percent. In five of those counties his losses were above ten percent, and in ten of those counties Quinn's losses were in the five to ten percent range. His average loss in those twenty seven counties was 5.70 percent when his 2014 totals were compared to his 2010 totals.

Quinn's policies were unpopular and his support eroded throughout Downstate and especially in Jackson and Alexander and surrounding counties when he closed the Tamms Prison in Alexander County. This super maximum security state prison was the largest single employer in what was one of the poorest counties in the state or nation, and the loss of that prison and those jobs simply poisoned Quinn's relationship with southern Illinois. He also closed the Murphysboro Youth Center, a facility designed to rehabilitate young offenders, and the Carbondale House of Glass, a prison transition center, in Jackson County, which helped ensure his defeat in that county in 2014. In the Centralia area he started the process of shutting down the Murray Developmental Center which accounted for hundreds of state jobs. At Dwight he closed the Dwight Correctional Center for Women and moved all the inmates to the Logan Correctional Center which had been a facility for men and which had to be retrofitted for women at considerable expense.

Those cases of facility and state office closings were repeated across other rural counties downstate, and they became the indelible mark of the Quinn Administration in too many Downstate counties. If general elections are retrospective evaluations on the incumbent's performance in the past four years, as many political scientists argue, then 2014 was a resounding negative evaluation for Quinn's stewardship of state government in Illinois (Fiorina, 1981).

The Quinn Administration insisted that those closures were necessary because of budget constraints and that they were also the right thing to do from a rational policy and responsible management standpoint. That case may well have merit, but in areas where unemployment and poverty rates are high, rational budgetary cases do not necessarily carry the day in political campaigns. Quinn struggled with the budget deficit for the entire time he was in office. In 2011 Quinn and the Democratic majority in the General Assembly enacted an income tax increase in a genuine attempt to address the structural deficit that Illinois government had maintained for years under both Democratic and Republican administrations. Yet, they had failed to balance the budget and pay off the accumulated state deficit entirely even though the pay down had reduced the backlog of unpaid bills from approximately \$10 billion to approximately \$4 billion after the income tax increase started generating new revenue. That was a tangible indicator of real progress on the Illinois budgetary problem, but Quinn and the Democrats failed entirely to make that fact widely known and the prevailing narrative about the budget and the tax increase decidedly favored the Republicans. The Republicans and other critics, especially the major media outlets such as most notably the Chicago Tribune, consistently charged that the Democrats

had also increased some programs and started new ones instead of paying off the backlog of bills and they successfully purveyed the message that the new revenue from the income tax increase had been squandered. No amount of splitting budgetary hairs by Quinn and his allies could overcome that damning charge and Rauner was quite successful in conveying the idea that he, as a very successful businessman, could handle the money better than Quinn and the Democrats.

In the general election Rauner won all the counties, except for Cook, he had lost to the other three Republican candidates in the primary. He successfully united the Republican Party in a way that eluded Quinn with the Democratic Party base. The turnout in Chicago was one of the lowest in modern times (Korecki, November 5, 2014). Turnout statewide at 49 percent was little better. Quinn desperately needed the party base to vote at rates nearly comparable to the presidential election results for 2012. Instead, the turnout rates in the Democratic strongholds sank below the 2010 mid-term election rates. Turnout and a failure of the Democratic Party's ground game outside Chicago was a significant part of the Quinn defeat. There are many reasons for the low mid-term elections turnout decline for the Democrats. These include the fact that the party in the White House usually loses seats in the Congress and often loses governors' races. This factor is also coupled with the job approval ratings of an incumbent president which in his sixth year are often in decline. This was true of Obama who was in the low to mid-forties in most polls. In addition, the Democratic base is heavily concentrated among low to moderate income people and minorities who are harder to get to the polls especially in mid-term elections. This was an especially big problem for the Democrats in 2014 when the national and state parties failed markedly in developing a narrative about the stakes involved in the election and thus provide a compelling incentive for hard to mobilize voters to get out and vote to save the candidates they already had in office.

Conclusion

In many respects this was a classic retrospective voting election for Illinois with the Democratic Governor and his record for the five years he had held the office becoming the major issue. Quinn's record was long and convoluted and he had taken many public stances and advocated for controversial policies which were not always popular or well-received, the most prominent of which were the income tax increase and the pension reforms he championed. Being a Chief Executive means making decisions and often those decisions negatively impact people and groups who keep score. Because of past mismanagement and especially irresponsible budget choices made by Democrats and Republicans alike and by governors and legislators past and present, there was a lot of hurt and not enough help for state government to spread around. Quinn had picked numerous fights and made a fair share of enemies, often within his own party.

Bruce Rauner had the luxury of no public record of any kind to defend and his public position taking on policy was limited to this campaign while explaining what he might do if he were to be elected. It was the known versus the unknown. The choice came down to an evaluation of Pat Quinn's very prominent past versus the unknown prospects of putting the state under new management and taking a chance that the results would be better than the Quinn record. A majority of the voters decided to take that chance.

Turnout was certainly low and was one of the major failures for the Democrats; however, as indicated above by the story of the Tamms prison and other state facility closings, turnout alone was not the only problem that caused the failure of the Quinn campaign. People say they want a balanced budget and the state constitution requires that the General Assembly pass a balanced budget every single fiscal year. Yet, we built up a backlog of ten billion dollars of unpaid state bills over ten years. How is that even possible? The answer lies in a series of state budgets where the income projections are unrealistic, borrowing money via bonding and putting off and abdicating payments for major items like the state's legally obligated contributions to the pension funds are common practices, and transfers of funds from earmarked accounts to the state's general fund are common, even though those funds have to be paid back, usually in the next fiscal year. The state had come to rely on a variety of subterfuge and fiction to manage its financial affairs, and this produced what is commonly called the "structural deficit" which simply means that there is no way the state's real income is going to meet its fixed financial obligations in any given year.

To their credit the Quinn Administration and the majority Democrats in the General Assembly finally tried to do something realistic about the structural deficit with the income tax increase of 2011. And they did pay down a significant total of the backlog of unpaid bills by 2014. The fatal mistake the Democrats made was in not making the necessary increases permanent from the start instead of promising to take it all off by the end of 2014 which ensured that the whole debate would be a central feature of the 2014 general election campaign. In retrospect having that tax increase billed as temporary and set to expire at the end of 2014, looming in the middle of the statewide elections, was a grave political mistake Quinn and the Democrats made back in 2011. The Quinn Administration made enough cuts to be painful and to be significant contributions to reducing the deficit, but those cuts did not ensure a balanced budget anyway. The losses were real and hit real people, often those who were not well off to start with, living in poor counties and working at fairly low pay grades, people who are usually Democrats and turn out to vote for their party. The public good arguments and benefits were amorphous collective goods and not at all evident to individual voters. The personal losses were real and felt directly by a lot of ordinary people, many of whom would usually vote for the Democrats.

People tend to say repeatedly in public opinion polls that they want the deficit reduced and balanced budgets, and our polls at the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute show that consistently. But when it comes to making programmatic cuts, laying off workers, and reducing services people generally want those painful choices to be visited on someone else. My colleague, Charles Leonard and I have written an entire paper based on five years of statewide public opinion polls on that subject (Jackson and Leonard, 2014). In that paper we described what we termed, "the dilemma of democracy", i.e. the challenge for the political authorities to agree on a level of goods and services which address the state's needs while also ensuring that the revenues (mostly from taxes) will be sufficient to meet those needs each year. The challenge to the people, the voters, is to understand that this balance is necessary and not to be fooled by budgetary sleight of hand and political pandering. Mass democracies the world over face that dilemma in the 21st century and the State of Illinois is no exception.

We will see now whether Bruce Rauner and the Republicans are willing to face that challenge honestly. Rauner won partially on a promise to eliminate the increase in the income tax. He did talk vaguely later in the campaign about a “phased in” reduction and it dropped to 3.75 percent on January 1, 2015. He also talked vaguely about expanding the base of goods and services which should be covered by the state sales tax. This is a realistic proposal which could legitimately address the structural deficit and one which many other states, including several which surround Illinois and are our competitors have already adopted. He also talked incessantly about economic growth and the creation of new jobs as the all-purpose solution. That is a grand solution in the long term and almost no one opposes that idea. The challenge is how to get from here to there. The immediate problem is that such economic growth and new revenue will take some time to realize and any revenue from those sources will be in the future, much of it far into the future, and the budget challenge of significant lost revenue began on the first day of the new year in 2015, and becomes much larger and more intense at the beginning of the next fiscal year on July 1, 2015.

So we will see if the Rauner Administration is really dedicated to meeting this “challenge of democracy” as we posed it in our recent paper, or if they will prove to be just another candidate with an ill-defined plan which promises no pain in order to win the election but then has no realistic plan to govern.

At the end of the Governor and U. S. Senate races in 2010 in a report similar to this one, I wrote the following about Illinois and the nation:

If you take the traditional red versus blue map approach and designate the counties according to which party won the majority of the two party vote, Illinois is indeed a very polarized state. It is a microcosm of the United States and like the nation as a whole it is deeply divided into liberal versus conservative, Democratic versus Republican, rural versus urban areas where people see the world quite differently and vote quite differently. There is a deep and growing rural versus urban divide in this country. The suburbs are the fastest growing parts of most states and the suburbs hold the key and the balance of power in this highly polarized equation. In Illinois, as goes the suburban ring of Chicago, the Collar Counties and Cook outside the city, so goes Illinois in statewide elections (Jackson, 2011, 16).

That mass polarization has continued and the divisions have grown deeper since the 2010 midterms which was itself a deeply polarizing election. It is hard to imagine a more polarized political system than the mid-term election results for 2014 produced nationwide and in Illinois. The rural versus urban divide became more notable and more complete in the nation when the Democrats lost almost everything outside the big city urban areas in the 2014 midterm elections. The South which was an almost one-party Democratic region for nearly a hundred years has now become an almost one-party Republican region in the last decade. Now 65 to 75 percent of white voters in the South routinely vote for the Republicans. Nationally President Obama received only 43 percent of the white vote in 2008 and only 39 percent in 2012. The African-American vote for the Democrats now stands above 90 percent in presidential elections (Stanley and Niemi, 2013, 116-117). Racial polarization between white and black voters is the deepest in American

history. Almost all the competitive races for the U. S. Senate, the U. S. House and the governorships went to the Republicans in the red wave election of 2014. Partisan and ideological gridlock, which had been deep previously promised to get deeper in the run up to the 2016 presidential elections.

This pattern was replicated in Illinois where the only county Pat Quinn won in 2014 was Cook to exacerbate an already polarized outcome from 2010 when he only won Cook plus St. Clair, Jackson and Alexander in southern Illinois and the Metro-East area. In 2014 even those former bastions of Democratic strength were lost to the Republicans and the polarization of the state was almost complete. Illinois since 2000 has frequently been termed a “Dark Blue” state (Green, 2007). That may have been an apt characterization in 2007 when Paul Green wrote it, but it is clearly not adequate for the changed circumstances of today. Illinois is now much more accurately described as a competitive state which slightly leans Democratic. If you view the map of Illinois representing the governor’s race outcome in 2014 it is a sea of red surrounding the blue island of Chicago and Cook County. The results in 2010 and especially in 2014 show that in any given election with the right circumstances and the right candidates Republicans can certainly win statewide elections. This is especially true in the mid-term elections which are lower turnout elections disadvantaging the Democrats. The sooner the Democratic Party of Illinois realizes this, the more effective they can be in addressing their problems outside Cook County. One way to accomplish this is through successful governance. In the near future successful governing will require compromise and seeking real solutions to real problems by both parties. It will test the mettle of the new Republican Governor and his protagonists who are the veteran leaders in the state legislature on both sides of the aisle.

The chances of partisan gridlock in Illinois certainly exist also but there is some reason to believe that our fate at the state level need not be as extreme as the national scene. Rauner did not campaign as a Tea Party Republican. Indeed, he went out of his way to emphasize his moderation at least on the social issues and his record in Chicago area philanthropic circles, especially focused on education reform, indicate something of a social conscience. He is from the big business and country club wing of the Republican Party which tends to hold the most power in Illinois Republican circles. If Rauner can find some help from his Republican allies in the General Assembly and they put some votes on controversial bills, and if he can also make common cause with the Democrats who lead the legislative branch, then Illinois may yet escape some of the more dysfunctional tenets of our polarized national political system.

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Appendix A
Democratic Primary Results 2014 by County

<u>QUINN</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>Hardiman</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>Q</u>
Adams	62	38	Alexander	63	37
Bond	52	48	Calhoun	54	46
Boone	57	43	Cass	52	48
Brown	57	43	Christian	54	46
Bureau	68	32	Clinton	63	37
Carroll	55	45	Crawford	54	46
Champaign	70	30	Cumberland	54	46
Clark	51	49	Edgar	52	48
Clay	50.4	49.6	Fayette	55	45
Coles	52	48	Franklin	56	44
Cook	79	21	Fulton	52	48
DeKalb	73	27	Gallatin	58	42
DeWitt	51	49	Greene	50.5	49.5
Douglas	53	47	Hamilton	56	44
DuPage	79	21	Jefferson	60	40
Edwards	69	31	Johnson	56	44
Effingham	53	47	Macoupin	54	46
Ford	53	47	Marion	72	28
Grundy	65	35	Mason	52	48
Hancock	54	46	Moultrie	58	42
Hardin	52	48	Perry	57	43
Henderson	53	47	Pope	52	48
Henry	62	38	Pulaski	58	42
Iroquois	61	39	Randolph	60	40
Jackson	59	41	Saline	56	44
Jasper	51	49	Shelby	67	33
Jersey	53	47	Union	64	36
JoDaviess	66	34	Vermillion	52	48
Kane	75	25	Washington	62	38
Kankakee	65	35	Williamson	51	49
Kendall	73	27			
Know	62	38			
Lake	82	28			
LaSalle	67	33			
Lawrence	61	39			
Lee	59	41			
Livingston	58	42			
Logan	53	47			
Macon	55	45			
Madison	55	45			
Marshall	57	43			
Massac	59	41			
McDonough	65	35			
McHenry	72	28			
McLean	68	32			

	% of Vote	Votes
Quinn	71.94%	321,818
Hardiman	28.06%	125,500
Quinn # of Counties Carried		72
Hardiman # of Counties Carried		30

Appendix A
Democratic Primary Results 2014 by County

<u>QUINN</u>	<u>Q</u>	<u>H</u>
Menard	56	44
Mercer	55	45
Monroe	70	30
Montgomery	53	47
Morgan	52	48
Ogle	53	47
Peoria	66	34
Piatt	60	40
Pike	52	48
Putnam	60	40
Richland	56	44
Rock Island	64	36
Sangamon	65	35
Schuyler	50.3	49.7
Scott	54	46
St. Clair	66	34
Stark	58	42
Stephenson	58	42
Tazewell	61	39
Wabash	63	37
Warren	62	38
Wayne	56	44
White	52	48
Whiteside	59	41
Will	71	29
Winnebago	56	44
Woodford	57	43

Appendix B
Republican Primary Results by County

<u>Rauner</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Dillard</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Brady</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Rutherford</u>	<u>%</u>
Alexander	36	Adams	70	Mason	35	Livingston	50
Boone	40	Bond	41	McLean	32	Wabash	29
Bureau	37	Brown	78	Washington	34	Hardin	29
Calhoun	32	Cass	60	Wayne	34		
Carroll	38	Champaign	40				
Cook	59	Christian	46				
Crawford	33	Clark	34				
Dekalb	44	Clay	41				
DuPage	46	Clinton	43				
Edwards	33	Coles	41				
Effingham	34	Cumberland	44				
Fayette	37	DeWitt	31				
Grundy	40	Douglas	41				
Henderson	37	Edgar	35				
Henry	41	Ford	30				
JoDaviess	33	Franklin	53				
Kane	48	Fulton	43				
Kankakee	43	Gallatin	36				
Kendall	44	Greene	45				
Lake	55	Hamilton	30				
LaSalle	42	Hancock	56				
Lawrence	38	Irroquois	32				
Macon	38	Jackson	56				
McHenry	53	Jasper	43				
Mercer	44	Jefferson	36				
Putnam	35	Jersey	36				
Rock Island	47	Johnson	48				
St. Clair	40	Know	46				
Stephenson	37	Lee	40				
Warren	37	Logan	45				
Whiteside	39	Macoupin	40				
Will	48	Madison	39				
Winnebago	39	Marion	43				
		Marshall	36				
		Massac	60				
		McDonoug	63				
		Menard	52				
		Monroe	35				
		Montgomery	42				
		Morgan	58				
		Moultrie	44				
		Ogle	37				
		Peoria	45				
		Perry	55				

<u>Counties</u>			
	<u>Carried</u>	<u>% of vote</u>	<u># of votes</u>
<u>Rauner</u>	33	40.13	328,924
<u>Dillard</u>	62	37.22	305,120
<u>Brady</u>	4	15.09	123,708
<u>Rutherford</u>	3	7.58	61,948

Appendix B
Republican Primary Results by County

<u>Rauner</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Dillard</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Brady</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Rutherford</u>	<u>%</u>
		Piatt	39				
		Pike	62				
		Pope	54				
		Pulaski	48				
		Randolph	50				
		Richland	48				
		Saline	44				
		Sangamon	62				
		Schuyler	63				
		Scott	66				
		Shelby	38				
		Stark	36				
		Tazewell	42				
		Union	63				
		Vermilion	41				
		White	34				
		Williamson	54				
		Woodford	31				

Appendix C

County	2010 General Election Quinn v. Brady				2014 General Election Quinn v. Rauner				% Change in (D) vote
	Quinn (D)	Brady (R)	D % of vote	R % of vote	Quinn (D)	Rauner (R)	D % of vote	R % of vote	
Adams	4883	17765	21.57%	78.43%	4342	17146	20.21%	79.79%	-1.36%
Alexander	1371	1248	52.35%	47.65%	1015	1137	47.17%	52.83%	-5.18%
Bond	1847	3345	35.57%	64.43%	1442	3082	31.87%	68.13%	-3.70%
Boone	4414	9074	32.73%	67.27%	5029	9529	34.54%	65.46%	1.81%
Brown	449	1503	24.93%	75.07%	364	1120	24.53%	75.47%	-0.40%
Bureau	4371	7319	37.74%	62.26%	4731	7258	39.46%	60.54%	1.72%
Calhoun	961	1227	43.92%	56.08%	683	1157	37.12%	62.88%	-6.80%
Carroll	1445	3361	30.01%	69.99%	1582	3621	30.41%	69.59%	0.40%
Cass	1088	2433	30.09%	69.91%	1249	2242	35.78%	64.22%	5.69%
Champaign	21053	29297	41.81%	58.19%	22314	29918	42.72%	57.28%	0.91%
Christian	3820	7465	33.85%	66.15%	3265	7462	30.44%	69.56%	-3.41%
Clark	1629	4231	27.78%	72.22%	1083	3805	22.16%	77.84%	-5.62%
Clay	1158	3484	24.95%	75.05%	721	2948	19.65%	80.35%	-5.30%
Clinton	3653	8547	29.94%	70.06%	2270	9699	18.97%	81.03%	-10.97%
Coles	4100	9713	26.69%	73.31%	4376	9507	31.52%	68.48%	4.83%
Cook	900832	400285	69.24%	30.76%	870866	447388	66.06%	33.94%	-3.18%
Crawford	1691	4864	25.80%	74.20%	1505	4375	25.60%	74.40%	-0.20%
Cumberland	970	2993	24.48%	75.52%	926	2739	25.27%	74.73%	0.79%
DeKalb	10852	14949	42.06%	57.94%	10944	16246	40.25%	59.75%	-1.81%
DeWitt	1358	3920	25.73%	74.27%	1299	3859	25.18%	74.82%	-0.55%
Douglas	1239	4753	20.68%	79.32%	1156	4522	20.36%	79.64%	-0.32%
DuPage	110117	154986	41.54%	58.46%	105374	174041	37.71%	62.29%	-3.83%
Edgar	1607	4890	24.73%	75.27%	1435	4491	24.22%	75.78%	-0.51%
Edwards	380	1800	17.43%	82.57%	314	1862	14.43%	85.57%	-3.00%
Effingham	2381	9856	19.46%	80.54%	2272	9352	19.55%	80.45%	0.09%
Fayette	1598	4675	25.48%	74.52%	1481	4638	24.20%	75.80%	-1.28%
Ford	906	3452	20.79%	79.21%	854	3401	20.07%	79.93%	-0.72%
Franklin	5741	6395	47.31%	52.69%	4104	7677	34.84%	65.16%	-12.47%
Fulton	4748	5786	45.07%	54.93%	4976	5173	49.03%	50.97%	3.96%
Gallatin	883	1148	43.47%	56.53%	564	1145	33.00%	67.00%	-10.47%
Greene	1305	2739	32.27%	67.73%	1159	2820	29.13%	70.87%	-3.14%
Grundy	5813	9132	38.90%	61.10%	6073	9760	38.36%	61.64%	-0.54%
Hamilton	1206	2052	37.02%	62.98%	780	2136	26.75%	73.25%	-10.27%

Appendix C


	2010 General Election Quinn v. Brady				2014 General Election Quinn v. Rauner				
Hancock	1631	4780	25.44%	74.56%	1343	4271	23.92%	76.08%	-1.52%
Hardin	680	1303	34.29%	65.71%	419	922	31.25%	68.75%	-3.04%
Henderson	1297	1888	40.72%	59.28%	912	1559	36.91%	63.09%	-3.81%
Henry	5980	10900	35.43%	64.57%	5958	10829	35.49%	64.51%	0.06%
Iriquois	1997	7741	20.51%	79.49%	1723	7329	19.03%	80.97%	-1.48%
Jackson	7386	7220	50.57%	49.43%	6876	8114	45.87%	54.13%	-4.70%
Jasper	1008	2837	26.20%	73.80%	936	2897	24.42%	75.58%	-1.78%
Jefferson	4030	7500	34.95%	65.05%	3310	8281	28.56%	71.44%	-6.39%
Jersey	2509	4724	34.69%	65.31%	2292	5215	30.53%	69.47%	-4.16%
JoDaviess	2842	4763	37.37%	62.63%	2700	4726	36.36%	63.64%	-1.01%
Johnson	1309	3021	30.23%	69.77%	1099	3170	25.74%	74.26%	-4.49%
Kane	48579	68426	41.52%	58.48%	46363	75835	37.94%	62.06%	-3.58%
Kankakee	12046	17207	41.12%	58.88%	12431	20449	37.81%	62.19%	-3.31%
Kendall	11158	17130	39.44%	60.56%	11361	19946	36.29%	63.71%	-3.15%
Knox	6465	9085	41.16%	58.84%	6925	8311	45.45%	54.55%	4.29%
Lake	86878	102675	45.83%	54.17%	79939	116277	40.74%	59.26%	-5.09%
LaSalle	13495	17378	43.71%	56.29%	13871	19843	41.14%	58.86%	-2.57%
Lawrence	1642	3229	33.71%	66.29%	1216	2670	31.29%	68.71%	-2.42%
Lee	3246	6838	32.19%	67.81%	4061	6527	38.35%	61.65%	6.16%
Livingston	3503	8273	29.75%	70.25%	3073	7335	29.53%	70.47%	-0.22%
Logan	1953	6304	23.65%	76.35%	2201	5864	27.29%	72.71%	3.64%
Macon	11966	21914	35.32%	64.68%	11345	20467	35.66%	64.34%	0.34%
Macoupin	6042	9278	39.44%	60.56%	5169	9278	35.78%	64.22%	-3.66%
Madison	33060	44382	42.70%	57.30%	28444	46075	38.17%	61.83%	-4.53%
Marion	4168	7016	35.20%	64.80%	2291	8683	20.88%	79.12%	-14.32%
Marshall	1162	2744	29.75%	70.25%	1285	2666	32.52%	67.48%	2.77%
Mason	1594	2836	35.99%	64.01%	1891	2952	39.05%	60.95%	3.06%
Massac	1513	3170	32.31%	67.69%	1268	2828	30.96%	69.04%	-1.35%
McDonough	2792	5716	32.83%	67.17%	2842	5242	35.16%	64.84%	2.33%
McHenry	31695	53585	37.14%	62.86%	29116	61827	32.02%	67.98%	-5.12%
McLean	15723	32972	32.29%	67.71%	16600	31646	34.41%	65.59%	2.12%
Menard	1324	3159	29.53%	70.47%	1371	3239	29.74%	70.26%	0.21%
Mercer	2403	3710	39.31%	60.69%	2377	3823	38.34%	61.66%	-0.97%
Monroe	3849	7639	33.50%	66.50%	3138	8843	26.19%	73.81%	-7.31%
Montgomery	3262	5670	36.52%	63.48%	2752	5260	34.35%	65.65%	-2.17%

Appendix C

	2010 General Election Quinn v. Brady				2014 General Election Quinn v. Rauner				
Morgan	3162	6738	31.94%	68.06%	3182	7192	30.67%	69.33%	-1.27%
Moultrie	1117	3346	25.03%	74.97%	1021	3261	23.84%	76.16%	-1.19%
Ogle	4542	11318	28.64%	71.36%	5015	11236	30.86%	69.14%	2.22%
Peoria	20039	28955	40.90%	59.10%	21232	28127	43.02%	56.98%	2.12%
Perry	2997	3898	43.47%	56.53%	2294	4481	33.86%	66.14%	-9.61%
Piatt	1619	4653	25.18%	74.82%	1702	4975	25.49%	74.51%	0.31%
Pike	1514	4391	25.64%	74.36%	1268	4110	23.58%	76.42%	-2.06%
Pope	566	1309	30.19%	69.81%	409	1057	27.90%	72.10%	-2.29%
Pulaski	1082	1631	39.88%	60.12%	917	1487	38.14%	61.86%	-1.74%
Putnam	913	1195	43.31%	56.69%	1096	1264	46.44%	53.56%	3.13%
Randolph	4607	6227	42.52%	57.48%	3838	6607	36.74%	63.26%	-5.78%
Richland	1266	3684	25.58%	74.42%	1171	3525	24.94%	75.06%	-0.64%
Rock Island	20514	22904	47.25%	52.75%	20495	22680	47.47%	52.53%	0.22%
Saline	3060	4448	40.76%	59.24%	2375	4839	32.92%	67.08%	-7.84%
Sangamon	25038	42278	37.19%	62.81%	27822	39692	41.21%	58.79%	4.02%
Schuyler	845	1891	30.88%	69.12%	990	2051	32.56%	67.44%	1.68%
Scott	422	1235	25.47%	74.53%	480	1538	23.79%	76.21%	-1.68%
Shelby	809	5638	24.39%	75.61%	1780	5726	23.71%	76.29%	-0.68%
St. Clair	39152	37772	50.90%	49.10%	33474	39438	45.91%	54.09%	-4.99%
Stark	543	1242	30.42%	69.58%	537	1246	30.12%	69.88%	-0.30%
Stephenson	4209	9293	31.17%	68.83%	4558	9338	32.80%	67.20%	1.63%
Tazewell	13189	29248	31.08%	68.92%	13538	26991	33.40%	66.60%	2.32%
Union	2411	3676	39.61%	60.39%	1887	3900	32.61%	67.39%	-7.00%
Vermilion	6561	14251	31.52%	68.48%	6290	14028	30.96%	69.04%	-0.56%
Wabash	1054	2728	27.87%	72.13%	885	2809	23.96%	76.04%	-3.91%
Warren	1965	3602	35.30%	64.70%	1923	3281	36.95%	63.05%	1.65%
Washington	1495	3950	27.46%	72.54%	1004	4354	18.74%	81.26%	-8.72%
Wayne	1123	5404	17.21%	82.79%	625	4899	11.31%	88.69%	-5.90%
White	1510	3537	29.92%	70.08%	1339	4358	23.50%	76.50%	-6.42%
Whiteside	6981	10510	39.91%	60.09%	7125	9436	43.02%	56.98%	3.11%
Will	79786	97831	44.93%	55.07%	81548	109319	42.73%	57.27%	-2.20%
Williamson	8654	12240	41.42%	58.58%	6177	13081	32.07%	67.93%	-9.35%
Winnebago	28398	46492	37.92%	62.08%	30691	44785	40.66%	59.34%	2.74%
Woodford	2990	10170	22.71%	77.29%	3209	10061	24.18%	75.82%	1.47%
Total	1745219	1713385	50.46%	49.54%	1681343	1823627	47.97%	52.03%	-2.49%


MAP A





March 2014 Democratic Primary
Pat Quinn v. Tio Hardiman



MAP B


March 2014 Republican Primary
Dillard, Rauner, Brady, Rutherford



-  Dillard (62)
-  Rauner (33)
-  Brady (4)
-  Rutherford (3)

MAP C

Illinois Primary, 2014 v. 2010
Democratic v. Republican Gains/Losses



Yellow box: Counties where Quinn's % of the vote improved in 2014 over 2010 (N = 32)

Green box: Counties where Rauner's % of the Vote Improved Over Brady 2014 v. 2010 (and Quinn's Decreased) (N = 70)